

*Contact Person:* Scott Borg, Antarctic Geology & Geophysics, Office of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230. Telephone: (703) 306-1033.

*Purpose of Meeting:* To provide advice and recommendations concerning proposals submitted to NSF for financial support.

*Agenda:* To review and evaluate Mars Rock: Special Research Opportunity proposals as part of the selection process for awards.

*Reason For Closing:* The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: April 17, 1997.

**M. Rebecca Winkler,**

*Committee Management Officer.*

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## NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

### Advisory Panel for Social and Political Sciences; Notice of Meeting

In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, as amended), the National Science Foundation (NSF) announces the following meeting.

*Name:* Advisory Panel for Social and Political Sciences (1761).

*Date and Time:* May 8, 1997 12:00 p.m. (Conference Call).

*Place:* National Science Foundation, Stafford Place, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Room 980.1, Arlington, VA 22230.

*Type of Meeting:* Closed.

*Contact Person:* Dr. Harmon Hosch, Program Director for Law and Social Science, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230 Telephone: 703: 306-1762.

*Purpose of Meeting:* To provide advice and recommendations concerning support for research proposals submitted to the NSF for financial support.

*Agenda:* To review and evaluate the Global Perspective on Sociological Studies proposals as part of the selection process for awards.

*Reason for Closing:* The proposals being reviewed include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries; and personal information concerning individuals associated with the proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c) (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Dated: April 16, 1997.

**M. Rebecca Winkler,**

*Committee Management Officer.*

[FR Doc. 97-10375 Filed 4-21-97; 8:45 am]

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## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-382]

### Entergy Operations, Inc.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 issued to Entergy Operations Inc., (the licensee) for operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana.

The proposed amendment would change Waterford 3 Technical Specifications by deleting Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.3, Action (b) and its associated surveillance requirement. The current TS 3.7.1.3 limiting condition for operation (LCO) allows credit for an alternate supply for emergency feedwater (EFW) in the event the condensate storage pool (CSP) is unavailable as the primary source. Surveillance 4.7.1.3.2 is being deleted since use of the Wet Cooling Tower (WCT) basins as the backup supply as described in the current Action (b) will no longer be allowed.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.

As previously identified, the accidents for which the combined water inventory of the

CSP and WCT basin is needed are tornado and natural circulation events. The combined inventory is also required during post-LOCA long term cooling until shutdown cooling is entered. CSP level is not a failure mode for any of these events. The contents of the CSP and one WCT basin are sufficient to meet plant needs for accident mitigation in each of these scenarios. Deletion of TS 3.7.1.3 Action (b) and the associated surveillance do not affect the volume of either the CSP or the WCT basin and will not affect the consequences of the accidents for which the CSP and a WCT basin are needed.

In addition, all accident analyses assume that EFW is initially aligned to the CSP. No credit is taken for an initial alignment to the WCT basins. Thus removal of this action will not impact any analysis.

As previously discussed, a catastrophic failure of the CSP concurrent with an EFW system demand is not a credible scenario. As a conservative measure, Waterford 3 has elected to incorporate administrative controls in its off-normal procedures to address this scenario.

2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

*Response:* No.

The CSP is used almost exclusively as the water supply for EFW. The only exceptions are its use as a makeup source for the CCW system, Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water System, Fuel Pool and Purification System, and Essential Chilled Water, which place a minimal demand on the pool. The possible failure modes that could keep the CSP from fulfilling its intended safety function as the only dedicated source of EFW are tank vent clogging, low tank level, and pump suction flashing.

The CSP is equipped with an 8 in. vent line which penetrates the pool ceiling and terminates in the above room six feet above the floor. There is no isolation valve on the line, and there are no known sources of debris in the area which could clog such a large diameter pipe. Also, the pipe ends with a "U"-bend, with the open end turned downwards. Accidental crimping of the thick walled pipe is not considered credible since the pipe is not within the travel path of any cranes, and is located in a congested area behind an instrument cabinet, out of the path of any fork lifts.

The CSP is equipped with redundant, safety grade level indicators and TS 3.7.1.3 requires operators to verify tank level is within allowable limits every 12 hours.

In addition, the CSP water remains at Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) ambient temperatures, usually below 90°. There are no lines from hot, interfacing systems which connect to the lines between the CSP and pump suction.

Therefore, the probability of these failure modes will not increase by the deletion of TS 3.7.1.3, Action (b). As such, it is not considered credible that tank level would be out of limits when a system demand occurred. Also, no new system connections or interactions are created by this change. Deletion of this TS action statement does not