[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 190 (Monday, September 30, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51008-51012]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-25027]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
28 CFR Part 74
[AG Order No. 2056-96]
RIN 1190-AA42
Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry: Guidelines
for Individuals Who Relocated to Japan as Minors During World War II
AGENCY: Department of Justice.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (``Department'') hereby adopts a
change to the regulations governing redress provisions for persons of
Japanese ancestry. This change will amend the standards of the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988 to make eligible for payments of $20,000 those
persons who are otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations,
but who involuntarily relocated during World War II to a country with
which the United States was at war. In practice, this amendment will
make potentially eligible those persons who were evacuated, relocated,
or interned by the United States Government; who, as minors, relocated
to Japan or a country with which the United States was at war during
World War II, and otherwise were unemancipated and lacked the legal
capacity to leave the custody and control of their parents (or legal
guardians) who chose to relocate to Japan during the war; and who did
not enter active military service on behalf of the Japanese Government
or another enemy government during the statutorily-defined war period.
EFFECTIVE DATE: September 30, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tink D. Cooper or Emlei M. Kuboyama,
Office of Redress Administration, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, PO Box 66260, Washington, DC 20035-6260; (888)
219-6900 (voice) (toll-free) or (202) 219-4710 (TDD).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. 1989 et. seq., as amended) (``the Act''), enacted into law
the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians (``Commission'') established by Congress in
1980. See Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
Act, Pub. L. 96-317 (1980). This bipartisan commission was established:
(1) To review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order
9066, issued February 19, 1942, and the impact of that Executive Order
on American citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry; (2) to review directives of United States military forces
requiring the relocation and, in some cases, detention in internment
camps of these American citizens and permanent resident aliens; and (3)
to recommend appropriate remedies. The Commission submitted to Congress
in February 1983 a unanimous report, Personal Justice Denied, which
extensively reviewed the history and circumstances of the decisions to
exclude, remove, and then to detain Japanese Americans and Japanese
resident aliens from the West Coast, as well as the treatment of Aleuts
during World War II. Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese
Ancestry, 54 FR 34,157 (1989). The final part of the Commission's
report, Personal Justice Denied Part 2: Recommendations, concluded that
these events were influenced by racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a
failure of political leadership, and recommended remedial action to be
taken by Congress and the President. Id.
On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Act into
law. The purposes of the Act were to acknowledge and apologize for the
fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of
Japanese Americans and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry,
to make restitution, and to fund a public education program to prevent
the recurrence of any similar event in the future. 50 U.S.C. app. 1989-
1989a.
Section 105 of the Act makes the Attorney General responsible for
identifying, locating, and authorizing payment of redress to eligible
individuals. Id. 1989b-4. The Attorney General delegated the
responsibilities and duties assigned to her to the Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, who, in keeping with precedent, has
designated the Office of Redress Administration (ORA) in the Civil
Rights Division to carry out the execution of the responsibilities and
duties under the Act. The regulations governing eligibility and
restitution were drafted by ORA and published under the authority of
the Justice
[[Page 51009]]
Department in 1989. 54 FR 34,157 (1989) (final rule) codified at 28 CFR
Part 74).
ORA is charged with the responsibility of identifying and locating
persons eligible for redress under the Act. To date, restitution has
been paid to a total of 79,980 Japanese Americans and permanent
resident aliens of Japanese ancestry.
Section 108 of the Act articulates the standards for redress
eligibility. 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b-7(2). Among those excluded from
eligibility under that section are persons ``who, during the period
beginning on December 7, 1941, and ending on September 2, 1945,
relocated to a country while the United States was at war with that
country * * *'' Id. As part of a citizen exchange program during World
War II, the United States returned formerly interned persons of
Japanese ancestry to Japan on two occasions. On June 18, 1942,
approximately 1,083 persons of Japanese ancestry returned to Japan
aboard the M.S. Gripsholm, and on September 2, 1943, the Gripsholm
returned another 1,340 persons of Japanese ancestry to Japan. A number
of these persons asserted claims for redress based on their evacuation
and internment by the United States Government prior to their
relocation to Japan. However, based on section 108 of the Act and 28
CFR 74.4, ORA found them ineligible for redress. 54 FR 34,162 (1989).
In all, 175 persons who relocated to Japan aboard the Gripsholm claimed
compensation under the Act; approximately 124 of these claimants were
persons who were under the age of 21 upon their departure from the
United States. ORA's denial of redress to these claimants was upheld
during the administrative appeal process set forth in 28 CFR 74.17. 54
FR 34,164-65 (1989).
It is helpful to describe the circumstances of these individuals.
The West Coast voluntary evacuation period began with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1, on March 2, 1942, and ended with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 4, effective on March 29, 1942. After this date,
persons of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from leaving the West
Coast because the Government was preparing to forcibly relocate and
intern them later. Over 120,000 Japanese Americans were eventually
interned. Of these 120,000, approximately 124 were minor children whose
parents decided to depart the United States for Japan during the war on
one of the M.S. Gripsholm sailings prior to September 2, 1945. The
majority of the passengers on the first sailing were Japanese
diplomats, while many of the passengers on the second sailing were
American citizens or permanent resident aliens. Also aboard were some
Japanese nationals who had left Japan to live and work in the United
States and who, by law, were ineligible to apply for United States
citizenship. Many of these individuals returned to Japan with their
American-born children.
These American children persevered through an arduous period during
which they were forcibly evacuated from their homes on the West Coast
and interned with their parents. The minors were unable legally to
return to their homes in the prohibited military zones on the West
Coast and were required to travel to Japan with their parents on a long
and difficult journey.
The loyalty of most of these American children, however, apparently
never waned. According to ORA research, the vast majority of them did
not enter into the active military service on behalf of an enemy
government during World War II. Furthermore, almost all returned to the
United States after the war. Out of the approximately 124 minors who
have filed for redress, and who relocated to Japan with their parents
during World War II, 108 subsequently returned to the United States,
while only 16 remained in Japan.
II. Responses to Public Comments
As a result of this revised interpretation, more fully discussed
below, the Civil Rights Division published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in the Federal Register, 61 FR 29716 (June 12, 1996),
inviting the public to submit comments on this proposed category of
eligible persons. The comment period expired on July 12, 1996.
By the close of the comment period, the Division had received 1,152
timely comments. Of these comments, 1,096 were based on a form letter
which requested that the rulemaking process be expedited. Of the
remaining comments, 51 were from individuals, 3 were from various
organizations representing the interests of Japanese Americans, and 2
were from organizations that opposed this interpretation. Of these
original comments, 45 were in support of the revision while 11 comments
were against the revision. Also, a few comments were not timely filed
as indicated by the postmark and were not considered. The Department
read and analyzed each comment and considered the merits of the points
of view expressed in them.
The vast majority of comments indicated support for this provision.
The 1,096 form letters were favorable and requested that the regulatory
process be expedited. There were also 45 comments (42 individual
letters, 3 organization letters) in support of the amendment changes.
Twenty-eight of the letters supported the amendments and generally
asserted that the children of the internees suffered as much as their
parents had during the evacuation and relocation period, since the
children themselves were interned as well as being subjected to the
war-time conditions in Japan following their relocation. Several
letters echoed this sentiment and indicated that minors did not have
the ability to freely choose to relocate to Japan during the war, and
that the prisoner exchange was unjust. Several elected officials,
including U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, favorably agreed with this
amendment. One person was in favor of this proposal but mistakenly
believed that anyone who returned to Japan at any time would now be
eligible; to the contrary, those persons who returned to Japan before
the start of World War II, remained in Japan throughout the war, will
remain ineligible.
In addition, there were several comments that opposed this revision
and indicated that the Act's original exclusionary language in section
108 should apply to all persons, regardless of age, who relocated to
Japan during World War II. There were 11 comments (9 individual
letters, 2 organization letters) opposed to making this category of
claimants eligible for redress. These comments raised four main issues:
(1) That it was wrong to extend redress solely to Japanese Americans
without extending compensation to those of German and Italian descent
and their children who were similarly situated; (2) that the American
children of Japanese parents were not forcibly removed from their
homes, but rather their parents as their natural guardians made the
decision for them; (3) that these children, American-born with Japanese
parents, had dual nationality and were technically citizens of Imperial
Japan under Japanese law, and were not American citizens; and (4) that,
in light of the federal government's current budgetary crisis, such
expensive outlays were not justified.
The Department has considered the merit of each of these comments
and disagrees with the viewpoints that were expressed. First, the
Department notes that it is compelled to comply with the laws
established by Congress and is fulfilling its mandate. In response to
the comments, the Department notes that the purpose of the Act was to
provide compensation for the injustices suffered by Japanese Americans
during World
[[Page 51010]]
War II as a result of specific Federal Government action based solely
on their Japanese ancestry. A Federal appeals court has determined that
Congress' decision to compensate only those of Japanese ancestry who
sustained deprivations of liberty or property as a result of defined
Federal Government actions during World War II survives constitutional
scrutiny. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 113
S.Ct. 95 (1992). In Jacobs, an American child of German ancestry, who
was detained in an internment camp during the war with his father but
was ineligible for redress under the Act, challenged the Act on equal
protection grounds. Jacobs argued that he was similarly situated with
respect to Japanese Americans who received compensation. The court
indicated that Congress found that there was no mass exclusion or
detention ordered against American citizens of German or Italian
descent. Id. at 319. It also concluded that the Act survived the
strictest level of scrutiny and that Congress' decision to compensate
Japanese Americans and not German Americans was ``substantially related
(as well as narrowly tailored) to the important (and compelling)
governmental interest of compensating those who were interned during
World War II because of racial prejudice.'' Id. at 321.
Second, one of the threshold requirements for eligibility under the
Act is U.S. citizenship or permanent residency status during the
defined statutory period. In each case, minor relocatees who will be
eligible for redress were American-born and meet the other criteria
required by the Act. It is contrary to the law to assert that children
born in the United States are not American citizens, but are
technically citizens of another country. The doctrine of ``jus soli,''
incorporated into the United States Constitution through the Fourteenth
Amendment, makes, with certain limited exceptions, all persons born in
the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens at birth.
See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, section 1; 8 U.S.C. 1401(a). (Persons born
to certain foreign diplomats in the United States do not necessarily
obtain U.S. citizenship at birth since their parents have diplomatic
immunity and are therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.)
Third, we note that the minor relocatees did not make a knowing and
voluntary decision to relocate to Japan. The Department has concluded
that section 108 should not be construed to make ineligible for redress
those persons who relocated involuntarily. (See Section III for a
detailed legal discussion of this issue.) Finally, Congress
appropriated funds to provide redress to these claimants and the
Department is fulfilling its designated role.
The Department reviewed and analyzed each comment and considered
the merits of the points of view expressed in them. Substantive changes
were not made in the proposals, but other non-substantive changes were
made in order to provide further clarification of this amendment.
III. Revised Interpretation
Following publication of the draft regulations in 1989, the
Department received 61 comments concerning the eligibility of persons
who, as minors, relocated to Japan aboard the Gripsholm. Based on the
comments received at that time, however, it found no reason to
differentiate between adults who returned to Japan during World War II
and minors. As a result, in the preamble of the final regulation, the
Department stated that ``the exclusionary language of the Act would
preclude from eligibility the minors, as well as adults, who were
relocated to Japan during [the relevant] time period.'' 54 FR 34,160
(1989).
The Department, based on an argument not previously presented, now
revises its interpretation regarding the eligibility of persons who
relocated to Japan during World War II. Specifically, it revises its
determination of eligibility with regard to persons who were under the
age of 21 and not emancipated as of their dates of departures from the
United States, who did not participate in the active military service
on behalf of an enemy government during World War II, and who are
otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations.
In effecting this revision, the Department is operating within the
established framework of Chevron versus N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43.
Under Chevron, an agency must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress when interpreting a statute. However,
where an act is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue,
Congress has assigned to the agency the responsibility to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Id. at 843-44. For the
reasons set forth below, the Department believes that the proscription
of section 108 is ambiguous with respect to its coverage of the class
of individuals described above, and that the revision is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.
As enacted, section 108 expressly excludes from eligibility ``any
individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and
ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to (another) country while the
United States was at war with that country.'' 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b-7
(emphasis added). This language does not specifically resolve whether
the exclusion applies to individuals who relocated involuntarily.
This issue is suggested on the face of the statute when it is read
as a whole because, while the statute uses the active voice in section
108's exclusion clause, the eligibility clauses of the statute use the
passive voice. For example, section 108 begins by defining an
``eligible individual'' as a person of Japanese ancestry ``who, during
the evacuation, relocation and internment period-- * * * was confined,
held in custody, relocated, or otherwise deprived of liberty or
property as a result of * * * (various Executive Orders and Acts).'' 50
U.S.C. app. 1989b-7(2) (emphasis added). Title II of the Act, which
provides reparations to Aleuts evacuated from their home islands during
World War II, similarly defines an eligible Aleut as a person ``who, as
a civilian, was relocated by authority of the United States from his or
her home village * * * to an internment camp * * *.'' 50 U.S.C. app.
1989c-1(5) (emphasis added). The contrasting use of the active voice in
the exclusion clause suggests the possibility that section 108 might be
read to exclude only those individuals who voluntarily relocated to an
enemy country during the war.
This possibility is consistent with judicial decisions. The United
States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Ninth
Circuit have deemed the use of the active as opposed to the passive
voice relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation. Dickson versus
Office of Personnel Mgmt., 828 F.2d 32, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (isolated
use of passive voice in phrase defining liability is significant and
allows suit against Office of Personnel Management whenever an adverse
determination ``is made,'' even if by another agency); United States
versus Arrellano, 812 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1987) (clause of
statute defining criminal intent phrased in active voice applies to
conduct of the accused, while second clause phrased in passive voice
applies only to the conduct of others). Thus, the statutory language
creates an ambiguity as to whether eligibility decisions should
distinguish between voluntary relocatees and involuntary relocatees.
For the reasons that follow, we believe the better interpretation is to
exclude only individuals who relocated voluntarily.
[[Page 51011]]
The Act's legislative history provides very little significant
insight into congressional intent regarding the eligibility of
involuntary relocatees. As originally introduced, neither the House nor
the Senate bill included a relocation exclusion provision in the
section defining eligible individuals. Entering conference, the House
version of the Act contained the exclusion, while the Senate version
contained no such provision. The conferees agreed to adopt the House
provision, which excluded ``those individuals who, during the period
from December 7, 1941, through September 2, 1945, relocated to a
country at war with the United States.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 785, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988). There is no additional discussion of the
relocation exclusion in the conference report.
A discussion of whether individuals who returned to Japan should be
included in the definition of ``eligible individuals'' is contained in
a witness statement submitted to the House and Senate subcommittees
considering the legislation. In testimony opposing the enactment of the
bill, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, Richard K.
Willard, noted that as then written (without the relocation exclusion),
the breadth of the definition would cover any individual who had been
subject to exclusion, relocation, or internment, including persons
living outside of the United States. In the Department's view, this
overlooked the fact that at least several hundred of the detainees were
``fanatical pro-Japanese,* * *. and (had) voluntarily sought
repatriation to Japan after the end of the war.'' The Department
believed that allowing these disloyal individuals to receive the
benefit of the legislation would be unfair to the United States and to
loyal persons of Japanese descent. To accept the Findings and to
Implement the Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians: Hearing on S. 1009 Before the Subcomm. on
Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 281, 296 (1987)
(Hearings). This statement, however, does not reveal or suggest an
opinion that the bill ought to exclude from redress persons who
involuntarily relocated to an enemy country.
In sum, the Department believes that section 108's exclusion of
persons who relocated to an energy country during World War II is
susceptible to the interpretation that it does not apply to persons who
relocated involuntarily, that so interpreting the statute gives effect
to the principles Congress meant to embody in the exclusionary
provision, and that this interpretation is otherwise a reasonable
construction of the statute.
The Department further notes that the determination of whether a
person relocated voluntarily to an enemy country during World War II is
extraordinarily difficult to determine at this late date, over half a
century since the period during which the actions that are relevant to
a determination about the state of mind of individual relocatees took
place. Under these circumstances, the Department has discretion to
structure the process for determining redress eligibility in a manner
that avoids the inherent inaccuracy of any attempt to engage in a case-
by-case inquiry into the subjective factor of state of mind, as well as
the potential administrative burdens associated with case-by-case
inquiry, by articulating some reasonable, objective criteria to guide
the process.
To that end, the final rule adopts two bright line standards to
administer section 108's exclusion provision. First, any person who was
21 years of age or older, emancipated by petition of the court or by
marriage, or otherwise emancipated, as of the date of his or her
departure from the United States, shall be irrebuttably presumed to
have relocated voluntarily, and will be ineligible for redress under
the Act. Second, any person who served in the Japanses military, or the
military of another enemy country, during the statutorily-defined war
period shall be irrebuttably presumed to have relocated voluntarily
and, therefore, will be ineligible for redress. All otherwise eligible
persons falling outside these categories, that is, persons who were
minors and not otherwise emancipated as of the dates of their
departures from the United States and who did not serve in the Japanese
military or the military of another enemy government during the
statutorily-defined war period, shall be considered involuntary
relocatees and therefore eligible for redress under the Act.
The Supreme Court has affirmed the ability of agencies to employ
generally applicable rules as an alternative to case-by-case
adjudication. See, e.g., American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,
611 (1991) (``Prior decisions of this Court) confirm that, even if a
statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decision-
maker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues
of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to
withhold that authority.''). In particular, the Court has noted that
the Congress is free to use prophylactic rules despite their ``inherent
imprecision'' when it wishes to avoid ``the expense and other
difficulties of individual determinations.'' Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 777 (1975).
The Department believes that under American Hospital Ass'n and
other authorities agencies enjoy a similar latitude to that enunciated
in Weinberger. As in Weinberger, justifying the use of such bright-line
rules does not require determining whether the rules ``precisely filter
[] out those, and only those, who are in the factual position which
generated the congressional concern * * * (n) or * * * whether (they)
filter [] out a substantial part of the class which caused the * * *
concern, or whether (they) filter [] out more members of the class than
nonmembers.'' Id. Rather, the question is whether the Department could
``rationally have concluded both that * * * particular (rules) would
protect against (the abuse Congress sought to avoid), and that the
expense and other difficulties of individualized determinations
justified (their) inherent imprecision.'' Id. For the reasons that
follow, the final rule satisfies this standard.
As stated above, the final rule applies an irrebuttable presumption
that persons who were 21 years of age or older, emancipated by petition
of the court or by marriage, or otherwise emancipated as of the dates
of their departures from the United States, were voluntary relocatees.
The Department proposes to apply this irrebuttable presumption because
adult relocatees were more likely than minor relocatees to have been
able to assent freely to their relocation to Japan. The age of 21 as of
the date of departure was chosen because, during the period covered by
the Act's relocation exclusion, the legal age of majority in most
states was 21.
Noting the dearth of legislative history pertaining to the Act's
exclusion clause, the United States Court of Federal Claims stated in
Suzuki v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 688 (1993), that Congress may have
enacted the exclusion clause in an effort to deny benefits to
individuals who had either been disloyal to the United States or ``who,
despite possible continued loyalty to the United States, had aided an
energy country during war.'' Id. at 695. Nothing in the Department's
revised interpretation of section 108 is inconsistent with this
observation, since both of the possible purposes cited by the court
assume volition on the part of the relocatee to leave the United States
and relocate to Japan. If, by contrast, an individual relocatee was not
free to
[[Page 51012]]
assent to his or her relocation on account of his or her minority
status, it is reasonable for the Department to conclude that such
individual was not the type of person against whom Congress intended to
apply section 108's exclusion provision. By itself the relocation of
minors during World War II does not raise doubts or inferences
concerning disloyalty. In fact, most American-born minor relocatees
returned to the United States following the war.
Examples of distinctions in the treatment of minors and adults
abound in our law. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988)
(plurality opinion). Accordingly, it is reasonable for the Department
to apply such a distinction in determing whether individuals who
relocated to Japan during the statutorily-defined war period did so
voluntarily.
The final rule also applies an irrebuttable presumption the
individuals who served in the military of an enemy government during
the statutorily-defined war period relocated voluntarily because the
Department believes that evidence that an individual entered into the
active military service on behalf of an enemy government following his
or her departure from the United States is a strong indication that the
individual relocated voluntarily. In view of that reasonable belief and
the fact that it is difficult at this time to determine with complete
certainty the motivations of individuals who entered the active
military service against the United States during World War II, and in
light of the increased administrative burdens associated with
individualized efforts to ascertain the 50-year old motivations of such
individuals, the Department believes it is appropriate to interpret the
fact that an individual served in the military of an enemy government
following his or her relocation as evidence that the individual
relocated voluntarily.
The Department will thus require individuals who apply for redress
under the Act and who relocated to Japan during the statutorily-defined
war period to provide information as to their ages and emancipation
status upon their dates of departure from the United States to relocate
to Japan, and to state whether or not they participated in the active
military service on behalf of an enemy government, including the
Japanese Government, during World War II. If such individuals state
that they were 21 years of age or older, or emancipated minors, as of
the dates of their departures, they will be deemed ineligible for
redress under the Act. Similarly, if such individuals state that they
participated in the active military service on behalf of an enemy
government during World War II, they also will be deemed ineligible. In
contrast, otherwise eligible relocatees who were under the age of 21
and not otherwise emancipated upon the dates of their departures from
the United States, and who did not serve in the military on behalf of
an enemy government during World War II, will be eligible for redress
under the Act.
IV. Regulatory Matters
This rule relieves a restriction upon individuals otherwise
eligible for redress under the Act and is therefore exempt from the
provision of the Administrative Procedures Act pertaining to delay in
effective date. 5 U.S.C. 553(d). Moreover, the Department has
determined that this final rule will be effective immediately upon
publication in the Federal Register for good cause shown, i.e., to
expedite these claims, since involuntary relocatees are some of the
older claimants and at least four persons, potentially eligible under
this revision, have since passed away; to process the current claims as
quickly as possible because of budgetary concerns and the program's
sunset date of August 10, 1998; and to resolve a pending lawsuit in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims involving 14 plaintiffs who were minor
children during the war and who will be potentially eligible under this
revision.
The Attorney General in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), has reviewed this regulation and by approving it
certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic
impact upon a substantial number of small entities because this rule
confers a benefit on a limited group of individuals.
The Office of Management and Budget has determined that this final
rule is a significant regulatory action under Executive Order No. 12866
and, accordingly, this final rule has been reviewed and approved by the
Office of Management and Budget. Information collection associated with
this regulation has been approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, OMB No. 1190-0010.
List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 74
Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Archives and
records, Citizenship and naturalization, Civil rights, Indemnity
payments, Minority groups, Nationality, War claims.
For the reasons set forth in the preamble and by the authority
vested in me, including 28 U.S.C. 509 and 510, chapter I of title 28,
part 74, of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
PART 74--CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT REDRESS PROVISION
1. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b.
2. In Subpart B, Sec. 74.4 is revised to read as follows:
Subpart B--Standards of Eligibility
Sec. 74.4 Individuals excluded from compensation pursuant to section
108(B) of the Act.
(a) The term ``eligible individual'' does not include any
individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and
ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a country while the United
States was at war with that country.
(b) Nothing in paragraph (a) of this section is meant to exclude
from eligibility any person who, during the period beginning on
December 7, 1941, and ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a
country while the United States was at war with that country, and who
had not yet reached the age of 21 and was not emancipated as of the
date of departure from the United States, provided that such person is
otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations and the
following standards:
(1) Persons who were 21 years of age or older, or emancipated
minors, on the date they departed the United States for Japan are
subject to an irrebuttable presumption that they relocated to Japan
voluntarily and will be ineligible.
(2) Persons who served in the active military service on behalf of
the Government of Japan or an enemy government during the period
beginning on December 7, 1941 and ending on September 2, 1945 are
subject to an irrebuttable presumption that they departed the United
States voluntarily for Japan. If such individuals served in the active
military service of an enemy country, they must inform the Office of
such service and, as a result, will be ineligible.
Dated: September 21, 1996.
Janet Reno,
Attorney General.
[FR Doc. 96-25027 Filed 9-27-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-10-M