[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 153 (Wednesday, August 7, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 41046-41058]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-20048]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 284

[Docket Nos. RM96-14-000]


Secondary Market Transactions on Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines

July 31, 1996.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Energy.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is issuing a notice 
of proposed rulemaking to revise section 284.243 of the Commission's 
regulations to improve the efficiency of the Commission's capacity 
release mechanism and encourage greater use of this mechanism. The 
Commission is proposing to: make changes in its regulations and 
policies to improve the operation of the capacity release mechanism; 
eliminate the prior requirement for competitive bidding; and permit 
shippers to release capacity, and pipelines to sell interruptible and 
short-term firm service, at rates above the rate cap when the shipper 
or pipeline has demonstrated that it does not exercise market power.

DATES: Comments on the proposed rule are due October 7, 1996. Comments 
should be filed with the Office of the Secretary and should refer to 
Docket No. RM96-14-000.

ADDRESSES: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., 
Washington, DC, 20426.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Goldenberg, Office of the 
General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First 
Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426; (202) 208-2294.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In addition to publishing the full text of 
this document in the Federal Register, the Commission provides all 
interested persons an opportunity to inspect or copy the contents of 
this document during normal business hours in Room 2A, 888 First 
Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20426.
    The Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS), an electronic 
bulletin board service, provides access to the texts of formal 
documents issued by the Commission. CIPS is available at no charge to 
the user and may be accessed using a personal computer with a modem by 
dialing 202-208-1397 if dialing locally or 1-800-856-3920 if dialing 
long distance. To access CIPS, set your communications software to 
19200, 14400, 12000, 9600, 7200, 4800, 2400, 1200bps, full duplex, no 
parity, 8 data bits, and 1 stop bit. The full text of this document 
will be available on CIPS indefinitely in ASCII and WordPerfect 5.1 
format for one year. The complete text on diskette in WordPerfect 
format may also be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, La 
Dorn Systems Corporation, also located in Room 2A, 888 First Street, 
N.E., Washington D.C. 20426.
    The Commission's bulletin board system also can be accessed through 
the FedWorld system directly by modem or through the Internet. To 
access the FedWorld system by modem:

 Dial (703) 321-3339 and logon to the FedWorld system.
 After logging on, type: /go FERC

    To access the FedWorld system, through the Internet:

 Telnet to: fedworld.gov
 Select the option: [1] FedWorld
 Logon to the FedWorld system
 Type: /go FERC

Or:

 Point your Web Browser to: http://www.fedworld.gov
 Scroll down the page to select FedWorld Telnet Site
 Select the option: [1] FedWorld
 Logon to the FedWorld system
 Type: /go FERC

    The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) requires 
interstate natural gas pipelines to provide a mechanism that permits 
firm shippers to release unneeded capacity to other shippers needing 
that capacity. The Commission is proposing to revise its capacity 
release regulations, Sec. 284.243, to improve the efficiency of the 
program and encourage greater use of capacity release. The Commission 
is proposing changes in three areas. First, the Commission is proposing 
to require pipelines to improve their existing capacity release 
procedures to make the system work more efficiently. Second, the 
Commission is proposing to improve the speed and certainty of 
transactions by removing the requirement for competitive bidding. 
Third, the Commission proposes to permit releases of capacity and 
pipeline sales of interruptible and short-term firm capacity at rates 
above the pipeline's maximum rate upon a showing that the releasing 
shipper or the pipeline cannot exercise market power.

I. Public Reporting Burden

    The proposed rule would affect two existing Commission data 
collections, FERC-545, Gas Pipeline Rates: Rate Change (Non-formal), 
(OMB Control No. 1902-0154) (FERC-545), and FERC-549B, Gas Pipeline 
Rates: Capacity Release Information (OMB Control No. 1902-0169)(FERC-
549B).
    Under the existing data collection/requirements of FERC-545, there 
would be a one-time estimated annual reporting burden of 4,125 hours 
(55 hours per company) with the adoption of the revised regulations 
proposed herein. A one-time tariff filing would adjust certain general 
terms and condition language in pipeline tariffs to reflect the 
implementation of the proposed changes in the Commission's capacity 
release program. Tariff filings would be required of approximately 75 
interstate natural gas pipelines. (See FERC-545 burden detail in 
estimated burden table below.)
    Under existing data collection FERC-549B there would be a reduction 
in annual burden of an estimated 115,650 hours (1,542 hours per 
company). The estimated burden reduction reflects the proposed 
improvements to the way the capacity release program operates and the 
elimination of competitive bidding requirements.
    The revised regulations proposed in the subject NOPR are being 
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under 
section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, (44 U.S.C. 
3507(d)). For copies of the OMB submission, contact Michael Miller at 
(202)208-1415. Interested persons may send comments regarding these 
burden estimates or any other aspect of these collections of 
information, including suggestions for reductions of burden, to the 
Desk Officer FERC, Office of Management and Budget, Room 3019 NEOB, 
Washington, D.C. 20503, phone 202-395-3087 or via the Internet at 
[email protected].

[[Page 41047]]

Comments should be filed with the Office of Management and Budget. A 
copy of any comments filed with the Office of Management and Budget 
also should be sent to the following address at the Commission: Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, Information Services Division, Room 41-
17, Washington, DC 20426, Attention: Michael Miller.

                            Estimated Annual Burden Associated With the Subject NOPR                            
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                                                                               Total No.                 Total  
              Affected data collection/requirement                  No. of        of       Hours per    annual  
                                                                 respondents   responses   response      hours  
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FERC-549B (1902-0169):                                                                                          
    Reporting/Data Requirement Burden..........................           75          75      -1,542    -115,650
FERC-545 (1902-0154):                                                                                           
    Reporting/Data Requirement Burden..........................           75          75          55       4,125
    Total Annual Hours Net Increase or (Decrease) in Burden....           75          75      -1,487    -111,525
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    The above estimates include time for reviewing the requirements of 
the Commission's proposed regulations, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the necessary data, and reviewing and 
completing the collection of information.

Data Collection/Requirement Costs

    The Commission expects that the proposed changes in its regulations 
would result in a net reduction in day-to-day operating costs. The one-
time tariff filing burden/cost under FERC-545 would be more than offset 
by the expected burden/cost reduction and efficiencies created under 
FERC-549B. The Commission estimates that the changes in reporting 
requirements proposed herein would result in an overall net reduction 
in the average annualized cost per respondent for the first year. 
Following the first year, a permanent annual reduction in burden/cost 
would occur under the FERC-549B data collection as indicated below.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Estimated annualized costs (per respondent)                     
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FERC-549B (Annual Reduction)...............................     -$75,378
FERC-545 (One-time Initial Cost/First Year)................        2,652
                                                            ------------
    Net Total Cost (Net Reduction).........................     -$73,726
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Internal Review:

    The Commission has reviewed the proposed revisions to its 
regulations and determined that the changes are necessary to establish 
more efficient pipeline operations. The proposed rule would encourage 
buyers to use the capacity release system more often and make it more 
competitive with other means of acquiring capacity.
    The proposed revisions are consistent with the Commission's plan 
for efficient information collection, communication, and management 
within the natural gas industry. The Commission has assured itself, by 
means of its internal review, that there is reasonable and objective 
support for the burden estimates associated with the proposed changes 
in information requirements.
    The Commission emphasizes that the increased cost under FERC-545 
would be a one-time cost that pipelines would not incur on an ongoing 
year-to-year basis. The estimated cost reflects the one-time tariff 
filings to incorporate the revised regulations proposed herein. These 
revisions appear necessary to improve the efficiency of the capacity 
release program between shippers and pipelines, efficiency which, in 
the long run, should reduce the costs of all participants in the 
market.

II. Current Capacity Release Rules

    The Commission instituted the capacity release mechanism to create 
a uniform, national program for the reallocation of interstate pipeline 
capacity to complement the unbundled, open access environment created 
by Order No. 636. 1 The capacity release mechanism enables firm 
shippers to make the most efficient and economical use of the capacity 
for which they pay as well as providing shippers that previously had 
been unable to acquire firm pipeline capacity (i.e., non-local 
distribution company shippers) with access to firm capacity. By 
permitting market forces to reallocate capacity to those who place a 
higher value on the capacity than the original holder, the capacity 
release mechanism increases economic efficiency as well as promoting 
the most efficient use of the natural gas transportation network.2
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    \1\ Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations 
Governing Self-Implementing Transportation; and Regulation of 
Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order No. 
636, 57 FR 13267 (Apr. 16, 1992), FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles 
[January 1991-June 1996] para. 30,939 (Apr. 8, 1992), order on 
reh'g, Order No. 636-A, 57 FR 36128 (Aug. 12, 1992), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] para. 30,950 (Aug. 3, 
1992), order on reh'g, Order No. 636-B, 57 FR 57911 (Dec. 8, 1992), 
61 FERC para. 61,272 (1992), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 
United Distribution Co. v. FERC, No. 92-1485 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 
1996).
    \2\ As part of its restructuring of the electric industry, the 
Commission has also provided for transmission capacity reassignment 
for electric utilities. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through 
Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public 
Utilities, Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 1996], para. 31,036, at 31,694 
(Apr. 24, 1996).
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    The Commission's authority to establish a uniform, national program 
governing the reallocation of interstate capacity has just been 
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia in United Distribution Co. v. FERC (UDC).3 The Court also 
affirmed the Commission's jurisdiction over, and authority to prevent, 
other capacity reallocations that may interfere with the establishment 
of the uniform federal program, such as buy-sell transactions in which 
an LDC uses its interstate capacity to transport gas on behalf of a 
purchaser. The Court found that the Commission's jurisdiction over a 
buy-sell derives from the transportation component of the transaction; 
the reallocation of interstate pipeline capacity to the purchaser is a 
``central element'' of such transactions.4
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    \3\ No. 92-1485, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 17436, slip op. at 63-81 
(D.C. Cir. July 16, 1996).
    \4\ Id., at 80. The Commission also has Natural Gas Act 
jurisdiction over buy-sells and other transactions to the extent 
they constitute the sale of natural gas for resale. See id., at 68.
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    Under the Commission's capacity release program, a firm shipper 
(releasing shipper) sells its capacity by returning its capacity to the 
pipeline for reassignment to the buyer (replacement shipper). The 
pipeline contracts with, and receives payment from, the replacement 
shipper and then issues a credit to the releasing shipper. The 
replacement shipper may pay less than the pipeline's maximum tariff 
rate, but

[[Page 41048]]

not more. The results of all releases are posted by the pipeline on its 
Electronic Bulletin Board (EBB) and made available through 
standardized, downloadable files.
    The releasing shipper can locate a replacement shipper in two ways. 
The releasing shipper can choose to have the pipeline post the notice 
of release so other shippers can submit bids for that capacity, with 
the capacity awarded to the highest bidder. Or, the releasing shipper 
can enter into a pre-arranged transaction with a replacement shipper 
for the release of capacity.
    The regulations establish a number of requirements for pre-arranged 
releases. For pre-arranged releases at less than the maximum rate, the 
regulations generally require that the pipeline post the release and 
permit other shippers to bid for that capacity. If a competitive bid 
exceeds the pre-arranged release rate, the designated replacement 
shipper is given the opportunity to match that bid and thus retain the 
capacity.
    The Commission, however, has recognized that, for short-term 
transactions, shippers need the ability to reallocate capacity quickly 
and efficiently. The original regulations, therefore, provided an 
exemption from the competitive bidding requirements for transactions of 
less than one calendar month. This exception has been extended to 
transactions of 31 days or less. To ensure that parties cannot use the 
exception to avoid bidding for longer-term transactions, the 
regulations prohibit parties from rolling-over or granting extensions 
to 31-day-or-less transactions unless they comply with the requirements 
for prior notice and bidding.
    Since Order No. 636, the Commission, on several occasions, has fine 
tuned the mechanics of the capacity release procedure. In February 
1993, the Commission convened a technical conference to examine methods 
of creating standardized downloadable files for capacity information, 
so that shippers and third-party service providers could obtain 
capacity information without having to deal with the eccentricities of 
the individual pipeline EBBs. The industry formed Working Groups to 
devise the necessary standards, and, in Order No. 563, the Commission 
adopted into its regulations the standards recommended by a consensus 
of the industry.5
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    \5\ Standards For Electronic Bulletin Boards Required Under Part 
284 of the Commission's Regulations, Order No. 563, 59 FR 516 (Jan. 
5, 1994), FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] 
para. 30,988 (Dec. 23, 1993), order on reh'g, Order No. 563-A, 59 FR 
23624 (May 6, 1994), FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-
June 1996] para. 30,994 (May 2, 1994), reh'g denied, Order No. 563-
B, 68 FERC para. 61,002 (1994).
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    The Commission also began receiving requests from local 
distribution companies (LDCs) to revise the capacity release 
regulations by removing the requirements for competitive bidding and 
the cap on the rate releasing shippers could receive for 
capacity.6 After the capacity release program had been in effect 
for a year, the Commission began a review of the program which involved 
informal meetings between staff and representatives from all segments 
of the industry.
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    \6\ See Petition Of United Distribution Companies and Associated 
Gas Distributors For A Rulemaking To Promote Growth And Development 
Of The Secondary Market, Docket No. RM94-10-000, filed December 9, 
1993.
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    During these meetings, all industry segments recommended that the 
less-than-one calendar month exception from the bidding requirements be 
extended to a full month to conform the bidding exception to the 
industry's monthly purchasing schedule. The Commission adopted the 
industry's recommendation in Order No. 577 and extended the bidding 
exception to 31 days.7 The extension of the bidding exception 
ensures that releasing and replacement shippers can consummate monthly 
transactions quickly and provides replacement shippers with the needed 
assurance that they will obtain the contracted-for capacity at the 
negotiated price.
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    \7\ Release of Firm Capacity on Interstate Natural Gas 
Pipelines, Order No. 577, 60 FR 16979 (Apr. 4, 1995), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] para. 31,017 (Mar. 29, 
1993), reh'g granted, Order No. 577-A, 60 FR 27882 (June 8, 1995), 
FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] para. 31,021 
(May 31, 1995).
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    The Commission also improved the capacity release system as part of 
its recent standardization of pipeline business and communication 
practices. On July 17, 1996, the Commission issued a final rule 
incorporating by reference business practice and communication 
standards proposed by the Gas Industry Standards Board (GISB).8 
These standards will be implemented by pipelines in the spring of 1997.
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    \8\ Standards for Business Practices of Interstate Natural Gas 
Pipelines, Order No. 587, 76 FERC para. 61,042 (1996). GISB is a 
consensus standards organization open to all members of the gas 
industry. Under GISB procedures, standards must be approved by a 
consensus of the five segments of the industry--pipelines, LDCs, 
producers, end-users, and services (including marketers and third-
party computer service providers).
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    The standards require changes in pipelines' capacity release 
procedures and in their methods of communicating capacity release 
information. An important procedural change is the establishment of a 
capacity release timeline.9 This timeline provides that, if 
pipelines are notified of a non-biddable capacity release transaction 
by 9:00 a.m. the day of nomination, the replacement shipper can 
nominate the same day (at 11:30 a.m.). For biddable transactions (of 
less than five months), the timeline provides that if a pre-arranged 
transaction (or a shipper's offer soliciting bids) is posted to the 
pipeline by 1:00 p.m., the pipeline must complete the bidding and 
matching process by 5:00 p.m., and the replacement shipper can nominate 
the next day.10
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    \9\ Capacity Release Standard 5.3.2. All times used in the 
standards are central clock time (which is central standard time, 
without a daylight savings time adjustment).
    \10\ Longer-term transactions, those of five months or longer, 
have a 4-day bidding period.
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    The communication standards require pipelines to process file 
uploads of pre-arranged transactions. This change complements the file 
downloads previously required by Order No. 563, because shippers and 
third-party service providers now will be able to transmit pre-arranged 
deals to the pipelines without being burdened by the inconsistent and 
irregular procedures of individual pipeline EBBs. Instead, they will be 
able to efficiently transmit this information to every pipeline using 
the same file formats and protocols.

Proposed Revisions

    The Commission proposes revisions to Sec. 284.243 to further 
improve the efficiency of the capacity release mechanism and thereby 
create an even more robust secondary market. The revisions are intended 
to encourage greater use of capacity release and make capacity release 
more competitive with other means of acquiring capacity, such as the 
pipelines' interruptible and short-term firm services as well as the 
so-called ``gray market.'' The gray market generally refers to LDCs' 
use of their firm transportation capacity to make targeted bundled 
transportation/gas sales to specific purchasers either on-system or 
off-system.
    Specifically, as discussed below, the Commission proposes three 
major revisions to its capacity release regulations and policies. 
First, the Commission is proposing to revise its regulations as well as 
change policies to improve the operation of the capacity release 
program. Second, the Commission proposes to eliminate the competitive 
bidding requirement. Third, the Commission proposes to permit shippers 
to release capacity, and pipelines to sell interruptible and short-term 
firm service, at rates above the rate

[[Page 41049]]

cap when the shipper or pipeline has demonstrated that it does not 
exercise market power. In addition, the Commission is revising its 
regulations to reflect the long-standing policy that pipelines must 
permit permanent releases of capacity--releases where the replacement 
shipper takes over the remaining term of the releasing shipper's 
contract, and the releasing shipper is relieved of its obligations 
under its pipeline contract.11
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    \11\ El Paso Natural Gas Company, 61 FERC para. 61,333, at 
62,311-12, aff'd, 62 FERC para. 61,311, at 62,999-17-999-18 (1993).
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A. Improvements to the Mechanism

1. Comparability Between Released Capacity and Pipeline Short-Term 
Services
    The Commission proposes to add a requirement in its regulations 
requiring pipelines to treat all short-term transportation--capacity 
release, interruptible, and short-term firm--in a comparable manner. 
This proposal ensures that the pipeline procedures are not inherently 
biased in favor of pipeline services, so that capacity release can 
compete on an even basis.
    The recently adopted GISB standards go a long way towards achieving 
such comparability. Interruptible shippers can submit a nomination 
under their interruptible contract on the day they determine they need 
service. While not identical, the GISB capacity release standards 
permit replacement shippers (with pre-arranged transactions not subject 
to bidding) to nominate the same day the pipeline is notified of the 
capacity release transaction. If shippers submit a pre-arranged non-
biddable transaction to the pipeline by 9:00 a.m., the pipeline will 
complete the contracting process by 10:00 a.m., thereby enabling the 
replacement shipper to nominate by the 11:30 a.m. nomination 
deadline.12
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    \12\ For transactions subject to bidding, the standards impose a 
one-day delay between notification of the pipeline and the ability 
to nominate to permit the pipeline to complete the bidding process. 
This aspect of comparability is discussed in the competitive bidding 
section, infra.
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    The Commission requests comment on whether the GISB standard should 
be deemed sufficient to satisfy the proposed comparability requirement. 
While non-biddable capacity releases must be posted to the pipeline 
2\1/2\ hours prior to notification, interruptible shippers have no pre-
nomination notice requirement; they can simply submit a nomination at 
the 11:30 a.m. nomination deadline. Comments should discuss whether the 
2\1/2\ hour time differential between capacity release and 
interruptible nominations is of competitive significance.
    The comments also should address methods for making the capacity 
release procedures parallel even more closely the procedures used by 
the pipelines for interruptible service. For example, interruptible 
shippers are pre-approved for creditworthiness and have master 
contracts that enable them to submit nominations without any further 
procedures. Similarly, pipelines could pre-approve replacement shippers 
for creditworthiness and execute a master contract with all pre-
approved shippers. Once pre-approved, a replacement shipper, like an 
interruptible shipper, could nominate pursuant to a capacity release 
transaction so long as the pipeline is notified of the transaction 
anytime prior to the nomination deadline.
    In addition, for replacement shippers that have not been pre-
approved, the Commission could relax the policy, adopted in Order No. 
636, that releasing shippers can never be liable for usage charges and 
penalties incurred by replacement shippers.13 The Commission's 
rationale for the policy was that such charges are unrelated to the 
reservation of capacity and primarily are designed to recover the 
variable costs of replacement shippers' use of the pipeline or to deter 
replacement shippers from engaging in prohibited conduct. Since the 
releasing shipper has no control over the conduct of the replacement 
shipper after the release, the Commission found no purpose in requiring 
the releasing shipper to be responsible for these charges.
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    \13\ Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 
1991-June 1996] at 30,564-65; Order No. 636-B, 61 FERC at 61,998.
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    While the Commission still finds this rationale generally 
persuasive, it should not be invoked unnecessarily to impede capacity 
release transactions. Thus, the Commission could permit a releasing 
shipper to assume liability for usage and related charges for a limited 
period during which the pipeline completes the credit check and the 
contracting process.
2. Flexibility in the Use of Capacity
    One of the Commission's goals is to provide shippers with the 
utmost flexibility to manage their capacity, so they can derive the 
maximum benefit from that capacity whether through their own use or 
through release. The Commission, therefore, has adopted policies 
requiring pipelines to permit shippers to segment or aggregate capacity 
or use their capacity to effect backhauls and exchanges.14 In the 
oft-quoted example of such flexibility in Order No. 636, the Commission 
explained that a shipper with capacity from the Gulf of Mexico to New 
York City could release the portion from the Gulf to Atlanta, Georgia, 
and separately release the portion from Atlanta to New York or retain 
the Atlanta to New York portion for the releasing shipper's own 
use.15
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    \14\ Order No. 636, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-
June 1996] at 30,420-21; Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 
Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] at 30,558; Order No. 636-B, 61 
FERC at 61,997.
    \15\ Id.
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    The Commission also requires pipelines to provide for flexible 
receipt and delivery points. Under this policy, any firm shipper can 
switch its primary firm receipt or delivery points to any available 
point and also use any available point on a secondary basis (with a 
lower priority than a shipper using the point as a primary point, but a 
greater priority than interruptible transportation, since the use of 
the alternate point is for firm capacity).16
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    \16\ Order No. 636, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-
June 1996] at 30,428-29; Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. 
Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] at 30,583.
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    In some cases, releasing and replacement shippers may not be 
getting the full flexibility in managing their capacity that the 
Commission envisioned in Order No. 636. Thus, the Commission will fully 
enforce its current policies, and supplement those policies as 
necessary, so that shippers have the tools to structure their use or 
release of capacity to best meet their needs.

a. Segmentation of Capacity

    During the informal discussions with Commission staff, several 
participants stated that segmentation on some pipelines was difficult, 
particularly in the supply area. The Commission also has become aware 
of segmentation problems in some cases.17
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    \17\ See ANR Pipeline Company, 75 FERC para. 61,082, at 61,242 
and 75 FERC para. 61,083 (1996).
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    As the Commission stated recently in Opinion No. 405,18 the 
ability to segment capacity is an integral feature of the capacity 
release mechanism. Segmentation can increase both releasing and 
replacement shippers' access to supply sources. For example, through 
segmentation, a releasing shipper can obtain access to an alternative 
supply source while still recouping some of its investment by releasing 
its supply area capacity to a

[[Page 41050]]

replacement shipper. The release then provides the replacement shipper 
with access to the supply area without having to obtain, and pay for, 
the full mainline path of the releasing shipper. With the right to 
segment capacity between interconnections, shippers can customize their 
capacity reservations to match their precise transportation path needs.
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    \18\ Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (Transco), 76 
FERC para. 61,021, slip op. at 15, 18-19 (1996).
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    The Commission, therefore, will vigorously enforce segmentation 
rights to ensure that the capacity release system operates as 
effectively as possible. As summarized in Opinion No. 405, the 
Commission's current policy requires that pipelines adhere to the 
following four principles in order to provide shippers with full and 
effective segmentation rights.
    First, to the extent operationally feasible, pipelines must assign 
specific rights to capacity, including storage capacity, and capacity 
at receipt and delivery points.19 To ensure shippers are aware of 
available capacity, pipelines must fully comply with the Commission 
regulations to post available capacity at each receipt and delivery 
point.20
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    \19\ See Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 62 FERC para. 61,015 
at 61,080 (1993); Arkla Energy Resources, 62 FERC para. 61,076 at 
61,452 (1993).
    \20\ 18 CFR 284.8(b)(3) (provide notice of capacity at all 
receipt and delivery points); Standards for Electronic Bulletin 
Boards Required Under Part 284 of the Commission's Regulations, 
Order No. 563, 59 FR 516 (Jan. 5, 1994), FERC Stats. & Regs. 
Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] para. 30,988 (Dec. 23 1993) at 
31,007, order on reh'g, Order No. 563-A, 59 FR 23,624 (May 6, 1994), 
FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 1996] para. 30,994 
(May 2, 1994), at 31,040-41, order on reh'g, Order No. 563-B, 68 
FERC para. 61,002 (1994) (posting of operationally available 
capacity).
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    Second, the releasing shipper must be able to schedule service up 
to its contract demand (CD) level on any segment it retains, while the 
replacement shipper can simultaneously schedule up to its CD level on 
the released segment. The purpose of permitting segmented capacity 
would be frustrated if different segments of the pipeline could not be 
used simultaneously. Therefore, the pipeline should not impose a 
Maximum Daily Quantity (MDQ) limitation that prevents the segmented use 
of capacity.21
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    \21\ See Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 63 FERC para. 61,100 
at 61,452 (1993); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 62 FERC para. 
61,015 at 61,111 (1993); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 61 FERC 
para. 61,357 at 62,419 (1993).
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    Third, absent a condition in the release, the replacement shipper 
must have the same right to use alternate receipt and delivery points 
as other firm shippers.22
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    \22\ See El Paso Natural Gas Company, 62 FERC at 62,984, 62,991 
(1993). The priority for scheduling service at alternate receipt and 
delivery points is lower than that for primary receipt and delivery 
points. Once scheduled, however, service at alternate points has the 
same priority as service at primary points. Alternate firm receipt 
and delivery points always have priority over interruptible service.
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    Fourth, segmented releases must be scheduled as quickly as non-
segmented releases. There should be no additional payments for 
segmenting capacity, nor should pipelines limit the amount charged for 
releases of segments of capacity except that the price for any single 
release may not exceed a price cap set by the Commission.23 Thus, 
releasing shippers can subdivide their capacity as many times as they 
are able even if the total amount received for the various releases 
exceeds the as-billed rate paid by the releasing shipper.
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    \23\ See Order No. 636 at 30,420-21.
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    In addition to the policies articulated in Opinion No. 405, the 
Commission expects pipelines to adhere to the principle, established in 
Order No. 636-B,24 that forward haul shippers should be permitted 
to release their capacity for a backhaul. Backhauls are, in essence, 
segmented releases, which should be permitted unless the pipeline can 
document operational constraints.
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    \24\ Order No. 636-B, 61 FERC at 61,997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission intends to apply these policies when it reviews 
pipeline tariff filings or in other proceedings. Segmentation also is 
an issue that the industry can examine through GISB to determine 
whether standards for segmentation can be developed.
    In addition, firm shippers should be able to use their own capacity 
in segments. In the Commission's original formulation of the 
segmentation requirement, it addressed segmentation only in the context 
of capacity release; it did not specifically apply the policy to 
shippers segmenting their capacity for their own use. There appears no 
reason to distinguish between segmentation for capacity release and 
segmentation for a shipper's own use. Permitting shippers to segment 
capacity for their own use may enhance their ability to make full use 
of capacity, as well as enhance the value of released capacity, because 
the replacement shipper can segment the capacity it buys. The 
Commission welcomes comments on whether pipelines should be required to 
permit shippers to segment their capacity when not releasing capacity.

b. Use of Receipt and Delivery Points

    During the restructuring proceedings mandated by Order No. 636, the 
Commission permitted some pipelines to retain existing tariff 
provisions that did not permit shippers' primary receipt and delivery 
point CD rights to exceed their mainline rights.25 As a 
consequence, the Commission accepted tariff provisions under which 
releasing shippers would lose their rights to primary receipt or 
delivery points if replacement shippers changed primary points under 
the release.26 Even at the time, the Commission was skeptical 
about the justifications for such restrictions,27 and rejected 
applications to impose similar restrictions by pipelines without pre-
existing restrictions.28
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    \25\ Transwestern Pipeline Company, 62 FERC para. 61,090, at 
61,659, 63 FERC para. 61,138, at 61,911-12 (1993).
    \26\ A releasing shipper could preserve its right to return to 
its primary point after the release by including a provision in its 
notice of release restricting the replacement shipper's ability to 
change points.
    \27\ See Transwestern Pipeline Company, 62 FERC at 61,659, 63 
FERC at 61,911-12 (1993); El Paso Natural Gas Company, 62 FERC para. 
61,311, at 62,982-83 (1993).
    \28\ See Northwest Pipeline Company, 63 FERC para. 61,124, at 
61,806-08 n.72 (1993).
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    The continuation of such restrictions appears to limit the utility 
of the capacity release mechanism. A releasing shipper may be unwilling 
to enter into a short term release if, in so doing, it loses priority 
to its primary receipt and delivery points for the remainder of a 20-
year contract. On the other hand, a replacement shipper may need to use 
receipt and delivery points different from those held by the releasing 
shipper. The replacement shipper may be reluctant to bid on mainline 
firm capacity if its ability to receive or deliver gas at a currently 
available point is subject to bumping by shippers coming later in time.
    The Commission, therefore, intends to look more closely at 
restrictions on the ability of replacement shippers to change primary 
receipt or delivery points in the future. As pointed out in Opinion No. 
405, pipelines may not impose overly restrictive limits on the amount 
of primary receipt and delivery point capacity that a shipper can 
reserve, and any such limitations must be operationally justified.
    Pipeline operational flow orders (OFOs) also may create 
difficulties for replacement shippers using secondary points. An OFO 
may give shippers at a primary point scheduling priority over those 
using that point on a secondary basis even though the operational 
problem giving rise to the OFO is not at the point in question, but 
instead affects an upstream point on the mainline to which all the 
shippers have equal firm rights. For example, according to OFO notices 
that the Commission downloaded from pipeline EBBs during

[[Page 41051]]

the winter of 1996, some pipelines restricted scheduled secondary point 
deliveries, but did not limit scheduled primary point 
deliveries.29 In this situation, a replacement shipper's inability 
to use an available primary point could result in a limitation on the 
amount of gas it can receive during a peak period.
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    \29\ Also, a pipeline's OFO may require shippers to shift supply 
from secondary to primary points. When this provision is coupled 
with a restriction on the replacement shipper's ability to change 
primary points at the initiation of a release, the replacement 
shipper may be unable to deliver gas where needed when an OFO is 
invoked. Compare Northwest Pipeline Company, 71 FERC para. 61,315 
(1995) (OFO can require shippers to switch supply from secondary to 
primary points) with Transwestern Pipeline Company, 62 FERC para. 
61,090, at 61,659, 63 FERC para. 61,138, at 61,911-12 (1993) 
(replacement shipper's ability to switch to a new primary point is 
restricted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission invites comment on whether pipeline OFOs have caused 
problems for the use of secondary point capacity. Commenters should 
suggest, based on their experience, ways in which OFOs can be more 
narrowly focused or handled differently while still permitting the 
pipelines to respond to operational problems on their systems. Comments 
also should address whether primary and secondary receipt and delivery 
points should be treated identically in OFO situations when the 
operational constraint involves mainline capacity. This would be 
consistent with the Commission's current policy that once gas is 
scheduled, firm service is firm service, with no distinction in 
priority between firm service designated for primary and secondary 
points.

B. The Bidding Requirement

    The current regulations exempt capacity release transactions from 
competitive bidding if the transactions are at the maximum rate or are 
for 31 days or less.30 Bidding is thus required for all discounted 
releases (at less than the maximum tariff rate) longer than 31 days; 
and for discounted 31 day-or-less transactions if the release is a 
rollover or continuation of an exempt 31-day-or-less transaction. The 
Commission's principal goal in requiring posting and bidding was to 
make capacity release transactions open so other shippers could conduct 
price discovery and could monitor transactions for potential 
discrimination.31 The competitive bidding requirement was intended 
to ensure that interstate transportation capacity would be allocated to 
those placing the highest value on obtaining that capacity and to 
prevent discriminatory allocation of interstate capacity at prices 
below the going market price.
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    \30\ 18 CFR 284.243(h).
    \31\ Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 
1991-June 1996] at 30,555.
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    The Commission has received a number of requests, particularly from 
LDCs, to eliminate mandatory competitive bidding on pipeline EBBs. 
Those advocating the removal of the bidding requirement contend bidding 
adds delay to the capacity release process due to the administrative 
cumbersomeness of the pipelines' bidding procedures. They maintain 
bidding also adds uncertainty to the process because it creates a risk 
for the replacement shipper that it will be unable to acquire capacity 
at the price it expected. Bidding, they assert, thus can prevent 
parties from negotiating mutually beneficial transactions. They further 
maintain that, in the over two years the capacity release system has 
been in effect, no significant pattern of abuse has been shown.
    Proliance Energy LLC and Baltimore Gas and Electric Company filed 
comments on the GISB standards in Docket No. RM96-1, arguing that, due 
primarily to the bidding process, the GISB standards do not fully 
achieve the Commission's goal of providing for comparability between 
the capacity release process and the process of obtaining pipeline 
short-term services, like interruptible or short-term firm. They 
pointed out that interruptible shippers can nominate on the day they 
want capacity, while the GISB standards require at least one day (if 
not more) to complete transactions subject to bidding.
    Based on the data collected by the Commission, bidding does not 
appear to be widespread.32 From May 1, 1995, to June of 
1996,33 competing bids were submitted on only 14% to 20% of all 
transactions subject to bidding (which themselves comprise 28% of all 
transactions).34 For transactions longer than 31 days, the 
percentage on which competitive bids were made is in the range of 25% 
to 31%.
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    \32\ The appendix provides more details of the capacity release 
information the Commission has downloaded from the pipelines.
    \33\ Although the capacity release mechanism has been in place 
since the fall of 1993, the May 1, 1995 date was chosen so that the 
analysis would be based on a consistent set of data reflecting the 
current regulations. Prior to May 1, 1995, the exemption from the 
bidding requirement applied only to less-than-one-calendar-month 
transactions. For the period after May 1, 1995, Order No. 577 
extended the bidding exemption to 31-day-or-less transactions.
    \34\ As shown in the appendix, the differences in the 
percentages in the range reflect the effect of adjustments to deal 
with inconsistent, and contradictory data showing a transaction as 
being non-biddable, but also showing competing bids having been 
submitted.
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    The original purposes of the posting and bidding requirements were 
first and foremost to ensure public disclosure of capacity release 
transactions, for both price discovery and monitoring, and secondarily 
to ensure that capacity was allocated to the shipper placing the 
greatest value on the capacity. In light of the experience with 
capacity release, the Commission has reconsidered whether the bidding 
requirement continues to be warranted. Experience demonstrates that the 
competitive bidding requirement introduces delay, uncertainty, and 
inefficiency into the capacity release process and is used 
infrequently.
    Even with the improvements in the GISB standards, the bidding 
process still creates at least a one-day delay, and consequent 
uncertainty for replacement shippers, who cannot be sure that they will 
obtain the needed capacity at the price they are willing to pay.35 
The delays and uncertainty imposed by mandatory competitive bidding 
just do not seem warranted given that the data show that, for all 
biddable transactions, competitive bids are submitted, at most, one-
fifth of the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ If the releasing shipper specifies methodologies for 
determining the highest bid other than the three standard methods, 
the bidding process may take longer, introducing even further delay. 
The three standard methodologies for determining the highest bid are 
the highest absolute rate (independent of time and quantity), the 
highest net revenue (rate times quantity independent of when 
revenues are received), and the highest net present value (rate 
times quantity adjusting for when revenues are received). Capacity 
Release Standard 5.3.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The delay and uncertainty created by the competitive bidding 
requirement further interferes with the goal of ensuring comparable 
treatment between capacity release and pipeline short-term services. As 
discussed in the prior section, if bidding is eliminated, replacement 
shippers can nominate under a timetable comparable to that of 
interruptible shippers. If competitive bidding is retained, however, 
the Commission does not see how comparability between biddable capacity 
release transactions and pipeline services could reasonably be 
achieved. The present GISB timetable requiring the posting, bidding, 
and matching process to take place in a 4-hour window the day prior to 
nomination seems about as fast as can be reasonably required.
    In addition, the Commission is aware that parties have been able to 
design means of avoiding the bidding requirement.36 Eliminating 
bidding

[[Page 41052]]

ensures that those abiding by the rules are not disadvantaged compared 
to those who skirt them. Trying to control these avoidance practices 
would only be likely to introduce greater administrative inefficiencies 
into the process, inefficiencies which the amount of competitive 
bidding does not seem to justify.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Inside F.E.R.C.'s Gas Marketing Report for December 1, 1995 
(McGraw-Hill) alludes to a ``well-developed set of tricks'' allowing 
some capacity traders to circumvent the bidding and roll-over 
requirements. One such tactic mentioned in the article is for the 
buyer to use different company names to effect multi-month releases. 
The buyer uses one name to purchase capacity under the 31-day-or-
less exemption in the first month and then avoids the bidding 
requirement for the next month by using a different company name, 
such as that of an affiliate.
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    Even with elimination of bidding, the Commission's paramount goal--
providing public disclosure of transactions--will still be achieved by 
continuing, and strengthening, the posting requirement. Indeed, 
elimination of bidding may well result in greater and more accurate 
public disclosure of price data, because shippers may forego the 
mechanisms they have been using to avoid the bidding requirement.
    The elimination of bidding does not mean that a releasing shipper 
can release its capacity in an unduly discriminatory fashion, and the 
Commission can still take action if it detects a pattern of undue 
favoritism. For example, a release of capacity cannot be tied to 
conditions unrelated to the use of the interstate capacity, such as the 
purchase of gas from the releaser.37
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 
1991-June 1996] at 30,559. As an example of discriminatory use of 
interstate capacity by an LDC, see Interstate Gas Marketing., Inc. 
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, No. 377 C.D. 1995, 1996 
Pa. Commw., Lexis 270 (June 24, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The posting requirements, however, need to be strengthened. In 
downloading pipeline capacity release information, the Commission has 
found that relevant information about completed transactions is not 
available in a single dataset.38 Easily accessible and retrievable 
information about release transactions is crucial for the Commission 
and the industry to monitor capacity release transactions effectively. 
Thus, additional standardization appears necessary. GISB should 
coordinate with Commission staff in seeking to resolve these issues, 
and, if necessary, staff can convene a technical conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ For example, some relevant information about pre-arranged 
transactions is found in the dataset for capacity release offers, 
but is not transferred to the dataset providing information about 
awards. Thus, the Commission has to download both datasets to obtain 
the information. An additional complication is that some pipelines 
purge their offer and bid datasets after a transaction is completed. 
Thus, unless shippers or the Commission download daily, which adds 
burden and expense, some of this detail is lost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission is proposing to discontinue the pipelines' 
obligation to afford a posting and bidding option for those shippers 
wanting to solicit competitive bids. Given the preponderance of pre-
arranged transactions,39 requiring pipelines to provide a bidding 
service (and permitting them to recover the costs of this service in 
their cost-of-service) does not appear warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Ninety-two percent of all capacity release transactions are 
pre-arranged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal to eliminate the requirement for pipelines to provide 
a bidding service does not signify that the Commission finds bidding 
unimportant. Even if only a small percentage of capacity release 
transactions are subject to bidding, the bidding results may provide 
valuable information about the value of released capacity.
    A mandatory requirement for pipelines to provide a bidding service, 
however, does not appear necessary for releasing shippers to post 
capacity for bid. Elimination of the requirement for bidding through 
the pipelines will create an opportunity for the market to create even 
more efficient, computerized capacity trading processes. At present, 
third-party service providers cannot establish efficient bidding 
programs for transactions subject to competitive bidding, because 
transactions cannot be fully consummated on the third-parties' systems; 
a pre-arranged transaction on the third-party boards still must be 
transmitted to the pipeline and re-posted for a second round of bidding 
according to the pipeline's bidding requirements. With the bidding 
requirement removed, the dual posting will be eliminated, enabling 
third-party service providers to complete transactions and then use the 
GISB standards to upload the results to the pipelines for processing. 
In addition, if they choose, pipelines still could institute a bidding 
service in response to market demand.
    The Commission requests comments on whether the requirement that 
pipelines provide a posting and bidding service should be continued, 
and, given that pipelines currently provide such a system on their 
EBBs, how expensive it would be to continue providing the service. 
Commenters, however, should take into account the possible need to 
upgrade computer systems (for example, to permit file uploads of bids 
and offers) as well as the additional costs of maintaining a bidding 
mechanism if EBBs were replaced with more standardized Internet 
technologies, as the industry is considering in the Business Practices 
Rulemaking in Docket No. RM96-1.
    Those commenters recommending retention of the bidding requirement 
are requested to propose changes to improve the efficiency of the 
current bidding mechanisms. For example, the Commission requests 
comment on whether the efficiency of bidding could be improved if 
third-party boards satisfied the bidding requirement. The Commission 
requested and received some comments on substituting bidding on third-
party boards for pipeline bidding in response to the Business Practices 
NOPR in Docket No. RM96-1. The few who commented on the issue opposed 
the requirement on the grounds that locating capacity might be made 
more difficult if shippers looking for capacity on one pipeline had to 
monitor postings on all third-party boards. Commenters should consider 
whether this problem outweighs the potential efficiency gains from 
third-party bidding. Also, comments should discuss whether the 
perceived problem--that pipeline listings will appear on multiple 
third-party boards--is likely to occur or whether there are methods for 
handling such problems. For example, the pipeline and its customers 
could jointly solicit bids for, and choose, the third-party service 
provider that will list offerings for that pipeline. Or, the Commission 
could set standards that would ensure that shippers could access 
multiple third-party displays on a single computer (for instance, by 
using WindowsTM or Internet browsers).

The Price Cap

    The Commission's regulations do not permit the rate for released 
capacity to exceed the maximum rate in the pipelines' tariffs. The 
Commission initially imposed this ceiling because the secondary market 
had not been shown to be sufficiently competitive that releasing 
shippers would be unable to exert market power.40
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ Order No. 636-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 
1991-June 1996] at 30,560.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission's inquiry here is to determine whether the price cap 
can be lifted because the secondary market is sufficiently competitive 
so that releasing shippers cannot exercise market power. The Commission 
recognizes that, on many pipelines, a large number of shippers hold 
firm capacity and, due to the Commission's flexible receipt and 
delivery point policy, numerous shippers may be able to compete in 
offering capacity to potential

[[Page 41053]]

replacement shippers. Pipeline short-term services, interruptible and 
short-term firm, also potentially compete with capacity release 
transactions. In addition, the Commission is mindful that removing the 
cap for releases and for pipeline short-term services may produce more 
efficient capacity utilization by permitting prices to rise to market 
clearing levels. Removal of the cap also may remove the incentive for 
releasers to use the ``gray market'' as a means of circumventing the 
price cap.41
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ By making a bundled sale, releasers avoid the cap by, in 
effect, adding the full price of capacity (even if above the cap) to 
the unregulated price for gas to produce a total price to the buyer 
fully reflective of the amount the buyer is willing to pay for 
capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission, however, has some concerns about the potential for 
the exercise of market power in certain situations. First, regardless 
of the number of firm shippers on a pipeline, LDCs may still exercise 
market power over customers behind their city-gate. Because a customer 
behind an LDC's city-gate must use the LDC's system to transport gas to 
its final destination, the LDC may be able to structure its intrastate 
service so that the end-user's ability to obtain released interstate 
capacity from shippers other than its own LDC is limited.42
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ See Questar Pipeline Company, 64 FERC para. 61,157, at 
62,282-83 (1993); Meridian Oil Inc. v. Southern California Gas Co., 
65 FERC para. 61,379 (1993) (raising concerns about intrastate rate 
structures effect on LDC customers' ability to seek interstate 
capacity from sources other than their own LDC).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, an LDC's control over take-away capacity at primary 
delivery points may limit the capacity choices of a customer behind the 
city-gate, and thus confer market power on the LDC. If a customer 
behind an LDC's city-gate purchases capacity from its own LDC, it will 
obtain access to the city-gate delivery point on a primary basis. If, 
however, it buys mainline capacity from another firm shipper (with a 
different primary delivery point), the customer would have to effect 
delivery to the city-gate as a secondary delivery point. Particularly 
during peak periods, the customer may not be able to use the secondary 
point if it is preempted by the LDC's use of the point on a primary 
basis. In this event, the customer would not have access to a 
competitive market for capacity; it would have only one realistic 
capacity option--the primary point capacity of its own LDC.
    Second, on some pipelines or portions of systems, the market may 
not be competitive, because one or only a few shippers control the firm 
capacity, producing high concentration indices indicative of the 
potential to exercise market power. For example, a downstream shipper 
may possess market power because it holds a large percentage of the 
available capacity on the last segment of the pipeline. This may be 
particularly true on a telescoping pipeline where the capacity of the 
system decreases the farther downstream one goes.
    Third, interruptible capacity, standing alone, may not be a 
sufficient competitive alternative to released capacity. In the first 
place, interruptible service on a fully subscribed pipeline becomes 
available only if firm shippers are not using or releasing their firm 
capacity. On a peak day, for instance, a replacement shipper cannot 
simply reject a high asking price for firm capacity release and count 
on the use of interruptible service. If the replacement shipper rejects 
the released firm capacity, and the releasing shipper either uses the 
capacity itself or releases it to another replacement shipper, the 
interruptible capacity may not be available. Even if the replacement 
shipper is able to acquire interruptible capacity, its use of the 
interruptible service is still subject to being bumped by firm service.
    Although shippers potentially can use the ``gray market'' to avoid 
the price cap, the Commission does not find the existence of the gray 
market sufficient to warrant across-the-board removal of the price cap. 
The Commission is unaware of any empirical data on the extent of gray 
market activity, but the available information suggests that the gray 
market is not a sufficiently attractive alternative that it will 
replace capacity release. For example, the amount of capacity 
represented by capacity release transactions is growing and a 
significant number of the transactions during peak periods take place 
at maximum rates.43 The requests by LDCs to remove the price cap 
from the release market further indicate that LDCs do not find the gray 
market a completely satisfactory substitute for capacity release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See Appendix, at p. 1 and 5. For example, according to the 
Commission's data, 30% of releases during the peak heating season in 
January 1996 were at the maximum rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, the Commission cannot abjure its statutory responsibility 
to ensure that rates are just and reasonable simply because of the 
potential for shippers to avoid the price cap.44 Unless a shipper 
can show that it cannot exercise market power, the Commission cannot 
conclude that the market-based rates the shipper would charge are 
competitive and, therefore, just and reasonable. The appropriate 
response to the gray market, therefore, is not to remove the rate cap 
across-the-board, but to establish reasonable conditions that will 
permit shippers to exceed the price cap when they cannot exercise 
market power.
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    \44\ If the Commission had information showing that a shipper 
making a sale for resale used a bundled sale to exceed the maximum 
rate for interstate transportation, the Commission has the statutory 
authority to take action against that shipper. Such action could 
include revocation or limitations on the shippers' blanket marketing 
certificate to make sales for resale. 18 CFR 284.401-02. In 
addition, if the gray market sale is a buy-sell, it is prohibited. 
See Order No. 636, FERC Stats. & Regs. Preambles [January 1991-June 
1996] at 30,416, aff'd, United Distribution Co. v. FERC, slip op. at 
77-81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission, however, does have some concerns about whether the 
gray market may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the capacity 
release market and may permit undue discrimination to occur. In view of 
the Court of Appeals decision in UDC, the Commission is interested in 
exploring the extent of gray market activity and possible approaches 
for achieving a consistent regulatory framework for both capacity 
release and the gray market. Although the Commission does not wish to 
disrupt economic transactions occurring in the gray market, it is 
interested in receiving comments on alternatives for regulating 
capacity release and gray market activities, such as whether gray 
market transactions should be subject to after-the-fact posting.
    The Commission proposes to lift the price cap for released, 
interruptible, and short-term firm capacity when releasing shippers and 
pipelines can demonstrate that they are unable to exercise market 
power.45 The Commission is proposing to include in its capacity 
release regulations at section 284.243(e) a provision authorizing 
shippers to submit applications to remove the price cap. Consistent 
with the Commission's Policy Statement on Alternatives to Cost-of-
Service Ratemaking,46 pipelines seeking to remove the cap for 
interruptible service can file a request for a declaratory order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ The Commission may, in some circumstances, need to consider 
the relationship between an LDC and its affiliate if that 
affiliation bears upon the ability of the combined entity to 
exercise market power.
    \46\ 74 FERC para. 61,076 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    LDCs (or in some cases other shippers controlling take-away 
capacity at delivery points) would have an additional prerequisite to 
establish that they cannot exercise market power. They will need to 
establish that they provide the ability to obtain (either individually 
or through aggregation) open access transportation on the LDC's 
facilities. If an LDC does not provide

[[Page 41054]]

open access transportation, its intrastate rates and terms and 
conditions of service may discourage its customers from seeking 
capacity from other interstate shippers. If the LDC provides open 
access transportation, however, a customer can be assured of 
transportation on the LDC's facilities regardless of whether it 
purchases interstate capacity from the LDC or another shipper. In 
addition, an LDC's open access provisions need to deal with the market 
power conveyed by the LDC's control over primary delivery points. Thus, 
an acceptable open access service would need to include a right for 
customers behind the city-gate to use the LDC's city-gate as a primary 
delivery point, regardless of whether they purchase interstate capacity 
from the LDC.
    The Commission solicits comments on a number of aspects of this 
proposal. Comments should address how to measure market power in the 
secondary market, such as whether to use the traditional market power 
analysis as used in the Policy Statement or whether modified criteria 
can ease the evidentiary burden, without compromising the integrity of 
the market power analysis. Comments should further address the minimum 
criteria needed for an acceptable open access program and the 
relationship between the open access definition and the required market 
power showing. For example, should the Commission presume that there is 
sufficient competition if an LDC's open access program includes an 
assignment of its upstream interstate capacity rights to its customers 
either individually or through aggregation? 47 By virtue of such 
an assignment, there presumably would be such a large number of holders 
of primary point capacity to the LDC's city-gate that any potential 
buyer behind the city-gate would have a sufficient number of 
alternative sources of capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ This assignment is akin to the assignment of pipeline 
upstream 858 capacity to its customers in Order No. 636.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission further requests comment on whether LDCs should be 
permitted to directly assign their capacity, without going through the 
pipeline's contracting process, in certain circumstances, such as when 
they have demonstrated a lack of market power. Comments should address 
whether a lack of market power provides adequate protection to permit 
direct assignment and what limitations, if any, should be imposed on 
direct assignment.
    Comments also should consider how the Commission should determine 
whether an LDC's open access program meets the necessary open access 
criteria. For example, the Commission could review an LDC's program de 
novo or it could first require challenges to made at the state level 
and give deference to determinations by state Public Utility 
Commissions.
    The Commission is proposing to permit pipelines to file to have the 
price cap lifted for interruptible and short-term firm service, because 
these services appear to compete directly with capacity release. In the 
staff paper attached to the February 8, 1995 request for comments on 
market-based rates, the staff concluded that market-based rates for 
pipeline interruptible service might be warranted upon a showing that 
capacity release was a good substitute for pipeline interruptible 
service, but that the ability, at that time, to make such a showing was 
doubtful.48 With the revisions to the capacity release program to 
make it comparable to pipeline short-term services, capacity release 
should now become a sufficient alternative to pipeline capacity. The 
Commission, however, requests comments on issues relating to the 
release of the price cap for short-term firm service, such as how to 
establish regulations dealing with roll-overs or extensions of short-
term firm contracts to ensure that shippers do not lose the protection 
of the price cap when they purchase long-term firm capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-Service Ratemaking for 
Natural Gas Pipelines, 70 FERC para. 61,139, at 61,415 (1995) 
(Request for Comments on Alternative Pricing Methods).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As an alternative to the maximum reservation rate limitation on all 
capacity releases, or the complete elimination of the price cap, the 
Commission requests comments on the appropriateness of permitting the 
release and reassignment of capacity subject to a cost-based annual 
revenue cap. Under such an approach, what reporting requirements should 
be imposed on holders of capacity to ensure that the annual revenue 
limitation is not exceeded? If the Commission adopts this revised 
revenue cap, should it apply for short-term firm and interruptible 
transactions as well? How should the interruptible rate under an annual 
limitation be determined?
    After receipt of comments on this proposal, the Commission intends 
to hold a technical conference to explore issues related to removal of 
the price cap and the best means of measuring market power in the 
secondary market. In addition, to obtain additional record information 
for determining whether, and how, to relax the price cap, the 
Commission is proposing, in a separate order in this docket, to 
establish an experimental, pilot program under which the cap will be 
lifted for some LDCs and pipelines which meet the specified criteria. 
The Commission will use the record developed from the comments, the 
technical conference, and the pilot program to make its final 
determination on whether, and how, to relax the price cap.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) 49 generally 
requires a description and analysis of final rules that will have 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. 
The proposed regulations would impose requirements only on interstate 
pipelines, which are not small businesses, and, in fact, the overall 
effect of these revisions is to reduce costs, not only for the 
pipelines, but for those dealing with pipelines, including small 
businesses. Accordingly, pursuant to section 605(b) of the RFA, the 
Commission hereby certifies that the regulations proposed herein will 
not have a significant adverse impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ 5 U.S.C. 601-612.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Environmental Analysis

    The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment 
or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a 
significant adverse effect on the human environment.50 The 
Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from these 
requirements as not having a significant effect on the human 
environment.51 The action taken here falls within categorical 
exclusions in the Commission's regulations for rules that are 
clarifying, corrective, or procedural, for information gathering, 
analysis, and dissemination, and for sales, exchange, and 
transportation of natural gas that requires no construction of 
facilities.52 Therefore, an environmental assessment is 
unnecessary and has not been prepared in this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Order No. 486, Regulations Implementing the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 52 FR 47897 (Dec. 17, 1987), FERC Stats. & 
Regs. Preambles 1986-1990 para. 30,783 (1987).
    \51\ 18 CFR 380.4.
    \52\ See 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii), 380.4(a)(5), 380.4(a)(27).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Information Collection Requirement

    OMB's regulations at 5 CFR 1320.11 require that it approve certain 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements (collections of information) 
imposed by a Federal agency. Upon approval of a

[[Page 41055]]

collection of information, OMB shall assign an OMB control number and 
an expiration date. Respondents subject to the filing requirements of 
this proposed rule shall not be penalized for failing to respond to 
these collections of information unless the collections of information 
display valid OMB control numbers.
    Title: FERC-545, Gas Pipeline Rates: Rate Change (Non-formal).
    Action: Data Collection/Requirements.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0154.
    Respondents: Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines (Not applicable to 
small businesses).
    Frequency of Responses: One-time tariff filings (First year).
    Title: FERC-549B, Gas Pipeline Rates: Capacity Release Information.
    Action: Reduction in Data Collection/Requirements.
    OMB Control No.: 1902-0169.
    Respondents: Interstate Natural Gas Pipelines (Not applicable to 
small businesses).
    Frequency of Responses: Continuing/Day-to-Day--Elimination of 
Certain Capacity Release/Competitive Bidding Requirements (Annual 
Burden/Cost Reduction).
    Necessity of Information: The subject Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
solicits public comments on the Commission's efforts to encourage 
greater use of the capacity release mechanism and to make capacity 
release more competitive with other means of acquiring capacity. The 
implementation of the proposed revisions to the Commission's 
regulations would help the Commission carry out its responsibilities 
under the Natural Gas Act and coincide with the current regulatory 
environment which the Commission instituted with Order Nos. 636, 563, 
and 587 and the restructuring of the natural gas industry. The 
Commission's Office of Pipeline Regulation (OPR) would use the tariff 
data filed under FERC-545 in rate proceedings to review rate and tariff 
changes by natural gas companies for the transportation of gas and for 
general industry oversight. Based on experience over the last two 
years, the Commission has determined that the competitive bidding 
requirements may no longer be warranted and that their elimination may 
increase industry efficiency. The information collected under FERC-545 
in the subject NOPR would be reported to the Commission and be subject 
to audit.
    The Commission is submitting a copy of the subject NOPR to OMB for 
its review. Interested persons may obtain information on the proposed 
modifications to the Commission's regulations by contacting the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street N.E., Washington, DC 
20426 [Attention: Michael Miller, Information Services Division, 
(202)208-1415] or the Office of Management and Budget [Attention: Desk 
Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (202)395-3087].

VII. Comment Procedures

    The Commission invites interested persons to submit written 
comments on the matters proposed in this notice, including any related 
matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish to discuss. 
An original and 14 copies of comments to this notice must be filed with 
the Commission no later than October 7, 1996. Comments should be 
submitted to the Office of the Secretary, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 888 First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, and should 
refer to Docket No. RM96-14-000. Additionally, the Commission strongly 
encourages commenters to submit a computer diskette of their comments 
in WordPerfect version 6.1 format or lower or in ASCII format, with the 
name of the filer and Docket No. RM96-14-000 on the outside of the 
diskette. Those providing files in ASCII format should take care to 
examine the form of an ASCII conversion to ensure, for instance, that 
it includes footnotes, headers, and footers, as these have often been 
left out in past electronic filings. All written comments will be 
placed in the Commission's public files and will be available for 
inspection in the Commission's Public Reference Room at 888 First 
Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426, during regular business hours.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 284

    Continental shelf, Natural gas, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Incorporation by reference.

    By direction of the Commission.
Lois D. Cashell,
Secretary.
    In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission proposes to amend 
Part 284, Chapter I, Title 18, Code of Federal Regulations, as set 
forth below.

PART 284--CERTAIN SALES AND TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS UNDER THE 
NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978 AND RELATED AUTHORITIES

    1. The authority citation for part 284 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 717-717w, 3301-3432; 42 U.S.C 7101-7532; 43 
U.S.C 1331-1356.

    2. Sec. 284.243 is amended by removing paragraph (h), redesignating 
paragraph (g) as paragraph (h), and revising paragraphs (b) through (f) 
and adding paragraph (g) to read as follows:


Sec. 284.243  Release of firm capacity on interstate pipelines.

* * * * *
    (b) Firm shippers must be permitted to release their capacity, in 
whole or in part, on a permanent or short-term basis, without 
restrictions on the terms and conditions of the release. A replacement 
shipper is any shipper that obtains released capacity.
    (c) A firm shipper that wants to release any or all of its firm 
capacity must notify the pipeline of the replacement shipper to which 
it wishes to release its capacity and the terms and conditions of the 
release. The pipeline must provide a mechanism complying with 
Sec. 284.10 of this part by which the shipper or its designated agent 
can notify the pipeline of the terms of the release.
    (d) The pipeline must provide notice of the name of the replacement 
shipper and the terms and conditions of the release on its Electronic 
Bulletin Board and in downloadable files required under Sec. 284.10 of 
this part.
    (e) The pipeline must allocate released capacity to the replacement 
shipper at the rate established by the parties, but such rate shall not 
exceed the pipeline's maximum rate, unless the Commission has granted 
the releasing shipper's application to release capacity at a rate 
exceeding the maximum.
    (f) Unless otherwise agreed by the pipeline, the contract of the 
shipper releasing capacity will remain in full force and effect, with 
the net proceeds from any resale to a replacement shipper credited to 
the releasing shipper's reservation charge. If the releasing shipper 
has released its capacity for the remaining term of its contract, the 
pipeline must permit the releasing shipper to terminate its contract.
    (g) The pipeline must establish tariff provisions that will permit 
replacement shippers to nominate and contract for service on a basis 
comparable to shippers nominating and contracting for interruptible or 
firm capacity from the pipeline.
* * * * *
    Note.--The following appendix will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

[[Page 41056]]

Appendix--RM96-14-000

I. Capacity Release Award Characteristics

Source: Monthly EDI Downloads--30 Pipelines 1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\  Algonquin Gas Transmission, Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas, 
ANR Pipeline, Colorado Interstate Gas, CNG Transmission, Columbia 
Gas, Columbia Gulf, East Tennessee Natural Gas, El Paso Natural Gas, 
Florida Gas Transmission, Midwestern Gas Transmission, Mississippi 
River Transmission, Natural Gas Pipeline, Noram Gas Transmission, 
Northern Border Pipeline, Northern Natural Gas, Northwest Pipeline, 
Pacific Gas Transmission, Paiute Pipeline, Panhandle Eastern Pipe 
Line, Southern Natural Gas, Stingray Pipeline, Tennessee Gas 
Pipeline, Texas Eastern Transmission, Texas Gas Transmission, 
Trunkline Gas, Trailblazer Pipeline, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line, 
Transwestern Pipeline, Williams Natural Gas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Released Capacity Held By Replacement Shippers

(Trillion Btu/day)

Capacity Held During the Month 2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Includes all capacity releases since 6/1/94 still in effect 
during the indicated month.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(From Awards Between 06/01/94 and 04/30/96)

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Max     Average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
January 1995........................................       9.4       8.8
February 1995.......................................      10.8      10.1
March 1995..........................................      10.5       9.9
April 1995..........................................      11.7      11.2
May 1995............................................      12.6      11.9
June 1995...........................................      14.1      13.3
July 1995...........................................      14.9      14.0
August 1995.........................................      17.0      16.0
September 1995......................................      17.1      16.4
October 1995........................................      16.1      15.5
November 1995.......................................      15.1      14.4
December 1995.......................................      14.1      13.5
January 1996........................................      13.9      13.3
February 1996.......................................      15.1      14.6
March 1996..........................................      15.2      14.7
April 1996..........................................      17.5     16.7 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The same 30 pipelines reported 86.5 trillion Btu/day firm         
  transportation quantities in their April 1, 1996 Index of Customers   
  filing.                                                               


         Capacity Release Awards By Term and Whether Prearranged        
                    [Awards from 5/1/95-5/31/96] \3\                    
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Percent of
             Term                  Prearranged      No. of       total  
                                                    awards      awards  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
< = 31 days...................  No..............       1,379           7
                                Yes.............      16,696          82
                                                 -----------------------
                                                      18,075          89
> 31 days.....................  No..............         172           1
                                Yes.............       2,007          10
                                                 -----------------------
                                                       2,179          11
All...........................  No..............       1,551           8
                                Yes.............      18,703          92
                                                 -----------------------
                                                      20,254        100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Awards data for May 1996 is not complete.                           


         Capacity Release Awards By Term and Whether Recallable         
                      [Awards from 5/1/95-5/31/96]                      
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Percent of
             Term                  Recallable       No. of       total  
                                                    awards      awards  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
< = 31 days...................  No..............       6,188          32
                                Yes.............      11,394          58
                                                 -----------------------
                                                      17,582          90
> 31 days.....................  No..............         911           4
                                Yes.............       1,128           6
                                                 -----------------------
                                                       2,039          10
All...........................  No..............       7,099          36
                                Yes.............      12,522          64
                                                 -----------------------
                                                      19,621         100
------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Capacity Release Bidding

Source: Monthly EDI Downloads--30 Pipelines (Awards from 5/1/95-5/31/
96)

                    Capacity Release Awards By Term and Whether Biddable and Prearranged \4\                    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            No. of              
                 Term                          Biddable                Prearranged          awards      Percent 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
< = 31 days..........................  Yes.....................  Yes....................       1,759          22

[[Page 41057]]

                                                                                                                
                                                                 No.....................         310           4
                                       No......................  Yes....................       5,726          73
                                                                 \5\ No.................         104           1
                                                                                         -----------------------
                                                                                               7,899         100
> 31 days............................  Yes.....................  Yes....................         292          34
                                                                 No.....................          34           4
                                       No......................  Yes....................         529          61
                                                                 \5\ No.................          10           1
                                                                                         -----------------------
                                                                                                 865         100
All..................................  Yes.....................  Yes....................       2,051          24
                                                                 No.....................         344           4
                                       No......................  Yes....................       6,255          71
                                                                 \5\ No.................         114           1
                                                                                         -----------------------
                                                                                               8,764        100 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Analysis limited to awards with corresponding offer information in database. Resulting sample size is 43% of
  all awards. Offer information is source for whether transaction is biddable.                                  
\5\ This reported data is inconsistent, since it would seem that a transaction which is non-biddable should be  
  pre-arranged.                                                                                                 



                               Capacity Release Awards With Competitive Bidding 6                               
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                       Percent  
                                                                              No. of    Awards with      with   
                   Term                          Reported as biddable        biddable    competing    competing 
                                                                              awards        bids         bids   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<=31 days.................................  Yes..........................        1,398          168           12
                                            No \7\.......................          111          111  ...........
                                                                          --------------------------            
                                            Total \8\....................        1,509          279           19
>31 days..................................  Yes..........................          252           64           25
                                            No \7\.......................           21           21  ...........
                                                                          --------------------------            
                                            Total \8\....................          273           85           31
All.......................................  Yes..........................        1,650          232           14
                                            No \7\.......................          132          132  ...........
                                                                          --------------------------            
                                            Total \8\....................        1,782          364           20
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Analysis limited to awards with corresponding offer and bid information in database. Resulting sample size  
  is 35% of all awards. Offer information is the source for whether transaction is biddable. Bid information    
  indicates whether competing bids were submitted.                                                              
\7\ This reported data is inconsistent, in that the underlying offers were coded as non-biddable but in fact    
  competitive bids were submitted.                                                                              
\8\ This reflects the inclusion in the analysis of awards coded as non-biddable for which competitive bids were 
  actually submitted. Including these awards leads to the higher percentage of awards with competing bids shown 
  in the last column.                                                                                           

III. Capacity Release Discounts

Source: EDI Downloads--30 Pipelines (Awards from 6/1/94-5/31/96)

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                    Mean         Mean   
                                                                             Percent of   Percent of   Percent of   Percent of   percent of   percent of
                                                                  No. of    awards with   awards at   awards with   awards at    max. resv.  max. volum.
                          Award date                              awards     discounted   max. resv.   discounted  max. volum.      rate         rate   
                                                                 included    resv. rate      rate     volum. rate      rate     (discounted  (discounted
                                                                                                                                  awards)      awards)  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 1994....................................................          900           62            6           31            1         42.2         33.6
July 1994....................................................          856           68            6           26            0         28.5         19.3
August 1994..................................................          973           65            6           29            1         18.4         25.5
September 1994...............................................          999           68            7           23            2         19.6         24.5
October 1994.................................................         1082           62           13           22            4         23.5         27.8
November 1994................................................          907           57           12           28            4         28.0         28.9
December 1994................................................          920           54           15           27            3         27.2         22.8
January 1995.................................................         1184           56           14           27            3         25.9         18.7
February 1995................................................         1287           65           10           22            2         25.2         21.7
March 1995...................................................         1691           70            8           20            2         24.2         23.6
April 1995...................................................         1726           70            6           21            3         22.3         20.6
May 1995.....................................................         1738           67            7           24            2         21.0         23.8
June 1995....................................................         1450           63            5           31            1         22.0         24.1
July 1995....................................................         1540           60            6           33            2         26.6         23.9

[[Page 41058]]

                                                                                                                                                        
August 1995..................................................         1597           59            5           34            1         24.2         28.5
September 1995...............................................         1776           60           16           23            1         28.6         33.6
October 1995.................................................         1804           58           19           22            1         25.1         37.0
November 1995................................................         1462           58           17           21            3         34.5         46.0
December 1995................................................         1048           48           25           24            3         43.8         39.3
January 1996.................................................          981           43           30           24            3         41.3         27.0
February 1996................................................          922           46           29           21            3         40.9         20.5
March 1996...................................................         1555           56           24           17            3         37.0         21.3
April 1996...................................................         1357           66           19           14            2         31.2         17.8
May 1996.....................................................          609           52           18           29            2         29.8         23.5
June 1996....................................................           97           70            7           23            .         15.9         19.6
                                                                    30,461           60           13           24            2         27.7         26.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[FR Doc. 96-20048 Filed 8-6-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-P