[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 220 (Wednesday, November 13, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58257-58261]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-29007]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

All Power Reactor Licensees; Issuance of Final Director's 
Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has 
granted in part and denied in part a Petition, dated April 13, 1994, 
submitted by Mr. Paul M. Blanch (Petitioner). The Petition requested 
that the NRC take action with regard to all power reactor licensees, 
concerning the potential failure of the fuel in the spent fuel pools 
for all reactors in the United States. Specifically, the Petitioner 
requested that the NRC: (1) immediately issue an information notice or 
other appropriate notification forwarding all information in its 
possession to all power reactor licensees regarding the potential 
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools, and reminding licensees of their 
responsibilities to perform timely operability determinations in 
accordance with their technical specifications and NRC Generic Letter 
91-18; (2) direct each licensee to immediately perform an evaluation of 
this potential deficiency to determine compliance with its current 
licensing basis; (3) deny all requests for license amendments for the 
expansion of spent fuel pool capacity until these safety concerns are 
fully resolved; and (4) after evaluation by each licensee, if the NRC 
determines there is little or no risk to public health and safety, the 
NRC may issue a Notice of Enforcement Discretion. Request (3) was 
determined to be a request for a licensing action and so was beyond the 
scope of 10 CFR 2.206.
    The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
granted in part Requests (1) and (2) of the April 13, 1994, Petition. 
With regard to Petitioner's Request (4), the Director has concluded 
that there has been no need for issuance of NOEDs regarding potential 
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools. The reasons for these decisions 
are explained in the ``Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206'' 
(DD-96-18), the complete text of which follows this notice, and which 
is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document 
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at 
the local public document room for all power reactor licensees.
    A copy of this Final Director's Decision has been filed with the 
Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided in this 
regulation, this Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of its issuance, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the Decision within 
that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of November 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Final Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    By a Petition submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 on April 13, 1994, 
Mr. Paul M. Blanch (Petitioner) requested that the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) take immediate action with regard to all 
power reactor

[[Page 58258]]

Licensees, concerning the potential failure of the fuel in the spent 
fuel pools for all reactors in the United States. Specifically, the 
Petitioner requested that the NRC: (1) immediately issue an information 
notice or other appropriate notification forwarding all information in 
its possession to all power reactor Licensees regarding the potential 
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools, and reminding Licensees of their 
responsibilities to perform timely operability determinations in 
accordance with their technical specifications and NRC Generic Letter 
91-18; (2) direct each Licensee to immediately perform an evaluation of 
this potential deficiency to determine compliance with its current 
licensing basis; (3) deny all requests for license amendments for the 
expansion of spent fuel pool capacity until these safety concerns are 
fully resolved;1 and (4) after evaluation by each Licensee, if the 
NRC determines there is little or no risk to public health and safety, 
the NRC may issue a Notice of Enforcement Discretion which represents a 
determination by the NRC not to enforce an applicable technical 
specification or license condition.
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    \1\ This request by Petitioner is not within the scope of the 
2.206 process as it does not request enforcement action as is more 
fully discussed in my letter transmitting this Director's Decision 
to Petitioner. Accordingly, it will not be further addressed in this 
Director's Decision.
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    As a basis for his requests, the Petitioner asserted that 
approximately 1\1/2\ years before the Petition was submitted, the NRC 
was informed of a potential substantial nuclear safety hazard at the 
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) operated by Pennsylvania 
Power and Light Company (PP&L or Licensee) and that the NRC overlooked 
the need to inform utilities of this potential problem. The Petitioner 
claimed that this hazard involves a major design flaw such that, during 
a design-basis loss-of-coolant-accident, the electrical power to the 
fuel pool cooling system would be turned off, resulting in loss of 
cooling for the spent fuel pool. Petitioner alleged that, as a result 
of the loss-of-coolant-accident, radiation levels in the reactor 
building would prohibit operators from entering the reactor building to 
restart the system. Petitioner claimed that, if cooling is not 
restored, the water in the spent fuel pool will boil, water will 
evaporate and, since the valves which must be opened to provide 
replacement water are located within the inaccessible reactor building, 
replacement water cannot be provided. Petitioner postulated that this 
would result in high onsite and offsite radiation levels and a failure 
of the spent fuel in the pool and a consequent release of massive 
amounts of airborne radioactivity outside of primary and secondary 
containment. Petitioner alleged further that the residual heat removal 
system could not cool the fuel pool under accident conditions, and that 
if replacement water could be provided, temperature and humidity 
conditions inside the reactor building would cause the emergency 
systems to fail, resulting in additional fuel failure and failure of 
the primary and secondary containment.
    In a letter of May 5, 1994, the Director of the Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation acknowledged receipt of the Petition and denied the 
Petitioner's requests for immediate relief. In the acknowledgement 
letter, he informed the Petitioner that the remaining requests were 
being evaluated under 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations and 
that action would be taken in a reasonable time.
    The NRC staff's review of the issues related to spent fuel storage 
pool safety raised in the April 13, 1994, Petition is now complete. As 
explained below, the NRC staff has taken actions which, in part, 
address Petitioner's requests. A discussion of these issues and the NRC 
response to the Petitioner's requests follows.

II. Discussion

    On November 27, 1992, a report was filed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 
by two contract engineers at SSES, which notified the Commission of 
potential design deficiencies in spent fuel pool decay heat removal 
systems and containment systems at the Susquehanna Steam Electric 
Station. The report noted that, under certain conditions, systems 
designed to remove decay heat from the spent fuel pool would be unable 
to perform their intended function and that, due to concurrent plant 
conditions, it would not be possible for operators to place backup 
systems in service or that backup systems would also otherwise be 
unable to perform their intended function. The report contended that, 
under such conditions, the spent fuel pool could reach boiling 
conditions and that the adverse environment created by a boiling pool 
would render systems designed to remove decay heat from the reactor 
core and systems designed to limit the release of fission products to 
the environment unable to perform their intended function. The ultimate 
consequence of this condition would be the failure of fuel in both the 
reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool and a substantial release of 
fission products to the environment that would cause significant harm 
to the public health and safety.
    The NRC staff determined initially that the issues appeared to be 
of low safety significance because of the low probability that the 
necessary sequence of events would take place. Specifically, the NRC 
staff observed that a loss-of-coolant accident followed by multiple 
failures of emergency core cooling systems would be necessary to 
achieve the adverse radiological conditions that would preclude 
operator actions to ensure continued adequate decay heat removal from 
the spent fuel pool. On this basis, the NRC staff determined that 
immediate actions to assure public health and safety were not 
warranted.
    However, because of the complex nature of the issues raised in the 
Part 21 report, the NRC staff undertook an extensive evaluation of the 
matter which continued from November 1992 to June 1995. The NRC staff 
review process included information-gathering trips to the Licensee's 
engineering offices and to the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station 
(SSES), public meetings with the Licensee, public meetings and written 
correspondence with the authors of the Part 21 report, and numerous 
written requests for information to the Licensee and corresponding 
responses. The staff issued Information Notice 93-83, ``Potential Loss 
of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident,'' on 
October 7, 1993, which informed licensees of all operating reactors of 
the nature of the issues raised in the Part 21 report.
    The NRC staff reviewed and evaluated the plant design and expected 
operation of plant equipment with respect to the various event 
sequences described in the Part 21 report. The staff also evaluated the 
response of plant equipment to a broader range of initiating events 
than was identified in the Part 21 report. For example, the staff 
considered the safety significance of a loss of spent fuel pool decay 
heat removal capability resulting from loss of offsite power events, 
from seismic events, and from flooding events. The staff considered the 
potential for such events to lead to spent fuel pool boiling sequences 
that could in turn jeopardize safety-related equipment needed to 
maintain reactor core cooling. The NRC staff conducted both 
deterministic and probabilistic evaluations to fully understand the 
safety significance of the issues raised. In addition, the staff 
evaluated the impact of certain modifications made by the Licensee 
during the course of the NRC staff's review. Finally, the staff 
examined

[[Page 58259]]

issues associated with the design of the spent fuel pool cooling system 
to determine the extent to which the Licensee's design and operation 
met the applicable regulatory requirements.
    The NRC staff issued a draft safety evaluation addressing the 
issues raised in the Part 21 report regarding SSES for comment on 
October 25, 1994. After receiving comments from the Licensee, the 
authors of the Part 21 report and the Advisory Committee on Reactor 
Safeguards, the staff issued a final safety evaluation regarding the 
issues raised in the Part 21 report for the Susquehanna Steam Electric 
Station on June 19, 1995 (SSES SE).2
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    \2\ Letter to R. Byram, PP&L, from J. Stolz, NRC, ``Susquehanna 
Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, Safety Evaluation Regarding 
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Issues'' (TAC NO. M85337), dated June 19, 
1995.
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    In the SSES SE, the staff documented the deterministic and 
probabilistic evaluations regarding the spent fuel pool issues raised 
in the Part 21 report and resulting conclusions. On the basis of the 
deterministic analysis of the plant as it was configured at the time 
the SSES SE was prepared, the NRC staff concluded that systems used to 
cool the spent fuel storage pool are adequate to prevent unacceptable 
challenges to safety-related systems needed to protect the health and 
safety of the public during design-basis accidents.
    On the basis of the probabilistic evaluation, the NRC staff 
concluded that the specific scenario involving a large radionuclide 
release from the reactor vessel, which was described in the Part 21 
report, is a sequence of very low probability. The NRC staff's 
evaluation concluded that, even with consideration of the additional 
initiating events described above, ``loss of spent fuel pool cooling 
events'' represented events of low safety significance at the time the 
Part 21 report was submitted. However, the staff also concluded that 
the plant modifications and procedural upgrades made during the course 
of the staff's review, which included removal of the gates that 
separate the spent fuel storage pools from the common cask storage pit, 
installation of remote spent fuel pool temperature and level indication 
in the control room, and numerous procedural upgrades, provided a 
measurable improvement in plant safety and that these conclusions had 
potential generic implications. In summary, with regard to loss of 
spent fuel pool cooling events, the design of the SSES facility was 
adequate to protect public health and safety.
    The staff issued Information Notice 93-83, Supplement 1, 
``Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling After a Loss-of-Coolant 
Accident or a Loss of Offsite Power,'' to all power reactor licensees 
on August 24, 1995, in which the SSES SE was summarized. The 
information notice also described the staff's plans to undertake an 
action plan to evaluate the generic concerns raised in the SSES SE and 
to address certain additional concerns arising from a special 
inspection at a permanently shutdown reactor facility.3 The 
generic action plan, entitled ``Task Action Plan for Spent Fuel Storage 
Pool Safety'' (Task Action Plan) was issued on October 13, 1994, and 
included the following actions: (1) a search for and analysis of 
information regarding spent fuel storage pool issues, (2) an assessment 
of the operation and design of spent fuel storage pools at selected 
reactor facilities, (3) an evaluation of the assessment findings for 
safety concerns, and (4) selection and execution of an appropriate 
course of action based on the safety significance of the findings.
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    \3\ On January 25, 1994, the licensee for Dresden Unit 1, a 
permanently shutdown facility, discovered approximately 55,000 
gallons of water in the basement of the unheated Unit 1 containment. 
The water originated from a rupture of the service water system that 
occurred due to freeze damage. The licensee investigated further and 
found that, although the fuel transfer system was not damaged, there 
was a potential for a portion of the fuel transfer system inside 
containment to fail and result in a partial drain-down of the spent 
fuel pool that contained 660 spent fuel assemblies. The NRC issued 
Bulletin 94-01, ``Potential Fuel Pool Draindown Caused by Inadequate 
Maintenance Practices at Dresden Unit 1,'' on April 8, 1994 to all 
licensees with permanently shutdown reactors who had spent fuel 
stored in spent fuel pools. The NRC requested that such licensees 
take certain actions to ensure that spent fuel storage safety did 
not become degraded.
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    As part of its review under the Task Action Plan, the staff 
performed assessment visits to four operating reactors. The staff also 
reviewed operating experience, as documented in Licensee Event Reports 
and other information sources, as well as in previous studies of spent 
fuel pool issues. Finally, the staff gathered detailed design data for 
every operating reactor and analyzed this data to identify potential 
safety issues.
    The NRC staff completed its work under the Task Action Plan in July 
1996. The staff forwarded the results of its review to the Commission 
on July 26, 1996.4 In the report, the staff concluded that 
existing spent fuel storage pool structures, systems, and components 
provide adequate protection for public health and safety. Protection is 
provided by several layers of defense involving accident prevention 
(e.g., quality controls on design, construction, and operation), 
accident mitigation (e.g., multiple cooling systems and multiple makeup 
water paths), radiation protection, and emergency preparedness. Design 
features addressing each of these areas for spent fuel storage for each 
operating reactor have been reviewed and approved by the staff. In 
addition, the limited risk analyses available for spent fuel storage 
suggest that current design features and operational constraints cause 
issues related to spent fuel pool storage to be a small fraction of the 
overall risk associated with an operating light-water reactor.
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    \4\ Memorandum to the Commission, from J. Taylor, ``Resolution 
of Spent Fuel Storage Pool Action Plan Issues,'' dated July 26, 
1996.
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    Notwithstanding the findings resulting from the Task Action Plan, 
the NRC staff reviewed each operating reactor's spent fuel pool design 
to identify strengths and weaknesses, and to identify potential areas 
for safety enhancements. The NRC staff identified seven categories of 
design features that reduce the reliability of spent fuel pool decay 
heat removal, increase the potential for loss of spent fuel coolant 
inventory, or increase the potential for consequential loss of 
essential safety functions at an operating reactor. The NRC staff 
determined that these design features existed at twenty-two sites.
    As the staff has concluded that present facility designs provide 
adequate protection of public health and safety, possible safety 
enhancements will be evaluated pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3). The 
analyses for possible safety enhancement backfits will consider whether 
modifications to the plant design to address the plant-specific design 
features identified by the NRC staff could provide a substantial 
increase in the overall protection of public health and safety and 
whether such modifications could be justified on a cost-benefit basis.
    The NRC staff also identified three additional categories of design 
features that may have the potential to reduce the reliability of spent 
fuel pool decay heat removal, increase the potential for loss of spent 
fuel coolant inventory, or increase the potential for consequential 
loss of essential safety functions at an operating reactor. The NRC 
staff preliminarily determined that these design features existed at 
eleven sites. However, the staff has insufficient information at this 
time to determine whether backfits pursuant to 10 CFR 50.109(a)(3) are 
warranted. For plants identified as having design features in these 
three categories, the NRC staff will gather and evaluate additional 
information prior to determining whether to require any backfits.
    In addition to the plant-specific analyses described above for 
twenty-two

[[Page 58260]]

sites which will address certain design features, the NRC staff plans 
to address issues relating to the functional performance of spent fuel 
pool decay heat removal, as well as the operational aspects related to 
coolant inventory control and reactivity control, for all operating 
reactors. The staff plans to expand the proposed, performance-based 
rule for shutdown operations at nuclear power plants (10 CFR 50.67) to 
encompass fuel storage pool operations to address these performance and 
operational considerations.
    The NRC staff has sent the July 26, 1996, report to all licensees. 
For those licensees whose plants have one or more of the design 
features which warrant an analysis of possible plant-specific safety 
enhancements, the staff has provided an opportunity for licensees to 
comment on (1) the accuracy of the NRC staff's understanding of the 
plant design, (2) the safety significance of the design concern, (3) 
the cost of potential modifications to address the design concern, or 
(4) the existing protection from the design concern provided by 
administrative controls or other means. In developing a schedule and 
plans for conducting the plant-specific regulatory analyses, the NRC 
staff will consider comments received from licensees.

III. Response to Petitioner's Requests

A. Issuance of Generic Communications to Licensees on Failure of Spent 
Fuel

    The NRC staff has issued three information notices on matters 
related to adequate decay heat removal from the spent fuel pool. 
Information Notice 93-83, ``Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 
After a Loss-of-Coolant Accident,'' was issued on October 7, 1993, and 
described the concerns raised in the November 27, 1992, Part 21 report. 
Information Notice 93-83, Supplement 1, was issued on August 24, 1995, 
to inform licensees of the results of the NRC review of the concerns at 
SSES. Information Notice (IN) 95-54, ``Decay Heat Management Practices 
During Refueling Outages,'' was issued on December 1, 1995. It 
described recent NRC assessments of events at certain plants regarding 
licensee control of refueling operations and the methods for removing 
decay heat produced from the irradiated fuel stored in the spent fuel 
pool during refueling outages. In IN 95-54, the NRC staff communicated 
to licensees that the plant-specific events described in IN 95-54 and 
the previous information notices illustrated the importance of assuring 
that (1) planned core offload evolutions, including refueling practices 
and irradiated decay heat removal, are consistent with the licensing 
basis, including the Final Safety Analysis Report, technical 
specifications, and license conditions; (2) changes are evaluated 
through the application of the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, as 
appropriate; and (3) all relevant procedures associated with core 
offloads have been appropriately reviewed.
    As described in Section II, the NRC staff also forwarded the July 
26, 1996, report on spent fuel to all licensees. The NRC has determined 
that these generic communications to power reactor licensees are 
sufficient to provide licensees with information on spent fuel pool 
cooling issues.
    Petitioner's request that the NRC issue an information notice or 
other appropriate notification forwarding all information in its 
possession to all power reactor licensees regarding the potential 
failure of fuel in spent fuel pools is granted to the extent that the 
NRC staff has provided information on spent fuel storage safety issues 
by way of the generic communications and correspondence described 
above.
    Petitioner's request that the NRC remind licensees of their 
responsibilities to perform timely operability determinations in 
accordance with their technical specifications is granted to the extent 
that the NRC has communicated to licensees the importance of conducting 
relevant spent fuel pool decay heat removal activities in accordance 
with technical specifications and other plant-specific applicable 
regulatory requirements in IN 95-54.

B. Licensee Evaluation of Compliance With the Licensing Basis

    Petitioner requested that the staff direct each licensee to 
immediately perform an evaluation of the potential failure of the fuel 
in the spent fuel pool to determine compliance with the current 
licensing basis. The NRC staff examined the issue of the conformance of 
the existing plant design with the facility licensing basis in great 
detail for SSES.5 As documented in the SSES SE, the NRC staff 
concluded that neither operation of spent fuel pool cooling during 
design-basis accident conditions nor mitigation of the effects of a 
loss of spent fuel pool cooling during normal and design-basis accident 
conditions could be considered part of the SSES licensing basis with 
the exception of mitigation of loss of spent fuel pool cooling 
following a design-basis seismic event. In general, the NRC staff's 
conclusion is based on the fact that, with respect to operation of the 
spent fuel pool cooling systems during normal and design-basis accident 
conditions, the SSES operating license safety evaluation report 6 
(SER) did not cite the applicable General Design Criteria (GDC) (GDC 44 
and GDC 61 in its entirety) as the basis for finding the system 
acceptable. With respect to the mitigation of the effects of a loss of 
spent fuel pool cooling during normal and design-basis accident 
conditions, in the SSES SE, the staff found no evidence that it 
expected secondary containment systems to accommodate the added heat 
and vapor loads that would follow a sustained loss of spent fuel pool 
cooling for any design-basis event with the specific exception of a 
design-basis seismic event.
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    \5\ In the SSES spent fuel pool design review, the NRC staff 
determined which regulations the licensee was required to comply 
with. In addition, operational limitations were extracted from 
plant-specific licensing documents including the Final Safety 
Analysis Report, technical specifications, license amendments and 
other docketed correspondence.
    \6\ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ``Safety Evaluation 
Report Related to the Operation of Susquehanna Steam Electric 
Station, Units 1 and 2,'' NUREG-0776, April 1981.
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    The NRC staff's finding that mitigation of a loss of spent fuel 
pool cooling following a design basis seismic event was part of the 
licensing basis was based on specific statements in the SER that 
acceptance of a non-seismic spent fuel pool cooling system was an 
acceptable deviation from GDC 2, based, in part, on the existence of an 
adequate standby gas treatment system. At the time of the original 
licensing review, the staff did not attempt to extend the licensing 
basis for loss of spent fuel pool cooling following a design basis 
seismic event to any other design basis events.
    During its review of spent fuel pool concerns at SSES, the NRC 
staff raised its concerns to the Licensee regarding the ability to 
mitigate a loss of spent fuel pool cooling following a seismic event. 
As discussed in the SSES SE, the Licensee took certain actions, 
including implementing routine operation of the adjacent spent fuel 
pools in a cross-connected manner, that adequately addressed NRC staff 
concerns. In summary, with regard to the spent fuel pool issues raised 
by Petitioner, SSES design and operation conform to the facility 
licensing basis.
    As part of the Task Action Plan, the staff considered on a generic 
basis the history of regulatory requirements related to spent fuel 
pools as they were applied in plant licensing activities. The staff 
observed that such regulatory requirements evolved since the first 
nuclear power plants were licensed and

[[Page 58261]]

observed that specific regulatory guidance on the design of spent fuel 
pool cooling systems was not issued until 1975 when the Standard Review 
Plan was issued, after construction permits for most currently 
operating reactors were issued. Because the regulatory requirements 
were not constant during the era when the staff was conducting 
licensing reviews for the current generation of operating reactors, the 
staff observed that approved designs varied from plant to plant. 
However, the staff did conclude, based on information available during 
the recent review of spent fuel pool system design, that all operating 
reactors had design features for spent fuel storage (addressing 
accident prevention functions, accident mitigation functions, radiation 
protection functions, and emergency preparedness functions) which had 
been reviewed and approved by the staff and that these facility designs 
were in compliance with the NRC requirements applied at the time of 
licensing.
    Although the NRC staff concluded that plants were in compliance 
with the NRC design requirements applied at the time of licensing, the 
NRC staff also recently reviewed certain operating practices at all 
operating reactors to verify that the plants were being operated 
consistent with the plant design described in the licensing basis. 
7 Specifically, the staff reviewed refueling outage practices with 
regard to offloading irradiated fuel into the spent fuel pool. The 
staff concluded on the basis of the information collected and reviewed 
and the specific licensee actions taken and commitments made during the 
course of this review, core offload practices are currently consistent 
with the spent fuel pool decay heat removal licensing basis for all 
plants or will be prior to the next refueling outage. However, during 
the course of the review, the staff determined that 9 sites (15 units) 
needed to perform evaluations or make modifications, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.59 or 10 CFR 50.90, to ensure that their reload practices adhered to 
their licensing basis. This is an indication that these plants may have 
previously performed full core offloads inconsistent with their 
licensing basis.
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    \7\ Memorandum to the Commission, from J. Taylor, dated May 21, 
1996.
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    The staff has documented the details of its findings in recent NRC 
inspection reports for each of the nine sites. The staff will take 
regulatory action, as appropriate, to address these potential 
operational non-conformances.
    Petitioner requested that evaluations be performed of Petitioner's 
concern regarding spent fuel pool cooling by licensees to determine 
compliance with their licensing basis. This request is granted to the 
extent that the NRC staff has performed evaluations of both the design 
and operational aspects of spent fuel pool storage issues for all 
operating reactors to the extent described above.

C. Issuance of Notices of Enforcement Discretion

    The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (the Act) and the Energy 
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, give NRC the authority to take 
enforcement actions necessary to ensure compliance with certain 
provisions of those Acts and with NRC regulations, orders, and 
licenses. Licenses include specified license conditions and facility 
technical specifications which are part of the license. The NRC's 
enforcement policy is published in NUREG-1600, ``General Statement of 
Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions,'' July 1995 
(Enforcement Policy).
    The Enforcement Policy recognizes that, on occasion, circumstances 
may arise concerning a licensee's compliance with a Technical 
Specification Limiting Condition for Operation or with some other 
license conditions which would involve an unnecessary plant transient 
or the performance of plant testing that is inappropriate for the 
specific plant conditions. For such occasions, the Enforcement Policy 
provides a process, referred to as a Notice of Enforcement Discretion 
(NOED), by which the NRC staff, upon request from the licensee, may 
choose not to enforce compliance with the applicable technical 
specifications or license conditions in limited circumstances. A NOED 
will only be issued if the NRC staff is satisfied that the action is 
consistent with public health and safety.
    In Request 4, Petitioner seems to suggest that the exercise of 
enforcement discretion by issuance of a NOED may be appropriate 
concerning spent fuel pool issues raised in the Petition. As discussed 
in Section B, with regard to potential failure of fuel in spent fuel 
pools, the NRC staff has determined that spent fuel pools contain 
design features which were reviewed and approved by the staff. In 
addition, these facility designs have been found to be in compliance 
with NRC requirements applied at the time of licensing. Based upon the 
review of the information provided in the Petition, the NRC staff has 
not identified any circumstances warranting the issuance of a NOED. If 
a situation is presented to the staff involving a request for a NOED, 
such a request will be considered in accordance with the Enforcement 
Policy.

IV. Conclusion

    Based on the NRC staff's evaluation described above, the NRC staff 
has issued generic communications responsive to Petitioner's Request 1. 
In addition, the NRC staff has reviewed the aspect of compliance of 
NRC-licensed facilities in the area of spent fuel pool design 
responsive in part to Petitioner's Request 2. To this extent, the 
Petition is granted. With regard to Petitioner's Request 4, the NRC 
staff has concluded that there has been no need for issuance of NOEDs 
regarding potential failure of fuel in spent fuel pools.
    A copy of this Final Director's Decision will be placed in the 
Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, 
NW., Washington, D.C., and at the local public document room for all 
power reactor licensees.
    A copy of this Final Director's Decision will also be filed with 
the Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's Regulations. This Decision will become the 
final action of the Commission 25 days after its issuance, unless the 
Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of the Decision within 
that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of November 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-29007 Filed 11-12-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P