[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 39 (Thursday, February 27, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 8917-8921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4985]
[[Page 8917]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
49 CFR Part 571
[Docket No. 74-14; Notice 113]
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Request for comments.
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SUMMARY: This document solicits public comments on a petition from U.
S. Senator Dirk Kempthorne to amend the provisions in the agency's
automatic occupant protection standard concerning the use of unbelted
as well as belted dummies in testing air bag-equipped vehicles. The
petition asks that the agency impose a moratorium on testing with
unbelted dummies. The petition was submitted in response to the deaths
of young children and of drivers, primarily short-statured women, as a
result of air bag deployments in low speed crashes. The petitioner
believes that the necessity of meeting the unbelted test requirement is
adversely affecting current air bag designs and causing these deaths.
The petitioner also believes that the requirement is preventing vehicle
manufacturers from optimizing air bag designs for belted occupants.
The agency has concluded that section 2508 of the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 precludes it from
eliminating the unbelted test requirement.
However, since the agency is interested in all potential solutions
to the air bag deaths and since the agency can recommend legislative
changes to Congress, the agency is seeking public comment on the
benefits and disbenefits of eliminating the unbelted test.
DATES: Comments must be received by March 31, 1997.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to the docket and notice number of
this notice and be submitted to: Docket Section, Room 5109, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20590. (Docket Room hours are 9:30 a.m.-4:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday.)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For information about air bags and related rulemakings: Visit the
NHTSA web site at ``http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov'' and select 11AIR BAGS:
Information about air bags.''
For non-legal issues: Clarke Harper, Chief, Light Duty Vehicle
Division, NPS-11, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-2264.
Fax: (202) 366-4329.
For legal issues: J. Edward Glancy, Office of Chief Counsel, NCC-
20, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
SW, Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-2992. Fax: (202) 366-
3820.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Introduction
Air bags have been installed in millions of cars and light trucks.
As of the end of model year 1996, driver air bags had been installed in
over 56,000,000 vehicles and passenger air bags in over 27,000,000
vehicles. As of the end of calendar year 1996, air bags had saved the
lives of over 1,700 occupants, almost two-thirds of them unbelted.
However, they had also caused the deaths of 35 young children and 20
adults,1 primarily in low speed crashes in which the other
occupants of the vehicles involved in the crashes have either not been
injured or received only minor injuries. All but one of the adults were
drivers and a majority of them were short-statured women.
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\1\ The figure of 20 is based on information that NHTSA has
developed through NHTSA's Special Crash Investigation program and is
not a census. Studies of Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) data
are underway to obtain a more precise figure.
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The reports of air bag-related deaths and injuries contrast sharply
with the expectations for air bags. The Department's initial interest
in air bags arose in the late 1960's as researchers observed that air
bags offered a means of increasing crash protection for unbelted
occupants. Despite vigorous efforts to promote the use of the safety
belts that Federal regulation had recently required in all passenger
cars, the rate of safety belt use was hovering around 10 percent. With
such a low level of use, the safety belt was providing very little of
its expected benefits. Beginning in 1969, under Secretary John Volpe,
the Department explored the potential of air bags and other measures,
such as crash padding and automatic safety belts, that needed no
occupant action. A series of rulemaking actions followed, all of them
focussing on ways to provide automatic protection. The air bag was
always a leading candidate to provide this protection, but it was not
specifically required during the regulatory actions of the 1970's and
1980's.
The current occupant protection requirements trace back to 1984,
when Secretary Elizabeth Dole issued performance requirements for
automatic restraints (i.e., automatic belts or air bags). In a final
rule amending Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 208,
Occupant Crash Protection (49 CFR 571.208), the Department required
that the front outboard designated seating positions in passenger cars
be equipped with automatic occupant protection (i.e., either automatic
belts or air bags) instead of (or in addition to) manual lap and
shoulder belts. (49 Fed. Reg. 28962; July 17, 1984).2 For vehicles
equipped with air bags, the Standard specifies two crash tests for
determining whether the vehicles comply with the standard's injury
criteria. Both tests involve crashing a vehicle into a barrier at
speeds up to 30 mph. One crash uses unbelted anthropomorphic test
dummies, while the other uses belted dummies. The unbelted crash test
ensures that the vehicle provides effective ``automatic protection,''
i.e., protection that meets injury criteria ``by means that require no
action by vehicle occupants,'' in keeping with the standard's original
goal of providing protection to unbelted occupants.
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\2\ In 1987, the agency issued a final rule extending the
automatic occupant protection requirements to light trucks (i.e.,
vans, pickup trucks and sport utility vehicles). (52 Fed. Reg.
44898; November 23, 1987)
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In order to satisfy the injury criteria in a 30 mph unbelted test,
an air bag must deploy very quickly. Even so, the automatic protection
requirements do not specify a particular level of force. The amount of
force is a function of a number of factors and air bag design features;
it is also affected by the extent to which an air bag is designed to
exceed the Standard's performance requirements. Further, the Standard
affords substantial flexibility about how air bags perform in
circumstances other than those specified in the test procedure, such as
low-speed crashes and crashes with out-of-position occupants.
In the 1984 decision, the Department expressly recognized that
commenters had raised issues about potential risks associated with air
bags, but noted that there were technological means available for
addressing those risks. The Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (FRIA)
identified a variety of possible technological solutions to those
risks, including dual level inflation systems of several types and
measures such as changes in the shape and size of the bag, in
aspiration, and in inflation techniques.
The development of air bags after the 1984 decision on automatic
protection occurred at the same time as a significant increase in
safety belt use. From a very low 14 percent in 1984, safety belt use
increased rapidly in the late 1980's, reaching 59 percent by 1991,
[[Page 8918]]
and stands at 68 percent 3 today according to State-reported
surveys.4
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3 Belt use among fatally injured front seat occupants of cars
and light trucks is lower, approximately 37 percent, based on 1995
FARS data. The lowness of this rate reflects a number of factors,
including the belt use rate by motorists in general and the
effectiveness of belt use in preventing fatal injury. A more useful
belt use rate is the rate among occupants involved in potentially
fatal crashes. Those crashes include all fatal crashes as well as
all crashes in which there would have been a fatality but for belt
use. The use rate in potentially fatal crashes is slightly over 50
percent.
4 Some State surveys are limited to passenger cars. The
agency's latest National Occupant Protection Use Survey, a
probability-based study of safety belt use in all vehicle types,
indicates a current use rate of 58 percent. Another survey will be
conducted in 1997.
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The primary reason for the rapid increase in the rate of safety
belt use in the late 1980's was the enactment of State safety belt use
laws. No State had a safety belt use law in effect at the time of the
1984 decision. The number rose quickly thereafter as a result of the
concerted efforts of a large number of groups including State and
federal safety authorities, consumer groups, motor vehicle
manufacturers, and the insurance industry. The number of States with
safety belt use laws in effect rose to 8 by the end of 1985, 22 by the
end of 1986 and 28 by the end of 1987. All of the dozen most populous
States had laws in effect by the end of 1988 5. Forty-nine States
now have belt use laws.6
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5 The burst of legislative activity after the 1984 decision was
not coincidental. The 1984 decision provided that the automatic
protection requirements would be rescinded if the Secretary of
Transportation determined by April 11, 1989 that State safety belt
use laws meeting specified conditions had been passed by a
sufficient number of States to cover two-thirds of the U.S.
population. That date passed without such a determination having
been made.
6 In ISTEA, the Congress also provided that States that
failed to adopt mandatory safety belt use laws would have a
percentage of their Federal-aid highway construction funds
transferred to their highway safety programs.
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The decisive move toward air bags occurred in 1991, as safety belt
use was approaching 60 percent. The vehicle manufacturers had begun
installing driver air bags in large numbers by model year 1990 and were
discussing plans for fleetwide installation of air bags, including
passenger air bags, within a few years. It appeared that air bags had
won out over automatic belts as a means of providing automatic
protection. Accordingly, in Section 2508(a)(1) of the Intermodal
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), codified at 49 U.S.C.
Sec. 30127(b), Congress directed NHTSA to amend Standard No. 208 to
provide that the ``automatic occupant protection'' in passenger cars
and light trucks shall be ``an inflatable restraint,'' (i.e., an air
bag). ISTEA mandated that air bags be installed in 95 percent of
passenger cars in model year 1997 and in 100 percent of cars in model
year 1998 and thereafter. For light trucks, it mandated installation of
air bags in 80 percent of model year 1998 vehicles and 100 percent of
model year 1999 and later vehicles.
ISTEA did not change the compliance tests for air bags. Section
2508(a)(1) specified inflatable restraints ``complying with the
occupant protection requirements under section 4.1.2.1 of such
Standard.'' At the time ISTEA was adopted, section S4.1.2.1 of FMVSS
No. 208 required vehicles covered by that section to comply with
subsections (a), (b), and either (c)(1) or (c)(2). (Virtually all auto
manufacturers have chosen to certify their vehicles under subsection
(c)(2), rather than (c)(1)). Section S4.1.2.1(a) provided that at each
front outboard designated seating position, a vehicle must meet certain
frontal crash protection requirements ``by means that require no action
by vehicle occupants.'' In other words, compliance was required to be
demonstrated in an unbelted test. Section S4.1.2.1(c)(2) provided that
the vehicle must meet these frontal crash protection requirements
through the use of manual seat belts provided with the vehicle ``in
addition to the means that require no action by the vehicle occupant.''
Agency Actions To Eliminate Air Bag Deaths
Reports of fatal injuries to young children and drivers in low
speed crashes led the agency to make an extensive effort to obtain and
analyze the data necessary to understand the source of the problem and
to evaluate potential solutions. Since these data were not otherwise
available from industry or any other outside source, the agency
conducted its own series of tests to address these issues.
On November 22, 1996, NHTSA announced its comprehensive strategy
for addressing the problems of air bag deaths. In addition to public
information and education efforts, and recommendations to the States to
adopt more effective safety belt use laws, the agency outlined an array
of rulemaking actions it would take shortly. Pursuant to that
announcement, the agency subsequently took the actions described below.
To address the safety of vehicles already on the road, the agency
proposed to authorize motor vehicle dealers and repair businesses to
deactivate air bags upon the request of vehicle owners who were
informed of the pros and cons of such deactivation. (62 FR 831; January
6, 1997) The same proposal would also apply to vehicles produced during
the next several model years. This proposal is intended to address the
problems of families who need to have young children in the front seat
for medical monitoring purposes, as well as other persons who could be
harmed by a functioning air bag. The agency strongly believes that
children and other vulnerable persons should not be put at risk. The
air bag technology currently chosen to meet the unbelted test presents
such a risk. Although the agency is not legally authorized to eliminate
the test, it has proposed temporary changes to the testing requirements
that would permit significant depowering. The agency took several other
actions that would affect vehicles produced during the next several
model years. It issued a final rule requiring vehicles made on or after
February 25, 1997, to be equipped with new, attention-getting labels
that clearly warn consumers about the potential dangers associated with
air bags. (61 FR 60206; November 27, 1996) It issued another final rule
extending, until September 1, 2000, a provision allowing manufacturers
the option of putting a manual cut-off switch for the passenger air bag
in vehicles with no rear seat or with a rear seat too small for rear-
facing child restraints. (62 FR. 798; January 6, 1997)
The agency also proposed two temporary options that would permit or
facilitate the depowering of current air bags. (62 FR 807; January 6,
1997) For the unbelted crash test requirement, the first option would
replace the existing ``60 g's'' chest injury criterion with a less
stringent ``80 g's'' criterion. The second option would convert the
unbelted crash test requirement from a test of complete vehicles in
barrier crashes, to a sled test using an unbelted dummy seated in a
body buck and a standardized 125 millisecond crash pulse. That crash
pulse is based on a November 1996 submission from the American
Automobile Manufacturers Association. Comments on the deactivation and
depowering proposals were due February 5, 1997.
Agency Actions to Increase U.S. Belt Use Rates
As the agency noted in its depowering proposal, NHTSA is
participating with vehicle manufacturers, air bag suppliers, insurance
companies and safety organizations in a coalition effort to address the
adverse effects of air bags by increasing the use of safety belts and
child seats. Substantial benefits could be obtained from achieving
higher safety
[[Page 8919]]
belt use rates. If the safety belt use rate were 75 percent in
potentially fatal crashes instead of the current level of 52.6 percent,
an additional 4,000 lives would be saved annually.
On January 23, 1997, the President issued a memorandum directing
the Department to work with the Congress, the States, and other
concerned persons, including representatives of the automobile and
insurance industries, and safety and consumer groups, and within 45
days (March 9, 1997) submit a plan to the President for increasing
safety belt use nationwide.
The President specified that the plan shall address, among other
things, the State laws that require the use of seatbelts, assistance
from the Department of Transportation to improve those laws, and a
comprehensive education campaign on behalf of the public and private
sector to help the public understand the need to wear seatbelts.
Agency Announcement of Public Workshop on Smart Air Bags
Finally, with respect to the longer term, NHTSA announced that it
would conduct a public workshop concerning smart air bags. (62 Fed.
Reg. 2996; January 21, 1997) The purpose of the workshop was to foster
a constructive dialogue with the industry, consumer groups and other
parties concerning issues related to mandating the introduction of
reliable ``smart'' air bags that either suppress deployment or modulate
the level of deployment under circumstances in which full deployment
might cause serious injury. In addition to ``smart'' technology, the
workshop addressed other air bag technologies that could reduce the
risk of air bag injuries but that have not been employed in current air
bag designs. It also explored the question whether amendments to the
standard are needed that could prove counterproductive in the long term
or whether suitable technology can be installed under the current
standard, as some air bag suppliers have suggested. The workshop was
held February 11-12, 1997, in Washington, D.C.
Petition for a Moratorium on the Unbelted Test Requirement
Out of concern about the deaths caused by air bags, Senator Dirk
Kempthorne sent the agency a letter, dated December 4, 1996,
petitioning the agency to commence rulemaking to establish an immediate
moratorium on the unbelted test requirement.
In support of his petition, the Senator said in his letter:
This unbelted standard was developed when few Americans used
seat belts. Now 49 states require seat belts to be worn, and nearly
70% of Americans use them. In providing protection to those adults
who choose not to obey seat belt laws, we are jeopardizing the lives
of our children, as well as small women. That is an unacceptable
policy choice.
He argued that, in the absence of the unbelted test requirement,
air bags could be developed that ``could improve the performance of air
bags for belted occupants, provide significant protection for unbelted
occupants, and, most importantly, significantly reduce injuries to
children.''
Senator Kempthorne amplified his views about the need for, and
possible benefits of, his requested amendment during the January 9
Senate hearing. He argued that NHTSA's proposals do not go far enough:
I agree that depowering is required, but unless the
administration acts on my proposal, both smart and depowered air
bags must still protect adult males who refuse to wear their seat
belt. That still puts children and women at risk * * *. [T]he
Administration even today insists that adults not wearing seat belts
should be protected at the expense of children and women. While 49
States require seat belts to be used, this Federal policy says, in
essence, law breakers who don't wear seat belts will be protected,
but maybe at the cost of the children. Seat belts provide the
primary protection in all types of crashes. Air bags are intended to
provide supplemental protection in car accidents * * * Air bags
should supplement seat belts, not replace them. Federal highway
safety policy should acknowledge and recognize individual
responsibility.
In closing, he listed the benefits he anticipated from that his
proposed moratorium. He stated that the moratorium:
[O]ne, will make air bags live up to [their] rightful supplemental
safety responsibility.
Number two, will increase safety for two-thirds of the American
people who obey the law and wear seat belts.
Number three, will get safer bags into cars faster.
Number four, will better protect women and senior citizens.
Number five, will minimize chances of children being killed.
Views of Other Participants in the Senate Hearing
Statements by Committee members and witnesses during the Senate
hearing on January 9 illustrate the range of views and arguments
regarding the unbelted test requirement. Support for elimination of the
requirement was expressed by the President of the American Automobile
Manufacturers Association and the President of the Association of
International Automobile Manufacturers.
Expressing his personal views, the Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board said:
Federal regulations and NHTSA's recent proposal to depower air
bags * * * still require that vehicle test procedures be based on
unrestrained occupants. In essence, air bags are being designed,
because of certification testing requirements, primarily to protect
unbelted, rather than belted occupants, even though the air bags are
being promoted as supplemental restraints systems and the majority
of motor vehicle occupants now use seat belts. Air bag regulatory
standards, based on unrestrained occupants, are no longer
appropriate.
He suggested that air bag performance certification testing should
be based primarily on belted occupants.
Mr. Robert Sanders, representing the Parents' Coalition for Air Bag
Warnings, a group composed of parents of young children killed by air
bags, did not explicitly address the issue of the unbelted test
requirement. However, Mr. Sanders, himself a parent of a child killed
by an air bag, questioned some of the same arguments used in support of
eliminating the requirement:
This problem is not a problem with the regulators. It's also not
a problem with the safety standard. The safety standard 208 * * *
does not say that they [the vehicle manufacturers] can't make a bag
that has less power. They can have a bag that has a lot of power
when it is needed, for an adult, and less power when it's not
needed, for a child or for an unbelted occupant. And it is a fact
that GM successfully designed such a system in the mid 70's.
They [the vehicle manufacturers] are saying that the Federal
government safety standard compels us to make a bag that's dangerous
for children. Therefore, please change the safety standard.
There's nothing wrong with the safety standard * * *. They had
the capability to comply with 208 and simultaneously make a bag that
was safe and effective for all sizes of occupants.
Additional concerns about eliminating the unbelted test requirement
were raised by several other participants:
U.S. Senator Richard Bryan asked whether a moratorium on
the unbelted test requirement might be equivalent to ``no standard'' at
all for air bag performance.
Joan Claybrook, President of Public Citizen, suggested
that the existing standard does not force vehicle manufacturers to
produce air bags that pose a risk to young children and women in low
speed crashes. She said that manufacturers have the flexibility under
the Standard to use dual level inflators based on crash severity. In
low speed crashes, there would be a low level of inflation and in high
speed
[[Page 8920]]
crashes, an appropriately higher level of inflation.
Ricardo Martinez, Administrator of NHTSA, noted that of
the approximately 1,700 persons whose lives had been saved by air bags,
an estimated 1,200 of them were unbelted.
Recent Agency Statements About the Unbelted Test Requirement
During the Senate hearing on January 9, Senator Kempthorne asked
the agency to provide its views regarding its legal authority to
eliminate the unbelted test requirement. In a letter dated January 13,
1997, the agency responded to the Senator, concluding that it lacked
such authority. The agency pointed out the following:
In section 2508(a)(1) of that statute, which is currently
codified at 49 U.S.C. 30127(b), Congress directed NHTSA to amend
FMVSS No. 208 ``to provide that the automatic occupant protection
for the front outboard designed seating positions [of certain
vehicles] shall be an inflatable restraint complying with the
occupant protection requirements under section 4.1.2.1 of such
Standard.'' Thus, each vehicle must have an air bag that provides
``automatic occupant protection.'' If the unbelted test were
eliminated from FMVSS No. 208, such that vehicles only had to
satisfy the performance requirements of the standard with the manual
belts attached, there would be no way to ensure that the air bags
would in fact provide ``automatic'' protection to front seat
occupants.7
\7\ A more detailed analysis of this legal issue has been
prepared by NHTSA and placed in the docket for this proceeding.
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NHTSA's January 13 letter to the Senator noted that, as part of its
analysis of the air bag problem and its efforts to identify the best
solutions, the agency considered whether eliminating the unbelted test
requirement would be advisable, putting aside the issue of legal
authority. At that time, the agency concluded that elimination was
unnecessary. NHTSA decided that other measures would enable vehicle
manufacturers to depower air bags to an extent that would eliminate
much of the risk to belted occupants and children and that the agency's
other regulatory solutions (deactivation, enhanced labels, cut-off
switches, and smart air bags) would address the remaining risk.
Additional depowering appeared undesirable, given the associated trade-
offs. As the agency stated in its January 13 letter:
Our research indicated that depowering air bags in the range of
20-35 percent would reduce the risk to children without
significantly increasing the risk that the bags would be too weak to
protect occupants in high-speed crashes. Our tests indicated that
depowering beyond that level produced little additional benefit for
children, and markedly increased the risk for larger occupants. The
amendment we proposed on January 6, 1997, will enable the
manufacturers to depower their air bags by the 20-35 percent that
seems to present the best balance for the safety of all occupants.
Nevertheless, the agency recognized that there might come a point
at which dropping the unbelted test might become appropriate for
reasons other than additional depowering. As NHTSA noted in its
depowering proposal:
The agency recognizes that, at some point, belt use might rise
to a point at which retention of the unbelted test requirements
might no longer be appropriate. The agency notes that belt use in
Australia is over 95 percent, and averages 93 percent in Canada.
However, as noted above, the belt use among fatally injured vehicle
occupants is less than 40 percent.
(62 FR 807, at 824)
The level of safety belt use is an essential factor in evaluating
the effects of eliminating the unbelted test, since there is little
doubt that most if not all vehicles now on the market can comply with
the injury criteria by means of safety belts alone. Thus, if the
unbelted test were deleted and no other tests were added to regulate
the performance of air bags, the vehicle manufacturers would be free to
install air bags that afford no protection to either belted or unbelted
occupants. In effect, the standard would no longer regulate the level
of protection afforded to unbelted occupants. This would be a
fundamental departure from the original concept of the standard, which
was to protect unbelted occupants as well as belted occupants.
Agency Decision To Request Public Comment
NHTSA has decided to seek public comment on its tentative
conclusions about the appropriateness of dropping the unbelted test
requirement under the current circumstances, and the factual issues
presented by the request for a moratorium. Given the importance of the
underlying problem and the interest in eliminating the unbelted test
requirement expressed by participants in the Senate hearing, the agency
believes that it would be beneficial to obtain public comments
analyzing the benefits and disbenefits of eliminating the unbelted test
requirement. NHTSA is seeking as much detailed technical data as
possible in support of any comments. Although the agency currently
lacks the authority to take that action, it could ask Congress to adopt
the necessary legislation.
To help frame the issues relevant to the merits of eliminating the
unbelted test, the agency has drawn the following arguments from the
information submitted to it:
Arguments for eliminating the unbelted test:
(1) A vehicle safety standard should not benefit some occupants by
means that cause harm to others. The rule should be: ``First, do no
harm.''
(2) To the extent that the need to satisfy the injury criteria of
Standard No. 208 in an unbelted test results in air bags that are
causing injuries in low-speed crashes, the standard needs to be
changed.
(3) The increase in national belt use rate to 68 percent has made
the unbelted test requirement obsolete.
(4) Air bags ought to be designed for the benefit of those who obey
the law and use their safety belts.
(5) Air bags are intended to be supplemental safety devices and
ought to be optimized for the benefit of belted occupants, and thus
save increased numbers of those occupants.
Arguments against eliminating the unbelted test:
(1) The unbelted test requirement does not require manufacturers to
install air bags that cause deaths in low speed crashes. Technology
such as dual level inflators, higher deployment thresholds and smart
air bags have the potential to prevent deaths in low speed crashes,
while preserving the ability of air bags to protect occupants in higher
speed crashes.
(2) In the short run, the agency's depowering proposal will allow
manufacturers to achieve the same goals sought by proponents of
eliminating the unbelted test requirement, while retaining some
protection for unbelted occupants.
(3) Thirty-two percent of front seat occupants--and 50 percent of
occupants in potentially fatal crashes--do not wear safety belts. The
air bag is the primary protection for these people, not merely
supplemental protection.
(4) If the unbelted test requirement were eliminated, with no
compensatory changes, future air bags might be less protective than
current ones, even for belted occupants. If air bags were depowered too
much, they would not provide adequate protection at higher speeds or
for larger occupants, whether belted or unbelted.
(5) Without the unbelted test, the performance of air bags would
not be regulated. The manufacturers would be free to reduce the power
of air bags to any level the market would permit. Safety decisions like
this are too critical to be left to the marketplace.
[[Page 8921]]
Questions for Commenters
1. What would the benefit of eliminating the unbelted test
requirement be compared to the projected benefits of the agency's
proposed options to allow depowering of air bags? Would eliminating the
unbelted test requirement allow greater depowering than adoption of the
80g option? The sled test option? Would greater depowering have
benefits or disbenefits?
2. What changes would the manufacturers make in response to the
elimination of the unbelted test requirement? How long would it take to
implement those changes? Would manufacturers respond differently to
eliminating the unbelted test requirement than they would if the agency
adopted the 80g option? The sled test option?
3. How and to what extent could air bags be made more effective for
belted occupants in the absence of an unbelted test requirement? Would
these changes affect the performance of air bags in protecting unbelted
occupants?
4. Given current belt use rates, should Federal law continue to
require automatic protection for unbelted occupants? If so, should the
required level of protection be the same as for belted occupants?
Should the ISTEA air bag mandate be repealed to allow manufacturers to
provide automatic protection by automatic safety belts?
5. Is there a level of safety belt usage at which it would be
appropriate to no longer require protection for unbelted occupants? If
so, what level?
6. If the unbelted test requirement were eliminated, should that
elimination be coupled with simultaneous compensatory changes to the
injury criteria or to the test requirements, or both, to ensure the
continued protective value of air bags? Changes might take the form of
making the existing criteria more stringent, adding additional
criteria, or both. If compensatory changes are desirable, what changes
should be made? What level of protectiveness should be required for
belted occupants? For unbelted occupants?
7. Would the effects of eliminating the unbelted test requirement
be different for driver air bags versus passenger air bags? Have the
design changes that the vehicle manufacturers have been making to
driver air bags significantly reduced the problem of driver deaths
caused by air bags? For unbelted drivers? For belted drivers?
8. If the unbelted test requirement were eliminated, should such
elimination be permanent or temporary? If temporary, for how long
should it be suspended? Should it be reinstated after smart air bags
are required?
9. Would any potential harm from eliminating the unbelted test fall
disproportionately on groups who tend to have lower belt use rates and
higher crash rates, such as young drivers? Would the belts designed to
protect belted occupants be less effective for unbelted occupants?
10. What should the role of the Federal government be with respect
to the design of air bags so as to minimize air bag deaths in low speed
crashes? Should government merely point out potential ways of avoiding
such consequences and let the marketplace decide whether they should be
implemented, or should it mandate features that will minimize the risk?
11. If the unbelted test were to be deleted through legislation,
should that action be coupled with measures to secure the enactment of
stronger safety belt use laws or other measures to increase safety belt
use?
Submission of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit comments. It is requested
but not required that 10 copies be submitted.
All comments must not exceed 15 pages in length. (49 CFR 553.21).
Necessary attachments may be appended to these submissions without
regard to the 15-page limit. This limitation is intended to encourage
commenters to detail their primary arguments in a concise fashion.
If a commenter wishes to submit certain information under a claim
of confidentiality, three copies of the complete submission, including
purportedly confidential business information, should be submitted to
the Chief Counsel, NHTSA, at the street address given above, and seven
copies from which the purportedly confidential information has been
deleted should be submitted to the Docket Section. A request for
confidentiality should be accompanied by a cover letter setting forth
the information specified in the agency's confidential business
information regulation. 49 CFR Part 512.
All comments received before the close of business on the comment
closing date indicated above will be considered, and will be available
for examination in the docket at the above address both before and
after that date. To the extent possible, comments filed after the
closing date will also be considered. Comments will be available for
inspection in the docket. The NHTSA will continue to file relevant
information as it becomes available in the docket after the closing
date, and it is recommended that interested persons continue to examine
the docket for new material.
Those persons desiring to be notified upon receipt of their
comments in the rules docket should enclose a self-addressed, stamped
postcard in the envelope with their comments. Upon receiving the
comments, the docket supervisor will mail the postcard back.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles.
(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166;
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50)
Issued on February 24, 1997.
L. Robert Shelton,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 97-4985 Filed 2-24-97; 4:51 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P