[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 220 (Wednesday, November 13, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 58160-58165]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-28943]


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FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION

46 CFR Part 586

[Docket No. 96-20]


Port Restrictions and Requirements in the United States/Japan 
Trade

AGENCY: Federal Maritime Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Maritime Commission, in response to apparent 
unfavorable conditions in the foreign oceanborne trade between the 
United States and Japan, proposes the imposition of fees on liner 
vessels operated by Japanese carriers calling at United States ports. 
The effect of the rule will be to adjust or meet unfavorable conditions 
caused by Japanese port restrictions and requirements by imposing 
countervailing burdens on Japanese carriers.

DATES: Comments due on or before January 13, 1997.

ADDRESSES: Send comments (original and 15 copies) to: Joseph C. 
Polking, Secretary, Federal Maritime Commission, 800 North Capitol 
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20573, (202) 523-5725.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert D. Bourgoin, General Counsel, 
Federal Maritime Commission, 800 North Capitol Street, N.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20573, (202) 523-5740.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

Information Demand Orders

    On September 12, 1995, the Federal Maritime Commission 
(``Commission'' or ``FMC'') issued information demand orders to 
carriers in the U.S./Japan trade,1 inquiring about certain 
restrictions and requirements for the use

[[Page 58161]]

of port and terminal facilities in Japan. Four issues of concern were 
addressed by the information demand orders: (1) The ``prior 
consultation'' system, a process of mandatory discussions and 
operational approvals involving port and terminal management, unions, 
and ocean carriers serving Japan; (2) restrictions on the operation of 
Japanese ports on Sunday; (3) the requirement that all containerized 
cargo exported from Japan be weighed and measured by harbor workers, 
regardless of commercial necessity; and (4) the disposition of the 
Japanese Harbor Management Fund, which was the subject of Docket No. 
91-19, Actions to Address Conditions Affecting U.S. Carriers Which do 
not Exist for Foreign Carriers in the U.S./Japan Trade. The Commission 
observed that these practices may result in conditions unfavorable to 
shipping in the United States/Japan trade, and may constitute adverse 
conditions affecting U.S. carriers that do not exist for Japanese 
carriers in the United States.
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    \1\ NYK Line (North America) Inc.; Mitsui O.S.K. Lines 
(America), Inc.; K Line America Inc.; Sea-Land Service, Inc.; 
American President Line; Westwood Shipping Lines; Evergreen Line; 
Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd.; Maersk Inc.; China Ocean Shipping Co.; 
Hyundai Merchant Marine; Orient Overseas Container Line (``OOCL''); 
Yangming Marine Line; Neptune Orient Lines; Senator Linie (USA) 
Inc.; Mexican Line (TMM); Hapag-Lloyd (America) Inc.; Zim Container; 
and Cho Yang Line.
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Prior Consultation

    Many of the questions in the information demand orders centered on 
the prior consultation system and how it is administered by the Japan 
Harbor Transportation Association (``JHTA''). JHTA is an association of 
companies providing harbor transportation services, including terminal 
operators, stevedores, and sworn measurers. Under this system, carriers 
serving Japan must consult with JHTA about operational matters 
involving Japanese ports or harbor labor. After JHTA consults with a 
carrier, it may conduct consultations with labor interests, then 
approve or deny the line's request.
    The responses to the Commission's orders indicated that virtually 
all operational plans and changes made by carriers serving Japan must 
be submitted for prior consultation. These include: any changes in 
berth, route, or port calls; inauguration of new services or new 
vessels; the addition of extra port calls (either permanently or 
temporarily), or calls by non-container ships at container berths; 
jumboization of vessels or changes in vessel technology which affect 
stevedoring or terminal operations; temporary assignment of vessels as 
substitutes (even if only for one voyage) or the renaming of vessels; 
rationalization agreements between carriers involving vessel sharing or 
berthing changes; the assignment of a stevedoring contractor or 
terminal operator to a carrier and any subsequent change in assignment; 
requests for Sunday work; changes in mandatory weighing and measuring 
arrangements; or any other changes which affect stevedoring or terminal 
operations.
    The comments shed light on the complex and opaque procedural 
aspects of the prior consultation system. According to several 
respondents, if a carrier wants to take one of the above-described 
actions, it first submits a draft written request for prior 
consultation outlining its proposal to JHTA. If the matter is deemed to 
be important, a meeting is then scheduled for a carrier representative 
to explain its request to JHTA chairman Shiroo Takashima. Often, the 
carrier executive is accompanied by an official of the stevedoring 
company used by that line. At this stage, the JHTA chairman may refuse 
to accept the request, or require changes or impose conditions for 
acceptance.
    According to several respondents, if the carriers' request is 
acceptable to the JHTA chairman, it is taken up at a formal ``pre-prior 
consultation'' meeting. These meetings, generally held monthly, are 
attended by the JHTA chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, prior 
consultation administrator, a representative from the carrier, and 
often a representative of its affected stevedore or terminal operator. 
If the request is accepted at this stage, the matter is deliberated at 
formal prior consultation meetings between JHTA and union officials, 
both in Tokyo and at the local level. Carrier representatives do not 
attend the JHTA-union meetings.
    A number of respondents suggested that the final prior consultation 
meetings are simply formalities. It appears that if a carrier's request 
is unacceptable to JHTA, this is conveyed early in the process, often 
in the carrier's initial meeting with the JHTA chairman. If JHTA takes 
an unfavorable view of a request, there is no formal rejection; 
instead, it simply is not accepted for consideration at the formal 
prior consultation meetings. In contrast, if a request has been 
accepted by the JHTA chairman, it is almost assured to be approved at 
the formal meetings.
    Beyond the above-described procedures, JHTA's decision-making 
process in prior consultation appears to be characterized by a total 
lack of transparency. The respondents indicated that there are almost 
no written rules, either substantive or procedural, nor are there 
written reasons for decisions or an appeal process; JHTA appears to 
have absolute discretion over the terms and conditions imposed in the 
prior consultation process.
    Many respondents suggested that JHTA uses prior consultation to 
prevent competition and maintain an agreed-upon allocation of work 
among the JHTA member companies. Several carriers recounted instances 
where prior consultation requests were held up until the carriers 
agreed to take on additional, unnecessary stevedoring companies or 
contractors. A number of carriers observed that JHTA may require that, 
when carriers consolidate terminal operations, the benefitting 
stevedore must reach an agreement with the losing one to take on some 
of the latter's workers, thereby insuring that there is still income 
passing to the losing stevedoring company. These practices, according 
to a number of commenters, prevent any real competition and undermine 
attempts to increase the efficiency of port operations, with the result 
that Japan has port costs that far exceed those of its Asian neighbors 
and other major trading nations.
    Much of JHTA's ability to compel participation in prior 
consultation appears to stem from its relationship with, and support 
of, organized labor. Some respondents explained that, if they did not 
participate in prior consultation or comply with JHTA's requests, they 
would be subject to retaliation, such as work stoppages or labor 
disruptions. Some respondents recounted an instance in 1985 when JHTA, 
in response to an investigation by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
(``FTC''), announced that it was abandoning the carrier-JHTA component 
of the prior consultation system. When the now-defunct Yamashita 
Shiminon Kaisha Line attempted to go ahead with changes in its 
operations, two of its vessels reportedly were boycotted by the unions, 
on the grounds that there had been no prior consultation. In order to 
prevent any further disruptions, respondents stated, carriers had no 
choice but to request that JHTA reestablish its prior consultation 
system.

Japanese Government Oversight

    Respondents confirmed that the agency with direct authority over 
harbor services is the Ministry of Transport (``MOT''). Persons wishing 
to perform harbor transportation services must obtain a license from 
MOT, in accordance with the Port Transportation Business Law. Also, 
under the Law Establishing the Ministry of Transportation, MOT is 
invested with authority over, inter alia, the development, improvement 
and coordination of the harbor transportation business. MOT reportedly 
can give oversight or guidance relating to the conduct of the Prior 
Consultation System if a national

[[Page 58162]]

policy (i.e., the development, improvement and coordination of the 
harbor transport business) is sought to be furthered. Respondents also 
indicated that administrative guidance, or gyoseishido, is practiced by 
governmental bodies in Japan, to secure cooperation of affected parties 
to further an administrative purpose.2
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    \2\ The Commission in its information demand orders described 
further authority that MOT apparently maintains under the Port 
Transportation Business Law. For example, MOT reviews rates based on 
whether they are reasonable and non-discriminatory. Art. 9. MOT must 
approve operators' ``terms and conditions on port transportation,'' 
to determine that ``there is no fear that the terms and conditions 
may impede the benefits of users,'' and also approve any changes in 
operators' business plans. Art. 11 & 17. If MOT determines that the 
port transportation businesses ``impede benefits of users'' it may 
order changes in business plans, terms and conditions, or rates. 
Art. 21.
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    MOT appears to have given guidance or otherwise become involved 
with prior consultation on at least a few occasions. In 1986, MOT 
signed, as a witness, the Letter of Confirmation on New Prior 
Consultation, an agreement between JHTA and carriers establishing the 
current version of the system. More recently, in 1992, MOT reportedly 
issued a ministerial view to JHTA and the Japanese Shipowners Ports 
Council setting forth basic principles for prior consultation regarding 
container terminal disputes.3 In that document (a translation of 
which was provided by respondents), MOT directed that, if carriers make 
changes to their operations, these changes must be submitted for prior 
consultation. It was also stated in the Ministerial View that if a 
shipping company changes the consortium with which it is affiliated, or 
reorganizes its service, it will give explanations to JHTA and obtain 
its understanding as early as possible. While the Ministerial View was 
addressed specifically to the Japanese shipowners, it appears that its 
principles are applied uniformly to all shipping companies.
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    \3\ The Japanese Shipowners Ports Council (``JSPC'') is the 
component of the Japanese Shipowners' Association that deals 
directly with harbor service-related matters. JSPC often served as 
the voice of the Japanese lines in prior consultation and other 
dealings with JHTA. There is a similar association for non-Japanese 
shipowners operating in Japan, the Japan Foreign Steamship 
Association (``JFSA'').
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    JHTA's operations also fall within the jurisdiction of the Japanese 
Fair Trade Commission (``FTC''). The Japanese respondents explained 
that Article 8 of the Law Relating to the Prohibition of Private 
Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of Japan (``Antimonopoly 
Law'') prohibits trade associations from engaging in certain 
activities, including restricting competition, limiting the number of 
entrepreneurs, restricting unduly the activities of constituent 
entrepreneurs, and causing entrepreneurs to engage in unfair business 
practices. As the agency responsible for administering the Antimonopoly 
Law, the FTC has the authority to investigate JHTA and its activities.
    This FTC authority has been invoked on occasion. In June, 1985, a 
complaint was filed with the Fair Trade Commission against JHTA, 
reportedly alleging that JHTA was restricting the activities of 
carriers and the competition among terminal operators. However, 
respondents stated that the complaint was later withdrawn and the FTC 
suspended its investigation.
    Another FTC complaint was filed late last year. Apparently, a 
dispute erupted between JHTA and one of its members, Sankyu, Inc. 
Sankyu filed a complaint with the FTC, alleging that JHTA was violating 
Japanese antitrust laws, allocating work among operators. In response, 
according to published reports, JHTA began exerting considerable 
pressure on one of Sankyu's clients, OOCL. JHTA reportedly refused to 
permit prior consultation and approve the carrier's space sharing and 
terminal reorganization plans. In February, according to press reports 
and other sources, Sankyu acquiesced to JHTA pressure and withdrew its 
FTC complaint. While the FTC has not formally dismissed or terminated 
its investigation, it does not appear to have taken any further action 
in this area since Sankyu's withdrawal.

Mandatory Weighing and Measuring

    The respondents uniformly confirmed that mandatory weight and 
measure data for all cargo is not required for any administrative 
functions or documentary procedures in Japan, nor do carriers require 
measurement of export box load cargo. Some carriers stated that they 
have attempted unsuccessfully to refuse sworn measurement services and 
charges; however, JHTA and union representatives threatened work 
delays, stoppages, and other retaliation if these efforts continued. 
The majority of carriers have not attempted unilaterally to stop 
weighing and measuring. Estimates of per-container weighing and 
measuring costs ranged from $41 to $85 per TEU, with the majority of 
responses in the $60-$68 range.
    In December, 1995, and January, 1996, agreements were reached 
involving JHTA, the sworn measurement companies, and JSPC and JFSA (the 
Japanese and foreign carrier groups), to phase out mandatory weighing 
and measuring over the course of five years. Reportedly, under the plan 
agreed to by the parties, carriers will be required to make a lump-sum 
payment to the sworn measurers each year from 1996 to 2000. The 
payments will be based on the amount paid for weighing and measuring in 
1994. The lump sum payments for the five years will be 83.3%, 66.6%, 
49.9%, 33.2%, and 16.5% of the 1994 total.

Sunday Work

    Because the earthquake that struck the Kobe region in January, 
1995, disabled most of that port's facilities, the volume of cargo 
moving through other Japanese ports increased substantially. According 
to several of the respondents, harbor workers immediately began 
operating on Sundays on an emergency basis to accommodate the 
additional capacity. In May, 1995, a one-year agreement reportedly was 
reached between JHTA and the unions to keep Sunday work in place in 
Japan's six major ports (Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and 
Kanmon).
    The one-year agreement (the text of which was provided by several 
respondents) has several requirements and restrictions for Sunday work. 
For example, Sunday work is limited to the moving of containers between 
vessels and the carriers container yards. Therefore, cargo cannot 
arrive at the gate on Sunday for loading that day, and cargo discharged 
on Sunday cannot be released the same day to the consignee. Also, the 
agreement provides that receipt of cargo on Saturdays should be 
minimized as much as possible, as Saturday is a day off for most harbor 
workers. Vessels may be loaded and unloaded on Sundays only between 
8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.
    According to the text of the agreement, a shipping company wishing 
to work on Sunday must apply by the preceding Friday. An additional 
charge is imposed for Sunday work. Sunday work is limited to shipping 
companies that ``have fully implemented the MOT approved rates and 
charges.'' Sunday work is also limited to carriers that ``have observed 
the harbor industrial labor/management agreement'' concerning numbers 
of hours and days that union laborers may work and amount of overtime 
available.
    The current restrictions on Sunday work apparently have had a 
number of negative effects on the respondent carriers. Some pointed out 
that restrictions on moving cargo into or out of the container yard 
causes inefficiency and leads to gate congestion on

[[Page 58163]]

Saturday and Monday. Several noted that Sunday work surcharges result 
in extra costs. Also, respondents noted that the requirement that lines 
apply in advance for Sunday work, and the shortened working hours, can 
be a burden and pose planning problems.
    It appears that the uncertainty surrounding the one-year agreement 
has also discouraged carriers from taking full advantage of Sunday 
work. While more than half of the respondents indicated that they have 
used Sunday work on occasion, virtually all of this use has been to 
accommodate vessel delays or other exigencies. No respondent indicated 
that it changed sailing schedules to use Sunday work on a regular 
basis. Apparently, since a permanent shift in vessel schedules would be 
complex and costly for an individual carrier, its alliance partners, 
and its feeder services, carriers cannot switch to regular Sunday calls 
without guarantees that Sunday work will continue to be available.
    While it appears that Sunday work will continue to be provided for 
the near term, there has been no discernable progress in reaching a 
stable and permanent resolution of the Sunday work issue. The previous 
one-year agreement for Sunday work expired in June 1996, and was 
extended for one-month intervals for July and August. It has been 
reported recently that JHTA and waterfront unions have reached an 
agreement by which Sunday work would be continued for six months, 
through March 10, 1997. However, beyond the March 10 deadline, the fate 
of Sunday work appears uncertain.

Discussion

JHTA Dominance Through the Prior Consultation System

    Of all the issues raised in the Commission's information demand 
order, it is apparent that prior consultation is the most serious. The 
prior consultation system is central to JHTA's dominance of the harbor 
services market in Japan, as it is the mechanism by which JHTA 
exercises control over the activities of individual carriers and 
stevedoring companies. Other JHTA restrictions, such as those affecting 
Sunday work and mandatory weighing and measuring, are also of serious 
concern to the Commission; however, it appears that these matters are 
symptoms rather than root causes of JHTA's dominant position.
    By serving as intermediary in all negotiations and requiring, on 
threat of labor disruption, that carriers submit virtually all planned 
operational changes for approval, JHTA is able to assign and allocate 
work among its member companies. This process is used to eliminate 
competition among terminal operators and stevedores, obviating the need 
for them to operate more efficiently, reorganize, downsize, or 
otherwise cut costs to gain market share. It also puts JHTA in a 
position to block any carrier initiatives to reduce terminal costs, 
such as plans by various carrier alliances to share terminals and 
reduce the number of stevedoring companies used, until plans are made 
to protect the harbor workers' competitive status quo.
    JHTA has pushed prior consultation far beyond its purported use as 
a labor relations device. As numerous respondents pointed out, 
virtually every operational change by a carrier, even those with no 
apparent labor impact, must be submitted to JHTA. This all-encompassing 
scope of prior consultation has given JHTA broad leverage to implement 
programs that benefit its constituents. It can, for example, extract 
unwarranted payments from carriers, such as the Harbor Maintenance Fund 
and the mandatory weighing and measuring fees. JHTA also appears to 
have unchecked authority to punish its detractors.
    JHTA has shown little regard for public accountability in its 
administration of prior consultation. There are virtually no written 
rules and no public records, decisions, or appeals. This lack of 
transparency makes it almost impossible for government, industry, or 
media critics to scrutinize the workings of the system.

The Role of the Government of Japan

    Prior consultation and JHTA dominance do not, however, appear to be 
an entirely private sector problem. Prior consultation and JHTA enjoy a 
substantial amount of support from Japanese authorities. Under the Port 
Transportation Business Law and the Law Establishing the Ministry of 
Transportation, MOT has broad authority to oversee and regulate the 
activities and business practices of JHTA and its members. In 
exercising this authority, however, MOT officials have chosen to permit 
JHTA to wield unchecked authority through the prior consultation 
process, rather than requiring JHTA to be less anticompetitive, less 
arbitrary, and more transparent.4
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    \4\ We would also note that the FTC has repeatedly discontinued 
investigations into JHTA's activities without taking measures to 
curb the anticompetitive effects of JHTA's actions.
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    Further Government of Japan support for prior consultation was 
evinced clearly by the 1992 Ministerial View issued to carriers by MOT. 
This document, on its face, mandates that carriers submit changes in 
their business plans to JHTA for prior consultation. This would appear 
to be an unequivocal validation and endorsement of JHTA's prior 
consultation activities.
    However, the most significant example of government support for 
JHTA is the MOT licensing of harbor service companies. The Japanese 
Port Transportation Business Law directs that, if a person seeks to 
begin performing harbor services, MOT shall evaluate, inter alia, 
whether the business in question ``has an appropriate plan to perform 
the business,'' and whether it would ``cause port transportation supply 
to be excessively over transportation demand.'' Art. 5 & 6. It appears 
that MOT uses this authority to restrict entry and to shield JHTA and 
its members from foreign competition. U.S. carriers have stated that 
they have been shut out of the market entirely, and advised by Japanese 
authorities that they should not even bother to apply because such 
certificates would not be granted.
    It appears that, by preventing foreign lines from providing 
terminal services for themselves and by blocking new entrants from the 
market, the Government of Japan virtually guarantees that JHTA's 
monopoly over harbor operations will continue unabated. The licensing 
requirement ensures that JHTA is insulated from pressure to reform, 
either from outside competitors or new members. Carriers remain captive 
in an increasingly unworkable port system, and their customers are 
forced to absorb the resultant costs, which are among the highest in 
the world. Moreover, the Government of Japan's licensing practices 
appear blatantly discriminatory against U.S. carriers. There are no 
legal restrictions on the ownership of terminal operations by Japanese 
companies in the United States.
    It is our conclusion that the Government of Japan's support for the 
prior consultation system, through its discriminatory and restrictive 
licensing requirements for persons wishing to perform harbor services, 
appears to constitute conditions unfavorable to shipping in the U.S./
Japan trade. Accordingly, we are proposing the imposition of 
countervailing sanctions, pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Merchant 
Marine Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C. app. 876(1)(b) (``Section 19''). To avert 
the imposition of these sanctions, we would urge the Government of 
Japan to

[[Page 58164]]

afford U.S. carriers relief by making available to them all necessary 
licenses, permissions, or certificates to perform, for themselves and 
third parties, stevedoring and terminal operating services, or to 
establish subsidiaries or related ventures to do so, as Japanese 
carriers are permitted to do in the United States.
    In addition, we remain concerned about the long term resolution of 
the Sunday work issue. We are encouraged, however, that some progress 
appears to have been made in this area, as well as with regard to 
weighing and measuring. Therefore, we are not proposing sanctions in 
these areas at this time. However, the Commission will continue to 
monitor progress on these issues, and on the disposition of the yet 
undisposed balances in the Harbor Management Fund, and will take 
further remedial action if appropriate.
    Section 19 authorizes and directs the Federal Maritime Commission 
to

make rules and regulations affecting shipping in the foreign trade 
not in conflict with law in order to adjust or meet general or 
special conditions unfavorable to shipping in the foreign trade, 
whether in any particular trade or upon any particular route or in 
commerce generally, including intermodal movements, terminal 
operations, cargo solicitations, forwarding and agency services, 
non-vessel-operating common carrier operations, and other activities 
and services integral to transportation systems, and which arise out 
of or result from foreign laws, rules, or regulations or from 
competitive methods or practices employed by owners, operators, 
agents, or masters of vessels of a foreign country * * *.

    The measures authorized under Section 19 include limitation of 
sailings, suspension of carriers' tariffs or rights to use conference 
tariffs, suspension of carriers' rights to operate under FMC-filed 
terminal and other agreements, fees of up to $1,000,000 per voyage, or 
any other action deemed necessary and appropriate to adjust or meet the 
unfavorable condition. 46 U.S.C. app. 876(9).
    After giving consideration to all available countervailing 
sanctions, including limitations of sailings and suspension of carrier 
tariffs or terminal or other agreements, the Commission has determined 
to propose a primary remedy of a $100,000 fee, assessed on Japanese 
carriers when their liner vessels enter U.S. ports. However, the 
Commission specifically solicits comment on the feasibility of 
additional or alternative sanctions. The Commission reserves the right 
to adjust the level of the fee or add additional or alternative 
sanctions at any time if the subject adverse conditions are not 
remedied. In the event that the presently prescribed fees are not paid, 
the Proposed Rule provides for the denial of clearance or entry to or 
detention at U.S. ports.
    In order to provide proper notice and a fair opportunity to respond 
to the proposed action, the Commission is giving all interested parties 
sixty days to file comments. Factual submissions, where relevant, 
should include evidence or statistics showing commercial loss and to 
the extent possible be supported by sworn documents and affidavits.

List of Subjects in 46 CFR Part 586

    Cargo vessels; Exports; Foreign relations; Imports; Maritime 
carriers; Penalties; Rates and fares; Tariffs.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the FMC proposes to 
amend 46 CFR Part 586 as follows:
    Therefore, pursuant to section 19(1)(b) of the Merchant Marine Act, 
1920, 46 U.S.C. app. 876(1)(b), as amended, Reorganization Plan No. 7 
of 1961, 75 Stat. 840, and 46 CFR Part 585, it is proposed to amend 
Part 586 of Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 586--ACTIONS TO ADJUST OR MEET CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO 
SHIPPING IN THE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE

    1. The authority citation for Part 586 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 46 U.S.C. app. 876(1)(b); 46 U.S.C. app. 876(5) 
through (12); 46 CFR Part 585; Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1961, 26 
FR 7315 (August 12, 1961).

    2. Section 586.2 is added to read as follows:


Sec. 586.2   Conditions unfavorable to shipping in the United States/ 
Japan trade.

    (a) Conditions unfavorable to shipping in the trade. (1) The 
Federal Maritime Commission (``Commission'') has determined that the 
Government of Japan has created conditions unfavorable to shipping in 
the U.S.-Japan trade, by discriminatorily restricting the licensing of 
persons wishing to offer harbor and terminal services in Japan.
    (2) Through its discriminatory and restrictive licensing practices, 
the Government of Japan has protected the dominant position of the 
Japan Harbor Transportation Association (``JHTA''), an association of 
Japanese waterfront employers. Benefitting from this protection and 
from a lack of oversight by the Government of Japan, JHTA has virtually 
eliminated competition in the Japanese harbor services market. JHTA 
effectively controls competition through the use of the prior 
consultation system, by which carriers are required to submit virtually 
all operational plans and requests for JHTA review.
    (3) JHTA has used the leverage afforded by the prior consultation 
system to force carriers, inter alia, to change terminal and 
stevedoring arrangements, to take on unnecessary stevedoring companies 
or contractors, and to make unwarranted payments to JHTA and its 
members. This has resulted in detrimental excess costs for carriers and 
shippers engaged U.S.-Japan oceanborne trade.
    (4) The Government of Japan has discriminated against U.S. carriers 
by refusing to make licenses to perform port services available to 
them. This has left U.S. carriers with no choice but to submit their 
shoreside planning and operations to JHTA control. In contrast, there 
are no legal restrictions on the ownership of terminal operations by 
Japanese carriers in the United States.
    (b) Definitions. (1) Japanese carrier means Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, 
Ltd., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd, and Nippon Yusen Kaisha.
    (2) Designated vessel means any container-carrying liner vessel 
owned or operated by a Japanese carrier (or any subsidiary, related 
company, or parent company thereof).
    (c) Assessment of fees. A fee of one hundred thousand dollars shall 
be assessed each time a designated vessel is entered in any port of the 
United States from any foreign port or place.
    (d) Report and payment. Each Japanese carrier, on the fifteenth day 
of each month, shall file with the Secretary of the Federal Maritime 
Commission a report listing each vessel for which fees were assessed 
under paragraph (c) of this section during the preceding calendar 
month, and the date of each vessel's entry. Each report shall be 
accompanied by a cashiers check or certified check, payable to the 
Federal Maritime Commission, for the full amount of the fees owed for 
the month covered by the report. Each report shall be sworn to be true 
and complete, under oath, by the carrier official responsible for its 
execution.
    (e) Refusal of clearance by the collector of customs. If any 
Japanese carrier subject to this section shall fail to pay any fee or 
to file any quarterly report required by paragraph (d) of this section 
within the prescribed period, the Commission may request the Chief, 
Carrier Rulings Branch of the U.S. Customs Service to direct the 
collectors of customs at U.S. ports to refuse the clearance required by 
46 U.S.C. app. section 91 to any designated vessel owned or operated by 
that carrier.

[[Page 58165]]

    (f) Denial of entry to or detention at United States ports by the 
Secretary of Transportation. If any Japanese carrier subject to this 
section shall fail to pay any fee or to file any quarterly report 
required by paragraph (d) of this section within the prescribed period, 
the Commission may request the Secretary of Transportation to direct 
the Coast Guard to:
    (1) Deny entry for purpose of oceanborne trade, of any designated 
vessel owned or operated by that carrier to any port or place in the 
United States or the navigable waters of the United States; or
    (2) Detain that vessel at the port or place in the United States 
from which it is about to depart for another port or place in the 
United States. By the Commission.
Joseph C. Polking,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-28943 Filed 11-12-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6730-01-W