[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 13 (Tuesday, January 21, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3014-3030]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-1355]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a 
program to provide for safe and secure storage of weapons-usable 
fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium [HEU]) and a 
strategy for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, as 
specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition 
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (S&D Final PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229, December 1996). The 
fundamental purpose of the program is to maintain a high standard of 
security and accounting for these materials while in storage, and to 
ensure that plutonium produced for nuclear weapons and declared excess 
to national security needs (now, or in the future) is never again used 
for nuclear weapons.
    DOE will consolidate the storage of weapons-usable plutonium by 
upgrading and expanding existing and planned facilities at the Pantex 
Plant in Texas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, and 
continue the storage of weapons-usable HEU at DOE's Y-12 Plant at the 
Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Tennessee, in upgraded and, as HEU is 
dispositioned, consolidated facilities. After certain conditions are 
met, most plutonium now stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site (RFETS) in Colorado will be moved to Pantex and SRS. 
Plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site (Hanford), the Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL) will remain at those sites until disposition (or 
movement to lag storage at the disposition facilities).
    DOE's strategy for disposition of surplus plutonium is to pursue an 
approach that allows immobilization of surplus plutonium in glass or 
ceramic material for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and burning of some of the surplus plutonium 
as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing, domestic, commercial reactors, 
with subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic repository 
pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. DOE may also burn MOX fuel in 
Canadian Deuterium Uranium [CANDU] reactors in the event of an 
appropriate agreement among Russia, Canada, and the United States, as 
discussed below. The timing and extent to which either or both of these 
disposition approaches (immobilization or MOX) are ultimately deployed 
will depend upon the results of future technology development and 
demonstrations, follow-on (tiered) site-specific environmental review, 
contract negotiations, and detailed cost reviews, as well as 
nonproliferation considerations, and agreements with Russia and other 
nations. DOE's program will be subject to the highest standards of 
safeguards and security throughout all aspects of storage, 
transportation, and processing, and will include appropriate 
International Atomic Energy Agency verification.
    Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that 
would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them 
suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the 
total quantity of plutonium (that has or may be declared surplus to 
defense needs) would require extensive purification to use in MOX fuel, 
and therefore will likely be immobilized. DOE will immobilize at least 
8 metric tons (MT) of currently declared surplus plutonium materials 
that DOE has already determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel. 
DOE reserves the option of using the immobilization approach for all of 
the surplus plutonium.
    The exact locations for disposition facilities will be determined 
pursuant to a follow-on, site-specific disposition environmental impact 
statement (EIS) as well as cost, technical and nonproliferation 
studies. However, DOE has decided to narrow the field of candidate 
disposition sites. DOE has decided that a vitrification or 
immobilization facility (collocated with a plutonium conversion 
facility) will be located at either Hanford or SRS, that a potential 
MOX fuel fabrication facility will be located at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, 
or SRS (only one site), and that a ``pit'' disassembly and conversion 
facility will be located at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one 
site). (``Pits'' are weapons components containing plutonium.) The 
specific reactors, and their locations, that may be used to burn the 
MOX fuel will depend on contract negotiations, licensing, and 
environmental reviews. Because there are a number of technology 
variations that could be used for immobilization, DOE will also 
determine the specific immobilization technology based on the follow-on 
EIS, technology developments, cost information, and nonproliferation 
considerations. Based on current technological and cost information, 
DOE anticipates that the follow-on EIS will identify, as part of the 
proposed action, immobilizing a portion of the surplus plutonium using 
the ``can-in-canister'' technology at the Defense Waste Processing 
Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site.
    The use of MOX fuel in existing reactors would be undertaken in a 
manner that is consistent with the United States' policy objective on 
the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process and the United 
States' policy discouraging the civilian use of plutonium. To this end, 
implementing the MOX alternative would include government ownership and 
control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at a DOE site, and use of 
the facility only for the surplus plutonium disposition program. There 
would be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent MOX fuel. The MOX 
fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle in existing reactors, 
with appropriate arrangements, including contractual or licensing 
provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus plutonium disposition.
    The Department of Energy also retains the option of using MOX fuel 
in Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors in Canada in the event a 
multilateral agreement is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and the 
United States to use CANDU reactors for surplus United States' and 
Russian plutonium. DOE will engage in a test and demonstration program 
for CANDU MOX fuel as appropriate and consistent with future 
cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada.
    These efforts will provide the basis and flexibility for the United 
States to initiate disposition efforts either multilaterally or 
bilaterally through negotiations with other nations, or unilaterally as 
an example to Russia and

[[Page 3015]]

other nations. Disposition of the surplus plutonium will serve as a 
nonproliferation and disarmament example, encourage similar actions by 
Russia and other nations, and foster multilateral or bilateral 
disposition efforts and agreements.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision 
(ROD) are effective upon issuance of this document, in accordance with 
DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Procedures 
and Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508).

ADDRESSES: Copies of the S&D Final PEIS, the Technical Summary Report 
For Long-Term Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, the 
Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium 
Disposition, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition, and 
this ROD may be obtained by writing to the U.S. Department of Energy, 
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, MD-4, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, or by calling (202) 586-4513. The 
56-page Summary of the S&D Final PEIS, the other documents noted above 
(other than the full PEIS), and this ROD are also available on the 
Fissile Materials Disposition World Wide Web Page at: http://
web.fie.com/htdoc/fed/DOE/fsl/pub/menu/any/

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the storage and 
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials program or this ROD 
contact: Mr. J. David Nulton, Director, NEPA Compliance and Outreach, 
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, telephone 
(202) 586-4513.
    For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20585, 
telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus weapons-
usable fissile materials both in the United States and the former 
Soviet Union. Further agreements on disarmament may increase the 
surplus quantities of these materials. The global stockpiles of 
weapons-usable fissile materials pose a danger to national and 
international security in the form of potential proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the potential for environmental, safety, and health 
consequences if the materials are not properly safeguarded and managed.
    In September 1993, President Clinton issued a Nonproliferation and 
Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear 
proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and Russia's 
President Yeltsin issued a Joint Statement Between the United States 
and Russia on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 
Means of Their Delivery. In accordance with these policies, the focus 
of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts in this regard is five-fold: (i) 
To secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; (ii) to assure 
safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-
usable fissile materials; (iii) to establish transparent and 
irreversible nuclear arms reductions; (iv) to strengthen the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime; and (v) to control nuclear exports. The policy 
also states that the United States will not encourage the civil use of 
plutonium and that the United States does not engage in plutonium 
reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes.
    To demonstrate the United States' commitment to these objectives, 
President Clinton announced on March 1, 1995, that approximately 200 
metric tons of U.S.-origin weapons-usable fissile materials, of which 
165 metric tons are HEU and 38 metric tons are weapons-grade plutonium, 
had been declared surplus to the United States' defense needs.\1\ The 
safe and secure storage of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU, and the 
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, consistent with the 
Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS and the decisions described 
in section V of this ROD, are consistent with the President's 
nonproliferation policy.
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    \1\ The Secretary of Energy's Openness Initiative announcement 
of February 6, 1996, announced that the United States has about 213 
metric tons of surplus fissile materials, including the 200 metric 
tons the President announced in March, 1995. Of the 213 metric tons 
of surplus materials, the Openness Initiative announcement indicated 
that about 174.3 metric tons are HEU and about 38.2 metric tons are 
weapons-grade plutonium. Additional quantities of plutonium may be 
declared surplus in the future; therefore, the S&D Final PEIS 
analyzes the disposition of a nominal 50 metric tons of plutonium, 
as well as the storage of 89 metric tons of plutonium and 994 metric 
tons of HEU.
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II. Decisions Made in This ROD

    This ROD encompasses two categories of decisions: (1) The sites and 
facilities for storage of non-surplus weapons-usable plutonium and HEU, 
and storage of surplus plutonium and HEU pending disposition; and (2) 
the programmatic strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-usable 
plutonium. This ROD does not encompass the final selection of sites for 
plutonium disposition facilities, nor the extent to which the two 
plutonium disposition approaches (immobilization or MOX) will 
ultimately be implemented. Those decisions will be made pursuant to a 
follow-on EIS. However, DOE does announce in this ROD that the slate of 
candidate sites for plutonium disposition has been narrowed. This ROD 
does not include decisions about the disposition of surplus HEU, which 
were made in July 1996 in the separate ROD for the Disposition of 
Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, 
61 FR 40619 (Aug. 5, 1996).\2\
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    \2\ The material considered in the S&D Final PEIS, and covered 
by the decisions in this ROD, does not include spent nuclear fuel, 
irradiated targets, uranium-233, plutonium-238, plutonium residues 
of less than 50-percent plutonium by weight, or weapons program 
materials-in-use.
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III. NEPA Process

A. S&D Draft PEIS

    On June 21, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the 
Federal Register (59 FR 31985) to prepare a Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (S&D PEIS), which was originally to address the storage and 
disposition of both plutonium and HEU. DOE subsequently concluded that 
a separate EIS on surplus HEU disposition would be appropriate. 
Accordingly, DOE published a notice in the Federal Register (60 FR 
17344) on April 5, 1995, to inform the public of the proposed plan to 
prepare a separate EIS for the disposition of surplus HEU.
    DOE published an implementation plan (IP) for the S&D PEIS in March 
1995 (DOE/EIS-0229-IP). The IP recorded the issues identified during 
the scoping process, indicated how they would be addressed in the S&D 
PEIS, and provided guidance for the preparation of the S&D PEIS. DOE 
issued the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials 
Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S&D Draft PEIS, DOE/
EIS-0229-D) for public comment in February 1996. On March 8, 1996, both 
DOE and the Environmental Protection

[[Page 3016]]

Agency (EPA) published Notices of Availability of the S&D Draft PEIS in 
the Federal Register (61 FR 9443 and 61 9450), announcing a public 
comment period from March 8 until May 7, 1996. In response to requests 
from the public, DOE on May 13, 1996 published another Notice in the 
Federal Register (61 FR 22038) announcing an extension of the comment 
period until June 7, 1996. Eight public meetings on the S&D Draft PEIS 
were held during March and April 1996 in Washington, DC and in the 
vicinity of the DOE sites under consideration for the proposed actions.
    During the 92-day public comment period, the public was encouraged 
to provide comments via mail, toll-free fax, electronic bulletin board 
(Internet), and toll-free telephone recording device. By these means, 
DOE received 8,442 comments from 6,543 individuals and organizations 
for consideration. In addition, 250 oral comments were recorded from 
some of the 734 individuals who attended the eight public meetings. All 
of the comments received, and the Department's responses to them, are 
presented in Volume IV (the Comment Response Document) of the S&D Final 
PEIS. All of the comments were considered in preparation of the S&D 
Final PEIS, and in many cases resulted in changes to the document. The 
Notice of Availability for the S&D Final PEIS was published by EPA in 
the Federal Register on December 13, 1996 (61 FR 65572). DOE published 
its own Notice of Availability for the S&D Final PEIS in the Federal 
Register on December 19, 1996 (61 FR 67001).

B. Alternatives Considered

    The S&D PEIS analyzes the reasonable action alternatives in 
addition to the Preferred Alternative and the No Action Alternative. 
The Preferred Alternative, which is described below in section V, 
Decisions, and which DOE has decided to implement, represents a 
combination of alternatives for both storage and disposition.
1. The Proposed Action
    The proposed action, as described in the S&D PEIS, would involve 
the following actions for U.S. weapons-usable fissile materials:
     Storage--provide a long-term storage system (for up to 50 
years) for nonsurplus plutonium and HEU that meets the Stored Weapons 
Standard \3\ and applicable environmental, safety, and health standards 
while reducing storage and infrastructure costs.
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    \3\ The ``Stored Weapons Standard'' for weapons-usable fissile 
materials storage was initially defined in Management and 
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of 
Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Stored Weapons Standard as follows: 
The high standards of security and accounting for the storage of 
intact nuclear weapons should be maintained, to the extent 
practical, for weapons-usable fissile materials throughout 
dismantlement, storage, and disposition.
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     Storage Pending Disposition--provide storage that meets 
the Stored Weapons Standard for inventories of weapons-usable plutonium 
and HEU \4\ that have been or may be declared surplus.
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    \4\ The S&D PEIS covers long-term storage of nonsurplus HEU and 
storage of surplus HEU pending disposition. Until storage decisions 
are implemented, surplus HEU that has not gone to disposition will 
continue to be stored pursuant to, and not to exceed the 10-year 
interim storage time period evaluated in, the Environmental 
Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium 
Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee (Y-12 EA) (DOE/EA-0929, September 1994) and Finding 
of No Significant Impact (FONSI).
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     Disposition--convert surplus plutonium and plutonium that 
may be declared surplus in the future to forms that meet the Spent Fuel 
Standard,\5\ thereby providing evidence of irreversible disarmament and 
setting a model for proliferation resistance.
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    \5\ The ``Spent Fuel Standard'' for disposition was also 
initially defined in Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons 
Plutonium, National Academy of Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Spent 
Fuel Standard as follows: The surplus weapons-usable plutonium 
should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as 
the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in 
spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
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2. Long-Term Storage Alternatives and Related Activities
    a. No Action. Under the No Action Alternative, all weapons-usable 
fissile materials would remain at existing storage sites. Maintenance 
at existing storage facilities would be done as required to ensure safe 
operation for the balance of the facility's useful life. Sites covered 
under the No Action Alternative included Hanford, INEL, Pantex, the 
ORR, SRS, RFETS, and LANL. Although there are no weapons-usable fissile 
materials within the scope of the S&D PEIS stored currently at Nevada 
Test Site (NTS), it was also analyzed under No Action to provide an 
environmental baseline against which impacts of the storage and 
disposition action alternatives were analyzed.
    b. Upgrade at Multiple Sites. Under this alternative for storage, 
DOE would either modify certain existing facilities or build new 
facilities, depending on the site's ability to meet standards for 
nuclear material storage facilities, and would utilize existing site 
infrastructure to the extent possible. These modified or new facilities 
would be designed to operate for up to 50 years. Plutonium materials 
currently stored at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS would remain at 
those four sites (in upgraded or new facilities), and HEU would remain 
at ORR (in upgraded, consolidated facilities). This alternative does 
not apply to NTS because NTS does not currently store weapons-usable 
fissile materials.
    A sub-alternative of relocating portions of the plutonium inventory 
(a total of 14.4 metric tons according to DOE's Openness Initiative 
announcements of December 7, 1993, and February 6, 1996, respectively) 
from RFETS and LANL to one or more of the four existing plutonium 
storage sites is analyzed. Storage of surplus materials without 
strategic reserve and weapons research and development (R&D) materials 
is also included as a sub-alternative. Within some of the five 
candidate storage sites under this alternative, there are also multiple 
storage options.
    c. Consolidation of Plutonium. Under this alternative, plutonium 
materials at existing sites would be removed, and the entire DOE 
inventory of plutonium would be consolidated at one site, while the HEU 
inventory would remain at ORR. Again, Hanford, INEL, Pantex and SRS 
would be candidate sites for plutonium consolidation. In addition, NTS 
would be a candidate site for this alternative. Consolidation of 
plutonium at ORR would result in a situation in which inventories of 
plutonium and HEU were collocated at one site; this alternative was 
therefore analyzed as one option under the Collocation Alternative (see 
below). A sub-alternative to account for the separate storage of 
surplus materials without strategic reserve and weapons R&D materials 
was also included.
    d. Collocation of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium. Under the 
Collocation Alternative, the entire DOE inventory of plutonium and HEU 
would be consolidated and collocated at the same site. The six 
candidate sites would be Hanford, NTS, INEL, Pantex, ORR, and SRS. A 
sub-alternative for the separate storage of surplus materials without 
strategic reserve and weapons R&D materials was also included.
3. Plutonium Disposition Alternatives and Related Activities
    The disposition technologies analyzed in the S&D PEIS were those 
that would convert surplus plutonium into a form that would meet the 
Spent Fuel Standard. For the purpose of environmental impact analyses 
of the various disposition alternatives, both generic and specific 
sites were used to provide perspective on these

[[Page 3017]]

alternatives. Under each alternative, there are various ways to 
implement the alternative. These ``variants'' (such as the can-in-
canister 6 approach) are shown in Table 1 to provide a range of 
available options for consideration.
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    \6\ In the can-in-canister variant, cans of plutonium in a glass 
or ceramic matrix would be placed in a canister. This canister would 
then be filled with borosilicate glass containing high-level 
radioactive waste (HLW) or highly radioactive material such as 
cesium. This variant, at an existing facility (the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility [DWPF] at SRS), is described in Appendix O of 
the S&D Final PEIS.

      Table 1.--Description of Variants Under Plutonium Disposition     
                              Alternatives                              
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Alternatives analyzed                  Possible variants         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Deep Borehole Direct        Arrangement of plutonium in
 Disposition                         different types of emplacement     
                                     canisters.                         
 Deep Borehole Immobilized   Emplacement of pellet-group
 Disposition                         mix.                               
                                     Pumped emplacement of      
                                     pellet-grout mix.                  
                                     Plutonium concentration    
                                     loading, size and shape of ceramic 
                                     pellets.                           
 New Vitrification           Collocated pit disassembly/
 Facilities                          conversion, plutonium conversion,  
                                     and immobilization facilities.     
                                     Use of either Cs-137 from  
                                     capsules or HLW as a radiation     
                                     barrier.                           
                                     Wet or dry feed preparation
                                     technologies.                      
                                     An adjunct melter adjacent 
                                     to the DWPF at SRS, in which       
                                     borosilicate glass frit with       
                                     plutonium (without highly          
                                     radioactive radionuclides) is added
                                     to borosilicate glass containing   
                                     HLW from the DWPF.                 
                                     A can-in-canister approach 
                                     at SRS in which cans of plutonium  
                                     glass (without highly radioactive  
                                     radionuclides) are plaed in DWPF   
                                     canisters which are then filled    
                                     with borosilicate glass containing 
                                     HLW in the DWPF (see Appendix O of 
                                     the Final PEIS).                   
                                     A can-in-canister approach 
                                     similar to above but using new     
                                     facilities at sites other than SRS.
 New Ceramic                 Collocated pit disassembly/
 Immobilization Facilities           plutonium conversion, and          
                                     immobilization facilities.         
                                     Use of either Cs-137 from  
                                     capsules or HLW as a radiation     
                                     barrier.                           
                                     Wet or dry feed preparation
                                     technologies.                      
                                     A can-in-canister approach 
                                     at SRS in which the plutonium is   
                                     immobilized without highly         
                                     radioactive radionuclides in a     
                                     ceramic matrix and then placed in  
                                     the DWPF canisters that are then   
                                     filled with borosilicate glass     
                                     containing HLW (See Appendix O of  
                                     the Final PEIS).                   
                                     A can-in-canister approach 
                                     similar to above but using new     
                                     facilities at sites other than SRS.
 Electrometallurgical        Immobilize plutonium into  
 Treatment (glass-bonded zeolite     metal ingot form.                  
 form)                                                                  
                                     Locate at DOE sites other  
                                     than ANL-W at INEL.                
 Existing LWR With New MOX   Pressurized or Boiling     
 Facilities                          Water Reactors.                    
                                     Different numbers of       
                                     reactors.                          
                                     European MOX fuel          
                                     fabrication.                       
                                     Modification/completion of 
                                     existing facilities for MOX        
                                     fabrication.                       
                                     Collocated pit disassembly/
                                     conversion, plutonium conversion,  
                                     and MOX facilities.                
                                     Reactors with different    
                                     core management schemes (plutonium 
                                     loadings, refueling intervals).    
 Partially Completed LWR     Same as for existing LWR   
 With New MOX Facilities             (except that MOX fuel would not be 
                                     fabricated in Europe).             
 Evolutionary LWR With New   Same as for partially      
 MOX Facilities                      completed LWR.                     
 Existing CANDU Reactor      DIfferent numbers of       
 With New MOX Facilities             reactors.                          
                                     Modification/completion of 
                                     existing facilities for MOX        
                                     fabrication.                       
                                     Collocated pit disassembly/
                                     conversion, plutonium conversion,  
                                     and MOX facilities.                
                                     Reactors with different    
                                     core management schemes (plutonium 
                                     loadings, refueling intervals).    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ANL-W=Argonne National Laboratory-West; Cs-137=cesium-137;        
  HLW=high-level waste; LWR=light water reactor                         

    The first step in plutonium disposition is to remove the surplus 
plutonium from storage, then process this material in a pit 
disassembly/conversion facility (for pits) or in a plutonium conversion 
facility (for non-pit materials). The processing would convert the 
plutonium material into a form suitable for each of the disposition 
alternatives described in the following sections. The pit disassembly/ 
conversion facility and the plutonium conversion facility would be 
built at a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were 
evaluated for the potential environmental impacts of constructing and 
operating these facilities.
    a. No Disposition Action. A ``No Plutonium Disposition'' action 
means disposition would not occur, and surplus plutonium-bearing weapon 
components (pits) and other forms, such as metal and oxide, would 
remain in storage in accordance with decisions on the long-term storage 
of weapons-usable fissile materials.
    b. Deep Borehole Category. Under this category of alternatives, 
surplus weapons-usable plutonium would be disposed of in deep boreholes 
that would be drilled at least 4 kilometers (km) (2.5 miles [mi]) into 
ancient, geologically stable rock formations beneath the water table. 
The deep borehole would provide a geologic barrier against potential 
proliferation. A generic site was evaluated for the construction and 
operation of a borehole complex where the surplus plutonium would be 
prepared for emplacement in the borehole. This complex would consist of 
five major facilities: Processing; drilling; emplacing/sealing; waste 
management; and support (security, maintenance, and utilities).
    (1) Direct Disposition (Borehole). Under the Direct Disposition 
Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed 
as necessary, converted to a form suitable for emplacement, packaged, 
and placed in a deep borehole. The deep borehole would be sealed to 
isolate the

[[Page 3018]]

plutonium from the accessible environment. Long-term performance of the 
deep borehole would depend on the stability of the geologic system. A 
generic site was used for the borehole complex to analyze the 
environmental impact of this alternative.
    (2) Immobilized Disposition (Borehole). Under the Immobilized 
Disposition Alternative, the surplus plutonium would be removed from 
storage, processed, and converted to a suitable form for shipment to a 
ceramic immobilization facility. The output of this facility would be 
spherical ceramic pellets containing plutonium, facilitating handling 
during transportation and emplacement. The ceramic pellets (about 2.54 
centimeters [cm] [1 inch {in}] in diameter and containing 1 percent 
plutonium by weight) would then be placed in drums and shipped to the 
borehole complex. At the deep borehole site, the ceramic pellets would 
be mixed with non-plutonium ceramic pellets and fixed with grout during 
emplacement. The deep borehole would be sealed to isolate the plutonium 
from the accessible environment. Long-term performance of the deep 
borehole would depend on the stability of the geologic system.
    Although a generic site was used for analyses of the borehole 
complex in this alternative, the ceramic immobilization facility would 
be built at a DOE site. Therefore, the six candidate sites for long-
term storage were used to evaluate the environmental impacts of the 
borehole immobilization facility.
    c. Immobilization Category. Under this category of alternatives, 
surplus plutonium would be immobilized to create a chemically stable 
form for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act (NWPA).7 The plutonium material would be mixed 
with or surrounded by high-level waste (HLW) or other radioactive 
isotopes and immobilized to create a radiation field that could serve 
as a proliferation deterrent, along with safeguards and security 
comparable to those of commercial spent nuclear fuel, thereby achieving 
the Spent Fuel Standard. All immobilized plutonium would be encased in 
stainless steel canisters and would remain in onsite vault-type storage 
until a geologic repository pursuant to the NWPA is operational.
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    \7\ Also referred to as a permanent, or HLW repository. Pursuant 
to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE is currently characterizing the 
Yucca Mountain Site in Nevada as a potential repository for spent 
nuclear fuel and HLW. Legislative clarification, or a determination 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the immobilized plutonium 
should be isolated as HLW, may be required before the material could 
be placed in Yucca Mountain should DOE and the President recommend, 
and Congress approve, its operation. No Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) wastes would be immobilized unless the 
immobilization would constitute adequate treatment under RCRA. The 
immobilized product would be consistent with the repository's waste 
acceptance criteria.
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    (1) Vitrification. Under the Vitrification Alternative, surplus 
plutonium would be removed from storage, processed, packaged, and 
transported to the vitrification facility. In this facility, the 
plutonium would be mixed with glass frit and highly radioactive cesium-
137 (Cs-137) or HLW to produce borosilicate glass logs (a slightly 
different process, using HLW, would be used for the can-in-canister 
variant, as discussed in Appendix O of the S&D Final PEIS). The Cs-137 
isotope could come from the cesium chloride (CsCl) capsules currently 
stored at Hanford or from existing HLW if the site selected for 
vitrification already manages HLW. Each glass log produced from the 
vitrification facility would contain about 84 kilograms (kg) (185 
pounds [lb]) of plutonium. The vitrification facility would be built at 
a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were analyzed 
for this alternative.
    (2) Ceramic Immobilization. Under the Ceramic Immobilization 
Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, 
processed, packaged, and transported to a ceramic immobilization 
facility. In this facility, the plutonium would be mixed with 
nonradioactive ceramic materials and Cs-137 or HLW to produce ceramic 
disks (a slightly different process, using HLW, would be used for the 
can-in-canister variant, as discussed in Appendix O of the S&D Final 
PEIS). Each disk would be approximately 30 cm (12 in) in diameter and 
10 cm (4 in) thick, and would contain approximately 4 kg (9 lb) of 
plutonium. The Cs-137 or HLW would be provided as previously described. 
The ceramic immobilization facility would be built at a DOE site. The 
six candidate sites for long-term storage were analyzed for this 
alternative.
    (3) Electrometallurgical Treatment. Under the Electrometallurgical 
Treatment Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, 
processed, packaged, and transported to new or modified facilities for 
electrometallurgical treatment. This process could immobilize surplus 
fissile materials into a glass-bonded zeolite (GBZ) form. With the GBZ 
material, the plutonium would be in the form of a stable, leach-
resistant mineral that is incorporated in durable glass 
materials.8 Existing electrometallurgical facilities at INEL were 
used as a representative site for analysis of potential environmental 
impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ In May 1996, the Department issued a Finding of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI) (61 Fed. Reg. 25647) and decision to 
proceed with the limited demonstration of the electrometallurgical 
treatment process at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) at 
INEL for processing up to 125 spent fuel assemblies from the 
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (100 drivers and 25 blanket 
assemblies). Although this alternative could be conducted at other 
DOE sites, ANL-W is described in the S&D PEIS as the representative 
site for analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    d. Reactor Category. Under the reactor alternatives considered in 
the S&D PEIS, DOE would fabricate surplus plutonium into MOX fuel for 
use in reactors. The irradiated MOX fuel would reduce the proliferation 
risks of the plutonium material, and the reactors would also generate 
electricity. MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle, with 
no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent fuel. The spent nuclear 
fuel generated by the reactors would then be sent to a geologic 
repository pursuant to the NWPA.
    Because the United States does not have a MOX fuel fabrication 
facility or capability, a new dedicated MOX fuel fabrication facility 
would be built at a DOE or commercial site.9 The surplus plutonium 
from storage would be processed, converted to plutonium dioxide 
(PuO2), and transferred to the MOX fuel fabrication facility. In 
this facility, PuO2 and uranium dioxide (UO2) (from existing 
domestic sources) would be blended and fabricated into MOX pellets, 
loaded into fuel rods, and assembled into fuel bundles suitable for use 
in the reactor alternatives under consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Although a generic commercial site was evaluated in the S&D 
PEIS, it is not part of the Preferred Alternative or the decisions 
in this ROD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Existing Light Water Reactors. Under the Existing Light Water 
Reactor (LWR) Alternative, the MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium 
would be fabricated and transported to existing commercial LWRs in the 
United States, where the MOX fuel would be used instead of conventional 
UO2 fuel. The LWRs employed for domestic electric power generation 
are pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors 
(BWRs). Both types of reactors use the heat produced from nuclear 
fission reactions to generate steam that drives turbines and generates 
electricity. Three to five reactor units would be needed.10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ It is possible that an existing LWR can be configured to 
produce tritium, consume plutonium as fuel, and generate revenue 
through the production of electricity. This configuration is called 
a multipurpose reactor. Environmental analysis of the multipurpose 
reactor is included in Chapter 4 of the Final Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling (TSR 
PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0161, October 1995) and Appendix N of the S&D PEIS. 
In the TSR PEIS ROD (December 1995), the multipurpose reactor was 
preserved as an option for future consideration. The Fast Flux Test 
Facility (FFTF) at Hanford has been under consideration for tritium 
production, and could also use surplus plutonium as reactor fuel if 
it were shown to be useful for tritium production. This ROD does not 
preclude use of the FFTF for tritium production or the potential use 
of surplus plutonium as fuel for the FFTF.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 3019]]

    (2) Partially Completed Light Water Reactors. Under the Partially 
Completed LWR Alternative, commercial LWRs on which construction has 
been halted would be completed. The completed reactors would use MOX 
fuel containing surplus plutonium. The characteristics of these LWRs 
would be the same as those of the existing LWRs discussed in the 
Existing LWR Alternative. The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant located along 
the west bank of the Tennessee River in Alabama was used as a 
representative site for the environmental analysis of this alternative. 
Two reactor units (such as those at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant) would 
be needed to implement this alternative.
    (3) Evolutionary Light Water Reactors. The evolutionary LWRs are 
improved versions of existing commercial LWRs. Two design approaches 
were considered in the S&D PEIS. The first is a large PWR or BWR 
similar to the size of the existing PWR and BWR. The second is a small 
PWR approximately one-half the size of the large PWR. Two large or four 
small evolutionary LWRs would be needed to implement this alternative.
    Under each design approach for this alternative, evolutionary LWRs 
would be built at a DOE site. Therefore, the six candidate sites for 
long-term storage were used to evaluate the environmental impacts of 
this alternative.
    (4) Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor. Under the CANDU Reactor 
Alternative, the MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium would be 
fabricated in a U.S. facility, then transported for use in one or more 
commercial heavy water reactors in Canada. The Ontario Hydro Bruce-A 
Nuclear Generating Station identified by the Government of Canada was 
used as a representative site for evaluation of this alternative. This 
station is located on Lake Huron about 300 km (186 mi) northeast of 
Detroit, Michigan. Environmental analysis of domestic activities up to 
the U.S./Canadian border is presented in the S&D PEIS. The use of CANDU 
reactors would be subject to the policies, regulations, and approval of 
the Federal and Provincial Canadian Governments. Pursuant to Section 
123 of the Atomic Energy Act, any export of MOX fuel from the United 
States to Canada must be made under the agreement for cooperation 
between the two countries. Spent fuel generated by a CANDU reactor 
would be disposed under the Canadian spent fuel program.

C. Preferred Alternative

    The S&D Final PEIS presented the Department's Preferred Alternative 
for both storage and disposition. DOE has decided to implement the 
Preferred Alternative as described in the S&D Final PEIS. Thus, the 
Preferred Alternative is described in Section V of this ROD, Decisions.

D. Environmental Impacts

    Chapter 4 and the appendices of the S&D Final PEIS analyzed the 
potential environmental impacts of the storage and disposition 
alternatives in detail. The S&D Final PEIS also evaluated the maximum 
site impacts that would result at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS from 
combining the Preferred Alternative for storage with the Preferred 
Alternative for disposition. Consistent with the Preferred Alternative, 
Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS are each a possible location for all or 
some plutonium disposition activities. The siting, construction, and 
operation of disposition facilities will be covered in a separate, 
follow-on EIS. The S&D Final PEIS described the total life cycle 
impacts that would result from the Preferred Alternative at the DOE 
sites identified for potential placement of the disposition facilities.
    Based on analyses in the S&D Final PEIS, the areas where impacts 
might be significant are as follows:
     The use of groundwater at the Pantex Plant for storage and 
disposition facilities could contribute to the overall declining water 
levels of the Ogallala Aquifer. The projected No Action Alternative 
water usage at Pantex in the year 2005 reflects a reduction from 
current usage due to planned downsizing over the next few years. The 
Preferred Alternative would require a 72-percent increase in the 
projected No Action Alternative water use; the total amount (428 
million liters per year) is considerably less than what is currently 
being withdrawn (836 million liters per year) at Pantex.
     A set of postulated accidents was used for each plutonium 
disposition alternative over the life of the campaign to obtain 
potential radiological impacts at the four DOE sites where disposition 
facilities could be built. The PEIS analyzes the risk of latent cancer 
fatalities (reflecting the probability of accident occurrence and the 
latent cancer fatalities potentially caused by the accident) for 
accidents that have low probabilities of occurrence and severe 
consequences, as well as those that have higher probabilities and low 
consequences. For potential severe accidents, the risk of latent cancer 
fatalities to the population located within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of 
the accident for the ``front-end'' disposition process campaign would 
range from 4.5x10-16 (that is, approximately 1 chance in 2 
quadrillion) to 1.7x10-4 (approximately 1 chance in 6,000) for the 
pit disassembly/conversion facility, and from 1.5x10-16 to 
1.3x10-4 for the plutonium conversion facility. This risk would 
range from 2.8x10-14 to 1.8x10-5 for the vitrification 
facility, from 7.0x10-16 to 1.9x10-7 for the ceramic 
immobilization facility, and from 4.6x10-16 to 4.3x10-4 for 
the MOX fuel fabrication facility. To estimate the change in risk 
associated with using MOX fuel instead of uranium fuel in existing 
LWRs, the severe accident scenarios assumed a large population 
distribution near a generic existing LWR and extreme meteorological 
conditions for dispersal, leading to large doses that were not 
necessarily reflective of actual site conditions. The resultant change 
in risk of cancer fatalities to a generic population located within 80 
km (50 mi) of the severe accidents was estimated to range from -
2.0x10-4 to 3.0x10-5 per year 11, reflecting a 
postulated risk of using MOX fuel that ranges from seven percent lower 
to eight percent higher than the risk of using uranium fuel. Under the 
Preferred Alternative, the estimated risk of cancer fatalities under 
severe accident conditions using MOX fuel in existing LWRs ranges from 
0.01 to 0.098 for an 11-year campaign.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     11 Accidents severe enough to cause a release of plutonium 
involved combinations of events that are highly unlikely. Estimates 
and analyses presented in Chapter 4 and summarized in Table 2.5-3 of 
the PEIS indicate a range of latent cancer fatalities of 5,900 to 
7,300 and a risk of 0.016 to 0.15 of a fatality in the population 
for the 17-year campaign analyzed under the Existing LWR 
Alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Under the Preferred Alternative, HEU would continue to be 
stored at the Y-12 Plant at ORR in existing facilities that would be 
upgraded to meet requirements for withstanding natural phenomena, 
including earthquakes and tornadoes. This upgrade would reduce the 
expected risk for the design basis accidents analyzed in the Y-12 EA 
(for example, Building 9212) by approximately 80 percent, resulting in 
a latent cancer fatality risk of 7.4 x 10-6 (approximately 7 in a 
million) to the maximally exposed individual, 5.7 x 10-8 
(approximately 6 in 100

[[Page 3020]]

million) to a non-involved worker, and 5.1 x 10-7 (approximately 5 
in 10 million) to the 80-km offsite population.
     Under the Preferred Alternative, safe, secure storage 
would continue for materials at Hanford, INEL, and ORR, pending 
disposition. Therefore, there would be no transportation impact at 
these sites until disposition. The storage transportation impact would 
come from movement of the RFETS materials to Pantex and SRS. If, 
following the EIS for construction and operation of plutonium 
disposition facilities, potential plutonium disposition activities were 
added to Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS, the estimated total health 
effects for the life of the project from transportation of surplus 
plutonium (including transportation of those materials from RFETS to 
Pantex and SRS) would range from 0.193 fatalities for transportation to 
Pantex, to 1.87 fatalities for transportation to SRS (primarily from 
normal expected traffic accidents, not from radiological releases). In 
addition to the disposition activities at DOE sites, there would be 
transportation of the MOX fuel from the DOE fuel fabrication site to 
existing LWRs. The location of the LWRs and the destination of the MOX 
fuel could be either the eastern or western United States. For 4,000 km 
(2,486 mi) of such transportation, there could be up to an additional 
3.61 potential fatalities (primarily from normal expected traffic 
accidents, not from radiological releases) for the life of the 
campaign, assuming 100 percent of the surplus plutonium would be used 
in commercial reactors. The actual amount would be smaller, and 
therefore potential fatalities would be lower, under the Preferred 
Alternative.
     At Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS the Preferred 
Alternative would slightly increase regional employment and income. At 
RFETS, phaseout of plutonium storage would result in the loss of 
approximately 2,200 direct jobs. Compared to the total employment in 
the area, the loss of these jobs and the impacts to the regional 
economy would not be severe.
    DOE has fully considered all of the environmental analyses in the 
S&D Final PEIS in reaching the decisions set forth in Section V, below.

E. Avoidance/Minimization of Environmental Harm

    For the long-term storage of fissile material, there are four sites 
(Hanford, NTS, INEL, and LANL) where the Preferred Alternative is ``no 
action''; that is, no plutonium would be stored at NTS, and at Hanford, 
INEL, and LANL, DOE would continue storage at existing facilities, 
using proven nuclear materials safeguards and security procedures, 
until disposition. These existing facilities would be maintained to 
ensure their safe operation and compliance with applicable 
environmental, safety and health requirements. At RFETS, the Preferred 
Alternative is to phase out storage of weapons-usable fissile 
materials, thus mitigating environmental impacts at RFETS. There are 
three sites (Pantex, ORR, and SRS) where the Preferred Alternative is 
to upgrade existing and planned new facilities. Site-specific 
mitigation measures for storage at these sites have been described in 
the S&D Final PEIS, and are summarized as follows:
     At Pantex, to alleviate the effects from using groundwater 
from the Ogallala Aquifer, the city of Amarillo is considering 
supplying treated wastewater to Pantex from the Hollywood Road 
Wastewater Treatment Plant for industrial use; the Department will use 
such treated wastewater to the extent possible. Radiation doses to 
individual workers will be kept low by maintaining comprehensive badged 
monitoring and programs to keep worker exposures ``as low as reasonably 
achievable'' (ALARA).
     At ORR, radiation doses to individual workers will be kept 
low by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and ALARA programs, 
including worker rotations. Upgrades for HEU storage to meet 
performance requirements will include seismic structural modifications 
as documented in Natural Phenomena Upgrade of the Downsized/
Consolidated Oak Ridge Uranium/Lithium Plant Facilities. These 
modifications will reduce the risk of accidents to workers and the 
public.
     At SRS, to minimize soil erosion impacts during 
construction, storm water management and erosion control measures will 
be employed. Mitigation measures for potential Native American 
resources will be identified through consultation with the potentially 
affected tribes. Radiation doses to individual workers will be kept low 
by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and ALARA programs 
including worker rotations. The modified Actinide Packaging and Storage 
Facility (APSF) will be designed and operated in accordance with 
contemporary DOE Orders and regulations to reduce risks to workers and 
the public.

    From a nonproliferation standpoint, the highest standards for 
safeguards and security will be employed during transportation, 
storage, and disposition. With respect to transportation, DOE will 
coordinate the transport of plutonium and HEU with State officials, 
consistent with current policy. Although the actual routes will be 
classified, they will be selected to circumvent populated areas, 
maximize the use of interstate highways, and avoid bad weather. DOE 
will continue to coordinate emergency preparedness plans and responses 
with involved states through a liaison program. The packaging, 
vehicles, and transport procedures being used are specifically designed 
and tested to prevent a radiological release under all credible 
accident scenarios.
    For the Preferred Alternative for disposition, site-specific 
mitigation measures will be addressed in the follow-on, site-specific 
EIS. In the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, 
measures are proposed to reduce the possibility of the theft or loss of 
material. For both immobilization and MOX fuel fabrication, bulk 
processing is the point in the disposition process when the material is 
most vulnerable to covert attempts to steal or divert it. A variety of 
opportunities for improving safeguards, some of which are already 
implemented at large, modern facilities, include near real-time 
accounting, increased automation in the process design, and improved 
containment and surveillance.
    The security risks posed by transportation can be reduced by 
minimizing the amount of transportation required (for example, putting 
the plutonium processing and MOX fabrication operations at the same 
site), minimizing the number of sites to which material has to be 
shipped, and minimizing the distance between those sites.

F. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

    The environmental analyses in Chapter 4 of the S&D Final PEIS 
indicate that the environmentally preferable alternative (the 
alternative with the lowest environmental impacts over the 50 years 
considered in the PEIS) for storage of weapons-usable fissile materials 
would be the Preferred Alternative, which consists of No Action at 
Hanford, NTS, INEL, and LANL pending disposition, phaseout of storage 
at RFETS, and upgrades that would ultimately reduce environmental 
vulnerabilities at ORR, SRS, and Pantex.
    For disposition of surplus plutonium, the environmentally 
preferable alternative would be the No Disposition Action alternative, 
because the

[[Page 3021]]

plutonium would remain in storage in accordance with decisions on the 
long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials, and there would 
be no new Federal actions that could impact the environment. For normal 
operations, analyses show that immobilization would be somewhat 
preferable to the existing LWR and preferred alternatives, although 
these alternatives, with the exception of waste generated, would be 
essentially environmentally comparable. 12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The potential risk of latent cancer fatality for a 
maximally exposed individual of the public from lifetime accident-
free operation under the various alternatives are: 1.2x10-9 to 
1.2x10-7 for boreholes, 1.2x10-9 to 1.2x10-7 for 
immobilization (vitrification or ceramic immobilization), 
1.3x10-6 to 2.6x10-6 for existing LWRs, and 9.0x10-7 
to 1.7x10-6 for the Preferred Alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Severe facility accident considerations indicate that 
immobilization options would be environmentally preferable to the 
existing reactor and preferred alternatives, although the likelihood of 
occurrence of severe accidents and the risk to the public are expected 
to be fairly low. Although No Disposition Action would be 
environmentally preferable, it would not satisfy the purpose and need 
for the Proposed Action, because the stockpile of surplus plutonium 
would not be reduced, and the Nonproliferation and Export Control 
Policy would not be implemented.
    The hybrid approach (pursuing both reactors/MOX and immobilization) 
is being chosen over immobilization alone because of the increased 
flexibility it will provide by ensuring that plutonium disposition can 
be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately fail or 
be delayed. Establishing the means for expeditious plutonium 
disposition will also help provide the basis for an international 
cooperative effort that can result in reciprocal, irreversible 
plutonium disposition actions by Russia. (See discussion in sections IV 
and V, below.)

IV. Non-Environmental Considerations

A. Technical Summary Reports

    To assist in the preparation of this ROD, DOE's Office of Fissile 
Materials Disposition prepared and in July 1996 issued a Technical 
Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition and a 
Technical Summary Report for Long-Term Storage of Weapons-Usable 
Fissile Materials. These Technical Summary Reports (TSRs) summarize 
technical, cost, and schedule data for the storage and disposition 
alternatives that are considered in the S&D PEIS. After receiving 
comments on each of the TSRs, DOE issued revised versions of the 
reports in October and November, 1996, respectively.

1. Storage Technical Summary Report

    This report provides technical, cost and schedule information for 
long-term storage alternatives analyzed in the S&D PEIS. The cost 
information for each alternative is presented in constant 1996 dollars 
and also discounted or present value dollars. It identifies both 
capital costs and life cycle costs. The following costs are in 1996 
dollars.
    The cost analyses show that the combination (preferred) alternative 
for the storage of plutonium would provide advantages to the Department 
with respect to implementing disposition technologies and would be the 
least expensive compared to other storage alternatives. The cost of the 
combination (preferred) alternative would be approximately $30 million 
in investment and $360 million in operating costs from inception until 
disposition occurs. The cost of the upgrade at multiple sites 
alternative would be approximately $380 million in investment and $3.2 
billion in operating costs for 50 years. The costs for the 
consolidation alternative could range from approximately $40 million to 
$360 million in investment and $600 million to $1.1 billion for 
operating costs for 50 years, depending on the extent to which existing 
facilities and capabilities can be shared with other programs at the 
sites.
    The schedule analysis shows that the upgraded storage facilities 
for plutonium under the combination (preferred) alternative could be 
operational by 2004 at Pantex (Zone 12), and by 2001 at SRS. The 
upgrade for the storage of HEU could be completed by 2004 (or earlier). 
RFETS pits could be received at Pantex beginning in 1997 in Zone 4 on a 
temporary basis until Zone 12 upgrades are completed. The other 
analyzed alternatives (upgrade and consolidation) would require about 
six years to complete.
2. Disposition Technical Summary Report
    This report provides technical viability, cost, and schedule 
information for plutonium disposition alternatives and variants 
analyzed in the S&D PEIS. The variants analyzed in the report are based 
on pre-conceptual design information in most cases.
    a. Technical Viability Estimates. The report indicates that each of 
the alternatives appears to be technically viable, although each is 
currently at a different level of technical maturity. There is high 
confidence that the technologies are sufficiently mature to allow 
procurement and/or construction of facilities and equipment to meet 
plutonium disposition technical requirements and to begin disposition 
in about a decade.13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Actual timing would depend on technical demonstrations, 
follow-on site-specific environmental review, detailed cost 
estimates, and international agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Reactor Alternatives--Light water reactors (LWRs) can be readily 
converted to enable the use of MOX fuels. Many European LWRs currently 
operate on MOX fuel cycles. Although some technical risks exist, they 
are all amenable to engineering resolution. Sufficient existing 
domestic reactor capacity exists, unless significant delays occur in 
the disposition mission. CANDU reactors appear to be capable of 
operating on MOX fuel cycles, but this has never been demonstrated on 
any industrial scale. Therefore, additional development would be 
required to achieve the level of maturity for the CANDU reactors that 
exists for light water reactors. Partially complete and evolutionary 
LWRs would involve increased technical risk relative to existing LWRs, 
as well as the need to complete or build (and license) new reactor 
facilities. The spent MOX fuel waste form that results from reactor 
disposition of surplus plutonium will have to satisfy waste acceptance 
criteria for the geologic repository.
    Immobilization Alternatives--All vitrification alternatives require 
additional research and development prior to implementation of 
immobilization of weapons-usable plutonium. However, a growing 
experience base exists relating to the vitrification of high-level 
waste. These existing technologies can be adapted to the plutonium 
disposition mission, though different equipment designs and glass 
formulations will generally be necessary due to criticality 
considerations and chemical differences between plutonium and HLW that 
may affect the stability of the glass matrix. Vitrification and ceramic 
immobilization alternatives are similar with regard to the technical 
maturity of incorporating plutonium in their respective matrices. The 
technical viability of electrometallurgical treatment has not yet been 
established for the plutonium disposition mission. The experimental 
data base for this alternative is limited, and critical questions on 
waste form performance are not yet resolved. This alternative is 
considered practical only if the underlying technology is further

[[Page 3022]]

developed for spent nuclear fuels.14 All of the immobilization 
alternatives will require qualification (to meet acceptance criteria) 
of the waste form for the geologic repository, and may require 
legislative clarification or NRC rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     14  A recent study by the National Research Council 
concludes that the electrometallurgical treatment technology is not 
sufficiently mature to provide a reliable basis for timely plutonium 
disposition. ``An Evaluation of the Electrometallurgical Approach 
for Treatment of Excess Weapons Plutonium'' (National Academy Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Deep Borehole Alternatives--Uncertainties for the deep borehole 
alternatives relate to selecting and qualifying a site; additional 
legislation and regulations, or legislative and regulatory 
clarification, may be required. The front-end feed processing 
operations for the deep borehole alternatives are much simpler than for 
other alternatives because no highly radioactive materials are 
processed, thus avoiding the need for remote handling operations. 
Emplacement technologies are comprised of largely low-technology 
operations which would be adaptations from existing hardware and 
processes used in the oil and gas industry.
    Hybrid Approaches--Two hybrid approaches that combine technologies 
were considered as illustrative examples, using existing LWR or CANDU 
reactors in conjunction with a can-in-canister (immobilization) 
approach. Hybrids provide insurance against technical or institutional 
hurdles which could arise for a single technology approach for 
disposition. If any significant roadblock is encountered in any one 
area of a hybrid, it would be possible to simply divert the feed 
material to the more viable technology. In the case of a single 
technology, such roadblocks would be more problematic.
    b. Cost Estimates. The following discussion is in constant 1996 
dollars unless otherwise stated.
    (1) Investment Costs.
     The investment costs for existing reactor variants tends 
to be about $1 billion; completing or building new reactors increases 
the investment cost to between $2 billion and $6 billion.
     The investment cost for the immobilization alternatives 
ranges from approximately $0.6 billion for the can-in-canister variants 
to approximately $2 billion for new greenfield variants.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ ``Greenfield'' means a variant involving a new facility, 
with no existing plutonium-handling infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Hybrid alternatives (combining both immobilization and 
reactor alternatives) require approximately $200 million additional 
investment over the existing light water reactor stand-alone 
alternatives.
     Investment costs for the deep borehole alternatives range 
from about $1.1 billion for direct emplacement to about $1.4 billion 
for immobilized emplacement.
     Alternatives that utilize existing facilities for 
plutonium processing, immobilization, or fuel fabrication would realize 
significant investment cost savings over building new facilities for 
the same function.
     Large uncertainties in the cost estimates exist, relating 
to both engineering and institutional factors.
     A significant fraction of the investment cost for an 
alternative/variant is related to the front-end facilities for the 
extraction of the plutonium from pits and other plutonium-bearing 
materials and for other functions that are common to all alternatives.
    (2) Life Cycle Costs.
     The life cycle costs for hybrid alternatives are similar 
to the stand-alone reactor alternatives. For the existing LWR/
immobilization hybrid alternative (preferred alternative), the cost is 
$260 million higher than the stand-alone reactor alternative; for the 
CANDU/immobilization hybrid alternative, the cost is $70 million 
higher.
     The combined investment and net operating costs for MOX 
fuel are higher than for commercial uranium fuel; thus, the cost of MOX 
fuel cannot compete economically with low-enriched uranium fuel for 
LWRs or natural uranium fuel for CANDU reactors.
     The can-in-canister approaches are the most attractive 
variants for immobilization based on cost considerations.
     The deep borehole alternatives are more expensive than the 
can-in-canister and existing reactor alternatives. The immobilized 
borehole alternative life cycle cost is $1 billion greater than that 
for the direct emplacement alternative ($3.6 billion vs. $2.6 billion).
     Large uncertainties in the cost estimates exist, relating 
to engineering, regulatory, and policy considerations.
    c. Schedule Estimates. The key conclusions of the Disposition 
Technical Summary Report with respect to schedules are as follows:
     Significant schedule uncertainties exist, relating to both 
engineering and institutional factors.
     Opportunities for compressing or expanding schedules 
exist.
    (1) Reactor Alternatives.  The rate at which MOX fuel is 
consumed in reactors will depend on the rate that MOX fuel is provided 
and fabricated, and the rate that plutonium oxide is provided to the 
MOX fuel fabrication facility.
     The time to attain production scale operation in existing 
LWRs and CANDU reactors could be about 8-12 years, depending on the 
need for and source of test assemblies that might be required.
     The time to complete the disposition mission is a function 
of the number of reactors committed to the mission, among other 
factors. For the variants considered, the time to complete varies from 
about 24 to 31 years.
    (2) Immobilization Alternatives.
     The time to start the disposition mission ranges from 7 to 
13 years, depending on the technology used and whether existing 
facilities are used.
     The operating campaign for the immobilization alternatives 
at full-scale operation would be about 10 years; it is possible to 
compress or expand the operating schedule by several years, if desired, 
by resizing the immobilization facility designs selected for analysis 
in this study. The overall mission duration (including research and 
development, construction, and operation) is expected to be about 18 to 
24 years.
     Potential delays for start-up of the immobilization 
alternatives involve completing process development and demonstration, 
and qualifying the waste form for a geologic repository.
    (3) Deep Borehole Alternatives.  The time to start-up is 
expected to be 10 years.
     The operating duration of the mission would be about 10 
years, although completing all burial operations at the borehole site 
in 3 years is possible. Therefore, the overall mission duration is 
estimated to be 20 years with accelerated emplacement reducing the 
duration by about 7 years.
     The schedule for the deep borehole alternatives would 
depend in part on selecting and qualifying a site, and obtaining 
legislative and regulatory clarification as well as any necessary 
permits.
    (4) Hybrid Approaches.  In general, the schedule data that 
apply to the component technologies apply to the hybrid alternatives as 
well.
     Confidence in an early start-up and an earlier completion 
can both be improved with a hybrid approach, relative to stand-alone 
alternatives.
     Hybrid alternatives provide an inherent back-up technology 
approach to enhance confidence in attaining schedule goals.

[[Page 3023]]

B. Nonproliferation Assessment

    To assist in the development of this ROD, DOE's Office of Arms 
Control and Nonproliferation, with support from the Office of Fissile 
Materials Disposition, prepared a report, Nonproliferation and Arms 
Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and 
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives. The report was issued in draft form 
in October 1996, and following a public comment period, was issued in 
final form in January 1997. It analyzes the nonproliferation and arms 
reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and 
HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium. It is based in part on a 
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report prepared for the Office of 
Fissile Materials Disposition by Sandia National Laboratory. The 
assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each 
option. Some of the ``options'' and ``alternatives'' discussed in the 
Nonproliferation Assessment are listed as ``variants'' (such as can-in-
canister) in the S&D Final PEIS. The key conclusions of the report, as 
presented in its Executive Summary, are reproduced below.
    1. Storage.  Each of the options under consideration for 
storage of U.S. weapons-usable fissile materials has the potential to 
support U.S. nonproliferation and arms reduction goals, if implemented 
appropriately.
     Each of the storage options could provide high levels of 
security to prevent theft of nuclear materials, and could provide 
access to excess materials for international monitoring.
     Making excess plutonium and HEU available for bilateral 
U.S.-Russian monitoring and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards, while protecting proliferation-sensitive information, would 
help demonstrate the U.S. commitment never to return this material to 
nuclear weapons, providing substantial arms reduction and 
nonproliferation benefits in the near-term.
    2. Disposition of U.S. Excess Plutonium
    a. In General.  Each of the options for disposition of 
excess weapons plutonium that meets the Spent Fuel Standard would, if 
implemented appropriately, offer major nonproliferation and arms 
reduction benefits compared to leaving the material in storage in 
directly weapons-usable form. Taking into account the likely impact on 
Russian disposition activities, the no-action alternative appears to be 
by far the least desirable of the plutonium disposition options from a 
nonproliferation and arms reduction perspective.
     Carrying out disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium, 
using options that ensured effective nonproliferation controls and 
resulted in forms meeting the Spent Fuel Standard, would:
     reduce the likelihood that current arms reductions would 
be reversed, by significantly increasing the difficulty, cost, and 
observability of returning this plutonium to weapons;
     increase international confidence in the arms reduction 
process, strengthening political support for the nonproliferation 
regime and providing a base for additional arms reductions, if desired;
     reduce long-term proliferation risks posed by this 
material by further helping to ensure that weapons-usable material does 
not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and
     lay the essential foundation for parallel disposition of 
excess Russian plutonium, reducing the risks that Russia might threaten 
U.S. security by rebuilding its Cold War nuclear weapons arsenal, or 
that this material might be stolen for use by potential proliferators.
     Choosing the ``no-action alternative'' of leaving U.S. 
excess plutonium in storage in weapons-usable form indefinitely, rather 
than carrying out disposition:
     would represent a clear reversal of the U.S. position 
seeking to reduce excess stockpiles of weapons-usable materials 
worldwide;
     would make it impossible to achieve disposition of Russian 
excess plutonium;
     could undermine international political support for 
nonproliferation efforts by leaving open the question of whether the 
United States was maintaining an option for rapid reversal of current 
arms reductions; and
     could undermine progress in nuclear arms reductions.
     The benefits of placing U.S. excess plutonium under 
international monitoring and then transforming it into forms that met 
the Spent Fuel Standard would be greatly increased, and the risks of 
these steps significantly decreased, if Russia took comparable steps 
with its own excess plutonium on a parallel track. The two countries 
need not use the same plutonium disposition technologies, however.
     As the 1994 NAS committee report 16 concluded, 
options for disposition of U.S. excess weapons plutonium will provide 
maximum nonproliferation and arms control benefits if they:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     16  See footnote 3, above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     minimize the time during which the excess plutonium is 
stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons;
     preserve material safeguards and security during the 
disposition process, seeking to maintain to the extent possible the 
same high standards of security and accounting applied to stored 
nuclear weapons (the Stored Weapons Standard);
     result in a form from which the plutonium would be as 
inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the larger and growing 
quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel (the Spent Fuel 
Standard).
     In order to achieve the benefits of plutonium disposition 
as rapidly as possible, and to minimize the risks and negative signals 
resulting from leaving the excess plutonium in storage, it is important 
for disposition options to begin, and to complete the mission as soon 
as practicable taking into account nonproliferation, environment, 
safety, and health, and economic constraints. Timing should be a key 
criterion in judging disposition options. Beginning the disposition 
quickly is particularly important to establishing the credibility of 
the process, domestically and internationally.
     Each of the options under consideration for plutonium 
disposition has its own advantages and disadvantages with respect to 
nonproliferation and arms control, but none is clearly superior to the 
others.
     Each of the options under consideration for plutonium 
disposition can potentially provide high levels of security and 
safeguards for nuclear materials during the disposition process, 
mitigating the risk of theft of nuclear materials.
     Each of the options under consideration for plutonium 
disposition can potentially provide for effective international 
monitoring of the disposition process.
     Plutonium disposition can only reduce, not eliminate, the 
security risks posed by the existence of excess plutonium, and will 
involve some risks of its own:
     Because all plutonium disposition options would take 
decades to complete, disposition is not a near-term solution to the 
problem of nuclear theft and smuggling. While disposition will make a 
long-term contribution, the near-term problem must be addressed through 
programs to improve security and safeguarding for nuclear materials, 
and to ensure adequate police, customs, and intelligence capabilities 
to interdict nuclear smuggling.

[[Page 3024]]

     All plutonium disposition options under consideration 
would involve processing and transport of plutonium, which will involve 
more risk of theft in the short term than if the material had remained 
in heavily guarded storage, in return for the long-term benefit of 
converting the material to more proliferation-resistant forms.
     Both the United States and Russia will still retain 
substantial stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile 
materials even after disposition of the fissile materials currently 
considered excess is complete. These weapons and materials will 
continue to pose a security challenge regardless of what is done with 
excess plutonium.
     None of the disposition options under consideration would 
make it impossible to recover the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, 
or make it impossible to use other plutonium to rebuild a nuclear 
arsenal. Therefore, disposition will only reduce, not eliminate, the 
risk of reversal of current nuclear arms reductions.
     A U.S. decision to choose reactor alternatives for 
plutonium disposition could offer additional arguments and 
justifications to those advocating plutonium reprocessing and recycle 
in other countries. This could increase the proliferation risk if it in 
fact led to significant additional separation and handling of weapons-
usable plutonium. On the other hand, if appropriately implemented, 
plutonium disposition might also offer an opportunity to develop 
improved procedures and technologies for protecting and safeguarding 
plutonium, which could reduce proliferation risks and would strengthen 
U.S. efforts to reduce the stockpiles of separated plutonium in other 
countries.
     Large-scale bulk processing of plutonium, including 
processes to convert plutonium pits to oxide and prepare other forms 
for disposition, as well as fuel fabrication or immobilization 
processes, represents the stage of the disposition process when 
material is most vulnerable to covert theft by insiders or covert 
diversion by the host state. Such bulk processing is required for all 
options, however; in particular, initial processing of plutonium pits 
and other forms is among the most proliferation-sensitive stages of the 
disposition process, but is largely common to all the options. More 
information about the specific process designs is needed to determine 
whether there are significant differences between the various 
immobilization and reactor options in the overall difficulty of 
providing effective assurance against theft or diversion during the 
different types of bulk processing involved, and if so, which approach 
is superior in this respect.
     Transport of plutonium is the point in the disposition 
process when the material is most vulnerable to overt armed attacks 
designed to steal plutonium. With sufficient resources devoted to 
security, however, high levels of protection against such overt attacks 
can be provided. International, and particularly overseas, shipments 
would involve greater transportation concerns than domestic shipments. 
17
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     17  International shipments would be involved (from the United 
States to Canada) if the CANDU option were pursued as a result of 
international agreements among the U.S., Canada, and Russia. 
Overseas shipments would be involved if European MOX fuel 
fabrication were utilized in the interim before a domestic MOX 
fabrication facility were completed. The Preferred Alternative and 
the decisions in this ROD do not involve European MOX fuel 
fabrication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    b. Conclusions Relating to Specific Disposition Options.
     The reactor options, homogeneous immobilization 18 
options, and deep borehole immobilized emplacement option can all meet 
the Spent Fuel Standard. The can-in-canister options are being refined 
to increase the resistance to separation of the plutonium cans from the 
surrounding glass, with the goal of meeting the Spent Fuel Standard. 
The deep borehole direct emplacement option substantially exceeds the 
Spent Fuel Standard with respect to recovery by sub-national groups, 
but could be more accessible and attractive for recovery by the host 
state than spent fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     18  The term ``homogeneous immobilization'' refers to 
mixing of solutions of plutonium and either HLW or cesium in liquid 
form, followed by solidification of the mixture in either glass or 
ceramic matrices. This contrasts with the ``can-in-canister'' 
variant, in which the plutonium and HLW or cesium materials are 
never actually mixed together.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The reactor options have some advantage over the 
immobilization options with respect to perceived irreversibility, in 
that the plutonium would be converted from weapons-grade to reactor-
grade, even though it is possible to produce nuclear weapons with both 
weapons and reactor-grade plutonium. The immobilization and deep 
borehole options have some advantage over the reactor options in 
avoiding the perception that they could potentially encourage 
additional separation and civilian use of plutonium, which itself poses 
proliferation risks.
     Options that result in accountable ``items'' (for purposes 
of international safeguards) whose plutonium content can be accurately 
measured (such as fuel assemblies or immobilized cans without fission 
products in the ``can-in-canister'' option) offer some advantage in 
accounting to ensure that the output plutonium matches the input 
plutonium from the process. Other options (such as homogeneous 
immobilization or immobilized emplacement in deep boreholes) would 
require greater reliance on containment and surveillance to provide 
assurance that no material was stolen or diverted--but in some cases 
could involve simpler processing, easing the task of providing such 
assurance.
     The principal uncertainty with respect to using excess 
weapons plutonium as MOX in U.S. LWRs relates to the potential 
difficulty of gaining political and regulatory approvals for the 
various operations required.
     Compared to the LWR option, the CANDU option would involve 
more transport and more safeguarding issues at the reactor sites 
themselves (because of the small size of the CANDU fuel bundles and the 
on-line refueling of the CANDU reactors). Demonstrating the use of MOX 
in CANDU reactors by carrying out this option for excess weapons 
plutonium disposition could somewhat detract from U.S. efforts to 
convince nations operating CANDU reactors in regions of proliferation 
concern not to pursue MOX fuel cycles, but these nations are likely to 
base their fuel cycle decisions primarily on factors independent of 
disposition of this material. Disposing of excess weapons plutonium in 
another country long identified with disarmament could have significant 
symbolic advantages, particularly if carried out in parallel with 
Russia. Disposition of Russian plutonium in CANDU reactors, however, 
would require resolving additional transportation issues and additional 
questions relating to the likely Russian desire for compensation for 
the energy value of the plutonium.
     The immobilization options have the potential to be 
implemented more quickly than the reactor options. They face somewhat 
less political uncertainty but somewhat more technical uncertainty than 
the reactor options.
     The likelihood of very long delays in gaining approval for 
siting and construction of deep borehole sites represents a very 
serious arms reduction and nonproliferation disadvantage of the 
borehole option, in either of its variants. While the deep borehole 
direct-emplacement option requires substantially less bulk processing 
than the other disposition options, that option may not meet the Spent 
Fuel Standard for retrievability by the host state, as mentioned above. 
Any potential

[[Page 3025]]

advantage from the reduced processing is small compared to the large 
timing uncertainty and the potential retrievability disadvantage.
     Similarly, the electrometallurgical treatment option, 
because it is less developed than the other immobilization options, 
involves more uncertainty in when it could be implemented, which 
represents a significant arms reduction and nonproliferation 
disadvantage. It does not appear to have major compensating advantages 
compared to the other immobilization options.
     The ``can-in-canister'' immobilization options have a 
timing advantage over the homogeneous immobilization options, in that, 
by potentially relying on existing facilities, they could begin several 
years sooner. As noted above, however, modified systems intended to 
allow this option to meet the Spent Fuel Standard are still being 
designed.

C. Comments on the S&D Final PEIS

    After issuing the Final PEIS, DOE received approximately 100 
letters from organizations and individuals commenting on the 
alternatives addressed in the PEIS. Many of these letters expressed 
opposition to the MOX fuel approach for surplus plutonium disposition. 
The major concern raised in these letters was the contention that the 
use of MOX fuel is associated with proliferation risk as well as 
additional delays, costs, and safety and environmental risks. One of 
these letters was from a coalition of 14 national organizations 
recommending that the Department decide to utilize immobilization for 
the disposition of all surplus plutonium and that MOX be retained for 
use, if at all, only as an ``insurance policy'' if immobilization 
should prove infeasible. Several of those 14 organizations also wrote 
separately making similar points. Conversely, many of the letters 
provided comments in support of the use of MOX fuel and/or a dual path, 
while a few expressed opposition to the immobilization alternatives.
    Seven of the letters received suggested the use of disposition 
approaches that were not analyzed in the PEIS. Three of these 
approaches (dropping plutonium into volcanoes, burying it in the sea at 
the base of a volcano, and storing it in large granite or marble 
structures) are similar to options that were either considered (but 
found to be unreasonable) in a screening process that preceded the 
PEIS, or were addressed in the PEIS Comment Response Document. These 
approaches were considered to be potentially damaging to the 
environment, among other things, and were therefore dismissed as 
unreasonable. Three other alternatives (plasma technology, binding and 
neutralizing plutonium with a new organic material, and use in rocket 
engines) recommended in these letters would require a substantial 
amount of development and could not be accomplished in the same time 
frame as alternatives analyzed in the PEIS. One commentor suggested 
adding the plutonium to the radioactive sludge being stored at Hanford 
for eventual disposal. The Department views this as unreasonable 
because of delays and increased costs that would be incurred in the 
program to manage the wastes in the Hanford tanks. One commentor was 
opposed to the utilization of Hanford's Fuels and Materials Examination 
Facility for MOX fuel fabrication and the Fast Flux Test Facility for 
MOX fuel burning.
    All of the issues raised in these letters are covered in the body 
of the Final PEIS, in the Comment Response Document, the Summary Report 
of the Screening Process (DOE/MD-0002, March 19, 1995), the Technical 
Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, or the 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile 
Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, which have 
each been considered in reaching this ROD.
    The Department's decision for surplus plutonium disposition is to 
pursue both the existing LWR (MOX fuel) and immobilization approaches. 
DOE recognizes that the estimated life-cycle cost of immobilization 
alone would be less than that of the hybrid approach (pursuing both), 
but the additional expense would be warranted by the increased 
flexibility should one of the approaches ultimately fail, and the 
increased ability to influence Russian plutonium disposition actions. 
(The lowest cost approach would be the No Disposition Action 
alternative; however, as noted in section III.F, above, that option 
would not satisfy the purpose and need for this program.) DOE also 
recognizes that analyses in the PEIS indicated that, for normal 
operation, the environmental and health impacts would be somewhat lower 
for immobilization, although, with the exception of waste generation, 
impacts for the preferred, immobilization, and existing LWR (MOX) 
alternatives would be essentially comparable (see prior discussion).
    Potential latent cancer fatalities for members of the public under 
the MOX approach would be significantly higher than under the 
immobilization approach only under highly unlikely facility accident 
scenarios; the risk (taking into account accident probabilities) to the 
public of latent cancer fatalities from accidents would be fairly low 
for both approaches.
    From the nonproliferation standpoint, results of the 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile 
Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (see section 
IV.B) indicated that each of the options under consideration for 
plutonium disposition has its own advantages and disadvantages, and 
each can potentially provide high levels of security and safeguards for 
nuclear materials during the disposition process, mitigating the risk 
of theft of nuclear materials. Initial processing of plutonium pits and 
other forms is among the most proliferation-sensitive stages of the 
disposition process, but is largely common to all the options. Although 
the Assessment also concluded that none of the approaches is clearly 
superior to the others, both the Nonproliferation Assessment and a 
letter from the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the 
Non-proliferation and Arms Control Implications of Weapons-Usable 
Fissile Materials Disposition Alternatives (included as Appendix B to 
the Nonproliferation Assessment) concluded that the hybrid approach 
(both reactors/MOX and immobilization) is preferable because of 
uncertainties in each approach and because it would minimize potential 
delays should problems develop with either approach. Numerous comment 
letters have made similar points.
    One such letter was received from five individuals who were the 
U.S. participants on the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission 
on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This letter supported the 
dual-track approach on the grounds that ``ruling out reactors and thus 
depending solely on vitrification as the only approach to plutonium 
disposition that might be implementable anytime soon, would have far 
bigger nonproliferation liabilities then would the two-track 
approach.'' These commentors argued that designating only 
immobilization as the preferred approach, with MOX as a back-up, would 
have essentially all the nonproliferation and arms reduction 
liabilities of a one-track approach, which would weaken the U.S. 
position and have severe consequences for the likely success of 
programs to carry out permanent disposition of weapons plutonium in 
Russia, and therefore jeopardize the success of programs to

[[Page 3026]]

carry out U.S. disposition. These commentors stated that without the 
dual-track approach, the U.S. will lose any leverage it might have over 
the conditions and safeguards accompanying the use of Russian plutonium 
in their reactors. They also pointed out that pursuing both the MOX 
option and immobilization in the U.S. may be the best way to convince 
Russia, which currently favors converting its own plutonium to MOX 
fuel, of the value of immobilization for a portion of its excess 
plutonium. These commentors argued that the dual-track approach would 
not undermine U.S. nonproliferation policy, would not increase the risk 
of nuclear theft and terrorism, and would not lead to a new domestic 
plutonium recycle industry since it would not significantly affect the 
huge economic barriers to using MOX fuel on a commercial basis.
    Two commentors expressed opposition to plutonium recycling 
(reprocessing), citing the Final Generic Environmental Statement on the 
Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Cooled 
Reactors (GESMO), NUREG-0002, which was issued by the NRC in 1976, and 
President Carter's decision to ban plutonium recycling. DOE notes that 
plutonium recycling is not part of the plutonium disposition program or 
the decisions in this ROD; on the contrary, this ROD includes 
conditions on the use of MOX fuel that are intended to prevent the use 
of recycled plutonium.
    The use of MOX fuel in existing reactors would be undertaken in a 
manner that is consistent with the United States' policy objective on 
the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process and the United 
States' policy discouraging the use of plutonium for civil purposes. To 
this end, implementing the MOX alternative would include government 
ownership and control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at a DOE 
site, and use of the facility only for the surplus plutonium 
disposition program. There would be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse 
of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel 
cycle in existing reactors, with appropriate arrangements, including 
contractual or licensing provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to 
surplus plutonium disposition.
    One commentor, who opposed MOX fuel use, urged DOE not to use 
European MOX fuel fabrication capability if the MOX approach is 
pursued. In this ROD, DOE has not decided to use European MOX fuel 
fabrication.

V. Decisions

A. Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS, 
the Department has decided to reduce, over time, the number of 
locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored, through a 
combination of storage alternatives in conjunction with a combination 
of disposition alternatives. DOE will begin implementing this decision 
by moving surplus plutonium from RFETS as soon as possible, 
transporting the pits to Pantex beginning in 1997, and non-pit 
plutonium materials to SRS upon completion of the expanded Actinide 
Packing and Storage Facility (APSF), anticipated in 2001. Over time, 
DOE will store this plutonium in upgraded facilities at Pantex and in 
the expanded APSF. Surplus and non-surplus HEU will be stored in 
upgraded facilities at ORR. Storage facilities for the surplus HEU will 
also be modified, as needed, to accommodate international inspection 
requirements consistent with the President's Nonproliferation and 
Export Control Policy. Accordingly, DOE has decided to pursue the 
following actions for storage:
     Phase out storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at RFETS 
beginning in 1997; move pits to Pantex, and non-pit materials to SRS 
upon completion of the expanded APSF. At Pantex, DOE will repackage 
pits from RFETS in Zone 12, then place them in existing storage 
facilities in Zone 4, pending completion of facility upgrades in Zone 
12. At SRS, DOE will expand the planned new APSF, and move separated 
and stabilized non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS to the expanded 
APSF upon completion. The small number of pits currently at RFETS that 
are not in shippable form will be placed in a shippable condition in 
accordance with existing procedures prior to shipment to Pantex. 
Additionally, some pits and non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS 
could be used at SRS, LANL, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) for tests and demonstrations of aspects of disposition 
technologies (see disposition decision, below). All non-pit weapons-
usable plutonium materials currently stored at RFETS are surplus.
    The Department's decision to remove plutonium from RFETS is based 
on the cleanup agreement among DOE, EPA, and the State of Colorado for 
RFETS, the proximity of RFETS to the Denver metropolitan area, and the 
fact that some of the RFETS plutonium is currently stored in buildings 
371 and 376, two of the most vulnerable facilities as defined by and 
identified in DOE's Plutonium Working Group Report on Environmental, 
Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities Associated With the Department's 
Plutonium Storage (DOE/EH-0414, November, 1994).
     Upgrade storage facilities at Zone 12 South (to be 
completed by 2004) at Pantex to store those surplus pits currently 
stored at Pantex, and surplus pits from RFETS, pending disposition. 
Storage facilities at Zone 4 will continue to be used for these pits 
prior to completion of the upgrade.
     In accordance with the preferred alternative in the Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship 
and Management (Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS), store 
Strategic Reserve pits at Pantex in other upgraded facilities in Zone 
12.
    The Department's decision to consolidate pit storage at Pantex 
places the pits at a central location where most of the pits already 
reside and where the expertise and infrastructure are already in place 
to accommodate pit storage.19 Pantex has more than 40 years of 
experience with the handling of pits. Zone 12 facilities would be 
modified for long-term storage of the Pantex plutonium inventory and 
the small number of pits transferred from RFETS and SRS for a modest 
cost (about $10 million capital cost). Pursuant to the Final EIS for 
the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of 
Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225), DOE is proposing to continue 
nuclear weapons stockpile management operations and related activities 
at the Pantex Plant, including interim storage of up to 20,000 
pits.20 Consequently, the storage of surplus pits at Pantex would 
offer the opportunity to share trained people and other resources, and 
a decreased cost could be realized over other sites without similar 
experience. Using the Pantex Plant for pit storage would also involve 
the lowest cost and the least new construction relative to other sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ A small number of research and development pits located at 
RFETS that have been and will continue to be packaged and returned 
to LANL and LLNL are outside the scope of the S&D PEIS and this ROD.
    \20\ The pits that are to be moved to Pantex pursuant to this 
ROD fall within the 20,000 pit limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Expand the planned APSF at SRS (Upgrade Alternative) to 
store those surplus, non-pit plutonium materials currently at SRS and 
surplus non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS, pending disposition 
(see disposition decision, below). DOE analyzed the

[[Page 3027]]

potential impacts of constructing and operating the APSF in the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials 
(DOE/EIS-0220) and announced the decision to build the facility in the 
associated ROD (60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995). DOE, pursuant to the 
decisions announced here to store surplus non-pit plutonium at SRS, 
will likely design and build the APSF and the expanded space to 
accommodate the RFETS material as one building,21 which DOE plans 
to complete in 2001. The RFETS surplus non-pit plutonium materials 
22 will be moved to SRS after stabilization is performed at RFETS 
under corrective actions in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities 
Safety Board Recommendation 94-1; and after the material is packaged in 
DOE-approved storage and shipping containers pursuant to existing 
procedures. The surplus plutonium already on-site at SRS and the 
movement of separated and stabilized non-pit plutonium from RFETS would 
result in the storage of a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus 
plutonium in the new, expanded APSF at SRS. In addition, shipment of 
the non-pit plutonium from RFETS to SRS, after stabilization, would 
only be implemented if the subsequent ROD for a plutonium disposition 
site (see Section V.B., below) calls for immobilization of plutonium at 
SRS. Placement of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials in a new storage 
facility at SRS will allow utilization of existing expertise and 
plutonium handling capabilities in a location where disposition 
activities could occur (see disposition decision, below). The decision 
to store non-pit plutonium from RFETS at SRS places most non-pit 
material at a plutonium-competent site with the most modern, state-of-
the-art storage and processing facilities, and at a site with the only 
remaining large-scale chemical separation and processing capability in 
the DOE complex.23 Pits currently located at SRS will be moved to 
Pantex for storage consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. There are no strategic non-
pit materials currently located at SRS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Building the APSF in this way, rather than as originally 
configured plus an expansion, will not increase the potential 
impacts of constructing and operating the facility beyond those 
analyzed in the S&D Final PEIS in conjunction with the analyses in 
the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Interim Management of 
Nuclear Materials.
    \22\ This decision does not include residues at RFETS that are 
less than 50-percent plutonium by weight, or scrub alloys. The 
management and disposition of those materials has been or is being 
considered in separate NEPA reviews. See Environmental Assessment 
for Solid Residue Treatment, Repackaging, and Storage (DOE/EA-1120, 
April 1996); Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS on the Management of 
Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site (61 FR 58866, November 19, 1996).
    \23\ SRS is one of the preferred candidate sites for plutonium 
disposition facilities, including the potential for the early start 
of disposition by immobilization using the can-in-canister option at 
the DWPF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Continue current storage (No Action) of surplus plutonium 
at Hanford and INEL, pending disposition (or movement to lag storage 
24 at disposition facilities when selected).25 This action 
will allow surplus plutonium to remain at the sites with existing 
expertise and plutonium handling capabilities, and where potential 
disposition activities could occur (see disposition decision, below). 
There are no non-surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials currently 
stored at either site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Lag storage is temporary storage at the applicable 
disposition facility.
    \25\ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) currently 
stores 0.3 metric tons of plutonium, which are primarily research 
and development and operational feedstock materials not surplus to 
government needs. Adequate storage facilities for this material 
currently exist at LLNL, where it will be stored and used for 
research and development activities. None of the plutonium stored at 
LLNL falls within the scope of the disposition alternatives in the 
S&D Final PEIS or the disposition decisions in this ROD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Continue current storage (No Action) of plutonium at LANL, 
pending disposition (or movement to lag storage at the disposition 
facilities). This plutonium will be stored in stabilized form with the 
non-surplus plutonium in the upgraded Nuclear Material Storage Facility 
pursuant to the No Action alternative for the site.
     Take No Action at the NTS. DOE will not introduce 
plutonium to sites that do not currently have plutonium in storage.
     Upgrade storage facilities at the Y-12 Plant (Y-12) (to be 
completed by 2004 or earlier) at ORR to store non-surplus HEU and 
surplus HEU pending disposition. Existing storage facilities at Y-12 
will be modified to meet natural phenomena requirements, as documented 
in Natural Phenomena Upgrade of the Downsized/Consolidated Oak Ridge 
Uranium/Lithium Plant Facilities (Y/EN-5080, 1994). Storage facilities 
will be consolidated, and the storage footprint will be reduced, as 
surplus HEU is dispositioned and blended to low-enriched uranium, 
pursuant to the ROD for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched 
Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (61 FR 40619, August 5, 
1996). Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management PEIS, HEU strategic reserves will be stored 
at the Y-12 Plant.

B. Plutonium Disposition

    Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS, 
DOE has decided to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that 
allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or 
ceramic forms and burning of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide fuel 
(MOX) in existing reactors. The decision to pursue disposition of the 
surplus plutonium using these approaches is supported by the analyses 
in the Disposition Technical Summary Report (section IV.A.2 above) and 
the Nonproliferation Assessment (section IV.B above), as well as the 
S&D Final PEIS. The results of additional technology development and 
demonstrations, site-specific environmental review, detailed cost 
proposals, nonproliferation considerations, and negotiations with 
Russia and other nations will ultimately determine the timing and 
extent to which MOX as well as immobilization is deployed. These 
efforts will provide the basis and flexibility for the United States to 
initiate disposition efforts either multilaterally or bilaterally 
through negotiations with other nations, or unilaterally as an example 
to Russia and other nations.
    Pursuant to this decision, the United States policy not to 
encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, not to itself 
engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear 
explosive purposes, does not change. Although under this decision some 
plutonium may ultimately be burned in existing reactors, extensive 
measures will be pursued (see below) to ensure that federal support for 
this unique disposition mission does not encourage other civil uses of 
plutonium or plutonium reprocessing. The United States will maintain 
its commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear 
programs in western Europe and Japan.
    The Disposition Technical Summary Report (section IV.A.2 above) 
concluded that the lowest cost option for plutonium disposition would 
be immobilization using the can-in-canister variant and existing 
facilities to the maximum extent possible, with a net life-cycle cost 
of about $1.8 billion. The Disposition Technical Summary Report also 
estimated that the net life-cycle cost of the hybrid immobilization/MOX 
approach would be about $2.2 billion. The additional expense of 
pursuing the hybrid approach would be warranted by

[[Page 3028]]

the increased flexibility it would provide, as noted in the 
Nonproliferation Assessment, to ensure that plutonium disposition could 
be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately fail or 
be delayed. Establishing the means for expeditious plutonium 
disposition will also help provide the basis for an international 
cooperative effort that can result in reciprocal, irreversible 
plutonium disposition actions by Russia. This disposition strategy 
signals a strong U.S. commitment to reducing its stockpile of surplus 
plutonium, thereby effectively meeting the purpose of and need for the 
Proposed Action.
    To accomplish the plutonium disposition mission, DOE will use, to 
the extent practical, new as well as modified existing buildings and 
facilities for portions of the disposition mission. DOE will analyze 
and compare existing and new buildings and facilities, and technology 
variations, in a subsequent, site-specific EIS. In addition, all 
disposition facilities will be designed or modified, as needed, to 
accommodate international inspection requirements consistent with the 
President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy. Accordingly, 
DOE has decided to pursue the following strategy and supporting actions 
for plutonium disposition:
     Immobilize plutonium materials using vitrification or 
ceramic immobilization at either Hanford or SRS, in new or existing 
facilities. Immobilization could be used for pure or impure forms of 
plutonium. In the subsequent EIS (referenced above), DOE anticipates 
that the preferred alternative for vitrification or ceramic 
immobilization will include the can-in-canister variant, utilizing the 
existing HLW and the DWPF at SRS (see below). Alternatively, new 
immobilization facilities could be built at Hanford or SRS. The 
immobilized material would be disposed of in a geologic repository. 
Pursuant to appropriate NEPA review, DOE will continue the research and 
development leading to the demonstration of the can-in-canister variant 
at the DWPF using surplus plutonium and the development of 
vitrification and ceramic formulations.
     Convert surplus plutonium materials into mixed oxide (MOX) 
fuel for use in existing reactors. Pure surplus plutonium materials 
including pits, pure metal, and oxides could be converted without 
extensive processing into MOX fuel for use in existing commercial 
reactors. Other, already separated forms of surplus plutonium would 
require additional purification. (This purification would not involve 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.) The Government-produced MOX fuel 
(from plutonium declared surplus to defense needs) would be used in 
existing LWRs with a once-through fuel cycle, with no reprocessing or 
subsequent reuse of the spent fuel. In addition, DOE will explore 
appropriate contractual limits to ensure that any reactor license 
modification for use of the MOX fuel is limited to governmental 
purposes involving the disposition of surplus, weapons-usable 
plutonium, so as to discourage general civil use of plutonium-based 
fuel. The spent MOX fuel would be disposed of in a geologic repository. 
If partially completed LWRs were to be completed by other parties, they 
would be considered for this mission. The MOX fuel would be fabricated 
in a domestic, government-owned facility at one of four DOE sites (SRS, 
Hanford, INEL, or Pantex).
    The Department reserves as an option the potential use of some MOX 
fuel in CANDU reactors in Canada in the event that a multilateral 
agreement to deploy this option is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and 
the United States. DOE will engage in a test and demonstration program 
for CANDU MOX fuel consistent with ongoing and potential future 
cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada.
    The test and demonstration activities could occur at LANL and at 
sites in Canada, potentially beginning in 1997, and will be based on 
appropriate NEPA review. Fabrication of MOX fuel for CANDU reactors 
would occur in a DOE facility, as would be true in the case of domestic 
LWRs. Strict security and safeguards would be employed in the 
fabrication and transport of MOX fuel to CANDU reactors, as well as 
domestic reactors. Whether, and the extent to which, the CANDU option 
is implemented will depend on multi-national agreements and the results 
of the test and demonstration activities.
    Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that 
would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them 
suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the 
total quantity of plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to 
defense needs would require extensive purification for use in MOX fuel, 
and therefore will likely be immobilized. Of the plutonium that is 
currently surplus, DOE will immobilize at least 8 metric tons that it 
has determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel.26 DOE 
reserves the option of using the immobilization approach for all of the 
surplus plutonium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ The S&D Final PEIS, for purposes of analysis of impacts of 
the preferred alternative (using both reactors and immobilization), 
assumed that about 30 percent (approximately 17 MT) of the surplus 
plutonium materials might be immobilized because they are impure. 
DOE's decision here that immobilization will be used for at least 8 
MT currently located at SRS and RFETS is based on DOE's current 
assessment that that quantity of material is so low in quality that 
its purification for use in MOX fuel would not be cost-effective. 
This decision does not preclude immobilizing all of the surplus 
plutonium, but it does preclude using the MOX/reactor approach for 
all of the material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The timing and extent to which either option is ultimately utilized 
will depend on the results of international agreements, future 
technology development and demonstrations, site-specific environmental 
review, detailed cost proposals, and negotiations with Russia and other 
nations. In the event both technologies are utilized, because the time 
required for plutonium disposition using reactors would be longer than 
that for immobilization, it is probable that some surplus plutonium 
would be immobilized initially, prior to completion of reactor 
irradiation for other surplus plutonium. Implementation of this 
strategy will involve some or all of the following supporting actions:
     Construct and operate a plutonium vitrification facility 
or ceramic immobilization facility at either Hanford or SRS. DOE will 
analyze alternative locations at these two sites for constructing new 
buildings or using modified existing buildings in subsequent, site-
specific NEPA review. SRS has existing facilities (the DWPF) and 
infrastructure to support an immobilization mission, and at Hanford, 
DOE has proposed constructing and operating immobilization facilities 
for the wastes in Hanford tanks. 27 DOE will not create new 
infrastructure for immobilizing plutonium with HLW or cesium at INEL, 
NTS, ORR, or Pantex. Due to the substantial timing and cost advantages 
associated with the can-in-canister option, as discussed in the 
Technical Summary Report For Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium 
Disposition and summarized in section IV.A.2, above, DOE anticipates 
that the proposed action for immobilization in the follow-on plutonium 
disposition EIS will include the use of the can-in-canister option at 
the DWPF at SRS for immobilizing a portion of the surplus, non-pit 
plutonium material. 28
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Tank Waste 
Remediation System, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/EIS-
0189, August 1996); ROD expected early in 1997.
    \28\ DOE expects to issue a Notice of Intent to prepare the 
follow-on EIS shortly following this ROD. Reasonable alternatives 
for the proposed action will be considered in the follow-on 
disposition EIS.

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[[Page 3029]]

     Construct and operate a plutonium conversion facility for 
non-pit plutonium materials at either Hanford or SRS. DOE will 
collocate the plutonium conversion facility with the vitrification or 
ceramic immobilization facility discussed above. In subsequent, site-
specific NEPA review, DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford 
and SRS for constructing new buildings or using modified existing 
buildings for the plutonium conversion facility.
     Construct and operate a pit disassembly/conversion 
facility at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one site). DOE will not 
introduce plutonium to sites that do not currently have plutonium in 
storage. Therefore, two sites analyzed in the S&D PEIS, NTS and ORR, 
will not be considered further for plutonium disposition activities. 
DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and 
SRS for constructing new buildings or using modified existing buildings 
in subsequent, site-specific NEPA review. Based on appropriate NEPA 
review, DOE anticipates demonstrating the Advanced Recovery and 
Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) concept at LANL for pit 
disassembly/conversion beginning in fiscal year 1997.
     Construct and operate a domestic, government-owned, 
limited-purpose MOX fuel fabrication facility at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, 
or SRS (only one site). As noted above, NTS and ORR will not be 
considered further for plutonium disposition activities. In follow-on 
NEPA review, DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford, INEL, 
Pantex, and SRS, for constructing new buildings or using modified 
existing buildings. The MOX fuel fabrication facility will serve only 
the limited mission of fabricating MOX fuel from plutonium declared 
surplus to U.S. defense needs, with shut-down and decontamination and 
decommissioning of the facility upon completion of this mission. 
29
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ DOE supports external regulation of its facilities, and in 
the Report of Department of Energy Working Group on External 
Regulation (DOE/UF-0001, December 1996), DOE proposed to seek 
legislation that would generally require NRC licenses for new DOE 
facilities. Therefore, DOE anticipates seeking an NRC license for 
the MOX fuel fabrication facility, which would be limited to a 
license to fabricate MOX fuel from plutonium declared surplus to 
defense needs. DOE may also seek legislation that would by statute 
limit the MOX fuel fabrication facility to disposition of surplus 
plutonium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    DOE's program for surplus plutonium disposition will be subject to 
the highest standards of safeguards and security for storage, 
transportation, and processing (particularly during operations that 
involve the greatest proliferation vulnerability, such as during MOX 
fuel preparation and transportation), and will include International 
Atomic Energy Agency verification as appropriate. Transportation of all 
plutonium-bearing materials under this program, including the 
transportation of prepared MOX fuel to reactors, will be accomplished 
using the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division's ``Safe Secure 
Transports'' (SSTs), which affords these materials the same level of 
transportation safety, security, and safeguards as is used for nuclear 
weapons.
    Pursuant to appropriate NEPA review(s), DOE will continue research 
and development and engage in further testing and demonstrations of 
plutonium disposition technologies which may include: dissolution of 
small quantities of plutonium in both glass and ceramic formulation; 
experiments with immobilization equipment and systems; fabrication of 
MOX fuel pellets for demonstrations of reactor irradiation at INEL; 
mechanical milling and mixing of plutonium and uranium feed; and 
testing of shipping and storage containers for certification, in 
addition to the testing and demonstrations previously described for the 
can-in-canister immobilization variant, the ARIES system, and other 
plutonium processes.
    DOE has decided not to pursue several disposition alternatives that 
were evaluated in the S&D PEIS: two deep borehole alternatives, 
electrometallurgical treatment, evolutionary reactors, and partially-
completed reactors (unless they were completed by others, in which case 
they would qualify as existing reactors). Although the deep borehole 
options are technically attractive, the institutional uncertainties 
associated with siting of borehole facilities make timely 
implementation of this alternative unlikely. To implement the borehole 
alternatives, new legislation and regulations, or clarification of 
existing regulations, may be necessary. DOE has decided not to pursue 
the electrometallurgical treatment option for immobilization because 
its technology is less mature than vitrification or ceramic 
immobilization. 30 DOE has decided not to pursue evolutionary 
reactors or partially-completed reactors because they offer no 
advantages over existing reactors for plutonium disposition and would 
involve higher costs, greater regulatory uncertainties, higher 
environmental impacts from construction, and less timely commencement 
of disposition actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     30  An evaluation by the National Research Council in a 
recent report (see footnote 12, above) concluded that the 
electrometallurgical treatment process is not sufficiently mature to 
provide a reliable basis for timely plutonium disposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Conclusion

    DOE has decided to implement a program to provide for safe and 
secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and for disposition 
of weapons-usable plutonium that is declared excess to national 
security needs (now or in the future), as specified in the Preferred 
Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS. DOE will consolidate the storage of 
weapons-usable plutonium by upgrading and expanding existing facilities 
at the Pantex Plant in Texas and SRS in South Carolina, continuing 
storage of surplus plutonium currently onsite at Hanford, LANL, and 
INEL pending disposition, and continuing storage of weapons-usable HEU 
at DOE's Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, in upgraded and, as surplus HEU is 
down-blended under the ROD for Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched 
Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, consolidated facilities. 
DOE will provide for disposition of surplus plutonium by pursuing a 
strategy that allows: (1) Immobilization of surplus plutonium for 
disposal in a repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and 
(2) fabrication of surplus plutonium into MOX fuel, for use in existing 
domestic commercial reactors (and potentially CANDU reactors, depending 
on future agreements with Russia and Canada). The timing and extent to 
which each of these disposition technologies is deployed will depend 
upon the results of future technology development and demonstrations, 
site-specific environmental review, detailed cost proposals, and the 
results of negotiations with Russia, Canada, and other nations. This 
programmatic decision is effective upon being made public, in 
accordance with DOE's regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021.315). 
The goals of this program are to support U.S. nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess fissile 
materials so that they may never be used in weapons again. This program 
will demonstrate the United States'' commitment to its nonproliferation 
goals, as specified in the President's Nonproliferation and Export 
Control Policy of 1993, and provide an example for other nations, where 
stockpiles of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials may be less 
secure from potential theft or diversion than those in the United

[[Page 3030]]

States, to encourage them to take similar actions.
    The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the 
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 
Sec. 4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts 
1500-1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.

    Issued in Washington, D.C., January 14, 1997.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-1355 Filed 1-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P