[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 77 (Tuesday, April 22, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19603-19607]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-10371]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 96-21]


Ellis Turk, M.D.; Denial of Application

    On February 12, 1996, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an 
Order to Show Cause to Ellis Turk, M.D., (Respondent) of Baltimore, 
Maryland, notifying him of an opportunity to show cause as to why DEA 
should not deny his application for registration as a practitioner 
under 21 U.S.C. 823(f), for reason that such registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest.
    By letter received by DEA on March 12, 1996, Respondent, through 
counsel, timely filed a request for a hearing, and following prehearing 
procedures, a hearing was held in Arlington, Virginia on September 4, 
1996, before Administrative Law Judge Paul A. Tenney. At the hearing 
both parties called witnesses to testify and introduced documentary 
evidence. After the hearing, both sides submitted proposed findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and argument. On November 22, 1996, Judge 
Tenney issued his Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision, recommending that Respondent's 
application for a DEA Certificate of Registration should be granted 
subject to various temporary limitations. On December 11, 1996, 
Government counsel filed exceptions to the Recommended Ruling of the 
Administrative Law Judge, and subsequently, Respondent's counsel filed 
a response to the Government's exceptions. Thereafter, on January 14, 
1997, Judge Tenney transmitted the record of these proceedings to the 
Acting Deputy Administrator.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator has considered the record in its 
entirety, and pursuant to 21 CFR 1316.67, hereby issued his final order 
based upon findings of fact and conclusions of law as hereinafter set 
forth.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent previously 
possessed DEA Certificate of Registration, AT2444711. On April 15, 
1993, and Order to Show Cause was issued proposing to revoke that 
Certificate of Registration, alleging that Respondent's continued 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. Following 
a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Mary Ellen Bittner, the then-
Deputy Administrator adopted the Opinion and Recommended Decision of 
Judge Bittner and revoked Respondent's DEA registration in a final 
order dated March 30, 1995, and effective May 8, 1995. See Ellis Turk, 
M.D., 60 FR 17,577 (April 6, 1995).
    In the prior proceeding, the then-deputy Administrator found that 
in 1987, DEA had received reports from drug distributors that 
Respondent had purchased excessive quantities of phentermine and 
phendimetrazine, both controlled substances. Consequently, on two 
occasions in December 1988, DEA, pursuant to administrative inspection 
warrants, conducted an accountability audit of controlled substances at 
Respondent's office covering the period December 29, 1987, through 
December 12, 1988. This audit revealed shortages of phentermine and 
phendimetrazine. These shortages were confirmed by a second audit 
conducted by a different DEA investigator using different records than 
those used for the previous audit. As a result of the audits, on 
November 22, 1989, a civil complaint was filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Maryland. Following a bench trial, 
the court found that Respondent failed to comply with the recordkeeping 
requirements of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and assessed a 
civil penalty of $24,000.00. The decision of the District Court was 
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
Respondent brought a civil action

[[Page 19604]]

against the United States Government alleging abuse of process, 
malicious abuse of process, constitutional violations, interference 
with the physician-patient relationship, harassment, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. Respondent's 
complaint was dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
and lack of process.
    In his final order, the then-Deputy Administrator noted that Judge 
Bittner had found that ``the evidence provided by the Government 
clearly established the shortages in Respondent's accountability of 
controlled substances, and that although Respondent offered various 
documents into evidence, none of them offered any plausible or coherent 
explanation for the discrepancies found in the investigation.'' In 
addition, Judge Bittner found ``that the Respondent, throughout the 
course of his previous litigation, as well as the instant case, 
continuously had been defensive, hostile, and uncooperative and had 
insisted on clouding the issues with tangential arguments and 
rhetorical allegations of political wrongdoing.'' The then-Deputy 
Administrator adopted Judge Bittner's opinion and recommended decision 
in its entirety.
    On July 10, 1995, Respondent submitted an application for a new DEA 
registration. That application is the subject of these proceedings. The 
Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that the then-Deputy 
Administrator's March 30, 1995 decision regarding Respondent is res 
judicata for purposes of this proceeding. See, Stanley Alan Azen, M.D., 
61 FR 57,893 (1996) (where the findings in a previous revocation 
proceeding were held to be res judicata in a subsequent administrative 
proceeding.) The then-Deputy Administrator's determination of the facts 
relating to the previous revocation of the Respondent's DEA 
registration is conclusive. Accordingly, the Acting Deputy 
Administrator adopts the March 30, 1995 final order in its entirety. 
The Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that the critical 
consideration in this proceeding is whether the circumstances, which 
existed at the time of the prior proceeding, have changed sufficiently 
to support a conclusion that Respondent's registration would be in the 
public interest.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator finds that on April 13, 1995, after 
receiving notice of the revocation of his previous DEA registration, 
Respondent telephoned the DEA Baltimore office and complained about 
both the District Court Judge in the civil action and Judge Bittner. 
Respondent asserted that there was a conspiracy against him and that if 
the drug distributors had not reported him, none of this would have 
happened. He further asserted that his records have always been good.
    On May 5, 1995, when Respondent met with representatives of DEA to 
surrender his DEA Certificate of Registration and his controlled 
substances prior to the effective date of the revocation, it was 
discovered that Respondent had in his possession outdated drugs that he 
had failed to include in his inventory of controlled substances. 
Respondent testified at the hearing in this matter that he came into 
possession of these outdated drugs when he purchased the medical 
practice of another doctor in 1980. Respondent stated that he advised 
state agents about the drugs at the time he took over the medical 
practice, but did not feel comfortable disposing of the drugs in the 
manner suggested by the state agents, and instead kept them locked up 
until turning them over to DEA in May 1995.
    On February 22, 1996, DEA received a letter from Respondent to the 
Administrator of DEA complaining about the DEA Baltimore office ``and 
others'' and requesting that his DEA registration be returned to him. 
Respondent asserted that, ``[i]n December of 1988, DEA officials from 
the Baltimore office along with a State of Maryland drug official, 
entered my office three times unannounced and without a proper warrant. 
They illegally seized my records and harassed me, my staff, and 
numerous patients.'' Regarding the civil case, Respondent argued that 
``I proved that my inventory of these two medications was properly 
reconciled in writing and the issue should never have gone to trial! 
However, [the District Court Judge] would not or could not believe the 
pleading I entered in the case! He is very ill with Parkinson's disease 
and probably suffers from dementia.'' Respondent then stated that ``my 
DEA license was taken from me fraudulently on May 8, 1995.'' He stated 
that Judge Bittner had the same pleading that the District Court Judge 
had ``showing proper reconciliation of my inventory.'' Respondent 
claimed that ``[his] case went from Judge Bittner to Mr. Steve Green, 
your deputy, who rubber-stamped Judge Bittner * * *.'' He then alleged 
that several doctors who had treated him in the past made ``the false 
complaint [that initiated this matter] since they have the motive and 
strong government connections.'' Respondent went on to state, ``I can 
understand a false complaint, but why would DEA (of Baltimore) etc. 
take it to such extremes (seven years now!)--was somebody paid off?''
    At the hearing in this matter, Respondent testified that he had 
adopted the inventory techniques used by the prior physician who owned 
the practice which consisted of a ledger book with reconciliation every 
six months. Respondent unequivocally stated at the hearing that his 
records were correct and that the audits conducted by DEA were wrong. 
Specifically, Respondent stated that ``I think there was an incorrect 
count, whether on purpose or unintentionally by the DEA. They were in 
error * * * I will continue to state that.'' Later, Respondent 
testified, ``There were no errors on my part * * *. The mistakes were 
made by the DEA * * *. They made up 11\1/2\ bottles missing.'' In 
response to a question as to how he would keep records differently now, 
Respondent stated, ``I have simplified it a little bit * * *. It isn't 
much different * * *.'' He then described an eight column accounting 
form that can be reconciled on a daily basis.
    Respondent was asked whether he was willing to cooperate with DEA 
and to discuss his inventorying techniques. He responded, ``Well, I 
hope if they want to come and review my inventory, I certainly will 
allow them. I hope it's not like the last time.'' Respondent's counsel 
asked, ``You would just hope that that wouldn't occur during office 
hours; am I hearing you correctly?'' Respondent answered, ``That's what 
I thought when it said reasonable time and place. I didn't think it 
meant in the middle of office hours.'' Later Respondent stated, ``And I 
would hate to have the same thing happen that happened in 1988 when 
they came in three times improperly.'' Specifically in response to 
questions about his future cooperation with DEA, Respondent testified, 
``I have eight years of harassment and false charges that make me very 
wary of the DEA.'' Respondent further testified, ``I've always 
cooperated with the authorities.'' However, Respondent acknowledged 
that the only time that DEA has ever inspected his recordkeeping was in 
December 1988.
    One of Respondent's patients testified that she has known 
Respondent for 16 years and finds him to be an honest and good doctor, 
who not only dispenses medication, but talks to his patients. She has 
never known him to dispense medication so as to increase her dosage.
    Respondent introduced evidence at the hearing that indicates that 
he is in good standing with the Maryland Board

[[Page 19605]]

of Physician Quality Assurance and the Maryland Division of Drug 
Control.
    The Government contends that Respondent's application for 
registration should be denied based upon the shortages of phentermine 
and phedimetrazine that were established at the prior proceeding, as 
well as Respondent's continued refusal to accept responsibility for the 
shortages and to recognize DEA's statutory authority to conduct 
inspections. The Government further contends that Respondent's 
testimony indicates that he is unwilling to cooperate with DEA in the 
future. Finally, the Government argues that Respondent failed to 
maintain an inventory of outdated drugs as required by the regulations.
    Respondent contends that he should be granted a DEA registration. 
Although he believes that DEA erred, he is willing to work with DEA 
regarding his controlled substance handling practices. He is in good 
standing with the state licensing boards and has never been convicted 
of a controlled substance offense. Respondent further contends that the 
outdated drugs were abandoned by his predecessor and that he kept them 
securely locked rather than disposing of them in an environmentally 
unsound manner. Respondent argues that the Government is estopped from 
raising the issue of the outdated drugs because the DEA was aware of 
these drugs from its 1988 inspection, yet did not raise the issue 
during the previous revocation proceeding.
    Respondent suggests that should he not be issued an unrestricted 
DEA Certificate of Registration, he should be issued a registration 
subject to the following limitations:
    A. Dr. Turk will provisionally resume use of a Certificate of 
Registration to prescribe Schedule II controlled substances and to 
dispense Schedule III, IV and V controlled substances.
    B. Dr. Turk will provide carbon (carbonless) copies of his 
prescriptions for Schedule II controlled substances to authorized DEA 
personnel upon request, with patient names redacted.
    C. The Certificate is provided upon the condition that Dr. Turk 
waives any requirement(s) for an administrative warrant for ``spot'' 
inventories to be conducted by authorized DEA personnel. Said waiver 
shall continue for a least two years from the date of this 
recommendation.
    D. The Certificate is provided upon the condition that Dr. Turk 
maintain a readily retrievable inventory ledger in addition to his 
``med sheets,'' and will provide the same to DEA personnel upon 
request, with patient names redacted. Dr. Turk must agree that he will 
fully comply with all applicable sections and sub-sections of 21 CFR 
1301-1304 (6/1/96 and subsequent editions).
    E. The Certificate is provided on the condition that Dr. Turk agree 
to meet with appropriate DEA personnel on a scheduled basis (mutual 
convenience) once every six months (for at least a two year-period) and 
to review records and conduct discussions deigned to maximize 
cooperation between the parties.
    Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 823(f), the Deputy Administrator may 
deny an application for a DEA Certificate of Registration if he 
determines that such registration would be inconsistent with the public 
interest, In determining the public interest, the following factors are 
considered:
    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or 
professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting 
research with respect to controlled substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws 
relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled 
substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety. These factors are to be considered in the disjunctive; the 
Deputy Administrative may rely on any one or a combination of factors 
and may give each factor the weight he deems appropriate in determining 
whether a registration should be revoked or an application for 
registration be denied. See Henry J. Schwarz, Jr., M.D., Docket No. 88-
42, 54 FR 16,422 (1989).
    The Administrative Law Judge found that all five factors are 
relevant in this proceeding. Regarding factor one, Judge Tenney found, 
and the Acting Deputy Administrator concurs, that there is no evidence 
of any adverse action against Respondent by the state licensing 
authorities. It is controverted that Respondent's medical license and 
license to handle controlled substances in the State of Maryland are in 
good standing.
    As to factor two, the Administrative Law Judge found that ``[t]here 
is no adverse evidence concerning Respondent's dispensing experience.'' 
As of the date of the hearing, he had been practicing medicine for 27 
years, and had been conducting a diet practice since 1980. Judge Tenney 
noted that a patient of Respondent testified that Respondent had never 
dispensed her medication so as to increase her dosage. In its 
exceptions to Judge Tenney's Opinion and Recommended Ruling, the 
Government argues that Judge Tenney improperly allowed the testimony of 
this patient, since she had not been disclosed as a potential witness 
to the Government until the day of the hearing. In its response to the 
Government's exceptions, Respondent contends that rebuttal witnesses 
need not be disclosed in advance of a hearing, and the Administrative 
Law Judge was careful to limit the patient's testimony. The Acting 
Deputy Administrator finds that DEA's regulations do not address 
rebuttal testimony, nevertheless as a general proposition, rebuttal 
witnesses need not be disclosed in advance of a hearing. The Acting 
Deputy Administrator therefore rejects the Government's exception and 
concurs with Judge Tenney's finding that there is no adverse evidence 
concerning Respondent's dispensing experience.
    Concerning factor three, the Acting Deputy Administrator concurs 
with Judge Tenney's finding that Respondent has not been convicted of 
any Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribution or 
dispensing of controlled substances.
    Regarding Respondent's compliance with controlled substance laws 
under factor four, the Administrative Law Judge found that the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland found Respondent 
liable for failing to comply with the recordkeeping requirements of the 
CSA and his previous registration was revoked based upon the shortages 
discovered as a result of the accountability audits. However, Judge 
Tenney noted that Respondent has now agreed to change his inventory 
practices to have a readily retrievable inventory.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator finds that the shortages revealed 
by the accountability audits demonstrate Respondent's failure to 
maintain complete and accurate records of controlled substances as 
required by 21 U.S.C. 827 and 21 CFR 1304.21. Respondent's 
noncompliance with these provisions has previously been found by a 
United States District Court Judge, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit, Judge Bittner and the then-Deputy Administrator 
in the previous revocation proceeding. Despite these findings, 
Respondent continues to deny that there was anything wrong with this 
recordkeeping, instead blaming DEA and alleging that DEA made up the 
shortages. Respondent has not presented any credible evidence in any of 
these proceedings to explain the discrepancies in his recordkeeping.

[[Page 19606]]

    The Acting Deputy Administrator is not convinced that Respondent's 
asserted changes to his recordkeeping practices will result in improved 
compliance with the laws relating to controlled substances. First, 
Respondent emphatically denies that there was anything wrong with his 
previous recordkeeping practices. Respondent's failure to accept 
responsibility for his misconduct does not augur well for his future 
compliance. Also, in describing the proposed changes in his 
recordkeeping, Respondent testified ``I have simplified it a little bit 
* * * It isn't much different * * *.''
    In addressing the outdated drugs that were in Respondent's 
possession, the Administrative Law Judge found that ``Respondent failed 
either to dispose of or to maintain an inventory of outdated drugs in 
his possession and his estopped argument is not developed.'' However, 
Judge Tenney noted that Respondent's failure to dispose of or inventory 
the expired drugs is not likely to recur since he has only changed his 
practice once and that was sixteen years ago. The Acting Deputy 
Administrator agrees with Judge Tenney. Respondent violated 21 CFR 
1304.13 by failing to include the outdated drugs in his inventory of 
controlled substances. However, given the circumstances regarding 
Respondent's possession of these drugs, it is unlikely that this 
violation will be repeated.
    As to factor five, Judge Tenney found that ``Respondent has had a 
diet practice since 1980. The accountability audits revealed shortages. 
However, there is no evidence that Respondent diverted any controlled 
substances. At most, Respondent had faulty inventory practices.''
    The Government disagreed, in its exceptions to Judge Tenney's 
Opinion and Recommended Ruling, with Judge Tenney's characterization 
under factor five that the shortages of controlled substances merely 
reflected faulty inventory practices. The Government contends that 
``[s]ince Respondent has never demonstrated that the audits were 
incorrect, the more plausible explanation is that the controlled 
substances were somehow diverted into illicit uses.'' Furthermore, the 
Government argues that since the findings of the previous revocation 
proceeding are res judicata, it would be inconsistent to find that the 
shortages warranted revocation in the prior proceeding, but not in the 
present case. The Government noted that the significant question in 
this proceeding is whether there has been a significant change in 
circumstances from the prior proceeding. The Government argues that the 
Administrative Law Judge failed to make any findings ``pertaining to 
Respondent's continued denial of the audit shortages and Respondent's 
continued hostility towards regulation by DEA.'' The Government 
asserted in its exceptions that ``[i]t would be hard to imagine a case 
where a DEA applicant has exhibited less of a change in attitude than 
Respondent has between the revocation proceeding and the present 
hearing.''
    In his response to the Government's exceptions, Respondent argues 
that the Government is collaterally estopped from arguing that 
Respondent unlawfully diverted controlled substances. Respondent 
further argues that ``the Government provides no factual basis, 
whatsoever, for its assertion that the more plausible explanation [for 
the shortages] is that the controlled substances in question were 
somehow diverted into illicit use.'' Respondent also takes issue with 
the Government's exception that the Administrative Law Judge did not 
consider Respondent's continued denials of the audit shortages and his 
alleged hostility toward DEA. Respondent argues that ``[n]owhere is 
hostility addressed in the record by Government counsel'' and the 
Government is bound by the record.
    As to the Government's assertions regarding Respondent's diversion 
of controlled substances, the Acting Deputy Administrator finds that no 
evidence was presented at the prior proceeding that the shortages 
revealed by the audits were a result of illicit diversion. Therefore, 
the Acting Deputy Administrator agrees with Respondent that the 
Government is colleratelly estopped from raising that argument in this 
proceeding. However, the Acting Deputy Administrator understands the 
Government's concern regarding Judge Tenney's statement about the 
shortages that, ``[a]t most, Respondent had faulty inventory 
practices.'' The Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that while 
diversion was not proven in the prior proceeding, at the very least, 
the audit results revealed faulty recordkeeping. This is extremely 
significant, because without proper recordkeeping, it is difficult to 
detect whether or not diversion is occurring.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator agrees with the Government's 
assertion that the Adminitrative Law Judge did not make findings 
regarding Respondent's continued denial of the audit shortages and his 
continued hostility towards regulation by DEA. Respondent contends that 
the Government cannot now raise this issue because ``[n]owhere is 
hostility addressed in the record by Government counsel'' and the 
Government is bound by the record. As noted above, the critical 
consideration in this proceeding is whether the circumstances, which 
existed at the time of the prior proceeding, have changed sufficiently 
to support a conclusion that Respondent's registration would be in the 
public interest. While the Administartive Law Judge found that 
Respondent has vowed to change his inventory practices, Judge Tenney 
did not address whether other circumstances that were found to exist in 
the prior proceeding have changed. In the final order revoking 
Respondent's previous registration, the then-Deputy Administrator 
adopted Judge Bittner's finding that ``Respondent, throughout the 
course of his previous litigation, as well as the instant case, 
continously had been defensive, hostile, and uncooperative and had 
insisted on clouding the issues with tangential arguments and 
rhetorical allegations of political wrongdoing.''
    The Acting Deputy Administrator concludes that the record in this 
proceeding indicates that Respondent's attitude has not changed since 
issuance of the earlier final order. First, in April 1995, immediately 
after notification of the earlier revocation, Respondent telephoned the 
local DEA office complaining about the District Court Judge and Judge 
Bittner and alleging that there was a conspiracy against him. 
Respondent submitted the application for registration that is the 
subject of this proceeding in July 1995. Then in February 1996, 
approximately six months before the hearing in this matter, Respondent 
sent a letter to the Administrator of DEA alleging that members of the 
local DEA office entered his office improperly and illegally seized his 
records; that his evidence to explain the audit results was ignored by 
the District Court Judge in the civil action, Judge Bittner, and the 
then-Deputy Administrator; that his previous DEA registration was 
fraudulently taken from him; and that he believed that the 
investigation of him was initiated based upon a false complaint made by 
doctors who had treated him in the past. All of these allegations were 
made despite findings to the contrary by the United States District 
Court Judge and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit in the civil proceeding, and by Judge Bittner and then then-
Deputy Administrator in the prior revocation proceeding. Finally, at 
the hearing in this matter, Respondent continued to deny that there was 
anything wrong with his recordkeeping and went so far as to claim that 
DEA

[[Page 19607]]

made up the shortages; continued to maintain that DEA was in his office 
improperly in 1988; and continued to assert that the claims against him 
were false and that he was harassed. Also, while Respondent indicated 
that he was willing to cooperate with DEA, he also made it clear that 
he was wary of DEA based upon the false charges and harassment against 
him, and that he believed that inspections should only be conducted 
when it is convenient for him and not during normal business hours. 
This last assertion is at odds with DEA's inspection authority under 21 
U.S.C. 880, which requires that administrative inspection warrants be 
served during normal business hours.
    Judge Tenney concluded that registration of Respondent would not 
inconsistent with the public interest with the imposition of the 
limitations suggested by Respondent. Therefore, Judge Tenney 
recommended that Respondent be granted a DEA Certificate of 
Registration subject to the temporary limitations suggested by 
Respondent. The Government filed an exception to this proposed sanction 
arguing that Respondent's application should be denied. Alternatively, 
the Government argued that if the Administrative Law Judge's 
recommendation is adopted by the Acting Deputy Administrator, the names 
and addresses of the patients on the records should not be redacted.
    The Acting Deputy Administrator notes that 21 C.F.R. 1306.05 and 
1304.24 require that prescriptions and records of dispensing contain 
the patient's name and address, and that to allow Respondent to redact 
that information would in effect subject him to lesser requirements 
than other registrants. However, the Acting Deputy Administrator finds 
that the Government has met its burden of proof that Respondent's 
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. As the 
Government noted in its exceptions, in Shatz v. United States 
Department of Justice, 873 F. 2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1989), the court 
held that once the Government had met its burden, the Respondent then 
had the burden to rebut the evidence and to prove sufficient 
rehabilitation. As discussed above, while Respondent has stated that he 
has changed his inventory practices, there is more than sufficient 
evidence in the record to indicate that Respondent has not accepted 
responsibility for his prior actions as a DEA registrant, has not 
significantly changed his inventory practices, and has not exhibited a 
willingness for DEA to inspect his records ``at any time'', as 
suggested in his response to the Government exceptions. Consequently, 
the Acting Deputy Administrator finds that Respondent's registration 
with DEA would be inconsistent with the public interest.
    Accordingly, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, pursuant to the authority vested in him by 
21 U.S.C. 823 and 28 C.F.R. 0.100(b) and 0.104, hereby orders that the 
application for registration, executed by Ellis Turk, M.D., be, and it 
hereby is, denied. This order is effective May 22, 1997.

    Dated: April 8, 1997.
James S. Milford,
Acting Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 97-10371 Filed 4-21-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-M