

**14 CFR Part 39****[Docket No. 96-NM-97-AD; Amendment 39-9917; AD 97-03-12]**

RIN 2120-AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; Jetstream Model 4101 Airplanes****AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.**ACTION:** Final rule; correction.

**SUMMARY:** This document corrects information in an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection for damage caused by arcing and overheating of the electrical ground posts ("earth posts") and ground cables for the direct current (DC) power generation and propeller de-icing systems of the left and right engines; and repair and replacement, if necessary. This action corrects the AD number assigned to that AD.

**DATES:** Effective March 14, 1997.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations was previously approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 14, 1997 (62 FR 5743, February 7, 1997).

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** William Schroeder, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2148; fax (206) 227-1149.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On January 29, 1997, the FAA issued AD 97-03-12, amendment 39-9917 (62 FR 5743, February 7, 1997), which is applicable to certain Jetstream Model 4101 airplanes. That AD requires a one-time inspection for damage caused by arcing and overheating of the electrical ground posts ("earth posts") and ground cables for the direct current (DC) power generation and propeller de-icing systems of the left and right engines; and repair and replacement, if necessary. That action was prompted by reports indicating that earth posts on some airplanes had failed due to overheating. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent potential consequences of overheating, such as failure of the DC power generation and propeller de-icing systems.

Since the issuance of that AD, the FAA has become aware of the fact that the document that was published in the Federal Register contained the incorrect AD number that had been assigned to that action. The published version

indicated an AD number of 96-03-12. However, the correct AD number is 97-03-12.

Action is taken herein to correct the AD number to 97-03-12 and to correctly add the AD as an amendment to section 39.13 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.13).

The effective date of the rule remains March 14, 1997.

Since no other part of the regulatory information has been changed, the final rule is not being republished.

**§ 39.13 [Corrected]**

On page 5743, in the issue of February 7, 1997, in the second column, the heading that identifies the pertinent agency numbers is corrected to read as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

[Docket No. 96-NM-97-AD; Amendment 39-9917, AD 97-03-12]

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On page 5744, in the issue of February 7, 1997, in the first column, the introductory text that specifies pertinent agency numbers and the airplane manufacturer is corrected to read as follows:

\* \* \* \* \*

97-03-12 Jetstream Aircraft Limited: Amendment 39-9917. Docket 96-NM-97-AD.

\* \* \* \* \*

Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 11, 1997.

Darrell M. Pederson,

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

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**14 CFR Part 39****[Docket No. 96-CE-45-AD; Amendment 39-9938; AD 97-04-13]**

RIN 2120-AA64

**Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., MU-2B Series Airplanes****AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.**ACTION:** Final rule

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., (Mitsubishi) MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires removing the vent check valve assembly from the bulkhead between the fuel tanks. This AD results from an incident where both engines on an affected airplane failed near the end of a flight because of lack of fuel to the engines. The incident is

attributed to the fuel filler caps on the top of the wings not sealing correctly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the inability of both engines to utilize the entire fuel supply because of the outboard fuel not transferring to the center tank, which could result in an uncommanded engine shutdown.

**DATES:** Effective April 16, 1997.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of April 16, 1997.

**ADDRESSES:** Service information that applies to this AD may be obtained from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Nagoya Aerospace Systems, 10, Oyecho, Minato-Ku, Nagoya, Japan. This information may also be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket 96-CE-45-AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. Eric M. Smith, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627-5260; facsimile (310) 627-5210.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

Events Leading to the Issuance of This AD

A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to Mitsubishi MU-2B series airplanes was published in the Federal Register as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on October 30, 1996 (61 FR 53939). The NPRM proposed to require removing the vent check valve assembly from the bulkhead between the fuel tanks. Accomplishment of the proposed action as specified in the NPRM would be in accordance with Mitsubishi MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 130A, dated July 19, 1971.

The NPRM is the result of an incident where both engines on an affected airplane failed near the end of a flight because of lack of fuel to the engines. The incident is attributed to the fuel filler caps on the top of the wings not sealing correctly.

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. No comments were received on the proposed rule or the FAA's determination of the cost to the public.