[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 249 (Thursday, December 26, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 68014-68026]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-32759]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
for Stockpile Stewardship and Management

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of 
Decision for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, the 
program through which DOE carries out its statutory responsibility for 
the United States nuclear weapons program. This Record of Decision is 
based on the information and analysis contained in the Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management (DOE/EIS-0236) and other factors, including 
the mission responsibilities of the Department, and comments received 
on the Draft and Final PEIS. DOE's decisions will continue the ongoing 
Office of Defense Programs missions at eight DOE sites, making 
appropriate adjustments consistent with post-Cold War national security 
policies. Selected facilities for enhanced experimental capability will 
be constructed and operated; manufacturing capability at existing 
weapons industrial plants will be maintained; however, manufacturing 
capacity will be appropriately downsized; plutonium pit component 
manufacturing capability will be reestablished.
    More specifically, for Stockpile Stewardship, the Department has

[[Page 68015]]

decided to: (1) Construct and operate the National Ignition Facility at 
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; (2) construct and operate 
the Contained Firing Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory; and (3) construct and operate the Atlas Facility at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory. Additionally, the Department has decided to 
transfer a small amount of plutonium-242 material from the Savannah 
River Site to the Los Alamos National Laboratory to support stockpile 
stewardship activities.
    With respect to Stockpile Management, the Department has decided 
to: (1) Downsize weapons assembly/disassembly capacity at the Pantex 
Plant; (2) downsize high explosive component fabrication capacity at 
the Pantex Plant; (3) downsize weapons secondary and case component 
fabrication capacity at the Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation; 
(4) downsize weapons nonnuclear component fabrication capacity at the 
Kansas City Plant; and (5) reestablish pit fabrication capability, with 
a small capacity, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, or this Record of 
Decision, please call 800-776-2765, or write to: Jay Rose, Director, 
Reconfiguration Group, Office of Technical and Environmental Support, 
DP-45, United States Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, 
Washington, D.C. 20585.
    The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program maintains an 
Internet Home Page at http://web.fie.com/fedix/doeoor.html. This can 
also be accessed by modem by dialing toll-free (800) 783-3349 or (301) 
258-0953 in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
    For information on the DOE's National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, United States Department of Energy, 
1000 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Since the inception of nuclear weapons in the 1940s, DOE and its 
predecessor agencies have been responsible for the stewardship and 
management of the nation's stockpile. Through the system of national 
laboratories and industrial facilities known collectively as the 
Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex), DOE has provided the nation with 
nuclear weapons and ensured that those weapons remain safe and 
reliable. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS analyzes the 
potential consequences to human health and the environment if certain 
changes to the Complex are implemented to support DOE's Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Program.
    The term ``stockpile stewardship'' refers to core competencies in 
activities associated with research, design, development, and testing 
of nuclear weapons, and the assessment and certification of their 
safety and reliability under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Historically, these activities have been performed at the three DOE 
weapons laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, and Sandia 
National Laboratories in New Mexico and California) and the Nevada Test 
Site. The term ``stockpile management'' refers to core competencies in 
activities associated with the production, maintenance, surveillance, 
and disassembly of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. Historically, 
these activities have been performed at the DOE nuclear weapons 
industrial facilities (currently, the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee, the 
Kansas City Plant in Missouri, the Pantex Plant in Texas and the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina).
    In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world's 
political regimes, the emphasis of the United States nuclear weapons 
program has shifted dramatically from developing and producing new-
design weapons to dismantlement and maintenance of a smaller enduring 
stockpile. In accordance with national security policy, including the 
terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START) Treaties, the 
nuclear weapons stockpile is being significantly reduced. The United 
States is no longer producing new-design nuclear weapons, and DOE has 
closed or consolidated some of its former weapons industrial 
facilities. Additionally, in 1992, the United States declared a 
moratorium on underground nuclear testing. President Clinton extended 
this moratorium and decided, in August 1995, to pursue a ``zero-yield'' 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that he signed in September 1996.
    Even with these significant changes, however, DOE's 
responsibilities for the nuclear weapons stockpile continue. The 
President and Congress have directed DOE to maintain the core 
intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear 
weapons and to maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring 
nuclear weapons stockpile. In response to this direction, DOE has 
developed a science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program 
to provide a single, highly integrated technical program for 
maintaining core competencies and ensuring the continued safety and 
reliability of the stockpile. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management 
Program has evolved from programs that served this mission over 
previous decades.
    With no new-design nuclear weapons production, DOE expects existing 
weapons to remain in the stockpile well into the next century. This 
means that the weapons will age beyond original expectations. Because 
underground nuclear testing will no longer be available, alternative 
means must be developed in order to assess and certify the weapons' 
continued safety and reliability. To meet these new challenges, DOE's 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has been developed to 
increase understanding of the basic phenomena associated with nuclear 
weapons, to provide better predictive understanding of the safety and 
reliability of weapons, and to ensure a strong scientific and technical 
basis for future United States nuclear weapons policy objectives.
    DOE prepared this Record of Decision pursuant to the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations for implementing the procedural 
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 CFR 
Parts 1500-1508) and the Department of Energy regulations implementing 
NEPA (10 CFR Part 1021). In making this Record of Decision for the 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, the Department considered 
the analysis from the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(PEIS) for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (DOE/EIS-
0236), issued in November 1996, along with other factors such as DOE 
statutory mission requirements, national security policy, cost, 
schedule, and technical risks. Additional technical descriptions and 
assessments of cost, schedule and technical risk are found in the 
Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives (DOE/AL, July 1996), the 
Stockpile Management Preferred Alternatives Report (DOE/AL, July 1996), 
and the Technology Basis and Site Comparison Evaluation for the 
National Ignition Facility (DOE/OAK, September 1996).

[[Page 68016]]

    In February 1996, DOE published the Draft PEIS for Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management, which evaluated the siting, construction, 
and operation of proposed stockpile stewardship facilities and the 
siting, construction, and operation of facilities proposed for 
stockpile management at eight alternative sites within the Complex. The 
60-day public comment period for the Draft PEIS began on March 8, 1996, 
and ended on May 7, 1996.
    During the comment period, public meetings were held in Los Alamos, 
Albuquerque and Santa Fe, New Mexico; North Las Vegas, Nevada; Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee; Kansas City, Missouri; Livermore, California; 
Washington, D.C.; Amarillo, Texas; and North Augusta, South Carolina. 
In response to requests from the public, five of the public meetings 
were joint meetings to obtain comments on both the Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS and the Department's Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft PEIS, which were 
being prepared concurrently. Two of the joint meetings (Amarillo and 
North Augusta) also addressed issues associated with another EIS then 
in preparation, the Site-Wide Draft Environmental Impact Statement for 
the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of 
Nuclear Weapon Components. In addition, the public was encouraged to 
provide comments via mail, fax, electronic bulletin board (Internet), 
and telephone (toll-free 800 number).
    Volume IV of the Final PEIS, the Comment Response Document, 
describes the public comment process in detail, presents comment 
summaries and responses, and provides copies of all comments received.
    The PEIS includes a classified appendix that provides additional 
information about weapons physics as it relates to the proposed actions 
for enhanced experimental capability, the stewardship need for 
plutonium-242 and its transfer to a weapons laboratory, and a number of 
the classified appendices to unclassified documents summarized or 
referenced in the PEIS. Applicable regulations provide that 
Environmental Impact Statements which address classified proposals may 
be restricted from public dissemination; consistent with the 
regulations, however, the Department has organized the PEIS so that 
classified information is segregated in order that the unclassified 
portions can be made available to the public [40 CFR 1507.3; 10 CFR 
1021.340(a)].
    For the National Ignition Facility, Contained Firing Facility, and 
the Atlas Facility, the PEIS included project specific environmental 
analyses (Appendices I, J and K of the PEIS) to address the detailed 
environmental impacts associated with siting, construction and 
operation. Based upon this Record of Decision, the Department intends 
to proceed with the construction and operation of these three 
facilities with no further National Environmental Policy Act reviews.

Proposed Actions

    Broadly stated, all of the existing basic capabilities of the 
Complex continue to be required both technically and by national 
security policy objectives established by the President and Congress. 
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS concentrates on three 
major proposed actions that result from the national security policy 
constraints placed on the Program. The three major proposed actions 
are: (1) Providing enhanced experimental capability; (2) rightsizing 
the industrial base; and (3) reestablishing manufacturing capability 
and a small capacity for plutonium pit components (the pit is the 
central core of a nuclear weapon containing plutonium and/or highly 
enriched uranium that is surrounded by a layer of high explosive). 
Additionally, the Department considered the transfer of a small amount 
of plutonium-242 from the Savannah River Site to Los Alamos National 
Laboratory or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in support of 
stockpile stewardship activities.

1. Proposed Action (1)--Providing Enhanced Experimental Capability for 
Stockpile Stewardship

    Historically, nuclear testing provided the Department with an 
unambiguous high confidence in the safety and reliability of weapons in 
the stockpile. As described in Chapters 2 and 3 of the PEIS, without 
underground nuclear testing, DOE must rely on experimental and 
computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to assess 
and predict the consequences of problems that may occur in an aging 
stockpile.
    DOE concluded that other approaches to stockpile stewardship would 
not ensure nuclear weapon safety and reliability, and that such 
approaches are therefore not reasonable. In addition, DOE concluded 
that only the three facilities discussed below are sufficiently well 
understood that they could be proposed and evaluated in detail in the 
PEIS (see Section 3.1.2 of the PEIS, and the sections below entitled, 
``Next Generation Experimental Facilities for Stockpile Stewardship,'' 
and ``Other Considerations.'')
    DOE has considered that there are differing opinions on the 
technical merit of DOE's proposed actions with regard to enhanced 
experimental capability. Nuclear weapons design information, including 
the complex physics of nuclear weapon explosions, is generally 
classified for reasons of national security and nonproliferation. Even 
if this information were unclassified, the physics problems remain 
extremely complex; hence, the reason why nuclear testing was so 
important to the past program. Both the classification of information 
and technical complexity of the issues form natural barriers to public 
communication. The technical complexity, alone, engenders significant 
debate among qualified experts, especially in the area of high energy 
density physics.
    The PEIS attempts to explain the weapon physics issues in an 
unclassified, comprehensible manner regarding its relation to mission 
purpose and need (Chapter 2), proposed actions and alternatives 
(Section 3.3), and project-specific technical detail (Volume III). In 
the absence of nuclear testing, there are two basic alternatives: (1) 
Rely on existing facilities, as described by the No Action alternative, 
as sources of experimental data; and (2) pursue the enhanced capability 
of the proposed facilities to provide the sources of experimental data 
needed.
    The nuclear weapons phenomena involved in enhanced experimental 
capability can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) Physics of 
nuclear weapons primaries (the primary contains the main high explosive 
and the plutonium pit); (2) physics of nuclear weapons secondaries (the 
secondary contains highly enriched uranium, lithium deuteride and other 
materials to produce a thermonuclear explosion); and (3) weapons 
effects (the effects of radiation on nuclear weapons and military 
systems). Because there are no proposed actions in the PEIS for new 
facilities designed primarily for weapons effects testing, this issue 
is not discussed further in this Record of Decision. The physics of 
nuclear weapons primaries and secondaries are described below, as well 
as alternatives that are assessed in the PEIS. More detail on the 
physics of nuclear weapons can be found in Section 2.4.1, 3.3, and 
Appendices I and K of the PEIS.

[[Page 68017]]

1.A. Physics of Nuclear Weapons Primaries
    With respect to the physics phenomena from the implosion of the 
primary, experimental facilities provide physics and computational 
model validation, material behavior information, improved understanding 
of the implosion and the ability to assess the effects of defects. 
Proposed new facilities and site alternatives considered, along with 
the existing facilities which are part of the No Action alternative, 
are discussed below.
    1.A.1  Alternatives.  1.A.1.1  No Action.  The principal diagnostic 
tools DOE currently uses to study initiation of nuclear weapons 
primaries are hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments (see Section 
3.3 of the PEIS). Under the No Action alternative, DOE would continue 
to use the hydrodynamic and dynamic testing facilities currently 
available at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Nevada Test Site (NTS), including 
the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility currently 
under construction at LANL (see Section 1.6.2 of the PEIS).
    1.A.1.2  Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the Contained 
Firing Facility (CFF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). 
Under this alternative, the capabilities of the CFF would be added to 
the existing facilities at LLNL used to study the physics of primaries. 
Specifically, the CFF would be an addition to the existing Flash X-Ray 
Facility (FXR) at LLNL Site 300, Building 801. The facility would 
provide an enclosed blast chamber to contain debris from high explosive 
experiments that support the stockpile stewardship program. The 
containment enclosure would reduce the environmental, safety, and 
health impacts of current outdoor testing. The enclosure would also 
improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing by better 
controlling experimental conditions. Because the CFF is an upgrade to 
an existing facility, sites other than Building 801, at LLNL, would 
have significant technical disadvantages, and were not evaluated in 
detail.
    1.A.2  Comparison of Alternatives.  1.A.2.1 Cost and Technical 
Factors. The CFF addition to the existing FXR Facility would cost about 
$50 million to construct and take about two years to complete. The CFF 
would improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing. 
Improving diagnostic capability to understand weapon primary behavior 
is crucial to DOE's ability to continue to certify the safety and 
reliability of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
    1.A.2.2  Environmental Factors. DOE prepared a Project Specific 
Analysis (Appendix J of the PEIS) to address the environmental impacts 
associated with construction and operation of the CFF. Because the 
proposal for the CFF involves modification to the existing FXR 
Facility, construction impacts would be negligible. Very little land 
would be disturbed (less than 1 acre) and the construction activities 
would largely involve internal modifications to the existing facility.
    Impacts associated with operation would also be negligible. The CFF 
enclosure would reduce gaseous and particulate air emissions from 
explosives testing, reduce the generation of solid low-level 
radioactive waste, reduce testing noise, and improve the safety of 
testing by controlling fragment dispersion. The CFF would not utilize 
any significant quantities of natural resources, and would not cause 
any significant socioeconomic impacts at LLNL. LLNL has adequate 
existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of 
wastes that would be generated by the CFF. Impacts to human health from 
CFF operation are expected to be within regulatory limits, and 
extremely small.
    1.A.3  Environmentally Preferable Alternative.  The environmentally 
preferable alternative is to construct and operate the CFF as an 
addition to FXR, at LLNL. Although this alternative would require 
construction and additional land utilization, the impacts associated 
with the construction and operation of this facility are minor and 
offset by the environmental benefits of the CFF. The CFF would contain 
releases to the atmosphere from the conventional high explosive 
detonations presently being conducted uncontained at the FXR Facility, 
which would continue operation under the No Action alternative.
    1.A.4  Decision.  DOE's decision is to proceed with the 
construction and operation of the CFF at Site 300, Building 801, at 
LLNL. This action is consistent with existing operations at Site 300 
and LLNL land-use plans and policies.
    Mitigation. The mitigation measures appropriate to the CFF 
construction and operation will be formalized in a CFF Mitigation 
Action Plan. The plan will be issued by the DOE and monitored for 
compliance by its representatives during construction and operation of 
the CFF. Construction and operation of the CFF are not expected to 
incur environmental impacts other than those associated with a 
temporary construction lay-down area. Dust suppression and storm water 
runoff mitigation technologies will be applied to reduce these impacts 
to insignificance. A preconstruction survey monitoring for endangered 
species will be conducted no more than 60 days prior to construction 
start-up.
1.B. Physics of Nuclear Weapons Secondaries
    The energy released by the fission of the nuclear weapons primary 
activates the secondary assembly, creating a thermonuclear (fusion) 
explosion. However, the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries deals 
with the interaction of many dynamic physics processes, including 
hydrodynamics, thermodynamics, fission, and fusion. Experimental 
facilities provide improved understanding of thermonuclear ignition, 
secondary physics and computational model validation, and material 
behavior information. These facilities will also be useful for 
investigating other physics phenomena related to the nuclear weapon 
primary and weapons effects (see Appendices I and K of the PEIS).
    1.B.1  Alternatives.  1.B.1.1  No Action. The No Action alternative 
would limit DOE to the use of existing facilities. The principal 
facilities currently available are the Nova Facility at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and the Pegasus II Facility at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
    1.B.1.2  Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the National 
Ignition Facility (NIF). Under this alternative, the capabilities of 
the NIF would add to the existing facilities used to study the physics 
of secondaries. The NIF would house the world's most powerful laser, 
focusing 192 laser beams onto a target containing isotopes of hydrogen. 
NIF experiments are designed to address, to various degrees, certain 
weapons issues connected with fusion ignition and boosting; weapon 
effects; radiation transport; and secondary implosion, ignition, and 
output. Most of these processes occur at very high energy density 
(i.e., at high temperatures and pressures) and are relevant to a 
weapon's performance. The NIF would achieve higher temperatures and 
pressures, albeit in a very small volume, than any other existing or 
proposed stockpile stewardship facility. The energy available to 
conduct experiments with the NIF would be about 50 times that available 
with Nova. Five alternative locations at four DOE sites were studied 
for the NIF: LLNL, LANL, NTS--Area 22 main site location

[[Page 68018]]

and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), and Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL), New Mexico.
    1.B.1.3  Action Alternative--Construct and Operate the Atlas 
Facility. Under this alternative, the Atlas Facility would be added to 
the existing facilities used to study the physics of secondaries. The 
Atlas Facility, a pulsed-power experimental facility that builds upon 
special equipment existing at LANL TA-35 (the technical area which 
contains the existing pulsed-power infrastructure), would provide the 
capability to create pressures and volumes necessary to accurately 
benchmark weapon-related computational predictions. The need to perform 
experiments with macroscopic pulsed-power targets, as well as with 
lasers, exists not only because of the limits of measurement 
diagnostics and improved ease of measurement at larger scale, but also 
because some of the physical phenomena that must be investigated cannot 
readily be scaled down to smaller sizes without affecting some 
parameters of importance. Existing facilities are not adequate to 
analyze some secondary physics issues.
    1.B.2  Comparison of Alternatives. The capabilities that would be 
provided by the two proposed facilities, the NIF and the Atlas 
Facility, are independent components needed to improve the 
understanding of the physics of nuclear weapon secondaries. As 
explained in Section 3.3 and Appendices I and K of the PEIS, because 
each facility responds to a different need and provides different 
capabilities related to nuclear weapons secondaries, they are 
complementary proposals.
    1.B.2.1  Cost and Technical Factors. National Ignition Facility. 
Total capital costs for construction of the NIF at LLNL would be 
approximately $1.1 billion. The capital and life-cycle comparative cost 
evaluation indicates the LLNL site will have the lowest capital and the 
lowest overall costs (by about 5%) of the alternative sites considered. 
Construction is anticipated to take about five years.
    In regard to technical risk, LLNL has the most extensive experience 
in developing, designing, constructing, and operating high power, 
large-aperture, solid-state lasers and optical components. The 
extensive solid-state laser infrastructure, equipment, and facilities 
at LLNL exceed those of the alternative sites. LLNL has improved this 
infrastructure continuously as it has built a succession of highly 
sophisticated solid-state lasers. LLNL also has the most extensive 
surrounding high-technology infrastructure.
    The Inertial Confinement Fusion Program (ICF) and the NIF have been 
supported by a succession of independent technical reviews conducted by 
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the Fusion Policy Advisory 
Committee (FPAC), the Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee 
(ICFAC), and the JASON Committee (a group of independent experts who 
evaluated the Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program). 
These reviews enabled the Department to plan the next reasonable steps 
to further the pursuit of ICF goals and to evaluate their relationship 
to SBSS. In September 1990, the NAS concluded that a solid state glass 
laser, as proposed for NIF, was the only driver capable of achieving 
ignition within a decade. Also in September 1990, as part of the 
Inertial Fusion Energy plan, the FPAC urged support for the ICF 
ignition facility, driven by a solid state glass laser as recommended 
by the NAS, as the most important next step in the investigation of 
inertial fusion energy's potential. In May 1994, the ICFAC stated that 
they believed that the ICF research and development program has a key 
role to play in ``science-based stewardship.'' They continued by saying 
that an essential ingredient in this role will be the achievement of 
ignition of a fusion capsule in the laboratory. In February 1996, their 
final report concludes that good progress in target physics continues 
and that DOE should proceed with the next step in the NIF project. In 
November 1994, the JASON Committee strongly endorsed the NIF, calling 
it ``the most scientifically valuable of the programs proposed for 
SBSS.'' They did not identify any other technologies that could provide 
the technical capabilities of the NIF. In March 1996, the JASON 
Committee reiterated their previous comment about the NIF and further 
concluded, ``that the present ICF Program does make an important 
contribution to SBSS, and that the NIF will substantially increase this 
contribution * * *'' The committee recommended proceeding with the NIF.
    Atlas Facility. Capital costs to build the Atlas Facility are 
estimated to be about $43 million. Construction will take about four 
years. Because LANL has more extensive expertise in microsecond pulsed-
power than any other DOE site, and because the Atlas Facility would 
utilize the extensive existing infrastructure and special equipment 
available at LANL, no other DOE sites were considered for the Atlas 
Facility. Proceeding with the construction of the Atlas Facility is 
also consistent with the November 1994 JASON Committee review mentioned 
above.
    1.B.2.2  Environmental Factors. National Ignition Facility. DOE 
prepared a Project Specific Analysis (Appendix I of the PEIS) to 
address the environmental impacts associated with construction and 
operation of the NIF. Potential environmental impacts were assessed for 
the No Action alternative and two design capabilities (i.e., Conceptual 
Design and Enhanced Design options) at all five candidate locations.
    The analysis indicates that there would be few differences in the 
environmental impacts between the candidate sites and little 
environmental impact in any case. The maximum daily particulate matter 
concentration in the air during site clearing would exceed applicable 
air quality standards for suspended particles less than 10 microns in 
diameter (PM10) at LLNL and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). 
However, the ambient air quality impacts would be localized and of 
short duration. Land requirements would be greatest at NTS (45.0 
acres), although this acreage is less that 1 percent of the uncommitted 
land at NTS. Conversely, the least amount of uncommitted land that 
would be required for NIF would be 7.9 acres at the NLVF. However, this 
acreage represents the largest percentage of uncommitted land at a 
candidate site (56 percent). Of greater significance would be the 
quality of the habitat of the uncommitted land that would be affected 
by NIF construction. The highest quality habitats that would be 
affected are forest (9.9 acres) at LANL or desert (45 acres) at NTS. At 
the other candidate sites, habitat disturbance would occur to 
previously disturbed grassland (LLNL and SNL) or to an area of sparse 
vegetation (NLVF). The risk to the public from a facility accident 
involving the release of radioactive material would be greatest at NLVF 
and SNL, although the potential for the actual occurrence of such an 
accident would be extremely low.
    Atlas Facility. DOE prepared a Project Specific Analysis (Appendix 
K of the PEIS) to address the environmental impacts associated with 
construction and operation of the Atlas Facility. Because the proposal 
for the Atlas Facility involves modification to the existing facilities 
within LANL's TA-35, construction impacts are expected to be small. 
Very little land (0.1 acre) would be disturbed and the construction 
activities would largely involve internal modifications to existing 
facilities.
    Impacts associated with operations would also be negligible. The 
Atlas

[[Page 68019]]

Facility would not utilize any significant quantities of natural 
resources, would not cause any significant socioeconomic changes at 
LANL, and would not generate significant quantities of wastes. LANL has 
adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and 
dispose of wastes that would be generated by the Atlas Facility. 
Impacts to human health from Atlas Facility operations are expected to 
be small and within regulatory limits.
    1.B.3 Environmentally Preferable Alternative. National Ignition 
Facility. The environmentally preferable alternative is the No Action 
alternative. However, in the absence of underground nuclear testing, it 
is the Department's technical judgment that its ability to carry out 
its statutory mission responsibilities would be impaired without the 
capabilities that would be provided by the NIF. For this reason, the No 
Action alternative with regard to the NIF is not reasonable.
    Based on the PEIS analysis of the action alternatives, siting the 
NIF at LLNL would have low or no adverse environmental impacts for most 
environmental resource categories (land use, air quality and noise, 
water biota, cultural, paleontologic, socioeconomic, human health, and 
waste management) and would have the highest beneficial socioeconomic 
impacts, compared to other site alternatives. After balancing the 
overall potential environmental impacts at the other candidate sites 
against LLNL, DOE concluded that none of the alternative candidate 
sites is environmentally preferable to LLNL for the NIF.
    Atlas Facility. The environmentally preferable alternative is the 
No Action alternative. However, in the absence of underground nuclear 
testing, it is the Department's technical judgment that its ability to 
carry out its statutory mission responsibilities would be impaired 
without the capabilities that would be provided by the Atlas Facility. 
For this reason, the No Action alternative with regard to the Atlas 
Facility is not reasonable.
    Because the Atlas Facility would rely upon existing facilities and 
special equipment already located at LANL, no additional site 
alternatives were analyzed. As discussed above, the single action 
alternative, to construct and operate the Atlas Facility at LANL TA-35, 
would result in negligible environmental impact.
    1.B.4 Decision. National Ignition Facility. DOE's decision is to 
proceed with the construction and operation of the NIF (enhanced design 
option) at LLNL. Without the improved experimental capabilities offered 
by the NIF, DOE would lack the ability to evaluate significant weapon 
performance issues, which could adversely affect confidence in the 
nation's nuclear deterrent. Among the alternatives determined to be 
reasonable, construction and operation of the NIF at LLNL is 
environmentally preferable, the least cost and, due to LLNL's existing 
infrastructure for laser technology, the least technical risk.
    Mitigation. The NIF mitigation measures appropriate to the LLNL 
site as identified in the PEIS (Appendix I, Paragraph I.4.7), will be 
formalized in a NIF Mitigation Action Plan. The plan will be issued by 
the DOE and monitored for compliance by its representatives during 
construction of the NIF. Mitigation measures appropriate to NIF 
operations will be incorporated in operating plans and procedures. A 
brief summary of the mitigation actions that will be taken follows.
    Construction materials will be stored in temporary laydown areas. 
When construction is complete, a Reclamation Plan will be developed and 
actions taken to restore the construction material laydown areas to 
their original condition. To assure that the public is aware of the NIF 
construction activities the public will be informed, through the local 
news media, that elevated noise levels will occur for several months 
during construction of the NIF. Visual monitoring will be done to 
determine the effectiveness of conventional water-spraying dust control 
measures to assure that air quality standards are not exceeded. A Storm 
Water Pollution Prevention Plan will be developed and a Storm Water 
Permit will be obtained from the San Francisco Bay Region Water Quality 
Control Board for storm water discharges during construction. No more 
than 60 days before the start of construction, a special status species 
survey will be conducted for protected and sensitive biological 
resources within the NIF site and laydown areas, and mitigation actions 
taken as necessary. Exclusion or buffer zones will be established to 
avoid any sensitive locations. Appropriate mitigation measures will be 
implemented to avoid or minimize potential adverse impacts to protected 
and sensitive resources, such as state and federally-listed threatened 
and endangered species. Construction crews will be informed of any 
environmental concerns that exist and requested to avoid sensitive 
areas. An alternative construction entrance will be utilized to prevent 
traffic congestion during major construction activities such as major 
concrete pours.
    For external combustion boilers, a permit will be obtained from the 
San Francisco Bay Area Air Quality Management District to comply with 
local area air quality standards. Hazardous materials will be 
inventoried and moved out of the area during flood conditions during 
NIF construction and operation. A Facility Safety Plan and Construction 
Safety Plan will be developed that will identify safety requirements 
for construction and operation of the NIF. A Waste Minimization Plan 
will be developed for the operational phase to evaluate the potential 
net reduction of hazardous, radioactive, and mixed waste streams. Other 
mitigation measures, identified in Sections I.4.7.2.4 and I.4.7.2.5 of 
Volume III of the PEIS, will be implemented to the extent practicable.
    Atlas Facility. DOE's decision is to proceed with the construction 
and operation of the Atlas Facility at LANL's TA-35. Without improved 
experimental capabilities offered by the Atlas Facility, DOE would lack 
the ability to evaluate significant weapon performance issues, which 
could adversely affect confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent. 
Among the alternatives determined to be reasonable, construction and 
operation of the Atlas Facility is environmentally preferable, the 
least cost, and the least technical risk.
    Mitigation. The mitigation measures appropriate to the Atlas 
Facility construction and operation will be formalized in an Atlas 
Facility Mitigation Action Plan. The plan will be issued by the DOE and 
monitored for compliance by its representatives during construction and 
operation of the Atlas facility. There is a potential for public 
exposure to nonstatic magnetic fields from the Atlas Facility for short 
periods when operated. Monitoring at various locations around the Atlas 
Facility will be conducted to insure fields greater than 1 Gauss (a 
measure of electromagnetism) do not cause adverse impacts. Warning 
signs and other administrative controls, such as road closures, will be 
put in place prior to the operation of the Atlas Facility, as 
necessary.
1.C. Next Generation Experimental Facilities for Stockpile Stewardship
    Related to the proposed actions for enhanced experimental 
facilities is the issue of next generation experimental facilities. In 
commenting on the Draft PEIS, some commentors suggested that potential 
next generation experimental facilities be analyzed as part of the 
proposed action. The Final PEIS

[[Page 68020]]

includes a discussion of potential next generation experimental 
facilities and the reasons why they are not proposed actions or 
alternatives (Section 3.3.4). These facilities, while contemplated on 
the basis of anticipated technical need, have not reached the stage of 
design maturity through research and development for DOE to include a 
decisionmaking analysis at this time.
    However, the PEIS does describe, in general terms or by reference, 
what is known today about their potential environmental impacts. The 
environmental impacts from these facilities as contemplated today would 
not be significantly different from existing ``similar'' facilities. By 
characterizing the potential impacts in this way, the decisionmaker was 
aware of the potential program-level cumulative impacts of the next 
generation facilities when deciding whether to pursue a program of 
enhanced experimental capability. If DOE were to propose to construct 
and operate such next generation facilities in the future, appropriate 
NEPA review would be performed.
1.D. Transport and Storage of Plutonium-242
    As a result of the Record of Decision for the Interim Management of 
Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site EIS (DOE/EIS-0220), 
existing plutonium-242 in nitrate solutions at H-Canyon at SRS will be 
stabilized by conversion to plutonium oxide in the HB-line. The 
plutonium-242 oxide would then be stored. The PEIS evaluates the need 
for plutonium-242 for stockpile stewardship activities and transport 
and storage of this material.
    1.D.1 Alternatives. 1.D.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action 
alternative, the plutonium-242 material would remain at SRS and be 
stored in existing facilities at either the FB-Line or Building 235F.
    1.D.1.2  Action Alternative 1--Store Plutonium-242 at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Under this alternative, the 
plutonium-242 would be transported to LANL and stored in an existing 
plutonium facility.
    1.D.1.3  Action Alternative 2--Store Plutonium-242 at the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Under this alternative, the 
plutonium-242 would be transported to LLNL and stored in Building 332.
    1.D.2  Comparison of Alternatives. 1.D.2.1 Cost and Technical 
Factors. Transporting the plutonium-242 material would only require a 
fraction of one Safe, Secure Trailer shipment, and the costs are not 
significant. Because there is existing storage capacity at all three 
sites, the storage costs are comparable and not significant.
    The programmatic need for shipment of this material is contained in 
a classified appendix to the Final PEIS. If the plutonium-242 material 
were not transported to LANL or LLNL, it could not be used for 
stockpile stewardship purposes.
    1.D.2.2  Environmental Factors. The small quantity of plutonium-242 
material is within the quantities of materials historically stored at 
all three sites. Regardless of the storage location for this material, 
there would be negligible environmental impacts. A high-bounding case 
analysis of the risk from the transport of this material (see Section 
4.19 of the PEIS) indicates low risk for either LANL or LLNL.
    1.D.3  Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For plutonium 
storage, the No Action alternative is the environmentally preferable 
alternative because there would be no potential impacts associated with 
transportation. However, the No Action alternative would not enable the 
plutonium-242 material to be used as needed for stockpile stewardship 
purposes, and is, therefore, not considered reasonable. For the action 
alternatives, storage at LANL is the environmentally preferable 
alternative because there is slightly less risk associated with 
transportation from SRS (due to the shorter distance from SRS).
    1.D.4  Decision. DOE's decision is to transport the plutonium-242 
material to LANL and store this material in an existing plutonium 
facility. LANL currently performs most of the plutonium activities for 
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and has the necessary 
facilities for storing this material. LLNL, although a reasonable 
alternative, is currently reducing its inventory of plutonium.

2. Proposed Action (2)--Rightsizing the Industrial Base

    With a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile, the capacity to 
manufacture nuclear weapons components and assemble or disassemble 
nuclear weapons can be reduced. For each required mission capability, 
the Department evaluated a No Action alternative, a downsize-in-place 
alternative, and an alternative that would transfer the mission to a 
weapons laboratory or to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). For pit component 
fabrication (a capability which no longer exists due to the closure of 
the Rocky Flats Plant in 1992), the Department evaluated reestablishing 
this capability, with an attendant small capacity, at Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL) or the Savannah River Site (SRS), in 
addition to the No Action alternative (see Proposed Action 3).
2.A. Weapons Assembly/Disassembly
    Weapons assembly/disassembly provides the capability to disassemble 
(dismantle) retired weapons, assemble nuclear and nonnuclear components 
into nuclear weapons, and perform weapons surveillance. In addition, 
this mission includes the capability to conduct nonintrusive 
modification pit reuse (external modifications to the pit) at the 
weapons assembly/disassembly facility. This mission also includes an 
option to store strategic reserves of nuclear components (pits and 
secondaries).
    2.A.1  Alternatives. 2.A.1.1  No Action. Under the No Action 
alternative, this mission would continue at Pantex in current 
facilities, but Pantex would not develop the capability to perform 
nonintrusive modification pit reuse. Currently, nonintrusive 
modification pit reuse can only be performed at the plutonium research 
and development (R&D) facilities at LANL and LLNL.
    2.A.1.2  Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Pantex Plant. This 
alternative would downsize and consolidate assembly/disassembly 
facilities and operations. Downsizing of the assembly/disassembly 
operation at Pantex would consist of an in-place decrease in facility 
footprint and relocation into modern existing facilities, mostly within 
Zone 12. No new construction would be required at Pantex; however, 
relocation and reinstallation of equipment would be required. The 
capabilities for nonintrusive modification pit reuse would be 
established in existing facilities within Zone 12. These facilities 
would also have the capability to support pit recertification and 
requalification operations.
    2.A.1.3  Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Nevada Test Site 
(NTS). This alternative is based on the use of the existing Device 
Assembly Facility and other plant infrastructure available at the NTS 
site that is required to maintain the capability for underground 
nuclear testing and experimentation. Because the Device Assembly 
Facility is not large enough to meet assembly/disassembly mission 
requirements, new construction would be required.
    2.A.2  Comparison of Alternatives. 2.A.2.1 Cost and Technical 
Factors. Downsizing the Pantex Plant is the lower cost action 
alternative. Significant capital construction (about $250 million in 
1995 dollars) would be required if the mission were relocated to NTS.

[[Page 68021]]

Downsizing Pantex presents less technical risk than relocation to NTS 
because of the need to relocate and requalify processes at NTS, the 
uncertainty in availability of key personnel, and the one year gap in 
operations that would be necessary while the transition occurred.
    2.A.2.2  Environmental Factors. Downsizing the Pantex Plant would 
have a net positive effect on environmental impacts compared to the No 
Action alternative. No land would be disturbed, groundwater withdrawals 
would be reduced, and accident risks would also be less than the No 
Action alternative because of the consolidation of the facility 
footprint (smaller area) into Zone 12. Socioeconomic impacts at Pantex 
would result because of reductions in workload that will occur when the 
current weapons dismantlement backlog is eliminated in about three 
years. The additional socioeconomic impacts due to facility downsizing 
after this dismantlement is complete are relatively small.
    Transferring the assembly/disassembly mission to NTS would entail 
upgrading and expanding the Device Assembly Facility. It is estimated 
that 18.5 additional acres would be disturbed. Although cultural and 
biotic resources are not expected to be impacted, the presence of a 
federally listed endangered species (the desert tortoise) at NTS would 
require a site survey to determine the potential for impacts. Water 
requirements to support the assembly/disassembly mission at NTS would 
amount to about 4 percent more than normal projected usage. 
Transferring the assembly/disassembly mission to NTS would create 
positive socioeconomic impacts at NTS, and significant negative 
socioeconomic impacts at Pantex.
    Risks to worker health would be essentially the same at either 
location. Worker exposure to radiation is expected to be about equal 
for the NTS and the downsizing of Pantex alternatives. Radiation 
exposure to members of the public from normal operation would be well 
within regulatory limits at both sites. Although the remoteness of the 
NTS site yields a lower potential accident risk, the risk to the public 
from an accident at Pantex is very low. Relocation to NTS would also 
eliminate the risk associated with the transport of low level waste 
from Pantex to the NTS for disposal. These transportation risks, 
however, are very low.
    2.A.3  Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally 
preferable alternative is to downsize existing capabilities at Pantex. 
No land would be disturbed, groundwater withdrawals would be reduced 
compared to usage under the No Action alternative, and accident risks 
would also be less than under the No Action alternative because of the 
consolidation of the facility footprint into Zone 12.
    2.A.4  Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing 
assembly/disassembly facilities presently located at the Pantex Plant. 
This is the environmentally preferable alternative, it exhibits the 
least technical risk, and is also the least-cost alternative.
2.B. High Explosives Fabrication
    The high explosives fabrication mission includes capabilities 
required for manufacturing process development, formulation, synthesis, 
main charge manufacturing and energetic component manufacture. The high 
explosives fabrication mission also supports some high explosives 
surveillance and some stockpile stewardship activities.
    2.B.1  Alternatives. 2.B.1.1  No Action. Under No Action, Pantex 
would continue fabrication and surveillance of high explosives 
components for nuclear weapons. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) would continue to 
perform weapon high explosives research and development, some 
surveillance, and high explosives safety studies.
    2.B.1.2  Action Alternative 1--Downsize at the Pantex Plant. This 
alternative would downsize and consolidate current high explosives 
operations and facilities at the Pantex Plant. Only minor modifications 
to existing facilities within Zones 11 and 12 would be required. This 
alternative would be considered only in conjunction with maintaining 
the weapons assembly/disassembly mission at Pantex.
    2.B.1.3  Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would transfer high explosives 
operations from Pantex to LANL. This alternative would use existing 
LANL research and development facilities, which have sufficient 
capacity for high explosives requirements. There would be no new 
building construction and no significant modifications required.
    2.B.1.4  Action Alternative 3--Relocate to the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL). This alternative would transfer high 
explosives operations from Pantex to LLNL, and would use existing LLNL 
research and development facilities. It would also require construction 
of one new facility for storage of high explosives at Site 300.
    2.B.1.5  Action Alternative 4--Relocate to both the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 
This option would involve splitting the high explosives mission between 
the two laboratories to protect core competencies at both. Since its 
impact is bounded by the previous two options, this option was not 
analyzed further in the PEIS.
    2.B.2  Comparison of Alternatives. 2.B.2.1  Cost and Technical 
Factors. The costs to perform the high explosives mission are not 
large, and are comparable for all site alternatives. The current high 
explosives fabrication mission at Pantex costs about $17 million per 
year. The future high explosives fabrication mission will be relatively 
small, costing $2-3 million per year (assuming the selected site has 
other missions to absorb site overhead).
    Since the U.S. does not have plans to develop new-design weapons, 
there is a concern that the laboratories will lose their core 
competencies in the area of high explosives technology. However, these 
competencies can be retained through greater teaming and integration of 
plant and laboratory capabilities and activities. This approach would 
attempt to protect core competence at the weapons laboratories in high 
explosives technology while retaining the overall fabrication mission 
at Pantex, the site with historical production experience.
    2.B.2.2  Environmental Factors. Environmental impacts from facility 
modification and operation are comparable for all alternatives, and are 
less than current operations. However, relocation of the high 
explosives fabrication mission to LANL or LLNL would result in minor 
additional environmental impacts due to the increased level of 
operations at those sites compared to the No Action alternative, and 
the small construction required at LLNL (less than 2.5 acres). 
Socioeconomic impacts are relatively small for all alternatives. There 
are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated with the 
high explosives fabrication mission. Risks to neighboring populations 
from credible facility accidents would be small for all alternatives.
    2.B.3  Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For high explosives 
fabrication, the environmentally preferable alternative is to downsize 
existing capabilities at the Pantex Plant. Environmental impacts under 
this alternative would be lower than under the No Action alternative.
    2.B.4  Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing high 
explosives fabrication facilities at the Pantex Plant.

[[Page 68022]]

This is the environmentally preferable alternative, the least-cost 
alternative and, when coupled with greater teaming and integration of 
plant and laboratory capabilities, has low technical risk. This 
decision is also consistent with Section 3140 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104-201), which 
requires that the high explosives fabrication mission be performed at 
Pantex.
2.C. Secondary and Case Fabrication
    The secondary and case fabrication mission includes activities to 
support fabrication, surveillance and inspection of secondaries and 
components. Functional capabilities for these services include 
operations to physically and chemically process, machine, inspect, 
assemble, and disassemble secondary and case materials. Materials 
include depleted uranium, enriched uranium, uranium alloys, 
isotopically enriched lithium hydride and lithium deuteride, and other 
materials.
    2.C.1  Alternatives. 2.C.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action 
alternative, DOE would continue secondary and case fabrication at the 
Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The Y-12 Plant would maintain the capability 
to produce and assemble secondaries, cases, and related nonnuclear 
weapon components.
    2.C.1.2  Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Y-12 Plant at Oak 
Ridge. This alternative would downsize the existing secondary and case 
fabrication facilities at the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. The downsized 
facilities would only require approximately 14 percent of the existing 
Y-12 Plant floor space, and no new facility construction would be 
needed to support the secondary and case fabrication mission. 
Modifications to the existing buildings would be required, both to 
implement the downsized mission and to upgrade the buildings to meet 
natural phenomena requirements (e.g., seismic events).
    2.C.1.3  Action Alternative 2-- Relocate to the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would transfer the secondary and 
case fabrication operations to 11 existing buildings at LANL using 
manufacturing processes proven at the Y-12 Plant. Modifications to the 
LANL facilities would be required to perform the secondary and case 
fabrication mission.
    2.C.1.4  Action Alternative 3--Relocate to the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL). This alternative would transfer the 
secondary and case fabrication operations to existing buildings at LLNL 
using manufacturing processes proven at the Y-12 Plant. The secondary 
and case fabrication facilities at LLNL would principally involve 
modifications to six buildings.
    2.C.2  Comparison of Alternatives. 2.C.2.1 Cost and Technical 
Factors. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge is the least-cost 
alternative because of significant facility modification costs (about 
$130 million at LANL and about $185 million at LLNL, both in 1995 
dollars) that would be required if the mission were relocated. 
Downsizing the Y-12 Plant also presents less technical risk than 
relocation to the other sites because a production infrastructure for 
secondaries and cases currently exists at the Y-12 Plant and processes 
would not need to be relocated and requalified. In addition, downsizing 
the Y-12 Plant provides greater program flexibility by allowing some 
additional capacity to be maintained in a standby mode at minimal cost.
    2.C.2.2  Environmental Factors. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant would not 
impact land, cultural or biotic resources. Downsizing would improve the 
efficiency of operations and significantly reduce natural resource 
requirements. Negative socioeconomic impacts associated with downsizing 
would be somewhat mitigated by positive socioeconomic impacts 
associated with the decontamination and decommissioning of facilities 
no longer required.
    Transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission to either 
LANL or LLNL would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at those 
sites and a large negative socioeconomic impact at Oak Ridge due to the 
phaseout of this mission. For the relocation to LLNL alternative, a 
small area of land (less than one acre) would be disturbed, but impacts 
to cultural and biotic resources are not expected. Transfer of the 
secondary and case fabrication mission from Oak Ridge would entail 
small, one time impacts associated with moving the strategic reserve of 
highly enriched uranium to a new location.
    Radiation exposure to workers is expected to be about equal for all 
three action alternatives and well within regulatory limits. Potential 
radiological impacts from accidents were determined to be about equal 
for Oak Ridge and LANL, and slightly higher for LLNL due to its closer 
proximity to populated areas.
    2.C.3   Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For secondary and 
case manufacturing, the environmentally preferable alternative is to 
downsize the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge. Downsizing the Y-12 Plant would 
not impact land, cultural, or biotic resources. Downsizing would 
improve the efficiency of operations and significantly reduce natural 
resource requirements compared to the No Action alternative.
    2.C.4  Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing 
secondary and case fabrication facilities located at the Y-12 Plant at 
Oak Ridge. This is the environmentally preferable alternative, has the 
least technical risk, and is the least-cost alternative.
2.D. Nonnuclear Fabrication
    Nonnuclear fabrication consists of the fabrication of electrical, 
electronic, electro-mechanical, and mechanical components (plastics, 
metals, composites), the assembly of arming, fuzing, and firing 
systems, and surveillance inspection and testing of nonnuclear 
components.
    2.D.1  Alternatives. 2.D.1.1 No Action. The No Action alternative 
would maintain these activities at their present location at the Kansas 
City Plant (KCP), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL). KCP manufactures nonnuclear weapon 
components and conducts surveillance testing on them. SNL conducts 
system engineering of nuclear weapons, designs and develops nonnuclear 
components, conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear testing, 
manufactures some nonnuclear weapons components, and provides safety 
and reliability assessments of the stockpile. LANL also manufactures a 
few nonnuclear weapons components and conducts surveillance on certain 
nonnuclear weapons components.
    2.D.1.2  Action Alternative 1--Downsize the Kansas City Plant 
(KCP). The downsized nonnuclear fabrication alternative consists of 
three major factory segments designed around electronics, mechanical, 
and engineered materials product lines, procuring some components from 
outside sources, and reducing the KCP facility area. This alternative 
consists of downsizing and consolidating existing facilities and would 
require facility modification but no new construction.
    2.D.1.3  Action Alternative 2--Relocate to the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). This alternative would use the 
existing expertise, capability, and infrastructure at LANL, LLNL, and 
SNL to satisfy fabrication requirements for nonnuclear components. This 
alternative would transfer the majority of current KCP missions to SNL, 
except for nuclear system plastic components, which would go either to 
LANL or LLNL, and high energy detonator inert components,

[[Page 68023]]

which would go to LANL. In addition, there is an option of moving the 
reservoir mission to either SNL or LANL. This alternative would require 
construction of a new stand-alone production site at SNL, consisting of 
six new buildings and renovations or minor modifications to some 
existing buildings.
    2.D.2  Comparison of Alternatives. 2.D.2.1 Cost and Technical 
Factors. Because of significant facility construction or modification 
costs to relocate the mission (about $235 million in 1995 dollars), 
downsizing the KCP is the least-cost alternative. Downsizing KCP also 
presents significantly less technical risk than relocation to the other 
sites, because a production infrastructure for nonnuclear components 
currently exists and processes would not need to be relocated and 
requalified.
    2.D.2.2  Environmental Comparison. For the alternative that would 
downsize KCP, the construction activities would involve internal 
modifications to the existing facility. No land would be disturbed. For 
the alternative that would transfer the KCP mission to the 
laboratories, construction impacts would involve internal facility 
modifications at LANL and LLNL. At SNL, approximately 22 acres of land 
would be disturbed to construct new facilities. This represents 6 
percent of the undisturbed land at SNL. Potential impacts to cultural 
and biotic resources could occur.
    There are minimal air impacts for both alternatives. Water 
requirements for a downsized facility at KCP would be reduced 31 
percent compared to No Action. For the alternative that would transfer 
the mission to the laboratories, groundwater use would increase by less 
than 1 percent over No Action usage at LANL and LLNL, but would 
increase by 64 percent over No Action usage at SNL. This would still 
represent only 29 percent of the groundwater rights and thus, no 
adverse impacts are expected. Transferring the nonnuclear mission to 
the laboratories would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at 
those sites, and a large negative socioeconomic impact at KCP due to 
the phaseout of this mission.
    There are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated 
with the nonnuclear fabrication mission, and there are no significant 
adverse impacts associated with normal operations. Accident profiles at 
the sites would not change as a result of downsizing at KCP or 
transferring the nonnuclear fabrication mission to the laboratories. 
Risks to neighboring populations from credible facility accidents would 
be small for all alternatives. All three sites have adequate existing 
waste management facilities to treat, store, and dispose of wastes that 
would be generated by this mission.
    2.D.3  Environmentally Preferable Alternative. The environmentally 
preferable alternative is to downsize existing facilities at the KCP. 
The relocation of this mission to SNL, LANL or LLNL would entail 
additional environmental impacts associated with the construction and 
operation of new facilities.
    2.D.4  Decision. DOE's decision is to downsize the existing 
facilities at the KCP. This is the environmentally preferable 
alternative, it exhibits the least technical risk, and is also the 
least-cost alternative.

3. Proposed Action (3)--Reestablishing Manufacturing Capability and 
Capacity for Pit Components

    This capability, hereafter referred to as pit fabrication, includes 
all activities necessary to fabricate new pits, to modify the internal 
features of existing pits (intrusive modification), and to recertify or 
requalify pits.
    3.A.1  Alternatives. 3.A.1.1 No Action. Under the No Action 
alternative, DOE would continue to use existing capabilities at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL). LANL maintains a limited capability to fabricate 
plutonium components using its plutonium research and development 
facility, and performs surveillance to provide safety and reliability 
assessments of the stockpile. In addition, less extensive capabilities 
would continue at LLNL to support material and process technology 
development.
    3.A.1.2  Action Alternative 1--Reestablish Capability at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This alternative would reconfigure 
the plutonium facility at LANL to fulfill the pit fabrication mission. 
This alternative would locate pit manufacturing in existing facilities. 
Existing equipment would be retained as much as possible, but some 
equipment would need to be upgraded.
    3.A.1.3  Action Alternative 2--Reestablish Capability at the 
Savannah River Site (SRS). This alternative would establish a pit 
fabrication facility at SRS within existing facilities, but with new 
equipment and systems. Facilities are available at the SRS, in F-Area 
and H-Area, which could house all the process functions required for 
the manufacture of plutonium pits. New equipment and systems would be 
required for the pit fabrication facility.
    3.A.2  Comparison of Alternatives. 3.A.2.1  Cost and Technical 
Factors Technical risk associated with each alternative was assessed by 
comparing the relative experience of each site in the pertinent 
production capability areas. No pits are currently being produced for 
the nuclear weapon stockpile, and neither site has done so in the 
recent past. However, LANL has recently provided pits for nuclear 
explosive testing, and is currently producing plutonium-238 heat 
sources for National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
programs. Also, LANL continues to perform pit surveillance and 
technology development activities directly related to the required 
capabilities for pit fabrication.
    SRS is currently processing and shipping plutonium-238 to LANL to 
support fabrication of NASA heat sources. Although SRS has a health, 
safety, and security infrastructure for plutonium operations, the 
historical mission for the site was separation and production of 
plutonium metal for shipment to other sites for weapons program use. 
Consequently, SRS has no experience with the kinds of capabilities 
required for precision nuclear component manufacturing and the 
ancillary supporting functions.
    The required workload for the fabrication of new replacement pits 
is small. DOE foresees only the replacement of pits destroyed in 
routine surveillance testing unless a near-term, life-limiting 
phenomenon is discovered in stockpile pits. Historical pit surveillance 
data and pit life studies do not predict a near-term problem. However, 
data are limited for weapons older than 25 years, and for the youngest 
weapons in the stockpile.
    The technological capability to manufacture all of the pit designs 
in the enduring stockpile provides an inherent capacity to manufacture 
about 50 pits per year in single shift operations. During weapon 
refurbishment to replace other components, DOE expects most pits to be 
requalified and reused. About 20 pits per year are expected to be 
required to replace pits destroyed in routine surveillance testing. A 
capacity of about 50 pits per year is, therefore, judged to be 
sufficient for the next 10 or more years.
    The construction costs for providing such a limited pit fabrication 
capacity are less at LANL (about $310 million in 1995 dollars) than at 
SRS (about $490 million in 1995 dollars). This is largely because the 
capability would be additive to existing capabilities at LANL

[[Page 68024]]

while a completely new stand-alone capability would be required at SRS. 
Both estimates include the costs of planned refurbishment of the LANL 
plutonium facility for its ongoing pit surveillance and stockpile 
stewardship missions. In addition, annual operating costs would be 
considerably less at LANL (about $30 million versus $60 million at SRS) 
because the mission would be additive to other existing missions and 
would not have to carry all facility overhead costs.
    The technical risk at LANL would be less, due to the existing 
experience base for stockpile stewardship and pit surveillance 
missions. The LANL capability would also be in place at least two years 
earlier than the SRS alternative.
    In reestablishing plutonium pit fabrication capability, DOE 
considered establishing a larger fabrication capacity more in line with 
the capacity planned for other manufacturing functions. Larger capacity 
was rejected, however, because of the small current demand for the 
fabrication of replacement pits, and the significant, but currently 
undefined, time period before additional capacity may be needed.
    3.A.2.2  Environmental Factors--Upgrades to existing facilities 
would be required for each alternative, and no new land would be 
disturbed. During operations, both alternatives would utilize similar 
facilities, procedures, and natural resources. Therefore, both 
alternatives would result in similar operational environmental impacts 
for most natural resource areas. Impacts to air quality would be 
minimal and well within established standards. At SRS, water 
requirements would be provided from surface water, which is plentiful, 
and no adverse impacts would be expected. At LANL, groundwater would be 
used. Water requirements for this mission, which would be less than 1 
percent of projected No Action usage, could be adequately met without 
exceeding the groundwater allotment at LANL.
    Socioeconomic impacts are comparable for either alternative, 
although SRS would require more additional new workers. Worker exposure 
to radiation would be larger at SRS due to the larger added workforce, 
but within regulatory limits for both alternatives. Both sites have 
adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and 
dispose of wastes that would be generated by the pit fabrication 
mission. Risks to neighboring populations from normal operations or 
credible facility accidents would be small for both alternatives.
    3.A.3  Environmentally Preferable Alternative. For pit 
manufacturing, the No Action alternative is the environmentally 
preferable alternative. Under the No Action alternative, no new 
construction would be required, and the Department would continue with 
the existing pit research and development capability at LANL and LLNL. 
However, DOE would not have the capability to replace the pit component 
in stockpile weapons if necessary, nor protect against stockpile 
attrition through surveillance testing. Thus, No Action is not a 
reasonable alternative.
    Of the two action alternatives, which would reestablish pit 
manufacturing capabilities at either LANL or SRS, LANL is the 
environmentally preferable alternative. Although overall environmental 
impacts are projected to be similar between the two sites, LANL was 
judged to be preferable due to the fact that the radiological risks to 
workers during normal operations are projected to be less than at SRS.
    3.A.4  Decision. DOE's decision is to reestablish the pit 
fabrication capability, at a small capacity, at LANL. This is the 
environmentally preferable alternative, it exhibits the least technical 
risk, and is also the least-cost alternative. This decision limits the 
plutonium fabrication facility plans to a facility sized to meet 
expected programmatic requirements over the next ten or more years. It 
is not sized to have sufficient capacity to remanufacture new plutonium 
pits at the same production rate as that of their original manufacture. 
DOE will perform development and demonstration work at its operating 
plutonium facilities over the next several years to study alternative 
facility concepts for larger capacity. Environmental analysis of this 
larger capacity has not been performed at this time because of the 
uncertainty in the need for such capacity and the uncertainty in the 
facility technology that would be utilized. Should a larger pit 
fabrication capacity be required in the future, appropriate 
environmental and siting analysis would be performed at that time.
    Mitigation. Specific mitigation measures are not addressed for the 
stockpile management decisions of this ROD, although many potential 
mitigation measures are identified in the PEIS. In accordance with the 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program's two-tiered NEPA 
Strategy, these specific mitigation measures will be addressed, as 
necessary, on a site-by-site basis, in any site-specific NEPA analyses 
needed to implement the stockpile management decisions of this ROD.

Strategic Reserve Storage

    The PEIS also evaluates storage alternatives for strategic reserve 
material (plutonium and highly enriched uranium that has not been 
declared surplus to national security needs). However, a decision on 
storage of strategic reserve materials will be made later in the Record 
of Decision on the Final PEIS for the Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials in conjunction with decisions on the 
storage of surplus materials. The preferred alternatives for strategic 
reserve storage described in both the Final PEIS for Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management and the Final PEIS for the Storage and 
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials are consistent. The 
preferred alternatives are: (1) Highly enriched uranium strategic 
reserve storage at Y-12; and (2) plutonium pit strategic reserve 
storage in Zone 12 at Pantex.

Other Considerations

    DOE has considered a wide range of views on alternatives for the 
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. However, it is national 
security policy, as established by the President and Congress, that 
must define the complex balance between U.S. national security policy 
objectives for nuclear deterrence, arms control and nonproliferation.
    Chapter 2 of the PEIS describes the national security policy 
framework that defines the purpose and need for DOE's nuclear weapons 
mission for the foreseeable future. That chapter also describes the 
development of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives in response 
to recent changes in national security policy, and puts those changes 
in a broad technical perspective. Successive levels of technical detail 
are provided in Volume I, Chapter 3 and Volumes II and III of the PEIS. 
The discussions that follow refer to the appropriate sections of the 
PEIS to avoid unnecessary repetition.
    While the terms ``stockpile stewardship'' and ``stockpile 
management'' are relatively new, the Program is not new when considered 
in terms of its substructure capabilities. What the terms are meant to 
convey is a post-Cold War change in Program focus away from large-scale 
development and production of new-design nuclear weapons with nuclear 
testing, to one that focuses on the safety and reliability of a 
smaller, aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Even with this change 
in focus, however, national security policies require DOE

[[Page 68025]]

to maintain the historical capabilities of the ongoing Program. The 
actions selected in this Record of Decision flow logically from the 
mission purpose and need, given the policy constraints placed on the 
Program by the President and Congress. Enhanced experimental capability 
(represented by the National Ignition Facility, Contained Firing 
Facility, and Atlas Facility) is needed because, in the absence of 
nuclear testing, it will provide the surrogate source of experimental 
data that are needed to continually assess and certify a safe and 
reliable stockpile. Rightsized manufacturing capacities at the Y-12 
Plant (Oak Ridge), the Kansas City Plant, and Pantex will most 
efficiently conform to the reduced requirements of a smaller, aging 
stockpile in the absence of new-design weapon production. A 
reestablished pit manufacturing capability at LANL will restore a 
required capability of the Program that was temporarily lost as a 
consequence of the closure of the Rocky Flats Plant.
    The question of alternatives for the Stockpile Stewardship and 
Management Program is complex because maintaining a nuclear weapons 
stockpile, whatever its size, requires a complete integrated set of 
technical capabilities as well as an appropriately sized manufacturing 
capacity. The technical capabilities are generally characterized as 
research, design, development, and testing; reliability assessment and 
certification; and manufacturing and surveillance operations (Section 
2.2 and Figure 2.7-2 of the PEIS). From a technical point of view, none 
of these capabilities can be deleted if DOE is to maintain a safe and 
reliable stockpile (Section 2.4 of the PEIS). Indeed, DOE has been 
directed by the President and Congress to maintain these capabilities 
(Section 2.4 of the PEIS).
    Commentors on the PEIS questioned the different treatment of 
stewardship and management alternatives, mainly the lack of 
programmatic alternatives to science based stockpile stewardship. 
Stewardship and management alternatives were treated differently in the 
PEIS because they address fundamentally different problems. Stockpile 
stewardship capabilities form the basis of DOE's judgments about the 
safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in a 
larger context, U.S. judgments about the nuclear weapons capabilities 
of others (Section 2.4.1 of the PEIS). DOE did not consider it 
reasonable to propose stewardship alternatives that would diminish, 
rather than enhance, stewardship capabilities, particularly given the 
fact that historic confidence in the safety and performance of the 
stockpile was derived from the nuclear testing that is no longer part 
of the ongoing stewardship program. National security policy requires 
DOE to maintain, and in some areas enhance, the stewardship 
capabilities of the three weapons laboratories and NTS (Section 2.2 of 
the PEIS). The PEIS explains the basis for this conclusion in a 
technical context, including the need for two independent nuclear 
design laboratories (Section 2.4.1 of the PEIS). Therefore, the PEIS 
did not propose any actions that would otherwise diminish ongoing 
stewardship missions.
    In the PEIS, the Department determined that there is only one 
reasonable programmatic alternative for stockpile stewardship: enhanced 
experimental capability (see Section 3.1.2). This determination is 
consistent with a previous review made in November 1994 by the JASON 
Committee, a group of independent experts who evaluated the Science-
Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program. The JASON Committee 
concluded that ``[a] strong SBSS program, such as we recommend in this 
report, is an essential component for the U.S. to maintain confidence 
in the performance of a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent under a 
comprehensive test ban.'' The JASON Committee further concluded that 
``[in] the absence of nuclear weapons testing, improved understanding 
of the warheads and their behavior over time will be derived from 
computer simulations and analyses benchmarked against past data and 
new, more comprehensive diagnostic information obtained from carefully 
designed laboratory experiments. Toward this goal, the SBSS calls for 
the construction of a number of experimental facilities which have 
applications both in basic scientific research and in research directed 
towards strengthening the underlying scientific understanding in the 
weapons program.''
    Section 3.1.2.4 of the PEIS discussed four possible programmatic 
stewardship alternatives to enhanced experimental capability and 
concluded that none of them were reasonable stand-alone alternatives. 
These included: denuclearization (eliminate nuclear weapons in the 
relative near term); restoration (continue to rely on underground 
nuclear testing); remanufacturing (reproduce exact replicas of proven 
designs); and maintenance (rely on enhanced surveillance and 
revalidation to detect and correct problems). Both denuclearization and 
restoration are inconsistent with United States national security 
policy. Furthermore, while remanufacturing and maintenance already are, 
and will continue to be key components of the Program, neither would 
provide sufficient technical assurance that problems that may arise in 
the stockpile will be effectively diagnosed and corrected.
    Prior to the issuance of the Final PEIS, some commentors expressed 
concern that the Department had not considered other programmatic 
alternatives for stockpile stewardship (i.e., remanufacturing). In 
response to their concerns, the Department asked Dr. Sidney D. Drell, 
of the JASON Committee, to review the issue of remanufacturing as a 
reasonable alternative to enhanced experimental capabilities.
    In an October 28, 1996, letter to the Secretary of Energy, Dr. 
Drell and another member of the JASON Committee, Dr. Richard L. Garwin, 
stated that ``we must not only maintain a cadre of first-class weapon 
scientists and engineers. We must also expand the existing science 
based understanding of the stockpile. The existing S&T [Science and 
Technology] base, including existing above-ground experimental 
facilities, is not adequate to the task of stewardship over the long 
term for an aging deterrent in the absence of nuclear tests. These 
requirements cannot be met if the SSMP [Stockpile Stewardship and 
Management Program] as planned by the Department of Energy is replaced 
simply by a program of remanufacturing or refurbishing existing weapons 
without paying careful attention to the need of maintaining weapons 
design capability, expanding our science based understanding of the 
stockpile, and providing the sources of experimental data needed to 
validate enhanced computer simulations.'' They concluded that ``[w]hile 
remanufacturing is a necessary component of SSMP, it is not a 
reasonable alternative to the pursuit of a science-based stockpile 
stewardship or the need for enhanced experimental capability.''
    National security policy also requires DOE to maintain a full 
complement of stockpile management capabilities and appropriate 
manufacturing capacity, albeit for a smaller post-Cold War stockpile. 
Unlike stockpile stewardship capabilities, a smaller stockpile does 
permit some reasonable siting alternatives for stockpile management 
capabilities and capacities to accomplish the mission purpose and need 
within the current national security policy framework (Section 2.4.2 of 
the PEIS).
    One important consideration in developing the PEIS was the 
possibility

[[Page 68026]]

that future international treaties may lead to a smaller U.S. 
stockpile, i.e., less than the currently defined START II protocol-
sized stockpile. The PEIS analyzed each of the two stockpile sizes 
currently defined and directed by national security policy, a START I 
Treaty stockpile (6000 accountable strategic weapons) and a START II 
protocol-sized stockpile (3500 accountable strategic weapons). In 
addition, the PEIS analyzed a hypothetical 1,000-weapon stockpile for 
the purpose of providing a sensitivity analysis for decisions on 
manufacturing capacity. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM) 
process that specifies the types of weapons and quantities of each 
weapon type in the stockpile is described in Section 1.1 of the PEIS. 
The classified NWSM is developed based on Department of Defense force 
structure requirements necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence and 
comply with existing arms control treaties while pursuing further arms 
control reductions. The PEIS describes this complex process, and 
explains why DOE does not believe it reasonable to speculate on 
additional stockpile sizes, which would necessarily entail the use of a 
large number of arbitrary assumptions (Section 2.2 of the PEIS). 
Nevertheless, DOE has considered the possibility that future national 
security policy could define a path to a smaller stockpile. Therefore, 
the analysis in the PEIS is very flexible in its approach to potential 
changes in stockpile size.
    It is important to note in this regard that, just as stockpile 
stewardship capabilities are currently viewed by the United States as 
furthering U.S. nonproliferation objectives by making the ``zero-
yield'' Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty feasible, it is reasonable to 
assume that confidence in U.S. stewardship capabilities would remain as 
important, if not more important, in future negotiations to reduce the 
stockpile further. The path to even a very small (tens or hundreds of 
weapons) or a zero stockpile would require the negotiation of complex 
international treaties, most likely with provisions that require 
intrusive international verification inspections of nuclear weapons-
related facilities. Therefore, DOE believes it reasonable to assume 
that complex treaty negotiations, when coupled with complex 
implementation provisions, could possibly stretch over several decades. 
On such a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile 
size alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, or 
alternatives in the PEIS as they relate to stewardship capabilities. 
The issues of maintaining the core competencies of the United States in 
nuclear weapons, and the technical problems of a smaller, aging 
stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing, would remain the same.
    With regard to stockpile management capability and capacity, the 
PEIS evaluates reasonable approaches for a gradual path to a very small 
or zero stockpile. At some point on this path, further downsizing of 
existing industrial plants or the alternative of consolidating 
manufacturing functions at stewardship sites would become more 
attractive as manufacturing capacity becomes a less important 
consideration. In the near term, however, the decisions to downsize the 
existing industrial plants would still be reasonable because the 
projected downsizing investment would be recouped within a few years 
through reduced operating expense, and downsizing in the near term is 
consistent with potential longer-term decisions regarding plant 
closures. With regard to reestablishing pit manufacturing capability, 
DOE does not intend to establish a greater manufacturing capacity than 
is inherent in reestablishing the basic manufacturing capability. Thus, 
on a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile size 
alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, or 
alternatives in the PEIS with regard to stockpile management 
capabilities and capacities.

Conclusions

    With the issuance of this Record of Decision, the Department is 
making the decisions necessary to: (1) construct and operate three 
enhanced experimental facilities (the National Ignition Facility at 
LLNL, the Contained Firing Facility at LLNL, and the Atlas Facility at 
LANL); (2) downsize the existing weapons industrial plants (Y-12 at Oak 
Ridge, the Kansas City Plant, and Pantex); and (3) reestablish the 
plutonium pit component manufacturing capability at LANL. Additionally, 
the Department has decided to transfer a small amount of plutonium-242 
material from SRS to LANL for stockpile stewardship activities.
    During the 30 day period following the Environmental Protection 
Agency's notice that the Final PEIS had been filed, the Department 
received four letters from government organizations in response to the 
Final PEIS. Two of the letters, from the Tennessee Historical 
Commission and the State of Missouri Office of Administration, 
expressed no objection or comment. A third letter, from the 
Environmental Protection Agency, indicated that the Agency's prior 
comments on the Draft PEIS had been adequately addressed in the Final 
PEIS, and that the Agency had no objections to the project as proposed. 
The fourth letter, from the New Mexico Environmental Department, 
provided comments on the nomenclature used to describe water resources 
in and around the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These comments do not 
change the analysis in the PEIS, but they have been considered in 
preparing this Record of Decision. In making these decisions, all 
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm from the 
alternatives selected have been adopted.
    These decisions will help enable the Department to assess and 
certify the safety and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons 
stockpile, while also supporting a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. These decisions will allow for the closing and ultimate 
remediation of unnecessary industrial facilities, and reduce the cost 
of existing manufacturing operations. These decisions reestablish the 
required national security capability of plutonium pit fabrication. 
These decisions are consistent with, and supportive of, national 
security policy requirements established by the President and Congress 
for nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, including 
the safeguards established for U.S. entry into the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty. Finally, these decisions will help enable the Department to 
maintain the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United 
States in nuclear weapons, and maintain a safe and reliable nuclear 
weapons stockpile.

    Issued in Washington DC, December 19, 1996.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-32759 Filed 12-24-96; 8:45 am]
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