[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 2 (Friday, January 3, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 424-429]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-64]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-245]


Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Nuclear Power 
Station, Unit 1; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 
2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision with 
regard to a Petition dated August 21, 1995, and supplemented on August 
28, 1995, submitted by Mr. George Galatis and We the People, Inc. (the 
Petitioners), requesting action under 10 CFR 2.206. The Petition 
pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, operated by 
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Licensee).
    The Petitioners requested that the NRC (1) suspend the license for 
the Millstone Unit 1 facility for a period of 60 days after the unit is 
brought into compliance with the license and the design basis; (2) 
revoke the operating license until the facility is in full compliance 
with the terms and conditions of its license; (3) perform a detailed 
independent analysis of the offsite dose consequences of the total loss 
of spent fuel pool water; and (4) take enforcement action pursuant to 
10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9. As bases for their requests, the Petitioners 
raised the following three issues: (1) The Licensee has knowingly, 
willingly, and flagrantly operated Millstone Unit 1 in violation of 
License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40; (2) License Amendments Nos. 39 and 
40 for Millstone Unit 1 are based on material false statements made by 
the Licensee in documents submitted to the NRC; and (3) the license 
amendment proposed in a letter dated July 28, 1995, should be denied 
and the Licensee should be required to operate in full conformance with 
License Amendment No. 40. Issue 3 was determined to be a request for a 
licensing action and so was beyond the scope of 10 CFR 2.206.
    The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
partially granted Requests 1, 2, and 3 of the Petition. The reasons for 
this decision are explained in the ``Partial Director's Decision 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-96-23), the complete text of which 
follows this notice. With regard to Petitioner's Request 4, the NRC 
staff activities are not yet complete. A Final Director's Decision will 
be issued upon completion of NRC activities in this area.
    A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be available for 
public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public 
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers 
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, 
Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at 
the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, 
Waterford, Connecticut.
    A copy of this Partial Director's Decision has been filed with the 
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. This Decision will become the 
final action of the Commission (for Petitioners' requests dispositioned 
in this Partial Director's Decision) 25 days after the date of issuance 
unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the 
Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of December 1996.


[[Page 425]]


    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    On August 21, 1995, Mr. George Galatis and We the People, Inc. 
(Petitioners), filed a Petition with the Executive Director for 
Operations of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 
Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 
2.206). A supplement to the Petition was submitted on August 28, 1995. 
These two submittals will hereinafter be referred to as the 
``Petition.''
    The Petition raised three issues regarding the Millstone Nuclear 
Power Station, Unit 1 (Millstone Unit 1), operated by Northeast Nuclear 
Energy Company (NNECO or Licensee). First, Petitioners asserted that 
the Licensee has knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly operated 
Millstone Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40. 
Specifically, Petitioners assert that NNECO has offloaded more fuel 
assemblies into the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP) during 
refueling outages than permitted under these license amendments. 
Second, Petitioners asserted that License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 for 
Millstone Unit 1 are based on material false statements made by the 
Licensee in documents submitted to the NRC. Third, the license 
amendment proposed by the Licensee in a letter dated July 28, 1995, 
regarding offloading of the entire core of spent fuel assemblies at 
Millstone Unit 1 should be denied and the Licensee should be required 
to operate in full conformance with License Amendment No. 40.
    On the basis of these assertions, the Petitioners requested that 
the NRC institute a proceeding under 10 CFR 2.202 to suspend the 
license for the Millstone Unit 1 facility for a period of 60 days after 
the unit is brought into compliance with the license and the design 
basis and to revoke the operating license for the Millstone Unit 1 
facility until it is in full compliance with the terms and conditions 
of its license. Petitioners also requested that before reinstatement of 
the license, a detailed independent analysis of the offsite dose 
consequences of the total loss of SFP water be conducted and that the 
NRC take enforcement action against NNECO pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 and 
50.9. Finally, Petitioners requested that the license amendment sought 
by NNECO be denied.
    By letter dated October 26, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioners 
that the Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations for 
preparation of a response. The NRC also informed the Petitioners that 
the NRC staff would take appropriate action within a reasonable time 
regarding the specific concerns raised in the Petition. Additionally, 
the Petitioners were informed that their request with regard to issues 
associated with the requested license amendment (i.e., Petitioners' 
third issue) was not within the scope of 10 CFR 2.206 and thus was not 
appropriate for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206. See Pacific Gas and 
Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-
81-6, 13 NRC 443 (1981).1 Therefore, this issue will not be 
addressed in this or any subsequent Director's Decision.
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    \1\ Petitioners' concerns related to the license amendment were 
considered by the NRC staff during the license amendment review 
process. A license amendment was issued by the NRC staff on November 
9, 1995. A number of petitioners, including We the People, Inc., 
sought to intervene in the license amendment proceeding. Two 
petitioners, including We the People, Inc., were found to have 
standing to intervene and were admitted to the proceeding subject to 
the filing of at least one admissible contention. Based upon 
confirmation by counsel for these petitioners that no contention 
would be filed, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board terminated the 
proceeding on April 15, 1996.
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    Petitioners' supplement of August 28, 1995, provided additional 
information. A portion of the Petitioners' supplemental letter of 
August 28, 1995, contained assertions relating to the third issue. 
Specifically, regarding Millstone Unit 3, the Petitioners asserted that 
there is a material false statement in a submission used to support a 
previous license amendment and that there is an unanalyzed condition in 
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with regard to system 
piping not being analyzed for the full-core offload normal end-of-cycle 
event. Also, with regard to Seabrook Station Unit 1, Petitioners 
asserted that there are Technical Specification violations related to 
criticality analysis and gaps in Boraflex material. As the third issue 
is outside the scope of 10 CFR 2.206, these assertions will not be 
addressed in this or subsequent Director's Decisions. However, the 
staff is reviewing these assertions and the staff's findings will be 
forwarded to the Petitioners by separate correspondence.
    Petitioners' supplemental letter also provided additional 
information on the first issue. Specifically, the Petitioners asserted 
that the licensees for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and Seabrook Unit 1 also 
performed full-core offloads in violation of their licenses. These 
assertions will be addressed in this Partial Director's Decision.
    Petitioners' issues 1 and 2 assert wrongdoing on the part of the 
Licensee. The NRC staff has not yet completed its review of possible 
wrongdoing on the part of the Licensee and will address this issue in a 
subsequent Director's Decision.
    The NRC staff has, however, completed its technical assessment of 
core offloading practices at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 and Seabrook 
Unit 1 and these areas are discussed below. As explained below, the NRC 
staff has taken actions that, in part, address the Petitioners' 
requests.

II. Discussion

A. Requests To Revoke and Suspend the Operating License for Millstone 
Unit 1
    The Petitioners based their requests on their issues that the 
Licensee has knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly operated Millstone 
Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 and that 
License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 for Millstone Unit 1 are based on 
material false statements. Specifically, the Petitioners stated that 
the Licensee conducted full-core offloads as a routine practice when 
its licensing basis analyses assumed one-third core offloads as the 
normal refueling practice. In their August 28 supplemental letter, the 
Petitioners asserted that the licensees for Millstone Units 2 and 3 and 
Seabrook Unit 1 also performed full-core offloads in violation of their 
licenses. The Petitioners further contend that the Licensee's actions 
subjected the public to an unacceptable risk. As previously noted, the 
wrongdoing aspects of the Licensee's actions will not be addressed in 
this Director's Decision. However, the technical aspects associated 
with core offloading practices will be addressed in the following 
paragraphs. For perspective, the NRC staff's conclusions are prefaced 
by an abbreviated history of this issue.
    On October 18, 1993, the Licensee issued Licensee Event Report 
(LER) 93-11. The LER stated that the Licensee had made inappropriate 
assumptions in the analysis that was performed in support of License 
Amendment No. 40 for Millstone Unit 1. Specifically, the normal 
refueling analysis assumed a one-third core offload when Unit 1 
routinely performed full-core refueling offloads. Following issuance of 
LER 93-11, the Licensee conducted refueling

[[Page 426]]

outage (RFO) 14 in 1994. The Licensee used a waiting period between the 
one-third core offload and the full-core offload during RFO 14 to 
ensure that the SFP bulk temperature remained within the temperature 
design parameters identified in LER 93-11 and the UFSAR.
    On April 22, 1994, the NRC issued Inspection Report (IR) 50-245/94-
01, 50-336/94-01, and 50-423/94-01. The NRC staff's review of LER 93-11 
was included in this inspection report. The NRC staff found that the 
Licensee for Millstone Unit 1 had historically removed all of the fuel 
assemblies to the SFP during refueling outages. The NRC staff noted 
that this operating practice was not consistent with the spent fuel 
analysis design-basis assumptions in the UFSAR. Therefore, the NRC 
staff concluded that the Licensee had failed to maintain spent fuel 
analysis design assumptions in plant operating practices. However, 
because the violation was a Licensee-identified Severity Level IV 
violation meeting the criteria set out in Section VII.B of the NRC 
Enforcement Policy,2 a Notice of Violation was not issued. The 
purpose of this policy regarding NRC discretion for citing violations 
is to encourage and support licensee initiatives for self-
identification and correction of problems.3
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    \2\ ``General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC 
Enforcement Actions,'' at that time contained in Appendix C to 10 
CFR Part 2.
    \3\ The NRC staff, in response to Petitioners' requests, is 
evaluating possible wrongdoing associated with this violation and 
will reassess the appropriateness of exercising enforcement 
discretion when the NRC staff's review is complete.
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    From July 10 through July 14, 1995, the NRC staff conducted a 
safety inspection of several previously identified technical issues at 
Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, including the Licensee's refueling offload 
practices that were reviewed previously. The results of the inspection 
were documented in NRC IR 50-245/95-28, 50-336/95-28, and 50-423/95-28 
issued on September 1, 1995. The staff noted that during RFOs 12, 13, 
and 14, the Licensee performed full-core offloads at Millstone Unit 1. 
The staff concluded that these outages may have been performed outside 
the design basis of Millstone Unit 1. The staff also concluded that the 
Licensee did not completely and accurately describe in its submittals 
for License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 the refueling activities as they 
were actually conducted. The Licensee was routinely performing full-
core offloads during refueling outages, but the amendment submittals 
stated that ``normal'' refueling offloads were one-third core offloads. 
Enforcement action associated with the staff's findings will be taken, 
as appropriate, upon final resolution of the Petitioners' contentions 
regarding possible wrongdoing.
    On July 28, 1995, the Licensee requested a license amendment to use 
full-core offloads as the normal refueling practice at Millstone Unit 
1. The Licensee proposed plant modifications to support this license 
amendment. The staff granted the Licensee's amendment request on 
November 9, 1995. The NRC's approval of the Licensee's request was 
based on design changes, procedure revisions, and enhanced 
administrative controls that did not exist during prior refueling 
activities. In the cover letter forwarding the granted license 
amendment, the staff noted that NNECO's design and operational 
practices for full-core offloads were more conservative than NRC 
recommendations and industry standards.
    On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for 
the planned 50-day RFO 15. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 1 has not 
yet restarted the plant from this shutdown.
    In part, in response to the concerns the Petitioners raised, from 
October 24 to November 10, 1995, the NRC staff performed an inspection 
at Millstone Unit 1 to ensure the Licensee's planned refueling 
operation would be done safely and in accordance with its license, 
design basis, and plant procedures. The inspection was continued from 
March 4 to 14, 1996. The results of this Millstone Unit 1 inspection 
were documented in NRC IR 50-245/95-82, issued July 10, 1996. The NRC 
staff concluded that the Licensee could safely offload fuel for RFO 15. 
However, the inspection identified design control questions related to 
the SFP cooling system. Consequently, the staff concluded that 
additional Licensee efforts were needed to identify and correct 
deficiencies related to the Licensee's SFP cooling systems and their 
operation. Two areas of concern involved the Licensee's failure (1) to 
conduct adequate safety evaluations in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and 
(2) to take adequate design control measures in accordance with 
Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50. These items were cited as apparent 
violations. NRC is considering enforcement action associated with the 
staff's findings.
    At a public meeting on December 5, 1995, the NRC's Acting Inspector 
General stated that, based on an investigation conducted by his office, 
refueling activities at Millstone Unit 1 may not have been conducted 
consistent with the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR.4
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    \4\ The results of the investigation were documented on December 
21, 1995, in Office of Inspector General Event Inquiry, ``NRC 
Failure to Adequately Regulate--Millstone Unit 1,'' Case No. 95-77I.
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    On December 13, 1995, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC required 
that NNECO provide the NRC with additional information to describe the 
actions taken to ensure that future operation of Millstone Unit 1 will 
be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
Millstone Unit 1 operating license, the Commission's regulations, and 
the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR. NRC concerns related to past refueling 
activities at Millstone Unit 1 were a major impetus for this request. 
The December 13, 1995, letter required this information to be submitted 
before the plant's restart.
    In January 1996, the NRC placed the Millstone facility on NRC's 
``Watch List'' as a Category 2 facility. Plants in this category have 
been identified as having weaknesses that warrant increased NRC 
attention. The NRC staff based its actions on the numerous problems 
identified by both the NRC and the Licensee and the repeated failure of 
the Licensee's corrective action programs to prevent recurrence of 
these problems.
    On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when 
both trains of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) system were 
declared inoperable due to the potential to clog the HPSI discharge 
throttle valves during the recirculation phase following a loss-of-
coolant accident. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 2 has not yet 
restarted the plant from this shutdown.
    On February 22, 1996, the Licensee issued ``ACR 7007--Event 
Response Team Report,'' which describes the underlying causes for 
numerous inaccuracies contained in Millstone Unit 1's UFSAR. The 7007 
Report also acknowledged that because of the nature of the identified 
causes, the potential existed for the presence of similar configuration 
management problems at the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Units 2 and 
3. In response to the 7007 Report and on the basis the NRC's own 
inspections of Millstone Unit 2 indicating problems such as those 
described in the 7007 Report, the NRC issued a letter on March 7, 1996, 
to NNECO, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), requiring that the type of 
information requested for Millstone Unit 1 on December 13, 1995, also 
be provided for Millstone Unit 2. This information had to be submitted 
before the plant's restart. In addition, although the NRC's

[[Page 427]]

inspection history did not indicate that similar problems existed at 
Millstone Unit 3 and Haddam Neck Plant, the NRC issued a separate 
letter on March 7, 1996, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) requiring the 
Licensee to address the applicability of the conclusions of the 7007 
Report to these plants.
    Following the March 7 letters, the NRC conducted a special 
inspection at Millstone Unit 3 that identified design and other 
deficiencies similar to those reported in the 7007 Report. On March 30, 
1996, the Licensee for Millstone Unit 3 shut down the plant after it 
was determined that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary 
feedwater turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did 
not meet NRC requirements. The Licensee for Millstone Unit 3 has not 
yet restarted the plant from this shutdown.
    In a letter dated April 4, 1996, to the Licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.54(f), the NRC stated that an NRC special inspection team found 
programmatic issues and design deficiencies at Millstone Unit 3 that 
were similar to those at Millstone Units 1 and 2. Thus, by this letter, 
the NRC required information for Millstone Unit 3 that was similar to 
that previously required for Millstone Units 1 and 2. This information 
had to be submitted before the plant's restart.
    On April 8, 1996, the NRC staff held the informal public hearing 
that the Petitioners requested. Information gained at this hearing was 
considered in the preparation of this Partial Director's Decision and 
will be considered in the preparation of the Final Director's Decision.
    On May 21, 1996, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC issued a 
letter to the Licensee requiring specific information regarding design 
and configuration deficiencies identified at each of the Millstone 
units, as well as a detailed description of the Licensee's plans for 
completion of the work required to respond to the NRC's previous 
letters.
    By letters dated June 20 and July 2, 1996, the Licensee responded 
to the NRC's letter of May 21, 1996. In its letters, the Licensee 
informed the NRC that Millstone Unit 3 would be the first Millstone 
unit that the Licensee planned to restart. The Licensee also described 
its configuration management plan (CMP) that is intended to provide 
reasonable assurance that the future operation of Millstone Unit 3 will 
be conducted in accordance with its design basis.
    In June 1996, at the direction of the Commission, the staff 
informed the Licensee that the Millstone facility had been designated a 
``Watch List'' Category 3 facility. Plants in this category have been 
identified as having significant weaknesses that warrant keeping the 
plant shut down until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that 
adequate programs have been established and implemented to ensure 
substantial improvement in the plant. This designation also requires 
the NRC staff to obtain the Commission's approval before restart of the 
facility.
    During an August 12, 1996, meeting with the Licensee, the staff 
informed the Licensee that the NRC staff believed NNECO should 
establish an independent corrective action verification program to 
provide additional assurance that the Licensee has effectively 
corrected its configuration management problems at all Millstone units. 
The NRC concluded that the Licensee's CMP was not sufficient to ensure 
the correction of the problems noted at the Millstone units, given the 
Licensee's history of poor performance in ensuring complete 
implementation of the corrective action for both known degraded and 
non-conforming conditions and past violations of NRC requirements.
    In response to the staff's comments in the August 12 meeting, in a 
letter dated August 13, 1996, the Licensee submitted its plan for 
conducting an independent review of the results of the Licensee's CMP 
regarding establishment of adequate design bases and design controls.
    On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order 
Establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program 
(Effective Immediately) for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 (ICAVP Order). 
The NRC issued the order because of the Licensee's history of poor 
performance in ensuring complete implementation of corrective actions 
for both known degraded and non-conforming conditions and past 
violations of NRC requirements. In addition, the magnitude and scope of 
the design and configuration deficiencies identified at the Millstone 
units indicated ineffective implementation of oversight programs, 
including the NRC-approved quality assurance program. Thus, the NRC 
ordered the Licensee to obtain the services of an organization 
independent of the Licensee and its design contractors to conduct a 
multi-disciplinary review of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3. The ICAVP is 
to provide independent verification that for the selected systems, the 
Licensee's CMP has identified and resolved existing problems, 
documented licensing and design bases, and established programs, 
processes, and procedures for effective configuration management in the 
future.
    Additionally, on the basis, in part, of the UFSAR compliance 
deficiencies found at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, on October 9, 1996, 
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the NRC issued letters to all operating 
reactor licensees. The letters required licensees to submit information 
to provide confidence and assurance that licensees are operating and 
maintaining their plants within the design bases and that any design-
bases deviations are reconciled in a timely manner. Specifically, the 
NRC staff required licensees to describe their configuration management 
processes, provide their rationale for concluding that the design-bases 
requirements have been translated into procedures, provide their 
rationale for concluding that the plant configuration and performance 
are consistent with the design-bases, describe their processes for 
identifying and correcting design-bases problems, and provide their 
assessment of the effectiveness of their current programs.
    On the basis of its review and inspections of the Millstone Unit 1 
SFP issues, the NRC staff has concluded that the design of the SFP and 
related systems at Millstone Unit 1 was adequate to protect public 
health and safety during full-core offloads.5 The staff concluded 
that the probability of reaching boiling conditions in the SFP when 
there has been a full-core offload would be low.
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    \5\ Based on its inspection and Licensee submittals, the NRC 
staff has identified some instances when the Licensee prematurely 
performed full-core offloads at Millstone Unit 1. Although the 
safety significance of these offloads was low, there is a regulatory 
concern associated with this practice and the NRC staff is 
considering enforcement action with regard to it.
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    At Millstone Unit 1, the systems that have an SFP cooling 
capability (i.e., SFP cooling system (SFPCS) and shutdown cooling 
system (SDCS)) are designed to receive power from two separate and 
independent emergency buses that can receive power from either of two 
onsite power supplies following a loss of normal power. The 
independence of the systems reduces the probability of an event capable 
of causing a sustained loss of SFP cooling. Assuming the SFP cooling 
function is lost, despite this feature, there would be a substantial 
period of time available in which to restore cooling before boiling 
occurs because of the large volume of water in the SFP and the reactor 
cavity during refueling outages. In the unlikely event that boiling 
occurs, the adverse safety impact of a boiling SFP is relatively low 
because the safety systems subject to adverse environmental conditions 
from

[[Page 428]]

SFP boiling would not have a necessary function when irradiated fuel 
has been transferred from the reactor vessel to the SFP. The water lost 
because of boiling can be replaced by the condensate system, which is a 
seismic Category I safety-related makeup source, or from the fire 
protection system.
    In addition to the design features previously discussed, to support 
its license amendment request of July 28, 1995, to conduct full-core 
offloads as the normal refueling practice at Millstone Unit 1, the 
Licensee further upgraded its SFP cooling capability by installing a 
cross-connect between the SDCS and the SFPCS. This modification 
provided a redundant train of shutdown cooling for use during full-core 
offloads.
    The Petitioners' supplemental letter of August 28, 1995, contained 
three allegations regarding core offloading practices at other 
facilities. The Petitioners noted that the allegations were given to 
Mr. Galatis and that he had no firsthand knowledge of the veracity of 
the allegations and did not, himself, allege the conditions exist or 
existed. However, Mr. Galatis contended that, considering the source, 
the allegations would appear to have substantial merit. These 
allegations are addressed in the following paragraphs.
    The Petitioners asserted that at Millstone Unit 2, the Licensee 
engaged in violations of its Technical Specifications by offloading 
more than one-third of the core into the SFP during normal end-of-cycle 
refueling outages.
    On the basis of the NRC staff's review of Licensee documentation, 
the NRC staff found that the Licensee routinely, with justified 
exceptions, conducted one-third core offloads for the Millstone Unit 2 
refueling outages in accordance with its licensing basis.
    The Petitioners asserted that at Millstone Unit 3, the Licensee 
also engaged in full-core offloads during normal refueling outages in 
violation of the applicable license amendment.
    The staff found that License Amendment No. 60, dated March 31, 
1991, was the applicable license amendment for current SFP storage 
issues. The Licensee requested this amendment in a letter dated 
November 30, 1990. In this letter, the Licensee stated that, although 
the design basis had assumed that normal refueling outages would use 
partial-core offloads, for Millstone Unit 3, a full-core discharge is 
the actual normal refueling practice. The design-bases analyses limited 
the allowed number of full-core discharges to six for the 40-year life 
of the plant. The Licensee stated that, if it decides to continue 
offloading a full-core as a normal event, the design basis would be 
changed before it exceeded the design-basis limit of six full-core 
offloads. The staff did not object to the Licensee's use of full-core 
offloads when License Amendment No. 60 was issued.
    The staff notes that the practice at Millstone Unit 3 is 
inconsistent with the original design-basis assumptions regarding 
normal RFO offloads. As was the case with Millstone Unit 1, the 
Licensee was routinely performing full-core RFO offloads when the 
design basis assumed partial-core offloads would be the normal RFO 
offload. Since the plant was analyzed for at least six full-core 
offloads and the Licensee has not exceeded this number of full-core 
offloads, the safety significance of this issue is low. The staff, on a 
generic basis, is considering the appropriate actions for licensees 
that have been conducting full-core offloads as their routine refueling 
practice when their design-basis assumptions for normal fuel offloads 
were based on partial RFO offloads. The staff will take appropriate 
action for Millstone Unit 3 once it makes this generic determination.
    The Petitioners asserted that Seabrook Unit 1, which is operated by 
the North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, was also operated in 
violation of the terms of its operating license by discharging the 
full-core to the SFP during routine refueling outages.
    The NRC staff found that all RFOs at Seabrook Unit 1 have involved 
discharge of the entire core to the SFP. Neither the Seabrook Unit 1 
operating license nor the plant Technical Specifications contain a 
limit on the fraction of the core that may be discharged to the SFP 
during refueling. The UFSAR originally did not state which type of 
offload would be performed routinely. However, the UFSAR did contain 
heat load assumptions. Before the first two RFO offloads, the Licensee 
verified that these assumptions would not be exceeded during the RFO. 
Before the third refueling outage, under the provisions of 10 CFR 
50.59, the UFSAR was revised to explicitly state that full-core 
discharge is routinely performed as part of a normal refueling. On the 
basis of its review, the staff found that the Licensee for Seabrook 
Unit 1 has conducted its core offloads in accordance with the 
facility's design basis.
    The Petitioners requested suspension and revocation of the 
operating license for Millstone Unit 1. As previously discussed, the 
relative safety significance of the full-core offloads performed at 
Millstone Unit 1 is low. However, all three Millstone units have been 
found to have significant design-basis deficiencies. The NRC has issued 
letters to NNECO for each Millstone facility requiring that certain 
information pertaining to actions taken to address design configuration 
issues be submitted to the NRC and requesting its submittal before the 
restart of the facilities. Additionally, the NRC has issued the ICAVP 
Order to the Licensee requiring an independent verification of its 
broad configuration management corrective actions before restarting of 
any Millstone units.
    These actions taken by the NRC are relevant to the issues raised by 
the Petitioners regarding adherence by the Licensee to its licensing 
basis. Further, the actions taken are much broader than those requested 
by Petitioners in that Petitioners' requests were limited to the SFP 
design basis at Millstone Unit 1. Thus, the NRC's actions to date 
constitute a partial grant of the Petitioners' requests regarding 
suspension and revocation of the operating license for Millstone Unit 
1.
B. Request to Perform a Detailed Independent Analysis of the Offsite 
Dose Consequences of the Total Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Water
    The risk of accidents in spent fuel storage pools beyond the design 
basis was examined in WASH-1400.6 In this study, it was concluded 
that the risks associated with the spent fuel are orders of magnitude 
below those involving the reactor core because of the simplicity of the 
SFP.
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    \6\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), ``Reactor Safety 
Study--An Assessment of Accident Risk in U.S. Commercial Nuclear 
Power Plants,'' WASH-1400, October 1975.
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    This issue was reexamined in the late 1980s because (1) spent fuel 
was being stored onsite instead of being reprocessed and (2) some 
laboratory studies provided evidence of the possibility of fire 
propagation between assemblies stored in an air-cooled environment. The 
dose estimate portions of the study were performed by the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory. The results of this reexamination were published 
in NUREG-1353.7 The NRC staff concluded that SFP accidents beyond 
the design basis did not warrant additional regulatory action because 
of the large inherent safety margins in the design and construction of 
the SFP.
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    \7\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), ``Regulatory 
Analysis for the Resolution of Generic Issue 82, `Beyond Design 
Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools,' '' NUREG-1353, April 1989.
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    Additionally, because of SFP safety questions that were first 
reported to the NRC staff in November 1992 by two engineers who 
formerly worked under contract for the Pennsylvania Power & Light 
Company, the NRC again revisited

[[Page 429]]

this issue. The principal safety concern the staff reviewed involved 
the potential for a sustained loss of SFP cooling and the potential for 
a substantial loss of spent fuel coolant inventory that could expose 
irradiated fuel.8
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    \8\ ``Task Action Plan for Spent Fuel Storage Pool Safety.''
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    The NRC staff completed its work under the task action plan in July 
1996. The staff forwarded the results of its review to the Commission 
on July 26, 1996.9 In the report, the staff concluded that 
existing SFP structures, systems, and components provide adequate 
protection for public health and safety. Protection is provided by 
several layers of defense involving accident prevention (e.g., quality 
controls on design, construction, and operation), accident mitigation 
(e.g., multiple cooling systems and multiple makeup water paths), 
radiation protection, and emergency preparedness. The staff has 
reviewed and approved design features addressing each of these areas 
for spent fuel storage for each operating reactor. In addition, the 
limited risk analyses available for spent fuel storage suggest that 
current design features and operational constraints cause issues 
related to SFP storage to be a small fraction of the overall risk 
associated with an operating light-water reactor.
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    \9\ Memorandum to the Commission from J. Taylor, ``Resolution of 
Spent Fuel Storage Pool Action Plan Issues,'' dated July 26, 1996.
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    The NRC's actions to date in evaluating SFP accidents beyond the 
design basis constitute a partial grant of the Petitioners' request to 
perform analyses of such accidents.
C. Request for Enforcement Action Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.9
    The NRC staff is still considering the Petitioners' assertions that 
the Licensee knowingly, willfully, and flagrantly operated Millstone 
Unit 1 in violation of License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 and submitted 
material false statements to obtain License Amendments Nos. 39 and 40, 
which will be addressed in a subsequent Director's Decision.

III. Conclusion

    The staff has completed its technical review of the full-core 
offload issue at Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, and Seabrook Unit 1. The 
staff has concluded that Millstone Unit 1 could safely offload a full 
core. The staff also found that Millstone Unit 3 and Seabrook Unit 1 
could safely offload full cores. Additionally, the staff found that 
Millstone Unit 2 was not routinely performing full-core offloads as 
asserted by the Petitioners. However, the staff followup of spent fuel 
pool issues raised by the Petitioners led, in part, to the 
identification of a broad spectrum of configuration management concerns 
that must be corrected before the restart of any Millstone unit.
    The three Millstone units are currently shut down and the NRC staff 
has issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an ICAVP for each 
Millstone unit to ensure that the plant's physical and functional 
characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design basis. 
The ICAVP shall be performed and completed for each unit, to the 
satisfaction of the NRC, before restart of any unit. To this extent, 
Petitioners' requests for suspension and revocation of the Millstone 
Unit 1 operating license are granted. In addition, the staff has 
evaluated spent fuel accidents beyond the design bases and, to this 
extent, Petitioners' request to perform analyses of such accidents is 
granted.
    A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be placed in the 
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room located at 
the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical 
College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut, and at the 
temporary local public document room located at the Waterford Library, 
ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut.
    A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will also be filed with 
the Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. This Partial Decision will 
become the final action of the Commission (for Petitioners' requests 1, 
2, and 3) 25 days after its issuance, unless the Commission, on its own 
motion, institutes review of the Decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of December 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-64 Filed 1-2-97; 8:45 am]
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