

Please notify Sandy Beall at the above address of your intention to attend the workshop or if you have written comments.

Issued in Washington, DC on January 31, 1997.

Christine A. Ervin,

Assistant Secretary, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy.

[FR Doc. 97-3063 Filed 2-6-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-NM-260-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-100, -200, -300, and -400 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-100, -200, -300, and -400 series airplanes. This proposal would require a one-time visual inspection to determine the part number of the fuel shutoff valve installed in the outboard engines. The proposed AD also would require replacement of certain valves with new valves, or modification of the spar valve body assembly, and various follow-on actions. This proposal is prompted by reports indicating that, due to high fuel pressure, certain fuel system components of the outboard engines have failed on in-service airplanes. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent such high fuel pressure, which could result in failure of the fuel system components; this situation could result in fuel leakage and, consequently, lead to an engine fire.

DATES: Comments must be received by March 20, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-260-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; or ITT Aerospace Controls, 28150 Industry Drive, Valencia, California 91355. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sulmo Mariano, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; telephone (206) 227-2686; fax (206) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 96-NM-260-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-260-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

The FAA has received several reports indicating that, due to high fuel pressure, the fuel system components of

the outboard engines have failed on Boeing Model 747 series airplanes:

1. Four incidents on airplanes powered by General Electric engines in which the fuel pump inlet of the engine was found to be cracked.

2. Two incidents on airplanes powered by Rolls Royce engines, in which the low pressure fuel filter housing on the engine was found to be cracked.

3. Two incidents on airplanes powered by Rolls Royce engines, in which the fuel cooled oil cooler on the engine was found to be ruptured.

The existing design of the fuel shutoff spar valve installed on certain Model 747 series airplanes powered by General Electric and Rolls Royce engines can cause high pressure to occur in the fuel line. High fuel pressure can occur after the fuel shutoff spar valve and the engine fuel shutoff valve are closed during engine shutdown. This can result in heating of the trapped fuel and, because these valves are closed, the pressure created from the heating process is not released.

High fuel pressure could result in failure of the fuel system components. If any of these components fails, the resultant fuel leakage could result in a possible engine fire.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2199, dated August 1, 1996. The alert service bulletin describes procedures for performing a visual inspection to determine the part number of the fuel shutoff valve installed in the left and right-hand outboard engines; and replacement of certain valves with new valves and various follow-on actions, if necessary. [These follow-on actions include aligning valve(s), performing a check to detect leaks, and correcting any discrepancy.] The new fuel shutoff valve will ensure that the fuel pressure is released at 55-70 pounds per square inch gauge (p.s.i.g.).

The FAA has also reviewed and approved ITT Service Bulletins SB125120-28-01, SB107970-28-01, and SB125334-28-01; all dated July 15, 1996. These service bulletins describe procedures for modification of the spar valve body assembly. The modifications involve replacement of the thermal relief valves located in the valve disc with new thermal relief valves. Back pressure on the thermal relief valve can cause the valves to open at a higher pressure than desired. Accomplishment of these modifications will reduce the opening pressure of the thermal relief valves.

Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require a one-time visual inspection to verify if the proper fuel shutoff valve is installed in the left and right-hand outboard engines. The proposed AD also would require replacement of any improper valve with a new valve or modification of the spar valve body assembly, and various follow-on actions. The actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with the service bulletins described previously.

The FAA also has determined that, following accomplishment of the proposed visual inspection and replacement or modifications, a one-time inspection to detect fuel leaks of the components between the fuel shutoff spar valve and the engine fuel shutoff valve to ascertain the integrity of these components is necessary. This proposed AD would require that this one-time inspection for leakage be accomplished and that any discrepant part be replaced with a serviceable part. These actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with the applicable section that pertains to Rolls Royce RB211 series engines or General Electric CF6-80C and CF6-45/50 series engines in Chapter 71 of the Boeing 747 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM).

Cost Impact

There are approximately 418 Boeing Model 747-100, -200, -300, and -400 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 24 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

It would take approximately 4 work hours per airplane to accomplish the proposed one-time visual inspection to determine the part number of the valve, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the visual proposed by this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$5,760, or \$240 per airplane.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

Should an operator elect to modify the valve body assembly of the fuel system rather than replace a discrepant valve, it would take approximately 20 work hours per airplane, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour.

Required parts would cost approximately \$404 (2 kits) per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of any necessary modification action is estimated to be \$1,604 per airplane.

Should an operator be required to accomplish the necessary one-time inspection to detect leaks and cracks (after replacement of the valve or modification of the assembly), it would take approximately 16 work hours per airplane, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of this one-time inspection is estimated to be \$960 per airplane.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption

ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Boeing: Docket 96-NM-260-AD.

Applicability: Model 747-100, -200, -300, and -400 series airplanes, having line numbers 001 through 1006, inclusive, and powered by General Electric or Rolls Royce engines; certificated in any category.

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent high fuel pressure in components between the fuel shutoff spar valve and the engine fuel shutoff valve, which could result in failure of the fuel system components, lead to fuel leakage, and, consequently, lead to a possible engine fire, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time visual inspection to determine the part number of the fuel shutoff valve installed in the left- and right-hand outboard engines, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2199, dated August 1, 1996.

(1) If a valve having P/N S343T003-40 (ITT P/N 125334D-1) is installed, no further action is required by this AD.

(2) If a valve having P/N S343T003-40 (ITT P/N 125334D-1) is not installed, prior to further flight, accomplish either paragraph (a)(2)(i) or (a)(2)(ii) of this AD.

(i) Replace the valve with a new valve, in accordance with the alert service bulletin. Prior to further flight following accomplishment of the replacement, align the valve(s), perform a check to detect leaks, and correct any discrepancy, in accordance with the alert service bulletin. Or

(ii) Modify the valve body assembly of the fuel system in accordance with ITT Service Bulletin SB125120-28-01, ITT Service Bulletin SB107970-28-01, and ITT Service Bulletin SB125334-28-01; all dated July 15, 1996.

(b) Prior to further flight following accomplishment of paragraph (a)(2) of this AD, perform a one-time inspection to detect fuel leaks of the components between the fuel shutoff spar valve and the engine fuel shutoff valve on all four engines, in accordance with the applicable section that pertains to Rolls Royce RB211 series engines or General Electric CF6-80C and CF6-45/50 series engines in Chapter 71 of the Boeing 747 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM). If

any leak is detected, prior to further flight, replace the part with a serviceable part.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 31, 1997.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97-3029 Filed 2-6-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96-NM-137-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA) Model CN-235 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain CASA Model CN-235 series airplanes. This proposal would require repetitive inspections of the torsion tubes and fittings of the elevator and rudder assemblies to detect stress corrosion cracking, and replacement of cracked parts. This proposed action also would require the accomplishment of a modification that would constitute terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This proposal is prompted by reports indicating that stress corrosion cracking in these parts has been found on some airplanes. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent loss of control of the elevator and/or rudder, due to failure of the elevator and/or rudder assemblies as a result of stress corrosion cracking.

DATES: Comments must be received by March 20, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-137-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

The service information referenced in the proposed rule may be obtained from Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A., Getafe, Madrid, Spain. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Greg Dunn, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2799; fax (206) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 96-NM-137-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,

ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM-137-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056.

Discussion

The Dirección General de Aviación (DGAC), which is the airworthiness authority for Spain, has notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may exist on certain CASA Model CN-235 series airplanes. The DGAC advises that it has received reports indicating that stress corrosion cracks were detected in the torsion tubes and fittings of the elevator and rudder assemblies on some of these airplanes. This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of these assemblies and subsequent loss of control of the elevator and/or rudder.

Explanation of Relevant Service Information

CASA has issued Service Bulletin SB-235-27-05, Revision 1, dated September 29, 1993 (for non-military airplanes), and Service Bulletin SB-235-27-05M, Revision 2, dated January 25, 1996 (for military airplanes). These service bulletins describe procedures for conducting repetitive visual inspections of the torsion tubes for the rudder and elevator to detect stress corrosion cracking, and replacement of discrepant tubes with tubes of a new design. Installation of the newly-designed torsion tubes is intended to preclude stress corrosion cracking and eliminates the need for repetitive visual inspections.

The DGAC classified Service Bulletin SB-235-27-05 (for non-military airplanes) as mandatory and issued Spanish airworthiness directive 06/94, dated August 1994, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in Spain. The DGAC classified Service Bulletin SB-235-27-05M (for military airplanes) as "recommended."

FAA's Conclusions

This airplane model is manufactured in Spain and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the DGAC has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the DGAC, reviewed all available information, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.