[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 13 (Tuesday, January 21, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3014-3030]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-1355]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a
program to provide for safe and secure storage of weapons-usable
fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium [HEU]) and a
strategy for the disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, as
specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (S&D Final PEIS, DOE/EIS-0229, December 1996). The
fundamental purpose of the program is to maintain a high standard of
security and accounting for these materials while in storage, and to
ensure that plutonium produced for nuclear weapons and declared excess
to national security needs (now, or in the future) is never again used
for nuclear weapons.
DOE will consolidate the storage of weapons-usable plutonium by
upgrading and expanding existing and planned facilities at the Pantex
Plant in Texas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, and
continue the storage of weapons-usable HEU at DOE's Y-12 Plant at the
Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Tennessee, in upgraded and, as HEU is
dispositioned, consolidated facilities. After certain conditions are
met, most plutonium now stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site (RFETS) in Colorado will be moved to Pantex and SRS.
Plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site (Hanford), the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), and the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) will remain at those sites until disposition (or
movement to lag storage at the disposition facilities).
DOE's strategy for disposition of surplus plutonium is to pursue an
approach that allows immobilization of surplus plutonium in glass or
ceramic material for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and burning of some of the surplus plutonium
as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in existing, domestic, commercial reactors,
with subsequent disposal of the spent fuel in a geologic repository
pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. DOE may also burn MOX fuel in
Canadian Deuterium Uranium [CANDU] reactors in the event of an
appropriate agreement among Russia, Canada, and the United States, as
discussed below. The timing and extent to which either or both of these
disposition approaches (immobilization or MOX) are ultimately deployed
will depend upon the results of future technology development and
demonstrations, follow-on (tiered) site-specific environmental review,
contract negotiations, and detailed cost reviews, as well as
nonproliferation considerations, and agreements with Russia and other
nations. DOE's program will be subject to the highest standards of
safeguards and security throughout all aspects of storage,
transportation, and processing, and will include appropriate
International Atomic Energy Agency verification.
Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that
would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them
suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the
total quantity of plutonium (that has or may be declared surplus to
defense needs) would require extensive purification to use in MOX fuel,
and therefore will likely be immobilized. DOE will immobilize at least
8 metric tons (MT) of currently declared surplus plutonium materials
that DOE has already determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel.
DOE reserves the option of using the immobilization approach for all of
the surplus plutonium.
The exact locations for disposition facilities will be determined
pursuant to a follow-on, site-specific disposition environmental impact
statement (EIS) as well as cost, technical and nonproliferation
studies. However, DOE has decided to narrow the field of candidate
disposition sites. DOE has decided that a vitrification or
immobilization facility (collocated with a plutonium conversion
facility) will be located at either Hanford or SRS, that a potential
MOX fuel fabrication facility will be located at Hanford, INEL, Pantex,
or SRS (only one site), and that a ``pit'' disassembly and conversion
facility will be located at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one
site). (``Pits'' are weapons components containing plutonium.) The
specific reactors, and their locations, that may be used to burn the
MOX fuel will depend on contract negotiations, licensing, and
environmental reviews. Because there are a number of technology
variations that could be used for immobilization, DOE will also
determine the specific immobilization technology based on the follow-on
EIS, technology developments, cost information, and nonproliferation
considerations. Based on current technological and cost information,
DOE anticipates that the follow-on EIS will identify, as part of the
proposed action, immobilizing a portion of the surplus plutonium using
the ``can-in-canister'' technology at the Defense Waste Processing
Facility (DWPF) at the Savannah River Site.
The use of MOX fuel in existing reactors would be undertaken in a
manner that is consistent with the United States' policy objective on
the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process and the United
States' policy discouraging the civilian use of plutonium. To this end,
implementing the MOX alternative would include government ownership and
control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at a DOE site, and use of
the facility only for the surplus plutonium disposition program. There
would be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent MOX fuel. The MOX
fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle in existing reactors,
with appropriate arrangements, including contractual or licensing
provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to surplus plutonium disposition.
The Department of Energy also retains the option of using MOX fuel
in Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors in Canada in the event a
multilateral agreement is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and the
United States to use CANDU reactors for surplus United States' and
Russian plutonium. DOE will engage in a test and demonstration program
for CANDU MOX fuel as appropriate and consistent with future
cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada.
These efforts will provide the basis and flexibility for the United
States to initiate disposition efforts either multilaterally or
bilaterally through negotiations with other nations, or unilaterally as
an example to Russia and
[[Page 3015]]
other nations. Disposition of the surplus plutonium will serve as a
nonproliferation and disarmament example, encourage similar actions by
Russia and other nations, and foster multilateral or bilateral
disposition efforts and agreements.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision
(ROD) are effective upon issuance of this document, in accordance with
DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing Procedures
and Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508).
ADDRESSES: Copies of the S&D Final PEIS, the Technical Summary Report
For Long-Term Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, the
Technical Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium
Disposition, the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition, and
this ROD may be obtained by writing to the U.S. Department of Energy,
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, MD-4, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, or by calling (202) 586-4513. The
56-page Summary of the S&D Final PEIS, the other documents noted above
(other than the full PEIS), and this ROD are also available on the
Fissile Materials Disposition World Wide Web Page at: http://
web.fie.com/htdoc/fed/DOE/fsl/pub/menu/any/
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the storage and
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials program or this ROD
contact: Mr. J. David Nulton, Director, NEPA Compliance and Outreach,
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, telephone
(202) 586-4513.
For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20585,
telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus weapons-
usable fissile materials both in the United States and the former
Soviet Union. Further agreements on disarmament may increase the
surplus quantities of these materials. The global stockpiles of
weapons-usable fissile materials pose a danger to national and
international security in the form of potential proliferation of
nuclear weapons and the potential for environmental, safety, and health
consequences if the materials are not properly safeguarded and managed.
In September 1993, President Clinton issued a Nonproliferation and
Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear
proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and Russia's
President Yeltsin issued a Joint Statement Between the United States
and Russia on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the
Means of Their Delivery. In accordance with these policies, the focus
of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts in this regard is five-fold: (i)
To secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; (ii) to assure
safe, secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-
usable fissile materials; (iii) to establish transparent and
irreversible nuclear arms reductions; (iv) to strengthen the nuclear
nonproliferation regime; and (v) to control nuclear exports. The policy
also states that the United States will not encourage the civil use of
plutonium and that the United States does not engage in plutonium
reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes.
To demonstrate the United States' commitment to these objectives,
President Clinton announced on March 1, 1995, that approximately 200
metric tons of U.S.-origin weapons-usable fissile materials, of which
165 metric tons are HEU and 38 metric tons are weapons-grade plutonium,
had been declared surplus to the United States' defense needs.\1\ The
safe and secure storage of weapons-usable plutonium and HEU, and the
disposition of surplus weapons-usable plutonium, consistent with the
Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS and the decisions described
in section V of this ROD, are consistent with the President's
nonproliferation policy.
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\1\ The Secretary of Energy's Openness Initiative announcement
of February 6, 1996, announced that the United States has about 213
metric tons of surplus fissile materials, including the 200 metric
tons the President announced in March, 1995. Of the 213 metric tons
of surplus materials, the Openness Initiative announcement indicated
that about 174.3 metric tons are HEU and about 38.2 metric tons are
weapons-grade plutonium. Additional quantities of plutonium may be
declared surplus in the future; therefore, the S&D Final PEIS
analyzes the disposition of a nominal 50 metric tons of plutonium,
as well as the storage of 89 metric tons of plutonium and 994 metric
tons of HEU.
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II. Decisions Made in This ROD
This ROD encompasses two categories of decisions: (1) The sites and
facilities for storage of non-surplus weapons-usable plutonium and HEU,
and storage of surplus plutonium and HEU pending disposition; and (2)
the programmatic strategy for disposition of surplus weapons-usable
plutonium. This ROD does not encompass the final selection of sites for
plutonium disposition facilities, nor the extent to which the two
plutonium disposition approaches (immobilization or MOX) will
ultimately be implemented. Those decisions will be made pursuant to a
follow-on EIS. However, DOE does announce in this ROD that the slate of
candidate sites for plutonium disposition has been narrowed. This ROD
does not include decisions about the disposition of surplus HEU, which
were made in July 1996 in the separate ROD for the Disposition of
Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement,
61 FR 40619 (Aug. 5, 1996).\2\
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\2\ The material considered in the S&D Final PEIS, and covered
by the decisions in this ROD, does not include spent nuclear fuel,
irradiated targets, uranium-233, plutonium-238, plutonium residues
of less than 50-percent plutonium by weight, or weapons program
materials-in-use.
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III. NEPA Process
A. S&D Draft PEIS
On June 21, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the
Federal Register (59 FR 31985) to prepare a Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (S&D PEIS), which was originally to address the storage and
disposition of both plutonium and HEU. DOE subsequently concluded that
a separate EIS on surplus HEU disposition would be appropriate.
Accordingly, DOE published a notice in the Federal Register (60 FR
17344) on April 5, 1995, to inform the public of the proposed plan to
prepare a separate EIS for the disposition of surplus HEU.
DOE published an implementation plan (IP) for the S&D PEIS in March
1995 (DOE/EIS-0229-IP). The IP recorded the issues identified during
the scoping process, indicated how they would be addressed in the S&D
PEIS, and provided guidance for the preparation of the S&D PEIS. DOE
issued the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S&D Draft PEIS, DOE/
EIS-0229-D) for public comment in February 1996. On March 8, 1996, both
DOE and the Environmental Protection
[[Page 3016]]
Agency (EPA) published Notices of Availability of the S&D Draft PEIS in
the Federal Register (61 FR 9443 and 61 9450), announcing a public
comment period from March 8 until May 7, 1996. In response to requests
from the public, DOE on May 13, 1996 published another Notice in the
Federal Register (61 FR 22038) announcing an extension of the comment
period until June 7, 1996. Eight public meetings on the S&D Draft PEIS
were held during March and April 1996 in Washington, DC and in the
vicinity of the DOE sites under consideration for the proposed actions.
During the 92-day public comment period, the public was encouraged
to provide comments via mail, toll-free fax, electronic bulletin board
(Internet), and toll-free telephone recording device. By these means,
DOE received 8,442 comments from 6,543 individuals and organizations
for consideration. In addition, 250 oral comments were recorded from
some of the 734 individuals who attended the eight public meetings. All
of the comments received, and the Department's responses to them, are
presented in Volume IV (the Comment Response Document) of the S&D Final
PEIS. All of the comments were considered in preparation of the S&D
Final PEIS, and in many cases resulted in changes to the document. The
Notice of Availability for the S&D Final PEIS was published by EPA in
the Federal Register on December 13, 1996 (61 FR 65572). DOE published
its own Notice of Availability for the S&D Final PEIS in the Federal
Register on December 19, 1996 (61 FR 67001).
B. Alternatives Considered
The S&D PEIS analyzes the reasonable action alternatives in
addition to the Preferred Alternative and the No Action Alternative.
The Preferred Alternative, which is described below in section V,
Decisions, and which DOE has decided to implement, represents a
combination of alternatives for both storage and disposition.
1. The Proposed Action
The proposed action, as described in the S&D PEIS, would involve
the following actions for U.S. weapons-usable fissile materials:
Storage--provide a long-term storage system (for up to 50
years) for nonsurplus plutonium and HEU that meets the Stored Weapons
Standard \3\ and applicable environmental, safety, and health standards
while reducing storage and infrastructure costs.
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\3\ The ``Stored Weapons Standard'' for weapons-usable fissile
materials storage was initially defined in Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, National Academy of
Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Stored Weapons Standard as follows:
The high standards of security and accounting for the storage of
intact nuclear weapons should be maintained, to the extent
practical, for weapons-usable fissile materials throughout
dismantlement, storage, and disposition.
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Storage Pending Disposition--provide storage that meets
the Stored Weapons Standard for inventories of weapons-usable plutonium
and HEU \4\ that have been or may be declared surplus.
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\4\ The S&D PEIS covers long-term storage of nonsurplus HEU and
storage of surplus HEU pending disposition. Until storage decisions
are implemented, surplus HEU that has not gone to disposition will
continue to be stored pursuant to, and not to exceed the 10-year
interim storage time period evaluated in, the Environmental
Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium
Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee (Y-12 EA) (DOE/EA-0929, September 1994) and Finding
of No Significant Impact (FONSI).
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Disposition--convert surplus plutonium and plutonium that
may be declared surplus in the future to forms that meet the Spent Fuel
Standard,\5\ thereby providing evidence of irreversible disarmament and
setting a model for proliferation resistance.
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\5\ The ``Spent Fuel Standard'' for disposition was also
initially defined in Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, National Academy of Sciences, 1994. DOE defines the Spent
Fuel Standard as follows: The surplus weapons-usable plutonium
should be made as inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as
the much larger and growing quantity of plutonium that exists in
spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
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2. Long-Term Storage Alternatives and Related Activities
a. No Action. Under the No Action Alternative, all weapons-usable
fissile materials would remain at existing storage sites. Maintenance
at existing storage facilities would be done as required to ensure safe
operation for the balance of the facility's useful life. Sites covered
under the No Action Alternative included Hanford, INEL, Pantex, the
ORR, SRS, RFETS, and LANL. Although there are no weapons-usable fissile
materials within the scope of the S&D PEIS stored currently at Nevada
Test Site (NTS), it was also analyzed under No Action to provide an
environmental baseline against which impacts of the storage and
disposition action alternatives were analyzed.
b. Upgrade at Multiple Sites. Under this alternative for storage,
DOE would either modify certain existing facilities or build new
facilities, depending on the site's ability to meet standards for
nuclear material storage facilities, and would utilize existing site
infrastructure to the extent possible. These modified or new facilities
would be designed to operate for up to 50 years. Plutonium materials
currently stored at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS would remain at
those four sites (in upgraded or new facilities), and HEU would remain
at ORR (in upgraded, consolidated facilities). This alternative does
not apply to NTS because NTS does not currently store weapons-usable
fissile materials.
A sub-alternative of relocating portions of the plutonium inventory
(a total of 14.4 metric tons according to DOE's Openness Initiative
announcements of December 7, 1993, and February 6, 1996, respectively)
from RFETS and LANL to one or more of the four existing plutonium
storage sites is analyzed. Storage of surplus materials without
strategic reserve and weapons research and development (R&D) materials
is also included as a sub-alternative. Within some of the five
candidate storage sites under this alternative, there are also multiple
storage options.
c. Consolidation of Plutonium. Under this alternative, plutonium
materials at existing sites would be removed, and the entire DOE
inventory of plutonium would be consolidated at one site, while the HEU
inventory would remain at ORR. Again, Hanford, INEL, Pantex and SRS
would be candidate sites for plutonium consolidation. In addition, NTS
would be a candidate site for this alternative. Consolidation of
plutonium at ORR would result in a situation in which inventories of
plutonium and HEU were collocated at one site; this alternative was
therefore analyzed as one option under the Collocation Alternative (see
below). A sub-alternative to account for the separate storage of
surplus materials without strategic reserve and weapons R&D materials
was also included.
d. Collocation of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium. Under the
Collocation Alternative, the entire DOE inventory of plutonium and HEU
would be consolidated and collocated at the same site. The six
candidate sites would be Hanford, NTS, INEL, Pantex, ORR, and SRS. A
sub-alternative for the separate storage of surplus materials without
strategic reserve and weapons R&D materials was also included.
3. Plutonium Disposition Alternatives and Related Activities
The disposition technologies analyzed in the S&D PEIS were those
that would convert surplus plutonium into a form that would meet the
Spent Fuel Standard. For the purpose of environmental impact analyses
of the various disposition alternatives, both generic and specific
sites were used to provide perspective on these
[[Page 3017]]
alternatives. Under each alternative, there are various ways to
implement the alternative. These ``variants'' (such as the can-in-
canister 6 approach) are shown in Table 1 to provide a range of
available options for consideration.
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\6\ In the can-in-canister variant, cans of plutonium in a glass
or ceramic matrix would be placed in a canister. This canister would
then be filled with borosilicate glass containing high-level
radioactive waste (HLW) or highly radioactive material such as
cesium. This variant, at an existing facility (the Defense Waste
Processing Facility [DWPF] at SRS), is described in Appendix O of
the S&D Final PEIS.
Table 1.--Description of Variants Under Plutonium Disposition
Alternatives
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Alternatives analyzed Possible variants
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Deep Borehole Direct Arrangement of plutonium in
Disposition different types of emplacement
canisters.
Deep Borehole Immobilized Emplacement of pellet-group
Disposition mix.
Pumped emplacement of
pellet-grout mix.
Plutonium concentration
loading, size and shape of ceramic
pellets.
New Vitrification Collocated pit disassembly/
Facilities conversion, plutonium conversion,
and immobilization facilities.
Use of either Cs-137 from
capsules or HLW as a radiation
barrier.
Wet or dry feed preparation
technologies.
An adjunct melter adjacent
to the DWPF at SRS, in which
borosilicate glass frit with
plutonium (without highly
radioactive radionuclides) is added
to borosilicate glass containing
HLW from the DWPF.
A can-in-canister approach
at SRS in which cans of plutonium
glass (without highly radioactive
radionuclides) are plaed in DWPF
canisters which are then filled
with borosilicate glass containing
HLW in the DWPF (see Appendix O of
the Final PEIS).
A can-in-canister approach
similar to above but using new
facilities at sites other than SRS.
New Ceramic Collocated pit disassembly/
Immobilization Facilities plutonium conversion, and
immobilization facilities.
Use of either Cs-137 from
capsules or HLW as a radiation
barrier.
Wet or dry feed preparation
technologies.
A can-in-canister approach
at SRS in which the plutonium is
immobilized without highly
radioactive radionuclides in a
ceramic matrix and then placed in
the DWPF canisters that are then
filled with borosilicate glass
containing HLW (See Appendix O of
the Final PEIS).
A can-in-canister approach
similar to above but using new
facilities at sites other than SRS.
Electrometallurgical Immobilize plutonium into
Treatment (glass-bonded zeolite metal ingot form.
form)
Locate at DOE sites other
than ANL-W at INEL.
Existing LWR With New MOX Pressurized or Boiling
Facilities Water Reactors.
Different numbers of
reactors.
European MOX fuel
fabrication.
Modification/completion of
existing facilities for MOX
fabrication.
Collocated pit disassembly/
conversion, plutonium conversion,
and MOX facilities.
Reactors with different
core management schemes (plutonium
loadings, refueling intervals).
Partially Completed LWR Same as for existing LWR
With New MOX Facilities (except that MOX fuel would not be
fabricated in Europe).
Evolutionary LWR With New Same as for partially
MOX Facilities completed LWR.
Existing CANDU Reactor DIfferent numbers of
With New MOX Facilities reactors.
Modification/completion of
existing facilities for MOX
fabrication.
Collocated pit disassembly/
conversion, plutonium conversion,
and MOX facilities.
Reactors with different
core management schemes (plutonium
loadings, refueling intervals).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ANL-W=Argonne National Laboratory-West; Cs-137=cesium-137;
HLW=high-level waste; LWR=light water reactor
The first step in plutonium disposition is to remove the surplus
plutonium from storage, then process this material in a pit
disassembly/conversion facility (for pits) or in a plutonium conversion
facility (for non-pit materials). The processing would convert the
plutonium material into a form suitable for each of the disposition
alternatives described in the following sections. The pit disassembly/
conversion facility and the plutonium conversion facility would be
built at a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were
evaluated for the potential environmental impacts of constructing and
operating these facilities.
a. No Disposition Action. A ``No Plutonium Disposition'' action
means disposition would not occur, and surplus plutonium-bearing weapon
components (pits) and other forms, such as metal and oxide, would
remain in storage in accordance with decisions on the long-term storage
of weapons-usable fissile materials.
b. Deep Borehole Category. Under this category of alternatives,
surplus weapons-usable plutonium would be disposed of in deep boreholes
that would be drilled at least 4 kilometers (km) (2.5 miles [mi]) into
ancient, geologically stable rock formations beneath the water table.
The deep borehole would provide a geologic barrier against potential
proliferation. A generic site was evaluated for the construction and
operation of a borehole complex where the surplus plutonium would be
prepared for emplacement in the borehole. This complex would consist of
five major facilities: Processing; drilling; emplacing/sealing; waste
management; and support (security, maintenance, and utilities).
(1) Direct Disposition (Borehole). Under the Direct Disposition
Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage, processed
as necessary, converted to a form suitable for emplacement, packaged,
and placed in a deep borehole. The deep borehole would be sealed to
isolate the
[[Page 3018]]
plutonium from the accessible environment. Long-term performance of the
deep borehole would depend on the stability of the geologic system. A
generic site was used for the borehole complex to analyze the
environmental impact of this alternative.
(2) Immobilized Disposition (Borehole). Under the Immobilized
Disposition Alternative, the surplus plutonium would be removed from
storage, processed, and converted to a suitable form for shipment to a
ceramic immobilization facility. The output of this facility would be
spherical ceramic pellets containing plutonium, facilitating handling
during transportation and emplacement. The ceramic pellets (about 2.54
centimeters [cm] [1 inch {in}] in diameter and containing 1 percent
plutonium by weight) would then be placed in drums and shipped to the
borehole complex. At the deep borehole site, the ceramic pellets would
be mixed with non-plutonium ceramic pellets and fixed with grout during
emplacement. The deep borehole would be sealed to isolate the plutonium
from the accessible environment. Long-term performance of the deep
borehole would depend on the stability of the geologic system.
Although a generic site was used for analyses of the borehole
complex in this alternative, the ceramic immobilization facility would
be built at a DOE site. Therefore, the six candidate sites for long-
term storage were used to evaluate the environmental impacts of the
borehole immobilization facility.
c. Immobilization Category. Under this category of alternatives,
surplus plutonium would be immobilized to create a chemically stable
form for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act (NWPA).7 The plutonium material would be mixed
with or surrounded by high-level waste (HLW) or other radioactive
isotopes and immobilized to create a radiation field that could serve
as a proliferation deterrent, along with safeguards and security
comparable to those of commercial spent nuclear fuel, thereby achieving
the Spent Fuel Standard. All immobilized plutonium would be encased in
stainless steel canisters and would remain in onsite vault-type storage
until a geologic repository pursuant to the NWPA is operational.
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\7\ Also referred to as a permanent, or HLW repository. Pursuant
to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE is currently characterizing the
Yucca Mountain Site in Nevada as a potential repository for spent
nuclear fuel and HLW. Legislative clarification, or a determination
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the immobilized plutonium
should be isolated as HLW, may be required before the material could
be placed in Yucca Mountain should DOE and the President recommend,
and Congress approve, its operation. No Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) wastes would be immobilized unless the
immobilization would constitute adequate treatment under RCRA. The
immobilized product would be consistent with the repository's waste
acceptance criteria.
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(1) Vitrification. Under the Vitrification Alternative, surplus
plutonium would be removed from storage, processed, packaged, and
transported to the vitrification facility. In this facility, the
plutonium would be mixed with glass frit and highly radioactive cesium-
137 (Cs-137) or HLW to produce borosilicate glass logs (a slightly
different process, using HLW, would be used for the can-in-canister
variant, as discussed in Appendix O of the S&D Final PEIS). The Cs-137
isotope could come from the cesium chloride (CsCl) capsules currently
stored at Hanford or from existing HLW if the site selected for
vitrification already manages HLW. Each glass log produced from the
vitrification facility would contain about 84 kilograms (kg) (185
pounds [lb]) of plutonium. The vitrification facility would be built at
a DOE site. The six candidate sites for long-term storage were analyzed
for this alternative.
(2) Ceramic Immobilization. Under the Ceramic Immobilization
Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage,
processed, packaged, and transported to a ceramic immobilization
facility. In this facility, the plutonium would be mixed with
nonradioactive ceramic materials and Cs-137 or HLW to produce ceramic
disks (a slightly different process, using HLW, would be used for the
can-in-canister variant, as discussed in Appendix O of the S&D Final
PEIS). Each disk would be approximately 30 cm (12 in) in diameter and
10 cm (4 in) thick, and would contain approximately 4 kg (9 lb) of
plutonium. The Cs-137 or HLW would be provided as previously described.
The ceramic immobilization facility would be built at a DOE site. The
six candidate sites for long-term storage were analyzed for this
alternative.
(3) Electrometallurgical Treatment. Under the Electrometallurgical
Treatment Alternative, surplus plutonium would be removed from storage,
processed, packaged, and transported to new or modified facilities for
electrometallurgical treatment. This process could immobilize surplus
fissile materials into a glass-bonded zeolite (GBZ) form. With the GBZ
material, the plutonium would be in the form of a stable, leach-
resistant mineral that is incorporated in durable glass
materials.8 Existing electrometallurgical facilities at INEL were
used as a representative site for analysis of potential environmental
impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ In May 1996, the Department issued a Finding of No
Significant Impact (FONSI) (61 Fed. Reg. 25647) and decision to
proceed with the limited demonstration of the electrometallurgical
treatment process at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W) at
INEL for processing up to 125 spent fuel assemblies from the
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (100 drivers and 25 blanket
assemblies). Although this alternative could be conducted at other
DOE sites, ANL-W is described in the S&D PEIS as the representative
site for analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Reactor Category. Under the reactor alternatives considered in
the S&D PEIS, DOE would fabricate surplus plutonium into MOX fuel for
use in reactors. The irradiated MOX fuel would reduce the proliferation
risks of the plutonium material, and the reactors would also generate
electricity. MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel cycle, with
no reprocessing or subsequent reuse of spent fuel. The spent nuclear
fuel generated by the reactors would then be sent to a geologic
repository pursuant to the NWPA.
Because the United States does not have a MOX fuel fabrication
facility or capability, a new dedicated MOX fuel fabrication facility
would be built at a DOE or commercial site.9 The surplus plutonium
from storage would be processed, converted to plutonium dioxide
(PuO2), and transferred to the MOX fuel fabrication facility. In
this facility, PuO2 and uranium dioxide (UO2) (from existing
domestic sources) would be blended and fabricated into MOX pellets,
loaded into fuel rods, and assembled into fuel bundles suitable for use
in the reactor alternatives under consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Although a generic commercial site was evaluated in the S&D
PEIS, it is not part of the Preferred Alternative or the decisions
in this ROD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Existing Light Water Reactors. Under the Existing Light Water
Reactor (LWR) Alternative, the MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium
would be fabricated and transported to existing commercial LWRs in the
United States, where the MOX fuel would be used instead of conventional
UO2 fuel. The LWRs employed for domestic electric power generation
are pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors
(BWRs). Both types of reactors use the heat produced from nuclear
fission reactions to generate steam that drives turbines and generates
electricity. Three to five reactor units would be needed.10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ It is possible that an existing LWR can be configured to
produce tritium, consume plutonium as fuel, and generate revenue
through the production of electricity. This configuration is called
a multipurpose reactor. Environmental analysis of the multipurpose
reactor is included in Chapter 4 of the Final Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling (TSR
PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0161, October 1995) and Appendix N of the S&D PEIS.
In the TSR PEIS ROD (December 1995), the multipurpose reactor was
preserved as an option for future consideration. The Fast Flux Test
Facility (FFTF) at Hanford has been under consideration for tritium
production, and could also use surplus plutonium as reactor fuel if
it were shown to be useful for tritium production. This ROD does not
preclude use of the FFTF for tritium production or the potential use
of surplus plutonium as fuel for the FFTF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 3019]]
(2) Partially Completed Light Water Reactors. Under the Partially
Completed LWR Alternative, commercial LWRs on which construction has
been halted would be completed. The completed reactors would use MOX
fuel containing surplus plutonium. The characteristics of these LWRs
would be the same as those of the existing LWRs discussed in the
Existing LWR Alternative. The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant located along
the west bank of the Tennessee River in Alabama was used as a
representative site for the environmental analysis of this alternative.
Two reactor units (such as those at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant) would
be needed to implement this alternative.
(3) Evolutionary Light Water Reactors. The evolutionary LWRs are
improved versions of existing commercial LWRs. Two design approaches
were considered in the S&D PEIS. The first is a large PWR or BWR
similar to the size of the existing PWR and BWR. The second is a small
PWR approximately one-half the size of the large PWR. Two large or four
small evolutionary LWRs would be needed to implement this alternative.
Under each design approach for this alternative, evolutionary LWRs
would be built at a DOE site. Therefore, the six candidate sites for
long-term storage were used to evaluate the environmental impacts of
this alternative.
(4) Canadian Deuterium Uranium Reactor. Under the CANDU Reactor
Alternative, the MOX fuel containing surplus plutonium would be
fabricated in a U.S. facility, then transported for use in one or more
commercial heavy water reactors in Canada. The Ontario Hydro Bruce-A
Nuclear Generating Station identified by the Government of Canada was
used as a representative site for evaluation of this alternative. This
station is located on Lake Huron about 300 km (186 mi) northeast of
Detroit, Michigan. Environmental analysis of domestic activities up to
the U.S./Canadian border is presented in the S&D PEIS. The use of CANDU
reactors would be subject to the policies, regulations, and approval of
the Federal and Provincial Canadian Governments. Pursuant to Section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act, any export of MOX fuel from the United
States to Canada must be made under the agreement for cooperation
between the two countries. Spent fuel generated by a CANDU reactor
would be disposed under the Canadian spent fuel program.
C. Preferred Alternative
The S&D Final PEIS presented the Department's Preferred Alternative
for both storage and disposition. DOE has decided to implement the
Preferred Alternative as described in the S&D Final PEIS. Thus, the
Preferred Alternative is described in Section V of this ROD, Decisions.
D. Environmental Impacts
Chapter 4 and the appendices of the S&D Final PEIS analyzed the
potential environmental impacts of the storage and disposition
alternatives in detail. The S&D Final PEIS also evaluated the maximum
site impacts that would result at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS from
combining the Preferred Alternative for storage with the Preferred
Alternative for disposition. Consistent with the Preferred Alternative,
Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS are each a possible location for all or
some plutonium disposition activities. The siting, construction, and
operation of disposition facilities will be covered in a separate,
follow-on EIS. The S&D Final PEIS described the total life cycle
impacts that would result from the Preferred Alternative at the DOE
sites identified for potential placement of the disposition facilities.
Based on analyses in the S&D Final PEIS, the areas where impacts
might be significant are as follows:
The use of groundwater at the Pantex Plant for storage and
disposition facilities could contribute to the overall declining water
levels of the Ogallala Aquifer. The projected No Action Alternative
water usage at Pantex in the year 2005 reflects a reduction from
current usage due to planned downsizing over the next few years. The
Preferred Alternative would require a 72-percent increase in the
projected No Action Alternative water use; the total amount (428
million liters per year) is considerably less than what is currently
being withdrawn (836 million liters per year) at Pantex.
A set of postulated accidents was used for each plutonium
disposition alternative over the life of the campaign to obtain
potential radiological impacts at the four DOE sites where disposition
facilities could be built. The PEIS analyzes the risk of latent cancer
fatalities (reflecting the probability of accident occurrence and the
latent cancer fatalities potentially caused by the accident) for
accidents that have low probabilities of occurrence and severe
consequences, as well as those that have higher probabilities and low
consequences. For potential severe accidents, the risk of latent cancer
fatalities to the population located within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of
the accident for the ``front-end'' disposition process campaign would
range from 4.5x10-16 (that is, approximately 1 chance in 2
quadrillion) to 1.7x10-4 (approximately 1 chance in 6,000) for the
pit disassembly/conversion facility, and from 1.5x10-16 to
1.3x10-4 for the plutonium conversion facility. This risk would
range from 2.8x10-14 to 1.8x10-5 for the vitrification
facility, from 7.0x10-16 to 1.9x10-7 for the ceramic
immobilization facility, and from 4.6x10-16 to 4.3x10-4 for
the MOX fuel fabrication facility. To estimate the change in risk
associated with using MOX fuel instead of uranium fuel in existing
LWRs, the severe accident scenarios assumed a large population
distribution near a generic existing LWR and extreme meteorological
conditions for dispersal, leading to large doses that were not
necessarily reflective of actual site conditions. The resultant change
in risk of cancer fatalities to a generic population located within 80
km (50 mi) of the severe accidents was estimated to range from -
2.0x10-4 to 3.0x10-5 per year 11, reflecting a
postulated risk of using MOX fuel that ranges from seven percent lower
to eight percent higher than the risk of using uranium fuel. Under the
Preferred Alternative, the estimated risk of cancer fatalities under
severe accident conditions using MOX fuel in existing LWRs ranges from
0.01 to 0.098 for an 11-year campaign.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Accidents severe enough to cause a release of plutonium
involved combinations of events that are highly unlikely. Estimates
and analyses presented in Chapter 4 and summarized in Table 2.5-3 of
the PEIS indicate a range of latent cancer fatalities of 5,900 to
7,300 and a risk of 0.016 to 0.15 of a fatality in the population
for the 17-year campaign analyzed under the Existing LWR
Alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the Preferred Alternative, HEU would continue to be
stored at the Y-12 Plant at ORR in existing facilities that would be
upgraded to meet requirements for withstanding natural phenomena,
including earthquakes and tornadoes. This upgrade would reduce the
expected risk for the design basis accidents analyzed in the Y-12 EA
(for example, Building 9212) by approximately 80 percent, resulting in
a latent cancer fatality risk of 7.4 x 10-6 (approximately 7 in a
million) to the maximally exposed individual, 5.7 x 10-8
(approximately 6 in 100
[[Page 3020]]
million) to a non-involved worker, and 5.1 x 10-7 (approximately 5
in 10 million) to the 80-km offsite population.
Under the Preferred Alternative, safe, secure storage
would continue for materials at Hanford, INEL, and ORR, pending
disposition. Therefore, there would be no transportation impact at
these sites until disposition. The storage transportation impact would
come from movement of the RFETS materials to Pantex and SRS. If,
following the EIS for construction and operation of plutonium
disposition facilities, potential plutonium disposition activities were
added to Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS, the estimated total health
effects for the life of the project from transportation of surplus
plutonium (including transportation of those materials from RFETS to
Pantex and SRS) would range from 0.193 fatalities for transportation to
Pantex, to 1.87 fatalities for transportation to SRS (primarily from
normal expected traffic accidents, not from radiological releases). In
addition to the disposition activities at DOE sites, there would be
transportation of the MOX fuel from the DOE fuel fabrication site to
existing LWRs. The location of the LWRs and the destination of the MOX
fuel could be either the eastern or western United States. For 4,000 km
(2,486 mi) of such transportation, there could be up to an additional
3.61 potential fatalities (primarily from normal expected traffic
accidents, not from radiological releases) for the life of the
campaign, assuming 100 percent of the surplus plutonium would be used
in commercial reactors. The actual amount would be smaller, and
therefore potential fatalities would be lower, under the Preferred
Alternative.
At Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and SRS the Preferred
Alternative would slightly increase regional employment and income. At
RFETS, phaseout of plutonium storage would result in the loss of
approximately 2,200 direct jobs. Compared to the total employment in
the area, the loss of these jobs and the impacts to the regional
economy would not be severe.
DOE has fully considered all of the environmental analyses in the
S&D Final PEIS in reaching the decisions set forth in Section V, below.
E. Avoidance/Minimization of Environmental Harm
For the long-term storage of fissile material, there are four sites
(Hanford, NTS, INEL, and LANL) where the Preferred Alternative is ``no
action''; that is, no plutonium would be stored at NTS, and at Hanford,
INEL, and LANL, DOE would continue storage at existing facilities,
using proven nuclear materials safeguards and security procedures,
until disposition. These existing facilities would be maintained to
ensure their safe operation and compliance with applicable
environmental, safety and health requirements. At RFETS, the Preferred
Alternative is to phase out storage of weapons-usable fissile
materials, thus mitigating environmental impacts at RFETS. There are
three sites (Pantex, ORR, and SRS) where the Preferred Alternative is
to upgrade existing and planned new facilities. Site-specific
mitigation measures for storage at these sites have been described in
the S&D Final PEIS, and are summarized as follows:
At Pantex, to alleviate the effects from using groundwater
from the Ogallala Aquifer, the city of Amarillo is considering
supplying treated wastewater to Pantex from the Hollywood Road
Wastewater Treatment Plant for industrial use; the Department will use
such treated wastewater to the extent possible. Radiation doses to
individual workers will be kept low by maintaining comprehensive badged
monitoring and programs to keep worker exposures ``as low as reasonably
achievable'' (ALARA).
At ORR, radiation doses to individual workers will be kept
low by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and ALARA programs,
including worker rotations. Upgrades for HEU storage to meet
performance requirements will include seismic structural modifications
as documented in Natural Phenomena Upgrade of the Downsized/
Consolidated Oak Ridge Uranium/Lithium Plant Facilities. These
modifications will reduce the risk of accidents to workers and the
public.
At SRS, to minimize soil erosion impacts during
construction, storm water management and erosion control measures will
be employed. Mitigation measures for potential Native American
resources will be identified through consultation with the potentially
affected tribes. Radiation doses to individual workers will be kept low
by maintaining comprehensive badged monitoring and ALARA programs
including worker rotations. The modified Actinide Packaging and Storage
Facility (APSF) will be designed and operated in accordance with
contemporary DOE Orders and regulations to reduce risks to workers and
the public.
From a nonproliferation standpoint, the highest standards for
safeguards and security will be employed during transportation,
storage, and disposition. With respect to transportation, DOE will
coordinate the transport of plutonium and HEU with State officials,
consistent with current policy. Although the actual routes will be
classified, they will be selected to circumvent populated areas,
maximize the use of interstate highways, and avoid bad weather. DOE
will continue to coordinate emergency preparedness plans and responses
with involved states through a liaison program. The packaging,
vehicles, and transport procedures being used are specifically designed
and tested to prevent a radiological release under all credible
accident scenarios.
For the Preferred Alternative for disposition, site-specific
mitigation measures will be addressed in the follow-on, site-specific
EIS. In the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives,
measures are proposed to reduce the possibility of the theft or loss of
material. For both immobilization and MOX fuel fabrication, bulk
processing is the point in the disposition process when the material is
most vulnerable to covert attempts to steal or divert it. A variety of
opportunities for improving safeguards, some of which are already
implemented at large, modern facilities, include near real-time
accounting, increased automation in the process design, and improved
containment and surveillance.
The security risks posed by transportation can be reduced by
minimizing the amount of transportation required (for example, putting
the plutonium processing and MOX fabrication operations at the same
site), minimizing the number of sites to which material has to be
shipped, and minimizing the distance between those sites.
F. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives
The environmental analyses in Chapter 4 of the S&D Final PEIS
indicate that the environmentally preferable alternative (the
alternative with the lowest environmental impacts over the 50 years
considered in the PEIS) for storage of weapons-usable fissile materials
would be the Preferred Alternative, which consists of No Action at
Hanford, NTS, INEL, and LANL pending disposition, phaseout of storage
at RFETS, and upgrades that would ultimately reduce environmental
vulnerabilities at ORR, SRS, and Pantex.
For disposition of surplus plutonium, the environmentally
preferable alternative would be the No Disposition Action alternative,
because the
[[Page 3021]]
plutonium would remain in storage in accordance with decisions on the
long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials, and there would
be no new Federal actions that could impact the environment. For normal
operations, analyses show that immobilization would be somewhat
preferable to the existing LWR and preferred alternatives, although
these alternatives, with the exception of waste generated, would be
essentially environmentally comparable. 12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ The potential risk of latent cancer fatality for a
maximally exposed individual of the public from lifetime accident-
free operation under the various alternatives are: 1.2x10-9 to
1.2x10-7 for boreholes, 1.2x10-9 to 1.2x10-7 for
immobilization (vitrification or ceramic immobilization),
1.3x10-6 to 2.6x10-6 for existing LWRs, and 9.0x10-7
to 1.7x10-6 for the Preferred Alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Severe facility accident considerations indicate that
immobilization options would be environmentally preferable to the
existing reactor and preferred alternatives, although the likelihood of
occurrence of severe accidents and the risk to the public are expected
to be fairly low. Although No Disposition Action would be
environmentally preferable, it would not satisfy the purpose and need
for the Proposed Action, because the stockpile of surplus plutonium
would not be reduced, and the Nonproliferation and Export Control
Policy would not be implemented.
The hybrid approach (pursuing both reactors/MOX and immobilization)
is being chosen over immobilization alone because of the increased
flexibility it will provide by ensuring that plutonium disposition can
be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately fail or
be delayed. Establishing the means for expeditious plutonium
disposition will also help provide the basis for an international
cooperative effort that can result in reciprocal, irreversible
plutonium disposition actions by Russia. (See discussion in sections IV
and V, below.)
IV. Non-Environmental Considerations
A. Technical Summary Reports
To assist in the preparation of this ROD, DOE's Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition prepared and in July 1996 issued a Technical
Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition and a
Technical Summary Report for Long-Term Storage of Weapons-Usable
Fissile Materials. These Technical Summary Reports (TSRs) summarize
technical, cost, and schedule data for the storage and disposition
alternatives that are considered in the S&D PEIS. After receiving
comments on each of the TSRs, DOE issued revised versions of the
reports in October and November, 1996, respectively.
1. Storage Technical Summary Report
This report provides technical, cost and schedule information for
long-term storage alternatives analyzed in the S&D PEIS. The cost
information for each alternative is presented in constant 1996 dollars
and also discounted or present value dollars. It identifies both
capital costs and life cycle costs. The following costs are in 1996
dollars.
The cost analyses show that the combination (preferred) alternative
for the storage of plutonium would provide advantages to the Department
with respect to implementing disposition technologies and would be the
least expensive compared to other storage alternatives. The cost of the
combination (preferred) alternative would be approximately $30 million
in investment and $360 million in operating costs from inception until
disposition occurs. The cost of the upgrade at multiple sites
alternative would be approximately $380 million in investment and $3.2
billion in operating costs for 50 years. The costs for the
consolidation alternative could range from approximately $40 million to
$360 million in investment and $600 million to $1.1 billion for
operating costs for 50 years, depending on the extent to which existing
facilities and capabilities can be shared with other programs at the
sites.
The schedule analysis shows that the upgraded storage facilities
for plutonium under the combination (preferred) alternative could be
operational by 2004 at Pantex (Zone 12), and by 2001 at SRS. The
upgrade for the storage of HEU could be completed by 2004 (or earlier).
RFETS pits could be received at Pantex beginning in 1997 in Zone 4 on a
temporary basis until Zone 12 upgrades are completed. The other
analyzed alternatives (upgrade and consolidation) would require about
six years to complete.
2. Disposition Technical Summary Report
This report provides technical viability, cost, and schedule
information for plutonium disposition alternatives and variants
analyzed in the S&D PEIS. The variants analyzed in the report are based
on pre-conceptual design information in most cases.
a. Technical Viability Estimates. The report indicates that each of
the alternatives appears to be technically viable, although each is
currently at a different level of technical maturity. There is high
confidence that the technologies are sufficiently mature to allow
procurement and/or construction of facilities and equipment to meet
plutonium disposition technical requirements and to begin disposition
in about a decade.13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Actual timing would depend on technical demonstrations,
follow-on site-specific environmental review, detailed cost
estimates, and international agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reactor Alternatives--Light water reactors (LWRs) can be readily
converted to enable the use of MOX fuels. Many European LWRs currently
operate on MOX fuel cycles. Although some technical risks exist, they
are all amenable to engineering resolution. Sufficient existing
domestic reactor capacity exists, unless significant delays occur in
the disposition mission. CANDU reactors appear to be capable of
operating on MOX fuel cycles, but this has never been demonstrated on
any industrial scale. Therefore, additional development would be
required to achieve the level of maturity for the CANDU reactors that
exists for light water reactors. Partially complete and evolutionary
LWRs would involve increased technical risk relative to existing LWRs,
as well as the need to complete or build (and license) new reactor
facilities. The spent MOX fuel waste form that results from reactor
disposition of surplus plutonium will have to satisfy waste acceptance
criteria for the geologic repository.
Immobilization Alternatives--All vitrification alternatives require
additional research and development prior to implementation of
immobilization of weapons-usable plutonium. However, a growing
experience base exists relating to the vitrification of high-level
waste. These existing technologies can be adapted to the plutonium
disposition mission, though different equipment designs and glass
formulations will generally be necessary due to criticality
considerations and chemical differences between plutonium and HLW that
may affect the stability of the glass matrix. Vitrification and ceramic
immobilization alternatives are similar with regard to the technical
maturity of incorporating plutonium in their respective matrices. The
technical viability of electrometallurgical treatment has not yet been
established for the plutonium disposition mission. The experimental
data base for this alternative is limited, and critical questions on
waste form performance are not yet resolved. This alternative is
considered practical only if the underlying technology is further
[[Page 3022]]
developed for spent nuclear fuels.14 All of the immobilization
alternatives will require qualification (to meet acceptance criteria)
of the waste form for the geologic repository, and may require
legislative clarification or NRC rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14 A recent study by the National Research Council
concludes that the electrometallurgical treatment technology is not
sufficiently mature to provide a reliable basis for timely plutonium
disposition. ``An Evaluation of the Electrometallurgical Approach
for Treatment of Excess Weapons Plutonium'' (National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deep Borehole Alternatives--Uncertainties for the deep borehole
alternatives relate to selecting and qualifying a site; additional
legislation and regulations, or legislative and regulatory
clarification, may be required. The front-end feed processing
operations for the deep borehole alternatives are much simpler than for
other alternatives because no highly radioactive materials are
processed, thus avoiding the need for remote handling operations.
Emplacement technologies are comprised of largely low-technology
operations which would be adaptations from existing hardware and
processes used in the oil and gas industry.
Hybrid Approaches--Two hybrid approaches that combine technologies
were considered as illustrative examples, using existing LWR or CANDU
reactors in conjunction with a can-in-canister (immobilization)
approach. Hybrids provide insurance against technical or institutional
hurdles which could arise for a single technology approach for
disposition. If any significant roadblock is encountered in any one
area of a hybrid, it would be possible to simply divert the feed
material to the more viable technology. In the case of a single
technology, such roadblocks would be more problematic.
b. Cost Estimates. The following discussion is in constant 1996
dollars unless otherwise stated.
(1) Investment Costs.
The investment costs for existing reactor variants tends
to be about $1 billion; completing or building new reactors increases
the investment cost to between $2 billion and $6 billion.
The investment cost for the immobilization alternatives
ranges from approximately $0.6 billion for the can-in-canister variants
to approximately $2 billion for new greenfield variants.15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ ``Greenfield'' means a variant involving a new facility,
with no existing plutonium-handling infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hybrid alternatives (combining both immobilization and
reactor alternatives) require approximately $200 million additional
investment over the existing light water reactor stand-alone
alternatives.
Investment costs for the deep borehole alternatives range
from about $1.1 billion for direct emplacement to about $1.4 billion
for immobilized emplacement.
Alternatives that utilize existing facilities for
plutonium processing, immobilization, or fuel fabrication would realize
significant investment cost savings over building new facilities for
the same function.
Large uncertainties in the cost estimates exist, relating
to both engineering and institutional factors.
A significant fraction of the investment cost for an
alternative/variant is related to the front-end facilities for the
extraction of the plutonium from pits and other plutonium-bearing
materials and for other functions that are common to all alternatives.
(2) Life Cycle Costs.
The life cycle costs for hybrid alternatives are similar
to the stand-alone reactor alternatives. For the existing LWR/
immobilization hybrid alternative (preferred alternative), the cost is
$260 million higher than the stand-alone reactor alternative; for the
CANDU/immobilization hybrid alternative, the cost is $70 million
higher.
The combined investment and net operating costs for MOX
fuel are higher than for commercial uranium fuel; thus, the cost of MOX
fuel cannot compete economically with low-enriched uranium fuel for
LWRs or natural uranium fuel for CANDU reactors.
The can-in-canister approaches are the most attractive
variants for immobilization based on cost considerations.
The deep borehole alternatives are more expensive than the
can-in-canister and existing reactor alternatives. The immobilized
borehole alternative life cycle cost is $1 billion greater than that
for the direct emplacement alternative ($3.6 billion vs. $2.6 billion).
Large uncertainties in the cost estimates exist, relating
to engineering, regulatory, and policy considerations.
c. Schedule Estimates. The key conclusions of the Disposition
Technical Summary Report with respect to schedules are as follows:
Significant schedule uncertainties exist, relating to both
engineering and institutional factors.
Opportunities for compressing or expanding schedules
exist.
(1) Reactor Alternatives. The rate at which MOX fuel is
consumed in reactors will depend on the rate that MOX fuel is provided
and fabricated, and the rate that plutonium oxide is provided to the
MOX fuel fabrication facility.
The time to attain production scale operation in existing
LWRs and CANDU reactors could be about 8-12 years, depending on the
need for and source of test assemblies that might be required.
The time to complete the disposition mission is a function
of the number of reactors committed to the mission, among other
factors. For the variants considered, the time to complete varies from
about 24 to 31 years.
(2) Immobilization Alternatives.
The time to start the disposition mission ranges from 7 to
13 years, depending on the technology used and whether existing
facilities are used.
The operating campaign for the immobilization alternatives
at full-scale operation would be about 10 years; it is possible to
compress or expand the operating schedule by several years, if desired,
by resizing the immobilization facility designs selected for analysis
in this study. The overall mission duration (including research and
development, construction, and operation) is expected to be about 18 to
24 years.
Potential delays for start-up of the immobilization
alternatives involve completing process development and demonstration,
and qualifying the waste form for a geologic repository.
(3) Deep Borehole Alternatives. The time to start-up is
expected to be 10 years.
The operating duration of the mission would be about 10
years, although completing all burial operations at the borehole site
in 3 years is possible. Therefore, the overall mission duration is
estimated to be 20 years with accelerated emplacement reducing the
duration by about 7 years.
The schedule for the deep borehole alternatives would
depend in part on selecting and qualifying a site, and obtaining
legislative and regulatory clarification as well as any necessary
permits.
(4) Hybrid Approaches. In general, the schedule data that
apply to the component technologies apply to the hybrid alternatives as
well.
Confidence in an early start-up and an earlier completion
can both be improved with a hybrid approach, relative to stand-alone
alternatives.
Hybrid alternatives provide an inherent back-up technology
approach to enhance confidence in attaining schedule goals.
[[Page 3023]]
B. Nonproliferation Assessment
To assist in the development of this ROD, DOE's Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, with support from the Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition, prepared a report, Nonproliferation and Arms
Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives. The report was issued in draft form
in October 1996, and following a public comment period, was issued in
final form in January 1997. It analyzes the nonproliferation and arms
reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and
HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium. It is based in part on a
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report prepared for the Office of
Fissile Materials Disposition by Sandia National Laboratory. The
assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each
option. Some of the ``options'' and ``alternatives'' discussed in the
Nonproliferation Assessment are listed as ``variants'' (such as can-in-
canister) in the S&D Final PEIS. The key conclusions of the report, as
presented in its Executive Summary, are reproduced below.
1. Storage. Each of the options under consideration for
storage of U.S. weapons-usable fissile materials has the potential to
support U.S. nonproliferation and arms reduction goals, if implemented
appropriately.
Each of the storage options could provide high levels of
security to prevent theft of nuclear materials, and could provide
access to excess materials for international monitoring.
Making excess plutonium and HEU available for bilateral
U.S.-Russian monitoring and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safeguards, while protecting proliferation-sensitive information, would
help demonstrate the U.S. commitment never to return this material to
nuclear weapons, providing substantial arms reduction and
nonproliferation benefits in the near-term.
2. Disposition of U.S. Excess Plutonium
a. In General. Each of the options for disposition of
excess weapons plutonium that meets the Spent Fuel Standard would, if
implemented appropriately, offer major nonproliferation and arms
reduction benefits compared to leaving the material in storage in
directly weapons-usable form. Taking into account the likely impact on
Russian disposition activities, the no-action alternative appears to be
by far the least desirable of the plutonium disposition options from a
nonproliferation and arms reduction perspective.
Carrying out disposition of excess U.S. weapons plutonium,
using options that ensured effective nonproliferation controls and
resulted in forms meeting the Spent Fuel Standard, would:
reduce the likelihood that current arms reductions would
be reversed, by significantly increasing the difficulty, cost, and
observability of returning this plutonium to weapons;
increase international confidence in the arms reduction
process, strengthening political support for the nonproliferation
regime and providing a base for additional arms reductions, if desired;
reduce long-term proliferation risks posed by this
material by further helping to ensure that weapons-usable material does
not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorist groups; and
lay the essential foundation for parallel disposition of
excess Russian plutonium, reducing the risks that Russia might threaten
U.S. security by rebuilding its Cold War nuclear weapons arsenal, or
that this material might be stolen for use by potential proliferators.
Choosing the ``no-action alternative'' of leaving U.S.
excess plutonium in storage in weapons-usable form indefinitely, rather
than carrying out disposition:
would represent a clear reversal of the U.S. position
seeking to reduce excess stockpiles of weapons-usable materials
worldwide;
would make it impossible to achieve disposition of Russian
excess plutonium;
could undermine international political support for
nonproliferation efforts by leaving open the question of whether the
United States was maintaining an option for rapid reversal of current
arms reductions; and
could undermine progress in nuclear arms reductions.
The benefits of placing U.S. excess plutonium under
international monitoring and then transforming it into forms that met
the Spent Fuel Standard would be greatly increased, and the risks of
these steps significantly decreased, if Russia took comparable steps
with its own excess plutonium on a parallel track. The two countries
need not use the same plutonium disposition technologies, however.
As the 1994 NAS committee report 16 concluded,
options for disposition of U.S. excess weapons plutonium will provide
maximum nonproliferation and arms control benefits if they:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16 See footnote 3, above.
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minimize the time during which the excess plutonium is
stored in forms readily usable for nuclear weapons;
preserve material safeguards and security during the
disposition process, seeking to maintain to the extent possible the
same high standards of security and accounting applied to stored
nuclear weapons (the Stored Weapons Standard);
result in a form from which the plutonium would be as
inaccessible and unattractive for weapons use as the larger and growing
quantity of plutonium in commercial spent fuel (the Spent Fuel
Standard).
In order to achieve the benefits of plutonium disposition
as rapidly as possible, and to minimize the risks and negative signals
resulting from leaving the excess plutonium in storage, it is important
for disposition options to begin, and to complete the mission as soon
as practicable taking into account nonproliferation, environment,
safety, and health, and economic constraints. Timing should be a key
criterion in judging disposition options. Beginning the disposition
quickly is particularly important to establishing the credibility of
the process, domestically and internationally.
Each of the options under consideration for plutonium
disposition has its own advantages and disadvantages with respect to
nonproliferation and arms control, but none is clearly superior to the
others.
Each of the options under consideration for plutonium
disposition can potentially provide high levels of security and
safeguards for nuclear materials during the disposition process,
mitigating the risk of theft of nuclear materials.
Each of the options under consideration for plutonium
disposition can potentially provide for effective international
monitoring of the disposition process.
Plutonium disposition can only reduce, not eliminate, the
security risks posed by the existence of excess plutonium, and will
involve some risks of its own:
Because all plutonium disposition options would take
decades to complete, disposition is not a near-term solution to the
problem of nuclear theft and smuggling. While disposition will make a
long-term contribution, the near-term problem must be addressed through
programs to improve security and safeguarding for nuclear materials,
and to ensure adequate police, customs, and intelligence capabilities
to interdict nuclear smuggling.
[[Page 3024]]
All plutonium disposition options under consideration
would involve processing and transport of plutonium, which will involve
more risk of theft in the short term than if the material had remained
in heavily guarded storage, in return for the long-term benefit of
converting the material to more proliferation-resistant forms.
Both the United States and Russia will still retain
substantial stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable fissile
materials even after disposition of the fissile materials currently
considered excess is complete. These weapons and materials will
continue to pose a security challenge regardless of what is done with
excess plutonium.
None of the disposition options under consideration would
make it impossible to recover the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons,
or make it impossible to use other plutonium to rebuild a nuclear
arsenal. Therefore, disposition will only reduce, not eliminate, the
risk of reversal of current nuclear arms reductions.
A U.S. decision to choose reactor alternatives for
plutonium disposition could offer additional arguments and
justifications to those advocating plutonium reprocessing and recycle
in other countries. This could increase the proliferation risk if it in
fact led to significant additional separation and handling of weapons-
usable plutonium. On the other hand, if appropriately implemented,
plutonium disposition might also offer an opportunity to develop
improved procedures and technologies for protecting and safeguarding
plutonium, which could reduce proliferation risks and would strengthen
U.S. efforts to reduce the stockpiles of separated plutonium in other
countries.
Large-scale bulk processing of plutonium, including
processes to convert plutonium pits to oxide and prepare other forms
for disposition, as well as fuel fabrication or immobilization
processes, represents the stage of the disposition process when
material is most vulnerable to covert theft by insiders or covert
diversion by the host state. Such bulk processing is required for all
options, however; in particular, initial processing of plutonium pits
and other forms is among the most proliferation-sensitive stages of the
disposition process, but is largely common to all the options. More
information about the specific process designs is needed to determine
whether there are significant differences between the various
immobilization and reactor options in the overall difficulty of
providing effective assurance against theft or diversion during the
different types of bulk processing involved, and if so, which approach
is superior in this respect.
Transport of plutonium is the point in the disposition
process when the material is most vulnerable to overt armed attacks
designed to steal plutonium. With sufficient resources devoted to
security, however, high levels of protection against such overt attacks
can be provided. International, and particularly overseas, shipments
would involve greater transportation concerns than domestic shipments.
17
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17 International shipments would be involved (from the United
States to Canada) if the CANDU option were pursued as a result of
international agreements among the U.S., Canada, and Russia.
Overseas shipments would be involved if European MOX fuel
fabrication were utilized in the interim before a domestic MOX
fabrication facility were completed. The Preferred Alternative and
the decisions in this ROD do not involve European MOX fuel
fabrication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Conclusions Relating to Specific Disposition Options.
The reactor options, homogeneous immobilization 18
options, and deep borehole immobilized emplacement option can all meet
the Spent Fuel Standard. The can-in-canister options are being refined
to increase the resistance to separation of the plutonium cans from the
surrounding glass, with the goal of meeting the Spent Fuel Standard.
The deep borehole direct emplacement option substantially exceeds the
Spent Fuel Standard with respect to recovery by sub-national groups,
but could be more accessible and attractive for recovery by the host
state than spent fuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18 The term ``homogeneous immobilization'' refers to
mixing of solutions of plutonium and either HLW or cesium in liquid
form, followed by solidification of the mixture in either glass or
ceramic matrices. This contrasts with the ``can-in-canister''
variant, in which the plutonium and HLW or cesium materials are
never actually mixed together.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The reactor options have some advantage over the
immobilization options with respect to perceived irreversibility, in
that the plutonium would be converted from weapons-grade to reactor-
grade, even though it is possible to produce nuclear weapons with both
weapons and reactor-grade plutonium. The immobilization and deep
borehole options have some advantage over the reactor options in
avoiding the perception that they could potentially encourage
additional separation and civilian use of plutonium, which itself poses
proliferation risks.
Options that result in accountable ``items'' (for purposes
of international safeguards) whose plutonium content can be accurately
measured (such as fuel assemblies or immobilized cans without fission
products in the ``can-in-canister'' option) offer some advantage in
accounting to ensure that the output plutonium matches the input
plutonium from the process. Other options (such as homogeneous
immobilization or immobilized emplacement in deep boreholes) would
require greater reliance on containment and surveillance to provide
assurance that no material was stolen or diverted--but in some cases
could involve simpler processing, easing the task of providing such
assurance.
The principal uncertainty with respect to using excess
weapons plutonium as MOX in U.S. LWRs relates to the potential
difficulty of gaining political and regulatory approvals for the
various operations required.
Compared to the LWR option, the CANDU option would involve
more transport and more safeguarding issues at the reactor sites
themselves (because of the small size of the CANDU fuel bundles and the
on-line refueling of the CANDU reactors). Demonstrating the use of MOX
in CANDU reactors by carrying out this option for excess weapons
plutonium disposition could somewhat detract from U.S. efforts to
convince nations operating CANDU reactors in regions of proliferation
concern not to pursue MOX fuel cycles, but these nations are likely to
base their fuel cycle decisions primarily on factors independent of
disposition of this material. Disposing of excess weapons plutonium in
another country long identified with disarmament could have significant
symbolic advantages, particularly if carried out in parallel with
Russia. Disposition of Russian plutonium in CANDU reactors, however,
would require resolving additional transportation issues and additional
questions relating to the likely Russian desire for compensation for
the energy value of the plutonium.
The immobilization options have the potential to be
implemented more quickly than the reactor options. They face somewhat
less political uncertainty but somewhat more technical uncertainty than
the reactor options.
The likelihood of very long delays in gaining approval for
siting and construction of deep borehole sites represents a very
serious arms reduction and nonproliferation disadvantage of the
borehole option, in either of its variants. While the deep borehole
direct-emplacement option requires substantially less bulk processing
than the other disposition options, that option may not meet the Spent
Fuel Standard for retrievability by the host state, as mentioned above.
Any potential
[[Page 3025]]
advantage from the reduced processing is small compared to the large
timing uncertainty and the potential retrievability disadvantage.
Similarly, the electrometallurgical treatment option,
because it is less developed than the other immobilization options,
involves more uncertainty in when it could be implemented, which
represents a significant arms reduction and nonproliferation
disadvantage. It does not appear to have major compensating advantages
compared to the other immobilization options.
The ``can-in-canister'' immobilization options have a
timing advantage over the homogeneous immobilization options, in that,
by potentially relying on existing facilities, they could begin several
years sooner. As noted above, however, modified systems intended to
allow this option to meet the Spent Fuel Standard are still being
designed.
C. Comments on the S&D Final PEIS
After issuing the Final PEIS, DOE received approximately 100
letters from organizations and individuals commenting on the
alternatives addressed in the PEIS. Many of these letters expressed
opposition to the MOX fuel approach for surplus plutonium disposition.
The major concern raised in these letters was the contention that the
use of MOX fuel is associated with proliferation risk as well as
additional delays, costs, and safety and environmental risks. One of
these letters was from a coalition of 14 national organizations
recommending that the Department decide to utilize immobilization for
the disposition of all surplus plutonium and that MOX be retained for
use, if at all, only as an ``insurance policy'' if immobilization
should prove infeasible. Several of those 14 organizations also wrote
separately making similar points. Conversely, many of the letters
provided comments in support of the use of MOX fuel and/or a dual path,
while a few expressed opposition to the immobilization alternatives.
Seven of the letters received suggested the use of disposition
approaches that were not analyzed in the PEIS. Three of these
approaches (dropping plutonium into volcanoes, burying it in the sea at
the base of a volcano, and storing it in large granite or marble
structures) are similar to options that were either considered (but
found to be unreasonable) in a screening process that preceded the
PEIS, or were addressed in the PEIS Comment Response Document. These
approaches were considered to be potentially damaging to the
environment, among other things, and were therefore dismissed as
unreasonable. Three other alternatives (plasma technology, binding and
neutralizing plutonium with a new organic material, and use in rocket
engines) recommended in these letters would require a substantial
amount of development and could not be accomplished in the same time
frame as alternatives analyzed in the PEIS. One commentor suggested
adding the plutonium to the radioactive sludge being stored at Hanford
for eventual disposal. The Department views this as unreasonable
because of delays and increased costs that would be incurred in the
program to manage the wastes in the Hanford tanks. One commentor was
opposed to the utilization of Hanford's Fuels and Materials Examination
Facility for MOX fuel fabrication and the Fast Flux Test Facility for
MOX fuel burning.
All of the issues raised in these letters are covered in the body
of the Final PEIS, in the Comment Response Document, the Summary Report
of the Screening Process (DOE/MD-0002, March 19, 1995), the Technical
Summary Report for Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium Disposition, or the
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, which have
each been considered in reaching this ROD.
The Department's decision for surplus plutonium disposition is to
pursue both the existing LWR (MOX fuel) and immobilization approaches.
DOE recognizes that the estimated life-cycle cost of immobilization
alone would be less than that of the hybrid approach (pursuing both),
but the additional expense would be warranted by the increased
flexibility should one of the approaches ultimately fail, and the
increased ability to influence Russian plutonium disposition actions.
(The lowest cost approach would be the No Disposition Action
alternative; however, as noted in section III.F, above, that option
would not satisfy the purpose and need for this program.) DOE also
recognizes that analyses in the PEIS indicated that, for normal
operation, the environmental and health impacts would be somewhat lower
for immobilization, although, with the exception of waste generation,
impacts for the preferred, immobilization, and existing LWR (MOX)
alternatives would be essentially comparable (see prior discussion).
Potential latent cancer fatalities for members of the public under
the MOX approach would be significantly higher than under the
immobilization approach only under highly unlikely facility accident
scenarios; the risk (taking into account accident probabilities) to the
public of latent cancer fatalities from accidents would be fairly low
for both approaches.
From the nonproliferation standpoint, results of the
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Material Storage and Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (see section
IV.B) indicated that each of the options under consideration for
plutonium disposition has its own advantages and disadvantages, and
each can potentially provide high levels of security and safeguards for
nuclear materials during the disposition process, mitigating the risk
of theft of nuclear materials. Initial processing of plutonium pits and
other forms is among the most proliferation-sensitive stages of the
disposition process, but is largely common to all the options. Although
the Assessment also concluded that none of the approaches is clearly
superior to the others, both the Nonproliferation Assessment and a
letter from the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the
Non-proliferation and Arms Control Implications of Weapons-Usable
Fissile Materials Disposition Alternatives (included as Appendix B to
the Nonproliferation Assessment) concluded that the hybrid approach
(both reactors/MOX and immobilization) is preferable because of
uncertainties in each approach and because it would minimize potential
delays should problems develop with either approach. Numerous comment
letters have made similar points.
One such letter was received from five individuals who were the
U.S. participants on the U.S.-Russian Independent Scientific Commission
on Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This letter supported the
dual-track approach on the grounds that ``ruling out reactors and thus
depending solely on vitrification as the only approach to plutonium
disposition that might be implementable anytime soon, would have far
bigger nonproliferation liabilities then would the two-track
approach.'' These commentors argued that designating only
immobilization as the preferred approach, with MOX as a back-up, would
have essentially all the nonproliferation and arms reduction
liabilities of a one-track approach, which would weaken the U.S.
position and have severe consequences for the likely success of
programs to carry out permanent disposition of weapons plutonium in
Russia, and therefore jeopardize the success of programs to
[[Page 3026]]
carry out U.S. disposition. These commentors stated that without the
dual-track approach, the U.S. will lose any leverage it might have over
the conditions and safeguards accompanying the use of Russian plutonium
in their reactors. They also pointed out that pursuing both the MOX
option and immobilization in the U.S. may be the best way to convince
Russia, which currently favors converting its own plutonium to MOX
fuel, of the value of immobilization for a portion of its excess
plutonium. These commentors argued that the dual-track approach would
not undermine U.S. nonproliferation policy, would not increase the risk
of nuclear theft and terrorism, and would not lead to a new domestic
plutonium recycle industry since it would not significantly affect the
huge economic barriers to using MOX fuel on a commercial basis.
Two commentors expressed opposition to plutonium recycling
(reprocessing), citing the Final Generic Environmental Statement on the
Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Cooled
Reactors (GESMO), NUREG-0002, which was issued by the NRC in 1976, and
President Carter's decision to ban plutonium recycling. DOE notes that
plutonium recycling is not part of the plutonium disposition program or
the decisions in this ROD; on the contrary, this ROD includes
conditions on the use of MOX fuel that are intended to prevent the use
of recycled plutonium.
The use of MOX fuel in existing reactors would be undertaken in a
manner that is consistent with the United States' policy objective on
the irreversibility of the nuclear disarmament process and the United
States' policy discouraging the use of plutonium for civil purposes. To
this end, implementing the MOX alternative would include government
ownership and control of the MOX fuel fabrication facility at a DOE
site, and use of the facility only for the surplus plutonium
disposition program. There would be no reprocessing or subsequent reuse
of spent MOX fuel. The MOX fuel would be used in a once-through fuel
cycle in existing reactors, with appropriate arrangements, including
contractual or licensing provisions, limiting use of MOX fuel to
surplus plutonium disposition.
One commentor, who opposed MOX fuel use, urged DOE not to use
European MOX fuel fabrication capability if the MOX approach is
pursued. In this ROD, DOE has not decided to use European MOX fuel
fabrication.
V. Decisions
A. Storage of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS,
the Department has decided to reduce, over time, the number of
locations where the various forms of plutonium are stored, through a
combination of storage alternatives in conjunction with a combination
of disposition alternatives. DOE will begin implementing this decision
by moving surplus plutonium from RFETS as soon as possible,
transporting the pits to Pantex beginning in 1997, and non-pit
plutonium materials to SRS upon completion of the expanded Actinide
Packing and Storage Facility (APSF), anticipated in 2001. Over time,
DOE will store this plutonium in upgraded facilities at Pantex and in
the expanded APSF. Surplus and non-surplus HEU will be stored in
upgraded facilities at ORR. Storage facilities for the surplus HEU will
also be modified, as needed, to accommodate international inspection
requirements consistent with the President's Nonproliferation and
Export Control Policy. Accordingly, DOE has decided to pursue the
following actions for storage:
Phase out storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at RFETS
beginning in 1997; move pits to Pantex, and non-pit materials to SRS
upon completion of the expanded APSF. At Pantex, DOE will repackage
pits from RFETS in Zone 12, then place them in existing storage
facilities in Zone 4, pending completion of facility upgrades in Zone
12. At SRS, DOE will expand the planned new APSF, and move separated
and stabilized non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS to the expanded
APSF upon completion. The small number of pits currently at RFETS that
are not in shippable form will be placed in a shippable condition in
accordance with existing procedures prior to shipment to Pantex.
Additionally, some pits and non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS
could be used at SRS, LANL, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL) for tests and demonstrations of aspects of disposition
technologies (see disposition decision, below). All non-pit weapons-
usable plutonium materials currently stored at RFETS are surplus.
The Department's decision to remove plutonium from RFETS is based
on the cleanup agreement among DOE, EPA, and the State of Colorado for
RFETS, the proximity of RFETS to the Denver metropolitan area, and the
fact that some of the RFETS plutonium is currently stored in buildings
371 and 376, two of the most vulnerable facilities as defined by and
identified in DOE's Plutonium Working Group Report on Environmental,
Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities Associated With the Department's
Plutonium Storage (DOE/EH-0414, November, 1994).
Upgrade storage facilities at Zone 12 South (to be
completed by 2004) at Pantex to store those surplus pits currently
stored at Pantex, and surplus pits from RFETS, pending disposition.
Storage facilities at Zone 4 will continue to be used for these pits
prior to completion of the upgrade.
In accordance with the preferred alternative in the Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship
and Management (Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS), store
Strategic Reserve pits at Pantex in other upgraded facilities in Zone
12.
The Department's decision to consolidate pit storage at Pantex
places the pits at a central location where most of the pits already
reside and where the expertise and infrastructure are already in place
to accommodate pit storage.19 Pantex has more than 40 years of
experience with the handling of pits. Zone 12 facilities would be
modified for long-term storage of the Pantex plutonium inventory and
the small number of pits transferred from RFETS and SRS for a modest
cost (about $10 million capital cost). Pursuant to the Final EIS for
the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of
Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225), DOE is proposing to continue
nuclear weapons stockpile management operations and related activities
at the Pantex Plant, including interim storage of up to 20,000
pits.20 Consequently, the storage of surplus pits at Pantex would
offer the opportunity to share trained people and other resources, and
a decreased cost could be realized over other sites without similar
experience. Using the Pantex Plant for pit storage would also involve
the lowest cost and the least new construction relative to other sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ A small number of research and development pits located at
RFETS that have been and will continue to be packaged and returned
to LANL and LLNL are outside the scope of the S&D PEIS and this ROD.
\20\ The pits that are to be moved to Pantex pursuant to this
ROD fall within the 20,000 pit limit.
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Expand the planned APSF at SRS (Upgrade Alternative) to
store those surplus, non-pit plutonium materials currently at SRS and
surplus non-pit plutonium materials from RFETS, pending disposition
(see disposition decision, below). DOE analyzed the
[[Page 3027]]
potential impacts of constructing and operating the APSF in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement, Interim Management of Nuclear Materials
(DOE/EIS-0220) and announced the decision to build the facility in the
associated ROD (60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995). DOE, pursuant to the
decisions announced here to store surplus non-pit plutonium at SRS,
will likely design and build the APSF and the expanded space to
accommodate the RFETS material as one building,21 which DOE plans
to complete in 2001. The RFETS surplus non-pit plutonium materials
22 will be moved to SRS after stabilization is performed at RFETS
under corrective actions in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board Recommendation 94-1; and after the material is packaged in
DOE-approved storage and shipping containers pursuant to existing
procedures. The surplus plutonium already on-site at SRS and the
movement of separated and stabilized non-pit plutonium from RFETS would
result in the storage of a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus
plutonium in the new, expanded APSF at SRS. In addition, shipment of
the non-pit plutonium from RFETS to SRS, after stabilization, would
only be implemented if the subsequent ROD for a plutonium disposition
site (see Section V.B., below) calls for immobilization of plutonium at
SRS. Placement of surplus, non-pit plutonium materials in a new storage
facility at SRS will allow utilization of existing expertise and
plutonium handling capabilities in a location where disposition
activities could occur (see disposition decision, below). The decision
to store non-pit plutonium from RFETS at SRS places most non-pit
material at a plutonium-competent site with the most modern, state-of-
the-art storage and processing facilities, and at a site with the only
remaining large-scale chemical separation and processing capability in
the DOE complex.23 Pits currently located at SRS will be moved to
Pantex for storage consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. There are no strategic non-
pit materials currently located at SRS.
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\21\ Building the APSF in this way, rather than as originally
configured plus an expansion, will not increase the potential
impacts of constructing and operating the facility beyond those
analyzed in the S&D Final PEIS in conjunction with the analyses in
the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Interim Management of
Nuclear Materials.
\22\ This decision does not include residues at RFETS that are
less than 50-percent plutonium by weight, or scrub alloys. The
management and disposition of those materials has been or is being
considered in separate NEPA reviews. See Environmental Assessment
for Solid Residue Treatment, Repackaging, and Storage (DOE/EA-1120,
April 1996); Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS on the Management of
Certain Plutonium Residues and Scrub Alloy Stored at the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (61 FR 58866, November 19, 1996).
\23\ SRS is one of the preferred candidate sites for plutonium
disposition facilities, including the potential for the early start
of disposition by immobilization using the can-in-canister option at
the DWPF.
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Continue current storage (No Action) of surplus plutonium
at Hanford and INEL, pending disposition (or movement to lag storage
24 at disposition facilities when selected).25 This action
will allow surplus plutonium to remain at the sites with existing
expertise and plutonium handling capabilities, and where potential
disposition activities could occur (see disposition decision, below).
There are no non-surplus weapons-usable plutonium materials currently
stored at either site.
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\24\ Lag storage is temporary storage at the applicable
disposition facility.
\25\ Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) currently
stores 0.3 metric tons of plutonium, which are primarily research
and development and operational feedstock materials not surplus to
government needs. Adequate storage facilities for this material
currently exist at LLNL, where it will be stored and used for
research and development activities. None of the plutonium stored at
LLNL falls within the scope of the disposition alternatives in the
S&D Final PEIS or the disposition decisions in this ROD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue current storage (No Action) of plutonium at LANL,
pending disposition (or movement to lag storage at the disposition
facilities). This plutonium will be stored in stabilized form with the
non-surplus plutonium in the upgraded Nuclear Material Storage Facility
pursuant to the No Action alternative for the site.
Take No Action at the NTS. DOE will not introduce
plutonium to sites that do not currently have plutonium in storage.
Upgrade storage facilities at the Y-12 Plant (Y-12) (to be
completed by 2004 or earlier) at ORR to store non-surplus HEU and
surplus HEU pending disposition. Existing storage facilities at Y-12
will be modified to meet natural phenomena requirements, as documented
in Natural Phenomena Upgrade of the Downsized/Consolidated Oak Ridge
Uranium/Lithium Plant Facilities (Y/EN-5080, 1994). Storage facilities
will be consolidated, and the storage footprint will be reduced, as
surplus HEU is dispositioned and blended to low-enriched uranium,
pursuant to the ROD for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched
Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (61 FR 40619, August 5,
1996). Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS, HEU strategic reserves will be stored
at the Y-12 Plant.
B. Plutonium Disposition
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS,
DOE has decided to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that
allows for immobilization of surplus weapons plutonium in glass or
ceramic forms and burning of the surplus plutonium as mixed oxide fuel
(MOX) in existing reactors. The decision to pursue disposition of the
surplus plutonium using these approaches is supported by the analyses
in the Disposition Technical Summary Report (section IV.A.2 above) and
the Nonproliferation Assessment (section IV.B above), as well as the
S&D Final PEIS. The results of additional technology development and
demonstrations, site-specific environmental review, detailed cost
proposals, nonproliferation considerations, and negotiations with
Russia and other nations will ultimately determine the timing and
extent to which MOX as well as immobilization is deployed. These
efforts will provide the basis and flexibility for the United States to
initiate disposition efforts either multilaterally or bilaterally
through negotiations with other nations, or unilaterally as an example
to Russia and other nations.
Pursuant to this decision, the United States policy not to
encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, not to itself
engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear
explosive purposes, does not change. Although under this decision some
plutonium may ultimately be burned in existing reactors, extensive
measures will be pursued (see below) to ensure that federal support for
this unique disposition mission does not encourage other civil uses of
plutonium or plutonium reprocessing. The United States will maintain
its commitments regarding the use of plutonium in civil nuclear
programs in western Europe and Japan.
The Disposition Technical Summary Report (section IV.A.2 above)
concluded that the lowest cost option for plutonium disposition would
be immobilization using the can-in-canister variant and existing
facilities to the maximum extent possible, with a net life-cycle cost
of about $1.8 billion. The Disposition Technical Summary Report also
estimated that the net life-cycle cost of the hybrid immobilization/MOX
approach would be about $2.2 billion. The additional expense of
pursuing the hybrid approach would be warranted by
[[Page 3028]]
the increased flexibility it would provide, as noted in the
Nonproliferation Assessment, to ensure that plutonium disposition could
be initiated promptly should one of the approaches ultimately fail or
be delayed. Establishing the means for expeditious plutonium
disposition will also help provide the basis for an international
cooperative effort that can result in reciprocal, irreversible
plutonium disposition actions by Russia. This disposition strategy
signals a strong U.S. commitment to reducing its stockpile of surplus
plutonium, thereby effectively meeting the purpose of and need for the
Proposed Action.
To accomplish the plutonium disposition mission, DOE will use, to
the extent practical, new as well as modified existing buildings and
facilities for portions of the disposition mission. DOE will analyze
and compare existing and new buildings and facilities, and technology
variations, in a subsequent, site-specific EIS. In addition, all
disposition facilities will be designed or modified, as needed, to
accommodate international inspection requirements consistent with the
President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy. Accordingly,
DOE has decided to pursue the following strategy and supporting actions
for plutonium disposition:
Immobilize plutonium materials using vitrification or
ceramic immobilization at either Hanford or SRS, in new or existing
facilities. Immobilization could be used for pure or impure forms of
plutonium. In the subsequent EIS (referenced above), DOE anticipates
that the preferred alternative for vitrification or ceramic
immobilization will include the can-in-canister variant, utilizing the
existing HLW and the DWPF at SRS (see below). Alternatively, new
immobilization facilities could be built at Hanford or SRS. The
immobilized material would be disposed of in a geologic repository.
Pursuant to appropriate NEPA review, DOE will continue the research and
development leading to the demonstration of the can-in-canister variant
at the DWPF using surplus plutonium and the development of
vitrification and ceramic formulations.
Convert surplus plutonium materials into mixed oxide (MOX)
fuel for use in existing reactors. Pure surplus plutonium materials
including pits, pure metal, and oxides could be converted without
extensive processing into MOX fuel for use in existing commercial
reactors. Other, already separated forms of surplus plutonium would
require additional purification. (This purification would not involve
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.) The Government-produced MOX fuel
(from plutonium declared surplus to defense needs) would be used in
existing LWRs with a once-through fuel cycle, with no reprocessing or
subsequent reuse of the spent fuel. In addition, DOE will explore
appropriate contractual limits to ensure that any reactor license
modification for use of the MOX fuel is limited to governmental
purposes involving the disposition of surplus, weapons-usable
plutonium, so as to discourage general civil use of plutonium-based
fuel. The spent MOX fuel would be disposed of in a geologic repository.
If partially completed LWRs were to be completed by other parties, they
would be considered for this mission. The MOX fuel would be fabricated
in a domestic, government-owned facility at one of four DOE sites (SRS,
Hanford, INEL, or Pantex).
The Department reserves as an option the potential use of some MOX
fuel in CANDU reactors in Canada in the event that a multilateral
agreement to deploy this option is negotiated among Russia, Canada, and
the United States. DOE will engage in a test and demonstration program
for CANDU MOX fuel consistent with ongoing and potential future
cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada.
The test and demonstration activities could occur at LANL and at
sites in Canada, potentially beginning in 1997, and will be based on
appropriate NEPA review. Fabrication of MOX fuel for CANDU reactors
would occur in a DOE facility, as would be true in the case of domestic
LWRs. Strict security and safeguards would be employed in the
fabrication and transport of MOX fuel to CANDU reactors, as well as
domestic reactors. Whether, and the extent to which, the CANDU option
is implemented will depend on multi-national agreements and the results
of the test and demonstration activities.
Due to technology, complexity, timing, cost, and other factors that
would be involved in purifying certain plutonium materials to make them
suitable for potential use in MOX fuel, approximately 30 percent of the
total quantity of plutonium that has been or may be declared surplus to
defense needs would require extensive purification for use in MOX fuel,
and therefore will likely be immobilized. Of the plutonium that is
currently surplus, DOE will immobilize at least 8 metric tons that it
has determined are not suitable for use in MOX fuel.26 DOE
reserves the option of using the immobilization approach for all of the
surplus plutonium.
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\26\ The S&D Final PEIS, for purposes of analysis of impacts of
the preferred alternative (using both reactors and immobilization),
assumed that about 30 percent (approximately 17 MT) of the surplus
plutonium materials might be immobilized because they are impure.
DOE's decision here that immobilization will be used for at least 8
MT currently located at SRS and RFETS is based on DOE's current
assessment that that quantity of material is so low in quality that
its purification for use in MOX fuel would not be cost-effective.
This decision does not preclude immobilizing all of the surplus
plutonium, but it does preclude using the MOX/reactor approach for
all of the material.
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The timing and extent to which either option is ultimately utilized
will depend on the results of international agreements, future
technology development and demonstrations, site-specific environmental
review, detailed cost proposals, and negotiations with Russia and other
nations. In the event both technologies are utilized, because the time
required for plutonium disposition using reactors would be longer than
that for immobilization, it is probable that some surplus plutonium
would be immobilized initially, prior to completion of reactor
irradiation for other surplus plutonium. Implementation of this
strategy will involve some or all of the following supporting actions:
Construct and operate a plutonium vitrification facility
or ceramic immobilization facility at either Hanford or SRS. DOE will
analyze alternative locations at these two sites for constructing new
buildings or using modified existing buildings in subsequent, site-
specific NEPA review. SRS has existing facilities (the DWPF) and
infrastructure to support an immobilization mission, and at Hanford,
DOE has proposed constructing and operating immobilization facilities
for the wastes in Hanford tanks. 27 DOE will not create new
infrastructure for immobilizing plutonium with HLW or cesium at INEL,
NTS, ORR, or Pantex. Due to the substantial timing and cost advantages
associated with the can-in-canister option, as discussed in the
Technical Summary Report For Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium
Disposition and summarized in section IV.A.2, above, DOE anticipates
that the proposed action for immobilization in the follow-on plutonium
disposition EIS will include the use of the can-in-canister option at
the DWPF at SRS for immobilizing a portion of the surplus, non-pit
plutonium material. 28
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\27\ See Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Tank Waste
Remediation System, Hanford Site, Richland, Washington (DOE/EIS-
0189, August 1996); ROD expected early in 1997.
\28\ DOE expects to issue a Notice of Intent to prepare the
follow-on EIS shortly following this ROD. Reasonable alternatives
for the proposed action will be considered in the follow-on
disposition EIS.
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[[Page 3029]]
Construct and operate a plutonium conversion facility for
non-pit plutonium materials at either Hanford or SRS. DOE will
collocate the plutonium conversion facility with the vitrification or
ceramic immobilization facility discussed above. In subsequent, site-
specific NEPA review, DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford
and SRS for constructing new buildings or using modified existing
buildings for the plutonium conversion facility.
Construct and operate a pit disassembly/conversion
facility at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, or SRS (only one site). DOE will not
introduce plutonium to sites that do not currently have plutonium in
storage. Therefore, two sites analyzed in the S&D PEIS, NTS and ORR,
will not be considered further for plutonium disposition activities.
DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford, INEL, Pantex, and
SRS for constructing new buildings or using modified existing buildings
in subsequent, site-specific NEPA review. Based on appropriate NEPA
review, DOE anticipates demonstrating the Advanced Recovery and
Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) concept at LANL for pit
disassembly/conversion beginning in fiscal year 1997.
Construct and operate a domestic, government-owned,
limited-purpose MOX fuel fabrication facility at Hanford, INEL, Pantex,
or SRS (only one site). As noted above, NTS and ORR will not be
considered further for plutonium disposition activities. In follow-on
NEPA review, DOE will analyze alternative locations at Hanford, INEL,
Pantex, and SRS, for constructing new buildings or using modified
existing buildings. The MOX fuel fabrication facility will serve only
the limited mission of fabricating MOX fuel from plutonium declared
surplus to U.S. defense needs, with shut-down and decontamination and
decommissioning of the facility upon completion of this mission.
29
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\29\ DOE supports external regulation of its facilities, and in
the Report of Department of Energy Working Group on External
Regulation (DOE/UF-0001, December 1996), DOE proposed to seek
legislation that would generally require NRC licenses for new DOE
facilities. Therefore, DOE anticipates seeking an NRC license for
the MOX fuel fabrication facility, which would be limited to a
license to fabricate MOX fuel from plutonium declared surplus to
defense needs. DOE may also seek legislation that would by statute
limit the MOX fuel fabrication facility to disposition of surplus
plutonium.
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DOE's program for surplus plutonium disposition will be subject to
the highest standards of safeguards and security for storage,
transportation, and processing (particularly during operations that
involve the greatest proliferation vulnerability, such as during MOX
fuel preparation and transportation), and will include International
Atomic Energy Agency verification as appropriate. Transportation of all
plutonium-bearing materials under this program, including the
transportation of prepared MOX fuel to reactors, will be accomplished
using the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division's ``Safe Secure
Transports'' (SSTs), which affords these materials the same level of
transportation safety, security, and safeguards as is used for nuclear
weapons.
Pursuant to appropriate NEPA review(s), DOE will continue research
and development and engage in further testing and demonstrations of
plutonium disposition technologies which may include: dissolution of
small quantities of plutonium in both glass and ceramic formulation;
experiments with immobilization equipment and systems; fabrication of
MOX fuel pellets for demonstrations of reactor irradiation at INEL;
mechanical milling and mixing of plutonium and uranium feed; and
testing of shipping and storage containers for certification, in
addition to the testing and demonstrations previously described for the
can-in-canister immobilization variant, the ARIES system, and other
plutonium processes.
DOE has decided not to pursue several disposition alternatives that
were evaluated in the S&D PEIS: two deep borehole alternatives,
electrometallurgical treatment, evolutionary reactors, and partially-
completed reactors (unless they were completed by others, in which case
they would qualify as existing reactors). Although the deep borehole
options are technically attractive, the institutional uncertainties
associated with siting of borehole facilities make timely
implementation of this alternative unlikely. To implement the borehole
alternatives, new legislation and regulations, or clarification of
existing regulations, may be necessary. DOE has decided not to pursue
the electrometallurgical treatment option for immobilization because
its technology is less mature than vitrification or ceramic
immobilization. 30 DOE has decided not to pursue evolutionary
reactors or partially-completed reactors because they offer no
advantages over existing reactors for plutonium disposition and would
involve higher costs, greater regulatory uncertainties, higher
environmental impacts from construction, and less timely commencement
of disposition actions.
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30 An evaluation by the National Research Council in a
recent report (see footnote 12, above) concluded that the
electrometallurgical treatment process is not sufficiently mature to
provide a reliable basis for timely plutonium disposition.
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VI. Conclusion
DOE has decided to implement a program to provide for safe and
secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and for disposition
of weapons-usable plutonium that is declared excess to national
security needs (now or in the future), as specified in the Preferred
Alternative in the S&D Final PEIS. DOE will consolidate the storage of
weapons-usable plutonium by upgrading and expanding existing facilities
at the Pantex Plant in Texas and SRS in South Carolina, continuing
storage of surplus plutonium currently onsite at Hanford, LANL, and
INEL pending disposition, and continuing storage of weapons-usable HEU
at DOE's Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, in upgraded and, as surplus HEU is
down-blended under the ROD for Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched
Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement, consolidated facilities.
DOE will provide for disposition of surplus plutonium by pursuing a
strategy that allows: (1) Immobilization of surplus plutonium for
disposal in a repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and
(2) fabrication of surplus plutonium into MOX fuel, for use in existing
domestic commercial reactors (and potentially CANDU reactors, depending
on future agreements with Russia and Canada). The timing and extent to
which each of these disposition technologies is deployed will depend
upon the results of future technology development and demonstrations,
site-specific environmental review, detailed cost proposals, and the
results of negotiations with Russia, Canada, and other nations. This
programmatic decision is effective upon being made public, in
accordance with DOE's regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021.315).
The goals of this program are to support U.S. nuclear weapons
nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess fissile
materials so that they may never be used in weapons again. This program
will demonstrate the United States'' commitment to its nonproliferation
goals, as specified in the President's Nonproliferation and Export
Control Policy of 1993, and provide an example for other nations, where
stockpiles of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials may be less
secure from potential theft or diversion than those in the United
[[Page 3030]]
States, to encourage them to take similar actions.
The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.
Sec. 4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts
1500-1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.
Issued in Washington, D.C., January 14, 1997.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 97-1355 Filed 1-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P