[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 190 (Monday, September 30, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51008-51012]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-25027]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 74

[AG Order No. 2056-96]
RIN 1190-AA42


Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry: Guidelines 
for Individuals Who Relocated to Japan as Minors During World War II

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (``Department'') hereby adopts a 
change to the regulations governing redress provisions for persons of 
Japanese ancestry. This change will amend the standards of the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988 to make eligible for payments of $20,000 those 
persons who are otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations, 
but who involuntarily relocated during World War II to a country with 
which the United States was at war. In practice, this amendment will 
make potentially eligible those persons who were evacuated, relocated, 
or interned by the United States Government; who, as minors, relocated 
to Japan or a country with which the United States was at war during 
World War II, and otherwise were unemancipated and lacked the legal 
capacity to leave the custody and control of their parents (or legal 
guardians) who chose to relocate to Japan during the war; and who did 
not enter active military service on behalf of the Japanese Government 
or another enemy government during the statutorily-defined war period.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 30, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tink D. Cooper or Emlei M. Kuboyama, 
Office of Redress Administration, Civil Rights Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, PO Box 66260, Washington, DC 20035-6260; (888) 
219-6900 (voice) (toll-free) or (202) 219-4710 (TDD).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. 1989 et. seq., as amended) (``the Act''), enacted into law 
the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and 
Internment of Civilians (``Commission'') established by Congress in 
1980. See Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
Act, Pub. L. 96-317 (1980). This bipartisan commission was established: 
(1) To review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order 
9066, issued February 19, 1942, and the impact of that Executive Order 
on American citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese 
ancestry; (2) to review directives of United States military forces 
requiring the relocation and, in some cases, detention in internment 
camps of these American citizens and permanent resident aliens; and (3) 
to recommend appropriate remedies. The Commission submitted to Congress 
in February 1983 a unanimous report, Personal Justice Denied, which 
extensively reviewed the history and circumstances of the decisions to 
exclude, remove, and then to detain Japanese Americans and Japanese 
resident aliens from the West Coast, as well as the treatment of Aleuts 
during World War II. Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese 
Ancestry, 54 FR 34,157 (1989). The final part of the Commission's 
report, Personal Justice Denied Part 2: Recommendations, concluded that 
these events were influenced by racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a 
failure of political leadership, and recommended remedial action to be 
taken by Congress and the President. Id.
    On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Act into 
law. The purposes of the Act were to acknowledge and apologize for the 
fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of 
Japanese Americans and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry, 
to make restitution, and to fund a public education program to prevent 
the recurrence of any similar event in the future. 50 U.S.C. app. 1989-
1989a.
    Section 105 of the Act makes the Attorney General responsible for 
identifying, locating, and authorizing payment of redress to eligible 
individuals. Id. 1989b-4. The Attorney General delegated the 
responsibilities and duties assigned to her to the Assistant Attorney 
General for Civil Rights, who, in keeping with precedent, has 
designated the Office of Redress Administration (ORA) in the Civil 
Rights Division to carry out the execution of the responsibilities and 
duties under the Act. The regulations governing eligibility and 
restitution were drafted by ORA and published under the authority of 
the Justice

[[Page 51009]]

Department in 1989. 54 FR 34,157 (1989) (final rule) codified at 28 CFR 
Part 74).
    ORA is charged with the responsibility of identifying and locating 
persons eligible for redress under the Act. To date, restitution has 
been paid to a total of 79,980 Japanese Americans and permanent 
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry.
    Section 108 of the Act articulates the standards for redress 
eligibility. 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b-7(2). Among those excluded from 
eligibility under that section are persons ``who, during the period 
beginning on December 7, 1941, and ending on September 2, 1945, 
relocated to a country while the United States was at war with that 
country * * *'' Id. As part of a citizen exchange program during World 
War II, the United States returned formerly interned persons of 
Japanese ancestry to Japan on two occasions. On June 18, 1942, 
approximately 1,083 persons of Japanese ancestry returned to Japan 
aboard the M.S. Gripsholm, and on September 2, 1943, the Gripsholm 
returned another 1,340 persons of Japanese ancestry to Japan. A number 
of these persons asserted claims for redress based on their evacuation 
and internment by the United States Government prior to their 
relocation to Japan. However, based on section 108 of the Act and 28 
CFR 74.4, ORA found them ineligible for redress. 54 FR 34,162 (1989). 
In all, 175 persons who relocated to Japan aboard the Gripsholm claimed 
compensation under the Act; approximately 124 of these claimants were 
persons who were under the age of 21 upon their departure from the 
United States. ORA's denial of redress to these claimants was upheld 
during the administrative appeal process set forth in 28 CFR 74.17. 54 
FR 34,164-65 (1989).
    It is helpful to describe the circumstances of these individuals. 
The West Coast voluntary evacuation period began with the issuance of 
Proclamation No. 1, on March 2, 1942, and ended with the issuance of 
Proclamation No. 4, effective on March 29, 1942. After this date, 
persons of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from leaving the West 
Coast because the Government was preparing to forcibly relocate and 
intern them later. Over 120,000 Japanese Americans were eventually 
interned. Of these 120,000, approximately 124 were minor children whose 
parents decided to depart the United States for Japan during the war on 
one of the M.S. Gripsholm sailings prior to September 2, 1945. The 
majority of the passengers on the first sailing were Japanese 
diplomats, while many of the passengers on the second sailing were 
American citizens or permanent resident aliens. Also aboard were some 
Japanese nationals who had left Japan to live and work in the United 
States and who, by law, were ineligible to apply for United States 
citizenship. Many of these individuals returned to Japan with their 
American-born children.
    These American children persevered through an arduous period during 
which they were forcibly evacuated from their homes on the West Coast 
and interned with their parents. The minors were unable legally to 
return to their homes in the prohibited military zones on the West 
Coast and were required to travel to Japan with their parents on a long 
and difficult journey.
    The loyalty of most of these American children, however, apparently 
never waned. According to ORA research, the vast majority of them did 
not enter into the active military service on behalf of an enemy 
government during World War II. Furthermore, almost all returned to the 
United States after the war. Out of the approximately 124 minors who 
have filed for redress, and who relocated to Japan with their parents 
during World War II, 108 subsequently returned to the United States, 
while only 16 remained in Japan.

II. Responses to Public Comments

    As a result of this revised interpretation, more fully discussed 
below, the Civil Rights Division published a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking in the Federal Register, 61 FR 29716 (June 12, 1996), 
inviting the public to submit comments on this proposed category of 
eligible persons. The comment period expired on July 12, 1996.
    By the close of the comment period, the Division had received 1,152 
timely comments. Of these comments, 1,096 were based on a form letter 
which requested that the rulemaking process be expedited. Of the 
remaining comments, 51 were from individuals, 3 were from various 
organizations representing the interests of Japanese Americans, and 2 
were from organizations that opposed this interpretation. Of these 
original comments, 45 were in support of the revision while 11 comments 
were against the revision. Also, a few comments were not timely filed 
as indicated by the postmark and were not considered. The Department 
read and analyzed each comment and considered the merits of the points 
of view expressed in them.
    The vast majority of comments indicated support for this provision. 
The 1,096 form letters were favorable and requested that the regulatory 
process be expedited. There were also 45 comments (42 individual 
letters, 3 organization letters) in support of the amendment changes. 
Twenty-eight of the letters supported the amendments and generally 
asserted that the children of the internees suffered as much as their 
parents had during the evacuation and relocation period, since the 
children themselves were interned as well as being subjected to the 
war-time conditions in Japan following their relocation. Several 
letters echoed this sentiment and indicated that minors did not have 
the ability to freely choose to relocate to Japan during the war, and 
that the prisoner exchange was unjust. Several elected officials, 
including U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, favorably agreed with this 
amendment. One person was in favor of this proposal but mistakenly 
believed that anyone who returned to Japan at any time would now be 
eligible; to the contrary, those persons who returned to Japan before 
the start of World War II, remained in Japan throughout the war, will 
remain ineligible.
    In addition, there were several comments that opposed this revision 
and indicated that the Act's original exclusionary language in section 
108 should apply to all persons, regardless of age, who relocated to 
Japan during World War II. There were 11 comments (9 individual 
letters, 2 organization letters) opposed to making this category of 
claimants eligible for redress. These comments raised four main issues: 
(1) That it was wrong to extend redress solely to Japanese Americans 
without extending compensation to those of German and Italian descent 
and their children who were similarly situated; (2) that the American 
children of Japanese parents were not forcibly removed from their 
homes, but rather their parents as their natural guardians made the 
decision for them; (3) that these children, American-born with Japanese 
parents, had dual nationality and were technically citizens of Imperial 
Japan under Japanese law, and were not American citizens; and (4) that, 
in light of the federal government's current budgetary crisis, such 
expensive outlays were not justified.
    The Department has considered the merit of each of these comments 
and disagrees with the viewpoints that were expressed. First, the 
Department notes that it is compelled to comply with the laws 
established by Congress and is fulfilling its mandate. In response to 
the comments, the Department notes that the purpose of the Act was to 
provide compensation for the injustices suffered by Japanese Americans 
during World

[[Page 51010]]

War II as a result of specific Federal Government action based solely 
on their Japanese ancestry. A Federal appeals court has determined that 
Congress' decision to compensate only those of Japanese ancestry who 
sustained deprivations of liberty or property as a result of defined 
Federal Government actions during World War II survives constitutional 
scrutiny. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 113 
S.Ct. 95 (1992). In Jacobs, an American child of German ancestry, who 
was detained in an internment camp during the war with his father but 
was ineligible for redress under the Act, challenged the Act on equal 
protection grounds. Jacobs argued that he was similarly situated with 
respect to Japanese Americans who received compensation. The court 
indicated that Congress found that there was no mass exclusion or 
detention ordered against American citizens of German or Italian 
descent. Id. at 319. It also concluded that the Act survived the 
strictest level of scrutiny and that Congress' decision to compensate 
Japanese Americans and not German Americans was ``substantially related 
(as well as narrowly tailored) to the important (and compelling) 
governmental interest of compensating those who were interned during 
World War II because of racial prejudice.'' Id. at 321.
    Second, one of the threshold requirements for eligibility under the 
Act is U.S. citizenship or permanent residency status during the 
defined statutory period. In each case, minor relocatees who will be 
eligible for redress were American-born and meet the other criteria 
required by the Act. It is contrary to the law to assert that children 
born in the United States are not American citizens, but are 
technically citizens of another country. The doctrine of ``jus soli,'' 
incorporated into the United States Constitution through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, makes, with certain limited exceptions, all persons born in 
the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens at birth. 
See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, section 1; 8 U.S.C. 1401(a). (Persons born 
to certain foreign diplomats in the United States do not necessarily 
obtain U.S. citizenship at birth since their parents have diplomatic 
immunity and are therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States.)
    Third, we note that the minor relocatees did not make a knowing and 
voluntary decision to relocate to Japan. The Department has concluded 
that section 108 should not be construed to make ineligible for redress 
those persons who relocated involuntarily. (See Section III for a 
detailed legal discussion of this issue.) Finally, Congress 
appropriated funds to provide redress to these claimants and the 
Department is fulfilling its designated role.
    The Department reviewed and analyzed each comment and considered 
the merits of the points of view expressed in them. Substantive changes 
were not made in the proposals, but other non-substantive changes were 
made in order to provide further clarification of this amendment.

III. Revised Interpretation

    Following publication of the draft regulations in 1989, the 
Department received 61 comments concerning the eligibility of persons 
who, as minors, relocated to Japan aboard the Gripsholm. Based on the 
comments received at that time, however, it found no reason to 
differentiate between adults who returned to Japan during World War II 
and minors. As a result, in the preamble of the final regulation, the 
Department stated that ``the exclusionary language of the Act would 
preclude from eligibility the minors, as well as adults, who were 
relocated to Japan during [the relevant] time period.'' 54 FR 34,160 
(1989).
    The Department, based on an argument not previously presented, now 
revises its interpretation regarding the eligibility of persons who 
relocated to Japan during World War II. Specifically, it revises its 
determination of eligibility with regard to persons who were under the 
age of 21 and not emancipated as of their dates of departures from the 
United States, who did not participate in the active military service 
on behalf of an enemy government during World War II, and who are 
otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations.
    In effecting this revision, the Department is operating within the 
established framework of Chevron versus N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43. 
Under Chevron, an agency must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress when interpreting a statute. However, 
where an act is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, 
Congress has assigned to the agency the responsibility to elucidate a 
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Id. at 843-44. For the 
reasons set forth below, the Department believes that the proscription 
of section 108 is ambiguous with respect to its coverage of the class 
of individuals described above, and that the revision is a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.
    As enacted, section 108 expressly excludes from eligibility ``any 
individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and 
ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to (another) country while the 
United States was at war with that country.'' 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b-7 
(emphasis added). This language does not specifically resolve whether 
the exclusion applies to individuals who relocated involuntarily.
    This issue is suggested on the face of the statute when it is read 
as a whole because, while the statute uses the active voice in section 
108's exclusion clause, the eligibility clauses of the statute use the 
passive voice. For example, section 108 begins by defining an 
``eligible individual'' as a person of Japanese ancestry ``who, during 
the evacuation, relocation and internment period-- * * * was confined, 
held in custody, relocated, or otherwise deprived of liberty or 
property as a result of * * * (various Executive Orders and Acts).'' 50 
U.S.C. app. 1989b-7(2) (emphasis added). Title II of the Act, which 
provides reparations to Aleuts evacuated from their home islands during 
World War II, similarly defines an eligible Aleut as a person ``who, as 
a civilian, was relocated by authority of the United States from his or 
her home village * * * to an internment camp * * *.'' 50 U.S.C. app. 
1989c-1(5) (emphasis added). The contrasting use of the active voice in 
the exclusion clause suggests the possibility that section 108 might be 
read to exclude only those individuals who voluntarily relocated to an 
enemy country during the war.
    This possibility is consistent with judicial decisions. The United 
States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Ninth 
Circuit have deemed the use of the active as opposed to the passive 
voice relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation. Dickson versus 
Office of Personnel Mgmt., 828 F.2d 32, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (isolated 
use of passive voice in phrase defining liability is significant and 
allows suit against Office of Personnel Management whenever an adverse 
determination ``is made,'' even if by another agency); United States 
versus Arrellano, 812 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1987) (clause of 
statute defining criminal intent phrased in active voice applies to 
conduct of the accused, while second clause phrased in passive voice 
applies only to the conduct of others). Thus, the statutory language 
creates an ambiguity as to whether eligibility decisions should 
distinguish between voluntary relocatees and involuntary relocatees. 
For the reasons that follow, we believe the better interpretation is to 
exclude only individuals who relocated voluntarily.

[[Page 51011]]

    The Act's legislative history provides very little significant 
insight into congressional intent regarding the eligibility of 
involuntary relocatees. As originally introduced, neither the House nor 
the Senate bill included a relocation exclusion provision in the 
section defining eligible individuals. Entering conference, the House 
version of the Act contained the exclusion, while the Senate version 
contained no such provision. The conferees agreed to adopt the House 
provision, which excluded ``those individuals who, during the period 
from December 7, 1941, through September 2, 1945, relocated to a 
country at war with the United States.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 785, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988). There is no additional discussion of the 
relocation exclusion in the conference report.
    A discussion of whether individuals who returned to Japan should be 
included in the definition of ``eligible individuals'' is contained in 
a witness statement submitted to the House and Senate subcommittees 
considering the legislation. In testimony opposing the enactment of the 
bill, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, Richard K. 
Willard, noted that as then written (without the relocation exclusion), 
the breadth of the definition would cover any individual who had been 
subject to exclusion, relocation, or internment, including persons 
living outside of the United States. In the Department's view, this 
overlooked the fact that at least several hundred of the detainees were 
``fanatical pro-Japanese,* * *. and (had) voluntarily sought 
repatriation to Japan after the end of the war.'' The Department 
believed that allowing these disloyal individuals to receive the 
benefit of the legislation would be unfair to the United States and to 
loyal persons of Japanese descent. To accept the Findings and to 
Implement the Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians: Hearing on S. 1009 Before the Subcomm. on 
Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 281, 296 (1987) 
(Hearings). This statement, however, does not reveal or suggest an 
opinion that the bill ought to exclude from redress persons who 
involuntarily relocated to an enemy country.
    In sum, the Department believes that section 108's exclusion of 
persons who relocated to an energy country during World War II is 
susceptible to the interpretation that it does not apply to persons who 
relocated involuntarily, that so interpreting the statute gives effect 
to the principles Congress meant to embody in the exclusionary 
provision, and that this interpretation is otherwise a reasonable 
construction of the statute.
    The Department further notes that the determination of whether a 
person relocated voluntarily to an enemy country during World War II is 
extraordinarily difficult to determine at this late date, over half a 
century since the period during which the actions that are relevant to 
a determination about the state of mind of individual relocatees took 
place. Under these circumstances, the Department has discretion to 
structure the process for determining redress eligibility in a manner 
that avoids the inherent inaccuracy of any attempt to engage in a case-
by-case inquiry into the subjective factor of state of mind, as well as 
the potential administrative burdens associated with case-by-case 
inquiry, by articulating some reasonable, objective criteria to guide 
the process.
    To that end, the final rule adopts two bright line standards to 
administer section 108's exclusion provision. First, any person who was 
21 years of age or older, emancipated by petition of the court or by 
marriage, or otherwise emancipated, as of the date of his or her 
departure from the United States, shall be irrebuttably presumed to 
have relocated voluntarily, and will be ineligible for redress under 
the Act. Second, any person who served in the Japanses military, or the 
military of another enemy country, during the statutorily-defined war 
period shall be irrebuttably presumed to have relocated voluntarily 
and, therefore, will be ineligible for redress. All otherwise eligible 
persons falling outside these categories, that is, persons who were 
minors and not otherwise emancipated as of the dates of their 
departures from the United States and who did not serve in the Japanese 
military or the military of another enemy government during the 
statutorily-defined war period, shall be considered involuntary 
relocatees and therefore eligible for redress under the Act.
    The Supreme Court has affirmed the ability of agencies to employ 
generally applicable rules as an alternative to case-by-case 
adjudication. See, e.g., American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 
611 (1991) (``Prior decisions of this Court) confirm that, even if a 
statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decision-
maker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues 
of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to 
withhold that authority.''). In particular, the Court has noted that 
the Congress is free to use prophylactic rules despite their ``inherent 
imprecision'' when it wishes to avoid ``the expense and other 
difficulties of individual determinations.'' Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 
U.S. 749, 777 (1975).
    The Department believes that under American Hospital Ass'n and 
other authorities agencies enjoy a similar latitude to that enunciated 
in Weinberger. As in Weinberger, justifying the use of such bright-line 
rules does not require determining whether the rules ``precisely filter 
[] out those, and only those, who are in the factual position which 
generated the congressional concern * * * (n) or * * * whether (they) 
filter [] out a substantial part of the class which caused the * * * 
concern, or whether (they) filter [] out more members of the class than 
nonmembers.'' Id. Rather, the question is whether the Department could 
``rationally have concluded both that * * * particular (rules) would 
protect against (the abuse Congress sought to avoid), and that the 
expense and other difficulties of individualized determinations 
justified (their) inherent imprecision.'' Id. For the reasons that 
follow, the final rule satisfies this standard.
    As stated above, the final rule applies an irrebuttable presumption 
that persons who were 21 years of age or older, emancipated by petition 
of the court or by marriage, or otherwise emancipated as of the dates 
of their departures from the United States, were voluntary relocatees. 
The Department proposes to apply this irrebuttable presumption because 
adult relocatees were more likely than minor relocatees to have been 
able to assent freely to their relocation to Japan. The age of 21 as of 
the date of departure was chosen because, during the period covered by 
the Act's relocation exclusion, the legal age of majority in most 
states was 21.
    Noting the dearth of legislative history pertaining to the Act's 
exclusion clause, the United States Court of Federal Claims stated in 
Suzuki v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 688 (1993), that Congress may have 
enacted the exclusion clause in an effort to deny benefits to 
individuals who had either been disloyal to the United States or ``who, 
despite possible continued loyalty to the United States, had aided an 
energy country during war.'' Id. at 695. Nothing in the Department's 
revised interpretation of section 108 is inconsistent with this 
observation, since both of the possible purposes cited by the court 
assume volition on the part of the relocatee to leave the United States 
and relocate to Japan. If, by contrast, an individual relocatee was not 
free to

[[Page 51012]]

assent to his or her relocation on account of his or her minority 
status, it is reasonable for the Department to conclude that such 
individual was not the type of person against whom Congress intended to 
apply section 108's exclusion provision. By itself the relocation of 
minors during World War II does not raise doubts or inferences 
concerning disloyalty. In fact, most American-born minor relocatees 
returned to the United States following the war.
    Examples of distinctions in the treatment of minors and adults 
abound in our law. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988) 
(plurality opinion). Accordingly, it is reasonable for the Department 
to apply such a distinction in determing whether individuals who 
relocated to Japan during the statutorily-defined war period did so 
voluntarily.
    The final rule also applies an irrebuttable presumption the 
individuals who served in the military of an enemy government during 
the statutorily-defined war period relocated voluntarily because the 
Department believes that evidence that an individual entered into the 
active military service on behalf of an enemy government following his 
or her departure from the United States is a strong indication that the 
individual relocated voluntarily. In view of that reasonable belief and 
the fact that it is difficult at this time to determine with complete 
certainty the motivations of individuals who entered the active 
military service against the United States during World War II, and in 
light of the increased administrative burdens associated with 
individualized efforts to ascertain the 50-year old motivations of such 
individuals, the Department believes it is appropriate to interpret the 
fact that an individual served in the military of an enemy government 
following his or her relocation as evidence that the individual 
relocated voluntarily.
    The Department will thus require individuals who apply for redress 
under the Act and who relocated to Japan during the statutorily-defined 
war period to provide information as to their ages and emancipation 
status upon their dates of departure from the United States to relocate 
to Japan, and to state whether or not they participated in the active 
military service on behalf of an enemy government, including the 
Japanese Government, during World War II. If such individuals state 
that they were 21 years of age or older, or emancipated minors, as of 
the dates of their departures, they will be deemed ineligible for 
redress under the Act. Similarly, if such individuals state that they 
participated in the active military service on behalf of an enemy 
government during World War II, they also will be deemed ineligible. In 
contrast, otherwise eligible relocatees who were under the age of 21 
and not otherwise emancipated upon the dates of their departures from 
the United States, and who did not serve in the military on behalf of 
an enemy government during World War II, will be eligible for redress 
under the Act.

IV. Regulatory Matters

    This rule relieves a restriction upon individuals otherwise 
eligible for redress under the Act and is therefore exempt from the 
provision of the Administrative Procedures Act pertaining to delay in 
effective date. 5 U.S.C. 553(d). Moreover, the Department has 
determined that this final rule will be effective immediately upon 
publication in the Federal Register for good cause shown, i.e., to 
expedite these claims, since involuntary relocatees are some of the 
older claimants and at least four persons, potentially eligible under 
this revision, have since passed away; to process the current claims as 
quickly as possible because of budgetary concerns and the program's 
sunset date of August 10, 1998; and to resolve a pending lawsuit in the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims involving 14 plaintiffs who were minor 
children during the war and who will be potentially eligible under this 
revision.
    The Attorney General in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility 
Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), has reviewed this regulation and by approving it 
certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic 
impact upon a substantial number of small entities because this rule 
confers a benefit on a limited group of individuals.
    The Office of Management and Budget has determined that this final 
rule is a significant regulatory action under Executive Order No. 12866 
and, accordingly, this final rule has been reviewed and approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget. Information collection associated with 
this regulation has been approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget, OMB No. 1190-0010.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 74

    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Archives and 
records, Citizenship and naturalization, Civil rights, Indemnity 
payments, Minority groups, Nationality, War claims.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble and by the authority 
vested in me, including 28 U.S.C. 509 and 510, chapter I of title 28, 
part 74, of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 74--CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT REDRESS PROVISION

    1. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b.

    2. In Subpart B, Sec. 74.4 is revised to read as follows:

Subpart B--Standards of Eligibility


Sec. 74.4  Individuals excluded from compensation pursuant to section 
108(B) of the Act.

    (a) The term ``eligible individual'' does not include any 
individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and 
ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a country while the United 
States was at war with that country.
    (b) Nothing in paragraph (a) of this section is meant to exclude 
from eligibility any person who, during the period beginning on 
December 7, 1941, and ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a 
country while the United States was at war with that country, and who 
had not yet reached the age of 21 and was not emancipated as of the 
date of departure from the United States, provided that such person is 
otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations and the 
following standards:
    (1) Persons who were 21 years of age or older, or emancipated 
minors, on the date they departed the United States for Japan are 
subject to an irrebuttable presumption that they relocated to Japan 
voluntarily and will be ineligible.
    (2) Persons who served in the active military service on behalf of 
the Government of Japan or an enemy government during the period 
beginning on December 7, 1941 and ending on September 2, 1945 are 
subject to an irrebuttable presumption that they departed the United 
States voluntarily for Japan. If such individuals served in the active 
military service of an enemy country, they must inform the Office of 
such service and, as a result, will be ineligible.

    Dated: September 21, 1996.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 96-25027 Filed 9-27-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-10-M