[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 218 (Friday, November 8, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57923-57926]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-28741]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245, License No. DPR-21]


Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    Notice is hereby given that the Acting Director, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition dated 
December 30, 1994, by Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petition for action under 10 
CFR 2.206). The Petition pertains to Millstone Nuclear Power Station, 
Unit 1.
    In the Petition, the Petitioner asserted that (1) the licensee does 
not adequately control work and procedure compliance at Millstone, as 
evidenced by the use of standard commercial-grade lugs in a gas turbine 
fuel forwarding pump and motor that are quality assurance (QA) 
subsystems of the emergency gas turbine generator and which had 
apparently been crimped using diagonal pliers; improper Raychem 
splices, cable bend radius, and connections in the connection boxes of 
major safety-related QA equipment; and installation of non-QA lugs and 
improperly performed crimping in fire protection QA emergency lights 
and (2) the Petitioner was subjected to ridicule by the gas turbine 
system engineer for raising concerns regarding the lugs on the gas 
turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor. The Petitioner requested that 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (1) ``force'' Northeast 
Utilities (NU) to review all existing work orders for the past 10 or 12 
years, with NRC oversight, to ensure that quality assurance motor and 
connection work does not have certain deficiencies; (2) assess a 
Severity Level I violation against NU and its managers for apparent 
violations of 10 CFR 50.7 and a Severity Level III violation against a 
gas turbine system engineer at Millstone for his apparent violation of 
10 CFR 50.7 and NU's ``Code of Conduct and Ethics;'' and (3) institute 
sanctions against the system engineer and NU and its managers for 
engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.
    The Acting Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has 
determined to deny the Petition. The reasons for this denial are 
explained in the ``Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-
96-17), the complete text of which follows this notice and is available 
for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the 
Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local 
public document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three 
Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, 
Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at 
the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road, 
Waterford, Connecticut.
    A copy of the Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the 
Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided by this 
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the 
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on 
its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ashok C. Thadani,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[DD-96-17]

I. Introduction

    On December 30, 1994, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a 
Petition with

[[Page 57924]]

the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). In the Petition, the Petitioner 
asserted that (1) inadequate work control and procedure compliance 
exist at Millstone Unit 1, as evidenced by the use of standard 
commercial-grade lugs in a gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor 
that are quality assurance (QA) 1 subsystems of the emergency gas 
turbine generator and which had apparently been crimped using diagonal 
pliers; improper Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and connections in 
the connection boxes of major safety-related QA equipment; and non-QA 
lugs installed, and improperly performed crimping, in fire protection 
quality assurance (FPQA) emergency lights, and (2) he had been 
subjected to ridicule by the gas turbine system engineer for raising 
concerns regarding the lugs on the gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and 
motor and that the system engineer willfully violated 10 CFR 50.5 and 
50.7.
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    \1\ Quality Assurance comprises those quality assurance actions 
related to the physical characteristics of a material, structure, 
component, or system which provide a means to control the quality of 
the material, structure, component, or system to predetermined 
requirements.
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    The Petitioner requested that the NRC (1) require Northeast 
Utilities (NU) to review all existing work orders for the past 10 or 12 
years, with NRC oversight, to ensure that QA motor and connection work 
does not have certain deficiencies; (2) assess a Severity Level I 
violation against NU and its managers for apparent violations of 10 CFR 
50.7 and a Severity Level III violation against the gas turbine system 
engineer at Millstone for his apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7 and 
NU's ``Code of Conduct and Ethics;'' and (3) institute sanctions 
against the system engineer and NU and its managers for engaging in 
deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.
    By letter dated February 23, 1995, the NRC informed the Petitioner 
that the Petition had been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's regulations. 
The NRC also informed the Petitioner that the staff would take 
appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific 
concerns raised in the Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues 
raised by the Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that the 
actions sought by the Petitioner are not warranted.

II. Discussion

A. Inadequate Work Control and Procedural Compliance Issues

    The issues raised by the Petitioner regarding the improper crimping 
and use of commercial grade lugs in the gas turbine fuel forwarding 
pump and motor; improper Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and 
connection issues, and improper crimping and use of non-QA lugs in 
emergency lighting, have been addressed in correspondence between the 
NRC and NNECO, and have been the subject of evaluations by NNECO and an 
NRC inspection. Specifically, by letters dated December 5 and 28, 1994, 
and February 14, 1995, and during a phone conversation on December 15, 
1994, the NRC raised these issues and requested NNECO to submit written 
responses. By letters dated March 6 and April 26, 1995, NNECO responded 
to these requests and submitted information regarding its evaluation of 
these issues. On May 15 through June 21, 1995, the NRC conducted a 
special safety inspection, which focused on these and other maintenance 
issues. The inspection findings are contained in Inspection Report (IR) 
50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22 (IR 95-22), dated July 21, 
1995. Finally, NNECO provided further information regarding these 
issues in its August 31, 1995, response to the Petition. A broad 
summary of the resolution of these issues is set forth below.
1. Gas Turbine Fuel Forwarding Pump and Motor Issues
    The Petitioner asserts that the licensee inadequately controls work 
and procedural compliance at Millstone, as evidenced by the use of 
standard commercial-grade lugs (instead of QA lugs) in a gas turbine 
fuel forwarding pump and motor that are QA subsystems of the emergency 
gas turbine generator and which the Petitioner asserts had been crimped 
with diagonal pliers (instead of the proper crimping tool). In its 
response to the Petition dated August 31, 1995, NNECO stated that, when 
the supervisor examined the lugs in question, he concluded that 
although the lugs were somewhat discolored as a result of age, and may 
have had an indented crimp, they appeared to the supervisor to be the 
type of lug that had been installed in the 1971-1972 time-frame, when 
no procedures were in place with respect to the type of lug required or 
the method of crimping. NNECO further stated that these lugs are 
considered acceptable where they have already been installed (i.e., 
meet original electrical standards); however, when maintenance is 
performed requiring re-lugging, the lugs are upgraded and installed in 
accordance with current procedures.
    NNECO further stated that the fact that the lugs in question were 
commercial grade and may have been crimped with diagonal pliers is not 
indicative of a work control or procedural compliance problem. The lugs 
appeared to the NNECO supervisor to be the type of lug that had been 
installed at or near the time of initial plant start-up in accordance 
with the appropriate electrical standards that existed at that time. 
Moreover, once the concern was raised about the proper type and 
crimping of the lugs by the Petitioner, NNECO took prompt action by 
initiating a work order to replace all the lugs.
    The NRC staff discussed the issue of defective lugs with the 
maintenance department manager and the worker who replaced the lugs 
during the special safety inspection. Neither individual could remember 
the work in detail but stated that to ensure reliability, the lugs were 
replaced.
    Based on NNECO's conclusion that (1) the lugs in question had been 
installed in the 1971-1972 time-frame when no procedures were in place 
with respect to the type of lug required or the method of crimping, (2) 
these lugs are considered acceptable where installed, and based on 
NNECO's prompt action to initiate a work order and replace all the 
lugs, the NRC concludes that this issue does not indicate an inadequate 
work control or procedural compliance problem.
2. Improper Raychem Splices, Cable Bend Radius, and Connection Issues
    The Petitioner asserts that the licensee is inadequately 
controlling work and procedural compliance at Millstone, as evidenced 
by improper Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and connections in the 
connection boxes of major safety-related QA equipment (low pressure 
coolant injection (LPCI) and core spray (CS) pumps). In its letter 
dated April 26, 1995, NNECO informed the NRC that an operability 
determination had been completed on the issue of the Raychem splice 
installation, and whether Raychem splice bend radii on the LPCI and CS 
pumps were less than the recommended limits (five times the Raychem 
diameter). The operability determination concluded that the motor 
splices were operable and that an immediate inspection to verify bend 
radii was not warranted. In addition, NNECO stated that 50 percent of 
the Raychem splices on the LPCI and CS pump motors had been inspected 
at that

[[Page 57925]]

time with no problems identified. In its followup letter dated August 
31, 1995, NNECO stated that a visual inspection of all the LPCI and CS 
pump motors had been completed and none of the connections exceeded the 
minimum bend radius. Further, NNECO did not identify any discrepancies 
in the connection boxes for the LPCI and CS pump motors. NNECO's 
evaluations validated the determination that the splices are 
operable.2
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    \2\ In addition, NNECO (1) performed a review of all the work 
orders for the current Raychem splice installation and verified that 
the procedure specified that a minimum bend radius of five times the 
Raychem diameter not be exceeded, (2) verified that the training the 
electricians receive on Raychem splices discusses the requirement of 
not exceeding five times the minimum bend radius, and (3) requested 
that Raychem determine what the consequences of exceeding the 
minimum bend radius would be. The results of the Raychem testing 
showed that even if one or more splices exceeded the minimum bend 
radius, a tighter bend radius was acceptable.
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    As a result of its evaluation of NNECO's response and supporting 
documentation and its independent verification of two of the pump 
motors in question, the NRC found NNECO's response acceptable and that 
no further NRC review was needed. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes 
that the Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and the connections in the 
connection boxes of major safety-related equipment (LPCI and CS motors) 
are acceptable.
3. Emergency Lighting Issue
    The Petitioner asserts that the licensee does not adequately 
control work and procedure compliance at Millstone, as evidenced by 
non-QA lugs and improperly performed crimping in FPQA emergency lights. 
The NRC staff requested NNECO to review the use of improper lugs for 
emergency lighting at Millstone Unit 1. Specifically, the NRC requested 
NNECO to review the concern that all four lugs on emergency light unit 
(ELU) 1-ELU-21 had Thomas and Betts lugs (non-QA) rather than the 
required QA AMP lugs, and all four lugs were not crimped properly. In 
addition, the NRC staff asked NNECO to review the concern that one lug 
on the emergency light 1-ELU-29 was a Thomas and Betts lug and that 
three of the four lugs were not properly crimped.
    NNECO responded that a review of the revision history for Procedure 
MP 790.2, ``Emergency Light Inspection,'' determined that the procedure 
made no reference to a specific lug prior to April 1993. NNECO stated 
that because the safety classification of these ELUs is FPQA, the lugs 
utilized in the ELUs must be FPQA. NNECO noted that Thomas and Betts 
lugs are only stocked as FPQA.
    NNECO stated further that an evaluation was performed to determine 
the consequences of Thomas and Betts lugs in lieu of AMP lugs and to 
determine if all lug crimps on 1-ELU-21 and 29 were adequate. 
Additionally, NNECO's evaluation verified the ability of 1-ELU-21 and 
29 to perform their design function. NNECO has determined that the lug 
manufacturer is not a critical issue as long as the lug is compatible 
with the battery terminal and the wire used. In this case, the Thomas 
and Betts lug is similar to the AMP lug, and both lugs are compatible 
with the battery terminals and wire used. A compatibility study has 
been completed and documented in a Replacement Item Evaluation (RIE).
    NNECO performed a review of previous ELU surveillances to determine 
whether a degraded condition had been observed for the battery terminal 
lugs in these ELUs; this review did not reveal any degraded conditions. 
The Millstone Unit 1 Engineering Department inspected the crimping of 
the battery terminations, and the eight crimps were found to be 
adequate. Although all battery termination lugs are insulated on these 
ELUs, one splice on 1-ELU-29 appeared to be crimped by a die for 
noninsulated lugs. However, this crimp did not affect operability of 
the ELU since a high-resistance connection was not present, and the 
insulation was not damaged. Satisfactory completion of a battery 
discharge test confirmed the adequacy of the crimps. Nonetheless, the 
lug that appeared to be crimped by a die for noninsulated lugs on 1-
ELU-29 has been replaced.
    During its special inspection, the NRC staff reviewed the concern 
about emergency lighting lugs and NNECO's process for lug replacement. 
The NRC staff verified that specific lugs were not called for in 
earlier versions of the lug replacement procedure and, therefore, as 
long as the lug was compatible and classified as FPQA, it could be 
used. Since Thomas and Betts lugs are stocked as FPQA and are 
compatible, they could have been used in ELUs. In addition, since AMP 
lugs are stocked as non-QA, the plant staff would have had to fill out 
Form SF 486, ``Upgrading FPQA Parts,'' to justify the upgrade of the 
lugs to FPQA standards.
    The NRC staff reviewed an example of a lug changeout with an AMP 
lug and verified that Form SF 486 was included in the package to 
properly document the upgrade.
    The NRC staff reviewed the RIE form that documented the 
acceptability of Thomas and Betts lugs as an alternate for AMP lugs. 
The RIE indicated that the Thomas and Betts lugs are acceptable as an 
alternate item and that they will not degrade or compromise the 
original design basis. The NRC staff found the RIE to be properly 
documented and adequate. The NRC staff reviewed procedure MP 790.2, 
which was revised on April 12, 1995, and now requires that AMP lugs be 
used or an equivalent as evaluated and indicated by an RIE. Since an 
RIE has been completed documenting Thomas and Betts lugs as an 
alternative, they are acceptable. The NRC staff found the procedure 
adequate and also verified that the one questionable lug on 1-ELU-29 
was replaced. The NRC staff concluded that the lugs on 1-ELU-21 and 29 
were adequately designed and qualified and that the ELUs were fully 
operable.
    Based on NRC's findings that (1) the use of standard commercial-
grade lugs in a gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor that are QA 
subsystems of the emergency gas turbine generator and which had 
apparently been crimped with diagonal pliers does not constitute an 
inadequate work control or procedural compliance problem; (2) the 
Raychem splices, cable bend radius, and the connections in the 
connection boxes of major safety-related equipment (LPCI and CS motors) 
are operable; and (3) the lugs on 1-ELU-21 and 29 were adequately 
designed and qualified and the ELUs were fully operable, the NRC staff 
has determined that the licensee adequately controls work and procedure 
compliance within these areas at Millstone. Therefore, the Petitioner's 
request to require NU to review all existing work orders for the past 
10 or 12 years, with NRC oversight, to ensure that QA motor and 
connection work does not have certain deficiencies, is not warranted.

B. Harassment and Intimidation Issue

    The Petitioner alleges that he was ridiculed by the gas turbine 
system engineer for raising safety concerns regarding the lugs on the 
gas turbine fuel forwarding pump and motor and that the system engineer 
willfully violated 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.7. In addition, the Petitioner 
alleges that NU and its managers violated 10 CFR 50.5 and 50.7 and NU's 
``Code of Conduct and Ethics.''
    As indicated in a letter to the Petitioner dated November 28, 1995, 
from the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, 
Regional Operations and Research, the Petitioner has raised several 
complaints since 1993 with the NRC or the Department of Labor (DOL) 
concerning harassment, intimidation, or discrimination by individuals 
at NU because the Petitioner

[[Page 57926]]

raised safety concerns to NU or the NRC. As explained in the letter, 
the NRC conducted investigations into some of the harassment and 
intimidation allegations that the Petitioner had raised. The NRC did 
not substantiate that the Petitioner suffered discrimination for 
raising safety concerns. Further, of the complaints of harassment and 
intimidation that the Petitioner raised that were investigated by the 
DOL, none have been substantiated.
    The staff has, in addition, reviewed the Petitioner's remaining 
allegations of harassment and intimidation, including those in the 
Petition, and has concluded that they do not present sufficient 
information warranting further investigatory effort. Accordingly, 
absent a finding of discrimination by the Secretary of Labor or an 
Administrative Law Judge on any pending complaints, or significant new 
evidence from the Petitioner that would support the allegations that NU 
has harassed, intimidated, or discriminated against him, the NRC staff 
plans no further followup of the harassment and intimidation 
complaints. Based on the above, no further action is warranted.

III. Conclusion

    The licensee evaluated the technical issues and provided the 
results to the staff for review. The staff also conducted inspections 
to independently determine if the licensee's conclusions and corrective 
actions were acceptable. As explained above, none of the technical 
issues reflect a lack of procedural compliance or warrant additional 
action by the staff. Also, as explained above, the Petitioner's 
assertion of harassment and intimidation does not warrant any action.
    On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that no 
issues have been raised regarding Millstone Unit 1 that would require 
initiation of enforcement action. Therefore, no enforcement action is 
being taken in this matter.
    The Petitioner's request for action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is 
denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Decision will be 
filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review. 
This Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 
days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, 
institutes review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of October 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Ashok C. Thadani,
Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-28741 Filed 11-7-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P