[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 47 (Tuesday, March 11, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 11160-11161]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-5961]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 97-1]


Safe Storage of Uranium-233

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

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SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a 
concerning the Safe Storage of Uranium-233. The Board requests public 
comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation are due on or before April 10, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or 
telephone (202) 208-6400.

    Dated: March 6, 1997.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[Recommendation 97-1] Safe Storage of Uranium-233

Dated: March 3, 1997.
    Approximately one ton of Uranium-233 (233U), a man-made 
isotope of uranium, was produced by the Department of Energy (DOE) and 
its predecessor agencies. This material has been studied extensively, 
and uses were found for it in DOE's defense-related applications and in 
nuclear reactor programs supported both by DOE and commercial 
companies. The 233U in this country is now all in the possession 
of DOE. It is presently stored at several DOE sites, predominantly 
within defense nuclear facilities under the purview of the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). Almost all of the 233U 
has been determined by DOE to be excess to its needs, and with minor 
exceptions it is regarded as legacy material. As will be apparent from 
the following, however, any future

[[Page 11161]]

processing or disposal of the 233U will be accompanied by deep 
problems which will cause handling of the relatively small inventory of 
this material to be exceptionally difficult.
    Most of this material in DOE storage has a specific alpha-activity 
which approaches that of weapons grade plutonium. Furthermore, all 
233U contains an amount of 232U which varies from one lot to 
another. One of the daughter products in the radioactive decay chain of 
the 232U is Thallium-208 (208Th). That isotope of Thallium 
emits a high-energy (2.6 Mev) gamma ray when it decays. Depending on 
the amount of 232U present in the 233U, the surrounding 
radiation field can vary from somewhat less than one Rem/hr to several 
tens of Rem/hr. This radiation field causes handling and processing of 
any single item to be highly hazardous and very difficult to perform. 
Even visual inspection of a container housing 233U will usually be 
difficult.
    DOE has recently completed a review of issues associated with 
highly-enriched uranium. The results of that review have been made 
available to the Board in a report entitled the Highly Enriched Uranium 
Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerability Assessment Report. This 
report stated that 233U in storage exists in various forms 
throughout the complex, including metal, compounds, and scrap material. 
In addition, it noted that there was uncertainty as to the identity of 
some of the items and the material condition of many of the storage 
containers. Members of the Board's staff have also recently reviewed 
the storage of 233U. The results of that review have been issued 
by the Board as the report ``Uranium-233 Storage Safety at Department 
of Energy Facilities'' (DNFSB/TECH-13). The assessments in that report 
have led the Board to identify several areas of concern.
    Responsibility for the 233U inventory remaining within the DOE 
complex is diffuse. Several secretarial officers and office heads are 
responsible for aspects of defense nuclear facilities that store 
significant quantities of 233U. For example, Defense Programs is 
responsible for Building 3019 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
where more than 400 kg of 233U resides. Environmental Management 
now has responsibility for the Chemical Processing Plant and the 
Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory, where there are about 350 kg of unirradiated 233U in 
various chemical and physical forms and a large number of irradiated 
nuclear fuel elements. An additional complication results from the role 
of DOE's Office of Material Disposition in developing strategies for 
final disposal of excess special nuclear material. By way of contrast 
to this state of dispersed responsibility, the Board notes the better 
practice of placing stabilization of plutonium residues under a single 
project manager, in response to the Board's Recommendation 94-1.
    Uncertainty as to the condition of many items of stored \233\U 
generates additional concerns. Review of the original storage and 
packaging of the items of \233\U reveals wide variations in practices. 
Questions exist in some cases as to the original state and composition 
of stored items. Furthermore, many of the containers in which U-233 is 
stored have not been inspected for decades, and in some cases have not 
even been accessed over this interval. The inactivity leads to 
additional doubts as to the condition of the stored material, and 
degrades even further the information base which should be improved 
before it becomes necessary to process the contents of the containers 
for ultimate disposal. It also raises questions as to how the storage 
facilities themselves can be deactivated, cleaned up, and 
decommissioned, since some will be contaminated with this highly 
radioactive material.
    It cannot be ruled out that problems exceeding those which 
motivated the Board in issuance of its Recommendation 94-1 may be found 
where \233\U is stored under conditions such that physical 
deterioration can occur. For this reason it would appear prudent to 
assess the adequacy of packaging of the items of \233\U as they are 
presently stored, as well as the state of the storage facilities, and 
to correct any problems that are found. The assessment would profit 
from the example of DOE's implementation of the Board's Recommendation 
94-1, in developing a standard for the interim packaging and storage of 
plutonium. A similar standard would probably be appropriate for \233\U, 
but some differences may be called for.
    The Board understands that work is presently on-going within DOE to 
address some of the above concerns. However, actions to deal with DOE's 
remaining inventory of U-233 would be greatly enhanced by a more 
systematic and focused approach. Therefore, the Board recommends that 
DOE:
    1. Establish a single line project to deal with issues attached to 
safe storage of \233\U.
    2. Develop standards to be used for packaging, transportation, and 
interim and long-term storage of \233\U.
    3. Characterize the items of \233\U presently in storage in DOE's 
defense nuclear facilities, as to material, quantity, and type and 
condition of storage container.
    4. Evaluate the conditions and appropriateness of the vaults and 
other storage systems used for the \233\U at DOE's defense nuclear 
facilities.
    5. Assess the state of storage of the items of \233\U in light of 
the standards mentioned in recommendation 2 above.
    6. Initiate a program to remedy any observed shortfalls in ability 
to maintain the items of \233\U in acceptable interim storage.
    7. Establish a plan for the measures that can eventually be used to 
place the \233\U in safe, permanent storage.
    8. Until these ultimate measures are taken, ensure that the DOE 
complex retains the residue of technical knowledge and competence 
needed to carry through all of the measures needed to ensure safe 
storage of the \233\U in the short and the long term.
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Appendix--Transmittal Letter to Acting Secretary of Energy

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

March 3, 1997.
The Honorable Charles B. Curtis,
Acting Secretary of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, 
Washington, DC 20585-1000

    Dear Mr. Curtis: On March 3, 1997, the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board (Board), in accordance with 42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2286a(a)(5), unanimously approved Recommendation 97-1 which is 
enclosed for your consideration. Recommendation 97-1 deals with the 
Safe Storage of Uranium-233.
    42 U.S.C. Sec. 2286d(a) requires the Board, after receipt by 
you, to promptly make this recommendation available to the public in 
the Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. The Board 
believes the recommendation contains no information which is 
classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this 
recommendation does not include information restricted by the 
Department of Energy under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 
Secs. 2161-68, as amended, please arrange to have this 
recommendation promptly on file in your regional public reading 
rooms.
    The Board will publish this recommendation in the Federal 
Register.

      Sincerely,
John T. Conway
Chairman
Enclosure: c: Mr. Mark B. Whitaker, Jr.

[FR Doc. 97-5961 Filed 3-10-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-M