[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 89 (Thursday, May 8, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 25146-25150]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-11834]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 71
RIN 3150-AF59
Requirements for Shipping Packages Used To Transport Vitrified
High-Level Waste
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend
its regulations to remove canisters containing vitrified high-level
waste (HLW) containing plutonium from the packaging requirement for
double containment. This amendment is being proposed in response to a
petition for rulemaking (PRM-71-11) submitted by the Department of
Energy (DOE). This proposed rule would also make a minor correction to
the usage of metric and English units to be consistent with existing
NRC policy.
DATE: The comment period expires July 22, 1997. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
For information on submitting comments electronically, see the
discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information
Section.
Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments
received and the environmental assessment and finding of no significant
impact, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also be
viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board
established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under Electronic
Access in the Supplementary Information Section.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8520, e-mail [email protected]
or Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-
6196, e-mail [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In 10 CFR 71.63, the NRC imposed special requirements on licensees
who ship plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquerels (20 curies). These
requirements specify that plutonium must be in solid form and that
packages used to ship plutonium must provide a separate inner
containment (the ``double containment'' requirement). In adopting these
requirements, the NRC specifically excluded plutonium in the form of
reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloys, and, on a case-by-case
basis, other plutonium-bearing solids that the NRC determines do not
require double containment.
On November 30, 1993, the DOE petitioned the NRC to amend
Sec. 71.63 to add a provision that would specifically remove canisters
containing plutonium-bearing vitrified waste from the packaging
requirement for double containment. The NRC published a notice of
receipt for the petition, docketed as PRM-71-11, in the Federal
Register on February 18, 1994 (59 FR 8143), requesting public comment
by May 4, 1994. On May 23, 1994 (59 FR 26608), the public comment
period was extended to June 3, 1994, at the request of the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Oversight Program of the State
of Idaho.
Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, the
DOE is the Federal agency responsible for developing and administering
a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear
fuel. In the petition, the DOE proposes to ship the HLW from each of
its three storage locations at Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford,
Washington; and West Valley, New York; directly to the geologic
repository in casks certified by the NRC. Currently, this HLW exists
mostly in the form of
[[Page 25147]]
liquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor
fuels. The DOE proposes to solidify this material into a borosilicate
glass form in which the HLW is dispersed and immobilized. The glass
would then be placed into stainless steel canisters for storage and
eventual transport to the geologic repository. DOE's purpose in
requesting an amendment to the rule is to allow the transportation and
disposal of HLW in a more cost-effective and efficient manner without
adversely affecting public health and safety.
The containers used to transport canisters of vitrified HLW will be
Type B packages certified by the NRC. These packages are required to
meet accident resistant standards. The HLW will also be subject to the
special transport controls for a ``Highway Route Controlled Quantity''
pursuant to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. In addition,
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires the DOE to
provide technical assistance and funds to train emergency responders
along the planned route.
The DOE asserts that shipment of vitrified HLW without double
containment will not adversely affect safety. This is because the
canistered, vitrified HLW provides a comparable level of protection to
the packaging of reactor fuel elements, which does not require double
containment. The DOE also noted that the plutonium concentrations in
the vitrified HLW will be considerably lower than the concentration in
spent nuclear fuel and that vitrified HLW is in an essentially
nonrespirable form.
Comments on the petition were received from three parties: the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Nye County, Nevada (the site for
the proposed spent fuel and HLW repository at Yucca Mountain); and the
INEL Oversight Program of the State of Idaho. EPA reviewed the petition
in accordance with its responsibilities under Section 309 of the Clean
Air Act and had no specific comments. Nye County agreed with the
rationale and arguments advanced by the DOE, and had no objection to
DOE's petition. The State of Idaho commented that the petition was
premature because it did not specify the parameters or performance
standards that HLW must meet.
On June 1, 1995, the NRC staff met with the DOE in a public meeting
to discuss the petitioner's request and the possible alternative of
requesting an NRC determination under Sec. 71.63(b)(3) to exempt
vitrified HLW from the double containment requirement. The DOE informed
the NRC in a letter dated January 25, 1996, of its intent to seek this
exemption and the NRC received DOE's request on July 16, 1996. The DOE
requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held in abeyance
until a decision was reached on the exemption request.
In response to DOE's request, the NRC staff prepared a Commission
paper (SECY-96-215, dated October 8, 1996) outlining and requesting
Commission approval of the NRC staff's proposed approach for making a
determination under Sec. 71.63(b)(3). The determination would have been
the first made after the promulgation of the original rule, ``Packaging
of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive
Materials Under Certain Conditions,'' published on June 17, 1974 (39 FR
20960). In a staff requirements memorandum dated October 31, 1996, the
Commission disapproved the NRC staff's plan and directed that this
policy issue be addressed by rulemaking. In response, the NRC staff has
developed this proposed rule in response to the DOE petition.
Discussion
In the final 1974 rule, the NRC anticipated that a large number of
shipments of plutonium nitrate liquids could result from spent nuclear
fuel reprocessing and revised its regulations to require that plutonium
in excess of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) be shipped in solid form.
The NRC did so because shipment of plutonium liquids is susceptible to
leakage, particularly if a shipping package is improperly or not
tightly sealed. The value of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) was chosen
because it was equal to a large quantity of plutonium as defined in 10
CFR Part 71 in effect in 1974. Although this definition no longer
appears in 10 CFR Part 71, the value as applied to double containment
of plutonium has been retained. The concern about leakage of liquids
arose because of the potential for a large number of packages (probably
of more complex design) to be shipped due to reprocessing and the
increased possibility of human error resulting from handling this
expanded shipping load.
The NRC treats dispersible plutonium oxide powder in the same way
because it also is susceptible to leakage if packages are improperly
sealed. Plutonium oxide powder was of particular concern because it was
the most likely alternative form (as opposed to plutonium nitrate
liquids) for shipment in a fuel reprocessing economy. To address the
concern with dispersible powder, the NRC required that plutonium not
only must be in solid form, but also that solid plutonium be shipped in
packages requiring double containment.
In the accompanying statement of considerations to the final 1974
rule, the NRC stated that the additional inner containment requirements
are intended to take into account that the plutonium may be in a
respirable form and that solid forms that are essentially
nonrespirable, such as reactor fuel elements, are suitable for
exemption from the double containment requirement. The Commission
further stated that:
Since the double containment provision compensates for the fact
that the plutonium may not be in a ``nonrespirable'' form, solid
forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be
exempted from the double containment requirement. Therefore, it
appears appropriate to exempt from the double containment
requirements reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloy, and other
plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines suitable for
such exemption. The latter category provides a means for the
Commission to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, requests for
exemption of other solid material where the quantity and form of the
material permits a determination that double containment is
unnecessary.
DOE's petition to amend Sec. 71.63, by adding a provision that
exempts canisters containing vitrified HLW from the packaging
requirement for a separate inner containment is partly based on the
rationale that the vitrified HLW meets the intent of the rule because
the plutonium will be in an essentially nonrespirable form. The DOE
petition contends that the vitrified HLW contained in stainless steel
canisters provides a comparable level of safety protection to that
provided by spent fuel elements.
Specifically, in the technical information supporting the petition
1, the DOE sought to demonstrate that the waste acceptance
specifications and process controls in the vitrification process and
the waste and canister characteristics compare favorably to spent
nuclear fuel in terms of the dispersability and respirability of the
contents during normal conditions of transport and after an accident.
The DOE maintained that impact and leak tests on the canisters,
chemical analysis of spent fuel and simulated HLW borosilicate glass,
design of the HLW canister, and other studies of the levels of
plutonium and other radioactive elements present in the borosilicate
glass demonstrate that vitrified HLW
[[Page 25148]]
canisters are more robust and contain less plutonium than spent reactor
fuel elements. During actual transport conditions, the HLW canister
will be enclosed within an NRC-certified shipping cask, further
reducing the potential for canister damage and for release of
respirable particles of HLW glass.
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\1\ Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to
Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b), dated September 30, 1993.
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The DOE petition refers to plutonium in the form of borosilicate
glass as being essentially nonrespirable. This is because a minute
quantity of respirable particles could result if the glass fractures
such as during cooldown processes after being poured into the HLW
canisters, normal handling and transport conditions, and accident
conditions.
In the technical information supporting the petition, the DOE
compared the physical and chemical characteristics of the vitrified HLW
glass mixture to spent nuclear fuel pellets. Because impact studies of
simulated waste glass from the DOE Savannah River site (Aiken, South
Carolina) have shown comparable levels of fracture resistance and
similar fractions of respirable particles when compared to unirradiated
uranium fuel pellets and other potential waste form materials, the
fracture resistance of HLW glass is expected to be comparable to that
of uranium fuel pellets.
The DOE also compared the concentration of plutonium present in a
HLW canister from the Savannah River site to that contained in a
typical spent reactor fuel element and concluded that the spent reactor
fuel element contains at least 100 times the concentration of plutonium
expected in a HLW canister. The DOE stated that the maximum
concentration of plutonium projected for the Hanford and West Valley
HLW canisters is much less than that of the Savannah River canisters.
The DOE also compared the integrity of the HLW canister to the
cladding of a reactor fuel element. The wall thickness of proposed HLW
canisters designs are substantially thicker than the cladding thickness
of a reactor fuel element. Additionally, the DOE noted that reactor
fuel elements have been exposed to high levels of radiation which
effects the cladding's material properties. Consequently, the DOE
concluded that the protection provided by the HLW canister would be at
least comparable to that provided by spent reactor fuel cladding.
Based on DOE documents, it is estimated that there will be 3,500
shipments of vitrified HLW by 2030. These shipments would not start
until a HLW repository or an interim storage facility becomes
available. However, the DOE's statement of 3,500 shipments is based on
loading two HLW canisters in each reusable shipping cask. If a separate
inner containment is required, the weight of the canister would be
increased. This would cause a corresponding decrease in the vitrified
glass payload to remain within allowable conveyance weight and/or size
limitations, potentially to the point that only one canister could be
transported per shipping cask. Consequently, the number of shipments
required to transport the existing quantity of waste would increase.
Therefore, the proposed rule would have the following benefits: (1)
Reducing the occupational dose associated with loading, unloading,
decontaminating, and handling the shipping casks; (2) reducing the dose
to the public during normal transport by decreasing the total number of
shipments; (3) decreasing total loading and unloading time (and
resultant expense); and (4) reducing the cost of the containment
system.
Proposed Regulatory Action
The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63 based on our evaluation
of the petition submitted by the DOE, its attachment, ``Technical
Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters
from 10 CFR 71.63(b),'' and the three public comments received on the
petition after its publication in the Federal Register. 10 CFR 71.63
specifies special provisions when shipping plutonium in excess of 0.74
TBq (20 curies) per package, including a separate inner containment
system, except when plutonium is in solid form in reactor fuel
elements, metal, or metal alloys. In proposing to amend Sec. 71.63, the
NRC is accepting, with modifications, the petition submitted by DOE,
for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs.
In an accompanying statement of considerations to the 1974 rule on
shipping plutonium, the Commission stated that the additional inner
containment requirements are intended to take into account the fact
that the plutonium may be in a respirable form. The safety goal
achieved in Sec. 71.63 is the prevention of releases of respirable
forms of plutonium (when shipping over 0.74 TBq) during both normal
conditions of transportation and during accidents. The 1974 rule
considered both increased numbers of shipments of potentially
respirable forms of plutonium, as a result of commercial reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel, and an increased potential for a human packaging
error associated with the larger shipping load. However, these large
numbers of plutonium shipments have not occurred, due in part to
policy, technical, and economic decisions to abandon commercial
reprocessing in the late 1970s.
Because of the material properties of the vitrified HLW, the sealed
canisters, and the approved quality assurance programs as described in
the petition, canisters of vitrified HLW packaged in accordance with 10
CFR Part 71 are highly unlikely to result in releases of dispersible or
respirable forms of plutonium under normal transportation conditions,
as identified under 10 CFR Part 71. Therefore, for normal
transportation, the vitrified HLW canisters meet the intent of the
Sec. 71.63(b) requirement without the need for double containment.
As for accident conditions, transportation packages for vitrified
HLW will be required to be certified by the NRC pursuant to Section 180
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10175),
and 10 CFR Part 71. Every package for vitrified HLW will be required to
meet the standards for accident resistant (i.e., Type B) packages as
set forth in 10 CFR Part 71. The shipping casks for vitrified HLW are
anticipated to be similar in design and robustness, and provide a
comparable level of protection to shipping casks for spent nuclear
fuel. Because spent nuclear fuel is excluded from the double
containment requirement, a favorable comparison of the canisters of
vitrified HLW to spent nuclear fuel would support removal of the
vitrified HLW forms from double containment.
The tests described in the technical justification demonstrate that
the canisters containing the vitrified HLW compare favorably to the
cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor assemblies. The
comparison is in terms of physical integrity and containment, based
upon the material properties, dimensions, and the effects of radiation
damage to materials.
The DOE analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of
plutonium in the HLW canisters than in spent reactor fuel elements.
However, the DOE has not established an upper limit on plutonium
concentration for these vitrified HLW canisters, and the NRC is not
basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double
containment requirement based on the plutonium's concentration.
In the technical justification, the DOE described the physical
characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified
HLW, including that the canistered waste form be capable of
withstanding a 7-meter drop
[[Page 25149]]
onto a flat, essentially unyielding surface, without breaching or
dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by the DOE's
``Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD),'' Rev. 0,
which is referenced in the technical justification supporting the
petition. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test
onto an essentially unyielding surface, as required by the hypothetical
accident conditions in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9-meter drop test is performed
on the entire package under 10 CFR Part 71 certification review by the
NRC. The 7-meter drop applies to the canistered HLW, which is the
content of the NRC-certified Type B package.
The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant
to the demonstration that the canistered HLW represents an essentially
nonrespirable form for shipping plutonium. It is reasonable to expect
that the 7-meter drop test on the canister would be a more severe test
than the 9-meter drop test on an NRC-approved Type B package, due to
the energy absorption by the packaging and impact limiters. The WASRD
acceptance criterion of no ``breaching or dispersing radionuclides''
could be used to demonstrate that the waste is essentially
nonrespirable under accident conditions.
In some of these tests, the HLW canisters were dropped from 9
meters, 2 meters above the DOE 7-meter design standard, and portions of
the testing included deliberately introducing flaws (0.95 cm holes) in
the canisters' walls. In these drop tests, all the HLW canisters
remained intact. For those HLW canisters tested with the 0.95 cm holes,
the quantity of respirable plutonium released through these holes was
less than 20 curies. This review has provided the NRC staff confidence
that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitrified HLW is
essentially non-respirable in the forms likely to be shipped.
However, the NRC does not control the requirements in, or changes
to, the DOE's WASRD. Many requirements in the WASRD are apparently
derived from, or are DOE's interpretations of, the NRC or other
applicable regulations. There are no NRC regulations or other
requirements specifying a 7-meter drop test onto an essentially
unyielding surface for canistered HLW. Accordingly, the NRC does not
have assurance that this test will be retained in future revisions to
the WASRD. Therefore, this test itself does not represent a sufficient
basis for removing the regulatory requirement in 10 CFR 71.63 for a
separate inner containment.
To address this concern, the proposed rulemaking provides
additional requirements beyond those presented in the petition for
rulemaking that requested exemption of ``Canisters containing vitrified
high-level waste.'' The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63(b) by
excluding sealed canisters containing vitrified HLW from the double
containment requirement if these canisters meet the specific waste
package design criteria in 10 CFR Part 60. The additional requirement
to meet 10 CFR Part 60 is responsive to the public comment received on
the DOE petition from the State of Idaho by establishing criteria
relevant to the intent of the double containment rule.
The design criteria for HLW forms in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c)
require that the waste be in solid form, in sealed containers, and that
particulate waste forms be consolidated to limit the availability and
generation of particulate. The basis for these technical requirements
under 10 CFR Part 60 is to limit particulates for reduced leaching
versus limiting particulate for respirability. Nevertheless, the bases
are generally consistent. The DOE WASRD, and its associated quality
assurance programs, are primarily based upon compliance with 10 CFR
Part 60 requirements.
In addition, the NRC is proposing to make a minor formatting change
in the language of the regulation and a minor correction to the usage
of units in this section to be consistent with existing NRC policy.
Metric units are reported first with English units in parenthesis.
Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
The proposed compatibility level for this rulemaking is Division 4
because the change only affects the DOE plutonium shipments. Division 4
rules pertain to those regulatory functions that are reserved solely to
the authority of the NRC pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and 10 CFR Part 150.
Electronic Access
Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or
WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly
available communications software packages, or directly via Internet.
Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as
practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking
subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free
number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set
as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1).
Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem
can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the
``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's
Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also
have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the
particular subsystem.
The NRC subsystem on FedWorld also can be accessed by a direct dial
phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using
Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact
FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld
menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State
Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that
point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu.
The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc''
at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main
menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to
FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access
NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full
access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the main
FedWorld system.
If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and
menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download
documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or
upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files
can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you
will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look).
An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with
descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP
access.
Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web,
like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does
not display the NRC Rules Menu.
You may also access the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site
through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov). This site provides the
[[Page 25150]]
same access as the FedWorld bulletin board, including the facility to
upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports
that function.
For more information on the NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur
Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected]. For
information about the interactive rulemaking site, contact Ms. Carol
Gallagher, (301) 415-6215; e-mail [email protected].
Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in
Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, and therefore, an environmental impact statement is not
required. The proposed rule change removes shipments of sealed
canisters containing vitrified HLW that meet the design criteria in 10
CFR 60.135 (b) and (c) from the double containment packaging
requirement. The additional design requirement supports consistency
with the intent of the original 1974 rule. The primary purpose for
double containment is to ensure that any respirable plutonium will not
leak into the atmosphere. Vitrified HLW is essentially nonrespirable,
and therefore, the packaging requirement for double containment is
unnecessary.
The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this
proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their
comments on the environmental assessment. The environmental assessment
and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is
based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room,
2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the
environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are
available from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
telephone (301) 415-6196.
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information
collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the
Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0008.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently
valid OMB control number.
Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft analysis is
available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the draft analysis
may be obtained from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.
The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory
analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not
have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small
entities. The rulemaking only affects the DOE shipments of vitrified
HLW. No other entities are involved.
Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does
not apply to this proposed rule, and therefore, a backfit analysis is
not required because these amendments do not involve any provisions
that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71
Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear
materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.
PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2201,
2232, 2233, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242,
as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846). Section 71.97
also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789-790.
2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 71.63 Special requirements for plutonium shipments.
(a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be
shipped as a solid.
(b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be
packaged in a separate inner container placed within outer packaging
that meets the requirements of subparts E and F of this part for
packaging of material in normal form. If the entire package is
subjected to the tests specified in Sec. 71.71 (``Normal conditions of
transport''), the separate inner container must not release plutonium
as demonstrated to a sensitivity of 10-6 A2/h. If
the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in Sec. 71.73
(``Hypothetical accident conditions''), the separate inner container
must restrict the loss of plutonium to not more than A2 in 1
week. The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to solid
plutonium in the following forms:
(1) Reactor fuel elements;
(2) Metal or metal alloy;
(3) Sealed canisters containing vitrified high-level waste that
meet the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c); and
(4) Other plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines
should be exempt from the requirements of this section.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of May, 1997.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 97-11834 Filed 5-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P