

NATIONAL INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION

Notice of Approval of Class III Tribal Gaming Ordinances and Revocation of Class III Tribal Gaming Ordinance

AGENCY: National Indian Gaming
Commission.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The purpose of this notice is to inform the public of class III gaming ordinances approved by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The NIGC at (202) 632-7003, or by facsimile at (202) 632-7066 (not toll-free numbers).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) 25 U.S.C. § 2701 *et seq.*, was signed into law on October 17, 1988. The IGRA established the National Indian Gaming Commission (the Commission). Section 2710 of the IGRA authorizes the Commission to approve class II and class III tribal gaming ordinances. Section 2710(d)(2)(B) of the IGRA as implemented by 25 CFR § 522.8 (58 FR 5811 (January 22, 1993)), requires the Commission to publish, in the **Federal Register**, approved class III gaming ordinances. Section 522.12 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires the Chairman to publish all class III gaming ordinance revocations.

The IGRA requires all tribal gaming ordinances to contain the same requirements concerning ownership of the gaming activity, use of net revenues, annual audits, health and safety, background investigations and licensing of key employees. The Commission, therefore, believes that publication of each ordinance in the **Federal Register** would be redundant and result in unnecessary cost to the Commission. The Commission believes that publishing a notice of approval of each class III gaming ordinance is sufficient to meet the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(B). Also, the Commission will make copies of approved class III ordinances available to the public upon request. Requests can be made in writing to: National Indian Gaming Commission, 1441 L Street, N.W., 9th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005.

The Chair has approved tribal gaming ordinances authorizing class III gaming for the following Indian tribes:

Hopland Band of Pomo Indians
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians
Mooretown Rancheria
Picayune Rancheria of the Chukchansi
Indians
Quinault Indian Nation

Round Valley Indian Tribes
Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community
Shingle Springs Rancheria
Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma
The following tribe has revoked its class

II and class III ordinance:
Ponca Tribe of Nebraska

Ada E. Deer,

Acting Chair.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences Fiscal-Year 1996; Dissemination of Information

Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (PL 93-438) identifies an abnormal occurrence (AO) as an unscheduled incident or event that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determines to be significant from the standpoint of public health or safety. The Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 (PL 104-66) requires that AOs be reported to Congress on an annual basis. During fiscal-year 1996, eighteen events which occurred at NRC licensed facilities were determined to be AOs. These events are discussed below. As required by Section 208, the discussion for each event includes the date and place, the nature and probable consequences, the cause or causes, and the action taken to prevent recurrence. Each event is also being described in NUREG-0090, Vol. 19, "Report to Congress on Abnormal Occurrences, Fiscal Year 1996." This report will be available at NRC's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, about three weeks after the publication date of this **Federal Register** Notice.

Nuclear Power Plants

96-1 Plant Trip With Multiple Complications at Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station

One of the AO reporting criteria notes that major deficiencies in design, construction, use of, or management controls for licensed facilities or material can be considered an AO.

Date and Place

January 30-31, 1996; Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, a Westinghouse-designed pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, operated by the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation and located about 5.63 kilometers (3.5 miles) northeast of Burlington, Kansas.

Nature and Probable Consequences

One train of the essential service water system (ESWS) was inoperable due to frazil¹ ice blockage of the intake trash racks, and the second train was degraded. The ESWS removes heat from plant components which require cooling for safe shutdown of the reactor or following a design basis accident. The ESWS consists of two redundant trains, provides emergency makeup to the spent fuel pool and component cooling water systems, and is the safety related water supply to the auxiliary feedwater system. Freeze protection for the ESWS is a design provision, and is provided by a warming line from each ESWS train which discharges directly in front of the train's trash rack.

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on January 30, 1996, operators at Wolf Creek received alarms indicating that the traveling screens for the circulating water (CW) system were becoming blocked. The site watch reported that the traveling screens for Bays 1 and 3 were frozen and that water levels in these bays were approximately 2.44 meters (8 feet) below normal. The ESWS was started with the intent to separate the ESWS from the service water (SW) system. However, the ESWS was incorrectly aligned, which reduced warming flow to the ESWS suction bays (the lineup was corrected approximately 6 hours later). At approximately 3:30 a.m., operators received a service water low pressure alarm (CW system bays were subsequently determined to be at 3.66 meters (12 feet) below normal) and an electric fire pump started. The shift supervisor then directed a manual reactor/turbine trip. Following the scram, five control rods failed to fully insert (from 12 to 30 steps out). The event was further complicated because the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump developed a packing leak and was declared inoperable. The loss of CW system bay level was subsequently determined to be caused by ice blockage of the traveling screens, which was caused by freezing water from the spray wash system.

Train "A" ESWS pump was tripped and declared inoperable at 7:47 a.m. due to low discharge pressure and high strainer differential pressure. At about 5:45 p.m. the operators declared Train "A" operable based on an engineering evaluation. However, the pump was

¹ Minute ice crystals called frazil were formed when wind and temperature conditions caused water in the ultimate-heat-sink reservoir to become supercooled (cooled to a few hundredths of a degree below the freezing point without solidification). The frazil ice crystals mixed with the supercooled water, and adhered to the objects (i.e., trash racks) with which they collided.