[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 89 (Thursday, May 8, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 25146-25150]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-11834]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 71

RIN 3150-AF59


Requirements for Shipping Packages Used To Transport Vitrified 
High-Level Waste

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend 
its regulations to remove canisters containing vitrified high-level 
waste (HLW) containing plutonium from the packaging requirement for 
double containment. This amendment is being proposed in response to a 
petition for rulemaking (PRM-71-11) submitted by the Department of 
Energy (DOE). This proposed rule would also make a minor correction to 
the usage of metric and English units to be consistent with existing 
NRC policy.

DATE: The comment period expires July 22, 1997. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Attention: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm on Federal workdays.
    For information on submitting comments electronically, see the 
discussion under Electronic Access in the Supplementary Information 
Section.
    Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments 
received and the environmental assessment and finding of no significant 
impact, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street 
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents may also be 
viewed and downloaded electronically via the Electronic Bulletin Board 
established by NRC for this rulemaking as discussed under Electronic 
Access in the Supplementary Information Section.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Earl Easton, Office of Nuclear 
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8520, e-mail [email protected] 
or Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-
6196, e-mail [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    In 10 CFR 71.63, the NRC imposed special requirements on licensees 
who ship plutonium in excess of 0.74 terabecquerels (20 curies). These 
requirements specify that plutonium must be in solid form and that 
packages used to ship plutonium must provide a separate inner 
containment (the ``double containment'' requirement). In adopting these 
requirements, the NRC specifically excluded plutonium in the form of 
reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloys, and, on a case-by-case 
basis, other plutonium-bearing solids that the NRC determines do not 
require double containment.
    On November 30, 1993, the DOE petitioned the NRC to amend 
Sec. 71.63 to add a provision that would specifically remove canisters 
containing plutonium-bearing vitrified waste from the packaging 
requirement for double containment. The NRC published a notice of 
receipt for the petition, docketed as PRM-71-11, in the Federal 
Register on February 18, 1994 (59 FR 8143), requesting public comment 
by May 4, 1994. On May 23, 1994 (59 FR 26608), the public comment 
period was extended to June 3, 1994, at the request of the Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Oversight Program of the State 
of Idaho.
    Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, the 
DOE is the Federal agency responsible for developing and administering 
a geologic repository for the deep disposal of HLW and spent nuclear 
fuel. In the petition, the DOE proposes to ship the HLW from each of 
its three storage locations at Aiken, South Carolina; Hanford, 
Washington; and West Valley, New York; directly to the geologic 
repository in casks certified by the NRC. Currently, this HLW exists 
mostly in the form of

[[Page 25147]]

liquid and sludge resulting from the reprocessing of defense reactor 
fuels. The DOE proposes to solidify this material into a borosilicate 
glass form in which the HLW is dispersed and immobilized. The glass 
would then be placed into stainless steel canisters for storage and 
eventual transport to the geologic repository. DOE's purpose in 
requesting an amendment to the rule is to allow the transportation and 
disposal of HLW in a more cost-effective and efficient manner without 
adversely affecting public health and safety.
    The containers used to transport canisters of vitrified HLW will be 
Type B packages certified by the NRC. These packages are required to 
meet accident resistant standards. The HLW will also be subject to the 
special transport controls for a ``Highway Route Controlled Quantity'' 
pursuant to U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. In addition, 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires the DOE to 
provide technical assistance and funds to train emergency responders 
along the planned route.
    The DOE asserts that shipment of vitrified HLW without double 
containment will not adversely affect safety. This is because the 
canistered, vitrified HLW provides a comparable level of protection to 
the packaging of reactor fuel elements, which does not require double 
containment. The DOE also noted that the plutonium concentrations in 
the vitrified HLW will be considerably lower than the concentration in 
spent nuclear fuel and that vitrified HLW is in an essentially 
nonrespirable form.
    Comments on the petition were received from three parties: the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Nye County, Nevada (the site for 
the proposed spent fuel and HLW repository at Yucca Mountain); and the 
INEL Oversight Program of the State of Idaho. EPA reviewed the petition 
in accordance with its responsibilities under Section 309 of the Clean 
Air Act and had no specific comments. Nye County agreed with the 
rationale and arguments advanced by the DOE, and had no objection to 
DOE's petition. The State of Idaho commented that the petition was 
premature because it did not specify the parameters or performance 
standards that HLW must meet.
    On June 1, 1995, the NRC staff met with the DOE in a public meeting 
to discuss the petitioner's request and the possible alternative of 
requesting an NRC determination under Sec. 71.63(b)(3) to exempt 
vitrified HLW from the double containment requirement. The DOE informed 
the NRC in a letter dated January 25, 1996, of its intent to seek this 
exemption and the NRC received DOE's request on July 16, 1996. The DOE 
requested that the original petition for rulemaking be held in abeyance 
until a decision was reached on the exemption request.
    In response to DOE's request, the NRC staff prepared a Commission 
paper (SECY-96-215, dated October 8, 1996) outlining and requesting 
Commission approval of the NRC staff's proposed approach for making a 
determination under Sec. 71.63(b)(3). The determination would have been 
the first made after the promulgation of the original rule, ``Packaging 
of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive 
Materials Under Certain Conditions,'' published on June 17, 1974 (39 FR 
20960). In a staff requirements memorandum dated October 31, 1996, the 
Commission disapproved the NRC staff's plan and directed that this 
policy issue be addressed by rulemaking. In response, the NRC staff has 
developed this proposed rule in response to the DOE petition.

Discussion

    In the final 1974 rule, the NRC anticipated that a large number of 
shipments of plutonium nitrate liquids could result from spent nuclear 
fuel reprocessing and revised its regulations to require that plutonium 
in excess of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) be shipped in solid form. 
The NRC did so because shipment of plutonium liquids is susceptible to 
leakage, particularly if a shipping package is improperly or not 
tightly sealed. The value of 0.74 terabequerels (20 curies) was chosen 
because it was equal to a large quantity of plutonium as defined in 10 
CFR Part 71 in effect in 1974. Although this definition no longer 
appears in 10 CFR Part 71, the value as applied to double containment 
of plutonium has been retained. The concern about leakage of liquids 
arose because of the potential for a large number of packages (probably 
of more complex design) to be shipped due to reprocessing and the 
increased possibility of human error resulting from handling this 
expanded shipping load.
    The NRC treats dispersible plutonium oxide powder in the same way 
because it also is susceptible to leakage if packages are improperly 
sealed. Plutonium oxide powder was of particular concern because it was 
the most likely alternative form (as opposed to plutonium nitrate 
liquids) for shipment in a fuel reprocessing economy. To address the 
concern with dispersible powder, the NRC required that plutonium not 
only must be in solid form, but also that solid plutonium be shipped in 
packages requiring double containment.
    In the accompanying statement of considerations to the final 1974 
rule, the NRC stated that the additional inner containment requirements 
are intended to take into account that the plutonium may be in a 
respirable form and that solid forms that are essentially 
nonrespirable, such as reactor fuel elements, are suitable for 
exemption from the double containment requirement. The Commission 
further stated that:

    Since the double containment provision compensates for the fact 
that the plutonium may not be in a ``nonrespirable'' form, solid 
forms of plutonium that are essentially nonrespirable should be 
exempted from the double containment requirement. Therefore, it 
appears appropriate to exempt from the double containment 
requirements reactor fuel elements, metal or metal alloy, and other 
plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines suitable for 
such exemption. The latter category provides a means for the 
Commission to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, requests for 
exemption of other solid material where the quantity and form of the 
material permits a determination that double containment is 
unnecessary.

    DOE's petition to amend Sec. 71.63, by adding a provision that 
exempts canisters containing vitrified HLW from the packaging 
requirement for a separate inner containment is partly based on the 
rationale that the vitrified HLW meets the intent of the rule because 
the plutonium will be in an essentially nonrespirable form. The DOE 
petition contends that the vitrified HLW contained in stainless steel 
canisters provides a comparable level of safety protection to that 
provided by spent fuel elements.
    Specifically, in the technical information supporting the petition 
1, the DOE sought to demonstrate that the waste acceptance 
specifications and process controls in the vitrification process and 
the waste and canister characteristics compare favorably to spent 
nuclear fuel in terms of the dispersability and respirability of the 
contents during normal conditions of transport and after an accident. 
The DOE maintained that impact and leak tests on the canisters, 
chemical analysis of spent fuel and simulated HLW borosilicate glass, 
design of the HLW canister, and other studies of the levels of 
plutonium and other radioactive elements present in the borosilicate 
glass demonstrate that vitrified HLW

[[Page 25148]]

canisters are more robust and contain less plutonium than spent reactor 
fuel elements. During actual transport conditions, the HLW canister 
will be enclosed within an NRC-certified shipping cask, further 
reducing the potential for canister damage and for release of 
respirable particles of HLW glass.
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    \1\ Technical Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to 
Exempt HLW Canisters from 10 CFR 71.63(b), dated September 30, 1993.
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    The DOE petition refers to plutonium in the form of borosilicate 
glass as being essentially nonrespirable. This is because a minute 
quantity of respirable particles could result if the glass fractures 
such as during cooldown processes after being poured into the HLW 
canisters, normal handling and transport conditions, and accident 
conditions.
    In the technical information supporting the petition, the DOE 
compared the physical and chemical characteristics of the vitrified HLW 
glass mixture to spent nuclear fuel pellets. Because impact studies of 
simulated waste glass from the DOE Savannah River site (Aiken, South 
Carolina) have shown comparable levels of fracture resistance and 
similar fractions of respirable particles when compared to unirradiated 
uranium fuel pellets and other potential waste form materials, the 
fracture resistance of HLW glass is expected to be comparable to that 
of uranium fuel pellets.
    The DOE also compared the concentration of plutonium present in a 
HLW canister from the Savannah River site to that contained in a 
typical spent reactor fuel element and concluded that the spent reactor 
fuel element contains at least 100 times the concentration of plutonium 
expected in a HLW canister. The DOE stated that the maximum 
concentration of plutonium projected for the Hanford and West Valley 
HLW canisters is much less than that of the Savannah River canisters.
    The DOE also compared the integrity of the HLW canister to the 
cladding of a reactor fuel element. The wall thickness of proposed HLW 
canisters designs are substantially thicker than the cladding thickness 
of a reactor fuel element. Additionally, the DOE noted that reactor 
fuel elements have been exposed to high levels of radiation which 
effects the cladding's material properties. Consequently, the DOE 
concluded that the protection provided by the HLW canister would be at 
least comparable to that provided by spent reactor fuel cladding.
    Based on DOE documents, it is estimated that there will be 3,500 
shipments of vitrified HLW by 2030. These shipments would not start 
until a HLW repository or an interim storage facility becomes 
available. However, the DOE's statement of 3,500 shipments is based on 
loading two HLW canisters in each reusable shipping cask. If a separate 
inner containment is required, the weight of the canister would be 
increased. This would cause a corresponding decrease in the vitrified 
glass payload to remain within allowable conveyance weight and/or size 
limitations, potentially to the point that only one canister could be 
transported per shipping cask. Consequently, the number of shipments 
required to transport the existing quantity of waste would increase. 
Therefore, the proposed rule would have the following benefits: (1) 
Reducing the occupational dose associated with loading, unloading, 
decontaminating, and handling the shipping casks; (2) reducing the dose 
to the public during normal transport by decreasing the total number of 
shipments; (3) decreasing total loading and unloading time (and 
resultant expense); and (4) reducing the cost of the containment 
system.

Proposed Regulatory Action

    The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63 based on our evaluation 
of the petition submitted by the DOE, its attachment, ``Technical 
Justification to Support the PRM by the DOE to Exempt HLW Canisters 
from 10 CFR 71.63(b),'' and the three public comments received on the 
petition after its publication in the Federal Register. 10 CFR 71.63 
specifies special provisions when shipping plutonium in excess of 0.74 
TBq (20 curies) per package, including a separate inner containment 
system, except when plutonium is in solid form in reactor fuel 
elements, metal, or metal alloys. In proposing to amend Sec. 71.63, the 
NRC is accepting, with modifications, the petition submitted by DOE, 
for the reasons set forth in the following paragraphs.
    In an accompanying statement of considerations to the 1974 rule on 
shipping plutonium, the Commission stated that the additional inner 
containment requirements are intended to take into account the fact 
that the plutonium may be in a respirable form. The safety goal 
achieved in Sec. 71.63 is the prevention of releases of respirable 
forms of plutonium (when shipping over 0.74 TBq) during both normal 
conditions of transportation and during accidents. The 1974 rule 
considered both increased numbers of shipments of potentially 
respirable forms of plutonium, as a result of commercial reprocessing 
of spent nuclear fuel, and an increased potential for a human packaging 
error associated with the larger shipping load. However, these large 
numbers of plutonium shipments have not occurred, due in part to 
policy, technical, and economic decisions to abandon commercial 
reprocessing in the late 1970s.
    Because of the material properties of the vitrified HLW, the sealed 
canisters, and the approved quality assurance programs as described in 
the petition, canisters of vitrified HLW packaged in accordance with 10 
CFR Part 71 are highly unlikely to result in releases of dispersible or 
respirable forms of plutonium under normal transportation conditions, 
as identified under 10 CFR Part 71. Therefore, for normal 
transportation, the vitrified HLW canisters meet the intent of the 
Sec. 71.63(b) requirement without the need for double containment.
    As for accident conditions, transportation packages for vitrified 
HLW will be required to be certified by the NRC pursuant to Section 180 
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10175), 
and 10 CFR Part 71. Every package for vitrified HLW will be required to 
meet the standards for accident resistant (i.e., Type B) packages as 
set forth in 10 CFR Part 71. The shipping casks for vitrified HLW are 
anticipated to be similar in design and robustness, and provide a 
comparable level of protection to shipping casks for spent nuclear 
fuel. Because spent nuclear fuel is excluded from the double 
containment requirement, a favorable comparison of the canisters of 
vitrified HLW to spent nuclear fuel would support removal of the 
vitrified HLW forms from double containment.
    The tests described in the technical justification demonstrate that 
the canisters containing the vitrified HLW compare favorably to the 
cladding surrounding spent fuel pellets in reactor assemblies. The 
comparison is in terms of physical integrity and containment, based 
upon the material properties, dimensions, and the effects of radiation 
damage to materials.
    The DOE analysis demonstrates much lower concentrations of 
plutonium in the HLW canisters than in spent reactor fuel elements. 
However, the DOE has not established an upper limit on plutonium 
concentration for these vitrified HLW canisters, and the NRC is not 
basing its decision to remove these canisters from the double 
containment requirement based on the plutonium's concentration.
    In the technical justification, the DOE described the physical 
characteristics and acceptance standards of the canisters of vitrified 
HLW, including that the canistered waste form be capable of 
withstanding a 7-meter drop

[[Page 25149]]

onto a flat, essentially unyielding surface, without breaching or 
dispersing radionuclides. This requirement is imposed by the DOE's 
``Waste Acceptance System Requirements Document (WASRD),'' Rev. 0, 
which is referenced in the technical justification supporting the 
petition. This test should not be confused with the 9-meter drop test 
onto an essentially unyielding surface, as required by the hypothetical 
accident conditions in 10 CFR 71.73. The 9-meter drop test is performed 
on the entire package under 10 CFR Part 71 certification review by the 
NRC. The 7-meter drop applies to the canistered HLW, which is the 
content of the NRC-certified Type B package.
    The NRC agrees that the 7-meter drop test requirement is relevant 
to the demonstration that the canistered HLW represents an essentially 
nonrespirable form for shipping plutonium. It is reasonable to expect 
that the 7-meter drop test on the canister would be a more severe test 
than the 9-meter drop test on an NRC-approved Type B package, due to 
the energy absorption by the packaging and impact limiters. The WASRD 
acceptance criterion of no ``breaching or dispersing radionuclides'' 
could be used to demonstrate that the waste is essentially 
nonrespirable under accident conditions.
    In some of these tests, the HLW canisters were dropped from 9 
meters, 2 meters above the DOE 7-meter design standard, and portions of 
the testing included deliberately introducing flaws (0.95 cm holes) in 
the canisters' walls. In these drop tests, all the HLW canisters 
remained intact. For those HLW canisters tested with the 0.95 cm holes, 
the quantity of respirable plutonium released through these holes was 
less than 20 curies. This review has provided the NRC staff confidence 
that DOE's petition is supportable and that vitrified HLW is 
essentially non-respirable in the forms likely to be shipped.
    However, the NRC does not control the requirements in, or changes 
to, the DOE's WASRD. Many requirements in the WASRD are apparently 
derived from, or are DOE's interpretations of, the NRC or other 
applicable regulations. There are no NRC regulations or other 
requirements specifying a 7-meter drop test onto an essentially 
unyielding surface for canistered HLW. Accordingly, the NRC does not 
have assurance that this test will be retained in future revisions to 
the WASRD. Therefore, this test itself does not represent a sufficient 
basis for removing the regulatory requirement in 10 CFR 71.63 for a 
separate inner containment.
    To address this concern, the proposed rulemaking provides 
additional requirements beyond those presented in the petition for 
rulemaking that requested exemption of ``Canisters containing vitrified 
high-level waste.'' The NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR 71.63(b) by 
excluding sealed canisters containing vitrified HLW from the double 
containment requirement if these canisters meet the specific waste 
package design criteria in 10 CFR Part 60. The additional requirement 
to meet 10 CFR Part 60 is responsive to the public comment received on 
the DOE petition from the State of Idaho by establishing criteria 
relevant to the intent of the double containment rule.
    The design criteria for HLW forms in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c) 
require that the waste be in solid form, in sealed containers, and that 
particulate waste forms be consolidated to limit the availability and 
generation of particulate. The basis for these technical requirements 
under 10 CFR Part 60 is to limit particulates for reduced leaching 
versus limiting particulate for respirability. Nevertheless, the bases 
are generally consistent. The DOE WASRD, and its associated quality 
assurance programs, are primarily based upon compliance with 10 CFR 
Part 60 requirements.
    In addition, the NRC is proposing to make a minor formatting change 
in the language of the regulation and a minor correction to the usage 
of units in this section to be consistent with existing NRC policy. 
Metric units are reported first with English units in parenthesis.

Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations

    The proposed compatibility level for this rulemaking is Division 4 
because the change only affects the DOE plutonium shipments. Division 4 
rules pertain to those regulatory functions that are reserved solely to 
the authority of the NRC pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended, and 10 CFR Part 150.

Electronic Access

    Comments may be submitted electronically, in either ASCII text or 
WordPerfect format (version 5.1 or later), by calling the NRC 
Electronic Bulletin Board (BBS) on FedWorld. The bulletin board may be 
accessed using a personal computer, a modem, and one of the commonly 
available communications software packages, or directly via Internet. 
Background documents on the rulemaking are also available, as 
practical, for downloading and viewing on the bulletin board.
    If using a personal computer and modem, the NRC rulemaking 
subsystem on FedWorld can be accessed directly by dialing the toll free 
number (800) 303-9672. Communication software parameters should be set 
as follows: parity to none, data bits to 8, and stop bits to 1 (N,8,1). 
Using ANSI or VT-100 terminal emulation, the NRC rulemaking subsystem 
can then be accessed by selecting the ``Rules Menu'' option from the 
``NRC Main Menu.'' Users will find the ``FedWorld Online User's 
Guides'' particularly helpful. Many NRC subsystems and data bases also 
have a ``Help/Information Center'' option that is tailored to the 
particular subsystem.
    The NRC subsystem on FedWorld also can be accessed by a direct dial 
phone number for the main FedWorld BBS, (703) 321-3339, or by using 
Telnet via Internet: fedworld.gov. If using (703) 321-3339 to contact 
FedWorld, the NRC subsystem will be accessed from the main FedWorld 
menu by selecting the ``Regulatory, Government Administration and State 
Systems,'' then selecting ``Regulatory Information Mall.'' At that 
point, a menu will be displayed that has an option ``U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission'' that will take you to the NRC Online main menu. 
The NRC Online area also can be accessed directly by typing ``/go nrc'' 
at a FedWorld command line. If you access NRC from FedWorld's main 
menu, you may return to FedWorld by selecting the ``Return to 
FedWorld'' option from the NRC Online Main Menu. However, if you access 
NRC at FedWorld by using NRC's toll-free number, you will have full 
access to all NRC systems, but you will not have access to the main 
FedWorld system.
    If you contact FedWorld using Telnet, you will see the NRC area and 
menus, including the Rules Menu. Although you will be able to download 
documents and leave messages, you will not be able to write comments or 
upload files (comments). If you contact FedWorld using FTP, all files 
can be accessed and downloaded but uploads are not allowed; all you 
will see is a list of files without descriptions (normal Gopher look). 
An index file listing all files within a subdirectory, with 
descriptions, is available. There is a 15-minute time limit for FTP 
access.
    Although FedWorld also can be accessed through the World Wide Web, 
like FTP, that mode only provides access for downloading files and does 
not display the NRC Rules Menu.
    You may also access the NRC's interactive rulemaking web site 
through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov). This site provides the

[[Page 25150]]

same access as the FedWorld bulletin board, including the facility to 
upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports 
that function.
    For more information on the NRC bulletin boards call Mr. Arthur 
Davis, Systems Integration and Development Branch, NRC, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-5780; e-mail AXD[email protected]. For 
information about the interactive rulemaking site, contact Ms. Carol 
Gallagher, (301) 415-6215; e-mail [email protected].

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability

    The Commission has determined under the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 
Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a 
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment, and therefore, an environmental impact statement is not 
required. The proposed rule change removes shipments of sealed 
canisters containing vitrified HLW that meet the design criteria in 10 
CFR 60.135 (b) and (c) from the double containment packaging 
requirement. The additional design requirement supports consistency 
with the intent of the original 1974 rule. The primary purpose for 
double containment is to ensure that any respirable plutonium will not 
leak into the atmosphere. Vitrified HLW is essentially nonrespirable, 
and therefore, the packaging requirement for double containment is 
unnecessary.
    The NRC has sent a copy of the environmental assessment and this 
proposed rule to every State Liaison Officer and requested their 
comments on the environmental assessment. The environmental assessment 
and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is 
based are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 
2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the 
environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are 
available from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, 
telephone (301) 415-6196.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

    This proposed rule does not contain a new or amended information 
collection requirement subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0008.

Public Protection Notification

    The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently 
valid OMB control number.

Regulatory Analysis

    The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this 
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of 
the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft analysis is 
available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street 
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the draft analysis 
may be obtained from Mark Haisfield, Office of Nuclear Regulatory 
Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone (301) 415-6196.
    The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory 
analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as 
indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule, if adopted, will not 
have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small 
entities. The rulemaking only affects the DOE shipments of vitrified 
HLW. No other entities are involved.

Backfit Analysis

    The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, does 
not apply to this proposed rule, and therefore, a backfit analysis is 
not required because these amendments do not involve any provisions 
that would impose backfits as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1).

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 71

    Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear 
materials, Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 553; the NRC is proposing to 
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71.

PART 71--PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

    1. The authority citation for Part 71 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 62, 63, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 
930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended, sec. 1701, 106 Stat. 
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2201, 
2232, 2233, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 
as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846). Section 71.97 
also issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789-790.

    2. Section 71.63 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 71.63  Special requirements for plutonium shipments.

    (a) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be 
shipped as a solid.
    (b) Plutonium in excess of 0.74 TBq (20 Ci) per package must be 
packaged in a separate inner container placed within outer packaging 
that meets the requirements of subparts E and F of this part for 
packaging of material in normal form. If the entire package is 
subjected to the tests specified in Sec. 71.71 (``Normal conditions of 
transport''), the separate inner container must not release plutonium 
as demonstrated to a sensitivity of 10-6 A2/h. If 
the entire package is subjected to the tests specified in Sec. 71.73 
(``Hypothetical accident conditions''), the separate inner container 
must restrict the loss of plutonium to not more than A2 in 1 
week. The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to solid 
plutonium in the following forms:
    (1) Reactor fuel elements;
    (2) Metal or metal alloy;
    (3) Sealed canisters containing vitrified high-level waste that 
meet the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.135 (b) and (c); and
    (4) Other plutonium bearing solids that the Commission determines 
should be exempt from the requirements of this section.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of May, 1997.
John C. Hoyle,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 97-11834 Filed 5-7-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P