[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 19 (Wednesday, January 29, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4269-4271]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-2205]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD


Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has identified 
and resolved potential conflicts of interest situations related to its 
proposed

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contractor, Mr. Lary M. McGrew. This Notice, which is a summary of the 
facts related to this decision, satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 
1706.8(e) with respect to publication in the Federal Register. Under 
the Board's Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interests 
Regulation, 10 CFR part 1706 (OCI Regulations), an organizational or 
consultant conflict of interest (OCI) means that because of other past, 
present or future planned activities or relationships, a contractor or 
consultant is unable, or potentially unable, to render impartial 
assistance or advice to the Board, or the objectivity of such offeror 
or contractor in performing work for the Board is or might be otherwise 
impaired, or such offeror or contractor has or would have an unfair 
competitive advantage. While the OCI Regulations provide that contracts 
shall generally not be awarded to an organization where the Board has 
determined that an actual or potential OCI exists and cannot be 
avoided, the Board may waive this requirement in certain circumstances.
    The Board's mission is to provide advice and recommendations to the 
Department of Energy (DOE) regarding public health and safety matters 
related to DOE's defense nuclear facilities. This includes the review 
and evaluation of the content and implementation of health and safety 
standards including DOE orders, rules, and other safety requirements, 
relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of 
DOE defense nuclear facilities. In late 1991, Congress amended the 
Board's enabling Act, broadening the Board's jurisdiction over defense 
nuclear facilities to include the assembly, disassembly, and testing of 
nuclear weapons. With this increase in responsibility, the Board 
revised its priorities to include reviews of additional facilities, 
including, principally, the Pantex Plant (Pantex), Nevada Test Site 
(NTS), and additional facilities at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. Further, the 
Board recognized the need to direct its attention to the activities of 
the weapons' design laboratories such as Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia 
National Laboratory (Sandia) as they are actively involved in 
developing procedures and processes for the weapons assembly and 
disassembly operations at DOE facilities.
    Two matters of primary concern to the Board were, and continue to 
be, the safety of weapons disassembly operations and maintenance of the 
capability to safely conduct nuclear testing operations. While the DOE 
had been engaged in these activities for decades, significant and 
abrupt changes in the national security posture required dramatic 
shifts in emphasis within DOE. Unprecedented numbers of simultaneous 
nuclear weapons retirements required DOE to immediately develop and 
implement safe and well-engineered dismantlement procedures. Further, a 
nuclear testing moratorium, which is still in effect, removed the 
primary mechanism (i.e., an active, ongoing testing program) by which 
the capability to execute tests safely was exercised and ensured.
    Additionally, the weapons programs at the DOE Laboratories have 
lost, and continue to lose, skilled and experienced personnel due to 
retirement, downsizing, and reassignments. Consequently, the Board 
implemented a number of initiatives to meet its oversight 
responsibilities including the identification and selection of staff 
and outside experts with experience in conventional and nuclear 
explosive technology and safety, nuclear materials handling and 
storage, criticality safety, and nuclear weapons assembly, storage and 
testing.
    Since 1992, the Board has been actively involved in these 
activities, especially at Pantex. It remains convinced that effective 
oversight of weapons disassembly operations and related efforts, 
requires a comprehensive understanding of weapons design and technical 
features. However, while the Board has acquired staff with basic 
knowledge in these areas, and technical support from various outside 
experts with direct experience with LLNL designed weapons, it requires 
an individual with knowledge and experience of the weapons designed and 
developed at LLNL. Based on a search for potential candidates, the 
Board has identified Mr. Lary McGrew as an individual with this unique 
experience. Mr. McGrew retired from LLNL in 1996 after 37 years of 
continuous service in nuclear weapons development programs in the 
Weapons Engineering Division. Additionally, during his final two years 
at LLNL, he developed and participated in numerous weapons 
dismantlement procedures and processes for these activities at Pantex. 
Further, Mr. McGrew has provided extensive technical briefings to LLNL 
staff on the older weapons systems as they are being retired. 
Consequently, based on this experience, Mr. McGrew will be useful to 
the Board due to his direct knowledge of the design features of the 
LLNL weapons and those features generic to all weapons which must be 
considered during disassembly, reassembly, surveillance testing and 
dismantlement. His knowledge of weapons testing and the data from those 
test will be useful in the ongoing surveillance program and in the 
planning and conduct of non-nuclear testing at NTS. Most importantly, 
Mr. McGrew can provide invaluable assistance to the Board to help 
ensure that Laboratory design criteria are properly incorporated into 
every aspect of ongoing operations and facility readiness at both 
Pantex and Nevada Device Assembly Facility. Therefore, the Board 
believes that this comprehensive and unique knowledge of the LLNL 
weapons will significantly enhance its technical capabilities with 
respect to health and safety oversight matters associated with weapons 
dismantlement and testing issues.
    During a routine preaward review, Mr. McGrew informed the Board of 
a potential conflict of interest situation arising from his current and 
past association with DOE and its weapons program. As a condition of 
his retirement, he has agreed to hold no paid position or assignment at 
LLNL for a period of one year from August 16, 1996. However, Mr. McGrew 
has a continuing relationship as a non-paid consultant and has been 
provided a ``Q'' Clearance site access badge as a ``Participating 
Guest.'' He is currently assisting the Weapons Division with archival 
work to retain historical information on the warhead systems he helped 
develop during his career at LLNL. The goal of this project is to 
develop an index of the numerous classified and unclassified documents 
for each weapons system. He is also providing assistance to the 
Laboratory Archive in the cataloging of historical documents involving 
the engineering portions of the nuclear weapons developments at LLNL. 
The support he provides is limited to these areas and will not include 
any work involving the stockpiling, surveillance or dismantlement of 
warheads. Further, he will not be involved with any work at DOE 
facilities or related activities such as document preparation, review, 
or conduct of any of the work associated with the weapons programs. The 
other concern relates to this most recent work prior to retirement. 
During the past two years at LLNL, he was directly involved in the 
development of weapons dismantlement procedures and related activities 
at Pantex.
    Consequently, the Board had concerns regarding actual or potential 
conflicts of interest based primarily on two issues. First, would Mr. 
McGrew's continuing relationship with LLNL affect his ability to 
provide impartial assistance or advice to the Board. Second, would Mr. 
McGrew be placed in a situation as a

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consultant to the Board where he would be reviewing his own work on the 
process of weapons dismantlement which occurred within the last few 
years prior to his retirement.
    The Board reviewed this situation and concluded that, even if the 
circumstances could give rise to a potential conflict of interest 
situation, it is nonetheless in the best interests of the Government to 
have Mr. McGrew provide this support for the reasons described below. 
Mr. McGrew's comprehensive knowledge of weapons assembly and 
disassembly procedures of nuclear weapons gained through 37 years of 
direct experience, is invaluable to the Board in its health and safety 
reviews of weapons disassembly and related activities and thus is vital 
to the Board's oversight program. Although past reviews have been 
conducted by various Board staff, Mr. McGrew's technical expertise will 
enhance the Board's ability to perform these reviews more effectively. 
Furthermore, the Board recognized that it is unlikely that the work to 
be performed by Mr. McGrew could be satisfactorily performed by anyone 
whose experience and affiliations would not give rise to a conflict of 
interest question. That is because the individuals who have the 
requisite expertise in this area could only have obtained such 
expertise through previous or current employment or consulting 
relationship with one or more of the weapons design laboratories. The 
pertinent experience of other qualified individuals would therefore 
likely raise similar conflicts questions.
    Finally, as the Board is required under its OCI Regulations, where 
reasonably possible, to initiate measures which attempt to mitigate an 
OCI, Mr. McGrew and the Board have agreed to the following restrictions 
during contract performance. The Board will not have Mr. McGrew review 
the adequacy or effectiveness of the dismantlement procedures he 
developed or critique any other activity he was directly involved with. 
Rather, the Board will use his expertise to understand the unique 
aspects of the LLNL weapons' development process and how well Pantex is 
following these procedures during dismantlement. Also, technical staff 
will oversee the work of Mr. McGrew to ensure that all of his resultant 
work products are impartial and contain full support for any findings 
and conclusions issued thereunder. Further, in accordance with the 
Board's OCI Regulations, Mr. McGrew is required to promptly inform the 
Board of any new consulting or other contractual arrangements which 
could give rise to an OCI. This includes new work, or his acceptance of 
a paid position with LLNL.
    Accordingly, on the basis of the determination described above and 
pursuant to the applicable provisions of 10 CFR part 1706, the Chairman 
of the Board granted a Waiver of any conflicts of interests (and the 
pertinent provisions of the OCI Regulations) with the effort to be 
performed by Mr. McGrew under contract to the Board that might arise 
out of his current and past association with LLNL.

    Dated: January 23, 1997.
Kenneth M. Pusateri,
General Manager.
[FR Doc. 97-2205 Filed 1-29-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-M