[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 179 (Friday, September 13, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48474-48479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-23352]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Supplemental record of decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final 
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential 
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials

[[Page 48475]]

at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until 
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. Some 
of the particular materials considered in the EIS could present 
environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage 
condition.
    On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and 
Notice of Preferred Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim 
management of several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS, 
including a narrowing of alternatives under consideration for the 
stabilization of plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 solutions in H-Canyon, 
and obsolete neptunium targets in K-Reactor.
    On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for 
the stabilization of Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad 
targets. DOE also indicated that it was considering a DOE staff 
operations study, Facility Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River 
Site Chemical Separation Facilities (December 1995) before making a 
decision on the stabilization of the remaining two categories of 
nuclear materials at the SRS evaluated in the Interim Management of 
Nuclear Materials EIS--plutonium-239 solutions, and neptunium-237 
solution and obsolete targets.
    After further consideration of the facility utilization strategy 
study, the Final EIS, budget and schedule projections, and comments 
from interested parties, DOE is now issuing the following decision 
concerning these materials:

Neptunium-237 Solution and Targets

    DOE has decided to dissolve, chemically separate and process in F-
Canyon the neptunium-237 contained in nine (9) obsolete reactor targets 
and the existing neptunium-237 in solution currently in the H-Canyon. 
The resulting glass will be stored in canisters inside the shielded 
canyon facility in F-Canyon or the new Actinide Packaging and Storage 
Facility, when constructed, until DOE implements programmatic decisions 
on long-term storage, use or disposition of the material.

Plutonium-239 Solutions

    DOE has decided to stabilize the plutonium-239 solutions stored in 
the H-Canyon facility to a metal, using the F-Canyon and FB-Line 
facilities. The plutonium solutions will be converted to metal using 
the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities. The plutonium 
will be packaged in accordance with DOE's storage standard for 
plutonium and stored in an existing SRS vault until the Actinide 
Packaging and Storage Facility is available. The plutonium will be 
stored at the SRS until DOE implements long-term storage and 
disposition decisions on weapons useable forms of plutonium. The 
plutonium from this stabilization action will be prohibited from use in 
nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE is pursuing options for placing this 
material under international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards.
    By stabilizing these materials in the F-Canyon DOE can avoid both 
start up and decontamination costs associated with a portion of the HB-
Line that has never been operated. Moreover, this course of action will 
effect the expeditious completion of actions necessary to stabilize and 
convert these materials into forms suitable for safe storage and 
prepare the facilities for potential shutdown and deactivation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim 
management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the 
Final EIS, the initial ROD and Notice, the first supplemental ROD, or 
this second supplemental ROD contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA 
Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River 
Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031, 
(800) 242-8259, Internet: [email protected]
    For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave 
a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final 
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential 
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials 
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until 
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. Some 
of the particular materials considered in the EIS could present 
environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage 
condition.
    The Final EIS identified processing to oxide using the H-Canyon and 
HB-Line facilities as the preferred alternative for the neptunium-237 
solution and targets and the plutonium-239 solutions.
    On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a ROD and Notice of Preferred 
Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim management of several 
categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. In addition, DOE indicated 
that neptunium-237 solution and targets would be stabilized either by 
processing to oxide or vitrification, and that plutonium-239 solutions 
in H-Canyon would be stabilized through processing to metal, processing 
to oxide, or vitrification. DOE stated that it would select and 
implement one stabilization method for each of these material 
categories, and that the stabilization method chosen would be dependent 
upon further reviews of costs, schedules, and facility utilization 
options.
    On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for 
the stabilization of two of the remaining categories of nuclear 
materials (Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets) 
analyzed in the Final EIS.
    On February 29, 1996, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the 
Department's management and operating contractor for the Savannah River 
Site, advised DOE that, while engaged in a scheduled upgrade of safety 
authorization basis documentation, it had discovered that seismic 
(earthquake) analyses performed in the early 1980s were based on 
assumptions that are inconsistent with the as-built condition of the 
canyon facilities. As a result of this discovery, the transfer of 
nuclear materials into the canyon facilities was suspended while 
detailed analyses and reviews were conducted to ensure the safety of 
the canyon facilities and to determine if the information contained in 
the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Final EIS was sufficient. 
The F-Canyon analyses have been completed; the H-Canyon analyses are 
expected to be completed in September 1996. The completed F-Canyon 
analyses indicate that the ability of the F-Canyon facilities to 
withstand a severe earthquake is equal to or better than that predicted 
in existing Safety Analysis Reports and the EIS. Based on a Supplement 
Analysis, DOE determined that a Supplemental EIS for nuclear materials 
stabilization in F-Canyon is not required.
    After further consideration of the facility utilization strategy 
study, the Final EIS, budget and schedule projections, and comments 
from interested parties, DOE is now issuing its decisions for the 
stabilization of neptunium-237 solution and obsolete targets, and 
plutonium-239 solutions, the remaining two categories of nuclear 
materials at the SRS evaluated in the

[[Page 48476]]

Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS.

II. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

    DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the 
neptunium-237 solution and obsolete reactor targets, and the plutonium-
239 solutions at the SRS: (A) Continuing Storage (i.e., ``No Action'' 
within the context of NEPA), (B) Processing to Oxide, (C) Processing 
and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility 
(DWPF), and (D) Vitrification (F-Canyon). In addition, Processing to 
Metal was also evaluated for the plutonium-239 solutions. The following 
is a brief description of the alternatives evaluated.

A. Continuing Storage (No Action)

    Under this alternative, DOE would continue to store the materials 
in their current physical and chemical form. DOE would relocate or 
repackage materials stored in vaults or tanks to consolidate the 
material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. Periodic 
sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, weighing, visual 
inspection and similar activities would continue in order to monitor 
the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear material. Chemicals 
would be added to existing solutions in order to maintain concentration 
and chemistry within established parameters. Repackaging would include 
removing materials from damaged storage containers and placing them in 
new containers or placing the damaged containers in larger containers.
    A variety of activities could be required to maintain the materials 
in their current physical and chemical form. For example, DOE would 
maintain facilities in good working condition and would continue to 
provide utilities (water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and 
services (security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each 
facility. Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the 
skills necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would 
continue with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related 
vulnerabilities associated with storage of the materials and projects 
to upgrade or replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).

B. Processing to Oxide

    DOE would convert existing solutions of neptunium-237 and 
plutonium-239 to an oxide in HB-Line. Additional neptunium-237 solution 
would be generated in the processing of the obsolete reactor targets. 
After conversion of the plutonium and neptunium solutions to oxides, 
the oxides would be packaged and stored in accordance with applicable 
criteria in an existing vault until a new Actinide Packaging and 
Storage Facility is available.

C. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF

    DOE would perform research and development work to develop a method 
for chemically adjusting existing solutions and solutions that would 
result from the dissolution of the obsolete neptunium-237 targets in 
order to transfer them to the high level waste tanks in H-Area. The 
research and development work would be done to ensure nuclear 
criticality safety due to the amount of plutonium-239 in the existing 
solutions, and to evaluate the effects of the nuclear materials on the 
systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid high level 
waste.
    Upon completion of the studies, existing solutions of neptunium-237 
and plutonium-239 would be chemically adjusted and transferred to the 
high level waste tanks via underground pipelines. DOE would transport 
the obsolete targets from the K-Reactor area to F- or H-Canyon where 
they would be dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting solutions would 
be chemically adjusted and transferred to the high level waste tanks 
via underground pipelines. The solutions would be mixed with the 
existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- or H-Area tanks. 
The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would eventually be 
immobilized in borosilicate glass in the vitrification process at the 
DWPF. The glass would be contained within stainless steel canisters 
that would be stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending 
geologic disposal by DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be immobilized 
by the Saltstone Facility into a grout containing very low levels of 
radioactivity. The grout would be poured into concrete vaults located 
at the Saltstone Facility.

D. Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    For this alternative, DOE would utilize the vitrification 
capability that it decided in the December 12, 1995, ROD to install in 
F-Canyon for the stabilization of the americium and curium solution. 
The existing solutions of neptunium-237 and plutonium-239, currently 
stored in H-Canyon, would be transported to F-Canyon for vitrification 
upon development or procurement of a suitable shipping container. The 
obsolete neptunium-237 targets would be transported from K-Reactor area 
to F-Canyon, dissolved in nitric acid, and the neptunium chemically 
separated from other materials (principally aluminum). The resulting 
neptunium would be vitrified in conjunction with the existing neptunium 
solution. Neptunium separated from the processing of the Mark-16 and 
Mark-22 fuels pursuant to the February 8, 1996 ROD would be vitrified 
in conjunction with the existing neptunium materials. For the 
plutonium-239 this vitrified form would not meet the requirements of 
the storage standard (DOE Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals 
and Oxides (DOE-STD-3013-94)), which prescribes stable oxide or metal. 
Furthermore, the vitrified form would require additional processing to 
prepare its disposition.

E. Processing to Metal

    This alternative applies only to the plutonium-239 solutions. Under 
this alternative, DOE would transport the plutonium-239 solutions from 
H-Canyon to F-Canyon using the same container described above to 
transport the neptunium-237 solution. In F-Canyon, the plutonium 
solutions would be converted to plutonium metal using the FB-Line 
facility. After conversion, the metal would be packaged and stored in 
accordance with DOE's plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013-94) in 
an existing vault until a new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility 
is available. A new glove box is being installed in FB-Line to provide 
the equipment necessary to meet the storage standard criteria for the 
packaging of plutonium metal. The plutonium metal would be stored at 
the SRS until programmatic decisions are made and implemented by DOE on 
long-term storage or disposition.

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    The Final EIS for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials 
analyzed the potential environmental impacts that could result from 
implementation of the above management alternatives. DOE has concluded 
that there would be minimal environmental impact from implementation of 
any of these alternatives in the areas of geologic resources, 
ecological resources (including threatened or endangered species), 
cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land 
use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility 
modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within 
existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. DOE

[[Page 48477]]

anticipates that the existing SRS workforce would support any 
construction projects and other activities required to implement any of 
the alternatives. As a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic 
impacts from implementing any of the alternatives.
    Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical 
separations facilities would have greater environmental impacts (e.g., 
radiological, waste generation) during the actual dissolving, 
processing or conversion activities than simply storing these materials 
in the F- and H-Canyon facilities. After dissolving, processing and 
conversion activities have stabilized these materials, however, impacts 
of normal facility operations related to management of these materials 
would decline, and potential impacts of accidents associated with these 
materials would be reduced, with certain kinds of accidents eliminated 
(e.g., solution spills or releases). Potential health effects from 
normal operations from any of the alternatives, including those 
involving the operation of the canyon facilities, would be low and well 
within regulatory limits. All of the alternatives require some use of 
the canyon facilities.
    Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents 
associated with nuclear material storage would be reduced after 
material stabilization alternatives are implemented. Since actively 
operating facilities have potentially larger environmental impacts, 
stabilization alternatives requiring longer periods of time to complete 
are estimated to have relatively higher impacts than alternatives 
requiring less time to complete.
    Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives would result in 
low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts would continue for an 
indefinite period of time. Stabilization alternatives would be expected 
to result in slightly higher annual environmental impacts than ``No 
Action'' in the near-term, but would result in lower environmental 
impacts upon completion of the stabilization action. Under Continuing 
Storage alternatives, although chemicals would be added to existing 
solutions in order to maintain concentrations and chemistry within 
established parameters, no actions would be taken to chemically or 
physically stabilize the storage conditions. All of the stabilization 
alternatives, upon completion of the actions required, would reduce the 
potential for accidents and associated consequences. Several of the 
stabilization alternatives would involve a short-term increase in the 
risks from accidents until the required actions are completed.
    Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous 
liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable 
federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS 
facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste, 
mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by 
implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing 
waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are 
within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities 
for storage, treatment or disposal.
    SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear 
materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential 
impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the 
environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls 
are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the 
facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified; 
therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

IV. Other Factors

    In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing 
the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in making the 
decisions announced in this supplemental ROD. These other factors 
included: (1) The need to construct and operate modified or new 
facilities (e.g., a vitrification facility) and the reliability of 
older facilities, (2) nonproliferation concerns, involving potential 
impacts to United States nonproliferation policy as affected by both 
the operation of certain facilities and the attractiveness of the 
managed nuclear materials for potential weapons use, (3) implementation 
schedules, (4) technology availability, (5) labor availability and core 
competency, (6) level of custodial care for the continued safe 
management of the nuclear materials, (7) cost and budget 
considerations, (8) technical uncertainty (e.g., radiation and 
chemically induced changes to solution chemistry, criticality concerns 
for undeveloped processes), and (9) comments received during the 
scoping period for the EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials, and comments received on the Draft and Final EISs.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

    As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in 
lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative 
was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental 
factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an alternative might be expected 
to result in lower releases of hazardous pollutants to air or water 
than other alternatives, but might generate slightly higher amounts of 
radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the environmental impacts estimated for 
the alternatives evaluated for the neptunium-237 solution and targets, 
and plutonium-239 solutions, and identified the following as the 
environmentally preferable alternative for each material. The health 
and environmental effects from any of the alternatives are all low and 
well within regulatory limits.

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable 
alternative for stabilizing solutions and targets containing neptunium. 
Although vitrification in F-Canyon is estimated to result in slightly 
higher radiological doses to the SRS workers, it is estimated to result 
in the lowest potential radiological doses to the offsite public. 
Similarly, although it could result in higher airborne emissions of 
hazardous pollutants than the other alternatives, the levels of liquid 
effluent emissions would be comparable to the other alternatives. 
Vitrification (F-Canyon) would generate the least amount of high level, 
transuranic and mixed waste, and would generate comparable amounts of 
low level waste to the other alternatives.

Plutonium-239--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable 
alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-
Canyon. Of the stabilization alternatives, vitrification in F-Canyon is 
estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite 
public and the SRS workers; result in comparable levels of hazardous 
pollutant emissions to the air and water; and result in the least 
amount of transuranic, mixed, and low level waste with comparable 
amounts of high level waste. However, as indicated above, this 
alternative would require additional processing of the vitrified 
plutonium to prepare it for disposition.

[[Page 48478]]

VI. Decision

    After careful consideration of the issues and public comments 
received concerning the stabilization and management of SRS nuclear 
materials, the analyses of environmental impacts (including the ability 
of the F-Canyon facilities to withstand severe seismic events) and 
other factors, DOE has made the following decisions for the interim 
management of neptunium-237 and plutonium-239:

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

    DOE has decided to stabilize the neptunium-237 solution and 
obsolete reactor targets by vitrification in F-Canyon (the 
environmentally preferable alternative). The neptunium solution will be 
transported from H-Canyon to F-Canyon in a container meeting DOE Order 
0460.1, PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY requirements. Transport of 
the package will be subjected to management controls, such as 
restrictions on vehicle speed, route specifications, and escort 
requirements. The nine obsolete reactor targets will be transported 
from K-Reactor to F-Canyon. At F-Canyon, the targets will be dissolved 
and processed to separate the neptunium from other materials 
(principally aluminum). These other materials will be sent to the high 
level waste tanks for eventual treatment through the Saltstone and DWPF 
facilities. The existing neptunium solution and those generated from 
the obsolete reactor targets will be placed in a glass matrix, using 
vitrification equipment to be installed in F-Canyon (as announced in 
the December 12, 1995 ROD and Notice for the vitrification of the 
americium and curium solution). In addition, neptunium separated from 
the stabilization of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels (as announced in the 
February 8, 1996 supplemental ROD) will be stabilized in conjunction 
with these other solutions. The resulting stainless steel canisters 
containing the neptunium glass will be stored in the F-Canyon or a new 
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, when constructed, until DOE 
implements programmatic decisions on the future use or disposition of 
the neptunium.
    DOE selected vitrification in F-Canyon for several reasons. 
Although the SRS has an existing facility (HB-Line, Phase II) designed 
to purify and convert neptunium (and plutonium-239) to an oxide, it has 
never been operated. DOE can avoid both the costs to start up this 
portion of the HB-Line facility and the future decontamination of the 
facility by vitrifying the solution in F-Canyon. DOE could transfer the 
neptunium solution in H-Canyon to the adjacent high level waste tanks 
and eventually vitrify them in the DWPF. However, the physical form of 
glass produced by the DWPF would render any future recovery and use of 
the neptunium impractical due to cost and technical complexity.
    To maintain the neptunium in a concentrated physical form, thus 
preserving the potential for future use (for the potential production 
of plutonium-238), DOE evaluated alternatives for converting the 
neptunium to either an oxide or glass. Either form could support future 
use of the material, if required. DOE has found that the glass form 
offers significant advantages over the oxide form for future storage 
and handling. The glass matrix produced by the vitrification process 
provides some ``self-shielding'' compared to oxide. This reduces the 
radiation levels associated with the neptunium, thereby reducing 
exposure to workers. The glass matrix is also a much less dispersible 
form of radioactive material compared to the oxide in the event of a 
severe facility- related accident, such as a major fire. DOE has 
decided to dissolve and process the nine obsolete reactor targets 
because it would be advantageous to recover and consolidate the 
neptunium-237 into a single physical form for continued safe storage. 
The amount of material to be dissolved and processed is very small and 
can be done at minimal cost.
    Potential waste generation impacts are lower for the selected 
vitrification alternative than for the processing to oxide alternative. 
Potential safety and health impacts to workers and the public, and 
potential impacts to air and water resources are comparable between the 
two alternatives. Potential safety, health and environmental impacts 
are low and well within regulatory and management control limits.

Plutonium-239--Processing to Metal

    DOE has decided to stabilize the plutonium-239 solutions by 
processing them to metal in the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-
Line facilities. Plutonium-239 solutions will be transported from H-
Canyon to F-Canyon in a container meeting DOE Order 0460.1, PACKAGING 
AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY requirements. Transport of the package will 
be subjected to management controls, such as restrictions on vehicle 
speed, route specifications, and escort requirements. The plutonium-239 
solutions will undergo processing as necessary to remove impurities 
that would interfere with the conversion to metal process in FB-Line. 
The resulting stabilized plutonium metal will be packaged in accordance 
with DOE's storage standard (DOE-STD-3013-94) and stored in an existing 
vault at the SRS until a new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility is 
available. The plutonium will be stored until DOE implements long-term 
storage and disposition decisions on weapons useable forms of 
plutonium.
    As indicated above, the SRS could use a never-before operated 
portion of the HB-Line to stabilize the plutonium-239 to an oxide. 
Startup and future decontamination costs associated with this facility 
will be avoided by processing the plutonium to metal in the F-Canyon 
and FB-Line facilities. DOE evaluated transferring the plutonium-239 
solutions to the adjacent high level waste tanks for storage and 
subsequent vitrification in DWPF. This alternative would be more 
technically complex and potentially more expensive, and added 
criticality controls would be needed for tanks and facilities used for 
storage and treatment of the high level liquid waste.
    DOE also considered vitrifying the plutonium in F-Canyon (the 
environmentally preferable alternative) using the same equipment in F-
Canyon as planned for the vitrification of the americium/curium and 
neptunium solutions. This would produce a glass matrix with similar 
safe storage characteristics as described above for the vitrified 
neptunium. Demonstration and research activities are currently ongoing 
concerning vitrification of surplus plutonium pursuant to the 
Department's Materials Disposition program, but those activities focus 
primarily on stable forms of plutonium that are not in solution. 
Additional research and analytical work would be required for 
vitrification of plutonium solutions which may pose a health, safety or 
environmental concern in the next 10 years to ensure adequate 
criticality controls for the conversion process and for the safe 
storage of the product. It is expected that vitrification equipment 
modifications would be required to ensure adequate criticality control. 
Thus, while vitrification is not as viable as processing to metal in 
the near term, the decision to stabilize the plutonium to metal is 
compatible with all alternatives being considered for disposition of 
surplus weapons-useable plutonium.
    Potential waste generation impacts from processing to metal are 
comparable to the vitrification (environmentally preferable) 
alternative for high level waste, but greater for transuranic and

[[Page 48479]]

low level wastes. Potential safety and health impacts to workers and 
the public, and potential impacts to air and water resources for the 
conversion activity are comparable for the processing to metal, oxide, 
or vitrification alternatives. Potential safety, health and 
environmental impacts are low and well within regulatory and management 
control limits.
    The selected stabilization action will result in plutonium metal, a 
weapons-usable product. However, the quantity produced (including the 
metal to be produced as a result of decisions made in the December 12, 
1995 ROD and Notice) will be a small fraction of DOE's existing 
inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE believes this small amount does 
not present nuclear proliferation concerns. None of the stabilization 
alternatives would denature the plutonium in a way that would preclude 
its recovery and use in nuclear weapons manufacture. The stabilized 
plutonium will not be used for nuclear explosive purposes. In addition, 
DOE is pursuing options for placing surplus plutonium-239 under 
international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards.
    Finally, as noted above, the H-Canyon seismic analyses are expected 
to be completed in September 1996. A decision now to move neptunium and 
plutonium solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon is permissible and 
appropriate prior to the completion of the H-Canyon analyses because 
removal of the materials from H-Canyon would not involve operation of 
the HB-Line, but would result in reducing the amount of nuclear 
materials present in H-Canyon. No additional nuclear materials will be 
introduced into H-Canyon until the on-going seismic analyses are 
complete.

VII. Conclusion

    The Final EIS analyzes interim management alternatives for nuclear 
materials at the SRS. Those alternatives and the decisions associated 
with the safe management of these materials directly affect the 
operational status of the nuclear material processing facilities at the 
Site. The decisions in this supplemental ROD, as in the December 12, 
1995 ROD and Notice and February 8, 1996 Supplemental ROD, are 
structured to effect the completion of actions necessary to stabilize 
or convert nuclear materials into forms suitable for safe storage and 
prepare the facilities for potential subsequent shutdown and 
deactivation. The actions being implemented will support efficient, 
cost-effective consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials and 
will result in stabilization of the nuclear materials and alleviation 
of associated vulnerabilities within the time frame recommended by the 
DNFSB.
    The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and 
processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected 
budget constraints and with minimal additional training for involved 
personnel; rely upon proven technology; use an integrated approach 
considering a multiplicity of factors; and represent the optimum use of 
facilities to stabilize the materials in the shortest amount of time. 
Only minor modifications of the canyon facilities will be required 
(loading and unloading stations, and modification to the vitrification 
equipment to be installed for the americium/curium solution 
stabilization as announced in the December 12, 1995 ROD and Notice).
    Several years will be required to achieve stabilization of the 
nuclear materials within the scope of this and the previous RODs. 
Stabilization of the candidate nuclear materials will entail the 
operation of many portions of the chemical processing facilities and, 
consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, will preserve DOE's 
capabilities for the management and stabilization of other nuclear 
materials until programmatic decisions are made.

    Issued at Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
Alvin L. Alm,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 96-23352 Filed 9-12-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P