recording participation in spiritual activities.

ROUTINE USES OF RECORDS MAINTAINED IN THE SYSTEM, INCLUDING CATEGORIES OF USERS AND THE PURPOSES OF SUCH USES:

In addition to those disclosures generally permitted under 5 U.S.C. 553a(b) of the Privacy Act, these records and information contained therein may specifically be disclosed outside DoD as a routine use pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 55a(b)(3) as follows:

The 'Blanket Routine Uses' set forth at the beginning DLA's compilation of systems of records notices *do not* apply to this system.

POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR STORING, RETRIEVING, ACCESSING, RETAINING, AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS IN THE SYSTEM:

STORAGE:

Records are stored in paper and computerized form.

RETRIEVABILITY:

Records are retrieved by name or Social Security Number.

SAFEGUARDS:

Records are stored in locked cabinets or rooms and are controlled by personnel screening and computer software.

RETENTION AND DISPOSAL:

Information is retained in the system until superseded or no longer needed.

SYSTEM MANAGER(S) AND ADDRESS:

Office of the Command Chaplain, Defense Logistics Agency, ATTN: DDAC, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 2533, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–6221.

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES:

Individuals seeking to determine whether this system of records contains information about themselves should address written inquiries to the Privacy Act Officer, HQ DLA-CAAV, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 2533, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–6221.

RECORD ACCESS PROCEDURES:

Individuals seeking access to records about themselves contained in this system of records should address written inquiries to the Privacy Act Officer, HQ DLA-CAAV, 8725 John J. Kingman Road, Suite 2533, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–6221.

CONTESTING RECORD PROCEDURES:

The DLA rules for accessing records, and for contesting contents and appealing initial agency determinations are contained in DLA Regulation 5400.21; 32 CFR part 323; or may be obtained from the system manager.

RECORD SOURCE CATEGORIES:

Information is provided by the record subject or subject's family members.

EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED FOR THE SYSTEM:

None.

[FR Doc. 96–21550 Filed 8–22–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000–04–F

Department of the Navy

Amended Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Public Scoping Meeting Notice for Realignment of F/A–18 Aircraft and Operational Functions From Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as implemented by the Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500–1508), the Department of the Navy announced its intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to evaluate the potential environmental consequences of the realignment of F/A–18 aircraft and their associated personnel to Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana, Virginia Beach, Virginia on November 16, 1995.

In accordance with the 1993 mandates of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC 93), the Navy will close NAS Cecil Field, Florida, and realign its F/A–18 and S–3 aircraft, personnel, and other ancillary activities. The 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC 95) changed the receiving sites for NAS Cecil Field assets to ''other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, Virginia; MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina; NAS Jacksonville, Florida; and NAS Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and support infrastructure.'' This change was made to support the Navy's operational mission by maximizing the use of existing infrastructure and capacity, eliminating the need for substantial new construction to support the realignment, and maintaining operational flexibility for deployment.

The Navy's November 16, 1995 notice of intent indicated that for BRAC 95, two F/A–18 reserve squadrons are proposed to be transferred to NAS Atlanta for integration with Naval Reserve Forces and would be the subject of separate NEPA documentation. This action has not been revised by this amended notice of intent. The Navy's previous notice of intent also stated that two F/A–18 operational squadrons would be transferred to MCAS Beaufort and be addressed in a separate NEPA environmental assessment. The remainder of the F/A–18 assets (9 operational squadrons and the Fleet Replacement Squadron [FRS]), were to be transferred to NAS Oceana and be the subject of an EIS.

In recognition of non-specific language contained within the mandates of BRAC 95, the Navy has conducted preliminary planning analysis to determine a range of reasonable alternatives for the basing of F/A–18 operational aircraft. This included identifying east coast air stations with necessary capacity, compatible missions and appropriate facilities to support F/A–18 operations.

The Navy's preliminary analysis indicated that the following stations have compatible missions, necessary capacity, and could support F/A–18 aircraft: NAS Oceana, Virginia Beach, VA; MCAS Cherry Point, Havelock, NC; and MCAS Beaufort, SC. Based on this preliminary analysis, the Navy is in the process of developing F/A–18 alternative realignment scenarios for inclusion in the EIS.

No preferred alternative for the realignment has been identified by the Navy. Because several reasonable alternatives may be identified for the realignment of F/A–18 operational aircraft, the Navy now plans to prepare one EIS addressing the transfer of all 11 operational squadrons and the FRS from NAS Cecil Field.

This move includes approximately 200 aircraft, 5000 military personnel, and 200 civilians. In order to accommodate this realignment, depending on the alternative, new/existing facilities will be constructed or modified at NAS Oceana, MCAS Cherry Point, and/or MCAS Beaufort. In addition, this realignment will result in a greater level of aircraft operations at each of the respective stations and their associated training ranges, depending on the alternative selected.

The Navy intends to analyze the potential impacts of each alternative on the natural environment, including but not limited to air quality, plant and animal habitats, and water resources, such as streams and wetlands. It will also evaluate potential effects to the built environment, including land use patterns, cultural resources, transportation, housing, community services, and the regional economy. Further, the Navy will be preparing analyses of the projected operations of the incoming F/A–18 aircraft on the existing airspace range structure in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina and on aircraft noise exposure levels in and around NAS Oceana, MCAS Cherry Point and MCAS

Beaufort, associated outlying landing fields, and training areas.

ADDRESSES: The Navy has initiated a scoping process for the purpose of determining the scope of significant issues to be addressed in the EIS related to the proposed action. The Navy will hold two additional Public Scoping Meetings on the following dates: September 10, 1996, beginning at 7:00 p.m. at Havelock City Hall, Council Chambers, 1 Hatteras Avenue (at Route 70), Havelock, NC; and on September 11, 1996, beginning at 7:00 p.m. at the Technical College of the Low Country, Learning Resource Center, Main Auditorium, Building 12, 921 Ribaut Road, Beaufort, SC.

In order to ensure adequate time for those wishing to make public comments at the meetings, speakers will be limited to five minutes. Agencies and the public are also invited and encouraged to provide written comments on the scope of the EIS. Please mail written comments no later than October 5, 1996 to: Commander, Atlantic Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, 1510 Gilbert Street, Norfolk, Virginia 23511, Attn: Code 2032DC (Mr. Dan Cecchini), telephone (757) 322–4891, fax: (757) 322–4859.

D. E. Koenig,

LCDR, JAGC, USN, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 96–21551 Filed 8–22–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3810–FF–P

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 96–1]

In-Tank Precipitation System at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice; recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a concerning the In-Tank Precipitation System at the Savannah River Site. The Board requests public comments on this recommendation.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on September 23, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2901.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 208–6400.

Dated: August 19, 1996.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

August 14, 1996.

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has devoted substantial attention to the planned use of the In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) System at the Savannah River Site, because of its importance to removal of high-level radioactive waste from storage tanks at that Site, and because certain unique hazards are associated with the ITP process.

The hazards are a consequence of the volatile and flammable organic compound benzene that is released during the process in amounts that must not exceed safe limits. The benzene is generated through decomposition of tetraphenylborate (TPB) compounds. These compounds are added in the process with the objective to precipitate and remove radioactive cesium from solution in the waste water destined for the saltstone process. The concentrated slurry containing the precipitated cesium constitutes a much smaller volume than the original waste, and its feed to the vitrification process leads to production of a correspondingly smaller amount of glass ultimately to be disposed of in a repository.

The proposed treatment process calls for addition of a quantity of TPB in excess of that theoretically required to precipitate the cesium as cesium TPB. That excess is required partly because the significant amount of potassium present is also precipitated as potassium TPB, and partly because an excess of TPB in solution ensures more effective scrubbing of the radioactive cesium through precipitation. However, the benefit of effective scrubbing is accompanied by the generation of the benzene, which presents hazards of a different sort, and which also requires safety controls.

Westinghouse Savannah River Company is the Department of Energy contractor in charge of ITP. The Westinghouse staff at the Savannah River Site believed until recently that the principal cause of decomposition of TPB and generation of benzene is exposure of the TPB to the high level of radiation in the waste. That belief was based on results of full-scale tests conducted in 1983 that may have been misinterpreted, and on a decade of subsequent bench-scale tests using non-radioactive stimulants (almost exclusively) rather than actual waste. The first large-scale operations with actual waste since 1983 were conducted recently in Tank 48, and they showed that the generation and release of benzene did not follow predictions. The generation of benzene in the waste under treatment in Tank 48 was unexpectedly rapid. A surprisingly large amount of the benzene remained captured in the waste, and that benzene was released through action of mixing pumps in the tank.

The current view of the contractor staff is that benzene is produced principally through catalytic decomposition of TPB ions in solution. They believe the catalysts are potentially both soluble and insoluble species, one of which is soluble copper known to be present in the waste. They also believe that the cesium TPB precipitate and the potassium TPB precipitate are relatively immune to catalytic decomposition. The contractor proposes to conduct two Process Verification Tests (PVT), PVT–1 and PVT–2, to further establish the validity of these views and to demonstrate the accuracy of the model it has developed to predict the rate at which the captured benzene is released from solution. PVT–1 would be performed on the homogenized nuclear waste not in Tank 48, which has already been treated with TPB that subsequently has partly decomposed with the result that some cesium has returned to solution. Additional TPB would be added to this material to reprecipitate that cesium. The amount of TPB to be added would be strictly limited to a small amount as needed to reduce the concentration of cesium remaining in solution to a low radiation level acceptable for processing as low level waste in the saltstone process, and a large part of that solution would be sent to saltstone. The subsequent proposed experiment, PVT–2, will involve adding to the slurry remaining in Tank 48 a large amount of additional untreated waste and a substantial quantity of TPB as needed to precipitate the cesium in this new waste.

The Board has been informed that the primary safety precaution for the proposed cesium removal activities is to maintain an inert atmosphere in the headspace of Tank 48. This is to be done through establishing a sufficient flow of nitrogen to the tank. Two nitrogen feed systems are available, a normal system and a supplemental emergency system. The nitrogen systems are present to keep the concentration of oxygen below the level that would support combustion of the benzene. Westinghouse staff members have