[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 166 (Monday, August 26, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 43657-43668]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-21682]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Army

32 CFR Part 505


Privacy Program

AGENCY: Department of the Army, DOD.
ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of the Army is revising its Privacy Act 
exemption regulations to correct minor administrative errors. No 
additions to exemption rules are being made at this time.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 26, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Pat Turner at (520) 538-6856 or 
DSN 879-6856.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Executive Order 12866. The Director, 
Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense has 
determined that this Privacy Act rule for the Department of Defense 
does not constitute 'significant regulatory action'. Analysis of the 
rule indicates that it does not have an annual effect on the economy of 
$100 million or more; does not create a serious inconsistency or 
otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; 
does not materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients 
thereof; does not raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of 
legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth 
in Executive Order 12866 (1993).

Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980. The Director, Administration and 
Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense certifies that this 
Privacy Act rule for the Department of Defense does not have 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
because it is concerned only with the administration of Privacy Act 
systems of records within the Department of Defense.

Paperwork Reduction Act. The Director, Administration and Management, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense certifies that this Privacy Act rule 
for the Department of Defense imposes no information requirements 
beyond the Department of Defense and that the information collected 
within the Department of Defense is necessary and consistent with 5 
U.S.C. 552a, known as the Privacy Act of 1974.


List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 505

    Privacy.

    Accordingly, 32 CFR part 505 is amended as follows:

    1. The authority citation for 32 CFR part 505 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: Pub. L. 93-579, 88 Stat 1896 (5 U.S.C.552a).

    2. Section 505.5 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 505.5  Exemptions.

    (a) Exempting systems of records. The Secretary of the Army may 
exempt Army systems of records from certain requirements of the Privacy 
Act. There are two kinds of exemptions: General and specific. The 
general exemption relieves systems of records from most requirements of 
the Act; the specific exemptions from only a few. See appendix C to 
this part.
    (b) General exemptions. Only Army activities actually engaged in 
the enforcement of criminal laws as their primary function may claim 
the general exemption. To qualify for this exemption, a system must 
consist of:
    (1) Information compiled to identify individual criminals and 
alleged criminals, which consists only of identifying data and arrest 
records; type and disposition of charges; sentencing, confinement, and 
release records; and parole and probation status;
    (2) Information compiled for the purpose of criminal investigation 
including efforts to prevent, reduce, or control crime and reports of 
informants and investigators associated with an identifiable 
individual; or
    (3) Reports identifiable to an individual, compile at any stage of 
the process of enforcement of the criminal laws, from arrest or 
indictment through release from supervision.
    (c) Specific exemptions. The Secretary of the Army has exempted all 
properly classified information and a few systems of records that have 
the following kinds of information, from certain parts of the Privacy 
Act. The Privacy Act exemption cite appears in parentheses after each 
category.
    (1) Classified information in every Army system of records. This 
exemption is not limited to the systems listed in Sec. 505.5(d). Before 
denying as individual access to classified information, the Access and 
Amendment Refusal Authority must make sure that it was properly 
classified under the standards of Executive Orders 11652, 12065, or 
12958 and that it must remain so in the interest of national defense of 
foreign policy. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1)).
    (2) Investigatory data for law enforcement purposes (other than 
that claimed under the general exemption). However, if this information 
has been used to deny someone a right, privilege or benefit to which 
the individual is entitled by Federal law, it must be released, unless 
doing so would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (5 U.S.C. 
552a(k)(2)).
    (3) Records maintained in connection with providing protective 
services to the President of the United States or other individuals 
protected pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C., section 3056. (5 U.S.C. 
552a(k)(3)).
    (4) Statistical data required by statute and used only for 
statistical purposes and not to make decisions on the rights, benefits, 
or entitlements of individuals, except for census records which may be 
disclosed under Title 13 U.S.C., section 8. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(4)).
    (5) Data compiled to determine suitability, eligibility, or 
qualifications for Federal service, Federal contracts, or access to 
classified information. This information may be withheld only to the 
extent that disclosure would reveal the identify of a confidential 
source. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5)).
    (6) Testing material used to determine if a person is qualified for 
appointment or promotion in the Federal service. This information may 
be withheld only if disclosure would compromise the objectivity or 
fairness of the examination process. (5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6)).
    (7) Information to determine promotion potential in the Armed 
Forces. Information may be withheld, but only to the extent that 
disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source. (5 
U.S.C. 552a(k)(7)).
    (d) Procedures. When a system manager seeks an exemption for a 
system of records, the following information will be furnished to the 
Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications 
and Computers, Washington, DC 20310-0107; applicable system notice, 
exemptions sought, and justification. After appropriate staffing and 
approval by the Secretary of the Army, a proposed rule will be 
published in the Federal Register, followed, by a final rule 60 days 
later. No exemption may be invoked until these steps have been 
completed.
    (e) Exempt Army records. The following records may be exempt from 
certain parts of the Privacy Act:
    (1) A0020-1aSAIG.

[[Page 43658]]

    (i) System name: Inspector General Investigative Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) or (k)(5) may be exempt from 
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and 
(f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: Selected portions and/or records in this system are 
compiled for the purposes of enforcing civil, criminal, or military 
law, including executive orders or regulations validly adopted pursuant 
to law. Granting individuals access to information collected and 
maintained in these files could interfere with enforcement proceedings; 
deprive a person of a right to fair trial or an impartial adjudication 
or be prejudicial to the conduct of administrative action affecting 
rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals, constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; disclose the identity of a 
confidential source; disclose nonroutine investigative techniques and 
procedures, or endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement 
personnel; violate statutes which authorize or require certain 
information to be withheld from the public such as: Trade or financial 
information, technical data, National Security Agency information, or 
information relating to inventions. Exemption from access necessarily 
includes exemption from the other requirements.

    (2) A0020-1bSAIG.
    (i) System name: Inspector General Action Request/Assistance Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) or (k)(5) may be exempt from 
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and 
(f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: Selected portions and/or records in this system are 
compiled for the purposes of enforcing civil, criminal, or military 
law, including Executive Orders or regulations validly adopted pursuant 
to law. Granting individuals access to information collected and 
maintained in these files could interfere with enforcement proceedings; 
deprive a person of a right to fair trail or an impartial ajudication 
or be prejudicial to the conduct of administrative action affecting 
rights, benefits, or privileges of individuals; constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personnel privacy; disclose the identity of a 
confidential source; disclose nonroutine investigative techniques and 
procedures, or endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement 
personnel; violate statutes which authorize or require certain 
information, to be withheld from the public such as: Trade or financial 
information, technical data, National Security Agency information, or 
information relating to inventions. Exemption from access necessarily 
includes exemption from the other requirements.

    (3)A0025-55SAIS.
    (i) System name: Request for Information Files.
    (ii) Exemption: (A) All portions of this system of records which 
fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g).
    (B) All portions of the system maintained by offices of Initial 
Denying Authorities which do not have a law enforcement mission and 
which fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) through (k)(7) may 
be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), and (k)(1) through (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: This system of records is maintained solely for the 
purpose of administering the Freedom of Information Act and processing 
routine requests for information. To insure an accurate and complete 
file on each case, it is sometimes necessary to include copies of 
records which have been the subject of a Freedom of Information Act 
request. This situation applies principally to cases in which an 
individual has been denied access and/or amendment of personal records 
under an exemption authorized by 5 U.S.C. 552. The same justification 
for the original denial would apply to denial of access to copies 
maintained in the Freedom of Information Act file. It should be 
emphasized that the majority of records in this system are available on 
request to the individual and that all records are used solely to 
process requests. This file is not used to make any other 
determinations on the rights, benefits or privileges of individuals.

    (4)A0027-1DAJA.
    (i) System name: General Legal Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(5), (k)(6), and 
(k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), 
(e)(1), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(5), (k)(6), and 
(k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: Various records from other exempted systems of 
records are sometimes submitted for legal review or other action. A 
copy of such records may be permanently incorporated into the General 
Legal Files system of records as evidence of the facts upon which a 
legal opinion or review was based. Exemption of the General Legal Files 
system of records is necessary in order to ensure that such records 
continue to receive the same protection afforded them by exemptions 
granted to the systems of records in which they were originally filed.

    (5) A0027-10aDAJA.
    (i) System name: Prosecutorial Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to 
information collected and maintained by this component relating to the 
enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the 
orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could 
result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and 
disposition of charges; and jeopardize the safety and well-being of 
informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel 
and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal 
and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources and methods 
used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy 
of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption 
from access necessarily includes exemption from other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of 
disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that 
he is under investigation and provide him with significant information 
concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious 
impediment to law enforcement investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be 
collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject 
individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the 
investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law 
enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious

[[Page 43659]]

impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the existence 
of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of witnesses or 
confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (6) A0027-10bDAJA.
    (i) System name: Courts-Martial Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), (d)(4), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(H), 
and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: Courts-martial files are exempt because a large body 
of existing criminal law governs trials by courts-martial to the 
exclusion of the Privacy Act. The Congress recognized the judicial 
nature of courts-martial proceedings and exempt them from the 
Administrative Procedures Act by specifically excluding them from the 
definition of the term `agency' (Title 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(f)). Substantive 
and procedural law applicable in trials by court-martial is set forth 
in the Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Manual 
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised edition), and the 
decisions of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and Courts of Military 
Review. The right of the accused not to be compelled to be a witness 
against himself and the need to obtain accurate and reliable 
information with regard to criminal misconduct necessitate the 
collection of information from sources other than the individual 
accused. Advising the accused or any other witness of the authority for 
collection of the information, the purpose for which it is to be used, 
whether disclosure is voluntary or mandatory, and the effects on the 
individual of not providing the information would unnecesarily disrupt 
and confuse court-martial preceedings. It is the responsibility of the 
investigating officer or military judge to determine what information 
will be considered as evidence. In making the determination, the 
individual's rights are weighed against the accused's right to fair 
trial. The determination is final for the moment and the witness' 
failure to comply with the decision would delay the proceeding and may 
result in prosecution of the witness for wrongful refusal to testify. 
In a trial by court-martial, the accused has a unique opportunity to 
assure that the record is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete as 
it is made. He has the right to be present and the trial, to be 
represented by counsel at general and special courts-martial, and to 
consult with counsel in summary courts-martial, to review and challenge 
all information before it is introduced into evidence, to cross-examine 
all witnesses against him, to present evidence in his behalf and in 
general and special courts-martial, to review and comment upon the 
record for trial before it is authenticated. Procedures for correction 
of the record and controlled by paragraphs 82, 86, and 95, Manual for 
Courts-Martial, 1969 (Revised edition). After completion of appellate 
review, the record may not be amended. Article 76 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 876) provides that the proceedings, 
findings and sentences of courts-martial as approved, reviewed or 
affirmed are final and conclusive and binding upon all departments, 
courts, agencies, and of the United States subject only to action upon 
a petition for new trial (Article 73, UCMJ), action by the Secretary 
concerned (Article 74, UCMJ), and the authority of the President.

    (7) A0190-5DAMO.
    (i) System name: Vehicle Registration System (VRS).
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to 
information collected and maintained by this component relating to the 
enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the 
orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could 
result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and 
disposition of charges; and jeopardize the safety and well-being of 
informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel 
and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal 
and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources and methods 
used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy 
of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption 
from access necessarily includes exemption from other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of 
disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that 
he is under investigation and provide him with significant information 
concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious 
impediment to law enforcement investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be 
collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject 
individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the 
investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law 
enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the 
existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of 
witnesses or confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (8) A0190-9DAMO.
    (i) System name: Absentee Case Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to 
information collected and maintained by this component relating to the 
enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the 
orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could 
result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and 
disposition of charges; and jeopardize the safety and well-being of 
informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel 
and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal 
and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources and methods 
used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy 
of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption 
from access necessarily includes exemption from other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of 
disclosure

[[Page 43660]]

would place the subject of an investigation on notice that he is under 
investigation and provide him with significant information concerning 
the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious impediment 
to law enforcement investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be 
collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject 
individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the 
investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law 
enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the 
existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of 
witnesses or confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (9) A0190-14DAMO.
    (i) System name: Registration and Permit Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: From subsection (c)(3) because the release of 
accounting of disclosures would place the subject of an investigation 
on notice that he or she is under investigation and provide him or her 
with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation 
thus resulting in a serious impediment to criminal law enforcement 
investigations, activities or the compromise of properly classified 
material.

    (10) A0190-30DAMO.
    (i) System name: Military Police Investigator Certification Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), and (k)(7) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), 
and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5) and (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: From subsections (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) 
because disclosure of portions of the information in this system of 
records would seriously impair selection and management of these 
uniquely functioning individuals; hamper the inclusion of comments, 
reports and evaluations concerning the performance, qualifications, 
character, actions, and propensities of the agency; and prematurely 
compromise investigations which either concern the conduct of the agent 
himself or herself, or investigations wherein he or she is integrally 
or only peripherally involved. Additionally, the exemption from access 
necessarily includes exemptions from the amendment and the agency 
procedures that would otherwise be required to process these types of 
requests.

    (11) A0190-40DAMO.
    (i) System name: Serious Incident Reporting Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to 
information collected and maintained by this component relating to the 
enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the 
orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could 
result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and 
disposition of charges, and jeopardize the safety and well-being of 
informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel 
and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal 
and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources, and methods 
used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy 
of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption 
from access necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because of the release of accounting of 
disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that 
he is under investigation and provide him with significant information 
concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious 
impediment to law enforcement investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, they require that information be collected 
to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would 
alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation 
and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the 
existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of 
witnesses or confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and be revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (12) A0190-45DAMO
    (i) System name: Offense Reporting System (ORS).
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to 
information collected and maintained by this component relating to the 
enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the 
orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could 
result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and 
disposition of charges, and jeopardize the safety and well-being of 
informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel 
and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal 
and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources, and methods 
used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy 
of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption 
from access necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because of the release of accounting of 
disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that 
he is under investigation and provide him with significant information 
concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious 
impediment to law enforcement investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, they require that information be collected 
to the greatest extent practicable from the subject

[[Page 43661]]

individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the 
investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law 
enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the 
existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of 
witnesses or confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and be revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (13)A0190-47DAMO.
    (i) System name: Correctional Reporting System (CRS).
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: Granting individuals access to information collected 
and maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of 
criminal laws could interfere with the orderly administration of 
justice. Disclosure of this information could jeopardize the safety and 
well- being of information sources, correctional supervisors and other 
confinement facility administrators. Disclosure of the information 
could also result in the invasion of privacy of persons who provide 
information used in developing individual treatment programs. Further, 
disclosure could result in a deterioration of a prisoner's self-image 
and adversely affect meaningful relationships between a prisoner and 
his counselor or supervisor. These factors are, or course, essential to 
the rehabilitative process. Exemption from the remaining provisions is 
predicated upon the exemption from disclosure or upon the need for 
proper functioning of correctional programs.

    (14) A0195-2aUSACIDC.
    (i) System name: Source Register.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because release of 
accounting of disclosures would provide the informant with significant 
information concerning the nature of a particular investigation, the 
internal methods and techniques involved in criminal investigation, and 
the investigative agencies (state, local or foreign) involved in a 
particular case resulting in a serious compromise of the criminal law 
enforcement processes.
    (B) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f), and (g) 
because disclosure of portions of the information in this system of 
records would seriously impair the prudent and efficient handling of 
these uniquely functioning individuals; hamper the inclusion of 
comments and evaluations concerning the performance qualification, 
character, identity, and propensities of the informant; and prematurely 
compromise criminal investigations which either concern the conduct of 
the informant himself or investigations wherein he/she is intergrally 
or only peripherally involved. Additionally, the exemption from access 
necessarily includes exemption from amendment, certain agency 
requirements relating to access and amendment of records and civil 
liability predicated upon agency compliance with specific provisions of 
the Privacy Act.
    (C) From subsection (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) are also 
necessary to protect the security of information properly classified in 
the interest of national defense and foreign policy.
    (D) From subsection (e)(1) because the nature of the criminal 
investigative function creates unique problems in prescribing what 
information concerning informants is relevant or necessary. Due to 
close liaison and existing relationships with other Federal, state, 
local and foreign law enforcement agencies, information about 
informants may be received which may relate to a case then under the 
investigative jurisdiction of another Government agency but it is 
necessary to maintain this information in order to provide leads for 
appropriate law enforcement purposes and to establish patterns of 
activity which may relate to the jurisdiction of both the USACIDC and 
other agencies. Additionally, the failure to maintain all known 
information about informants could affect the effective utilization of 
the individual and substantially increase the operational hazards 
incumbent in the employment of an informant in very compromising and 
sensitive situations.
    (E) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information from the 
information would potentially thwart both the crminal investigtive 
process and the required management control over these individuals by 
appraising the informant of investigations or management actions 
concerning his involvement in criminal activity or with USACIDC 
personnel.
    (F) From subsection (e)(3) because supplying an informant with a 
form containing the information specified could result in the 
compromise of an investigation, tend to inhibit the cooperation of the 
informant, and render ineffectual investigative techniques and methods 
utilized by USACIDC in the performance of its criminal law enforcement 
duties.
    (G) From subsection (e)(5) because this requirement would unduly 
hamper the criminal investigative process due to type of records 
maintained an necessity for rapid information retrieval and 
dissemination. Also, in the collection of information about informants, 
it is impossible to determine what information is then accurate, 
relevant, timely and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly 
irrevelant or untimely information may acquire new significance as 
further investigation or contact brings new details to light. In the 
criminal investigative process, accuracy and relevance of information 
concerning informants can only be determined in a court of law. The 
restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of 
trained investigators to exercise their judgment in reporting 
information relating to informant's actions and would impede the 
development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law 
enforcement.
    (H) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this 
provision could present a serious impediment to criminal law 
enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, and the 
existence of confidential investigations.

    (15)A0195-2bUSACIDC.
    (i) System name: Criminal Investigation and Crime Laboratory Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of 
accounting of disclosures would place the subject of an investigation 
on notice that he is under investigation and provide him with 
significant information concerning coordinated investigative effort and 
techniques and the nature of the investigation, resulting in a serious

[[Page 43662]]

impediment to criminal law enforcement activities or the compromise of 
properly classified material.
    (B) From subsections (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f), and 
(g) because access might compromise on-going investigations, reveal 
classified information, investigatory techniques or the identity of 
confidential informants, or invade the privacy of persons who provide 
information in connection with a particular investigation. The 
exemption from access necessarily includes exemption from amendment, 
certain agency requirements relating to access and amendment of 
records, and civil liability predicated upon agency compliance with 
those specific provisions of the Privacy Act. The exemption from access 
necessarily includes exemption from other requirements.
    (C)From subsection (e)(1) because the nature of the investigative 
function creates unique problems in prescribed specific perimeters in a 
particular case as to what information is relevant or necessary. Also, 
due to close liaisons and working relationships with other Federal, 
state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies, information may be 
received which may relate to a case then under the investigative 
jurisdiction of another Government agency but it is necessary to 
maintain this information in order to provide leads for appropriate law 
enforcement purposes and to establish patterns of activity which may 
relate to the jurisdiction of both the USACIDC and other agencies.
    (D) From subsection (e)(2) because collecting information from the 
subject of criminal investigations would thwart the investigative 
process by placing the subject of the investigation on notice thereof.
    (E) From subsection (e)(3) because supplying an individual with a 
form containing the information specified could result in the 
compromise of an investigation, tend to inhibit the cooperation of the 
individual queried, and render ineffectual investigation techniques and 
methods utilized by USACIDC in the performance of their criminal law 
enforcement duties.
    (F) From subsection (e)(5) because this requirment would unduly 
hamper the criminal investigative process due to the great volume of 
records maintained and the necessity for rapid information retrieval 
and dissemination. Also, in the collection of information for law 
enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine what information is 
then accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of 
time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new 
significance as further investigation brings new details to light. In 
the criminal investigation process, accuracy and relevance of 
information can only be determine in a court of law. The restrictions 
imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the ability of trained 
investigators to exercise their judgment in reporting on investigations 
and impede the development of criminal intelligence necessary for 
effective law enforcement.
    (G) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this 
provision could present a serious impediment to criminal law 
enforcement by revealing investigative techniques, procedures, and the 
existence of confidential investigations.

    @(16) A0195-6USACIDC.
    (i) System name: Criminal Investigation Accreditation and Polygraph 
Examiner Evaluation Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), or (k)(7) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2), (k)(5), and (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsections (d), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and 
(f) because disclosure of portions of the information in this system of 
records would seriously impair the selection and management of these 
uniquely functioning individuals; hamper the inclusion of comments, 
reports and evaluations concerning the performance, qualifications, 
character, action and propensities of the agent; and prematurely 
compromise investigations with either concern the conduct of the agent 
himself or investigations wherein he or she is integrally or only 
peripherally involved. Additionally, the exemption from access 
necessarily includes exemptions from the amendment and the agency 
procedures which would otherwise be required to process these types of 
requests.
    (B) From subsection (e)(1) because the failure to maintain all 
known information about agents could affect the effective utilization 
of the individual and substantially increase the operational hazards 
incumbent in the employment of agents in very compromising and 
sensitive situations.

    (17) A0210-7DAMO.
    (i) System name: Expelled or Barred Person Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(4), (d), (e)(4)(G), 
(e)(4)(H), (f) and (g) because granting individuals access to 
information collected and maintained by this component relating to the 
enforcement of laws could interfere with proper investigations and the 
orderly administration of justice. Disclosure of this information could 
result in the concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and 
disposition of charges, and jeopardize the safety and well-being of 
informants, witnesses and their families, and law enforcement personnel 
and their families. Disclosure of this information could also reveal 
and render ineffectual investigative techniques, sources, and methods 
used by this component, and could result in the invasion of the privacy 
of individuals only incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption 
from access necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because of the release of accounting of 
disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that 
he is under investigation and provide him with significant information 
concerning the nature of the investigation, thus resulting in a serious 
impediment to law enforcement investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, they require that information be collected 
to the greatest extent practicable from the subject individual would 
alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the investigation 
and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the 
existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of 
witnesses or confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and be revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (18) A0340JDMSS.
    (i) System name: HDQA Correspondence and Control/Central File 
System.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k) may be exempt from the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C.

[[Page 43663]]

552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) through (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: Documents are generated by other elements of the Army 
or are received from other agencies and individuals. Because of the 
broad scope of the contents of this system and since the introduction 
of documents is largely unregulatable, specific portions or documents 
that may require an exemption cannot be predetermined. Therefore, and 
to the extent that such material is received and maintained, selected 
individual documents may be exempted from disclosure under any of the 
provisions of sections (k)(1) through (k)(7) of 5 U.S.C. 552a.

    (19) A0340-21SAIS.
    (i) System name: Privacy Case Files.
    (ii) Exemption: (A) All portions of this system of records which 
fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (B) All portions of this system maintained by the DA Privacy Review 
Board and those Access and Amendment Refusal Authorities which do not 
have a law enforcement mission and which fall within the scope of 5 
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) through (k)(7) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3)(d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: This system of records is maintained solely for the 
purpose of administering the Privacy Act of 1974. To insure accurate 
and complete file on each case, it is sometimes necessary to include 
copies of records which have been the subject of a Privacy Act request. 
This situation applies principally to cases in which an individual has 
been denied access and/or amendment of personal records under an 
exemption authorized by 5 U.S.C. 552a. The same justification for the 
original denial would apply to a denial of access and/or amendment of 
copies maintained in the Privacy Act Case File. It should be emphasized 
that the majority of records in this system are available on request to 
the individual and that all records are used solely to administer 
Privacy Act requests. This file is not used to make any other 
determination on the rights, benefits or privileges of individuals.

    (20) A0350-37TRADOC.
    (i) System name: Skill Qualification Test (SQT).
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system which fall within the 
scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) may be exempt from the provisions of 5 
U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6).
    (iv) Reasons: Exemption is needed for the portion of records which 
pertains to individual item response on tests, to preclude compromise 
of scoring keys.

    (21) A0351-12DAPE.
    (i) System name: Applicants/Students, U.S. Military Academy Prep 
School.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) and (k)(7) may be exempt from 
the following provision of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) and (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of 
evaluation material on individuals, furnished to the US Military 
Academy Preparatory School under an express promise of confidentiality, 
be maintained to ensure the candid presentation of information 
necessary in determinations involving admission to or retention at the 
United States Military Academy and suitability for commissioned 
military service.

    (22) A0351-17aUSMA.
    (i) System name: U.S. Military Academy Candidate Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), (k)(6), or (k)(7) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), (k)(6) and (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (d) because access might reveal 
investigatory and testing techniques. The exemption from access 
necessarily includes exemption from amendment, certain agency 
requirements relating to access and amendment of records, and civil 
liability predicated upon agency compliance with those specific 
provisions of the Privacy Act.
    (B) Exemption is necessary to protect the identity of individuals 
who furnished information to the United States Military Academy which 
is used in determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for 
military service and which was provided under an express promise of 
confidentiality.
    (C) Exemption is needed for the portion of records compiled within 
the Academy which pertain to testing or examination material used to 
rate individual qualifications, the disclosure of which would 
compromise the objectivity or fairness of the testing or examination 
process.
    (D) Exemption is required for evaluation material used by the 
Academy in determining potential for promotion in the Armed Services, 
to protect the identity of a source who furnished information to the 
Academy under an express promise of confidentiality.

    (23) A0351-17bUSMA.
    (i) System name: U.S. Military Academy Personnel Cadet Records.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) or (k)(7) may be exempt from 
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) and (k)(7).
    (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of 
evaluation and investigatory material on candidates, cadets, and 
graduates, furnished to the United States Military Academy under 
promise of confidentiality be maintained to insure the candid 
presentation of information necessary in determinations involving 
admissions to the Military Academy and suitability for commissioned 
service and future promotion.

    (24) A0380-13DAMO.
    (i) System name: Local Criminal Intelligence Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(2), (e)(3), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(8), (f), and (g).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (f), and 
(g) because granting individuals access to information collected and 
maintained by this component relating to the enforcement of laws could 
interfere with proper investigations and the orderly administration of 
justice. Disclosure of this information could result in the 
concealment, alteration or destruction of evidence, the identification 
of offenders or alleged offenders, nature and disposition of charges; 
and jeopardize the safety and well-being of informants, witnesses and 
their families, and law enforcement personnel and their families. 
Disclosure of this information could also reveal and render ineffectual 
investigative techniques, sources and methods used by this component 
and could result in the invasion of the privacy of individuals only 
incidentally related to an investigation. Exemption from access 
necessarily includes exemption from the other requirements.
    (B) From subsection (c)(3) because the release of accounting of 
disclosure would place the subject of an investigation on notice that 
he is under investigation and provide him with

[[Page 43664]]

significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, 
thus resulting in a serious impediment to law enforcement 
investigations.
    (C) From subsection (e)(2) because, in a criminal or other law 
enforcement investigation, the requirement that information be 
collected to the greatest extent practicable from the subject 
individual would alert the subject as to the nature or existence of the 
investigation and thereby present a serious impediment to effective law 
enforcement.
    (D) From subsection (e)(3) because compliance would constitute a 
serious impediment to law enforcement in that it could compromise the 
existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of 
witnesses or confidential informants.
    (E) From subsection (e)(8) because compliance with this provision 
would provide an impediment to law enforcement by interfering with the 
ability to issue warrants or subpoenas and by revealing investigative 
techniques, procedures or evidence.

    (25) A0380-67DAMI.
    (i) System name: Personnel Security Clearance Information Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), 
(e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: The material contained in this record system contains 
data concerning sensitive sources and operational methods whose 
dissemination must be strictly controlled because of national security 
intelligence considerations. Disclosure of documents or the disclosure 
accounting record may compromise the effectiveness of the operation, 
and negate specialized techniques used to support intelligence or 
criminal investigative programs, or otherwise interfere with the 
orderly conduct of intelligence operations or criminal investigations.

    (26) A0381-20bDAMI.
    (i) System name: Counterintelligence/Security Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through 
(d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the 
agencies to which information from this system has been released could 
inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential 
criminal violation, or intelligence operation or investigation; or the 
existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope 
of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of 
the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence 
personnel and could provide information to enable the subject to avoid 
detection or apprehension. Granting access to such information could 
seriously impede or compromise an investigation; endanger the physical 
safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel, and 
their families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the 
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose 
investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, granting access 
to such information could disclose classified and sensitive sources, 
information, and operational methods and could constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others.
    (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records in this system of records could inform the subject of a 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or 
investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained as to his/her activities; or of the identity of confidential 
sources, witnesses and intelligence personnel and could provide 
information to enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. 
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or 
compromise an operation or investigation; endanger the physical safety 
of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence personnel and their 
families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the 
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony and disclose 
investigative techniques and procedures. In addition, the agency is 
required to protect the confidentiality of sources who furnished 
information to the Government under an expressed promise of 
confidentiality or, prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied 
promise that the identity of the source would be held in confidence. 
This confidentiality is needed to maintain the Government's continued 
access to information from persons who otherwise might refuse to give 
it.
    (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early 
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are 
often questions of judgement and timing, an it is only after the 
information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such 
information can be established. In addition, during the course of the 
investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information 
which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative 
jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be 
segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or 
operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning 
violations of laws other than those which are within the scope of his/
her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations 
and law enforcement, military intelligence agents should retain 
information, since it an aid in establishing patterns of criminal or 
intelligence activity and provide valuable leads for other law 
enforcement or intelligence agencies.
    (D) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this 
system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, 
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to 
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections 
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt 
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has 
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest 
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual 
to have access to all or a portion os his/her records in this system of 
records.
    (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the 
privacy and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and 
to avoid the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures. 
Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published such a notice in broad, 
generic terms.

    (27) A0381-100aDAMI.
    (i) System name: Intelligence/Counterintelligence Source Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through 
(d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).

[[Page 43665]]

    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the 
agencies to which information from this system has been released could 
reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or 
investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation. 
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or 
compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety 
of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses, 
intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper 
influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the 
fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures.
    (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or 
investigation; or the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and 
intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could 
seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger 
the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence 
personnel and their families; lead to the improper influencing of 
witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony; 
disclose investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of 
those individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families; 
compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support 
intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly 
conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and 
investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the 
confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government 
under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 
27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source 
would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain 
the Government's continued access to information from persons who 
otherwise might refuse to give it.
    (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early 
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are 
often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the 
information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such 
information can be established. In addition, during the course of the 
investigation or operation, the investigator or operative may obtain 
information which is incidental to the main purpose of the 
investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot 
readily be segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the 
investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information 
concerning violations of law other than those which are within the 
scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of effective 
intelligence operations and law enforcement, military intelligence 
agents should retain information, since it is an aid in establishing 
patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and provides valuable 
leads for other law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
    (D) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this 
system of records is being exempt from subsection (d) of the Act 
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to 
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections 
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt 
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has 
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest 
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of 
staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual 
to have access to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of 
records.
    (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of sources of information, to protect the privacy 
and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential 
sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized 
techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this 
requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published 
such a notice in broad generic terms.

    (28) A0381-100bDAMI
    (i) System name: Technical Surveillance Index.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through 
(d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2) or (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the 
identities of agencies to which information from this system has been 
released could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or intelligence operation; of the 
existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope 
of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of 
the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence or 
law enforcement personnel and could provide information to enable the 
subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such 
information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; 
endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, 
intelligence or law enforcement personnel, and their families; lead to 
the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or 
the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could 
disclose classified and sensitive sources and operational methods and 
could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of 
others.
    (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records in this system of records could inform the subject of an 
investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation; of the 
existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the 
information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities; or of the 
identity of confidential sources, witnesses and intelligence or law 
enforcement personnel and could provide information to enable the 
subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such 
information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; 
endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, 
intelligence or law enforcement personnel and their families; lead to 
the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or 
the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could 
disclose classified, sensitive sources and operational methods and 
could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of 
others.
    (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early 
stages of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are 
often questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after

[[Page 43666]]

the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such 
information can be established. In addition, during the course of the 
investigation or operation, the investigator may obtain information 
which is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative 
jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be 
segregated. Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or 
operation, the investigator may obtain information concerning violation 
of laws other than those which are within the scope of his/her 
jurisdiction. In the interest of effective intelligence operations and 
law enforcement, criminal law enforcement investigators and military 
intelligence agents should retain this information, since it can aid in 
establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and can 
provide valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence 
agencies.
    (D) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) because this system of 
records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, concerning 
access to records, these requirements are inapplicable to the extent 
that this system of records will be exempt from subsections (d)(1) 
through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt from 
these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the 
U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command have published information 
concerning its notification, access, and contest procedures for their 
respective areas because, under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Intelligence or the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations 
Command could decide it is appropriate for an individual to have access 
to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of records.
    (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the 
privacy and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and 
to avoid the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures. 
Although the system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the U.S. Army Criminal 
Investigations Command have published such a notice in broad, generic 
terms.

    (29) A0601-141DASG.
    (i) System name: Army Medical Procurement Applicant Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of 
evaluations and investigatory material on applicants applying for 
enlistment furnished to the US Army Recruiting Command under an express 
promise of confidentiality, be maintained to insure the candid 
presentation of information necessary in determinations of enlistment 
and suitability for enlistment into the United States Army.

    (30) A0601-210aUSAREC.
    (i) System name: Enlisted Eligibility Files.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: It is imperative that the confidential nature of 
evaluations and investigatory material on applicants applying for 
enlistment furnished to the US Army Recruiting Command under an express 
promise of confidentiality, be maintained to insure the candid 
presentation of information necessary in determinations of enlistment 
and suitability for enlistment into the United States Army.

    (31) A0601-222USMEPCOM.
    (i) System name: ASVAB Student Test Scoring and Reporting System.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) may be exempt from the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6).
    (iv) Reasons: An exemption is required for those portions of the 
Skill Qualification Test system pertaining to individual item responses 
and scoring keys to prelude compromise of the test and to insure 
fairness and objectivity of the evaluation system.

    (32) A0608-18DASG.
    (i) System name: Family Advocacy Case Management.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records which fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5) may be exempt from 
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: Exemptions are needed in order to encourage persons 
having knowledge of abusive or neglectful acts toward children to 
report such information and to protect such sources from embarrassment 
or recriminations as well as to protect their right to privacy. It is 
essential that the identities of all individuals who furnish 
information under an express promise of confidentiality be protected. 
In the case of spouse abuse, it is important to protect the privacy of 
spouses seeking treatment. Additionally, granting individuals access to 
information relating to criminal and civil law enforcement could 
interfere with on-going investigations and the orderly administration 
of justice in that it could result in the concealment, alteration, 
destruction, or fabrication of information, could hamper the 
identification of offenders or alleged offenders, and the disposition 
of charges, and could jeopardize the safety and well-being of parents, 
children, and abused spouses.

    (33) A0614-115DAMI.
    (i) System name: Department of the Army Operational Support 
Activities.
    (ii) Exemption: All portions of this system of records that fall 
within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), or (k)(5) may be 
exempt from the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through 
(d)(5), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I), and (f).
    (iii) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(5).
    (iv) Reasons: (A) From subsection (c)(3)because disclosing the 
agencies to which information from this system has been released could 
reveal the subject's involvement in a sensitive intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation, or intelligence operation or 
investigation; or the existence of that investigation or operation. 
Granting access to such information could seriously impede or 
compromise an investigation or operation; endanger the physical safety 
of participants and their families, confidential sources, witnesses, 
intelligence personnel, and their families; and lead to the improper 
influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or the 
fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
procedures.
    (B) From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access 
to records could inform the subject of an intelligence or 
counterintelligence operation or investigation of an actual or 
potential criminal violation or the existence of that operation or 
investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence 
obtained, or of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses and 
intelligence personnel. Granting access to such information could 
seriously impede or compromise an operation or investigation; endanger 
the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, intelligence 
personnel and their

[[Page 43667]]

families; lead to the improper influencing of witnesses; the 
destruction of evidence or the fabrication of testimony; disclose 
investigative techniques and procedures; invade the privacy of those 
individuals involved in intelligence programs and their families; 
compromise and thus negate specialized techniques used to support 
intelligence programs; and interfere with and negate the orderly 
conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence operations and 
investigations. In addition, the agency is required to protect the 
confidentiality of sources who furnished information to the Government 
under an expressed promise of confidentiality or, prior to September 
27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity of the source 
would be held in confidence. This confidentiality is needed to maintain 
the Government's continued access to information from persons who 
otherwise might refuse to give it.
    (C) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to 
detect the relevance of specific information in the early stages of an 
investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often questions 
of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is 
evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be 
established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or 
operation, the investigator or operative may obtain information which 
is incidental to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of 
another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. 
Furthermore, during the course of the investigation or operation, the 
investigator may obtain information concerning violations of law other 
than those which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the 
interest of effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, 
military intelligence agents should retain information, since it is an 
aid in establishing patterns of criminal or intelligence activity and 
provides valuable leads for other law enforcement or intelligence 
agencies.
    (D) From subsection (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (f) because this 
system or records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, 
concerning access to records. These requirements are inapplicable to 
the extent that this system of records will be exempt from subsections 
(d)(1) through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt 
from these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has 
published information concerning its notification, access, and contest 
procedures because under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Intelligence could decide it is appropriate for an individual 
to have access to all or a portion os his/her records in this system of 
records.
    (E) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect 
the confidentiality of sources of information, to protectthe privacy 
and physical safety of participants and their families, confidential 
sources, and witnesses and to avoid the disclosure of specialized 
techniques and procedures. Although the system will be exempt from this 
requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence has published 
such a notice in broad, generic terms.

    (f) Exempt OPM records.  Three Office of Personnel Management 
systems of records apply to Army employees, except for nonappropriated 
fund employees. These systems, the specific exemptions determined to be 
necessary and proper, the records exempted, provisions of the Privacy 
Act from which exempt, and justification are set forth below:
    (1) Personnel Investigations Records (OPM/CENTRAL-9). All material 
and information in these records that meets the criteria stated in 5 
U.S.C. 552a(k)(1), (k)(2), (k)(3), (k)(5), and (k)(6) is exempt from 
the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (d). These provisions of 
the Privacy Act relate to making accountings of disclosures available 
to the data subject and access to and amendment of records. The 
specific applicability of the exemptions to this system and the reasons 
for the exemptions are as follows:
    (i) Personnel investigations may obtain from another Federal agency 
properly classified information which pertains to national defense and 
foreign policy. Application of exemption (k)(1) may be necessary to 
preclude the data subject's access to and amendment of such classified 
information under 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (ii) Personnel investigations may contain investigatory material 
compiled for law enforcement purposes other than material within the 
scope of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), e.g., investigations into the 
administration of the merit system. Application of exemption (k)(2) may 
be necessary to preclude the data subject's access to or amendment of 
such records, under 552a(c)(3) and (d).
    (iii) Personnel investigations may obtain from another Federal 
agency information that relates to providing protective services to the 
President of the United States or other individuals pursuant to section 
3056 of title 18. Application of exemption (k)(3) may be necessary to 
preclude the data subject's access to and amendment of such records 
under 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
    (iv) All information about individuals in these records that meets 
the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) is exempt from the 
requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4). These provisions of the 
Privacy Act relate to making accountings of disclosures available to 
the data subject, and access to and amendment of records. These 
exemptions are claimed because this system contains investigatory 
material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, 
eligibility, and qualifications for Federal civilian employment. To the 
extent that the disclosure of material would reveal the identity of 
source who furnished information to the Government under an express 
promise that the identity of the source would held in confidence, or, 
prior to September 27, 1975, under an implied promise that the identity 
of the source would be held in confidence, the application of exemption 
(k)(5) will be required to honor such a promise should the data subject 
request access to or amendment of the record, or access to the 
accounting of disclosures of the record.
    (v) All material and information in the records that meets the 
criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) is exempt from the requirements 
of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), relating to access to and amendment of records by 
the data subject. This exemption is claimed because portions of this 
system relate to testing or examination materials used solely to 
determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the 
Federal service. Access to or amendment of this information by the data 
subject would compromise the objectivity and fairness of the testing or 
exemption process.
    (2) Recruiting, Examining, and Placement Records (OPM/GOVT-5).
    (i) All information about individuals in these records that meets 
the criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5) is exempt from the 
requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (d). These provisions of the 
Privacy Act relate to making accountings of disclosures available to 
the data subject and access to and amendment of records. These 
exemptions are claimed because this system contains investigative 
material compiled solely for the purpose of determining the 
appropriateness of a request for approval of an objection to an 
eligible's qualification for employment in the Federal service. To the 
extent that the disclosure of such material would reveal the identity 
of a source who furnished information to the Government under an 
express promise that the identity of the source would be held in 
confidence, the application of

[[Page 43668]]

exemption (k)(5) will be required to honor such a promise should the 
data subject request access to the accounting of disclosures of the 
record.
    (ii) All material and information in these records that meets the 
criteria stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) are exempt from the requirements 
of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), relating to access to and amendment of records by 
the subject. The exemption is claimed because portions of this system 
relate to testing or examination materials used solely to determine 
individual qualification for appointment or promotion in the Federal 
service and access to or amendment of this information by the data 
subject would compromise the objectivity and fairness of the testing or 
examining process.
    (3) Personnel Research Test Validation Records (OPM/GOVT-6).  All 
material and information in these records that meets the criteria 
stated in 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(6) is exempt from the requirements of 5 
U.S.C. 552a(d), relating to access to and amendment of the records by 
the data subject. This exemption is claimed because portions of this 
system relate to testing or examination materials used solely to 
determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in the 
Federal service. Access to or amendment of this information by the data 
subject would compromise the objectivity and fairness of the testing or 
examination process.
* * * * *
    Dated: August 19, 1996.


L. M. Bynum,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 96-21682 Filed 8-23-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-F