[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 148 (Wednesday, July 31, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39953-39955]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-19451]


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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD


Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest

    The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has identified 
and resolved potential conflicts of interest situations related to its 
proposed contractor, MPR Associates, Incorporated (MPR). This Notice, 
which is a summary of the facts related to this decision, satisfies the 
requirements of 10 CFR 1706.8(e) with respect to publication in the 
Federal Register. Under the Board's Organizational and Consultant 
Conflicts of Interest Regulation, 10 CFR Part 1706 (OCI Regulations), 
an organizational or consultant conflict of interest (OCI) means that 
because of other past, present or future planned activities or 
relationships, a contractor or consultant is unable, or potentially 
unable, to render impartial assistance or advice to the Board, or the 
objectivity of such offeror or contractor in performing work for the 
Board is or might be otherwise impaired, or such offeror or contractor 
has or would have an unfair competitive advantage. While the OCI 
Regulations provide that contracts shall generally not be awarded to an 
organization where the Board has determined that an actual or potential 
OCI exists and cannot be avoided, the Board may waive this requirement 
in certain circumstances.
    The Board is tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the safe 
operation of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) defense nuclear 
facilities in order to ensure that the health and safety of the workers 
and the general public are adequately protected. One such facility is 
the Savannah River Site, which operates an In-Tank Precipitation (ITP) 
facility that provides highly radioactive material to the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility for conversion into vitrified logs for long-term 
storage.
    The Board has become aware of a potential health and safety matter 
at the Savannah River Site involving the ITP facility. Specifically, 
the ITP chemical process results in the generation of benzene in 
solution in an unpredictable manner. Furthermore, the benzene, a 
flammable substance, is released from the solution at an anomalous 
rate. These unpredictable phenomena could be due to catalysts, 
radioactive hydrolysis, turbulence, or other factors. Of overriding 
concern to the Board is that the result of these phenomena, in 
combination with oxygen intrusion, creates the potential for a 
deflagration or explosion of the vapor within the tank

[[Page 39954]]

and the subsequent release of highly radioactive material to the 
environment.
    In order to prevent the potential for a deflagration or explosion, 
certain aspects of the ITP chemical process must be established and 
fully understood. The first issue involves determining what caused an 
unexpected chemical excursion to occur in Tank 48H of the ITP facility 
where excess sodium tetraphenylborate rapidly decomposed to benzene. 
The second issue that requires assessment occurred during the excursion 
and revealed the fact that the benzene, by some yet to be understood 
mechanism, was not immediately released into the tank vapor space. As 
the fortuitous retention of the benzene was not due to a safety system 
design feature, determining what caused the benzene to be retained must 
be comprehended as its release could have compromised the safety system 
and resulted in a serious threat to the safety of the workers and the 
general public. Lastly, the adequacy of the safety system design must 
be addressed based on the chemical excursion and benzene retention 
determinations. It is therefore imperative that a comprehensive 
understanding of the causes for the unresolved benzene issues be 
acquired and appropriate safety measures be put into effect.
    Consequently, the Board informed DOE that no additional tank waste 
or sodium tetraphenylborate should be added to Tank 48H until the 
tetraphenylborate decomposition and benzene release mechanism are well 
understood and adequate safety measures are instituted.
    The Board does not have the breadth of required expertise readily 
available to conduct an in-depth safety evaluation of the ITP chemical 
process. The Board determined that outside technical experts possessing 
the prerequisite combination of chemical engineering expertise and 
nuclear safety experience were essential to the expeditious and 
proficient evaluation of the Board's concerns. To accomplish this, the 
Board identified MPR Associates, Incorporated (MPR) as an organization 
which could immediately provide the necessary expert technical 
assistance needed to assess the safety implication of this situation. 
The scope of this assistance includes such areas as identification of 
benzene generation and release mechanisms, potential hazard prevention 
and mitigation, and establishment of safety class systems and controls. 
MPR's technical expertise is precisely the kind of support that is 
critical to the successful performance of the Board's requirement. 
Specifically, MPR will provide the expert services of Mr. Julian 
Nichols, a chemical engineer with extensive background knowledge and 
experience gained from his long-term efforts on similar problems within 
the commercial nuclear industry and through performance of safety-
related activities at the Savannah River Site under previous contract 
to the Board.
    However, MPR brought potential conflict of interest situations to 
the Board's attention based on their current contractual relationships 
with DOE through six subcontracts. A brief description of each scope of 
work follows:
    1. Westinghouse Savannah River. Under this subcontract arrangement, 
MPR is performing an assessment of the Savannah River Site's integrated 
High-Level Waste System against commercial nuclear safety standards.
    2. Westinghouse Hanford Company. This subcontract agreement 
requires MPR to provide direct support to the Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Project by participating in the K Basin Independent Technical 
Assessment and providing management and technical assistance in other 
projects of this nature.
    3. Sandia National Laboratories. MPR is conducting an annealing 
demonstration of a U.S. reactor pressure vessel to determine if 
annealing is an economically viable option that can adequately address 
technical, engineering, and institutional issues.
    4. Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of the contract is to 
provide on-going engineering support to the Sandia Fissile Materials 
Disposition Technical Integration Team in specific planning and 
technical management tasks related to DOE's decision making process in 
the technology areas of nuclear power and materials management.
    5. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Under this agreement, 
MPR is providing technical support in the analysis and development of 
federal facility compliance requirements, health and ecological risk 
assessments, and review of various policy guidance documents related to 
``deactivation end states.''
    6. Energetics. This subcontract requires MPR to provide technical 
assistance in the evaluation of a proposal submitted for a full-scale 
demonstration of fossil-fuel-fired vitrification technology for the 
vitrification of radionuclide and hazardous-material contaminated 
soils.
    While MPR's anticipated contractual work for the Board and each 
DOE-related project would not necessarily create an actual overlap of 
work at this time, and hence no direct OCI, potential OCI's do exist 
due to MPR's concurrent relationships on behalf of DOE and the Board, 
as the Savannah River Site, for instance, is a defense nuclear facility 
under the Board's jurisdiction. Consequently, as a result of its 
relationships with DOE, the ability of MPR to provide objective to the 
Board could be questioned.
    The Board reviewed each potential conflict of interest situation 
and concluded that it is nonetheless in the best interests of the 
Government to have MPR perform the ITP chemical process safety 
evaluation due to their extensive experience with similar technical 
issues gained primarily in the commercial nuclear area coupled with 
their ability to respond immediately to this need. The determination 
was made that even if there were conflicts of interest as a result of 
the DOE-related work, it was outweighed by the need for an immediate 
in-depth safety evaluation of the ITP chemical process by a known 
expert in order to contend with the health risk that could result from 
deflagration or explosion of the vapor within Tank 48H.
    In accordance with the OCI Regulations, the Board also considered 
the value of MPR's subcontracts with DOE, which MPR disclosed 
represented a small fraction of its total revenues. In the Board's 
view, the revenues from the DOE-related projects do not make MPR 
financially dependent on DOE.
    The Board also considered whether a source other than MPR existed 
which has the caliber of qualified staff capable of responding to the 
Board's needs without having potential OCI situations. Three other 
potential contractors were considered but they did not possess the 
necessary combination of expertise and experience to satisfy the 
requirements of the Board's urgent needs. The Board is not aware of any 
other firm with the level of background knowledge and experience 
essential to the successful undertaking of the Board's requirement. In 
the Board's opinion, MPR, a nationally-recognized, well-respected 
expert firm in the nuclear industry, is the only source known to the 
Board that can satisfactorily perform the evaluation required by the 
Board. The Board's view is supported by MPR's previous involvement with 
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission when the need for immediate 
expert advice arose in the wake of the Three-Mile Island nuclear 
accident, and the Board's own experience with MPR, including the expert 
technical assistance MPR rendered in connection with the Board's 
investigation of leaks in the heat exchangers at the K-Reactor, and the 
evaluation of an F-Canyon tank

[[Page 39955]]

corrosion issue at the Savannah River Site.
    Finally, the Board is required under the OCI Regulations to 
initiate measures which attempt to mitigate an OCI where reasonably 
possible. The efforts of MPR will be overseen by experienced technical 
staff members of the Board to ensure that all resultant work products 
are impartial and reflect full support for any findings and 
recommendations contained therein.
    Accordingly, on the basis of the determination described above and 
pursuant to the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 1706, the Chairman of 
the Board granted a Waiver of any conflicts of interests (and the 
pertinent provisions of the OCI Regulations) with the effort to be 
performed by MPR under contract to the Board that might arise out of 
the contractual relationships with DOE.

    Dated: July 25, 1996.
Kenneth M. Pusateri,
General Manager.
[FR Doc. 96-19451 Filed 7-30-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-M