[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 18, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66699-66701]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-32213]


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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287]


Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Notice of 
Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses, 
Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and 
Opportunity for a Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. 
DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55, issued to the Duke Power Company (the 
licensee), for operation of the Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 
3, respectively, located in Seneca, South Carolina.
    If approved, the proposed amendments would allow a revision to the 
Oconee Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to include a one-time 
emergency power system functional test involving the three Oconee 
units. The purpose of the test is to verify certain design features of 
the emergency power system in an integrated fashion. The proposed test 
procedure involves safety equipment on all three Oconee units and is 
beyond the scope of tests described in the licensing basis of the 
units. The licensee has determined that there is a marginal increase in 
the possibility of a loss of power when compared with the other 
emergency power system functional tests that have been previously 
evaluated and that are performed at Oconee. Therefore, the licensee has 
determined that the tests may involve an unreviewed safety question, 
which requires prior NRC approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.
    The three Oconee units are presently shut down due to an outage 
resulting from an unexpected shutdown of Oconee Unit 2 on September 24, 
1996. Because of this condition, the NRC requested that the licensee 
consider performance of tests of the emergency electrical system in a 
letter dated October 18, 1996. Development and analysis of the test 
procedures led to the licensee's determination that an unreviewed 
safety question exists. Since the tests are scheduled to start on 
January 2, 1997, the amendments must be processed prior to that date. 
Any delay would delay startup of the Oconee units, which requires that 
the amendments be processed under exigent circumstances.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendments, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended

[[Page 66700]]

(the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under 
exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:
    This proposed change has been evaluated against the standards in 10 
CFR 50.92 and has been determined to involve no significant hazards 
considerations, in that operation of the facility in accordance with 
the proposed amendment would not:

    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    No. For this test all three Oconee units will already be in a 
shutdown condition, thus there is no chance of an Oconee unit trip, 
LOCA/LOOP [Loss-of-Coolant Accident/Loss of Offsite Power] scenarios 
and most UFSAR [Updated Final Safety Analysis Report] analyzed 
accident scenarios. The UFSAR Loss of Electric Power accident 
assumes two types of events: (1) Loss of load and (2) Loss of all 
system and station power. Since all three Oconee units are shutdown 
during performance of this test, an Oconee unit trip cannot occur. 
Nothing associated with this test will result in a significant 
increase in the likelihood of a loss of all system and station power 
since both Keowee units and the switchyard will remain available. In 
addition, the gas turbine at Lee Steam station will be available and 
the SSF [standby shutdown facility] diesel will be operable. The 
loss of all station power accident analysis assumptions are still 
valid. Additionally, since the switchyard will remain energized and 
available, offsite power can quickly be reconnected to the plant.
    The Keowee units provide the main source of emergency power for 
the Oconee units, but they are not accident initiators. This test 
has no adverse impact on the ability of the Keowee units to satisfy 
their design requirements of achieving rated speed and voltage 
within 23 seconds of receipt of an emergency start signal.
    Although not a design basis accident, a hypothetical station 
blackout condition where all offsite power and the Keowee units are 
lost is described in the UFSAR. As detailed above, this test will 
not deenergize the switchyard or remove the Keowee units. Thus, 
emergency power systems will remain available, as well as the SSF 
diesel, and there is no significant increase in [the] likelihood of 
a station blackout. The probability of an accident evaluated in the 
FSAR (LOOP, LOCA, and LOCA/LOOP) will not be significantly increased 
beyond what has already been evaluated under Technical 
Specifications.
    Calculations using the test configuration, actual core data, and 
no operator action (except for opening the atmospheric dump valves) 
for Oconee Units 1 and 2 indicate that core boiling will not occur. 
Based on the predicted steam generator heat transfer, the peak 
temperature will be approximately 220 deg.F at approximately 13.5 
hours. Since the RCS [Reactor Coolant System] will be pressurized by 
a nitrogen or steam bubble during the test, the reactor coolant will 
not boil at 220 deg.F. Core uncovery and possible fuel damage is not 
considered a concern during the performance of this test. In 
addition, there is no concern of any significant RCS temperature 
increase on Oconee Units 1 and 2 during the short periods when DHR 
[Decay Heat Removal] is interrupted. Fuel will be removed from the 
Oconee Unit 3 core during performance of this test. There is no 
adverse impact on containment integrity, radiological release 
pathways, fuel design, filtration systems, main steam relief valve 
setpoints, or radwaste systems.
    Therefore, based on this analysis and the information presented 
in Attachment 2 [of the licensee's application], the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated will not be 
significantly increased by the proposed test.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from the accidents previously evaluated?
    No. The emergency power system will remain operable and 
available to mitigate accidents. All three Oconee units will already 
be in a shutdown condition, so there is no risk of an Oconee unit 
trip, challenge to the reactor protective system (RPS), LOCA/LOOP 
scenarios, and most UFSAR analyzed accident scenarios. Since the 
Oconee units have been shutdown for greater than 60 days, the decay 
heat loads are relatively low. Additionally, on Oconee Unit 3, the 
vessel head will be removed and fuel will not be in the core when 
ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] injection occurs. This 
arrangement precludes any potential fuel assembly/control rod lift 
or reactivity management concerns.
    Preplanning, use of dedicated operators, and independent 
verification will be employed during critical test phases involving 
manual manipulation of the `S' and `E' breakers. A dedicated 
technician in contact with the control room will be stationed at the 
affected cabinet ready to close the appropriate knife switches to 
re-enable the normal source. These precautions ensure AC power 
sources are not paralleled. Therefore, based on this analysis and 
the supporting information in Attachment 2, no new failure modes or 
credible accident scenarios are postulated.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
    No. No function of any safety related emergency power system/
component will be adversely affected or degraded as a result of this 
test. No safety parameters, setpoints, or design limits are 
adversely affected. For this test, all three Oconee units will be in 
a shutdown condition, so there is no risk of an Oconee unit trip, 
challenge to the reactor protective system (RPS), LOCA/LOOP 
scenarios, and most UFSAR analyzed accident scenarios. Strictly per 
the Technical Specifications, ECCS and auxiliary power systems are 
not required with RCS temperature less than 200 deg.F. However, both 
the emergency power and DHR systems will remain operable during the 
test. Decay heat removal will only be briefly interrupted during the 
simulated LOOP portions of the test. Since the Oconee units have 
been shutdown for greater than 60 days, the decay heat loads are 
relatively low, and compensatory measures are in place to ensure 
heat removal capability can be regained in a timely manner. 
Additionally, the vessel head will be removed and fuel will not be 
in the core on Oconee Unit 3 when ECCS injection occurs. There is no 
adverse impact to the fuel, cladding, RCS, or required containment 
systems. Therefore, based on this analysis and the supporting 
information in Attachment 2, the margin of safety is not 
significantly reduced as a result of this test.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 15 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    The Commission may issue the license amendment before the 
expiration of the 15-day notice period if failure to do so would 
unnecessarily delay startup of the units, provided that its final 
determination is that the amendments involve no significant hazards 
consideration. The final determination will consider all public and 
State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it 
will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rules 
Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and 
Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the 
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. 
Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White

[[Page 66701]]

Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. 
to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may 
be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 
L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By January 2, 1997, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendments to the subject facility 
operating licenses and any person whose interest may be affected by 
this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the 
proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for 
leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of 
Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. 
Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which 
is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West South 
Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina. If a request for a hearing or 
petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the 
Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the 
Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or 
the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of 
hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendments under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If the amendments are issued before the expiration of the 30-day 
hearing period, the Commission will make a final determination on the 
issue of no significant hazards consideration. If a hearing is 
requested, the final determination will serve to decide when the 
hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendments and make them immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendments.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Docketing and 
Services Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of 
the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so 
inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 
1-(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union 
operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the 
following message addressed to Mr. Herbert N. Berkow: petitioner's name 
and telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and 
publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A 
copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General 
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, 
and to Mr. J. Michael McGarry, III, Winston and Strawn, 1200 17th 
Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated December 11, 1996, which is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room, located at the Oconee County Library, 501 West 
South Broad Street, Walhalla, South Carolina.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of December 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
David E. LaBarge,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate II-2, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-32213 Filed 12-17-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P