[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 72 (Tuesday, April 15, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18369-18371]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-9659]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270 50-287, 50-413, 50-414, 50-369 and 50-370]


Duke Power Company, et al.; (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, 
and 3), (Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2), and (McGuire Nuclear 
Station Units 1 and 2)

Exemption

I

    Duke Power Company, et al. (DPC or the licensee) is the holder of 
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47 and DPR-55 for the 
Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; License Nos. NPF-35 and NPF-
52 for the Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; and License Nos. 
NPF-9 and NPF-17 for the McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. The 
licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission in effect now and 
hereafter.

[[Page 18370]]

    The Oconee Nuclear Station consists of three pressurized water 
reactors near Greenville in Oconee County, South Carolina. The Catawba 
Nuclear Station consists of two pressurized reactors near Rock Hill in 
York County, South Carolina. The McGuire Nuclear Station consists of 
two pressurized reactors near Charlotte in Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina.

II

    Section 73.55 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR 73.55), ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage,'' 
paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall establish and 
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization 
which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that 
activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the 
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk 
to the public health and safety.''
    Section 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies 
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle 
access into a protected area.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A 
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all 
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without 
escort.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not 
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access 
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a 
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be 
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *.''
    The licensee has proposed to implement an alternative unescorted 
access control system that would eliminate the need to issue and 
retrieve badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all 
individuals with unescorted access to keep their badges when departing 
the site.
    An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow such 
individuals who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite 
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated August 
23, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of 
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own 
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are 
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common 
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee to 
provide alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative 
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the 
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall 
level of system performance provides protection against radiological 
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the 
regulation.
    Currently, unescorted access into the protected areas at the 
Oconee, Catawba, and McGuire units is controlled through the use of a 
photograph on a badge/keycard (hereafter, referred to as ``badge''). 
The security officers at each entrance station use the photograph on 
the badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The 
licensee's employees and contractor personnel who have been granted 
unescorted access are issued badges upon entrance at each entrance/exit 
location and the badges are returned upon exit. The badges are stored 
and are retrievable at each entrance/exit location. In accordance with 
10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractors are not allowed to take these badges 
offsite.
    Under the proposed biometric system, each individual who is 
authorized unescorted entry into protected areas would have the 
physical characteristics of his/her hand (i.e., hand geometry) 
registered, along with his/her badge number, in the access control 
system. When a registered user enters his/her badge into the card 
reader and places his/her hand onto the measuring surface, the system 
detects that the hand is properly positioned, and records the image. 
The unique characteristics of the hand image are then compared with the 
previously stored template in the access control computer system 
corresponding to the badge to verify authorization for entry.
    Individuals, including plant employees and contractors, would be 
allowed to keep their badges when they depart the site and, thus, 
eliminate the need to issue, retrieve, and store badges at the entrance 
stations to the plant. Badges do not carry any information other than a 
unique identification number. All other access processes, including 
search function capability, would remain the same. This system would 
not be used for persons requiring escorted access (i.e., visitors).
    A Sandia report, ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometrics 
Identification Devices,'' SAND91-0276UC-906, Unlimited Release, 
June 1991, concluded that hand geometry equipment possesses strong 
performance and high detection characteristics. Also, based on its own 
experience with the current photo identification system, the licensee 
determined that the proposed hand geometry system would provide the 
same high level of assurance as the current system that access is only 
granted to authorized individuals. The biometric system has been in use 
for a number of years at several sensitive Department of Energy 
facilities and, recently, at other nuclear power plants.
    The licensee will implement a process for testing the proposed 
system to ensure continued overall level of performance equivalent to 
that specified in the regulation. When the changes are implemented, the 
respective Physical Security Plans will be revised to include 
implementation and testing of the hand geometry access control system 
and to allow plant employees and contractors to take their badges 
offsite.
    When implemented, the licensee will control all points of personnel 
access into a protected area under the observation of security 
personnel through the use of both badge and a hand geometry 
verification system. The numbered picture badge identification system 
will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized 
unescorted access to protected areas. Badges will continue to be 
displayed by all individuals while inside the protected areas.
    Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for 
access into the protected areas, the proposed system would provide a 
positive verification process. The potential loss of a badge by an 
individual as a result of taking the badge offsite would not enable an 
unauthorized entry into protected areas.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff 
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance 
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the 
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides 
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which 
would be provided by the regulation.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, this exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and

[[Page 18371]]

security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Therefore, the 
Commission hereby grants the requested exemption from the requirements 
of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) to allow individuals not employed by the licensee 
(e.g., contractors) to take their photo identification badges offsite, 
provided that the proposed hand geometry biometrics system is in effect 
to control access into protected areas at the Oconee, Catawba, and 
McGuire nuclear stations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (62 FR 17221).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the request 
for exemption dated August 23, 1996, which is available for public 
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document rooms located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South 
Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina, for the Oconee Nuclear Station; 
the York County Library, 138 East Black Street, Rock Hill, South 
Carolina, for the Catawba Nuclear Station; and the J. Murrey Atkins 
Library, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University 
City Boulevard, North Carolina, for the McGuire Nuclear Station.
    This exemption is granted for the Oconee, Catawba, and McGuire 
nuclear stations with the condition that the corresponding 
modifications, procedures, training, and revisions to the Physical 
Security Plans necessary for implementation of the hand geometry 
biometrics system at the facilities will be submitted to the NRC staff 
for review and approval.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of April 1997.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-9659 Filed 4-14-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P