[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 153 (Wednesday, August 7, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41186-41187]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-20118]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366]


Georgia Power Company, et al. (Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, 
Units 1 and 2); Exemption

I

    The Georgia Power Company, et al. (GPC or the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 for the 
Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Hatch). The licenses 
provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules, 
regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.

II

    Subsection (a) of 10 CFR 70.24, ``Criticality Accident 
Requirements,'' requires that each licensee authorized to possess 
special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain in each area where such 
material is handled, used, or stored, an appropriate criticality 
monitoring system. In accordance with Subsection (a)(1) of 10 CFR 
70.24, coverage of all such areas at Hatch shall be provided by two 
criticality detectors. However, exemptions may be requested pursuant to 
10 CFR 70.24(d), provided that the licensee believes that good cause 
exists for the exemption.
    By letter dated June 4, 1996, the licensee requested an exemption 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24. Previous exemptions from the 
provisions of 10 CFR Part 70.24 for the storage of special nuclear 
material, including reactor fuel assemblies [maximum amount of 2,630 kg 
of U-235 in uranium enriched to no more than 3.0 weight percent (w/o)], 
were granted to Georgia Power Company for Hatch Unit 1 in NRC Materials 
License No. SNM-1378, issued on August 2, 1973; and for Hatch Unit 2 in 
NRC Materials License No. SNM-1772 issued on October 28, 1977, [maximum 
amount of 1,950 kg of U-235 in uranium enriched

[[Page 41187]]

to no more than 2.3 weight percent (w/o)]. The materials licenses 
expired upon conversion of the construction permits to operating 
licenses, which were August 6, 1974, for Unit 1, and June 13, 1978, for 
Hatch Unit 2. The basis for the current exemption request is the same 
as for the original request. Specifically, the licensee proposes to 
handle and store unirradiated fuel in the new fuel vault or the spent 
fuel pool without having a criticality monitoring system as required by 
10 CFR 70.24.
    The basis for the exemption is that the potential for accidental 
criticality is precluded because of the geometric spacing of fuel in 
the storage vault and administrative controls imposed on fuel handling 
procedures from the time the fuel is removed from approved shipping 
containers, until it is placed in specially designed storage racks.
    Inadvertent or accidental criticality of Special Nuclear Materials 
(SNM) while in use in the reactor vessel is precluded through 
compliance with the Hatch Technical Specifications, including 
reactivity requirements (e.g., shutdown margins, limits on control rod 
movement), instrumentation requirements (e.g., reactor power and 
radiation monitors), and controls on refueling operations (e.g., 
refueling equipment interlocks). In addition, the operators' attention 
directed toward instruments monitoring behavior of the nuclear fuel in 
the reactor assures the facility is operated in such a manner as to 
preclude inadvertent criticality. Finally, since access to the fuel in 
the reactor vessel is not physically possible while in use and is 
procedurally controlled during refueling, there are no concerns 
associated with loss or diversion of the fuel.
    SNM as a nuclear fuel is stored in one of two locations--the spent 
fuel pool or the new fuel vault. The spent fuel pool is used to store 
irradiated fuel under water after its removal from the reactor. The 
pool is designed to store fuel in a geometric array that precludes 
criticality. In addition, existing Technical Specification limits on 
keff are maintained less than or equal to 0.95, even in the event 
of a fuel handling accident.
    The new fuel vault is used to receive and store new fuel in a dry 
condition upon arrival on site and prior to loading in the reactor. The 
new fuel vault is designed to store new fuel in a geometric array that 
precludes criticality. In addition, existing safety evaluations 
demonstrate that an effective multiplication factor is maintained less 
than or equal to 0.95 when the new fuel racks are fully loaded and dry 
or flooded with unborated water, or in the event of a fuel handling 
accident.
    New fuel is shipped in a plastic wrap. When the fuel is removed 
from its transportation cask, the wrap is removed and the fuel is 
placed in the fuel inspection stand. Following inspection, the new fuel 
can either be placed in the new fuel storage vault or in the spent fuel 
pool (typically placed in the spent fuel pool). In no case is the 
plastic wrap reinserted on the fuel. Removal of the wrap requires it to 
be slit down the length of the new fuel assembly, thereby making its 
reuse highly unlikely. Therefore, there is no concern that the plastic 
wrap used as part of the new fuel package will be capable of holding 
water from flooding from overhead sources. Additionally, as discussed 
above, the new fuel storage racks were analyzed by the licensee for a 
postulated flooded condition, and the results show that keff is 
maintained less than or equal to 0.95.
    Both irradiated and unirradiated fuel is moved to and from the 
reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool to accommodate refueling 
operations. Also, unirradiated fuel can be moved to and from the new 
fuel vault. In addition, fuel movements into the facility and within 
the reactor vessel and the spent fuel pool occur. Fuel movements are 
procedurally controlled and designed to preclude conditions involving 
criticality concerns. Moreover, previous accident analyses demonstrate 
that a fuel handling accident (i.e., a dropped fuel element) will not 
create conditions that exceed design specifications. In addition, the 
Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manuals 
specifically address refueling operations and limit the handling of 
fuel to ensure against an accidental criticality and preclude certain 
movements over the spent fuel pool and the reactor vessel.
    Based upon the information provided, there is reasonable assurance 
that irradiated and unirradiated fuel will remain subcritical. The 
circumstances for granting an exemption to 10 CFR 70.24 are met because 
criticality is precluded with the present design configuration, 
Technical Specification requirements, administrative controls, and the 
fuel handling equipment and procedures. Therefore, the staff concludes 
that the licensee's request for an exemption from the requirements of 
10 CFR 70.24 is acceptable and should be granted.

III

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
70.14, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Georgia Power 
Company, et al., an exemption as described in Section II above from 10 
CFR 70.24, ``Criticality Accident Requirements'' for Hatch Units 1 and 
2.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the 
quality of the human environment (61 FR 36914).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 31st day of July 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-20118 Filed 8-6-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P