[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 2 (Friday, January 3, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 424-429]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-64]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245]
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Nuclear Power
Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR
2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision with
regard to a Petition dated August 21, 1995, and supplemented on August
28, 1995, submitted by Mr. George Galatis and We the People, Inc. (the
Petitioners), requesting action under 10 CFR 2.206. The Petition
pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, operated by
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee).
The Petitioners requested that the NRC (1) suspend the license for
the Millstone Unit 1 facility for a period of 60 days after the unit is
brought into compliance with the license and the design basis; (2)
revoke the operating license until the facility is in full compliance
with the terms and conditions of its license; (3) perform a detailed
independent analysis of the offsite dose consequences of the total loss
of spent fuel pool water; and (4) take enforcement action pursuant to
10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9. As bases for their requests, the Petitioners
raised the following three issues: (1) The Licensee has knowingly,
willingly, and flagrantly operated Millstone Unit 1 in violation of
License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40; (2) License Amendments Nos. 39 and
40 for Millstone Unit 1 are based on material false statements made by
the Licensee in documents submitted to the NRC; and (3) the license
amendment proposed in a letter dated July 28, 1995, should be denied
and the Licensee should be required to operate in full conformance with
License Amendment No. 40. Issue 3 was determined to be a request for a
licensing action and so was beyond the scope of 10 CFR 2.206.
The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
partially granted Requests 1, 2, and 3 of the Petition. The reasons for
this decision are explained in the ``Partial Director's Decision
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-96-23), the complete text of which
follows this notice. With regard to Petitioner's Request 4, the NRC
staff activities are not yet complete. A Final Director's Decision will
be issued upon completion of NRC activities in this area.
A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be available for
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at
the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,
Waterford, Connecticut.
A copy of this Partial Director's Decision has been filed with the
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. This Decision will become the
final action of the Commission (for Petitioners' requests dispositioned
in this Partial Director's Decision) 25 days after the date of issuance
unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the
Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of December 1996.
[[Page 425]]
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
I. Introduction
On August 21, 1995, Mr. George Galatis and We the People, Inc.
(Petitioners), filed a Petition with the Executive Director for
Operations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to
Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR
2.206). A supplement to the Petition was submitted on August 28, 1995.
These two submittals will hereinafter be referred to as the
``Petition.''
The Petition raised three issues regarding the Millstone Nuclear
Power Station, Unit 1 (Millstone Unit 1), operated by Northeast Nuclear
Energy Company (NNECO or Licensee). First, Petitioners asserted that
the Licensee has knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly operated
Millstone Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40.
Specifically, Petitioners assert that NNECO has offloaded more fuel
assemblies into the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) during
refueling outages than permitted under these license amendments.
Second, Petitioners asserted that License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 for
Millstone Unit 1 are based on material false statements made by the
Licensee in documents submitted to the NRC. Third, the license
amendment proposed by the Licensee in a letter dated July 28, 1995,
regarding offloading of the entire core of spent fuel assemblies at
Millstone Unit 1 should be denied and the Licensee should be required
to operate in full conformance with License Amendment No. 40.
On the basis of these assertions, the Petitioners requested that
the NRC institute a proceeding under 10 CFR 2.202 to suspend the
license for the Millstone Unit 1 facility for a period of 60 days after
the unit is brought into compliance with the license and the design
basis and to revoke the operating license for the Millstone Unit 1
facility until it is in full compliance with the terms and conditions
of its license. Petitioners also requested that before reinstatement of
the license, a detailed independent analysis of the offsite dose
consequences of the total loss of SFP water be conducted and that the
NRC take enforcement action against NNECO pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 and
50.9. Finally, Petitioners requested that the license amendment sought
by NNECO be denied.
By letter dated October 26, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioners
that the Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations for
preparation of a response. The NRC also informed the Petitioners that
the NRC staff would take appropriate action within a reasonable time
regarding the specific concerns raised in the Petition. Additionally,
the Petitioners were informed that their request with regard to issues
associated with the requested license amendment (i.e., Petitioners'
third issue) was not within the scope of 10 CFR 2.206 and thus was not
appropriate for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206. See Pacific Gas and
Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-
81-6, 13 NRC 443 (1981).1 Therefore, this issue will not be
addressed in this or any subsequent Director's Decision.
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\1\ Petitioners' concerns related to the license amendment were
considered by the NRC staff during the license amendment review
process. A license amendment was issued by the NRC staff on November
9, 1995. A number of petitioners, including We the People, Inc.,
sought to intervene in the license amendment proceeding. Two
petitioners, including We the People, Inc., were found to have
standing to intervene and were admitted to the proceeding subject to
the filing of at least one admissible contention. Based upon
confirmation by counsel for these petitioners that no contention
would be filed, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board terminated the
proceeding on April 15, 1996.
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Petitioners' supplement of August 28, 1995, provided additional
information. A portion of the Petitioners' supplemental letter of
August 28, 1995, contained assertions relating to the third issue.
Specifically, regarding Millstone Unit 3, the Petitioners asserted that
there is a material false statement in a submission used to support a
previous license amendment and that there is an unanalyzed condition in
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with regard to system
piping not being analyzed for the full-core offload normal end-of-cycle
event. Also, with regard to Seabrook Station Unit 1, Petitioners
asserted that there are Technical Specification violations related to
criticality analysis and gaps in Boraflex material. As the third issue
is outside the scope of 10 CFR 2.206, these assertions will not be
addressed in this or subsequent Director's Decisions. However, the
staff is reviewing these assertions and the staff's findings will be
forwarded to the Petitioners by separate correspondence.
Petitioners' supplemental letter also provided additional
information on the first issue. Specifically, the Petitioners asserted
that the licensees for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and Seabrook Unit 1 also
performed full-core offloads in violation of their licenses. These
assertions will be addressed in this Partial Director's Decision.
Petitioners' issues 1 and 2 assert wrongdoing on the part of the
Licensee. The NRC staff has not yet completed its review of possible
wrongdoing on the part of the Licensee and will address this issue in a
subsequent Director's Decision.
The NRC staff has, however, completed its technical assessment of
core offloading practices at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 and Seabrook
Unit 1 and these areas are discussed below. As explained below, the NRC
staff has taken actions that, in part, address the Petitioners'
requests.
II. Discussion
A. Requests To Revoke and Suspend the Operating License for Millstone
Unit 1
The Petitioners based their requests on their issues that the
Licensee has knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly operated Millstone
Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 and that
License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 for Millstone Unit 1 are based on
material false statements. Specifically, the Petitioners stated that
the Licensee conducted full-core offloads as a routine practice when
its licensing basis analyses assumed one-third core offloads as the
normal refueling practice. In their August 28 supplemental letter, the
Petitioners asserted that the licensees for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and
Seabrook Unit 1 also performed full-core offloads in violation of their
licenses. The Petitioners further contend that the Licensee's actions
subjected the public to an unacceptable risk. As previously noted, the
wrongdoing aspects of the Licensee's actions will not be addressed in
this Director's Decision. However, the technical aspects associated
with core offloading practices will be addressed in the following
paragraphs. For perspective, the NRC staff's conclusions are prefaced
by an abbreviated history of this issue.
On October 18, 1993, the Licensee issued Licensee Event Report
(LER) 93-11. The LER stated that the Licensee had made inappropriate
assumptions in the analysis that was performed in support of License
Amendment No. 40 for Millstone Unit 1. Specifically, the normal
refueling analysis assumed a one-third core offload when Unit 1
routinely performed full-core refueling offloads. Following issuance of
LER 93-11, the Licensee conducted refueling
[[Page 426]]
outage (RFO) 14 in 1994. The Licensee used a waiting period between the
one-third core offload and the full-core offload during RFO 14 to
ensure that the SFP bulk temperature remained within the temperature
design parameters identified in LER 93-11 and the UFSAR.
On April 22, 1994, the NRC issued Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/94-
01, 50-336/94-01, and 50-423/94-01. The NRC staff's review of LER 93-11
was included in this inspection report. The NRC staff found that the
Licensee for Millstone Unit 1 had historically removed all of the fuel
assemblies to the SFP during refueling outages. The NRC staff noted
that this operating practice was not consistent with the spent fuel
analysis design-basis assumptions in the UFSAR. Therefore, the NRC
staff concluded that the Licensee had failed to maintain spent fuel
analysis design assumptions in plant operating practices. However,
because the violation was a Licensee-identified Severity Level IV
violation meeting the criteria set out in Section VII.B of the NRC
Enforcement Policy,2 a Notice of Violation was not issued. The
purpose of this policy regarding NRC discretion for citing violations
is to encourage and support licensee initiatives for self-
identification and correction of problems.3
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\2\ ``General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC
Enforcement Actions,'' at that time contained in Appendix C to 10
CFR Part 2.
\3\ The NRC staff, in response to Petitioners' requests, is
evaluating possible wrongdoing associated with this violation and
will reassess the appropriateness of exercising enforcement
discretion when the NRC staff's review is complete.
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From July 10 through July 14, 1995, the NRC staff conducted a
safety inspection of several previously identified technical issues at
Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, including the Licensee's refueling offload
practices that were reviewed previously. The results of the inspection
were documented in NRC IR 50-245/95-28, 50-336/95-28, and 50-423/95-28
issued on September 1, 1995. The staff noted that during RFOs 12, 13,
and 14, the Licensee performed full-core offloads at Millstone Unit 1.
The staff concluded that these outages may have been performed outside
the design basis of Millstone Unit 1. The staff also concluded that the
Licensee did not completely and accurately describe in its submittals
for License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 the refueling activities as they
were actually conducted. The Licensee was routinely performing full-
core offloads during refueling outages, but the amendment submittals
stated that ``normal'' refueling offloads were one-third core offloads.
Enforcement action associated with the staff's findings will be taken,
as appropriate, upon final resolution of the Petitioners' contentions
regarding possible wrongdoing.
On July 28, 1995, the Licensee requested a license amendment to use
full-core offloads as the normal refueling practice at Millstone Unit
1. The Licensee proposed plant modifications to support this license
amendment. The staff granted the Licensee's amendment request on
November 9, 1995. The NRC's approval of the Licensee's request was
based on design changes, procedure revisions, and enhanced
administrative controls that did not exist during prior refueling
activities. In the cover letter forwarding the granted license
amendment, the staff noted that NNECO's design and operational
practices for full-core offloads were more conservative than NRC
recommendations and industry standards.
On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for
the planned 50-day RFO 15. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 1 has not
yet restarted the plant from this shutdown.
In part, in response to the concerns the Petitioners raised, from
October 24 to November 10, 1995, the NRC staff performed an inspection
at Millstone Unit 1 to ensure the Licensee's planned refueling
operation would be done safely and in accordance with its license,
design basis, and plant procedures. The inspection was continued from
March 4 to 14, 1996. The results of this Millstone Unit 1 inspection
were documented in NRC IR 50-245/95-82, issued July 10, 1996. The NRC
staff concluded that the Licensee could safely offload fuel for RFO 15.
However, the inspection identified design control questions related to
the SFP cooling system. Consequently, the staff concluded that
additional Licensee efforts were needed to identify and correct
deficiencies related to the Licensee's SFP cooling systems and their
operation. Two areas of concern involved the Licensee's failure (1) to
conduct adequate safety evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and
(2) to take adequate design control measures in accordance with
Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50. These items were cited as apparent
violations. NRC is considering enforcement action associated with the
staff's findings.
At a public meeting on December 5, 1995, the NRC's Acting Inspector
General stated that, based on an investigation conducted by his office,
refueling activities at Millstone Unit 1 may not have been conducted
consistent with the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR.4
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\4\ The results of the investigation were documented on December
21, 1995, in Office of Inspector General Event Inquiry, ``NRC
Failure to Adequately Regulate--Millstone Unit 1,'' Case No. 95-77I.
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On December 13, 1995, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC required
that NNECO provide the NRC with additional information to describe the
actions taken to ensure that future operation of Millstone Unit 1 will
be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
Millstone Unit 1 operating license, the Commission's regulations, and
the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR. NRC concerns related to past refueling
activities at Millstone Unit 1 were a major impetus for this request.
The December 13, 1995, letter required this information to be submitted
before the plant's restart.
In January 1996, the NRC placed the Millstone facility on NRC's
``Watch List'' as a Category 2 facility. Plants in this category have
been identified as having weaknesses that warrant increased NRC
attention. The NRC staff based its actions on the numerous problems
identified by both the NRC and the Licensee and the repeated failure of
the Licensee's corrective action programs to prevent recurrence of
these problems.
On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when
both trains of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) system were
declared inoperable due to the potential to clog the HPSI discharge
throttle valves during the recirculation phase following a loss-of-
coolant accident. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 2 has not yet
restarted the plant from this shutdown.
On February 22, 1996, the Licensee issued ``ACR 7007--Event
Response Team Report,'' which describes the underlying causes for
numerous inaccuracies contained in Millstone Unit 1's UFSAR. The 7007
Report also acknowledged that because of the nature of the identified
causes, the potential existed for the presence of similar configuration
management problems at the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Units 2 and
3. In response to the 7007 Report and on the basis the NRC's own
inspections of Millstone Unit 2 indicating problems such as those
described in the 7007 Report, the NRC issued a letter on March 7, 1996,
to NNECO, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), requiring that the type of
information requested for Millstone Unit 1 on December 13, 1995, also
be provided for Millstone Unit 2. This information had to be submitted
before the plant's restart. In addition, although the NRC's
[[Page 427]]
inspection history did not indicate that similar problems existed at
Millstone Unit 3 and Haddam Neck Plant, the NRC issued a separate
letter on March 7, 1996, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) requiring the
Licensee to address the applicability of the conclusions of the 7007
Report to these plants.
Following the March 7 letters, the NRC conducted a special
inspection at Millstone Unit 3 that identified design and other
deficiencies similar to those reported in the 7007 Report. On March 30,
1996, the Licensee for Millstone Unit 3 shut down the plant after it
was determined that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary
feedwater turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did
not meet NRC requirements. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 3 has not
yet restarted the plant from this shutdown.
In a letter dated April 4, 1996, to the Licensee pursuant to 10 CFR
50.54(f), the NRC stated that an NRC special inspection team found
programmatic issues and design deficiencies at Millstone Unit 3 that
were similar to those at Millstone Units 1 and 2. Thus, by this letter,
the NRC required information for Millstone Unit 3 that was similar to
that previously required for Millstone Units 1 and 2. This information
had to be submitted before the plant's restart.
On April 8, 1996, the NRC staff held the informal public hearing
that the Petitioners requested. Information gained at this hearing was
considered in the preparation of this Partial Director's Decision and
will be considered in the preparation of the Final Director's Decision.
On May 21, 1996, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC issued a
letter to the Licensee requiring specific information regarding design
and configuration deficiencies identified at each of the Millstone
units, as well as a detailed description of the Licensee's plans for
completion of the work required to respond to the NRC's previous
letters.
By letters dated June 20 and July 2, 1996, the Licensee responded
to the NRC's letter of May 21, 1996. In its letters, the Licensee
informed the NRC that Millstone Unit 3 would be the first Millstone
unit that the Licensee planned to restart. The Licensee also described
its configuration management plan (CMP) that is intended to provide
reasonable assurance that the future operation of Millstone Unit 3 will
be conducted in accordance with its design basis.
In June 1996, at the direction of the Commission, the staff
informed the Licensee that the Millstone facility had been designated a
``Watch List'' Category 3 facility. Plants in this category have been
identified as having significant weaknesses that warrant keeping the
plant shut down until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that
adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensure
substantial improvement in the plant. This designation also requires
the NRC staff to obtain the Commission's approval before restart of the
facility.
During an August 12, 1996, meeting with the Licensee, the staff
informed the Licensee that the NRC staff believed NNECO should
establish an independent corrective action verification program to
provide additional assurance that the Licensee has effectively
corrected its configuration management problems at all Millstone units.
The NRC concluded that the Licensee's CMP was not sufficient to ensure
the correction of the problems noted at the Millstone units, given the
Licensee's history of poor performance in ensuring complete
implementation of the corrective action for both known degraded and
non-conforming conditions and past violations of NRC requirements.
In response to the staff's comments in the August 12 meeting, in a
letter dated August 13, 1996, the Licensee submitted its plan for
conducting an independent review of the results of the Licensee's CMP
regarding establishment of adequate design bases and design controls.
On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order
Establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program
(Effective Immediately) for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 (ICAVP Order).
The NRC issued the order because of the Licensee's history of poor
performance in ensuring complete implementation of corrective actions
for both known degraded and non-conforming conditions and past
violations of NRC requirements. In addition, the magnitude and scope of
the design and configuration deficiencies identified at the Millstone
units indicated ineffective implementation of oversight programs,
including the NRC-approved quality assurance program. Thus, the NRC
ordered the Licensee to obtain the services of an organization
independent of the Licensee and its design contractors to conduct a
multi-disciplinary review of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3. The ICAVP is
to provide independent verification that for the selected systems, the
Licensee's CMP has identified and resolved existing problems,
documented licensing and design bases, and established programs,
processes, and procedures for effective configuration management in the
future.
Additionally, on the basis, in part, of the UFSAR compliance
deficiencies found at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, on October 9, 1996,
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC issued letters to all operating
reactor licensees. The letters required licensees to submit information
to provide confidence and assurance that licensees are operating and
maintaining their plants within the design bases and that any design-
bases deviations are reconciled in a timely manner. Specifically, the
NRC staff required licensees to describe their configuration management
processes, provide their rationale for concluding that the design-bases
requirements have been translated into procedures, provide their
rationale for concluding that the plant configuration and performance
are consistent with the design-bases, describe their processes for
identifying and correcting design-bases problems, and provide their
assessment of the effectiveness of their current programs.
On the basis of its review and inspections of the Millstone Unit 1
SFP issues, the NRC staff has concluded that the design of the SFP and
related systems at Millstone Unit 1 was adequate to protect public
health and safety during full-core offloads.5 The staff concluded
that the probability of reaching boiling conditions in the SFP when
there has been a full-core offload would be low.
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\5\ Based on its inspection and Licensee submittals, the NRC
staff has identified some instances when the Licensee prematurely
performed full-core offloads at Millstone Unit 1. Although the
safety significance of these offloads was low, there is a regulatory
concern associated with this practice and the NRC staff is
considering enforcement action with regard to it.
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At Millstone Unit 1, the systems that have an SFP cooling
capability (i.e., SFP cooling system (SFPCS) and shutdown cooling
system (SDCS)) are designed to receive power from two separate and
independent emergency buses that can receive power from either of two
onsite power supplies following a loss of normal power. The
independence of the systems reduces the probability of an event capable
of causing a sustained loss of SFP cooling. Assuming the SFP cooling
function is lost, despite this feature, there would be a substantial
period of time available in which to restore cooling before boiling
occurs because of the large volume of water in the SFP and the reactor
cavity during refueling outages. In the unlikely event that boiling
occurs, the adverse safety impact of a boiling SFP is relatively low
because the safety systems subject to adverse environmental conditions
from
[[Page 428]]
SFP boiling would not have a necessary function when irradiated fuel
has been transferred from the reactor vessel to the SFP. The water lost
because of boiling can be replaced by the condensate system, which is a
seismic Category I safety-related makeup source, or from the fire
protection system.
In addition to the design features previously discussed, to support
its license amendment request of July 28, 1995, to conduct full-core
offloads as the normal refueling practice at Millstone Unit 1, the
Licensee further upgraded its SFP cooling capability by installing a
cross-connect between the SDCS and the SFPCS. This modification
provided a redundant train of shutdown cooling for use during full-core
offloads.
The Petitioners' supplemental letter of August 28, 1995, contained
three allegations regarding core offloading practices at other
facilities. The Petitioners noted that the allegations were given to
Mr. Galatis and that he had no firsthand knowledge of the veracity of
the allegations and did not, himself, allege the conditions exist or
existed. However, Mr. Galatis contended that, considering the source,
the allegations would appear to have substantial merit. These
allegations are addressed in the following paragraphs.
The Petitioners asserted that at Millstone Unit 2, the Licensee
engaged in violations of its Technical Specifications by offloading
more than one-third of the core into the SFP during normal end-of-cycle
refueling outages.
On the basis of the NRC staff's review of Licensee documentation,
the NRC staff found that the Licensee routinely, with justified
exceptions, conducted one-third core offloads for the Millstone Unit 2
refueling outages in accordance with its licensing basis.
The Petitioners asserted that at Millstone Unit 3, the Licensee
also engaged in full-core offloads during normal refueling outages in
violation of the applicable license amendment.
The staff found that License Amendment No. 60, dated March 31,
1991, was the applicable license amendment for current SFP storage
issues. The Licensee requested this amendment in a letter dated
November 30, 1990. In this letter, the Licensee stated that, although
the design basis had assumed that normal refueling outages would use
partial-core offloads, for Millstone Unit 3, a full-core discharge is
the actual normal refueling practice. The design-bases analyses limited
the allowed number of full-core discharges to six for the 40-year life
of the plant. The Licensee stated that, if it decides to continue
offloading a full-core as a normal event, the design basis would be
changed before it exceeded the design-basis limit of six full-core
offloads. The staff did not object to the Licensee's use of full-core
offloads when License Amendment No. 60 was issued.
The staff notes that the practice at Millstone Unit 3 is
inconsistent with the original design-basis assumptions regarding
normal RFO offloads. As was the case with Millstone Unit 1, the
Licensee was routinely performing full-core RFO offloads when the
design basis assumed partial-core offloads would be the normal RFO
offload. Since the plant was analyzed for at least six full-core
offloads and the Licensee has not exceeded this number of full-core
offloads, the safety significance of this issue is low. The staff, on a
generic basis, is considering the appropriate actions for licensees
that have been conducting full-core offloads as their routine refueling
practice when their design-basis assumptions for normal fuel offloads
were based on partial RFO offloads. The staff will take appropriate
action for Millstone Unit 3 once it makes this generic determination.
The Petitioners asserted that Seabrook Unit 1, which is operated by
the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, was also operated in
violation of the terms of its operating license by discharging the
full-core to the SFP during routine refueling outages.
The NRC staff found that all RFOs at Seabrook Unit 1 have involved
discharge of the entire core to the SFP. Neither the Seabrook Unit 1
operating license nor the plant Technical Specifications contain a
limit on the fraction of the core that may be discharged to the SFP
during refueling. The UFSAR originally did not state which type of
offload would be performed routinely. However, the UFSAR did contain
heat load assumptions. Before the first two RFO offloads, the Licensee
verified that these assumptions would not be exceeded during the RFO.
Before the third refueling outage, under the provisions of 10 CFR
50.59, the UFSAR was revised to explicitly state that full-core
discharge is routinely performed as part of a normal refueling. On the
basis of its review, the staff found that the Licensee for Seabrook
Unit 1 has conducted its core offloads in accordance with the
facility's design basis.
The Petitioners requested suspension and revocation of the
operating license for Millstone Unit 1. As previously discussed, the
relative safety significance of the full-core offloads performed at
Millstone Unit 1 is low. However, all three Millstone units have been
found to have significant design-basis deficiencies. The NRC has issued
letters to NNECO for each Millstone facility requiring that certain
information pertaining to actions taken to address design configuration
issues be submitted to the NRC and requesting its submittal before the
restart of the facilities. Additionally, the NRC has issued the ICAVP
Order to the Licensee requiring an independent verification of its
broad configuration management corrective actions before restarting of
any Millstone units.
These actions taken by the NRC are relevant to the issues raised by
the Petitioners regarding adherence by the Licensee to its licensing
basis. Further, the actions taken are much broader than those requested
by Petitioners in that Petitioners' requests were limited to the SFP
design basis at Millstone Unit 1. Thus, the NRC's actions to date
constitute a partial grant of the Petitioners' requests regarding
suspension and revocation of the operating license for Millstone Unit
1.
B. Request to Perform a Detailed Independent Analysis of the Offsite
Dose Consequences of the Total Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Water
The risk of accidents in spent fuel storage pools beyond the design
basis was examined in WASH-1400.6 In this study, it was concluded
that the risks associated with the spent fuel are orders of magnitude
below those involving the reactor core because of the simplicity of the
SFP.
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\6\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), ``Reactor Safety
Study--An Assessment of Accident Risk in U.S. Commercial Nuclear
Power Plants,'' WASH-1400, October 1975.
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This issue was reexamined in the late 1980s because (1) spent fuel
was being stored onsite instead of being reprocessed and (2) some
laboratory studies provided evidence of the possibility of fire
propagation between assemblies stored in an air-cooled environment. The
dose estimate portions of the study were performed by the Brookhaven
National Laboratory. The results of this reexamination were published
in NUREG-1353.7 The NRC staff concluded that SFP accidents beyond
the design basis did not warrant additional regulatory action because
of the large inherent safety margins in the design and construction of
the SFP.
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\7\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), ``Regulatory
Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, `Beyond Design
Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,' '' NUREG-1353, April 1989.
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Additionally, because of SFP safety questions that were first
reported to the NRC staff in November 1992 by two engineers who
formerly worked under contract for the Pennsylvania Power & Light
Company, the NRC again revisited
[[Page 429]]
this issue. The principal safety concern the staff reviewed involved
the potential for a sustained loss of SFP cooling and the potential for
a substantial loss of spent fuel coolant inventory that could expose
irradiated fuel.8
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\8\ ``Task Action Plan for Spent Fuel Storage Pool Safety.''
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The NRC staff completed its work under the task action plan in July
1996. The staff forwarded the results of its review to the Commission
on July 26, 1996.9 In the report, the staff concluded that
existing SFP structures, systems, and components provide adequate
protection for public health and safety. Protection is provided by
several layers of defense involving accident prevention (e.g., quality
controls on design, construction, and operation), accident mitigation
(e.g., multiple cooling systems and multiple makeup water paths),
radiation protection, and emergency preparedness. The staff has
reviewed and approved design features addressing each of these areas
for spent fuel storage for each operating reactor. In addition, the
limited risk analyses available for spent fuel storage suggest that
current design features and operational constraints cause issues
related to SFP storage to be a small fraction of the overall risk
associated with an operating light-water reactor.
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\9\ Memorandum to the Commission from J. Taylor, ``Resolution of
Spent Fuel Storage Pool Action Plan Issues,'' dated July 26, 1996.
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The NRC's actions to date in evaluating SFP accidents beyond the
design basis constitute a partial grant of the Petitioners' request to
perform analyses of such accidents.
C. Request for Enforcement Action Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9
The NRC staff is still considering the Petitioners' assertions that
the Licensee knowingly, willfully, and flagrantly operated Millstone
Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 and submitted
material false statements to obtain License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40,
which will be addressed in a subsequent Director's Decision.
III. Conclusion
The staff has completed its technical review of the full-core
offload issue at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, and Seabrook Unit 1. The
staff has concluded that Millstone Unit 1 could safely offload a full
core. The staff also found that Millstone Unit 3 and Seabrook Unit 1
could safely offload full cores. Additionally, the staff found that
Millstone Unit 2 was not routinely performing full-core offloads as
asserted by the Petitioners. However, the staff followup of spent fuel
pool issues raised by the Petitioners led, in part, to the
identification of a broad spectrum of configuration management concerns
that must be corrected before the restart of any Millstone unit.
The three Millstone units are currently shut down and the NRC staff
has issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an ICAVP for each
Millstone unit to ensure that the plant's physical and functional
characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design basis.
The ICAVP shall be performed and completed for each unit, to the
satisfaction of the NRC, before restart of any unit. To this extent,
Petitioners' requests for suspension and revocation of the Millstone
Unit 1 operating license are granted. In addition, the staff has
evaluated spent fuel accidents beyond the design bases and, to this
extent, Petitioners' request to perform analyses of such accidents is
granted.
A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be placed in the
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,
NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room located at
the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical
College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and at the
temporary local public document room located at the Waterford Library,
ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.
A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will also be filed with
the Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. This Partial Decision will
become the final action of the Commission (for Petitioners' requests 1,
2, and 3) 25 days after its issuance, unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes review of the Decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of December 1996.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-64 Filed 1-2-97; 8:45 am]
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