

[F.C.S.C. Meeting Notice No. 8-96]**Sunshine Act Meetings;
Announcement in Regard to
Commission Meetings and Hearings**

The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, pursuant to its regulations (45 CFR Part 504), and the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. 552b), hereby gives notice in regard to the scheduling of meetings and oral hearings for the transaction of Commission business and other matters specified, as follows:

Date and Time: Mon., October 7, 1996, approximately 11:30 a.m.

Subject Matter: Consideration of Proposed Decisions on claims of Holocaust survivors against Germany.

Status: Closed.

Subject matter not disposed of at the scheduled meeting may be carried over to the agenda of the following meeting.

All meetings are held at the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E Street, NW., Washington, DC. Requests for information, or advance notices of intention to observe an open meeting, may be directed to: Administrative Officer, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 600 E Street, NW., Room 6029, Washington, DC 20579. Telephone: (202) 616-6988.

Dated at Washington, DC on August 23, 1996.

Jeanette Matthews,

Administrative Assistant.

[FR Doc. 96-22082 Filed 8-26-96; 12:44 pm]

BILLING CODE 4410-01-P

**NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION**

[Docket NO. 50-255]

**Consumers Power Company; Notice of
Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating
License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-20 issued to Consumers Power Company (the licensee) for operation of the Palisades Plant located in Van Buren County, Michigan.

The proposed amendment would revise the requirements of technical specification (TS) 3.1.9.3 to permit a filled refueling cavity to serve as a back-up means of decay heat removal.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis against the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The staff's review is presented below.

1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes emulate the Standard Technical Specifications by allowing use of a filled reactor cavity as the required backup capability for decay heat removal; only an operable train of shutdown cooling is currently allowed to fulfill this function. The decay heat removal backup capability need not provide forced flow through the reactor core. This is because Action 2.a of TS 3.1.9.3 currently requires discontinuation of all operations involving a reduction in primary coolant system (PCS) boron concentration if loss of the inservice system caused flow to be reduced below that required. The proposed changes do not affect the requirements for the inservice train of shutdown cooling. Since the proposed changes do not affect the requirements for equipment that would be in operation, allowing use of an alternate decay heat removal backup capability cannot alter any plant operating conditions, equipment settings, or capabilities or operating equipment. Therefore, operating the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated?

As discussed in the response to question 1, above, the proposed changes would not affect the plant configuration or the capability of equipment required to be in operation. The changes simply allow substitution of one means of

decay heat removal for another as a backup capability. The equipment used as a backup capability is only actuated after occurrence of an event that disables the decay heat removal equipment that is required to be in operation. Because the backup capability for decay heat removal, either as currently required or as proposed, would not be placed into service until after an event had occurred, operating the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The objectives of TS 3.1.9.3 are to ensure that the PCS is mixed by forced flow to avoid the potential for development of pockets of unborated or diluted coolant, and to ensure that sufficient decay heat removal capability is available to withstand loss of the operating decay heat removal system due to equipment failure or personnel error. These objectives are fulfilled by requiring (1) forced flow through the reactor core, (2) one operable system capable of decay heat removal to be in operation, and (3) another operable system capable of decay heat removal to provide a backup capability.

The proposed changes allow use of a filled refueling cavity as the required backup capability for decay heat removal; only an operable train of shutdown cooling is currently allowed to fulfill this function. The proposed changes do not affect the requirements for flow through the reactor core or the inservice train of shutdown cooling. The decay heat removal backup capability need not provide forced flow through the reactor core. This is because Action 2.a of TS 3.1.9.3 requires discontinuation of all operations involving a reduction in PCS boron concentration if loss of the inservice system caused flow to be reduced below that required. Since the proposed changes only allow substitution of an alternate method of meeting the third objective for that currently specified, all objectives of the specification are still met. Therefore, operating the facility in accordance with the proposed changes would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received