[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 33 (Wednesday, February 19, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7638-7649]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4116]
[[Page 7637]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part IV
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Research and Special Programs Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
49 CFR Part 171
Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed
Gas Service; Interim Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 7638]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Research and Special Programs Administration
49 CFR Part 171
[Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225)]
RIN 2137-AC97
Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied
Compressed Gas Service; Interim Final Rule
AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.
ACTION: Emergency Interim final rule and announcement of a public
meeting.
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SUMMARY: In this interim final rule, RSPA is amending the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR) to specify the conditions under which
certain cargo tank motor vehicles may continue to be used on an interim
basis, even if they are equipped with emergency discharge control
systems which may not function as required by the regulations under all
operating conditions. This rule addresses specification MC 330, MC 331,
and certain non-specification cargo tank motor vehicles which are used
to deliver propane and other liquefied compressed gases. It responds to
a recently discovered safety deficiency which may affect many of these
cargo tank motor vehicles. The intended effect of this action is to
ensure, on an interim basis, an acceptable level of safety for delivery
of liquefied compressed gases while a permanent solution to the problem
is developed and implemented.
During the term of this interim rule, RSPA is seeking comments and
data on the costs and effectiveness of alternative means of achieving a
level of safety for the long term comparable to that provided by its
long-standing regulation. At the same time, the Agency is also seeking
comments on the costs and benefits of the interim measures adopted in
this rule.
A public meeting is scheduled for March 20, 1997, to receive
comments and recommendations in regard to the measures adopted in this
interim final rule and to solicit recommendations for a permanent
solution. Additionally, two workshops have been scheduled for March 4-
5, 1997 and April 8-9, 1997. All interested persons, including trade
organizations, cargo tank producers, individual wholesale and retail
entities involved in the distribution of liquefied compressed gases and
representatives of public protection organizations, are encouraged to
participate.
DATES: Effective date: This interim final rule is effective February
19, 1997 through August 15, 1997.
Comment date: Comments must be received by April 21, 1997.
Public meeting: A public meeting will be held on Wednesday, March
20, 1997, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C.
Workshops: Workshops will be held on--March 4-5, 1997, and April 8-
9, 1997, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C.
Oral presentations: Any person wishing to present an oral statement
at the public meeting should notify Jennifer Karim by telephone or in
writing, on or before March 12, 1997.
ADDRESSES: Written comments: Address comments to the Dockets Office,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW,
Washington, D.C. 20590-0001. Comments should identify the docket number
and be submitted in two copies. Persons wishing to receive confirmation
of receipt of their comments should include a self-addressed, stamped
postcard. The Dockets Office is located on the Plaza Level of the
Nassif Building at the Department of Transportation at the above
address. Public dockets may be reviewed there between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
Public meeting: The public meeting will be held at the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Auditorium, 800 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, D.C. 20591.
Workshops: (1) March 4-5, 1997, U.S. Department of Transportation
(Room 6244, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C.
20590; (2) April 8-9, 1997, U.S. Department of Transportation (Room
6200, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590.
Oral presentations: Submit written text of oral statement to
Jennifer Karim, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room 8100, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Five copies of written
text of oral statements should be presented to RSPA staff immediately
prior to the oral presentation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Kirkpatrick, Office of
Hazardous Materials Technology, Research and Special Programs
Administration, telephone (202) 366-4545, or Stephen Keppler, Office of
Motor Carrier Safety and Technology, Safety and Hazardous Materials
Division, Federal Highway Administration, telephone (202) 366-2978,
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW, telephones
20590-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On September 8, 1996, more than 35,000 gallons of propane were
released during a delivery at a bulk storage facility in Sanford, North
Carolina. During the unloading of a specification MC 331 cargo tank
motor vehicle into two 30,000-gallon storage tanks, the discharge hose
from the cargo tank separated at its hose coupling at the storage tank
inlet connection. Most of the cargo tank's 9,800 gallons and more than
30,000 gallons from the storage tanks were released during this
incident. If this large quantity of propane had reached an ignition
source, 125 people (workers, residents and emergency responders) could
have been killed.
The hazards associated with transportation of liquefied petroleum
gas have been demonstrated repeatedly on U.S. highways. In fact,
propane releases are the second leading cause of death in hazardous
materials transportation. Between 1990 and 1991, five reported deaths
and 695 injuries resulted from propane incidents in highway
transportation. For example, when liquid propane is released into the
atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into its normal non-pressurized
gaseous form. This happens very rapidly, and in the process, the
propane combines readily with air to form fuel-air mixtures which are
ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent by volume. If an ignition
source is present in the vicinity of such highly flammable mixtures,
the vapor cloud ignites and burns very rapidly (characterized by some
experts as ``explosively''). This has occurred a number of times over
the years, and even though the incidents described below were not
caused by spills during lading transfer, they illustrate the grave
consequences of a large propane release when ignition occurs:
On July 25, 1962 in Berlin, NY, an MC 330 bulk transport
ruptured releasing about 6,900 gallons of liquid propane. Ignition
occurred. Ten persons were killed, and 17 others were injured. Property
damage included total destruction of 18 buildings and 11 vehicles.
On March 9, 1972 near Lynchburg, VA, an MC 331 bulk
transport overturned and slid into a rock embankment. The impact
ruptured the tank's shell releasing about 4,000 gallons of liquid
propane. Ignition occurred. Two persons were killed and five others
were injured. Property damage included a farmhouse, outbuildings and
about 12 acres of woodland.
[[Page 7639]]
On April 29, 1975, near Eagle Pass, Texas, an MC-330 bulk
transport struck a concrete headwall and ruptured releasing more than
8,000 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and
explosion killed 16 persons, injured 51, and destroyed 51 vehicles.
On February 22, 1973, 23 tank cars derailed in Waverly,
Tennessee. During wreck-clearing operations, a 30,000-gallon tank car
containing liquefied petroleum gas ruptured. The ensuing fire and
explosion killed 16 persons, injured 43, and caused $1.8 million in
property damage.
On December 23, 1988, in Memphis, Tennessee, an MC-330
bulk transport struck a bridge abutment and ruptured releasing 9388
gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and explosion
killed eight persons and injured eight.
On July 27, 1994, in White Plains, New York, an MC-331
bulk transport struck a column of an overpass and ruptured, releasing
9,200 gallons of propane. Ignition occurred. The driver was killed, 23
people were injured, and an area within a radius of approximately 400
feet was engulfed in fire.
In the Sanford incident, the driver became aware of the system
failure when the hose began to violently oscillate while releasing
liquid propane. He immediately shut down the engine, stopping the
discharge pump, but he could not access the remote closure control to
close the internal stop valve. The excess flow feature of the emergency
discharge control system did not function, and propane continued to be
released from the system. Additionally, the back flow check valve on
the storage tank system did not function and propane was released from
the storage tanks. In light of the large quantity of propane released,
this incident could have resulted in a catastrophic loss of life and
extensive property damage if the gas had reached an ignition source.
Fortunately, there was no fire.
Based on the preliminary information from the Sanford incident,
RSPA published an advisory notice in the Federal Register on December
13, 1996 (61 FR 65480). This notice alerted persons involved in the
design, manufacture, assembly, maintenance or transportation of
hazardous materials in MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles of
this problem with the excess flow feature of the emergency discharge
control systems and reminded them that these tanks and their components
must conform to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 171-
180; HMR). Since that time, RSPA has received applications for
emergency exemptions from both the National Propane Gas Association
(NPGA) and the Mississippi Tank Company that indicate the problem is
more extensive than originally believed. Additionally, The Fertilizer
Institute (TFI) and National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC) have
submitted applications to become party to these exemptions. In support
of its exemption application the Mississippi Tank Company, a
manufacturer of specification MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles, has
provided preliminary information that there is reason to suspect the
problem may be common to nearly all cargo tank motor vehicles used in
liquefied compressed gas service within the United States. This problem
may exist also in the non-specification cargo tanks authorized in
Sec. 173.315(k). Both applications for exemption are reprinted in their
entirety and discussed in detail below.
II. National Propane Gas Association Application for Emergency
Exemption
The body of NPGA's application for exemption is reproduced as
follows (numbers in brackets have been added for ease of reference in
the following discussion):
[1] The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA), acting as an
agent for its members, presents here an application for a DOT
Exemption to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to permit the
continued operation of certain cargo tank motor vehicles in propane
service pending development and installation of equipment intended
to overcome an operational difficulty identified recently. The
Association also requests that this application be handled as an
emergency exemption under the procedures outlined in 49 CFR 107.113.
Upon issuance of this emergency exemption, NPGA will submit a second
request to convert the emergency exemption to a conventional
exemption.
[2] NPGA is the national trade association of the LP-gas
(principally propane) industry with a membership of about 3,500
companies, including 37 affiliated state and regional associations,
representing members in all 50 states. Although the single largest
group of NPGA members are retail marketers of propane gas, the
membership also includes propane producers, transporters and
wholesalers, as well as manufacturers and distributors of associated
equipment, containers and appliances. Propane gas is used in over 18
million installations nationwide for home and commercial heating and
cooking, in agriculture, in industrial processing, and as a clean
air alternative engine fuel for both over-the-road vehicles and
industrial lift trucks.
[3] On September 8, 1996, a cargo tank motor vehicle, of the
type in the industry known as a highway transport--a large cargo
tank semi-trailer pulled by a highway truck tractor--was unloading a
cargo of propane into permanent storage tanks at a propane marketing
facility in Sanford, North Carolina. Shortly after the transfer
operation began, the transfer hose separated from the transfer
connection at its juncture with the plant piping and began
discharging liquid propane to the atmosphere. The vehicle driver
heard sounds unusual for a transfer operation and shut off the
vehicle engine. According to the report of the Federal Highway
Administration inspector, the driver was not able to get to the
remote controls to close the internal stop flow valve. The driver
then ran to an adjacent residential area to warn residents to
immediately evacuate the area. As will be discussed later in this
letter, the excess flow protection in the cargo tank did not
activate and the entire propane cargo was discharged to the
atmosphere.
[4] Likewise, emergency flow protection in the plant piping did
not activate automatically as designed and intended. As a result,
the entire contents of the storage facility--something in excess of
35,000 gallons of propane--was also discharged to the atmosphere.
While the emergency flow control system on the transport is subject
to the HMR, the storage tank system is subject to regulations of the
State of North Carolina. Investigation of that segment of the
incident is being handled as a separate matter. The purpose of this
letter is to discuss the transport system, applicable regulations
and what can be done to prevent such an incident from recurring.
[5] Mr. Samuel E. McTier, NPGA President, has appointed a
special task force to work directly under the NPGA Executive
Committee to determine the extent and nature of the underlying
causes of this incident. The task force was directed to study this
incident and develop two plans of action: First, how to provide for
continued safe operation of existing propane cargo tanks while
necessary changes are developed and put into place [including those
cargo tanks to be built during this transition period], and second,
how to correct safety and operational problems for the long term
through changes to the MC-331 specification, if necessary, and to
industry recommended safety and operating practices to preclude such
an incident from happening again. This task force first met December
12-13, 1996 in Atlanta, Georgia. The enclosed recommendations and
accompanying comments are based on their deliberations.
[6] NPGA understands that Mississippi Tank Company has already
submitted an application for an emergency exemption and supports the
technical discussions in that application as a succinct presentation
of the overall problem. In the time that has passed since that
application was filed with DOT, however, additional information has
become available. As a consequence, while much of the Mississippi
Tank information has been incorporated into this application, there
are certain significant differences between the NPGA application and
the Mississippi tank document.
[7] It is important to recognize that the situation described in
the Mississippi Tank application is not unique to that company.
Rather, that situation can reasonably be expected to occur with
propane transports from other assemblers.
[[Page 7640]]
[8] In the smaller propane cargo tank motor vehicles (typically
smaller than 3,500 gallons water capacity, called bobtails), the
cargo tank is mounted directly on the vehicle chassis. These
vehicles have a somewhat different piping arrangement than that used
on transports. Consequently, on preliminary review, bobtails do not
appear to have the same operating characteristics as transports. As
a result, the first priority of this NPGA special task force has
been directed at the transports; once the situation with the
transports has been brought under control for the short term, the
task force will immediately make similar investigations and studies
of the bobtail vehicles.
[9] NPGA is gravely concerned about the underlying causes of the
North Carolina incident and is committed to identifying and
implementing appropriate changes to industry recommended safety and
operating practices and to the HMR requirements to preclude such an
incident occurring again.
[10] The propane industry transports between 7 and 10 billion
gallons annually in these highway transports; that same volume is
transported again in these local delivery bobtail tank trucks. In
the past 10 years, there has not been a similar reported incident
during the unloading of a transport. According to DOT's information,
some 8 or 10 events have occurred unloading bobtails. That incident
rate works out to be less than one per year.
[11] The propane industry is committed to prompt correction of
any problems or concerns that are identified with DOT by this
special task force as part of our continuing desire and goal to
continue that safety record. We also believe that the current
incident experience record is testimony to the validity and
effectiveness of the safety and operating systems presently in use
for transportation of propane, both in the Hazardous Materials
Regulations and in industry safety and operating practices.
The Difficulty
[12] 49 CFR 178.337-11(a)(1)(i) requires each internal self-
closing stop valve and excess flow valve to automatically close if
any of its attachments are sheared off or if any attached hose or
piping is separated. 49 CFR 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) expands on the
requirements for properly sizing excess flow valves regarding
branching or other restrictions and the addition of additional
smaller capacity excess flow valves, where required.
[13] Mississippi Tank Company recently conducted tests in an
effort to determine why the excess flow feature of the internal
valve in the transport cargo tank outlet flange in the Sanford,
North Carolina incident did not function as intended by the MC-331
specification requirements. The Mississippi Tank tests clearly show
that the internal stop flow valves available for use with flange
mounted pumps will not always close automatically under conditions
simulating the situation where the hoses or piping might be sheared
off or separated from the pump. Mississippi Tank has also determined
that there are no such internal valves presently available that will
provide the protection required by Secs. 178.337-11 (a)(1)(i) and
(a)(1)(v).
[14] Principal among the conclusions reached from the
Mississippi Tank tests is that the internal valve equipped with the
400 gpm spring (which operates the excess flow feature to provide
automatic closure) would close dependably with tank pressures as low
as 65 psig but that the excess flow feature would not operate at
tank pressures lower than 65 psig.
Rather than repeat the discussion of the test results in the
Mississippi Tank application, in the interests of brevity, we refer
you to that application.
Solutions to the Situation--Long Term
[15] From the Mississippi Tank tests and from discussions with
the manufacturers of the cargo tank pumps and the internal valves,
NPGA has concluded that the second and third sentences of
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) are self-conflicting and mutually
exclusive. Based on present technology and equipment, it simply is
not possible to comply with both provisions.
[16] When this provision was reworded in the HM-183 amendments,
industry review of the new provisions indicated that there would be
no problem in complying with the requirement. The revised wording
was accepted at face value merely as a rewording of the provisions
that existed at that time in the MC-331 specification prior to the
amendments. At the time, all of the vehicle assemblers believed that
their individual practices for compliance with the specification
requirements were appropriate and adequate to the need. However, the
studies and discussions undertaken as a consequence of this North
Carolina incident have demonstrated, and have been confirmed by the
Mississippi Tank tests, that there is a basic conflict in the
provisions contained in these two sentences in Sec. 178.337-
11(a)(1)(v).
[17] It is now clear that excess flow protection, whether when
incorporated into the discharge internal valve or as an in-line
device, will not function under all climatic conditions nor under
other low flow rate conditions. In recognition of the preliminary
conclusion that excess flow devices will not always operate as
intended or desired, the NPGA special task force has concluded that
new control and operating systems must be developed to provide the
desired level of reliability and emergency flow control during
unloading operations. Devising these new systems is the next
priority for the special task force appointed by President McTier.
[18] The task force will also review control systems and
operating procedures for loading operations to be sure that the
desired level of emergency flow control will also be available in
that operation as well. The loading operations aspect of this
project, has been assigned a second level of priority, since there
have not been any reported incidents during those operations.
[19] The special task force already has identified several
possible alternatives for emergency flow control during transport
unloading for consideration as permanent changes to industry
recommended safety and operation practices or for adoption as
regulatory provisions. These possible solutions include:
A pneumatic deadman device interlocked with the
internal stop flow valve and the tank truck brakes, possibly
combined with a lanyard for remote activation. Possibly applicable
to bobtails as well.
Note: The term ``deadman'' is used to identify a system that
must be in place and operable in order for the unloading system to
operate. If the shut-down mechanism of the system is activated for
any reason, the unloading operation is discontinued and the internal
stop flow valve closes.
A mechanical deadman device, possibly combined with a
lanyard for remote activation. Possibly applicable to bobtails as
well.
A differential valve downstream of the pump. If the
engine is shut down, the set-pressure differential is detected and
stops the flow of propane. This system would only protect piping
downstream of the differential valve. Applicable to bobtails as
well.
[20] Amendment of Sec. 173.33 will also be needed to apply this
improved level of safety on a permanent basis to the continued
operation of existing MC-330 and MC-331 propane tank trucks and the
non-specification cargo tanks operated under Sec. 173.315(k).
[21] The special task force will also study provisions for
allowance of the physical and chemical properties of the lading in
designing the emergency flow protection system required by the MC-
331 specification. Such provisions are not presently a directly-
mentioned provision in the specification. The preliminary analyses
conducted by the special NPGA task force indicate that such
considerations are of primary importance. As an example, while NPGA
has every confidence in the results of the excess flow valve
capacity tests conducted by Mississippi Tank Company, which used
water under pneumatic tank pressure as the test medium, we also now
know that those tests only approximate the performance of the same
equipment when handling propane in a general manner. Sufficient data
and other information is not presently available to satisfactorily
model the performance of that equipment in water flow to
satisfactorily predict the manner in which the same equipment would
perform when handling propane, or any other liquefied compressed
gas, for that matter.
Solutions to the Situation--Short Term
[22] Responding to the long term need for a new control system
is the ultimate goal for the NPGA special task force. Part of that
mission includes presentation of appropriate recommendations to DOT
for further consideration and adoption as amendments to the MC-331
specification for new construction and to Sec. 173.33 to provide for
the continued operation of existing cargo tanks.
[23] However, the immediate problem is how to provide for the
continued operation of (1) existing MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tank
motor vehicles in propane service, (2) the non-specification
vehicles authorized under Sec. 173.315(k) of the HMR, and (3) any
new vehicles built in the interim period pending formal amendment of
the HMR. Also, provisions must be made in this continued operation
aspect for the annual leakage test and external inspection and for
[[Page 7641]]
the five-year requalification requirements of the HMR for these
vehicles.
[24] As an agent for the members of the Association, NPGA now
submits an application for a DOT Exemption. For reasons set forth
below, NPGA also recommends that this application be handled under
the provisions for emergency exemptions (Ref: Sec. 107.113).
Following DOT's approval of such an exemption, NPGA will promptly
submit an application to convert that emergency exemption to a
conventional exemption. Such a combination of Exemptions would
provide two things:
(1) authorization for the continued operation of existing cargo
tank motor vehicles in propane service in the interim to the
adoption of appropriate regulatory provisions to correct these
technical and operational difficulties and (2) for the conditional
operation (including annual tests and inspections and the five-year
requalification) of any cargo tank motor vehicles built under the
present regulations pending adoption of said amendments. Given the
exceptional safety record discussed earlier for both transports and
bobtails, NPGA believes that the following provisions for the
proposed Exemption will continue this safety record while the
relevant changes to industry safety and operating practices and any
changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations are developed and put
into place.
[25] NPGA is not advocating removal of Secs. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)
and (a)(1)(v) at the present time. Rather, we believe that further
information is needed as to the nature and extent of changes to be
considered for the MC-331 specification before any proposed changes
are considered for the Hazardous Materials Regulations.
[26] NPGA recognizes the importance of prompt and expedient
action in developing recommended changes to industry safety and
operating practices and provisions of the Hazardous Materials
Regulations to improve present the respective provisions for
emergency flow control. To that end, NPGA will present a time plan
with respective completion points for identification, development,
testing and implementation of retrofits and the presentation of
proposed changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations to DOT by
February 17, 1997. Furthermore, NPGA representatives will be in
frequent contact with RSPA/Office of Hazardous Materials Safety and
FHWA/Office of Motor Carrier Safety staff in a liaison capacity
regarding the deliberation so this NPGA special task force and will
present formal quarterly progress reports at appropriate liaison
meetings.
[27] Provisions of the Exemption:
1. Compliance with applicable provisions of the Hazardous
Materials Regulations, with the exception of Secs. 173.315(n),
178.337-11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v).
2. NPGA will contact all of its members operating or assembling
propane cargo tank motor vehicles and will work with industry trade
press and other resources to reach affected non-member companies.
The purpose of this outreach effort will be to bring the North
Carolina incident and related, identified concerns to the attention
of companies operating or assembling propane cargo tank motor
vehicles.
3. Transfer hose used under the terms of the exemption (1) will
be inspected before continued use, with particular attention to the
condition and suitability of the hose end couplings for service and
(2) otherwise comply with applicable provisions of NFPA 58, 1995
edition. New transfer hose assemblies will be tested as required by
Sec. 180.407(h)(1)(ii) before the hose assembly is placed in
service.
NFPA 58, 1995 edition designates NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of
Liquefied Petroleum Gases, published by the National Fire Protection
Association, Quincy, Massachusetts. In its capacity as an American
National Standard, NFPA 58 has been used as the basis of regulation
by virtually all of the 50 states. A copy of the 1995 edition (the
current edition) is enclosed for your information and consideration.
4. The vehicle driver will be continually in attendance and
control of the loading and unloading operations.
5. Drivers will be advised of the events leading to the December
8, 1996 incident at Sanford, North Carolina and trained against the
potential of that incident occurring again. Such training will
include the inspection of delivery hose and connections to be used
for the transfer operation to determine, among other things, that
the hose is suitable for continued service and that the hose-end
fittings and related connections to plant piping and tank truck
valves are suitable for service. Driver training as required by
Secs. 172.702 and 172.704 will include recognition of the potential
severity of equipment failure or malfunction during product transfer
and appropriate actions to be taken should such an event occur.
Records of this training will be included in records required by
Sec. 172.704(d). During the term of this exemption, a statement
signed by the driver acknowledging such training and operating
instructions will be filed by the employer in the files required by
Sec. 172.704.
6. The proposed exemption would apply to two types of vehicles:
(1) The continued operation of those cargo tanks already in
service--MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles in propane
service and non-specification propane cargo tanks authorized for
continued operation under the provisions of Sec. 173.315(k) and (2)
the entrance into service of new or remounted vehicles that will be
built or assembled in the interim period to the adoption of formal
regulatory provisions providing new approaches to emergency flow
control as an alternative to excess flow valves.
7. The proposed Exemption will authorize continued assembler and
design certification of new MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles and
required annual inspection and 5-year requalification certifications
that the subject vehicle complies with the Hazardous Materials
Regulations, with the exception of Secs. 173.315(n) and 178.337-
11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v).
Treatment as an Emergency Exemption
[28] In recognition of the provisions of HMR/Sec. 107.113(a), a
copy of this request for Emergency Exemption is being filed
concurrently with the Chief, Hazardous Materials and Safety
Division, Office of Safety and Technology, Federal Highway
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
20590-0001.
[29] The propane industry is in the midst of the winter heating
season. Over 80 percent of the 7-9 billion gallons of propane
referenced at the beginning of this letter is used as a residential
heating fuel in rural locations where natural gas service is not
available. Virtually all of these cargo tank motor vehicles--highway
transports and bobtails alike--are needed to provide timely and
adequate delivery of this heating fuel. In addition to residential
heating fuel, the industry also provides heating fuel to dairy
barns, chicken and hog brooders, peak shaving for natural gas
utilities. In addition, propane is also widely used as an
alternative engine fuel.
[30] There is another aspect of the need for expedient action in
the approval and implementation of this exemption--financial impact
on the propane marketers, propane producers, common carriers,
vehicle assemblers and equipment manufacturers.
propane marketers--Unless they are able to deliver
fuel, these companies literally will not be able to continue in
business. Of our 3,500 member companies, some 3,200 are small,
independent businesses operating about 3,400 bulk plants (local
retail facilities). There are another 3,400 bulk plants operated by
17 multistate marketer companies. Our members sell over 85% of the
propane used as a residential heating fuel. Once the propane has
been delivered to a bulk plant by a highway transport, it is
transported again by bobtail cargo tank vehicles to the ultimate
consumer.
propane producers--Propane heating fuel has two
sources: a co-product of natural gas production and a by-product of
crude petroleum cracking and refining operations.
common carriers--Over 90 percent of the propane used as
a heating fuel is transported first by pipeline and then by highway
transport to the local propane bulk plant. While some propane
marketers have their own fleet of transport tank trucks, many of
these companies rely on motor common carriers to deliver their
propane supply. While many of these carriers carry other materials
as well (hazardous as well as non-hazardous), for many carriers,
propane transportation is a very significant part of their business.
vehicle assemblers--For some of the vehicle assemblers,
propane cargo tank motor vehicles (especially bobtails) are a very
major part of their business. The companies building propane highway
transports typically produce semi-trailer cargo tank motor vehicles
for the transportation of other hazardous materials as well.
equipment manufacturers--The manufacturers of pumps,
valves, hose and the other equipment from which a tank truck is
assembled obviously service other industries than just propane; at
the same time, supplying the propane industry has become a rather
significant part of their business.
[31] The ability to be able to operate propane bobtails and
highway transports has
[[Page 7642]]
so many impacts and is so pervasive as be almost incalculable from
an economic impact viewpoint. On the one hand, we believe the
extremely large volume of propane handled annually (9,000,000,000
gallons) by transport and then a second time by the bobtails in
local deliveries and the demonstrated safety record over the history
of the industry is clear testimony to the commitment of this
industry to safety and employee training. On the other hand, we are
committed to correction of the provisions of Sec. 178.337-11
regarding emergency flow control to address the problems that have
been identified in the subject incident.
[32] The NPGA special task force believes it can identify
alternative emergency flow control systems in the very near future.
While several systems are already under study, no preferences have
been established, nor do we know currently what present or new
equipment will be necessary to implement any changes. Also, we want
to be reasonably sure that these ``new'' systems will indeed operate
as intended to provide the desired level of safety and operation
control under emergency conditions, thus, actual service tests will
be conducted before widespread installation is undertaken.
[33] Consequently, there is an extreme and vital need to keep
the present cargo tank motor vehicles in service, albeit under
closer scrutiny and control than has previously been the case, until
these retrofit devices and systems can be developed and placed into
operation.
[34] For many years, the propane industry has demonstrated its
dedication to safety and compliance with standards and regulations.
Issuance of this exemption will in no way reduce the safe
transportation of propane. On the contrary, identification of the
hazard illustrated by the Sanford, North Carolina incident will
prompt utmost caution during the period of the proposed Exemption.
Conclusion
[35] Therefore, NPGA believes that a true emergency exists for
handling this Exemption request in an expedited manner and thus
pledges that this exemption will be continued in use no longer than
absolutely necessary during the retrofit of any propane cargo tanks
requiring the authorization for operation, recertification or
requalification provided by the Exemption.
III. Mississippi Tank Company Application for Exemption
The body of the Mississippi Tank Company application for
exemption is reproduced as follows:
The purpose of this letter is to make application for an
emergency exemption of the Hazardous Materials Regulations stated
above. We urgently need an expedited response to our request and
offer the information required by part 107.3 as follows:
1. CFR 178.337-11Ali requires that each internal self-closing
stop valve and excess flow valve must automatically close if any of
its attachments are sheared off or if any attached hose or piping is
separated. Paragraph 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) expands on requirements for
properly sizing excess flow valves while considering branching or
other restrictions and, the addition of additional smaller capacity
excess flow valves, where required.
We learned during recent evaluation and testing of internal self
closing stop-valves on cargo tank trailers that the flange mounted
internal valves available for use with pumps will not automatically
close under conditions simulating the situation where the hoses or
piping might be sheared off or separated from the pump. Upon further
research and consideration, it has become apparent that there are no
internal valves available that will provide protection as required
by the above paragraphs.
Some considerations of the complex series of problems that are
facing us considering these requirements are listed as follows:
A. The most commonly used internal self-closing stop valve is a
Fisher C404-M32-600 flanged internal valve whose 600 at the end of
the model number indicates the flow rating of 600 GPM (propane).
Testing at our facility under simulated conditions using air
pressure and water indicates that this internal valve with this 600
GPM spring will not close with tank pressures up to 125 psig. Other
flow rates available (which is determined by the type of internal
spring that is furnished in the internal valve) are 340 GPM, 400
GPM, 800 GPM and 1000 GPM. Both the 340 GPM and 400 GPM springs were
tested to determine their behavior, with most of the testing
performed using the 400 GPM springs.
It was determined that the internal valve with the 400 GPM
spring would close dependably with pressures down to 65 psig but not
at all at lower pressures. This testing was performed while allowing
the pump to ``free-wheel'', which would allow the pump to pass more
product than if it were not allowed to free-wheel. Obviously, a pump
shaft held stationary would prevent the pump from allowing as much
product to pass, thereby preventing the sufficient flow of product
through the pump and discharge piping to trigger the self-closing
mechanism of the internal valve.
B. Internal valves (which are excess flow valves when open) have
springs with manufacturing tolerances of--20%/+10%, thereby allowing
a broad range of performance in a given flow-rated internal valve.
Example: a 400 GPM spring can allow a flow between 320 GPM to 440
GPM.
In order to insure proper operation of a pumping system on cargo
tanks, various sources in the industry have indicated that internal
valve flow rating have been sized with a minimum flow rating of 1.5
times the discharge capacity of the pump. This would indicate that
under the greatest flow conditions that the piping system and pump
can offer, the self-closing criteria for the internal valve would
have been exceeded by a minimum of 50%.
D. Flow rates through internal valves, and the associated
piping, is mostly determined by the internal pressure that exists in
the cargo tank. The greater the pressure, the more flow rate you
will have through a given piping system and the lower the pressure,
the lower flow rate through that same piping system. As an example,
a cargo tank that was in dedicated propane service might have
internal valves and excess flow valves that work dependably at
pressures of 125 psig or higher in warm temperatures but as the
temperature gets colder, for instance 20 deg.F, a tank pressure of
only about 41 psig would be present and it is predictable that the
internal valves and excess flow valves would no longer close due to
the reduced flow associated with lower pressures in the tank. This
problem becomes worse if a tank designed to carry products with
vapor pressures approaching 250 psig is hauling low vapor pressure
products, such as butanes, whose vapor pressures at warm
temperatures are very low and at very cold temperatures can be
practically nothing, insuring that the internal valves would not
function at these low pressures.
E. It appears obvious that if you size an internal valve to be
used with a pump that has a sufficiently low rating to insure that
the internal valve would automatically close in the event of the
separation of the discharge piping or hoses, the internal valve
would never remain open during the pumping operation. After further
study, it appears that due to the consistent volumetric displacement
of a pump, the internal valve would never close if it were sized to
allow the pump to dependably unload a product.
F. Consideration was given to the use of a lesser flow rate
excess flow valve at the pump discharge connection, but it was
determined after considerable deliberation that an excess flow valve
that was sized so as to allow the pump to discharge product
dependably might never close in the event the piping or hoses became
separated, as the flow rating must be sufficient to allow pumping
without causing the internal valve to close. If separation occurred,
the pump would still be turning at the same RPMs, thereby producing
roughly the same amount of flow rate as it was while the piping was
still connected. Again it becomes apparent that the downstream
excess protection appears not to be a viable solution either.
G. One internal valve manufacturer offers internal valves that
open and close using pump differential pressure, but due to the
nature of the way the pump must create differential pressure to
allow the internal valve to stay open, it has been determined during
discussions with the internal valve manufacturer that this internal
valve might not close in all conditions as it should.
2. The problem meeting this requirement applies to all
compressed gas cargo tanks of the MC331 classification (and possibly
the MC338 classification) that utilize internal self-closing stop
valves and excess flow valves in conjunction with pumps and in some
cases simply in conjunction with discharge piping. This problem is
not specific to any one class of product and would include all
products that require the use of these type cargo tanks.
3. Using the internal valves presently available, our company
has been producing between 40-200 cargo tanks a year for more than
35 years. Our company has no knowledge of any problems or safety
related issues resulting from the use of these valves. Although all
the cargo tanks in operation today apparently do not comply with the
[[Page 7643]]
above requirements, the compressed gas industry does not appear to
have a record of major problems in this area.
If an emergency exemption were granted to allow the continued
use and certification of these cargo tanks, a warning statement and/
or special operating instructions could be a new requirement as part
of the conditions allowing for the exemption. This would provide for
increased safety compared to what is presently available.
4. We feel that a special exemption is required for duration of
18-24 months minimum to allow all of the assemblers, equipment
manufacturers and owners to help work out a solution to this
problem. Equipment manufacturers advise that it takes a minimum of
12-15 months to design, test and make available new designs of
valving. If it is determined that this will be part of the solution,
the addition of ``dead-man'' type devices that cause the internal
valves to close when the operator is not present may be incorporated
as part of the solution as well.
We urgently request that you act upon our application for an
emergency exemption for the reasons explained above. This exemption
is needed to allow the continued use of existing equipment and to
allow badly needed new equipment to continue to be made available to
the industry.
Your expedited response on a priority basis is appreciated in
advance.
IV. RSPA'S and FHWA's Review
From the four emergency exemption applications, discussion with the
applicants, information developed from the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) investigation of the Sanford incident, the
regulatory history related to these issues and knowledge of the
liquefied compressed gas industry, RSPA and FHWA have developed the
following information and opinions related to the situation associated
with the failure of the excess flow feature with the emergency
discharge control system on cargo tanks used to transport liquefied
compressed gases.
Emergency discharge control systems on cargo tanks used to
transport liquefied gases provide two basic safety features. First, an
excess flow feature is designed to automatically stop the flow of gas
when piping, fittings or hoses rupture or separate. The second feature
is a remotely controlled internal self-closing stop valve designed to
stop the flow of product from a cargo tank. Cargo tanks having
capacities over 3500 gallons must have remote means of automatic
closure, both mechanical and thermal, of the internal self-closing stop
valve; the remote operators must be installed at the ends of the tank
in at least two, diagonally opposite locations. Cargo tanks of 3500
gallons capacity or less must have at least one remote means of
closure, which may be mechanical, installed on the end of the cargo
tank farther away from the loading/unloading connection area. The HMR
require the excess flow feature to function in the event of a complete
failure (separation) of any attached hoses or piping. The HMR do not
require the excess flow feature to function in response to leaks or
partial failure of a pipe, fitting or hose. Manual activation of the
self-closing valve is the primary safety feature for pipe, fitting or
hose failures during product transfer. RSPA does not agree with the
NPGA statement (paragraph 15) that the second and third sentences of
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) are ``self-conflicting and mutually
exclusive.''
When the equipment and regulations for excess flow features on
cargo tanks transporting liquefied gases were first developed, cargo
tank motor vehicles were unloaded using internal pressure, by
pressurizing them, or by use of pumps installed at unloading
facilities. With such unloading systems, an excess flow feature
properly designed for a cargo tank and the products the tank is
designed to transport would reliably function in the event of a total
pipe, fitting, or hose failure. Over time, in response to customer
demand, most cargo tank motor vehicles delivering liquefied gases to
customer bulk storage facilities have been equipped with pumps to speed
product transfer. The tests performed by Mississippi Tank Company
following the Sanford incident demonstrated that a pump in the
discharge system functions as a product flow regulator that restricts
excess flow, thereby preventing functioning of the excess flow feature.
Thus, excess flow valves or features will not function when pumps are
used in a cargo tank's discharge system. NPGA addresses this issue in
its discussion on ``Solutions to the Situation-Long Term'' (paragraphs
15 through 21).
RSPA and FHWA do not agree with the position of the NPGA task
force, expressed in paragraph 8, that transport vehicles should be
given first priority in addressing this situation. While the capacity
of bobtail cargo tanks is lower than that of transports, far more
bobtails are in use and many more local deliveries are made each day
than are deliveries to bulk storage facilities. Thus, the risk of an
accidental discharge of product is much higher for bobtails than for
transports. Because bobtail cargo tank motor vehicles are fitted with
pumps and discharge systems very similar to transports, RSPA and FHWA
believe that the excess flow features of these smaller vehicles also
may not function when a pipe, fitting or hose ruptures or separates.
This conclusion is supported by nine instances reported to RSPA over
the last ten years of propane releases involving the failure of the
excess flow system on bobtails.
As previously stated, RSPA and FHWA believe that manual activation
of the internal self-closing stop valve is the primary means of
stopping the flow of product from a cargo tank motor vehicle in the
event of pipe, fitting or hose failure during transfer operations. The
vehicle operator is the individual responsible for the manual
activation of the internal stop valve in the event of pipe, fitting or
hose failure. Under the present circumstances, where the excess flow
feature of the emergency discharge control system may not function,
RSPA and FHWA believe that special operator attendance requirements are
necessary to ensure that a qualified person will always be in a
position to immediately activate the internal stop valve in the event
of a release. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 177.834(i), RSPA
and FHWA believe that the operator must have an unobstructed view of
the cargo delivery lines, and be within an arm's reach of a means for
closure of the internal self-closing stop valve or other device that
will stop the discharge of product from the cargo tank. Until an
automatic flow control system is developed, this may require two
operator attendants on a cargo tank motor vehicle or the use of a
lanyard, electro-mechanical, or other device or system to remotely stop
the flow of product. If a lanyard or other device or system is used, it
must meet the performance standard in the regulation (``will
immediately stop the discharge of product from the cargo tank'). For
example, there must be adequate space for use of, and appropriate
tautness in, a lanyard being used to meet this requirement.
A number of other measures can be taken to mitigate the problem
experienced in Sanford. Among these are the following:
Remove pumps and compensate for decreased discharge flow
by means of:
--enlarging piping, fittings and hose downstream of existing internal
valves, retaining their excess flow features.
--increase pressure in the vapor space of the cargo tank, e.g., with a
nitrogen pad.
Relocate pumps to the receiving end of the unloading
system.
Transmit readout from storage tank filling instrumentation
back to the cargo tank so that operator/attendant can remain in close
proximity to internal valve closure devices.
Increase frequency and thoroughness of maintenance
actions; for example, systems for remote closure
[[Page 7644]]
of internal valves demand regular inspection, test and adjustment.
It has been reported that the propane release in the Sanford
incident was from the hose used for delivery and that the hose was new
and had not been pressure tested prior to attachment. Also, it was
reported that the hose coupling on the storage tank end had not been
firmly attached to the hose by means of the two machine bolts provided
for this type coupling.
On large MC 330/331 transport vehicles, hoses typically are not
attached to the cargo tank piping during transit, while on small local
delivery cargo tanks, hoses typically remain attached to the piping and
are under pressure during transit. Technically, hoses attached to
piping and under pressure during transit form part of the cargo tank
wall as defined in Sec. 178.320(a)(1). This means that they should be
tested in accordance with Sec. 180.407(g) at the test pressure required
for MC 330/331 cargo tanks in Sec. 180.407(g)(1)(iv), i.e., at 1.5
times either the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) or the re-
rated pressure, whichever is applicable. However, because of the
difficulties that may be encountered at these high pressures, and due
to the potential for over-stressing hose reinforcement fibers during
such a test, RSPA and FHWA believe the test should be conducted at no
less than 80 percent of the design pressure or maximum allowable
working pressure (MAWP) marked on the cargo tank. This pressure test
requirement includes couplings or other fittings which are part of the
assembled hose as used. It must be repeated after any repair or
modification of the assembled hose before it is re-used.
Non-specification cargo tanks. Potential difficulties with excess
flow protection are not well defined for the group of non-specification
cargo tanks which are authorized for transportation of liquefied
petroleum gas by Sec. 173.315(k). These cargo tanks were manufactured
before January 1, 1981, in conformance with the editions of the ASME
Code and NFPA Standard 58 which were in effect at the time of
manufacture. They must conform with applicable laws of the states in
which they operate; and they must be tested and inspected periodically
in accordance with subpart E of part 180, as specified for MC 331 cargo
tank motor vehicles.
RSPA and FHWA recognize that the situation described for MC 330 and
331 cargo tanks is no less severe for these non-specification vessels.
RSPA and FHWA encourage responsible authorities in every jurisdiction
to give special attention to NFPA provisions for vapor and liquid
withdrawal requirements for internal valves with integral excess-flow
valves or excess-flow protection.
V. RSPA's and FHWA's Evaluation of the Applications for Exemption
As a frame of reference for evaluation of the applications for
exemption, the specification requirements for emergency discharge
control can be achieved by means of either an internal self-closing
stop valve or an excess flow valve. The most important performance
standard relevant to this issue is that ``Each internal self-closing
stop valve and excess flow valve must automatically close if any of its
attachments are sheared off or if any attached hoses or piping are
separated.'' [See Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)]. Provisions of
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) come into play only if and when excess flow
valves are used anywhere in the system.
After evaluating the situation and the NPGA and Mississippi Tank
Company emergency exemption applications, RSPA finds that this
situation constitutes an emergency with broad applicability to many
persons and far reaching safety and economic impacts. RSPA also is not
aware of readily available, off-the-shelf equipment that can provide a
functioning automatic excess flow feature on cargo tanks without
removal of pumps and other restrictions. The applicants propose an
outreach effort to inform tank users of the Sanford incident and the
safety issues related to product transfer operations and a research and
development program to design a system which will provide greater
safety in product transfer operations.
During evaluation of the Sanford incident, it has become evident
that the level of safety provided by the HMR is not being achieved on
equipment currently being produced and certified by manufacturers of
these cargo tanks. Specifically, these tanks do not meet the
requirement for automatic closure of internal self-closing stop valves
and excess flow valves in the event of separation of hoses or piping.
The regulatory language is intended to ensure a certain level of safety
in these vehicles. However, the level of safety provided by the
immediate steps proposed by NPGA is not equivalent to the level of
safety provided by Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i). The NPGA proposes
requirements regarding driver training, testing and inspection of
equipment, and driver attendance during unloading operations (see
paragraph 27 of the NPGA application). These proposed requirements are
effectively the same as those already set forth in 49 CFR. In the
Mississippi Tank application, it was suggested that ``a warning
statement and/or special operating instructions'' could be required,
but no details were offered on how that would achieve a level of safety
equivalent to that provided by the existing regulatory requirements in
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i). Thus, neither application proposes procedures
that would compensate for the absence of excess flow features that
function reliably and in a passive manner.
Because the applications do not provide for an equivalent level of
safety, as required by Sec. 107.113(f)(2)(ii), of the HMR, they have
been denied by the Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials
Safety. Also, the issues addressed in the applications have significant
safety and economic implications for a broad range of persons;
consequently, RSPA believes the issues are better addressed through the
rulemaking process. Thus, RSPA is issuing this interim final rule.
VI. Provisions of the Interim Final Rule
RSPA is publishing this interim final rule to enhance the safety of
product transfer operations as they are currently conducted, in most
cases, while allowing the continued delivery of liquefied compressed
gases (principally propane, other liquefied petroleum gases and
anhydrous ammonia). RSPA and FHWA believe that, without the
authorization for continued operation provided by this rule, the
public, industry, and cargo tank motor vehicle operators and
manufacturers would be severely impacted. The liquefied compressed
gases authorized for highway transportation under this rule are used
for home heating, support of industrial and agricultural operations,
and as fertilizer. Because there are no alternative means for
distribution of these materials in most areas served by the cargo tank
motor vehicles authorized by this rule, RSPA and FHWA believe this rule
is necessary to prevent severe shortages of liquefied compressed gases
in the areas where they are consumed.
This emergency interim final rule authorizes, under specific
conditions, the continued manufacture, assembly, certification, use and
recertification of cargo tanks that may not meet the excess flow
feature requirements for cargo tanks authorized for the transportation
of liquefied compressed gases. This rule is effective through August
15, 1997. This will allow time for implementation of changes to
equipment that will automatically shut down product transfer as
required in Sec. 178.337-11,
[[Page 7645]]
when a pipe or hose ruptures or separates.
In the next several months, RSPA and FHWA will actively pursue
technical improvements to product delivery systems, as well as other
feasible operational controls, that may be applied to minimize threats
to public safety inherent in the transportation of liquefied compressed
gases. RSPA has developed an action plan that includes the two public
workshops scheduled for March 4-5, and April 8-9, 1997. In addition,
working through its Volpe National Transportation System Center, RSPA
will examine the availability and feasibility of systems that can
achieve the purpose of the regulations; identify facilities where
automatic shut-down systems may be safely tested, and seek out other
sources of technical expertise in government, industry and academia.
The August 15, 1997 compliance date was chosen in part because it
falls between the end of the summer 1997 planting season and the
beginning of the winter 1997-1998 heating season. This date gives
industry approximately six months to bring cargo tanks into compliance
with the current (i.e., pre-IFR) regulatory requirement. Alternatively,
industry may be able to demonstrate that regulatory compliance is not
feasible, and recommend timetables for achieving compliance or
implementing alternative technology to achieve the safety objective of
a passive, automatic shut off system for emergency discharge control.
By the expiration of the interim final rule, RSPA and FHWA could
announce their intent to strictly enforce the current regulatory
requirement, unless the industry convinces us that they are making a
good faith effort to develop a properly operating system that meets the
requirements of the HMR. Alternatively, depending on the information
developed during the comment period, RSPA would implement rulemaking
either to modify the current regulatory requirement, providing a
different means of passive shut-off, or extending the provisions of the
IFR (with modification, if warranted) based on an industry-developed
timetable for implementing technological change. The rule addresses the
concerns expressed in the exemption applications of the NPGA,
Mississippi Tank Company, TFI, and NTTC.
In order to enhance the level of safety during transfer operations
using current equipment, the rule specifies special conditions for
continued operations. The following provisions are adopted in
Sec. 171.5 to provide a set of alternative safety controls for the
carriage of liquefied gases in cargo tanks that cannot be demonstrated
to conform with existing excess flow feature requirements.
Paragraph (a)(1) specifies use provisions under which MC 330, MC
331 or non-specification cargo tank motor vehicles authorized under
Sec. 173.315(k) may be operated and unloaded.
Paragraph (a)(1)(i) prescribes that before transfer from a cargo
tank motor vehicle the integrity of components making up the discharge
system must be verified. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) prescribes that prior to
using a new or repaired transfer hose or a modified hose assembly, the
hose must be pressure tested at no less than 80 percent of the design
pressure or maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) marked on the
cargo tank. Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) specifies that a qualified person in
attendance of transfer from a cargo tank must have the capability for
emergency shut-down. Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) specifies that when there is
an unintentional release of lading, the internal self-closing stop
valve must be activated and all motive and auxiliary power equipment
must be shut down. Paragraph (a)(1)(v) prescribes the development of
comprehensive emergency operating procedures for all transfer
operations. Paragraph (a)(1)(vi) specifies that each manufacturer,
assembler, retester, motor carrier and other hazmat employer must
provide training to its hazmat employees so that they can properly
perform the new function-specific requirements in this section.
Paragraph (a)(2) prescribes conditions for continued qualification
of existing in-service cargo tank motor vehicles.
Paragraph (a)(3) addresses new vehicles, including a special entry
on the certification required by Sec. 178.337-18.
Paragraph (b) specifies the marking to be displayed on a cargo tank
motor vehicle operating under this section.
Paragraph (c) establishes August 15, 1997, as the expiration date
for this temporary regulation.
VII. Request for Comments
To facilitate decisions on the need for this interim final rule as
a short term response to an emergency and the potential need for a
permanent change in the rule, RSPA requests comments responding to the
questions listed below. RSPA also invites comments on any aspect of
this rulemaking action not specifically addressed by the questions.
RSPA and FHWA encourage interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written views, data, and information
concerning this interim final rule. Commenters are requested to provide
a reason or basis for each comment.
Additionally, RSPA and FHWA are seeking information pertaining to
research and development related to the issues contained in this rule.
This information may be presented at the public meeting.
1. NPGA has suggested the development of a ``deadman'' or a remote
valve actuation system, possibly using a lanyard. Automobiles are
commonly equipped with remote transmitter devices that fit on key rings
to unlock doors or open trunk lids from 50 feet away. If such a
manually activated device were used to close internal self-closing stop
valves, would it provide a level of safety equivalent to the
requirement for a passive automatic shut-down system required by
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)?
2. What types of devices can provide the passive automatic shut-
down function required by Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)?
3. What tests are appropriate at the time of manufacture or
assembly and at the time of requalification to ensure that the product
discharge system will close as required by Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)?
4. In view of the fact that specification MC 330 and MC 331 cargo
tank motor vehicles are authorized for a broad range of hazardous
materials, is it possible to design an emergency discharge control
system that functions effectively with all liquefied compressed gases
under all conditions normal to transportation? If not, should the
manufacturer's certification required under Sec. 178.337-18 specify the
materials and conditions that are acceptable for carriage in, or
unloading of, the cargo tank?
5. Do manufacturers and assemblers of cargo tank motor vehicles
provide operational and maintenance instructions to operators on the
use of the cargo tank motor vehicles they supply? If so, provide
examples of such information to RSPA.
6. Provide any information available on other interstate or
intrastate incidents involving the failure of emergency control systems
on cargo tanks authorized to transport liquefied compressed gases.
7. Are hoses used to transfer product from large transport cargo
tank motor vehicles permanently attached or carried on the vehicles or
supplied by the customer at the point of delivery?
8. RSPA is concerned that this problem may highlight a deficiency
in the training programs for Design Certifying Engineers and those
persons certifying cargo tanks as meeting the
[[Page 7646]]
requirements of the HMR. In addition, carrier function-specific
training programs also may not be providing sufficient training in the
specification requirements for these cargo tanks. What training is
provided to those individuals who are responsible for certifying,
operating, testing and repairing these cargo tank motor vehicles?
VIII. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This final rule is considered a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget. The rule is considered significant under the
Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the Department of Transportation
(44 FR 11034).
Because of the emergency nature of this rule, RSPA is not required
to prepare a regulatory evaluation. Nevertheless, in an effort to
minimize the burden of this rule, RSPA prepared a preliminary
regulatory evaluation which is available in the public docket.
Because of the potential safety risk posed by continued
transportation of liquefied compressed gases in specification MC 330
and MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles that do not conform to the
performance criteria for emergency discharge controls, RSPA has
determined that good cause exists for making this rule effective less
than 30 days from its issuance and that prior notice and opportunity to
comment is impractical and contrary to public interest.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (Act), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601-612,
directs agencies to consider the potential impact of regulations on
small business and other small entities. The Act, however, applies only
to rules for which an agency is required to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking pursuant to section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a) and 604(a).
Because of the emergency nature of this rule, RSPA is authorized under
section 553(b)(B) and section 553 (d)(3) of the APA to forego notice
and comment and to issue this rule as an interim final rule with an
immediate effective date. Consequently, RSPA is not required under the
Act to do a regulatory flexibility analysis in this rulemaking.
Specifically, section 553(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) of the APA
authorize agencies to dispense with certain procedures for rules,
including notice and comment, when they find ``good cause'' to do so.
``Good cause'' includes a finding that following notice-and-comment
procedures would be ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.'' Section 553(d)(3) allows an agency, upon a finding
of good cause, to make a rule effective immediately. ``Good cause'' has
been held to include situations where immediate action is necessary to
reduce or avoid health hazards or other imminent harm to persons or
property, or where inaction would lead to serious dislocation in
government programs or the marketplace.
Nevertheless, RSPA is concerned with the effect this rule may have
on small business. Consequently, in preparing a preliminary regulatory
evaluation under Executive Order 12866, RSPA has analyzed, based on
information currently available to the agency, the impact of this rule
on all affected parties, including small businesses. The preliminary
regulatory evaluation is available for review in the public docket. In
that preliminary evaluation, RSPA estimates that where an operator of
bobtails chooses to comply with the arms-reach attendance requirement
by use of a lanyard--as suggested by NPGA in its application for
emergency exemption--the average annual cost per operator will be
$1,324. In addition, in this interim final rule RSPA is asking
commenters to provide information to the agency regarding the economic,
safety and other impacts of this rule so that the agency can make any
necessary changes to the rule.
A small entity includes a small business, small organization or
small governmental jurisdiction. For purposes of this discussion, a
small business is deemed to be one which is independently owned and
operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation. RSPA
believes that the impacts of this rule are primarily addressed to
businesses involving the distribution of liquefied petroleum gas and
anhydrous ammonia, and to manufacturers and assemblers of cargo tanks
used for the distribution of these products. Under the Small Business
Administration's size standard definitions (13 CFR Part 121), liquefied
petroleum gas distributors with $5 million or less in annual receipts,
and manufacturers of truck or bus bodies or truck trailers that employ
500 or less individuals are small businesses. Based on available
information, RSPA estimates that at least 90% of the businesses
impacted by this rule are small businesses. RSPA further estimates
there are at least 6,800 businesses and at least 25,000 cargo tank
motor vehicles (7,000 ``transports'' and 18,000 ``bobtails'') affected
by this rule.
In order for RSPA to determine the potential impacts of this rule
on small entities, small businesses affected by this final rule are
requested to submit comments addressed to the impacts of this rule and
other significant alternatives on small entities. Some of the
considerations envisioned in assessing these impacts include the
following:
1. Are RSPA's estimates as to number of businesses affected by this
rule, and the percentage of these which are small businesses,
consistent with industry estimates? Are other estimates available as to
the numbers of businesses and small businesses in each sector of
business addressed by this rule (i.e., gas distributor, cargo tank
manufacturer, cargo tank assembler) and numbers of cargo tank motor
vehicles? Are there other business sectors affected? Are some
geographic areas affected more than others (please identify)?
2. Are there alternatives to this rule which accomplish RSPA's
objectives, while imposing less of an impact on small businesses? What
are those alternatives?
3. In what manner could differing compliance or reporting
requirements be implemented for small businesses to take into account
the resources available to small businesses? In what manner could
compliance or reporting requirements be clarified, consolidated or
simplified for such small businesses?
4. What are the direct and indirect costs of compliance with the
rule, calculated both as absolute costs and as a percentage of revenue
of the regulated small business?
5. What are the direct and indirect costs of completing paperwork
or recordkeeping requirements, again both as absolute costs and as a
percentage of revenue?
6. What is the effect of this rule, if any, on the competitive
position of small entities in relation to larger entities?
7. What is the effect of this rule on the small entity's cash flow
and liquidity?
8. What is the effect of this rule on the ability of a small entity
to remain in the market?
9. What is the availability and cost to the small entity for
professional assistance to meet regulatory requirements?
10. Are there any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap or conflict
with this rule?
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C. Executive Order 12612
This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles
and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 (``Federalism''). The
Federal hazardous materials transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127,
contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 5125(b)) that
preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements on certain covered
subjects. Covered subjects are:
(1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous
materials;
(2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and
placarding of hazardous materials;
(3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents
related to hazardous materials and requirements related to the number,
contents, and placement of those documents;
(4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; or
(5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance,
recondition, repair, or testing of a packaging or container
represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in
transporting hazardous material.
This interim final rule addresses covered subject item (5) above
and preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements not meeting
the ``substantively the same'' standard. Federal hazardous materials
transportation law provides at Sec. 5125(b)(2) that, if DOT issues a
regulation concerning any of the covered subjects, DOT must determine
and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of Federal
preemption. The effective date may not be earlier than the 90th day
following the date of issuance of the final rule and not later than two
years after the date of issuance. RSPA has determined that the
effective date of Federal preemption for these requirements will be May
20, 1997. Thus, RSPA lacks discretion in this area, and preparation of
a federalism assessment is not warranted.
D. Paperwork Reduction Act
The information collection and recordkeeping requirements contained
in this final rule have been submitted for emergency approval to the
Office of Management and Budget under the provisions of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995. Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal
Regulations requires that RSPA provide interested members of the public
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information
collection and recordkeeping requests. RSPA estimates that the total
information collection and recordkeeping burden in this interim final
rule is 17,575 hours, at a cost of $376,875, for the development and
maintenance of the comprehensive emergency operating procedure. These
figures are based in RSPA's belief that standardized emergency
operating procedures can be developed for use by a majority of industry
members, thus reducing substantially the burden hours and cost to
individual industry members of compliance with the emergency operating
procedures requirement. Requests for a copy of this information
collection should be directed to Deborah Boothe, Office of Hazardous
Materials Standards (DHM-10), Research and Special Programs
Administration, Room 8102, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC
20590-0001. Telephone (202) 366-8553. Written comments should be
received by the close of the comment period identified elsewhere in
this rulemaking and should be addressed to the Dockets Unit as
identified in the Addresses section of this rulemaking. Under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to respond to an
information collection unless it displays a valid OMB control number.
RSPA will publish a notice advising interested parties of the OMB
control number for this information collection when assigned by OMB.
E. Regulation identifier number (RIN)
A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN number contained in the heading
of this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.
F. Executive Order 12778
Any interested person may petition RSPA's Administrator for
reconsideration of this final rule within 30 days of publication of
this rule in the Federal Register, in accordance with the procedures
set forth at 49 CFR 106.35. Neither the filing of a petition for
reconsideration nor any other administrative proceeding is required
before the filing of a suit in court for review of this rule.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 171
Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 171 is amended as
follows:
PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS
1. The authority citation for Part 171 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127, 44701; Sec. 4, Pub. L. 101-410,
104 Stat. 890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Sec. 31001, Pub. L. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321; 49 CFR 1.45 and 1.53.
2. Section 171.5 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 171.5 Temporary regulation; liquefied compressed gases in cargo
tank motor vehicles.
(a) Section 178.337-11 of this subchapter requires an excess flow
feature as a part of the emergency discharge control system installed
in a cargo tank motor vehicle used to transport certain liquefied
compressed gases. Other regulations in Parts 173 and 180 of this
subchapter reference this requirement or similar requirements in effect
at the time of manufacture of a cargo tank. Notwithstanding this
requirement, a DOT MC 330 or MC 331 specification cargo tank motor
vehicle, or a non-specification cargo tank motor vehicle conforming to
the requirements of Sec. 173.315(k) of this subchapter, may, without
certification and demonstrated performance of the excess flow feature
of its emergency discharge control system, be represented for use and
used to transport liquefied compressed gases under the following
conditions:
(1) Use. The cargo tank motor vehicle must otherwise be operated,
unloaded and attended in full conformance with all applicable
requirements of this subchapter and the following additional
requirements:
(i) Before initiating any transfer from the cargo tank motor
vehicle, the person performing the function shall verify that each
component of the discharge system is of sound quality, is free of
leaks, and that connections are secure.
(ii) Prior to commencing transfer using a new or repaired transfer
hose or a modified hose assembly, it must be pressure tested at no less
than 80 percent of the design pressure or maximum allowable working
pressure (MAWP) marked on the cargo tank. This test must include all
hose and hose fittings and equipment arranged in the configuration to
be employed during transfer operations. A hose or associated equipment
that shows signs of leakage, significant bulging, or other defects, is
not acceptable for use.
(iii) In addition to attendance requirements in Sec. 177.834(i) of
this subchapter, the person who attends the
[[Page 7648]]
unloading of a cargo tank motor vehicle must have an unobstructed view
of the discharge system and be within arm's reach of a means for
closure (emergency shut-down device) of the internal self-closing stop
valve or other device that will immediately stop the discharge of
product from the cargo tank.
(iv) If there is an unintentional release of lading to the
environment during transfer, the qualified person attending the cargo
tank shall immediately activate the internal self-closing stop valve
and shut down all motive and auxiliary power equipment.
(v) A comprehensive emergency operating procedure must be developed
for all transfer operations and hazmat employees who perform unloading
functions must be thoroughly trained in its provisions. The emergency
operating procedure must be prominently displayed in or on the cargo
tank motor vehicle.
(vi) As required by Sec. 172.704 of this subchapter, each
manufacturer, assembler, retester, motor carrier and other hazmat
employer subject to the requirements of this section shall ensure that
its hazmat employees are trained to properly perform these new
function-specific requirements including the meaning of the marking
specified in paragraph (b) of this section. The hazmat employer shall
ensure that a record of the training is created, certified, and
maintained as specified in Sec. 172.704(d) of this subchapter.
(2) Continuing qualification. An existing in-service cargo tank
motor vehicle may continue to be marked and documented as required by
Part 180 of this subchapter if the following statement is added to the
current inspection report required by Sec. 180.417(b) of this
subchapter: ``Emergency excess flow control performance not established
for this unit.''
(3) New vehicles. A new (unused) cargo tank motor vehicle
manufactured, marked and certified prior to August 16, 1997, may be
marked and certified as conforming to specification MC 331 if it
otherwise meets all requirements of the specification and the following
statement is added to the certification document required by
Sec. 178.337-18 of this subchapter: ``Emergency excess flow control
performance not established for this unit.''
(b) Marking. The following marking must be displayed on a cargo
tank used in or represented for use under this section:
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19FE97.097
(1) The letters must be white and the background black.
(2) The letters must be at least 1.5cm in height.
(3) The marking must be 6cm x 15cm.
(c) Expiration date. This section is effective February 19, 1997
through August 15, 1997.
Issued in Washington, DC on February 13, 1997 under authority
delegated in 49 CFR part 1.
D.K. Sharma,
Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration.
[FR Doc. 97-4116 Filed 2-14-97; 12:09 pm]
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