[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 181 (Tuesday, September 17, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48921-48929]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-23738]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision for the Medical Isotopes Production Project: 
Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of 
Decision regarding DOE's proposal to establish a production capability 
for molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) and related medical isotopes. DOE has decided 
to proceed with the proposed action using the preferred alternative 
identified in the Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 
and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0249F). 
The selected facilities are located at Sandia National Laboratories in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM), and Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Further information on the 
environmental impact statement (EIS) can be obtained by contacting: Mr. 
Wade P. Carroll, MIPP EIS Document Manager, Office of Nuclear Energy, 
Science and Technology, NE-70, U.S. Department of Energy, 19901 
Germantown Road, Germantown, MD 20874, Telephone: (301) 903-7731; 
facsimile: (301) 903-5434.

[[Page 48922]]

    General information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) process can be obtained by contacting: Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, 
Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department 
of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585, 
Telephone: (202) 586-4600, or leave message at (800) 472-2756.
    For general information on the DOE isotope production program, 
please contact: Mr. Owen W. Lowe, Associate Director for Isotope 
Production and Distribution, NE-70, U.S. Department of Energy, 19901 
Germantown Road, Germantown, MD 20874, Telephone: (301) 903-5161.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE has prepared this Record of Decision 
pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations for 
implementing the procedural provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) 
and DOE regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR Part 1021). This Record 
of Decision is based on the final EIS, Medical Isotopes Production 
Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related Isotopes Environmental Impact 
Statement (DOE/EIS-0249F). The Notice of Availability of this final EIS 
was published in the Federal Register on May 3, 1996 (61 FR 19931). 
Several comment letters, discussed in the Comments on the Final EIS 
section of this document, were received after the final EIS was 
published. These comments were taken into consideration in preparing 
this Record of Decision.
    DOE initially prepared, and released for public comment, a draft 
environmental assessment (EA) dated February 7, 1995, on the proposed 
action of producing medical isotopes using the Annular Core Research 
Reactor (ACRR) and the adjacent Hot Cell Facility at SNL/NM for target 
irradiation and isotope extraction, and the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Facility at LANL in New Mexico for target fabrication. The 
public review and comment period for the draft EA ended on May 1, 1995. 
Based on the draft EA and comments received, DOE decided to prepare an 
EIS. The Notice of Intent to prepare the EIS was published in the 
Federal Register on July 6, 1995 (60 FR 35191). The draft EIS was 
published in December 1995, and the Notice of Availability of the draft 
EIS was published in the Federal Register on December 22, 1995 (60 FR 
66542).

Background

    For more than 40 years, DOE and its predecessor agencies have 
produced and distributed isotopes through DOE's national laboratories. 
In 1990, Congress established the Isotope Production and Distribution 
Program (IPDP), combining under one program all DOE isotope production 
activities.
    Among other activities, IPDP has responsibility for ensuring a 
stable supply of Mo-99 to the U.S. medical community. Mo-99 is a 
radioactive isotope of molybdenum that results from the fission of 
uranium atoms or from the irradiation of stable isotopes of molybdenum, 
such as Mo-98. Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) is a decay product of Mo-99. 
Approximately 38,000 diagnostic procedures involving radioactive 
isotopes are performed each day in the United States. Most of these 
procedures use Tc-99m. Diagnoses using Tc-99m make it possible to 
define internal conditions of the body that often cannot be determined 
through any other means except invasive surgery. The short life of Tc-
99m minimizes the radiation dose received by the patient. Because these 
isotopes are highly perishable with short lifetimes (the half-lives of 
Mo-99 and Tc-99m are 66 hours and 6 hours, respectively), the need to 
ensure a stable, continuous supply for medical use is critical. The 
U.S. medical community accounts for about 60 percent of the worldwide 
demand for Mo-99/Tc-99m, yet there is no current domestic production 
source for these isotopes.
    Prior to 1989, Mo-99 was produced in the United States by a single 
supplier, Cintichem, Inc. Cintichem produced Mo-99 by irradiating 
uranium deposited on the inside of stainless steel tubes, called 
targets, in a reactor and then chemically separating the Mo-99 from the 
targets and purifying it. In 1989, Cintichem discontinued operation of 
its production reactor. Since then, the United States has relied on 
production reactors in Canada for its supply of Mo-99.
    Until 1993, two Canadian reactors, operated by Atomic Energy of 
Canada Limited (AECL) at the Chalk River site (located about 100 miles 
from Ottawa, Canada), were available to produce Mo-99 through the 
irradiation of targets. AECL extracted the Mo-99 from the targets and 
provided it to Nordion International. Nordion then purified the Mo-99 
and shipped it to radiopharmaceutical manufacturers. In 1993, one of 
the Canadian reactors was permanently shut down leaving only one 
operating reactor, the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor. A 
shutdown of this single remaining reactor would jeopardize the U.S. 
supply of Mo-99. In April 1995, this reactor suffered an unplanned 
shutdown for four days. European sources were able temporarily to 
increase their production enough to cover the European demand normally 
supplied by Nordion, and Nordion had sufficient product in process to 
meet the U.S. demand during this brief period. However, shortages would 
have begun in the United States had the Canadian reactor remained out 
of service for only one or two more days.
    Nordion has announced its intention to build two modern ten-
megawatt reactors to replace the NRU reactor. However, the earliest 
that one of the new plants could be producing Mo-99 is mid-1999. Thus, 
a window of vulnerability for the U.S. medical community exists until a 
reliable backup source of Mo-99 is available. In addition, AECL has 
committed to the Canadian nuclear regulatory authority, the Atomic 
Energy Control Board, to shut down the NRU reactor in the year 2000. 
This action would extend the dependence of the United States on a 
single source of supply if only one new Canadian reactor were available 
at that time and would create immediate shortages if no new reactors 
were ready to operate at that time.
    As a general policy, DOE would favor medical isotope production by 
the private sector. However, because the medical radioisotope market is 
influenced by forces other than traditional market forces (e.g., 
support from national governments), full-cost recovery of investment is 
often not possible. In addition to these considerations, the 
uncertainties and liabilities of constructing and operating a nuclear 
reactor have prevented and will likely continue to prevent private 
companies from providing a U.S. domestic source of Mo-99 in the near 
term. In the 1992 hearings on the condition of the IPDP before the 
House Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Government Operations, testimony addressed the danger of 
U.S. dependence upon a single foreign source for its supply of the 
critical Mo-99 radioisotope and reaffirmed the need for DOE to become a 
Mo-99 supplier. Congress provided $7.6 million for this effort for 
fiscal year 1995, and $12 million for fiscal year 1996. In its report 
(S. Rep. No. 103-291) accompanying the Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations Act, 1995, the Senate Committee on Appropriations noted 
``that DOE is taking steps to * * * produce molybdenum-99 and related 
medical isotopes to ensure that there are no inadequacies of supply for 
domestic use. The committee supports this effort and wishes to be kept 
informed as DOE progresses.''

[[Page 48923]]

Production Processes

    Mo-99 can be produced by different processes. However, only two 
processes have been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for Mo-99 sold in the United States: the proprietary process used 
by Nordion and the Cintichem process. DOE owns the rights to the 
Cintichem process. Both processes produce Mo-99 in a reactor. The 
Nordion process results in substantial quantities of liquid radioactive 
waste; the Cintichem process produces largely solid radioactive waste 
that is much easier to manage and dispose of.
    In November 1991, DOE purchased the Cintichem technology, 
equipment, and the FDA Drug Master Files for the production of Mo-99, 
iodine-125 (I-125), iodine-131 (I-131), and xenon-133 (Xe-133) for 
$750,000 plus an agreement to pay Cintichem a four percent royalty on 
the first five years of sales of Mo-99 and the other isotopes produced 
by DOE using the Cintichem technology. In addition, DOE agreed to 
accept the spent nuclear fuel from the Cintichem reactor for disposal.

Related Isotopes

    The proposed action analyzed in the EIS is the production of Mo-99 
and related isotopes. While the focus of the proposed project is the 
production of Mo-99, related isotopes, I-125, I-131, and Xe-133, could 
be produced at any of the alternative production sites to offset the 
costs of Mo-99 production. Isotopes I-125 and I-131 are used in the 
treatment of thyroid conditions such as Graves' disease. Xe-133 is used 
in the diagnosis of lung maladies. As noted above, DOE purchased the 
rights to produce each of these isotopes using Cintichem's technology 
along with the right to produce Mo-99. Each of these isotopes can be 
made at any of the reactors under consideration and each can be 
processed, packaged, and distributed by the same production team. I-131 
and Xe-133 are essentially byproducts generated during the processing 
of Mo-99. I-125 is produced by irradiating a separate target containing 
nonradioactive xenon-124 in the same reactor. This isotope would be 
extracted separately and in a manner that would not interefere with Mo-
99 processing.

DOE Mo-99 Project History

    In 1991, in response to the shutdown of the Cintichem reactor, DOE 
identified the Omega West Reactor at LANL as the proposed facility to 
provide a backup supply of Mo-99. In December 1992, however, the Omega 
West Reactor experienced an unplanned shutdown. While the reactor was 
shut down, a leak in the primary cooling system was identified, and the 
reactor was not restarted.
    The search for an alternate facility to produce Mo-99 led to the 
identification of ACRR at SNL/NM as a suitable candidate for Mo-99 
production. Within DOE, ACRR and its associated Hot Cell Facility are 
managed by the Office of Defense Programs to provide for defense 
research needs. Defense-related experiments conducted in ACRR were 
completed in 1995. As mentioned previously, DOE issued a draft EA for 
public comment on the proposed action of producing medical isotopes 
using ACRR and its associated Hot Cell Facility at SNL/NM and the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility at LANL. Based on the draft 
EA and comments received, DOE decided to prepare an EIS.

Mo-99 Market

    The current U.S. demand for Mo-99 is about 3,000 6-day curies per 
week. A 6-day curie is defined as the amount of product, measured in 
curies, remaining 6 days after the product arrives on the 
radiopharmaceutical manufacturer's dock. The radiopharmaceutical 
manufacturers also require that specific activity of the product be at 
least 250 curies of activity per gram of aqueous molybdenum solution at 
delivery.
    The current supply of Mo-99 from Canada would be interrupted if the 
NRU reactor experiences a shutdown of approximately five days or longer 
for any reason. The NRU reactor must operate continuously for 12 or 13 
days of each 15-day operating period in order to maintain a continuous 
supply of Mo-99. Down time of 2 to 3 days every 15 days is normally 
required for maintenance, repairs, and target replacement. For many 
years, the NRU reactor has met this operating schedule to supply the 
U.S. and Canadian demands for Mo-99 and to ship Mo-99 to numerous other 
countries.
    If the NRU reactor were to shut down for reasons other than routine 
maintenance, it might not be restarted. The reactor was commissioned in 
1957, and an aggressive maintenance program is in place to keep it 
operating. However, no plans exist to continue operation beyond the 
year 2000 because of the reactor's age and lack of storage capacity for 
waste generated by the isotope separation process. Any major problem at 
the reactor requiring significant time and resources to repair would 
probably result in a permanent shutdown, terminating this source of 
supply.
    In the mid 1980s, Nordion and AECL began the planning and 
construction of a new isotope production and research reactor, Maple X, 
to replace the NRU reactor. However, AECL decided to halt construction 
of the Maple X reactor in 1993 for economic reasons. Nordion's parent 
company, MDS Health Group Ltd. of Canada, subsequently filed a breach 
of contract lawsuit against AECL, and the two sides agreed to 
arbitration hearings to resolve the dispute. The dispute has been 
resolved and Nordion apparently now plans to contract with AECL for the 
construction and operation of two new reactors (Maple I, a continuation 
of the Maple X project, and Maple II) dedicated to isotope production, 
and a radiochemical separation facility. These facilities would use a 
Mo-99 production and separation process similar to the Cintichem 
process to reduce the amounts of radioactive waste generated. Nordion 
recently announced that it will restart project planning and design 
activities for the two reactors and the radiochemical separation 
facility. The sale in the United States of Mo-99 produced at the Maple 
reactor complex cannot begin until at least one reactor and the 
radiochemical separation facility are completed and licensed. In 
addition, FDA must approve the product before Nordion can supply it to 
U.S. pharmaceutical companies.
    Nordion currently plans to build two reactors. However, if only one 
reactor is built, the situation of dependence on a sole source of 
supply would remain unchanged for nuclear medicine physicians in the 
United States as well as the related vulnerability to an interruption 
of supply. Nordion and AECL estimate that the time required to complete 
the necessary environmental and construction permitting process, to 
construct and commission one of the reactors, and to construct the 
radiochemical separation facility is about three years from the time 
the project is resumed. Construction and commissioning of the second 
reactor, if pursued, would proceed simultaneously and would be 
completed about one year after the first reactor is commissioned. Full-
scale Mo-99 production and its sale in the United States would probably 
require an additional several months at each of the reactors.
    Nordion has established a European subsidiary by acquiring the 
radiopharmaceutical department of the Institut National des Radio-
elements (IRE) in Fleurus, Belgium, but IRE (fully owned by the Belgian 
Federal Government) remains the owner of Mo-99 production. IRE and 
Nordion have signed a mutual Mo-99 backup

[[Page 48924]]

agreement to avoid a complete shortage of Mo-99 in case of an 
unscheduled shutdown of the Canadian NRU reactor. DOE has been informed 
that the current contractual backup arrangement requires IRE to supply 
Nordion with the excess capacity of its facility for up to eight weeks 
in the event of a shutdown.
    It is unlikely, however, that Nordion could immediately respond to 
a U.S. shortage of Mo-99 through its backup arrangement with IRE. 
Although IRE has informed DOE that IRE has a sufficient number of 
certified transport casks to ship the Mo-99 from Europe directly to the 
U.S. radiopharmaceutical companies, Mo-99 from the Belgian source has 
never been sold in the United States. Use of IRE's Mo-99 in the United 
States would depend on IRE's ability to obtain FDA approval. IRE 
submitted a Drug Master File to the FDA in 1991, and Mo-99 samples were 
sent to the U.S. radiopharmaceutical companies (DuPont-Merck, Amersham 
Mediphysics, and Mallinckrodt Medical) so that they could support IRE's 
request for FDA approval. However, the FDA approval process on the 
submittal has proceeded slowly because IRE has no established U.S. 
customers.
    Mallinckrodt Medical is currently working with the High Flux 
Reactor (HFR) at Petten in the Netherlands to secure a backup supply in 
1996 for its European needs and for its U.S. operations, dependent upon 
FDA approval. While production at the Petten HFR could be increased 
beyond European needs, it would not be expected to meet the U.S. demand 
if the supply from Nordion is interrupted.
    Mo-99 is produced in numerous other countries. These include 
reactor production facilities in Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Peru, 
Argentina, Russia, China, and South Africa. For the most part, they are 
small, government-run production facilities, and the Mo-99 is produced 
for local use rather than international export. None of these foreign 
sources, most running sporadically, could meet a significant portion of 
the U.S. demand for Mo-99/Tc-99m generators. Moreover, the foreign 
governments are reluctant to meet stringent FDA requirements for export 
to the United States. Transportation difficulties also limit the 
ability of foreign producers to supply Mo-99 to the United States.
    Thermo Technology Ventures, Inc., a U.S. company, is investigating 
a concept for direct production of Tc-99m using small particle 
accelerators. If successful in developing this concept and financing 
the operation of numerous facilities, Thermo Technology Ventures might 
be able to supply a significant quantity of Tc-99m to the U.S. medical 
community in the future.

Proposed Action

    The proposed action is for DOE to establish, as soon as 
practicable, a domestic U.S. production capability that would ensure a 
reliable supply of Mo-99 and related medical isotopes (I-125, I-131, 
and Xe-133) for use by the U.S. medical community. DOE's near-term goal 
is to provide a backup capability to Canadian production by supplying a 
baseline production level of 10 to 30 percent of current U.S. demand 
for Mo-99 with the capability to increase production rapidly to supply 
100 percent of the U.S. demand should the Canadian source be 
unavailable. The baseline production level would serve to maintain the 
capabilities of the facilities and staff to respond on short notice to 
supply the entire U.S. demand on an as-needed basis.
    Each of the alternatives, described in the next section, for 
accomplishing the proposed action would use the Cintichem process for 
the production of Mo-99 and related isotopes. A brief description of 
the steps in the process follows.
    As the initial step in the proposed production of Mo-99, targets 
would be fabricated, tested, and shipped to the reactor facility for 
irradiation. Targets would be manufactured by coating the inner walls 
of stainless steel tubes with highly enriched uranium oxide and then 
sealing the ends of the tubes with custom fittings.
    At the reactor facility, the targets would be irradiated for 
several days. Because Mo-99 decays at the rate of about one percent per 
hour, all steps following irradiation of the targets must be expedited. 
Upon removal from the reactor, the irradiated targets would be 
transferred in a shielded cask to an appropriate hot cell facility, 
preferably located adjacent to or near the reactor facility. Mo-99, I-
131, and Xe-133 would be extracted from the fission product inventory 
by chemical dissolution and precipitation reactions within the hot 
cells. The isotopes would be further refined and would undergo strict 
quality control procedures to meet FDA standards.
    The production of I-125 requires the irradiation of a different 
type of target than that used for the production of Mo-99. These 
targets would be irradiated in the same reactor selected for Mo-99 
production, but the targets would be processed separately and in a 
manner that would not interfere with Mo-99 processing.
    The isotopes would be packaged in Department of Transportation-
approved packaging for shipment by air on a daily basis to any of the 
three currently known potential customers: DuPont-Merck in Boston, 
Massachusetts; Amersham Mediphysics in Chicago, Illinois; and 
Mallinckrodt Medical in St. Louis, Missouri; or to Nordion 
International in Canada for final processing and distribution. Air 
express class shipments would be used.
    The radioactive waste generated during the production of the 
medical isotopes would be primarily low level waste. This waste and the 
spent nuclear fuel from the reactor would be managed, stored, and 
eventually disposed of in accordance with applicable regulatory 
requirements.

Alternatives Considered

    This section describes the alternatives evaluated in the EIS.

1. No Action

    Consideration of the No Action alternative is required by CEQ 
Regulations, and provides a baseline for comparison with the action 
alternatives. If the No Action alternative were selected, there would 
be no environmental impacts in the United States due to the production 
of Mo-99. However, the United States would continue to be vulnerable to 
a Mo-99 supply shortage due to the future uncertainties faced by the 
sole Canadian supplier.

2. Preferred Alternative--Annular Core Research Reactor and Hot Cell 
Facility at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico and Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Under this alternative, DOE would use the Chemistry and Metallurgy 
Research Facility to fabricate the targets containing highly enriched 
uranium. The targets would be shipped to the ACRR at SNL/NM for 
irradiation, and the irradiated targets would be processed in the 
adjacent Hot Cell Facility. Low level radioactive wastes from target 
fabrication at LANL would be disposed of on site. Low level radioactive 
wastes from the Mo-99 production at SNL/NM would be transported to the 
Nevada Test Site for disposal. Spent nuclear fuel generated during the 
isotope production activities would first be stored on site and later 
shipped to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) for storage 
in accordance with the Records of Decision on the DOE Programmatic 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

[[Page 48925]]

Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Environmental 
Impact Statement (SNF PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0203-F).
    To produce Mo-99 and related medical isotopes under this 
alternative, modifications would be required to the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Facility, the ACRR, and Hot Cell Facility. The 
modifications required to fabricate targets at the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Facility are relatively minor. Some interior walls 
would be removed, doors would be relocated, and glove boxes with 
filtered exhaust systems would be installed.
    The ACRR is operational but has historically operated in a pulsed 
mode or in a steady-state mode for about a week at a time, whereas 
continuous operation would be required for isotope production. To be 
able to meet 100 percent of the U.S. demand for Mo-99, the reactor 
would be modified to allow steady-state operation at four megawatts and 
to allow irradiation of a sufficient number of targets. The required 
modifications include installation of heat exchangers and cooling 
towers, removal of a stainless steel tube from the center of the 
reactor core, and various hardware upgrades. In addition, an air lock 
would be installed to minimize airborne releases during the transfer of 
irradiated targets, and ventilation and electrical systems would be 
upgraded. Following each modification to the reactor, a readiness 
assessment would need to be satisfactorily completed for the reactor to 
continue operations. When all the reactor modifications were completed, 
a determination of readiness would be made to establish whether there 
is a need for an operational readiness review.
    The existing Hot Cell Facility adjacent to the ACRR, with the 
addition of more shielding, could be used to produce approximately 10 
percent of the current U.S. demand for Mo-99 on a steady-state basis or 
30 percent of the demand for short periods. To meet greater than 10 
percent of U.S. demand on a continuous basis, a new hot cell consisting 
of five workstations would be constructed within the existing Hot Cell 
Facility. In addition, the Hot Cell Facility floor plan would be 
reconfigured, and the facility ventilation system would be upgraded.
    As noted above, the ACRR is currently managed by DOE's Office of 
Defense Programs. If responsibility for the ACRR is transferred to the 
DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, then the Office 
of Defense Programs has expressed an interest in retaining the right to 
have the reactor available to support defense missions in times of 
national emergency to address security concerns. Under such an 
arrangement, the ACRR would technically be subject to recall for 
defense-related activities if required. DOE has determined that the 
probability of recalling the ACRR to support Defense Programs' needs is 
so remote as not to preclude the ACRR as an alternative. Also, if it 
were recalled to support defense-related activities, the reactor could 
be reconverted for the production of Mo-99 in a week, if necessary.
    On April 15, 1996, the Pueblo of Isleta and the Southwest Research 
and Information Center filed a complaint against DOE in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Mexico challenging DOE's 
lack of a sitewide EIS for SNL/NM and continued reliance upon the 1977 
sitewide EA. Pueblo of Isleta v. Dep't of Energy, No. 96-0508 (D. N.M. 
filed Apr. 15, 1996). Plaintiffs allege that NEPA documents prepared at 
SNL/NM since 1977 do not adequately analyze the cumulative 
environmental impacts of other past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable actions at SNL/NM and seek to enjoin DOE from tiering any 
projects from the 1977 EA. The complaint lists the Draft Medical 
Isotopes Production Project EIS among the nuclear reactor research 
programs at SNL/NM. Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin any current 
activity at SNL/NM. DOE believes that this litigation is moot because 
DOE has already sought congressional funding to begin preparing a 
sitewide EIS at SNL/NM in 1997. Any action at SNL/NM with respect to 
the production of Mo-99 and related isotopes would be supported by the 
final Medical Isotopes Production Project EIS and would not be tiered 
from or dependent on the 1977 EA.

3. Omega West Reactor and Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility at 
Los Alamos National Laboratory

    Under this alternative, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 
Facility would be used to fabricate the targets as described for 
alternative 2. The targets would be transported to the Omega West 
Reactor for irradiation, and the irradiated targets would be 
transported back to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility for 
processing. Low level radioactive wastes from Mo-99 production would be 
disposed of on site. Spent nuclear fuel generated during the isotope 
production activities would first be stored on site and later shipped 
to the Savannah River Site for storage in accordance with the Records 
of Decision on the SNF PEIS.
    To produce Mo-99 and related medical isotopes under this 
alternative, modifications would be required to the Chemistry and 
Metallurgy Research Facility and the Omega West Reactor. As discussed 
previously, the modifications required to fabricate targets at the 
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility are relatively minor. Some 
interior walls would be removed, doors would be relocated, and glove 
boxes with filtered exhaust systems would be installed. Modifications 
required to support target processing operations would likewise be 
minor.
    The Omega West Reactor is shut down and would need to be restarted 
to support isotope production. Restarting the reactor would involve 
replacing an underground cooling water pipe, upgrading reactor cooling 
and air monitoring systems, and updating the required facility safety 
documentation. An operational readiness review for restart of the 
reactor would have to be satisfactorily completed before operations 
could resume.

4. Oak Ridge Research Reactor and Radioisotope Development Laboratory 
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)

    Under this alternative, the targets would be fabricated at the ORNL 
Radioisotope Development Laboratory. The targets would be transported 
to the Oak Ridge Research Reactor for irradiation, and the irradiated 
targets would be transported back to the Radioisotope Development 
Laboratory for processing. Low level radioactive wastes from Mo-99 
production at ORNL would be transported to the Nevada Test Site for 
disposal. Spent nuclear fuel generated during the isotope production 
activities would first be stored on site and later shipped to the 
Savannah River Site for storage in accordance with the Records of 
Decision on the SNF PEIS.
    To produce Mo-99 and related medical isotopes under this 
alternative, modifications would be required to the Radioisotope 
Development Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Research Reactor. The 
modifications required to fabricate and process targets at the 
Radioisotope Development Laboratory are relatively minor and include 
appropriate upgrades to facility ventilation and waste management 
systems.
    The Oak Ridge Research Reactor is shut down and would need to be 
restarted to support isotope production. Restarting the reactor would 
involve upgrading the reactor cooling system, installing new reflectors 
in the reactor core, upgrading or repairing out-of-service equipment, 
and upgrading the required facility safety documentation. An 
operational readiness review for restart of the reactor would have to 
be

[[Page 48926]]

satisfactorily completed before operations could resume.

5. Power Burst Facility and Test Area North Hot Cells at Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory

    Under this alternative, the targets would be fabricated at a 
facility on site such as the Experimental Test Reactor Critical 
Facility annex in the Test Reactor Area. The targets would be 
transported to the Power Burst Facility for irradiation, and the 
irradiated targets would be transported to the Test Area North Hot 
Cells or a comparable hot cell facility on site for processing. Low 
level radioactive wastes from Mo-99 production would be disposed on 
site. Spent nuclear fuel generated during the isotope production 
activities would be stored on site in accordance with the Records of 
Decision on the SNF PEIS.
    To produce Mo-99 and related medical isotopes under this 
alternative, modifications would be required to the Experimental Test 
Reactor Critical Facility annex, the Power Burst Facility, and the Test 
Area North Hot Cells. The required modifications at the Experimental 
Test Reactor Critical Facility annex are relatively minor and would 
include installation of glove boxes with filtered exhaust systems.
    The Power Burst Facility is in standby mode and would need to be 
restarted to support isotope production. Restarting the reactor would 
involve replacing a significant portion of the reactor instrumentation, 
modifying the reactor core to allow for target insertion, and updating 
the required facility safety documentation. An operational readiness 
review for restart of the reactor would have to be satisfactorily 
completed before operations could resume.
    The Test Area North Hot Cells would require only minor 
modifications to support Mo-99 target processing.

Evaluation

    This section describes the results of DOE's evaluation of each of 
the alternatives. It summarizes their environmental impacts, costs, and 
schedules and concludes by addressing the issue of privatization.

Environmental Impacts

    The environmental impacts of producing enough Mo-99 to meet 100 
percent of the U.S. demand were assessed in the EIS. However, since DOE 
currently proposes only to provide a backup capability that would be 
operating to meet 10 percent to 30 percent of the annual U.S. Mo-99 
demand, the actual consequences would be lower than the estimated 
levels presented in the EIS and described in this section unless there 
were an interruption of the Canadian supply for the entire year. The 
analyses in the EIS indicate that environmental impacts of any of the 
production alternatives would be minimal and well within applicable 
regulatory guidelines. Each of the action alternatives would use 
essentially the same technology for the production of Mo-99 and related 
medical isotopes. Minor differences in environmental impacts among the 
alternatives relate primarily to the type and status of the existing 
facilities, the modifications required to prepare the facilities for 
production, the quantities of low level waste generated, how those 
wastes would be managed, and the location of the production facilities 
with respect to the surrounding population and to the medical isotope 
distributors. All of the production alternatives discussed in the EIS 
would use existing facilities with relatively minor modifications and 
would have negligible consequences with respect to land use, cultural 
resources, aesthetic resources, geologic resources, water quality, 
ecological resources, or noise. In the category of regional 
socioeconomics, the sum of primary and secondary employment impacts 
ranged from 100 to 300 total regional jobs and from $3 million to $6 
million in annual regional income, generally less that 0.1 percent of 
the corresponding regional totals. Thus, the potential impacts on the 
adequacy of community resources and services would be negligible under 
any alternative.
    The environmental analyses revealed some differences in the 
radiological impacts to the public and to workers resulting from the 
design and location of particular facilities, but the consequences 
would be within regulatory limits in all cases. The analyses did not 
identify any alternative that provided a substantial advantage in terms 
of environmental consequences. For example, the combined collective 
radiation dose to the public from facility operations and 
transportation (including crew dose) in person-rem per year ranged from 
64 for ORNL to 89 for SNL/NM, and the radiological dose to project 
workers in person-rem per year was estimated to range from 9 to 12 for 
LANL to 22 to 25 for SNL/NM.1 As shown in the EIS, these doses 
would not be expected to result in latent fatal cancers for either 
workers or the public, and doses to exposed individuals would be well 
within regulatory limits. In addition, because all of the production 
alternatives would use small research reactors and comparable target 
fabrication and processing facilities, the risk of human health effects 
from credible facility accidents is very low, and the consequences of 
those accidents would be within DOE safety guidelines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ The facility and transportation values were derived from 
Table S-2 on page xiv of the EIS by adding the radiological dose to 
the population within 80 km (50 miles) from target irradiation and 
processing to the transportation radiological dose to the crew and 
public. The dose to project workers was taken from Table 3-1 on page 
3.61 of the EIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Production of low level radioactive waste would be less than 85 
cubic meters per year, and spent nuclear fuel would be generated at the 
rate of 16 to 32 kilograms per year under any alternative. These 
quantities of waste and spent nuclear fuel are small compared to the 
quantities of similar materials at the DOE facilities where they would 
ultimately be managed. All of the alternative sites have sufficient 
waste management capability either on site or through existing 
arrangements with other DOE sites to dispose of low level waste 
generated by the proposed activity. All alternative sites have adequate 
capabilities for storage of spent fuel for at least five years, if 
necessary, before the spent fuel is shipped to the Savannah River Site 
or INEL for storage in accordance with the Records of Decision on the 
SNF PEIS.
    Cumulative impacts on site and community infrastructure would be 
negligible because the medical isotope production process would use 
existing facilities and a relatively small staff. The quantities of 
radioactive waste generated annually, radiological facility emissions, 
and radiation dose to workers would increase compared to current or 
historical DOE operations at each of the sites considered in the EIS. 
Some sites would experience a large percentage increase in some impact 
categories; however, the absolute quantities are low and the 
consequences are generally small compared to current or historical DOE 
operations. For example, the quantity of solid low level waste that 
would be generated annually at SNL/NM would represent a 50 percent 
increase over historical generation levels, but the absolute quantity 
of waste generated is relatively small (49 cubic meters). Even with 
these increases, the cumulative regional emissions, doses, or other 
impacts would not exceed any regulatory limits at any of the 
alternative sites.
    The consequences of the No Action alternative would consist of 
those associated with ongoing production of medical isotopes at the 
Canadian facilities and transportation of medical isotopes to the 
current U.S. suppliers and their customers. The No Action alternative 
would also result in a

[[Page 48927]]

continued risk to the U.S. health care community and its consumers. If 
the sole Canadian source of Mo-99 became unavailable for an extended 
time, certain medical procedures could not be offered, and the cost of 
some diagnostic procedures and medical risk to patients would likely 
increase substantially.

Costs

    All cost analyses presented in the EIS were performed based on the 
operational capabilities required by each of the alternative sites to 
produce 100 percent of the U.S. demand for Mo-99 as quickly as 
possible. Cost estimates for each alternative include estimated 
expenditures to (1) prepare the reactor facility for startup, (2) 
operate the reactor to irradiate targets, (3) prepare the hot cell 
facility for processing irradiated targets, (4) process the targets to 
obtain the desired product, (5) prepare the target fabrication facility 
for production, and (6) fabricate targets. Preparation costs include 
estimated expenditures associated with site- specific process 
verification and document preparation. Operations costs were estimated 
on an annual basis and include estimated expenditures associated with 
radioactive waste management processes. The cost estimates do not 
include current expenditures that are being incurred by each of the 
sites to maintain their facilities, general isotope research (including 
Mo-99) and process experimentation costs being incurred, or planned 
decommissioning costs.
    Both the estimated preparation costs and operations costs are of 
similar magnitude among the alternatives. The estimated preparation 
costs range from $17.2 million for INEL to $21.0 million for ORNL. The 
estimated preparation costs for both the SNL/NM and LANL alternatives 
are $19.6 million. The estimated annual operating costs range from $8.4 
million for INEL to $12.8 million for SNL/NM. The estimated annual 
operating costs for ORNL and LANL are $9.6 million and $11.0 million, 
respectively.
    DOE recognized the varying degrees of confidence associated with 
these estimates and, therefore, commissioned an evaluation of the level 
of uncertainty associated with each of the estimates. The evaluation 
was performed by Jupiter Corporation and is presented in the report, 
Cost and Schedule Evaluation of Mo-99 Production Options Identified in 
the Environmental Impact Statement, June 3, 1996. This evaluation 
produced a range of likely costs and schedules for each of the 
production alternatives identified in the EIS. The SNL/NM estimates of 
schedule and cost are based on a detailed, integrated schedule with 
corresponding resource requirements. The Jupiter report estimated the 
costs for SNL/NM to have an uncertainty of about 10 percent. The LANL 
estimates are also based on a detailed, integrated schedule and have a 
similar level of accuracy as the SNL/NM estimates for the activities 
that LANL has identified. However, a greater level of schedule and cost 
uncertainty exists for the LANL alternative because of unanticipated 
delays and facility costs that are likely to be encountered in the 
restart and operation of the Omega West Reactor. The Jupiter report 
estimated that the costs for LANL have the potential to increase by 
about 25 percent for preparation cost and 9 percent for annual 
operating cost.
    The level of uncertainty is also greater in the case of estimated 
expenditures for ORNL and INEL due to cost projections made at a less 
detailed level than for the other two sites. Also for ORNL, 
uncertainties exist in the cost and schedule for restart of the Oak 
Ridge Research Reactor that has been shut down since 1987. The Jupiter 
report estimated that the ORNL reactor preparation costs have the 
potential to increase by over 25 percent and the operating costs have a 
20 percent uncertainty. In the case of INEL, Power Burst Facility 
replacement fuel costs were not included in the EIS estimate for 
operating costs. On a yearly basis, this added cost is likely to be in 
the range of $1 million to $1.5 million. In addition, the uncertainty 
in restart requirements and the likelihood of increased operational 
costs contribute to Jupiter's estimate of potential cost increases of 
over 35 percent for both facility preparations and operations. When all 
of these cost uncertainties are taken into consideration, the likely 
costs of preparation and operation would be of similar magnitude for 
each alternative.

Schedules

    Three milestones were compared in the EIS for each of the 
alternative Mo-99 production sites. The first milestone is reached when 
the alternative could begin initial production of Mo-99. Initial 
production is defined as the ability to reliably irradiate and process 
a limited number of targets (one or more per week). The ability to 
reach this milestone quickly is particularly important, because its 
attainment would allow DOE to initiate the FDA approval process and 
achieve an emergency production capability for some quantity of Mo-99. 
The second milestone is completion of all necessary facility 
modifications (reactor and hot cell) and process equipment 
construction. The final milestone is achievement of both an FDA-
approved production capacity and trained staff to meet 100 percent of 
the U.S. demand for Mo-99 on a continuous basis.
    Based on the schedules prepared by the potential host sites, the 
first milestone could be reached by SNL/NM in 6 months from the Record 
of Decision, in 13 months by LANL, 22 months by INEL, and 24 months by 
ORNL. The time estimated to complete facility modifications and thus 
meet the second milestone is 18 months from the Record of Decision for 
LANL, 22 months for both SNL/NM and INEL, and 24 months for ORNL. 
Finally, full production capability, the third milestone, is estimated 
to be reached 20 months from the Record of Decision for LANL, 28 months 
for both SNL/NM and INEL, and 30 months for ORNL.
    As in the case of cost estimates, the foregoing schedules are 
subject to varying degrees of confidence. The Jupiter Corporation 
evaluation of the schedules for each of the production alternatives 
identified a 10 percent uncertainty level in the SNL/NM schedule 
estimates for the reasons stated previously. Based on uncertainties in 
restarting the reactors at LANL, ORNL, and INEL, Jupiter estimated that 
the LANL schedule estimates had the potential to extend by 6 to 24 
months, and that both the ORNL and INEL schedule estimates had the 
potential to increase by 6 to 12 months.
    The uncertainties in the restart of reactors arises from the need 
for these nuclear facilities to have approved safety analysis reports 
(SAR) and to satisfactorily complete an operational readiness review. 
It is the policy of the Department that nuclear facilities and 
operations be analyzed to identify all hazards and potential accidents 
associated with the facility and the process systems, components, 
equipment, or structures, and to establish design and operational means 
to mitigate these hazards and potential accidents. A SAR documents the 
results of these analyses and their adequacy to ensure that the 
facility can be constructed, operated, maintained, shut down, and 
decommissioned safely and in compliance with applicable requirements. 
These detailed documents must be reviewed and approved by DOE. The 
current DOE standard for SARs is presented in DOE Order 5480.23. Of the 
alternatives evaluated in the EIS, the ACRR at SNL/NM is the only 
reactor with an approved SAR that complies with this order. Initial Mo-
99 production activities could proceed under the current ACRR SAR, 
although

[[Page 48928]]

the document would need to be amended in the future to analyze 
modifications necessary to support full Mo-99 production capability 
while the reactor continues to operate. The other reactors have 
previously approved SARs, but they are now out of date and not in 
compliance with the current DOE order. To operate those reactors, the 
operating laboratory would need to either demonstrate equivalence of 
the reactor's approved SAR to DOE Order 5480.23 or update the reactor's 
approved SAR to comply with the order. The Omega West Reactor at LANL 
has a draft SAR written in compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, but the 
approval process was stopped in 1993 after the reactor was placed in 
safe shutdown. The time and cost to revise existing SARs to meet DOE 
Order 5480.23 and obtain DOE approval varies according to the type and 
size of the nuclear facility. The need to update an SAR before a 
reactor can return to operation creates the potential for schedule 
delays, cost increases, and facility modifications to resolve 
unanticipated safety concerns. Significant updating of a reactor SAR to 
meet the current order and obtaining DOE review and approval typically 
costs several millions of dollars and takes over two years to complete. 
These potential schedule and cost impacts were considered in the 
uncertainty evaluation performed by Jupiter.
    Similarly, the need to conduct readiness reviews introduces cost 
and schedule uncertainties that could be significant depending on the 
level of review required. DOE Order 425.1 establishes the requirements 
for the restart of existing nuclear facilities that have been shut 
down. The requirements specify an independent readiness review process 
to demonstrate that it is safe to restart the facility. The order 
provides for two levels of review: an operational readiness review or a 
readiness assessment. DOE determines whether and which of these reviews 
need to be performed prior to the restart of a nuclear facility that 
has experienced conditions such as an unplanned shutdown, an extended 
shutdown (12 months for the category of reactors considered as Mo-99 
production alternatives), or after substantial facility modifications 
that require changes in the safety basis previously approved by DOE. 
The breadth and depth of the review required determines the amount of 
uncertainty introduced into cost and schedule estimates for restarting 
the reactor.
    Generally, an operational readiness review does the following:
    (1) Assesses the physical condition of the nuclear facility;
    (2) Assures that the facility drawings are a reflection of the 
current design of the facility;
    (3) Assures that the procedures reflect the facility as it 
currently exists and can be conducted as written;
    (4) Assures that the safety documentation is a reflection of the 
current design of the plant and adequately defines the envelope of the 
safe operating domain;
    (5) Assures that the personnel operating and managing the facility 
have the appropriate and/or required background and training to safely 
conduct operations and management of the facility; and
    (6) Assures that the facility has achieved a state of emergency 
preparedness that is acceptable, and that the facility can 
appropriately conduct the steps of the site emergency procedures.
    A minimum set of requirements for an operational readiness review 
is presented in section 4.d. of DOE Order 425.1, but the full set of 
review requirements is initially defined by DOE management and may be 
expanded by the operational readiness review team during the review if 
appropriate. The length of time required to conduct an operational 
readiness review depends on the review requirements ultimately 
established and could take between 6 and 24 months.
    In contrast, a readiness assessment generally focuses on a few 
specific areas of review and is often less time and resource intensive 
than an operational readiness review. Depending on the causes and 
duration of the shutdown and the modifications accomplished during the 
shutdown, a readiness assessment may be as short and simple as a 
restart check procedure, or it may approach the breadth and depth of an 
operational readiness review. As in the case of the preparation of 
safety documentation, the potential schedule and cost impacts of 
readiness reviews were considered in the uncertainty evaluation 
performed by Jupiter.

Privatization

    DOE's objective is to establish a reliable backup Mo-99 production 
capability as soon as practicable. From the inception of the EIS 
process, DOE has stated that while it prefers that Mo-99 be produced 
for the long term by the private sector, establishment of long-term 
private sector production is not within the scope of the EIS. In the 
long term, DOE will explore the possibility of private sector 
participation in the production of Mo-99 consistent with the DOE 
National Isotope Strategy. As discussed in the Background section of 
this document, however, it is unlikely that a private domestic source 
of Mo-99 is attainable in the near term to address the current 
vulnerability of the U.S. supply. For this reason, the long-term goal 
of privatization of Mo-99 production was expressly excluded from 
consideration in the EIS. DOE published in Commerce Business Daily on 
December 5, 1995, and in the Federal Register (60 FR 63515) on December 
11, 1995, a Notice for Expressions of Interest regarding the possible 
privatization of all of DOE's isotope activities. The Expressions of 
Interest were requested by March 29, 1996. Expressions of Interest that 
could apply to the production of Mo-99 and related isotopes were 
received for review during April 1996. Some of these Expressions of 
Interest are general in nature and do not focus on a particular site of 
interest for Mo-99 production activities. Several others are site 
specific and are directed toward either the use of the ACRR at SNL/NM 
or the Omega West Reactor at LANL. Because these Expressions of 
Interest are proprietary and are still under review, it is not 
appropriate to elaborate on their contents. However, the decision DOE 
is making here will not preclude privatization in the long term.

Comments on the Final EIS

    DOE received three comment letters after it issued the final EIS 
and has responded to them individually. Two letters were from residents 
of Albuquerque, New Mexico, who expressed concern regarding the 
handling and management of waste and spent nuclear fuel, topics 
addressed in the final EIS. The third letter was from Senator Dirk 
Kempthorne of Idaho who urged the selection of INEL as the site for Mo-
99 production and included a critique of the EIS. Most of the issues 
raised in this letter concern the relative strengths and capabilities 
of INEL as an alternative and the limitations of the preferred 
alternative including the potential for the ACRR to be recalled for 
defense-related testing, the agency's motivation for preparing the EIS, 
and the suitability of the ACRR for privatization. All of these topics 
are addressed in the final EIS.
    Several concerns presented in Senator Kempthorne's letter warrant a 
response here. First, the Department has considered and recognizes 
INEL's long history of medical isotope production and the significant 
historical contributions of INEL to DOE's missions. In the final EIS, 
DOE has recognized the relative strengths and the desire of each 
alternative location to host the Mo-99 mission. The

[[Page 48929]]

Department has been committed to giving each alternative location a 
fair and careful look.
    The potential recall of the ACRR for a defense mission also 
deserves particular comment. When it issued the final EIS, DOE believed 
that the chance of the ACRR being recalled for defense missions in time 
of national emergency was sufficiently low so as not to disqualify the 
ACRR as an alternative. Based on extensive discussions between the 
Office of Defense Programs and the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science 
and Technology, DOE continues to believe that the likelihood of a 
defense-related national emergency occurring that would require the use 
of the ACRR within the next several years is remote. DOE also believes 
that the critical need to establish a backup supply of Mo-99 in the 
shortest possible time far outweighs the minimal risk that this reactor 
would be recalled for defense-related emergencies.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    With respect to the establishment of a production capability for 
Mo-99 and related medical isotopes, the No Action alternative is the 
environmentally preferable alternative. Under the No Action 
alternative, the U.S. medical community would continue to rely on the 
single existing supply source for Mo-99, and any environmental impacts 
would occur primarily outside the United States. The No Action 
alternative, however, leaves the U.S. medical community vulnerable to a 
shortage of Mo-99 that could have a significant negative impact on the 
quality of health care received by thousands of U.S. medical patients 
each day. Therefore, the No Action alternative was not selected.
    Of the alternatives that would satisfy the purpose and need for 
action, the potential environmental impacts are generally small and of 
similar magnitude. Each of the action alternatives would use 
essentially the same technology for the production of Mo-99 and related 
medical isotopes. Minor differences among the action alternatives 
relate primarily to the type and status of the existing facilities, the 
modifications required to prepare the facilities for isotope 
production, and amounts of low level waste generated and how those 
wastes would be managed. No single alternative has the least impact in 
all of the categories analyzed in the EIS. For example, ORNL has the 
lowest collective radiation dose to the public; however, it could 
generate the second highest volume of low level waste. Similarly, SNL/
NM has the lowest utilization of uranium in fuel, and water usage, of 
all the sites considered but has a slightly higher worker dose during 
processing and operation. However, these differences and the others 
identified in the EIS are very minor and do not provide a basis for 
selecting an environmentally preferred alternative among those 
alternatives that satisfy the purpose and need for action.

Decision

    DOE has decided to implement the proposed project as specified in 
the preferred alternative in the EIS, that is, to produce Mo-99 and 
related isotopes at the ACRR and Hot Cell Facility at SNL/NM and to 
fabricate targets at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility at 
LANL. The basis for this decision rests on DOE's determination that it 
is essential to address as soon as possible the U.S. vulnerability to 
the failure of its sole source of supply of Mo-99, an isotope vitally 
necessary for the medical diagnosis of thousands of patients every day. 
Failure of the sole Canadian supply would leave the United States with 
critical shortages of Mo-99 within a week.
    The analyses of the alternatives in the EIS demonstrate that the 
impacts on the environment, involved workers, and the residents in the 
affected communities would be very small and within applicable 
regulatory limits and would not provide a basis for discrimination 
among the alternatives. The ACRR is the only reactor among all of the 
alternatives that is presently operating, and the ACRR can provide the 
earliest possible production of Mo-99 in the event that the Canadian 
supply becomes unavailable. The ACRR also has the most reliable 
projections of costs and schedules for meeting the planned production 
goals.
    The Department recognizes that the Office of Defense Programs has 
expressed interest in retaining the capability to use the ACRR in the 
event of a national emergency. The Department considers the likelihood 
of such an emergency in the next several years to be highly unlikely. 
DOE has decided that the critical need to establish a backup supply of 
Mo-99 in the shortest possible time far outweighs the minimal risk that 
this reactor would be recalled for defense-related emergencies.
    This decision is not affected by the litigation in Pueblo of Isleta 
v. Dep't of Energy, No. 96-0508 (D. N.M. filed Apr. 15, 1996). The 
Medical Isotopes Production Project is based upon its own final EIS 
that evaluates the cumulative impacts of the proposed action at SNL/NM 
as well as all of the other proposed alternatives. Neither that EIS nor 
this decision is dependent in any way upon the 1977 SNL/NM sitewide EA 
that the plaintiffs seek to enjoin reliance upon. Moreover, DOE 
believes that this litigation is moot because DOE has already sought 
congressional funding to begin preparing a sitewide EIS at SNL/NM in 
1997.

Use of all Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm

    Implementation of this decision will result in low environmental 
and health impacts. Mitigation measures typically applied to the 
operation of small research reactors and to the activities necessary to 
fabricate, irradiate, and process the Mo-99 targets will be applied 
throughout the project. These measures include filtration of air 
emissions from target fabrication, irradiation, and processing 
activities in accordance with applicable requirements and as low as 
reasonably achievable principles. Accordingly, no mitigation action 
plan is necessary.
    The Medical Isotopes Production Project: Molybdenum-99 and Related 
Isotopes will be initiated at the preferred alternative facilities 
under the program direction of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science 
and Technology and the Kirtland Area Office, Albuquerque Operations 
Office.

    Issued in Washington, D.C., this 11th day of September 1996.
Terry R. Lash,
Director, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology.
[FR Doc. 96-23738 Filed 9-16-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P