[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 33 (Wednesday, February 19, 1997)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 7638-7649]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-4116]



[[Page 7637]]

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Part IV





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Research and Special Programs Administration



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49 CFR Part 171



Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied Compressed 
Gas Service; Interim Final Rule

  Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 33 / Wednesday, February 19, 1997, / 
Rules and Regulations  

[[Page 7638]]



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Research and Special Programs Administration

49 CFR Part 171

[Docket No. RSPA-97-2133 (HM-225)]
RIN 2137-AC97


Hazardous Materials: Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles in Liquefied 
Compressed Gas Service; Interim Final Rule

AGENCY: Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT.

ACTION: Emergency Interim final rule and announcement of a public 
meeting.

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SUMMARY: In this interim final rule, RSPA is amending the Hazardous 
Materials Regulations (HMR) to specify the conditions under which 
certain cargo tank motor vehicles may continue to be used on an interim 
basis, even if they are equipped with emergency discharge control 
systems which may not function as required by the regulations under all 
operating conditions. This rule addresses specification MC 330, MC 331, 
and certain non-specification cargo tank motor vehicles which are used 
to deliver propane and other liquefied compressed gases. It responds to 
a recently discovered safety deficiency which may affect many of these 
cargo tank motor vehicles. The intended effect of this action is to 
ensure, on an interim basis, an acceptable level of safety for delivery 
of liquefied compressed gases while a permanent solution to the problem 
is developed and implemented.
    During the term of this interim rule, RSPA is seeking comments and 
data on the costs and effectiveness of alternative means of achieving a 
level of safety for the long term comparable to that provided by its 
long-standing regulation. At the same time, the Agency is also seeking 
comments on the costs and benefits of the interim measures adopted in 
this rule.
    A public meeting is scheduled for March 20, 1997, to receive 
comments and recommendations in regard to the measures adopted in this 
interim final rule and to solicit recommendations for a permanent 
solution. Additionally, two workshops have been scheduled for March 4-
5, 1997 and April 8-9, 1997. All interested persons, including trade 
organizations, cargo tank producers, individual wholesale and retail 
entities involved in the distribution of liquefied compressed gases and 
representatives of public protection organizations, are encouraged to 
participate.

DATES: Effective date: This interim final rule is effective February 
19, 1997 through August 15, 1997.
    Comment date: Comments must be received by April 21, 1997.
    Public meeting: A public meeting will be held on Wednesday, March 
20, 1997, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C.
    Workshops: Workshops will be held on--March 4-5, 1997, and April 8-
9, 1997, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C.
    Oral presentations: Any person wishing to present an oral statement 
at the public meeting should notify Jennifer Karim by telephone or in 
writing, on or before March 12, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Written comments: Address comments to the Dockets Office, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Room PL-401, 400 Seventh Street, SW, 
Washington, D.C. 20590-0001. Comments should identify the docket number 
and be submitted in two copies. Persons wishing to receive confirmation 
of receipt of their comments should include a self-addressed, stamped 
postcard. The Dockets Office is located on the Plaza Level of the 
Nassif Building at the Department of Transportation at the above 
address. Public dockets may be reviewed there between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays.
    Public meeting: The public meeting will be held at the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) Auditorium, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, 
Washington, D.C. 20591.
    Workshops: (1) March 4-5, 1997, U.S. Department of Transportation 
(Room 6244, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 
20590; (2) April 8-9, 1997, U.S. Department of Transportation (Room 
6200, Nassif Building), 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, D.C. 20590.
    Oral presentations: Submit written text of oral statement to 
Jennifer Karim, U.S. Department of Transportation, Room 8100, 400 
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590. Five copies of written 
text of oral statements should be presented to RSPA staff immediately 
prior to the oral presentation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald Kirkpatrick, Office of 
Hazardous Materials Technology, Research and Special Programs 
Administration, telephone (202) 366-4545, or Stephen Keppler, Office of 
Motor Carrier Safety and Technology, Safety and Hazardous Materials 
Division, Federal Highway Administration, telephone (202) 366-2978, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW, telephones 
20590-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    On September 8, 1996, more than 35,000 gallons of propane were 
released during a delivery at a bulk storage facility in Sanford, North 
Carolina. During the unloading of a specification MC 331 cargo tank 
motor vehicle into two 30,000-gallon storage tanks, the discharge hose 
from the cargo tank separated at its hose coupling at the storage tank 
inlet connection. Most of the cargo tank's 9,800 gallons and more than 
30,000 gallons from the storage tanks were released during this 
incident. If this large quantity of propane had reached an ignition 
source, 125 people (workers, residents and emergency responders) could 
have been killed.
    The hazards associated with transportation of liquefied petroleum 
gas have been demonstrated repeatedly on U.S. highways. In fact, 
propane releases are the second leading cause of death in hazardous 
materials transportation. Between 1990 and 1991, five reported deaths 
and 695 injuries resulted from propane incidents in highway 
transportation. For example, when liquid propane is released into the 
atmosphere, it quickly vaporizes into its normal non-pressurized 
gaseous form. This happens very rapidly, and in the process, the 
propane combines readily with air to form fuel-air mixtures which are 
ignitable over a range of 2.2 to 9.5 percent by volume. If an ignition 
source is present in the vicinity of such highly flammable mixtures, 
the vapor cloud ignites and burns very rapidly (characterized by some 
experts as ``explosively''). This has occurred a number of times over 
the years, and even though the incidents described below were not 
caused by spills during lading transfer, they illustrate the grave 
consequences of a large propane release when ignition occurs:
     On July 25, 1962 in Berlin, NY, an MC 330 bulk transport 
ruptured releasing about 6,900 gallons of liquid propane. Ignition 
occurred. Ten persons were killed, and 17 others were injured. Property 
damage included total destruction of 18 buildings and 11 vehicles.
     On March 9, 1972 near Lynchburg, VA, an MC 331 bulk 
transport overturned and slid into a rock embankment. The impact 
ruptured the tank's shell releasing about 4,000 gallons of liquid 
propane. Ignition occurred. Two persons were killed and five others 
were injured. Property damage included a farmhouse, outbuildings and 
about 12 acres of woodland.

[[Page 7639]]

     On April 29, 1975, near Eagle Pass, Texas, an MC-330 bulk 
transport struck a concrete headwall and ruptured releasing more than 
8,000 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and 
explosion killed 16 persons, injured 51, and destroyed 51 vehicles.
     On February 22, 1973, 23 tank cars derailed in Waverly, 
Tennessee. During wreck-clearing operations, a 30,000-gallon tank car 
containing liquefied petroleum gas ruptured. The ensuing fire and 
explosion killed 16 persons, injured 43, and caused $1.8 million in 
property damage.
     On December 23, 1988, in Memphis, Tennessee, an MC-330 
bulk transport struck a bridge abutment and ruptured releasing 9388 
gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. The ensuing fire and explosion 
killed eight persons and injured eight.
     On July 27, 1994, in White Plains, New York, an MC-331 
bulk transport struck a column of an overpass and ruptured, releasing 
9,200 gallons of propane. Ignition occurred. The driver was killed, 23 
people were injured, and an area within a radius of approximately 400 
feet was engulfed in fire.
    In the Sanford incident, the driver became aware of the system 
failure when the hose began to violently oscillate while releasing 
liquid propane. He immediately shut down the engine, stopping the 
discharge pump, but he could not access the remote closure control to 
close the internal stop valve. The excess flow feature of the emergency 
discharge control system did not function, and propane continued to be 
released from the system. Additionally, the back flow check valve on 
the storage tank system did not function and propane was released from 
the storage tanks. In light of the large quantity of propane released, 
this incident could have resulted in a catastrophic loss of life and 
extensive property damage if the gas had reached an ignition source. 
Fortunately, there was no fire.
    Based on the preliminary information from the Sanford incident, 
RSPA published an advisory notice in the Federal Register on December 
13, 1996 (61 FR 65480). This notice alerted persons involved in the 
design, manufacture, assembly, maintenance or transportation of 
hazardous materials in MC 330 and MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles of 
this problem with the excess flow feature of the emergency discharge 
control systems and reminded them that these tanks and their components 
must conform to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 CFR Parts 171-
180; HMR). Since that time, RSPA has received applications for 
emergency exemptions from both the National Propane Gas Association 
(NPGA) and the Mississippi Tank Company that indicate the problem is 
more extensive than originally believed. Additionally, The Fertilizer 
Institute (TFI) and National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC) have 
submitted applications to become party to these exemptions. In support 
of its exemption application the Mississippi Tank Company, a 
manufacturer of specification MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles, has 
provided preliminary information that there is reason to suspect the 
problem may be common to nearly all cargo tank motor vehicles used in 
liquefied compressed gas service within the United States. This problem 
may exist also in the non-specification cargo tanks authorized in 
Sec. 173.315(k). Both applications for exemption are reprinted in their 
entirety and discussed in detail below.

II. National Propane Gas Association Application for Emergency 
Exemption

    The body of NPGA's application for exemption is reproduced as 
follows (numbers in brackets have been added for ease of reference in 
the following discussion):

    [1] The National Propane Gas Association (NPGA), acting as an 
agent for its members, presents here an application for a DOT 
Exemption to the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to permit the 
continued operation of certain cargo tank motor vehicles in propane 
service pending development and installation of equipment intended 
to overcome an operational difficulty identified recently. The 
Association also requests that this application be handled as an 
emergency exemption under the procedures outlined in 49 CFR 107.113. 
Upon issuance of this emergency exemption, NPGA will submit a second 
request to convert the emergency exemption to a conventional 
exemption.
    [2] NPGA is the national trade association of the LP-gas 
(principally propane) industry with a membership of about 3,500 
companies, including 37 affiliated state and regional associations, 
representing members in all 50 states. Although the single largest 
group of NPGA members are retail marketers of propane gas, the 
membership also includes propane producers, transporters and 
wholesalers, as well as manufacturers and distributors of associated 
equipment, containers and appliances. Propane gas is used in over 18 
million installations nationwide for home and commercial heating and 
cooking, in agriculture, in industrial processing, and as a clean 
air alternative engine fuel for both over-the-road vehicles and 
industrial lift trucks.
    [3] On September 8, 1996, a cargo tank motor vehicle, of the 
type in the industry known as a highway transport--a large cargo 
tank semi-trailer pulled by a highway truck tractor--was unloading a 
cargo of propane into permanent storage tanks at a propane marketing 
facility in Sanford, North Carolina. Shortly after the transfer 
operation began, the transfer hose separated from the transfer 
connection at its juncture with the plant piping and began 
discharging liquid propane to the atmosphere. The vehicle driver 
heard sounds unusual for a transfer operation and shut off the 
vehicle engine. According to the report of the Federal Highway 
Administration inspector, the driver was not able to get to the 
remote controls to close the internal stop flow valve. The driver 
then ran to an adjacent residential area to warn residents to 
immediately evacuate the area. As will be discussed later in this 
letter, the excess flow protection in the cargo tank did not 
activate and the entire propane cargo was discharged to the 
atmosphere.
    [4] Likewise, emergency flow protection in the plant piping did 
not activate automatically as designed and intended. As a result, 
the entire contents of the storage facility--something in excess of 
35,000 gallons of propane--was also discharged to the atmosphere. 
While the emergency flow control system on the transport is subject 
to the HMR, the storage tank system is subject to regulations of the 
State of North Carolina. Investigation of that segment of the 
incident is being handled as a separate matter. The purpose of this 
letter is to discuss the transport system, applicable regulations 
and what can be done to prevent such an incident from recurring.
    [5] Mr. Samuel E. McTier, NPGA President, has appointed a 
special task force to work directly under the NPGA Executive 
Committee to determine the extent and nature of the underlying 
causes of this incident. The task force was directed to study this 
incident and develop two plans of action: First, how to provide for 
continued safe operation of existing propane cargo tanks while 
necessary changes are developed and put into place [including those 
cargo tanks to be built during this transition period], and second, 
how to correct safety and operational problems for the long term 
through changes to the MC-331 specification, if necessary, and to 
industry recommended safety and operating practices to preclude such 
an incident from happening again. This task force first met December 
12-13, 1996 in Atlanta, Georgia. The enclosed recommendations and 
accompanying comments are based on their deliberations.
    [6] NPGA understands that Mississippi Tank Company has already 
submitted an application for an emergency exemption and supports the 
technical discussions in that application as a succinct presentation 
of the overall problem. In the time that has passed since that 
application was filed with DOT, however, additional information has 
become available. As a consequence, while much of the Mississippi 
Tank information has been incorporated into this application, there 
are certain significant differences between the NPGA application and 
the Mississippi tank document.
    [7] It is important to recognize that the situation described in 
the Mississippi Tank application is not unique to that company. 
Rather, that situation can reasonably be expected to occur with 
propane transports from other assemblers.

[[Page 7640]]

    [8] In the smaller propane cargo tank motor vehicles (typically 
smaller than 3,500 gallons water capacity, called bobtails), the 
cargo tank is mounted directly on the vehicle chassis. These 
vehicles have a somewhat different piping arrangement than that used 
on transports. Consequently, on preliminary review, bobtails do not 
appear to have the same operating characteristics as transports. As 
a result, the first priority of this NPGA special task force has 
been directed at the transports; once the situation with the 
transports has been brought under control for the short term, the 
task force will immediately make similar investigations and studies 
of the bobtail vehicles.
    [9] NPGA is gravely concerned about the underlying causes of the 
North Carolina incident and is committed to identifying and 
implementing appropriate changes to industry recommended safety and 
operating practices and to the HMR requirements to preclude such an 
incident occurring again.
    [10] The propane industry transports between 7 and 10 billion 
gallons annually in these highway transports; that same volume is 
transported again in these local delivery bobtail tank trucks. In 
the past 10 years, there has not been a similar reported incident 
during the unloading of a transport. According to DOT's information, 
some 8 or 10 events have occurred unloading bobtails. That incident 
rate works out to be less than one per year.
    [11] The propane industry is committed to prompt correction of 
any problems or concerns that are identified with DOT by this 
special task force as part of our continuing desire and goal to 
continue that safety record. We also believe that the current 
incident experience record is testimony to the validity and 
effectiveness of the safety and operating systems presently in use 
for transportation of propane, both in the Hazardous Materials 
Regulations and in industry safety and operating practices.

The Difficulty

    [12] 49 CFR 178.337-11(a)(1)(i) requires each internal self-
closing stop valve and excess flow valve to automatically close if 
any of its attachments are sheared off or if any attached hose or 
piping is separated. 49 CFR 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) expands on the 
requirements for properly sizing excess flow valves regarding 
branching or other restrictions and the addition of additional 
smaller capacity excess flow valves, where required.
    [13] Mississippi Tank Company recently conducted tests in an 
effort to determine why the excess flow feature of the internal 
valve in the transport cargo tank outlet flange in the Sanford, 
North Carolina incident did not function as intended by the MC-331 
specification requirements. The Mississippi Tank tests clearly show 
that the internal stop flow valves available for use with flange 
mounted pumps will not always close automatically under conditions 
simulating the situation where the hoses or piping might be sheared 
off or separated from the pump. Mississippi Tank has also determined 
that there are no such internal valves presently available that will 
provide the protection required by Secs. 178.337-11 (a)(1)(i) and 
(a)(1)(v).
    [14] Principal among the conclusions reached from the 
Mississippi Tank tests is that the internal valve equipped with the 
400 gpm spring (which operates the excess flow feature to provide 
automatic closure) would close dependably with tank pressures as low 
as 65 psig but that the excess flow feature would not operate at 
tank pressures lower than 65 psig.
    Rather than repeat the discussion of the test results in the 
Mississippi Tank application, in the interests of brevity, we refer 
you to that application.

Solutions to the Situation--Long Term

    [15] From the Mississippi Tank tests and from discussions with 
the manufacturers of the cargo tank pumps and the internal valves, 
NPGA has concluded that the second and third sentences of 
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) are self-conflicting and mutually 
exclusive. Based on present technology and equipment, it simply is 
not possible to comply with both provisions.
    [16] When this provision was reworded in the HM-183 amendments, 
industry review of the new provisions indicated that there would be 
no problem in complying with the requirement. The revised wording 
was accepted at face value merely as a rewording of the provisions 
that existed at that time in the MC-331 specification prior to the 
amendments. At the time, all of the vehicle assemblers believed that 
their individual practices for compliance with the specification 
requirements were appropriate and adequate to the need. However, the 
studies and discussions undertaken as a consequence of this North 
Carolina incident have demonstrated, and have been confirmed by the 
Mississippi Tank tests, that there is a basic conflict in the 
provisions contained in these two sentences in Sec. 178.337-
11(a)(1)(v).
    [17] It is now clear that excess flow protection, whether when 
incorporated into the discharge internal valve or as an in-line 
device, will not function under all climatic conditions nor under 
other low flow rate conditions. In recognition of the preliminary 
conclusion that excess flow devices will not always operate as 
intended or desired, the NPGA special task force has concluded that 
new control and operating systems must be developed to provide the 
desired level of reliability and emergency flow control during 
unloading operations. Devising these new systems is the next 
priority for the special task force appointed by President McTier.
    [18] The task force will also review control systems and 
operating procedures for loading operations to be sure that the 
desired level of emergency flow control will also be available in 
that operation as well. The loading operations aspect of this 
project, has been assigned a second level of priority, since there 
have not been any reported incidents during those operations.
    [19] The special task force already has identified several 
possible alternatives for emergency flow control during transport 
unloading for consideration as permanent changes to industry 
recommended safety and operation practices or for adoption as 
regulatory provisions. These possible solutions include:
     A pneumatic deadman device interlocked with the 
internal stop flow valve and the tank truck brakes, possibly 
combined with a lanyard for remote activation. Possibly applicable 
to bobtails as well.

    Note: The term ``deadman'' is used to identify a system that 
must be in place and operable in order for the unloading system to 
operate. If the shut-down mechanism of the system is activated for 
any reason, the unloading operation is discontinued and the internal 
stop flow valve closes.

     A mechanical deadman device, possibly combined with a 
lanyard for remote activation. Possibly applicable to bobtails as 
well.
     A differential valve downstream of the pump. If the 
engine is shut down, the set-pressure differential is detected and 
stops the flow of propane. This system would only protect piping 
downstream of the differential valve. Applicable to bobtails as 
well.
    [20] Amendment of Sec. 173.33 will also be needed to apply this 
improved level of safety on a permanent basis to the continued 
operation of existing MC-330 and MC-331 propane tank trucks and the 
non-specification cargo tanks operated under Sec. 173.315(k).
    [21] The special task force will also study provisions for 
allowance of the physical and chemical properties of the lading in 
designing the emergency flow protection system required by the MC-
331 specification. Such provisions are not presently a directly-
mentioned provision in the specification. The preliminary analyses 
conducted by the special NPGA task force indicate that such 
considerations are of primary importance. As an example, while NPGA 
has every confidence in the results of the excess flow valve 
capacity tests conducted by Mississippi Tank Company, which used 
water under pneumatic tank pressure as the test medium, we also now 
know that those tests only approximate the performance of the same 
equipment when handling propane in a general manner. Sufficient data 
and other information is not presently available to satisfactorily 
model the performance of that equipment in water flow to 
satisfactorily predict the manner in which the same equipment would 
perform when handling propane, or any other liquefied compressed 
gas, for that matter.

Solutions to the Situation--Short Term

    [22] Responding to the long term need for a new control system 
is the ultimate goal for the NPGA special task force. Part of that 
mission includes presentation of appropriate recommendations to DOT 
for further consideration and adoption as amendments to the MC-331 
specification for new construction and to Sec. 173.33 to provide for 
the continued operation of existing cargo tanks.
    [23] However, the immediate problem is how to provide for the 
continued operation of (1) existing MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tank 
motor vehicles in propane service, (2) the non-specification 
vehicles authorized under Sec. 173.315(k) of the HMR, and (3) any 
new vehicles built in the interim period pending formal amendment of 
the HMR. Also, provisions must be made in this continued operation 
aspect for the annual leakage test and external inspection and for

[[Page 7641]]

the five-year requalification requirements of the HMR for these 
vehicles.
    [24] As an agent for the members of the Association, NPGA now 
submits an application for a DOT Exemption. For reasons set forth 
below, NPGA also recommends that this application be handled under 
the provisions for emergency exemptions (Ref: Sec. 107.113). 
Following DOT's approval of such an exemption, NPGA will promptly 
submit an application to convert that emergency exemption to a 
conventional exemption. Such a combination of Exemptions would 
provide two things:
    (1) authorization for the continued operation of existing cargo 
tank motor vehicles in propane service in the interim to the 
adoption of appropriate regulatory provisions to correct these 
technical and operational difficulties and (2) for the conditional 
operation (including annual tests and inspections and the five-year 
requalification) of any cargo tank motor vehicles built under the 
present regulations pending adoption of said amendments. Given the 
exceptional safety record discussed earlier for both transports and 
bobtails, NPGA believes that the following provisions for the 
proposed Exemption will continue this safety record while the 
relevant changes to industry safety and operating practices and any 
changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations are developed and put 
into place.
    [25] NPGA is not advocating removal of Secs. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i) 
and (a)(1)(v) at the present time. Rather, we believe that further 
information is needed as to the nature and extent of changes to be 
considered for the MC-331 specification before any proposed changes 
are considered for the Hazardous Materials Regulations.
    [26] NPGA recognizes the importance of prompt and expedient 
action in developing recommended changes to industry safety and 
operating practices and provisions of the Hazardous Materials 
Regulations to improve present the respective provisions for 
emergency flow control. To that end, NPGA will present a time plan 
with respective completion points for identification, development, 
testing and implementation of retrofits and the presentation of 
proposed changes to the Hazardous Materials Regulations to DOT by 
February 17, 1997. Furthermore, NPGA representatives will be in 
frequent contact with RSPA/Office of Hazardous Materials Safety and 
FHWA/Office of Motor Carrier Safety staff in a liaison capacity 
regarding the deliberation so this NPGA special task force and will 
present formal quarterly progress reports at appropriate liaison 
meetings.
    [27] Provisions of the Exemption:
    1. Compliance with applicable provisions of the Hazardous 
Materials Regulations, with the exception of Secs. 173.315(n), 
178.337-11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v).
    2. NPGA will contact all of its members operating or assembling 
propane cargo tank motor vehicles and will work with industry trade 
press and other resources to reach affected non-member companies. 
The purpose of this outreach effort will be to bring the North 
Carolina incident and related, identified concerns to the attention 
of companies operating or assembling propane cargo tank motor 
vehicles.
    3. Transfer hose used under the terms of the exemption (1) will 
be inspected before continued use, with particular attention to the 
condition and suitability of the hose end couplings for service and 
(2) otherwise comply with applicable provisions of NFPA 58, 1995 
edition. New transfer hose assemblies will be tested as required by 
Sec. 180.407(h)(1)(ii) before the hose assembly is placed in 
service.
    NFPA 58, 1995 edition designates NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of 
Liquefied Petroleum Gases, published by the National Fire Protection 
Association, Quincy, Massachusetts. In its capacity as an American 
National Standard, NFPA 58 has been used as the basis of regulation 
by virtually all of the 50 states. A copy of the 1995 edition (the 
current edition) is enclosed for your information and consideration.
    4. The vehicle driver will be continually in attendance and 
control of the loading and unloading operations.
    5. Drivers will be advised of the events leading to the December 
8, 1996 incident at Sanford, North Carolina and trained against the 
potential of that incident occurring again. Such training will 
include the inspection of delivery hose and connections to be used 
for the transfer operation to determine, among other things, that 
the hose is suitable for continued service and that the hose-end 
fittings and related connections to plant piping and tank truck 
valves are suitable for service. Driver training as required by 
Secs. 172.702 and 172.704 will include recognition of the potential 
severity of equipment failure or malfunction during product transfer 
and appropriate actions to be taken should such an event occur. 
Records of this training will be included in records required by 
Sec. 172.704(d). During the term of this exemption, a statement 
signed by the driver acknowledging such training and operating 
instructions will be filed by the employer in the files required by 
Sec. 172.704.
    6. The proposed exemption would apply to two types of vehicles: 
(1) The continued operation of those cargo tanks already in 
service--MC-330 and MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles in propane 
service and non-specification propane cargo tanks authorized for 
continued operation under the provisions of Sec. 173.315(k) and (2) 
the entrance into service of new or remounted vehicles that will be 
built or assembled in the interim period to the adoption of formal 
regulatory provisions providing new approaches to emergency flow 
control as an alternative to excess flow valves.
    7. The proposed Exemption will authorize continued assembler and 
design certification of new MC-331 cargo tank motor vehicles and 
required annual inspection and 5-year requalification certifications 
that the subject vehicle complies with the Hazardous Materials 
Regulations, with the exception of Secs. 173.315(n) and 178.337-
11(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(v).

Treatment as an Emergency Exemption

    [28] In recognition of the provisions of HMR/Sec. 107.113(a), a 
copy of this request for Emergency Exemption is being filed 
concurrently with the Chief, Hazardous Materials and Safety 
Division, Office of Safety and Technology, Federal Highway 
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 
20590-0001.
    [29] The propane industry is in the midst of the winter heating 
season. Over 80 percent of the 7-9 billion gallons of propane 
referenced at the beginning of this letter is used as a residential 
heating fuel in rural locations where natural gas service is not 
available. Virtually all of these cargo tank motor vehicles--highway 
transports and bobtails alike--are needed to provide timely and 
adequate delivery of this heating fuel. In addition to residential 
heating fuel, the industry also provides heating fuel to dairy 
barns, chicken and hog brooders, peak shaving for natural gas 
utilities. In addition, propane is also widely used as an 
alternative engine fuel.
    [30] There is another aspect of the need for expedient action in 
the approval and implementation of this exemption--financial impact 
on the propane marketers, propane producers, common carriers, 
vehicle assemblers and equipment manufacturers.
     propane marketers--Unless they are able to deliver 
fuel, these companies literally will not be able to continue in 
business. Of our 3,500 member companies, some 3,200 are small, 
independent businesses operating about 3,400 bulk plants (local 
retail facilities). There are another 3,400 bulk plants operated by 
17 multistate marketer companies. Our members sell over 85% of the 
propane used as a residential heating fuel. Once the propane has 
been delivered to a bulk plant by a highway transport, it is 
transported again by bobtail cargo tank vehicles to the ultimate 
consumer.
     propane producers--Propane heating fuel has two 
sources: a co-product of natural gas production and a by-product of 
crude petroleum cracking and refining operations.
     common carriers--Over 90 percent of the propane used as 
a heating fuel is transported first by pipeline and then by highway 
transport to the local propane bulk plant. While some propane 
marketers have their own fleet of transport tank trucks, many of 
these companies rely on motor common carriers to deliver their 
propane supply. While many of these carriers carry other materials 
as well (hazardous as well as non-hazardous), for many carriers, 
propane transportation is a very significant part of their business.
     vehicle assemblers--For some of the vehicle assemblers, 
propane cargo tank motor vehicles (especially bobtails) are a very 
major part of their business. The companies building propane highway 
transports typically produce semi-trailer cargo tank motor vehicles 
for the transportation of other hazardous materials as well.
     equipment manufacturers--The manufacturers of pumps, 
valves, hose and the other equipment from which a tank truck is 
assembled obviously service other industries than just propane; at 
the same time, supplying the propane industry has become a rather 
significant part of their business.
    [31] The ability to be able to operate propane bobtails and 
highway transports has

[[Page 7642]]

so many impacts and is so pervasive as be almost incalculable from 
an economic impact viewpoint. On the one hand, we believe the 
extremely large volume of propane handled annually (9,000,000,000 
gallons) by transport and then a second time by the bobtails in 
local deliveries and the demonstrated safety record over the history 
of the industry is clear testimony to the commitment of this 
industry to safety and employee training. On the other hand, we are 
committed to correction of the provisions of Sec. 178.337-11 
regarding emergency flow control to address the problems that have 
been identified in the subject incident.
    [32] The NPGA special task force believes it can identify 
alternative emergency flow control systems in the very near future. 
While several systems are already under study, no preferences have 
been established, nor do we know currently what present or new 
equipment will be necessary to implement any changes. Also, we want 
to be reasonably sure that these ``new'' systems will indeed operate 
as intended to provide the desired level of safety and operation 
control under emergency conditions, thus, actual service tests will 
be conducted before widespread installation is undertaken.
    [33] Consequently, there is an extreme and vital need to keep 
the present cargo tank motor vehicles in service, albeit under 
closer scrutiny and control than has previously been the case, until 
these retrofit devices and systems can be developed and placed into 
operation.
    [34] For many years, the propane industry has demonstrated its 
dedication to safety and compliance with standards and regulations. 
Issuance of this exemption will in no way reduce the safe 
transportation of propane. On the contrary, identification of the 
hazard illustrated by the Sanford, North Carolina incident will 
prompt utmost caution during the period of the proposed Exemption.

Conclusion

    [35] Therefore, NPGA believes that a true emergency exists for 
handling this Exemption request in an expedited manner and thus 
pledges that this exemption will be continued in use no longer than 
absolutely necessary during the retrofit of any propane cargo tanks 
requiring the authorization for operation, recertification or 
requalification provided by the Exemption.

III. Mississippi Tank Company Application for Exemption

    The body of the Mississippi Tank Company application for 
exemption is reproduced as follows:
    The purpose of this letter is to make application for an 
emergency exemption of the Hazardous Materials Regulations stated 
above. We urgently need an expedited response to our request and 
offer the information required by part 107.3 as follows:
    1. CFR 178.337-11Ali requires that each internal self-closing 
stop valve and excess flow valve must automatically close if any of 
its attachments are sheared off or if any attached hose or piping is 
separated. Paragraph 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) expands on requirements for 
properly sizing excess flow valves while considering branching or 
other restrictions and, the addition of additional smaller capacity 
excess flow valves, where required.
    We learned during recent evaluation and testing of internal self 
closing stop-valves on cargo tank trailers that the flange mounted 
internal valves available for use with pumps will not automatically 
close under conditions simulating the situation where the hoses or 
piping might be sheared off or separated from the pump. Upon further 
research and consideration, it has become apparent that there are no 
internal valves available that will provide protection as required 
by the above paragraphs.
    Some considerations of the complex series of problems that are 
facing us considering these requirements are listed as follows:
    A. The most commonly used internal self-closing stop valve is a 
Fisher C404-M32-600 flanged internal valve whose 600 at the end of 
the model number indicates the flow rating of 600 GPM (propane). 
Testing at our facility under simulated conditions using air 
pressure and water indicates that this internal valve with this 600 
GPM spring will not close with tank pressures up to 125 psig. Other 
flow rates available (which is determined by the type of internal 
spring that is furnished in the internal valve) are 340 GPM, 400 
GPM, 800 GPM and 1000 GPM. Both the 340 GPM and 400 GPM springs were 
tested to determine their behavior, with most of the testing 
performed using the 400 GPM springs.
    It was determined that the internal valve with the 400 GPM 
spring would close dependably with pressures down to 65 psig but not 
at all at lower pressures. This testing was performed while allowing 
the pump to ``free-wheel'', which would allow the pump to pass more 
product than if it were not allowed to free-wheel. Obviously, a pump 
shaft held stationary would prevent the pump from allowing as much 
product to pass, thereby preventing the sufficient flow of product 
through the pump and discharge piping to trigger the self-closing 
mechanism of the internal valve.
    B. Internal valves (which are excess flow valves when open) have 
springs with manufacturing tolerances of--20%/+10%, thereby allowing 
a broad range of performance in a given flow-rated internal valve. 
Example: a 400 GPM spring can allow a flow between 320 GPM to 440 
GPM.
    In order to insure proper operation of a pumping system on cargo 
tanks, various sources in the industry have indicated that internal 
valve flow rating have been sized with a minimum flow rating of 1.5 
times the discharge capacity of the pump. This would indicate that 
under the greatest flow conditions that the piping system and pump 
can offer, the self-closing criteria for the internal valve would 
have been exceeded by a minimum of 50%.
    D. Flow rates through internal valves, and the associated 
piping, is mostly determined by the internal pressure that exists in 
the cargo tank. The greater the pressure, the more flow rate you 
will have through a given piping system and the lower the pressure, 
the lower flow rate through that same piping system. As an example, 
a cargo tank that was in dedicated propane service might have 
internal valves and excess flow valves that work dependably at 
pressures of 125 psig or higher in warm temperatures but as the 
temperature gets colder, for instance 20  deg.F, a tank pressure of 
only about 41 psig would be present and it is predictable that the 
internal valves and excess flow valves would no longer close due to 
the reduced flow associated with lower pressures in the tank. This 
problem becomes worse if a tank designed to carry products with 
vapor pressures approaching 250 psig is hauling low vapor pressure 
products, such as butanes, whose vapor pressures at warm 
temperatures are very low and at very cold temperatures can be 
practically nothing, insuring that the internal valves would not 
function at these low pressures.
    E. It appears obvious that if you size an internal valve to be 
used with a pump that has a sufficiently low rating to insure that 
the internal valve would automatically close in the event of the 
separation of the discharge piping or hoses, the internal valve 
would never remain open during the pumping operation. After further 
study, it appears that due to the consistent volumetric displacement 
of a pump, the internal valve would never close if it were sized to 
allow the pump to dependably unload a product.
    F. Consideration was given to the use of a lesser flow rate 
excess flow valve at the pump discharge connection, but it was 
determined after considerable deliberation that an excess flow valve 
that was sized so as to allow the pump to discharge product 
dependably might never close in the event the piping or hoses became 
separated, as the flow rating must be sufficient to allow pumping 
without causing the internal valve to close. If separation occurred, 
the pump would still be turning at the same RPMs, thereby producing 
roughly the same amount of flow rate as it was while the piping was 
still connected. Again it becomes apparent that the downstream 
excess protection appears not to be a viable solution either.
    G. One internal valve manufacturer offers internal valves that 
open and close using pump differential pressure, but due to the 
nature of the way the pump must create differential pressure to 
allow the internal valve to stay open, it has been determined during 
discussions with the internal valve manufacturer that this internal 
valve might not close in all conditions as it should.
    2. The problem meeting this requirement applies to all 
compressed gas cargo tanks of the MC331 classification (and possibly 
the MC338 classification) that utilize internal self-closing stop 
valves and excess flow valves in conjunction with pumps and in some 
cases simply in conjunction with discharge piping. This problem is 
not specific to any one class of product and would include all 
products that require the use of these type cargo tanks.
    3. Using the internal valves presently available, our company 
has been producing between 40-200 cargo tanks a year for more than 
35 years. Our company has no knowledge of any problems or safety 
related issues resulting from the use of these valves. Although all 
the cargo tanks in operation today apparently do not comply with the

[[Page 7643]]

above requirements, the compressed gas industry does not appear to 
have a record of major problems in this area.
    If an emergency exemption were granted to allow the continued 
use and certification of these cargo tanks, a warning statement and/
or special operating instructions could be a new requirement as part 
of the conditions allowing for the exemption. This would provide for 
increased safety compared to what is presently available.
    4. We feel that a special exemption is required for duration of 
18-24 months minimum to allow all of the assemblers, equipment 
manufacturers and owners to help work out a solution to this 
problem. Equipment manufacturers advise that it takes a minimum of 
12-15 months to design, test and make available new designs of 
valving. If it is determined that this will be part of the solution, 
the addition of ``dead-man'' type devices that cause the internal 
valves to close when the operator is not present may be incorporated 
as part of the solution as well.
    We urgently request that you act upon our application for an 
emergency exemption for the reasons explained above. This exemption 
is needed to allow the continued use of existing equipment and to 
allow badly needed new equipment to continue to be made available to 
the industry.
    Your expedited response on a priority basis is appreciated in 
advance.

IV. RSPA'S and FHWA's Review

    From the four emergency exemption applications, discussion with the 
applicants, information developed from the Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA) investigation of the Sanford incident, the 
regulatory history related to these issues and knowledge of the 
liquefied compressed gas industry, RSPA and FHWA have developed the 
following information and opinions related to the situation associated 
with the failure of the excess flow feature with the emergency 
discharge control system on cargo tanks used to transport liquefied 
compressed gases.
    Emergency discharge control systems on cargo tanks used to 
transport liquefied gases provide two basic safety features. First, an 
excess flow feature is designed to automatically stop the flow of gas 
when piping, fittings or hoses rupture or separate. The second feature 
is a remotely controlled internal self-closing stop valve designed to 
stop the flow of product from a cargo tank. Cargo tanks having 
capacities over 3500 gallons must have remote means of automatic 
closure, both mechanical and thermal, of the internal self-closing stop 
valve; the remote operators must be installed at the ends of the tank 
in at least two, diagonally opposite locations. Cargo tanks of 3500 
gallons capacity or less must have at least one remote means of 
closure, which may be mechanical, installed on the end of the cargo 
tank farther away from the loading/unloading connection area. The HMR 
require the excess flow feature to function in the event of a complete 
failure (separation) of any attached hoses or piping. The HMR do not 
require the excess flow feature to function in response to leaks or 
partial failure of a pipe, fitting or hose. Manual activation of the 
self-closing valve is the primary safety feature for pipe, fitting or 
hose failures during product transfer. RSPA does not agree with the 
NPGA statement (paragraph 15) that the second and third sentences of 
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) are ``self-conflicting and mutually 
exclusive.''
    When the equipment and regulations for excess flow features on 
cargo tanks transporting liquefied gases were first developed, cargo 
tank motor vehicles were unloaded using internal pressure, by 
pressurizing them, or by use of pumps installed at unloading 
facilities. With such unloading systems, an excess flow feature 
properly designed for a cargo tank and the products the tank is 
designed to transport would reliably function in the event of a total 
pipe, fitting, or hose failure. Over time, in response to customer 
demand, most cargo tank motor vehicles delivering liquefied gases to 
customer bulk storage facilities have been equipped with pumps to speed 
product transfer. The tests performed by Mississippi Tank Company 
following the Sanford incident demonstrated that a pump in the 
discharge system functions as a product flow regulator that restricts 
excess flow, thereby preventing functioning of the excess flow feature. 
Thus, excess flow valves or features will not function when pumps are 
used in a cargo tank's discharge system. NPGA addresses this issue in 
its discussion on ``Solutions to the Situation-Long Term'' (paragraphs 
15 through 21).
    RSPA and FHWA do not agree with the position of the NPGA task 
force, expressed in paragraph 8, that transport vehicles should be 
given first priority in addressing this situation. While the capacity 
of bobtail cargo tanks is lower than that of transports, far more 
bobtails are in use and many more local deliveries are made each day 
than are deliveries to bulk storage facilities. Thus, the risk of an 
accidental discharge of product is much higher for bobtails than for 
transports. Because bobtail cargo tank motor vehicles are fitted with 
pumps and discharge systems very similar to transports, RSPA and FHWA 
believe that the excess flow features of these smaller vehicles also 
may not function when a pipe, fitting or hose ruptures or separates. 
This conclusion is supported by nine instances reported to RSPA over 
the last ten years of propane releases involving the failure of the 
excess flow system on bobtails.
    As previously stated, RSPA and FHWA believe that manual activation 
of the internal self-closing stop valve is the primary means of 
stopping the flow of product from a cargo tank motor vehicle in the 
event of pipe, fitting or hose failure during transfer operations. The 
vehicle operator is the individual responsible for the manual 
activation of the internal stop valve in the event of pipe, fitting or 
hose failure. Under the present circumstances, where the excess flow 
feature of the emergency discharge control system may not function, 
RSPA and FHWA believe that special operator attendance requirements are 
necessary to ensure that a qualified person will always be in a 
position to immediately activate the internal stop valve in the event 
of a release. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 177.834(i), RSPA 
and FHWA believe that the operator must have an unobstructed view of 
the cargo delivery lines, and be within an arm's reach of a means for 
closure of the internal self-closing stop valve or other device that 
will stop the discharge of product from the cargo tank. Until an 
automatic flow control system is developed, this may require two 
operator attendants on a cargo tank motor vehicle or the use of a 
lanyard, electro-mechanical, or other device or system to remotely stop 
the flow of product. If a lanyard or other device or system is used, it 
must meet the performance standard in the regulation (``will 
immediately stop the discharge of product from the cargo tank'). For 
example, there must be adequate space for use of, and appropriate 
tautness in, a lanyard being used to meet this requirement.
    A number of other measures can be taken to mitigate the problem 
experienced in Sanford. Among these are the following:
     Remove pumps and compensate for decreased discharge flow 
by means of:

--enlarging piping, fittings and hose downstream of existing internal 
valves, retaining their excess flow features.
--increase pressure in the vapor space of the cargo tank, e.g., with a 
nitrogen pad.

     Relocate pumps to the receiving end of the unloading 
system.
     Transmit readout from storage tank filling instrumentation 
back to the cargo tank so that operator/attendant can remain in close 
proximity to internal valve closure devices.
     Increase frequency and thoroughness of maintenance 
actions; for example, systems for remote closure

[[Page 7644]]

of internal valves demand regular inspection, test and adjustment.
    It has been reported that the propane release in the Sanford 
incident was from the hose used for delivery and that the hose was new 
and had not been pressure tested prior to attachment. Also, it was 
reported that the hose coupling on the storage tank end had not been 
firmly attached to the hose by means of the two machine bolts provided 
for this type coupling.
    On large MC 330/331 transport vehicles, hoses typically are not 
attached to the cargo tank piping during transit, while on small local 
delivery cargo tanks, hoses typically remain attached to the piping and 
are under pressure during transit. Technically, hoses attached to 
piping and under pressure during transit form part of the cargo tank 
wall as defined in Sec. 178.320(a)(1). This means that they should be 
tested in accordance with Sec. 180.407(g) at the test pressure required 
for MC 330/331 cargo tanks in Sec. 180.407(g)(1)(iv), i.e., at 1.5 
times either the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) or the re-
rated pressure, whichever is applicable. However, because of the 
difficulties that may be encountered at these high pressures, and due 
to the potential for over-stressing hose reinforcement fibers during 
such a test, RSPA and FHWA believe the test should be conducted at no 
less than 80 percent of the design pressure or maximum allowable 
working pressure (MAWP) marked on the cargo tank. This pressure test 
requirement includes couplings or other fittings which are part of the 
assembled hose as used. It must be repeated after any repair or 
modification of the assembled hose before it is re-used.
    Non-specification cargo tanks. Potential difficulties with excess 
flow protection are not well defined for the group of non-specification 
cargo tanks which are authorized for transportation of liquefied 
petroleum gas by Sec. 173.315(k). These cargo tanks were manufactured 
before January 1, 1981, in conformance with the editions of the ASME 
Code and NFPA Standard 58 which were in effect at the time of 
manufacture. They must conform with applicable laws of the states in 
which they operate; and they must be tested and inspected periodically 
in accordance with subpart E of part 180, as specified for MC 331 cargo 
tank motor vehicles.
    RSPA and FHWA recognize that the situation described for MC 330 and 
331 cargo tanks is no less severe for these non-specification vessels. 
RSPA and FHWA encourage responsible authorities in every jurisdiction 
to give special attention to NFPA provisions for vapor and liquid 
withdrawal requirements for internal valves with integral excess-flow 
valves or excess-flow protection.

V. RSPA's and FHWA's Evaluation of the Applications for Exemption

    As a frame of reference for evaluation of the applications for 
exemption, the specification requirements for emergency discharge 
control can be achieved by means of either an internal self-closing 
stop valve or an excess flow valve. The most important performance 
standard relevant to this issue is that ``Each internal self-closing 
stop valve and excess flow valve must automatically close if any of its 
attachments are sheared off or if any attached hoses or piping are 
separated.'' [See Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)]. Provisions of 
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(v) come into play only if and when excess flow 
valves are used anywhere in the system.
    After evaluating the situation and the NPGA and Mississippi Tank 
Company emergency exemption applications, RSPA finds that this 
situation constitutes an emergency with broad applicability to many 
persons and far reaching safety and economic impacts. RSPA also is not 
aware of readily available, off-the-shelf equipment that can provide a 
functioning automatic excess flow feature on cargo tanks without 
removal of pumps and other restrictions. The applicants propose an 
outreach effort to inform tank users of the Sanford incident and the 
safety issues related to product transfer operations and a research and 
development program to design a system which will provide greater 
safety in product transfer operations.
    During evaluation of the Sanford incident, it has become evident 
that the level of safety provided by the HMR is not being achieved on 
equipment currently being produced and certified by manufacturers of 
these cargo tanks. Specifically, these tanks do not meet the 
requirement for automatic closure of internal self-closing stop valves 
and excess flow valves in the event of separation of hoses or piping. 
The regulatory language is intended to ensure a certain level of safety 
in these vehicles. However, the level of safety provided by the 
immediate steps proposed by NPGA is not equivalent to the level of 
safety provided by Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i). The NPGA proposes 
requirements regarding driver training, testing and inspection of 
equipment, and driver attendance during unloading operations (see 
paragraph 27 of the NPGA application). These proposed requirements are 
effectively the same as those already set forth in 49 CFR. In the 
Mississippi Tank application, it was suggested that ``a warning 
statement and/or special operating instructions'' could be required, 
but no details were offered on how that would achieve a level of safety 
equivalent to that provided by the existing regulatory requirements in 
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i). Thus, neither application proposes procedures 
that would compensate for the absence of excess flow features that 
function reliably and in a passive manner.
    Because the applications do not provide for an equivalent level of 
safety, as required by Sec. 107.113(f)(2)(ii), of the HMR, they have 
been denied by the Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials 
Safety. Also, the issues addressed in the applications have significant 
safety and economic implications for a broad range of persons; 
consequently, RSPA believes the issues are better addressed through the 
rulemaking process. Thus, RSPA is issuing this interim final rule.

VI. Provisions of the Interim Final Rule

    RSPA is publishing this interim final rule to enhance the safety of 
product transfer operations as they are currently conducted, in most 
cases, while allowing the continued delivery of liquefied compressed 
gases (principally propane, other liquefied petroleum gases and 
anhydrous ammonia). RSPA and FHWA believe that, without the 
authorization for continued operation provided by this rule, the 
public, industry, and cargo tank motor vehicle operators and 
manufacturers would be severely impacted. The liquefied compressed 
gases authorized for highway transportation under this rule are used 
for home heating, support of industrial and agricultural operations, 
and as fertilizer. Because there are no alternative means for 
distribution of these materials in most areas served by the cargo tank 
motor vehicles authorized by this rule, RSPA and FHWA believe this rule 
is necessary to prevent severe shortages of liquefied compressed gases 
in the areas where they are consumed.
    This emergency interim final rule authorizes, under specific 
conditions, the continued manufacture, assembly, certification, use and 
recertification of cargo tanks that may not meet the excess flow 
feature requirements for cargo tanks authorized for the transportation 
of liquefied compressed gases. This rule is effective through August 
15, 1997. This will allow time for implementation of changes to 
equipment that will automatically shut down product transfer as 
required in Sec. 178.337-11,

[[Page 7645]]

when a pipe or hose ruptures or separates.
    In the next several months, RSPA and FHWA will actively pursue 
technical improvements to product delivery systems, as well as other 
feasible operational controls, that may be applied to minimize threats 
to public safety inherent in the transportation of liquefied compressed 
gases. RSPA has developed an action plan that includes the two public 
workshops scheduled for March 4-5, and April 8-9, 1997. In addition, 
working through its Volpe National Transportation System Center, RSPA 
will examine the availability and feasibility of systems that can 
achieve the purpose of the regulations; identify facilities where 
automatic shut-down systems may be safely tested, and seek out other 
sources of technical expertise in government, industry and academia.
    The August 15, 1997 compliance date was chosen in part because it 
falls between the end of the summer 1997 planting season and the 
beginning of the winter 1997-1998 heating season. This date gives 
industry approximately six months to bring cargo tanks into compliance 
with the current (i.e., pre-IFR) regulatory requirement. Alternatively, 
industry may be able to demonstrate that regulatory compliance is not 
feasible, and recommend timetables for achieving compliance or 
implementing alternative technology to achieve the safety objective of 
a passive, automatic shut off system for emergency discharge control.
    By the expiration of the interim final rule, RSPA and FHWA could 
announce their intent to strictly enforce the current regulatory 
requirement, unless the industry convinces us that they are making a 
good faith effort to develop a properly operating system that meets the 
requirements of the HMR. Alternatively, depending on the information 
developed during the comment period, RSPA would implement rulemaking 
either to modify the current regulatory requirement, providing a 
different means of passive shut-off, or extending the provisions of the 
IFR (with modification, if warranted) based on an industry-developed 
timetable for implementing technological change. The rule addresses the 
concerns expressed in the exemption applications of the NPGA, 
Mississippi Tank Company, TFI, and NTTC.
    In order to enhance the level of safety during transfer operations 
using current equipment, the rule specifies special conditions for 
continued operations. The following provisions are adopted in 
Sec. 171.5 to provide a set of alternative safety controls for the 
carriage of liquefied gases in cargo tanks that cannot be demonstrated 
to conform with existing excess flow feature requirements.
    Paragraph (a)(1) specifies use provisions under which MC 330, MC 
331 or non-specification cargo tank motor vehicles authorized under 
Sec. 173.315(k) may be operated and unloaded.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(i) prescribes that before transfer from a cargo 
tank motor vehicle the integrity of components making up the discharge 
system must be verified. Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) prescribes that prior to 
using a new or repaired transfer hose or a modified hose assembly, the 
hose must be pressure tested at no less than 80 percent of the design 
pressure or maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) marked on the 
cargo tank. Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) specifies that a qualified person in 
attendance of transfer from a cargo tank must have the capability for 
emergency shut-down. Paragraph (a)(1)(iv) specifies that when there is 
an unintentional release of lading, the internal self-closing stop 
valve must be activated and all motive and auxiliary power equipment 
must be shut down. Paragraph (a)(1)(v) prescribes the development of 
comprehensive emergency operating procedures for all transfer 
operations. Paragraph (a)(1)(vi) specifies that each manufacturer, 
assembler, retester, motor carrier and other hazmat employer must 
provide training to its hazmat employees so that they can properly 
perform the new function-specific requirements in this section.
    Paragraph (a)(2) prescribes conditions for continued qualification 
of existing in-service cargo tank motor vehicles.
    Paragraph (a)(3) addresses new vehicles, including a special entry 
on the certification required by Sec. 178.337-18.
    Paragraph (b) specifies the marking to be displayed on a cargo tank 
motor vehicle operating under this section.
    Paragraph (c) establishes August 15, 1997, as the expiration date 
for this temporary regulation.

VII. Request for Comments

    To facilitate decisions on the need for this interim final rule as 
a short term response to an emergency and the potential need for a 
permanent change in the rule, RSPA requests comments responding to the 
questions listed below. RSPA also invites comments on any aspect of 
this rulemaking action not specifically addressed by the questions. 
RSPA and FHWA encourage interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written views, data, and information 
concerning this interim final rule. Commenters are requested to provide 
a reason or basis for each comment.
    Additionally, RSPA and FHWA are seeking information pertaining to 
research and development related to the issues contained in this rule. 
This information may be presented at the public meeting.
    1. NPGA has suggested the development of a ``deadman'' or a remote 
valve actuation system, possibly using a lanyard. Automobiles are 
commonly equipped with remote transmitter devices that fit on key rings 
to unlock doors or open trunk lids from 50 feet away. If such a 
manually activated device were used to close internal self-closing stop 
valves, would it provide a level of safety equivalent to the 
requirement for a passive automatic shut-down system required by 
Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)?
    2. What types of devices can provide the passive automatic shut-
down function required by Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)?
    3. What tests are appropriate at the time of manufacture or 
assembly and at the time of requalification to ensure that the product 
discharge system will close as required by Sec. 178.337-11(a)(1)(i)?
    4. In view of the fact that specification MC 330 and MC 331 cargo 
tank motor vehicles are authorized for a broad range of hazardous 
materials, is it possible to design an emergency discharge control 
system that functions effectively with all liquefied compressed gases 
under all conditions normal to transportation? If not, should the 
manufacturer's certification required under Sec. 178.337-18 specify the 
materials and conditions that are acceptable for carriage in, or 
unloading of, the cargo tank?
    5. Do manufacturers and assemblers of cargo tank motor vehicles 
provide operational and maintenance instructions to operators on the 
use of the cargo tank motor vehicles they supply? If so, provide 
examples of such information to RSPA.
    6. Provide any information available on other interstate or 
intrastate incidents involving the failure of emergency control systems 
on cargo tanks authorized to transport liquefied compressed gases.
    7. Are hoses used to transfer product from large transport cargo 
tank motor vehicles permanently attached or carried on the vehicles or 
supplied by the customer at the point of delivery?
    8. RSPA is concerned that this problem may highlight a deficiency 
in the training programs for Design Certifying Engineers and those 
persons certifying cargo tanks as meeting the

[[Page 7646]]

requirements of the HMR. In addition, carrier function-specific 
training programs also may not be providing sufficient training in the 
specification requirements for these cargo tanks. What training is 
provided to those individuals who are responsible for certifying, 
operating, testing and repairing these cargo tank motor vehicles?

VIII. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures

    This final rule is considered a significant regulatory action under 
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget. The rule is considered significant under the 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the Department of Transportation 
(44 FR 11034).
    Because of the emergency nature of this rule, RSPA is not required 
to prepare a regulatory evaluation. Nevertheless, in an effort to 
minimize the burden of this rule, RSPA prepared a preliminary 
regulatory evaluation which is available in the public docket.
    Because of the potential safety risk posed by continued 
transportation of liquefied compressed gases in specification MC 330 
and MC 331 cargo tank motor vehicles that do not conform to the 
performance criteria for emergency discharge controls, RSPA has 
determined that good cause exists for making this rule effective less 
than 30 days from its issuance and that prior notice and opportunity to 
comment is impractical and contrary to public interest.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (Act), as amended, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, 
directs agencies to consider the potential impact of regulations on 
small business and other small entities. The Act, however, applies only 
to rules for which an agency is required to publish a notice of 
proposed rulemaking pursuant to section 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a) and 604(a). 
Because of the emergency nature of this rule, RSPA is authorized under 
section 553(b)(B) and section 553 (d)(3) of the APA to forego notice 
and comment and to issue this rule as an interim final rule with an 
immediate effective date. Consequently, RSPA is not required under the 
Act to do a regulatory flexibility analysis in this rulemaking.
    Specifically, section 553(b)(B) and section 553(d)(3) of the APA 
authorize agencies to dispense with certain procedures for rules, 
including notice and comment, when they find ``good cause'' to do so. 
``Good cause'' includes a finding that following notice-and-comment 
procedures would be ``impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest.'' Section 553(d)(3) allows an agency, upon a finding 
of good cause, to make a rule effective immediately. ``Good cause'' has 
been held to include situations where immediate action is necessary to 
reduce or avoid health hazards or other imminent harm to persons or 
property, or where inaction would lead to serious dislocation in 
government programs or the marketplace.
    Nevertheless, RSPA is concerned with the effect this rule may have 
on small business. Consequently, in preparing a preliminary regulatory 
evaluation under Executive Order 12866, RSPA has analyzed, based on 
information currently available to the agency, the impact of this rule 
on all affected parties, including small businesses. The preliminary 
regulatory evaluation is available for review in the public docket. In 
that preliminary evaluation, RSPA estimates that where an operator of 
bobtails chooses to comply with the arms-reach attendance requirement 
by use of a lanyard--as suggested by NPGA in its application for 
emergency exemption--the average annual cost per operator will be 
$1,324. In addition, in this interim final rule RSPA is asking 
commenters to provide information to the agency regarding the economic, 
safety and other impacts of this rule so that the agency can make any 
necessary changes to the rule.
    A small entity includes a small business, small organization or 
small governmental jurisdiction. For purposes of this discussion, a 
small business is deemed to be one which is independently owned and 
operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation. RSPA 
believes that the impacts of this rule are primarily addressed to 
businesses involving the distribution of liquefied petroleum gas and 
anhydrous ammonia, and to manufacturers and assemblers of cargo tanks 
used for the distribution of these products. Under the Small Business 
Administration's size standard definitions (13 CFR Part 121), liquefied 
petroleum gas distributors with $5 million or less in annual receipts, 
and manufacturers of truck or bus bodies or truck trailers that employ 
500 or less individuals are small businesses. Based on available 
information, RSPA estimates that at least 90% of the businesses 
impacted by this rule are small businesses. RSPA further estimates 
there are at least 6,800 businesses and at least 25,000 cargo tank 
motor vehicles (7,000 ``transports'' and 18,000 ``bobtails'') affected 
by this rule.
    In order for RSPA to determine the potential impacts of this rule 
on small entities, small businesses affected by this final rule are 
requested to submit comments addressed to the impacts of this rule and 
other significant alternatives on small entities. Some of the 
considerations envisioned in assessing these impacts include the 
following:
    1. Are RSPA's estimates as to number of businesses affected by this 
rule, and the percentage of these which are small businesses, 
consistent with industry estimates? Are other estimates available as to 
the numbers of businesses and small businesses in each sector of 
business addressed by this rule (i.e., gas distributor, cargo tank 
manufacturer, cargo tank assembler) and numbers of cargo tank motor 
vehicles? Are there other business sectors affected? Are some 
geographic areas affected more than others (please identify)?
    2. Are there alternatives to this rule which accomplish RSPA's 
objectives, while imposing less of an impact on small businesses? What 
are those alternatives?
    3. In what manner could differing compliance or reporting 
requirements be implemented for small businesses to take into account 
the resources available to small businesses? In what manner could 
compliance or reporting requirements be clarified, consolidated or 
simplified for such small businesses?
    4. What are the direct and indirect costs of compliance with the 
rule, calculated both as absolute costs and as a percentage of revenue 
of the regulated small business?
    5. What are the direct and indirect costs of completing paperwork 
or recordkeeping requirements, again both as absolute costs and as a 
percentage of revenue?
    6. What is the effect of this rule, if any, on the competitive 
position of small entities in relation to larger entities?
    7. What is the effect of this rule on the small entity's cash flow 
and liquidity?
    8. What is the effect of this rule on the ability of a small entity 
to remain in the market?
    9. What is the availability and cost to the small entity for 
professional assistance to meet regulatory requirements?
    10. Are there any Federal rules that duplicate, overlap or conflict 
with this rule?

[[Page 7647]]

C. Executive Order 12612

    This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles 
and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 (``Federalism''). The 
Federal hazardous materials transportation law, 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127, 
contains an express preemption provision (49 U.S.C. 5125(b)) that 
preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements on certain covered 
subjects. Covered subjects are:
    (1) The designation, description, and classification of hazardous 
materials;
    (2) The packing, repacking, handling, labeling, marking, and 
placarding of hazardous materials;
    (3) The preparation, execution, and use of shipping documents 
related to hazardous materials and requirements related to the number, 
contents, and placement of those documents;
    (4) The written notification, recording, and reporting of the 
unintentional release in transportation of hazardous material; or
    (5) The design, manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, 
recondition, repair, or testing of a packaging or container 
represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in 
transporting hazardous material.
    This interim final rule addresses covered subject item (5) above 
and preempts State, local, and Indian tribe requirements not meeting 
the ``substantively the same'' standard. Federal hazardous materials 
transportation law provides at Sec. 5125(b)(2) that, if DOT issues a 
regulation concerning any of the covered subjects, DOT must determine 
and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of Federal 
preemption. The effective date may not be earlier than the 90th day 
following the date of issuance of the final rule and not later than two 
years after the date of issuance. RSPA has determined that the 
effective date of Federal preemption for these requirements will be May 
20, 1997. Thus, RSPA lacks discretion in this area, and preparation of 
a federalism assessment is not warranted.

D. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection and recordkeeping requirements contained 
in this final rule have been submitted for emergency approval to the 
Office of Management and Budget under the provisions of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995. Section 1320.8(d), Title 5, Code of Federal 
Regulations requires that RSPA provide interested members of the public 
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information 
collection and recordkeeping requests. RSPA estimates that the total 
information collection and recordkeeping burden in this interim final 
rule is 17,575 hours, at a cost of $376,875, for the development and 
maintenance of the comprehensive emergency operating procedure. These 
figures are based in RSPA's belief that standardized emergency 
operating procedures can be developed for use by a majority of industry 
members, thus reducing substantially the burden hours and cost to 
individual industry members of compliance with the emergency operating 
procedures requirement. Requests for a copy of this information 
collection should be directed to Deborah Boothe, Office of Hazardous 
Materials Standards (DHM-10), Research and Special Programs 
Administration, Room 8102, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 
20590-0001. Telephone (202) 366-8553. Written comments should be 
received by the close of the comment period identified elsewhere in 
this rulemaking and should be addressed to the Dockets Unit as 
identified in the Addresses section of this rulemaking. Under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to respond to an 
information collection unless it displays a valid OMB control number. 
RSPA will publish a notice advising interested parties of the OMB 
control number for this information collection when assigned by OMB.

E. Regulation identifier number (RIN)

    A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory 
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The 
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in 
April and October of each year. The RIN number contained in the heading 
of this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the 
Unified Agenda.

F. Executive Order 12778

    Any interested person may petition RSPA's Administrator for 
reconsideration of this final rule within 30 days of publication of 
this rule in the Federal Register, in accordance with the procedures 
set forth at 49 CFR 106.35. Neither the filing of a petition for 
reconsideration nor any other administrative proceeding is required 
before the filing of a suit in court for review of this rule.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 171

    Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, 
Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

    In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 171 is amended as 
follows:

PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS

    1. The authority citation for Part 171 is revised to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5127, 44701; Sec. 4, Pub. L. 101-410, 
104 Stat. 890 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Sec. 31001, Pub. L. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321; 49 CFR 1.45 and 1.53.

    2. Section 171.5 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 171.5  Temporary regulation; liquefied compressed gases in cargo 
tank motor vehicles.

    (a) Section 178.337-11 of this subchapter requires an excess flow 
feature as a part of the emergency discharge control system installed 
in a cargo tank motor vehicle used to transport certain liquefied 
compressed gases. Other regulations in Parts 173 and 180 of this 
subchapter reference this requirement or similar requirements in effect 
at the time of manufacture of a cargo tank. Notwithstanding this 
requirement, a DOT MC 330 or MC 331 specification cargo tank motor 
vehicle, or a non-specification cargo tank motor vehicle conforming to 
the requirements of Sec. 173.315(k) of this subchapter, may, without 
certification and demonstrated performance of the excess flow feature 
of its emergency discharge control system, be represented for use and 
used to transport liquefied compressed gases under the following 
conditions:
    (1) Use. The cargo tank motor vehicle must otherwise be operated, 
unloaded and attended in full conformance with all applicable 
requirements of this subchapter and the following additional 
requirements:
    (i) Before initiating any transfer from the cargo tank motor 
vehicle, the person performing the function shall verify that each 
component of the discharge system is of sound quality, is free of 
leaks, and that connections are secure.
    (ii) Prior to commencing transfer using a new or repaired transfer 
hose or a modified hose assembly, it must be pressure tested at no less 
than 80 percent of the design pressure or maximum allowable working 
pressure (MAWP) marked on the cargo tank. This test must include all 
hose and hose fittings and equipment arranged in the configuration to 
be employed during transfer operations. A hose or associated equipment 
that shows signs of leakage, significant bulging, or other defects, is 
not acceptable for use.
    (iii) In addition to attendance requirements in Sec. 177.834(i) of 
this subchapter, the person who attends the

[[Page 7648]]

unloading of a cargo tank motor vehicle must have an unobstructed view 
of the discharge system and be within arm's reach of a means for 
closure (emergency shut-down device) of the internal self-closing stop 
valve or other device that will immediately stop the discharge of 
product from the cargo tank.
    (iv) If there is an unintentional release of lading to the 
environment during transfer, the qualified person attending the cargo 
tank shall immediately activate the internal self-closing stop valve 
and shut down all motive and auxiliary power equipment.
    (v) A comprehensive emergency operating procedure must be developed 
for all transfer operations and hazmat employees who perform unloading 
functions must be thoroughly trained in its provisions. The emergency 
operating procedure must be prominently displayed in or on the cargo 
tank motor vehicle.
    (vi) As required by Sec. 172.704 of this subchapter, each 
manufacturer, assembler, retester, motor carrier and other hazmat 
employer subject to the requirements of this section shall ensure that 
its hazmat employees are trained to properly perform these new 
function-specific requirements including the meaning of the marking 
specified in paragraph (b) of this section. The hazmat employer shall 
ensure that a record of the training is created, certified, and 
maintained as specified in Sec. 172.704(d) of this subchapter.
    (2) Continuing qualification. An existing in-service cargo tank 
motor vehicle may continue to be marked and documented as required by 
Part 180 of this subchapter if the following statement is added to the 
current inspection report required by Sec. 180.417(b) of this 
subchapter: ``Emergency excess flow control performance not established 
for this unit.''
    (3) New vehicles. A new (unused) cargo tank motor vehicle 
manufactured, marked and certified prior to August 16, 1997, may be 
marked and certified as conforming to specification MC 331 if it 
otherwise meets all requirements of the specification and the following 
statement is added to the certification document required by 
Sec. 178.337-18 of this subchapter: ``Emergency excess flow control 
performance not established for this unit.''
    (b) Marking. The following marking must be displayed on a cargo 
tank used in or represented for use under this section:

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[[Page 7649]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR19FE97.097



    (1) The letters must be white and the background black.
    (2) The letters must be at least 1.5cm in height.
    (3) The marking must be 6cm x 15cm.
    (c) Expiration date. This section is effective February 19, 1997 
through August 15, 1997.

    Issued in Washington, DC on February 13, 1997 under authority 
delegated in 49 CFR part 1.
D.K. Sharma,
Administrator, Research and Special Programs Administration.
[FR Doc. 97-4116 Filed 2-14-97; 12:09 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P