[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 133 (Wednesday, July 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36352-36359]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-17561]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision for Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization 
Final Environmental Impact Statement, Hanford Site, Richland, WA

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of record of decision.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared this Record 
of Decision (ROD) pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality 
regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 
1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021). The ROD is based 
on the analyses of environmental impacts identified in the Plutonium 
Finishing Plant Stabilization Final Environmental Impact Statement 
(DOE/EIS-0244-F); consideration of project costs; compliance 
requirements for systems involved in stabilizing plutonium-bearing 
material; and public and agency comments.
    DOE has prepared the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to 
provide an objective technical basis for evaluating alternatives to: 
(1) Convert the plutonium-bearing materials at the Plutonium Finishing 
Plant (PFP) Facility into a more stable, safer form; (2) reduce 
radiation exposure to PFP Facility workers; and (3) reduce the cost of 
maintaining the PFP Facility and its contents at the Hanford Site, 
Benton County, Washington. The actions evaluated in the Final EIS would 
stabilize PFP Facility materials that represent environmental, safety, 
or health vulnerabilities in their current condition. Existing 
vulnerabilities are the result of discontinuing nuclear material 
production and processing operations following the end of the Cold War. 
Although DOE has initiated programmatic environmental evaluations on 
the ultimate disposition of nuclear materials in the DOE complex which 
are now surplus to national defense requirements, the implementation of 
decisions regarding ultimate disposition will take several years. In 
the interim, DOE wants to eliminate vulnerabilities associated with 
certain current nuclear material storage

[[Page 36353]]

configurations in order to protect the environment and the health and 
safety of workers and the public.
    Reviews by DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
(DNFSB) have identified environmental, safety, and health 
vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of certain 
nuclear materials at the PFP Facility in their current location and 
physical condition. The Final EIS evaluates alternatives for managing 
these materials. In making the decisions announced in this ROD, DOE 
considered environmental and health impacts, costs, engineering 
feasibility, technology availability, and, to the greatest possible 
extent, stakeholder concerns and preferences.
    After careful consideration of environmental impacts, costs, 
engineering evaluations, and public and agency comments, DOE has 
decided to implement a select group of stabilization alternatives 
identified in the Final EIS. These include three out of four of the 
preferred stabilization alternatives supplemented by other 
stabilization and immobilization processes analyzed in the final EIS. 
DOE is documenting this determination in this ROD. The action will 
involve the removal of readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material 
in hold-up at the PFP Facility, and the stabilization of this and other 
plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility. Following 
stabilization, plutonium-bearing material will be in a form suitable 
for interim storage in existing vaults at the PFP Facility. Plutonium-
bearing material having low plutonium content (less than 50 weight 
percent) and meeting criteria established by DOE may be immobilized 
through a cementation process at the PFP Facility. All immobilized 
material will be transferred to solid waste management facilities at 
the Hanford Site and, as a consequence, will be removed from safeguards 
control. In selecting these alternatives, DOE has identified the most 
suitable strategy for reducing the long-term risk to the public, 
workers, and the environment.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The actions set forth in this ROD are effective upon 
being made public on June 28, 1996, in accordance with DOE's NEPA 
implementation regulations (10 CFR 1021.315).

ADDRESSES: For further information on the stabilization of material at 
the PFP Facility or this ROD or to receive a copy of the Final EIS, 
please contact: Mr. Ben F. Burton, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland 
Operations Office, Attn: PFP-EIS, P.O. Box 550, MSIN B1-42, Richland, 
Washington 99352, (509) 946-3700.
    For further information on DOE's NEPA process, please contact: Ms. 
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W., 
Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.
    The ROD, Final EIS, and reference documents are available in the 
public reading rooms and libraries identified in the Federal Register 
Notice that announced the availability of the Final EIS (61 FR 26178) 
or by calling (509) 946-3700.

I. Background

    In 1943, the federal government selected the Hanford Site as part 
of the Manhattan Project to produce plutonium for national defense 
needs. Metallic uranium fuel was irradiated in nuclear reactors at the 
Hanford Site to produce plutonium. Chemical processing separated the 
irradiated plutonium from the other elements in the irradiated fuel. 
The product was plutonium nitrate, which needed further processing to 
produce the metallic form used in nuclear weapons. Initially, the 
plutonium nitrate was shipped offsite for this additional processing. 
The post-war construction of the PFP Facility at the Hanford Site's 200 
West Area eliminated this necessity.
    Located approximately 51 kilometers (32 miles) northwest of 
Richland, Washington, the PFP Facility includes production and recovery 
areas, laboratories for routine analysis and research, and secure 
vaults for storage of plutonium. Currently, about 240 employees are 
physically located within the fenced area of the PFP Facility. 
Additional staff is located outside the fenceline, bringing the total 
number of employees to 592 people.
    When PFP Facility production operations stopped in 1989, most of 
the processing residues remained either in storage containers or on 
surfaces in enclosed process areas as hold-up. DOE has recognized the 
need for a plan that would result in the:
     Stabilization of plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP 
Facility to a form suitable for interim storage;
     Removal of readily retrievable, plutonium-bearing 
materials left behind in process equipment, process areas, and air and 
liquid waste management systems as a result of historic uses; and
     Placement of stabilized fissile material in existing 
vaults at the PFP Facility for interim storage.
    In June 1993, DOE announced its proposal to operate certain 
processes in the PFP Facility to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials 
and to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) pursuant to NEPA. As 
part of the NEPA process for the EA, DOE conducted public meetings in 
the summer and fall of 1993 to discuss the proposal to stabilize the 
plutonium-bearing materials. As a result of the public comments 
received, DOE decided that an EIS would be the appropriate level of 
NEPA review.
    On October 27, 1994, a Notice of Intent was published in the 
Federal Register (59 FR 53969) that identified the purpose, scope, and 
preliminary alternatives for the Draft EIS and invited the public to 
participate in the scoping process. Public meetings on the EIS scope 
were conducted in six Washington and Oregon cities. The public scoping 
process ended on December 12, 1994. Both oral and written comments were 
received during the Draft EIS scoping process.
    The Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0244-D) was issued in November 1995. The 
Draft EIS presented alternatives that would achieve the purpose and 
need of the program and included analyses of the potential 
environmental impacts that would result.
    On December 5, 1995, a Notice of Availability was published in the 
Federal Register (60 FR 62244) which formally announced the release and 
availability of the Draft EIS. The public hearing date, time, and 
location were also published and public comments on the Draft EIS were 
requested. A public meeting on the Draft EIS was held in Pasco, 
Washington, on January 11, 1996. While the comment period officially 
ended on January 23, 1996, DOE decided to accommodate comments received 
through February 15, 1996. Both oral and written comments were received 
during the comment period.
    Based on existing and draft DOE policy on plutonium disposition, 
and a comment received during the public hearing, DOE decided to 
evaluate another alternative not contained in the Draft EIS. This 
alternative would involve the immobilization of materials that have a 
low associated plutonium content and thus do not warrant stabilization 
measures and vault storage as do the other plutonium-bearing materials 
analyzed in this EIS. These materials would be immobilized through a 
cementation process, packaged, and transported to a Hanford Site solid 
waste management facility.
    The plan to include this alternative in the Final EIS was announced 
in the Federal Register on May 2, 1996. The announcement also opened 
the alternative for public comment during a

[[Page 36354]]

21-day comment period. Comments received are considered in this ROD.
    The Final EIS was issued in May 1996. In addition to the analysis 
presented in the Draft EIS, the Final EIS contained responses to 
comments received on the Draft. On May 24, 1996, a Notice of 
Availability was published in the Federal Register (61 FR 26178) which 
formally announced the release and availability of the Final EIS.

II. Alternatives Evaluated in EIS

    Preferred Alternative: The plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP 
Facility can be separated into two categories: (1) Materials that are 
stored in vaults or gloveboxes; and (2) materials referred to as hold-
up. The preferred alternative identified in the Final EIS would involve 
the removal of readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material in hold-
up and the stabilization of this and plutonium-bearing materials in 
vaults and gloveboxes.
    The PFP Facility contains a variety of reactive plutonium-bearing 
materials that are chemically and physically dissimilar. These 
materials have been grouped into four inventory categories. The 
preferred alternative includes the following stabilization process for 
the four inventory groups:

(1) Plutonium-bearing solutions
    --Ion exchange, vertical calcination, and thermal stabilization;
(2) Oxides, fluorides, and process residues
    --Thermal stabilization using a continuous furnace;
(3) Metals and alloys
    --Repackaging; and
(4) Polycubes and combustibles
    --Pyrolysis.

    The preferred alternative for stabilization would involve 
processing the plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility into a 
form suitable for interim storage in existing PFP Facility vaults. When 
stabilized, the material would have minimal chemical reactivity and 
would remain in solid form with a low water and organic content.
    The preferred alternative would also involve removing and 
stabilizing plutonium-bearing material currently in hold-up at the PFP 
Facility. Hold-up is material that has accumulated or been retained in 
PFP Facility gloveboxes, hoods, process equipment, piping, exhaust and 
ventilation systems, and canyons as a result of 40 years of plutonium-
processing operations at the Facility. The removal activities would be 
limited to substantive quantities of readily retrievable plutonium-
bearing material currently in hold-up. Due to the nature and location 
of the material in hold-up, various technologies would be employed to 
remove the material for subsequent stabilization. The removal methods 
would include chemical and mechanical processes and disassembly. No 
exterior construction or major internal modification to the PFP 
Facility is planned for facility stabilization.
    Alternatives: In addition to the preferred alternative, alternative 
stabilization processes and an immobilization process have been 
analyzed. These alternatives include:

 Plutonium-bearing solutions
    --Hydroxide precipitation followed by thermal stabilization;
 Oxides, fluorides, and process residues
    --Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces and
    --Immobilization;
 Metals and alloys
    --Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces; and
 Polycubes and combustibles
    --Batch thermal stabilization,
    --Molten salt oxidation, and
    --Immobilization.

    No Action Alternative: Under the no action alternative, actions 
would be limited to ongoing maintenance and security activities 
necessary for safe and secure management of the PFP Facility. DOE would 
not install processes to stabilize the plutonium-bearing materials at 
the PFP Facility. However, plutonium-bearing materials stored in the 
PFP Facility vaults that constitute an immediate safety hazard would 
continue to be repackaged as necessary for interim storage. In 
addition, the DOE would not remove plutonium-bearing materials in hold-
up at the PFP Facility. The plutonium-bearing materials would remain 
within or on PFP Facility systems.

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    In the Final EIS, DOE evaluated each alternative to assess the full 
range of potential environmental impacts.
    The impact analysis showed that there would be no measurable 
impacts to geology, seismology, and soils; water resources and 
hydrology; air quality; noise and sound levels; ecosystems; 
transportation; land use; or archaeological resources. No income or 
population group would experience disproportionate health or 
environmental effects under any of the alternatives. Environmental 
categories where potential impacts were identified include population 
and socioeconomics, historic resources, and anticipated health effects.
    Preferred Alternative: Environmental effects identified under the 
preferred alternative are primarily related to health, population and 
socioeconomics, cost, and historic resources.
    For the preferred alternative, the total PFP Facility worker 
radiation dose for stabilization and removal would be 930 person-rem. 
The total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 14 person-rem. 
Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, the 
probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups would 
be 0.37 and 0.0070, respectively. Therefore, no latent cancer 
fatalities would be anticipated.
    Population and socioeconomic effects resulting from the preferred 
alternative would be small. The estimated staff of 592 at the PFP 
Facility would be temporarily increased by approximately 10 percent. 
Following the completion of the preferred alternative, staff levels 
would be reduced to approximately 250. There would be less than a 1 
percent change to the area's population or economics from this 
alternative. The anticipated change from the preferred alternative 
would be too small to meaningfully influence the Benton and Franklin 
County economies or impact the existing infrastructure.
    The removal activities under the preferred alternative would be 
intrusive and destructive, and would involve equipment removal. Impacts 
to the Remote Mechanical A Line, the Plutonium Reclamation Facility, 
and any of the PFP facilities currently eligible for the National 
Register of Historic Places would require mitigation to preserve the 
history of these historic resources. These mitigation measures have 
been agreed to in a Memorandum of Agreement between DOE and the 
Washington State Historic Preservation Officer.
    Alternatives: Environmental effects identified under the 
alternative stabilization processes are primarily related to health, 
population and socioeconomics, and historic resources. The 
environmental effects associated with these alternative stabilization 
processes to population and socioeconomics and historic resources are 
similar to those discussed for the preferred alternative.
    Environmental effects from implementing an immobilization process 
are primarily related to waste storage capacity. It is anticipated that 
the immobilization alternative would generate up to 1,600 drums of 
transuranic waste, with each drum containing approximately 170 grams of 
plutonium. Hanford Site solid waste management facilities would manage 
all transuranic waste generated by this process over the six-year 
period. There

[[Page 36355]]

is currently space for approximately 500 drums at the Transuranic Waste 
Storage and Assay Facility. Additional space would become available 
when existing drums at the facility are transferred to other Hanford 
Site solid waste management facilities.
    No Action Alternative: For the no action alternative, the total PFP 
Facility worker radiation dose would be 53 person-rem per year. The 
total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 0.26 person-rem 
per year. Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, 
the probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups 
during an assumed 30 years operational life of the no action 
alternative would be 0.64 and 0.0039, respectively.
    Population and socioeconomic effects resulting from the no action 
alternative would be small. The existing staff at the PFP Facility 
would be reduced by approximately 100 because ongoing cleanup and 
stabilization activities would cease. The decrease in staff would be 
too small to meaningfully influence the Benton and Franklin County 
economies or impact the existing infrastructure. However, the PFP 
Facility would be required to maintain this work force indefinitely.
    Selected Alternatives: As with the preferred alternatives, the 
environmental effects identified under the selected alternatives are 
primarily related to health, population and socioeconomics, cost, and 
historic resources.
    For the selected alternative, the total PFP Facility worker 
radiation dose for stabilization and removal would be 1,120 person-rem. 
The total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 25 person-rem. 
Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, the 
probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups would 
be 0.45 and 0.013, respectively. Therefore, no latent cancer fatalities 
would be anticipated.
    Population and socioeconomic effects would be the same as the 
preferred alternative. Impacts on historic resources and proposed 
mitigations would also be the same.

IV. Environmentally Preferred Alternative

    To determine the environmentally preferred alternative, the short-
term (six years or the time required to implement the selected 
alternatives) and long-term (greater than six years) time frames are 
considered.
    Over the short-term, the no action alternative would not result in 
increased PFP Facility worker or public radiation exposure, costs, or 
loss of historic resources. These impacts would occur under all other 
alternatives analyzed. Therefore, in the short-term, the no action 
alternative could be considered preferable to the other alternatives. 
However, implementation of the no action alternative would not resolve 
the long-term health risks associated with the current form of the 
plutonium-bearing material within the PFP Facility.
    Implementation of the preferred alternative, identified in the 
Final EIS, or the alternatives selected by this ROD would result in 
increased exposure to Hanford Site workers and the public during the 
anticipated six-year period of operation. However, following completion 
of all proposed activities the radiation exposure to in-facility 
workers would drop to 45 percent of its current level. Continued 
exposure following the completion of stabilization and immobilization 
would be the result of facility transition until final disposition of 
the facility. Under the no action alternative the high background 
radiation levels would continue indefinitely. In about 30 years the 
radiation exposure to workers from the no action alternative would 
exceed the radiation exposure from the preferred or selected 
alternatives and would correspondingly result in greater health risk. 
Therefore in the long-term, the environmentally preferred alternative 
would be to stabilize and immobilize reactive plutonium-bearing 
material in the facility.
    The no action alternative does not address the continued 
degradation of the PFP Facility and the containers in which the 
plutonium-bearing materials are stored. Since the PFP Facility is over 
40 years old, there is a higher likelihood in the long-term of a 
release to the environment under accident conditions than would be 
anticipated under the preferred alternative, other stabilization 
alternatives, or the immobilization alternative.

V. Other Considerations

    In addition to the assessment of environmental impacts provided by 
the Final EIS, DOE considered the plutonium disposition criteria, 
costs, the recommendations of the DNFSB, the Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0229-D), and 
comments received on the immobilization alternative and Final EIS in 
determining a course of action to meet the need for interim management 
of the plutonium-bearing material. Comments received on the 
immobilization alternative and the Final EIS are discussed in Section 
VI.
    Plutonium Disposition Criteria: In January 1996, A DOE office 
internally circulated for review and comment a draft policy for the 
disposition of excess plutonium-bearing residues containing less than 
50 weight percent plutonium. Under this draft policy, plutonium-bearing 
material would be processed to one of two end-states: (1) Plutonium 
packaged for storage in accordance with DOE storage standard; or (2) 
waste suitable for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This 
policy would require that a determination of which end-state is more 
cost-effective be made by the responsible field office and approved by 
the appropriate DOE Secretarial Officer. As a result, the Final EIS 
included an alternative to immobilize candidate plutonium-bearing 
material through cementation.
    The cementation process was favored for immobilization because: (1) 
The ingredients are inexpensive, safe, and readily available; (2) the 
equipment needs are simple; (3) the final waste form has proven 
stability; (4) it meets the safeguards and security requirements; and 
(5) it meets the Hanford Site solid waste acceptance criteria and has 
been used extensively at the Hanford Site for immobilizing wastes. In 
contrast, immobilizing of materials in a glass (i.e., vitrification) or 
a ceramic matrix was not considered desirable because of the cost, 
specialized equipment required, lack of such equipment on the Hanford 
Site, and lack of site experience. These factors would result in delays 
in implementing these alternatives and additional health and safety 
risks. Another alternative would be to mix the plutonium with uranium 
to produce a mixed oxide fuel suitable for energy production in a 
nuclear power reactor. Because of the relatively small quantity of 
plutonium material being considered, it was not considered reasonable 
to develop the technology at the Hanford Site to support this 
alternative.
    The Final EIS contains the statement, ``The * * * Record of 
Decision will not include a decision on the immobilization alternative 
unless this draft policy or a comparable policy has been finalized.'' 
This policy has not been finalized, therefore decisions to immobilize 
plutonium-bearing materials will continue to be made in accordance with 
factors and provisions contained in the April 1994 DOE memorandum from 
Mr. C. Halsted, then Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Weapons 
Management.
    The Halsted memorandum provides evaluation factors for discard 
decisions for plutonium-bearing material. These factors are: worker 
safety, minimizing

[[Page 36356]]

environmental impact, regulatory concerns, waste minimization, disposal 
technical factors, technical risk, stakeholder interest, risk 
assessment, implementation time and feasibility, proliferation 
potential, cost, and interim storage feasibility. These factors will be 
applied to the categories of plutonium-bearing material potentially 
suitable for immobilization. Future policies of this nature will be 
evaluated in connection with decisions to immobilize low concentration 
materials.
    Costs: In the long-term, cost savings would be achieved by 
removing, stabilizing, and/or immobilizing the plutonium-bearing 
material at the PFP Facility versus continuing to operate the Facility 
in its current condition.
    Implementation of the preferred alternative would result in a ten 
percent increase in expenditures from the estimated fiscal year 1995 
level of $80 million to approximately $89 million. Following completion 
of stabilization and removal activities in about six years, the 
expenditures at the PFP Facility would decline to approximately $34 
million per year.
    The cost of implementing the other alternatives would be comparable 
to the cost of the preferred alternative.
    Under the no action alternative, the cost of operating the Facility 
would drop by approximately 17 percent from the fiscal year 1995 level 
of $80 million to approximately $67 million in fiscal year 1997. This 
reduction would result from a cessation of ongoing interim actions. 
This expenditure would go on indefinitely and may increase as the 
Facility ages and needs additional maintenance. In approximately 10 
years, the cost of continuing to maintain the PFP Facility would exceed 
the cost of stabilization.
    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB): The DNFSB is 
chartered by Congress to review and evaluate the content and 
implementation of the standards relating to the design, construction, 
operation, and decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities 
(including applicable DOE Orders, regulations, and requirements). The 
DNFSB recommended to the Secretary of Energy those specific measures 
that should be adopted to ensure that public health and safety are 
adequately protected. In Recommendation 94-1, the DNFSB noted that it 
was concerned that the halt in production of materials to be used in 
nuclear weapons froze the manufacturing pipeline in a state that, for 
safety reasons, should not be allowed to persist unremediated.
    In Recommendation 94-1, the DNFSB specifically advised: ``that an 
integrated program plan be formulated on a high priority basis, to 
convert within two to three years the materials'' plutonium metal that 
is in contact with, or in proximity to, plastic ``to forms or 
conditions suitable for safe interim storage;'' that the plan ``will 
require attention to limiting worker exposure and minimizing generation 
of additional waste and emission of effluents to the environment;'' and 
finally, that the plan ``should include a provision that, within a 
reasonable period of time (such as eight years), all storage of 
plutonium metal and oxide should be in conformance with the DOE 
standard on storage of plutonium.''
    All alternatives evaluated in the Final EIS, with the exception of 
the no action alternative would achieve the recommendation of the 
DNFSB.
    Fissile Material Programmatic EIS: The Storage and Disposition of 
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Programmatic Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0229-D) 
evaluates alternatives for the long-term storage and disposition of 
plutonium and other special nuclear material. None of the alternatives 
considered in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization Final EIS 
would preclude alternatives considered in the programmatic EIS.

VI. Comment on Immobilization Alternative and Final EIS

    DOE received three comments from individuals and organizations on 
the Immobilization Alternative and the Final EIS.
    1. Comment: Gordon Rogers provided the following comment:
    I have no objection to the alternative for immobilization in 
general. However, DOE should consider the additional security costs 
associated with the relatively large amount of plutonium-bearing 
material to be sent to the solid waste management facilities. The 
security provisions in place at the PFP Facility are more stringent 
than at the Hanford Site solid waste management facilities.
    Response: According to DOE Order 5632.1C, Protection and Control of 
Safeguards and Security Interests, protection and control shall be 
provided in a graded, cost-effective fashion in accordance with the 
potential risks to the national security and/or health and safety of 
DOE and contractor employees, the public, and the environment. By a 
graded approach, the DOE intends that the level-of-effort and magnitude 
of resources expended for the protection of a particular security 
interest are commensurate with the security interest's importance or 
the impact of its loss, destruction, or misuse.
    DOE Order 5633.3B, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials, 
defines materials attractiveness levels for the purpose of applying 
safeguards and security requirements. Prior to implementing the 
immobilization of plutonium residues, DOE will ensure that the material 
in its final form is placed in a category which will not impose 
additional safeguards and security requirements upon the Hanford Site 
solid waste facilities.
    2. Comment: The following comment was received from the Washington 
State Department of Ecology, Nuclear Waste Program:
    The fact that U.S. Department of Energy has not made a decision on 
whether this material has beneficial use seems inconsistent with the 
proposal to immobilize and transfer it to the Hanford Site Solid Waste 
Management Facilities. The new alternative addendum should fully 
describe the applicability of the State of Washington Hazardous Waste 
Management Act (HWMA) to the immobilization of the plutonium bearing 
material being considered. The addendum should provide a regulatory 
rationale that supports this new alternative. Please refer to our 
letter to Mr. James E. Mecca, dated April 7, 1996, where we clearly 
state the materials which contain Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at PFP 
are regulated wastes under the HWMA, so long as 1) they classify as a 
solid waste, 2) they classify as a mixed waste, and 3) they designate 
pursuant to Chapter 173.303.070 WAC.
    Response: The DOE has not classified any special nuclear material 
(SNM) currently in storage at the PFP Facility as waste. The materials 
stored at the PFP Facility have been determined to be excess to the 
nuclear weapons program needs, but an ultimate disposition for the 
material has not been determined.
    There is currently existing guidance contained in a 1994 DOE 
memorandum from Mr. C. Halsted, then Acting Director, Office of Nuclear 
Weapons Management, providing evaluation criteria for the economic and 
other discard related approaches for these materials. Lacking updated 
policy for these materials, the Final EIS provides an approach to 
utilize the existing guidance to evaluate the SNM inventory at the PFP 
Facility.
    Before proceeding with the alternative to immobilize residues, DOE 
recognizes that agreement upon an acceptable regulatory strategy will 
need to be reached with the Washington State Department of Ecology 
(Ecology). In the event that a regulatory path cannot be achieved, then 
the economic factors in the evaluation of candidate residues

[[Page 36357]]

will likely drive the residues to be thermally stabilized for storage 
or result in a further evaluation of the alternatives for recovery of 
the plutonium rather than it being immobilized for discard. The 
discussion below assumes that a path forward can be achieved.
    As the total inventory of material is evaluated, those items that 
are determined to be suitable for discard will be immobilized to the 
current Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) criteria and the Nuclear 
Safeguards and Security criteria. The SNM material would be removed 
from the PFP Facility inventory and transferred to a Hanford Site solid 
waste management facility for future shipment to the WIPP disposal 
area. The material would be defined as a waste at the point where the 
DOE requirements for discard are met; i.e., the material form and 
plutonium quantity are such that non-proliferation protection 
(safeguards) are no longer required. At the point of solid waste 
generation, DOE would designate the wastes as applicable under 
Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-070, and would implement 
any applicable requirements of WAC 173-303 for dangerous waste 
accumulation, transportation, and storage to the extent that non-SNM 
components are present which would require designation as dangerous 
waste.
    As discussed above, DOE is currently working with Ecology to 
develop a regulatory path forward. Resolution of this issue will be 
needed before DOE can implement plans to immobilize plutonium-bearing 
material in vault storage and hold-up.
    3. Comment: The following comment was received from the Washington 
State Department of Ecology, Nuclear Waste Program:
    The new alternative does not clearly compare or contrast the 
difference between the description and quantities of plutonium-bearing 
materials potentially suitable for immobilization under Section 3.1.3 
of the PFP-EIS and the new alternative. Please provide further 
clarification of the description and quantities between the two.
    Response: The description and quantity of plutonium-bearing 
materials potentially suitable for immobilization, discussed in Section 
3.1.3 and Appendix E of the Final EIS, are equivalent. Because the 
inventory of the plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility is of a 
varied nature, the material was grouped into inventory categories. 
These categories correspond to the inventory categories presented for 
stabilization.
    Up to 272 kg (599 lbs) of plutonium are candidates for 
immobilization. This number includes approximately 222 kg (489 lbs) of 
plutonium contained in 1,500 items that are currently stored in PFP 
Facility vaults and 50 kg (110 lbs) of plutonium in hold-up. The 
plutonium-bearing material in vault storage includes approximately 91 
kg (200 lbs) of oxides with less than 50 weight percent of plutonium, 
81 kg (178 lbs) of ash residues, 43 kg (95 lbs) of slag and crucible 
residues, and 7 kg (15 lbs) of miscellaneous plutonium-bearing 
material. The plutonium-bearing material in hold-up includes up to 4.5 
kg (10 lbs) of plutonium from the E-4 ventilation system ductwork; up 
to 4.3 kg (9.5 lbs) of plutonium from vacuum process piping; up to 28 
kg of plutonium from gloveboxes and hoods; and up to 12.5 kg (27.5 lbs) 
of plutonium from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon.

VII. Decision

    DOE prepared the Draft and Final EIS to evaluate environmental and 
human health impacts associated with operation of systems to continue 
the safe management of plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility. 
After careful consideration of environmental impacts, costs, 
engineering evaluations, and public and agency comments, DOE has 
decided to implement a select group of stabilization alternatives 
identified in the Final EIS. These include three out of four of the 
preferred stabilization alternatives supplemented by other 
stabilization and immobilization processes analyzed in the Final EIS. 
The action will also involve the removal of readily retrievable 
plutonium-bearing material in hold-up at the PFP Facility and the 
stabilization of this and other plutonium-bearing material at the PFP 
Facility. Following stabilization, plutonium-bearing material will be 
in a form suitable for interim storage in existing vaults at the PFP 
Facility. Plutonium-bearing material having low plutonium content and 
meeting criteria established by DOE may be immobilized through a 
cementation process at the PFP Facility and transferred to a Hanford 
Site solid waste management facility for storage. By selecting a suite 
of alternatives, DOE anticipates that health impacts to workers, and 
the cost to implement the action will be reduced. DOE is documenting 
this determination in this ROD.
    This action will reduce radiation exposure and risk to workers and 
the public, and future resources needed to safely manage the PFP 
Facility.
    Since the PFP Facility contains a variety of reactive plutonium-
bearing materials that are chemically and physically dissimilar, 
various processes will be required to stabilize these materials. The 
primary means to accomplish this will be through the implementation of 
the stabilization processes described under the preferred alternative 
in the Final EIS. However, stabilization of some portion of the 
plutonium-bearing materials may be better accomplished through one of 
the alternative stabilization processes analyzed in the Final EIS. For 
this reason, DOE may implement these alternative processes on a case-
by-case basis. The primary stabilization processes which will be 
implemented for each inventory category are:
    (1) Plutonium-bearing solutions: For Plutonium-bearing solutions 
two alternatives are selected.

--Ion exchange, vertical calcination, and thermal stabilization. Most 
plutonium-bearing solutions will be stabilized by thermal treatment 
using a vertical calciner. For this application, the feed material will 
include plutonium nitrate solutions, solutions containing chlorides, 
caustic solutions, and dissolved plutonium fluoride.

    In order to utilize the vertical calcination process, some of the 
plutonium-bearing solutions will require pretreatment by ion exchange 
to remove chemical constituents that are not compatible with the 
vertical calcination process or the process equipment. In addition, the 
calciner product may require further thermal stabilization in order to 
meet DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides'' 
(DOE-STD-3013-94).
    The combined ion exchange/vertical calciner/thermal treatment 
process will be capable of processing most of the inventory of 
plutonium nitrate and chloride solutions. It also will be able to 
process the plutonium fluoride solids if they are first dissolved and 
converted to the nitrate form using an acid dissolution pretreatment 
operation. This will increase the quantity of material to be stabilized 
from 335 kg (738 lb) plutonium to 338 kg (745 lb) of plutonium 
associated with approximately 4,800 l (1,268 gal) of solution.

--Hydroxide precipitation followed by thermal stabilization. Plutonium-
bearing solutions could be alternatively treated by a relatively simple 
hydroxide precipitation process. The resultant plutonium precipitate 
will then be thermally stabilized to an oxide form capable of meeting 
DOE's ``Criteria for Safe

[[Page 36358]]

Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). This 
alternative would be applied to the portion of the plutonium-bearing 
solutions that are determined to be unsuited for vertical calcination. 
An example would be material that could create a resinous residue or 
cause corrosion within the vertical calciner. No more than 20 percent 
of the plutonium solutions are anticipated to fall into this category.

    Caustic or other hydroxide-forming reagents will be added to the 
solution, gradually increasing the pH until insoluble plutonium 
hydroxide is formed. The plutonium hydroxide and other metal 
impurities, such as nickel, chromium, and iron, will precipitate out 
and be filtered from solution. The filtered solids will then be 
thermally processed into a stable oxide form.
    (2) Oxides, fluorides, and process residues: For oxides, fluorides, 
and process residues one alternative was selected.

--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces. Although it would 
result in additional radiation exposure to the PFP Facility worker, 
over the preferred alternative, this alternative was selected because 
development of the continuous process furnace has not proceeded as 
anticipated and the continuous furnace may not be capable of producing 
product that meets DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium 
Metals and Oxides'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). In addition, some of the 
materials are not amenable to continuous process furnace due to their 
size, moisture content, or high organic content. These materials, 
however, can be processed through a batch thermal stabilization 
process.

    Under the batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces 
process, the plutonium-bearing solids will be fed into a muffle furnace 
which is elevated to a temperature of approximately 1,000 deg.C 
(1,832 deg.F). The high temperature air environment lowers the residual 
moisture level and facilitates conversion of incompletely oxidized 
plutonium to plutonium oxides.
    Material that meets the DOE storage standard would not require any 
additional thermal stabilization and will be directly repackaged. 
Plutonium fluorides will pose problems in the muffle furnace due to the 
corrosive nature of fluoride-bearing gases that could be liberated. The 
plutonium fluorides may be pretreated using an acid dissolution process 
and blended with the plutonium-bearing solutions. Alternately, a 
corrosion control program may be established and the fluorides sent 
through the muffle furnace.
    This process may stabilize 2,417 kg (5,329 lb) of plutonium. The 
resultant plutonium oxides will be tested in accordance with the DOE 
storage standard. Product deemed acceptable may be packaged using 
existing capabilities at the Hanford Site and placed in the vault(s) at 
the PFP Facility for storage. Product not meeting the DOE storage 
standard will be recycled through the muffle furnace. The product may 
be retrieved and repackaged at a later date to meet the DOE storage 
standard specifying organic-free containers when a bagless transfer 
system becomes available at the Hanford Site. Alternatively, the 
material may go directly to an organic free container.
    (3) Metals and alloys: For metals and alloys two alternatives are 
selected.

--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces. The plutonium-
bearing solids will be fed into a muffle furnace and elevated to a 
final temperature of approximately 1,000 deg.C (1,832 deg.F). The high 
temperature air environment facilitates conversion of the metal and 
alloys to metal oxides (i.e., plutonium oxides).

    A total of 770 kg (1,698 lb) of plutonium may be stabilized using 
this process. The resultant product will be tested in accordance with 
the DOE storage standard. Product deemed acceptable will be packaged 
using existing capabilities at the Hanford Site and placed in the 
vault(s) at the PFP Facility for storage. It is assumed that the metals 
and alloys may require more than one thermal processing cycle to 
achieve the desired oxide product. The product may be retrieved and 
repackaged at a later date to meet the DOE storage standard specifying 
organic-free containers once a bagless transfer system becomes 
available at the Hanford Site. Alternatively, the material may go 
directly to an organic-free container.

--Repackaging. Non-destructive testing could indicate that some 
plutonium metals and alloys may safely be repackaged without thermal 
stabilization. These materials would be repackaged using methods that 
do not rely upon organic seals or plastic bags. The repackaged 
materials will be stored in the vault(s) at the PFP Facility and 
routinely monitored until final disposition.

    (4) Polycubes and combustibles: For polycubes and combustibles, 
because of technical uncertainties associated with the preferred 
alternative, two alternatives are selected.

--Pyrolysis. This alternative is a thermal process involving 
distillation and decarbonization, that separates the plutonium oxides 
from the polystyrene. The product, stable plutonium oxides, will be 
packaged and returned to the vaults at the PFP Facility.

    The pyrolysis process has the capability for processing other 
combustibles such as rags and polyethylene. If part of the inventory of 
combustibles is not suitable for pyrolysis, those combustibles may be 
sent to the Hanford Site solid waste management facilities for storage.
    A total of 35 kg (77 lb) of plutonium may be stabilized by this 
alternative. The resultant plutonium oxide will be thermally tested in 
accordance with DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals 
and Oxides'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). Product determined to be acceptable 
will be packaged using existing packaging capabilities and placed in 
the vault(s) at the PFP Facility for storage. Product not meeting the 
DOE storage standard will be run through additional thermal 
stabilization processes.

--Batch thermal stabilization. Alternatively, a process involving batch 
thermal stabilization of the plutonium-bearing polycubes and 
combustibles could be used. Although the thermal stabilization method 
used for the two types of materials is the same, each type of material 
will be processed separately. The polycubes or combustibles will be fed 
into a muffle furnace, which is elevated to a temperature of 
approximately 300 deg.C (572 deg.F). Initially, the furnace will be 
purged with nitrogen gas to maintain an inert environment and prevent 
combustion of the organic component. At 300 deg.C (572 deg.F), the 
organic component of the feed will be driven off into a secondary 
combustion chamber. The plutonium-bearing material remaining in the 
muffle furnace will be exposed to air and elevated to approximately 
1,000 deg.C (1,832 deg.F). The high temperature environment facilitates 
conversion of incompletely oxidized plutonium to plutonium oxides.

    (5) Removal of holdup: This ROD will also implement the preferred 
alternative for removal. The removal activities will be limited to 
plutonium-bearing materials that are readily retrievable. Plutonium-
bearing material with a high quantity of plutonium will be stabilized 
as described above. Material with a low plutonium content may be 
immobilized and sent to a Hanford Site solid waste management facility 
for storage. Due to

[[Page 36359]]

the nature and location of the material in hold-up, various 
technologies will be employed to remove the material for subsequent 
stabilization. All technologies analyzed in the Final EIS will be 
utilized to some degree. Four areas of the PFP Facility have been 
identified for removal of readily retrievable hold-up material: 
ductwork, vacuum system piping, gloveboxes and hoods, and the Plutonium 
Reclamation Facility canyon floor. These areas represent locations 
where a high quantity of plutonium-bearing material exists as hold-up 
and where removal actions will be beneficial in reducing the exposure 
risk. Non-readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material with a low 
quantity of plutonium will remain in hold-up at the PFP Facility. This 
material will be addressed when DOE makes a decision to decontaminate 
and decommission the PFP Facility.
    (6) Immobilization: Candidate plutonium-bearing material with low 
plutonium content may be immobilized and discarded. The plutonium-
bearing material will include: (1) Materials that are containerized and 
stored in vaults or gloveboxes; and (2) hold-up material.
    The immobilization process will be applicable for up to 272 kg (599 
lbs) of plutonium from selected quantities of the following plutonium-
bearing materials:

Oxides, fluorides, and process residues (not applicable for any 
fluorides or for oxides greater than 50 weight percent plutonium)
    --Immobilization of candidate materials
Polycubes and combustibles (not applicable for polycubes)
    --Immobilization of candidate materials
Low plutonium content material removed from hold-up (less than 50 
weight percent plutonium)

    The immobilization process will include a cementation step which 
will fix the plutonium-bearing material into a solid matrix, packaging 
the cemented materials into appropriate shipping containers, and 
transporting the containers to a Hanford Site solid waste management 
facility for storage.

VIII. Mitigation

    Since land use and water resources would not be impacted by the 
preferred alternative or other stabilization alternatives analyzed in 
the Final EIS, no mitigation measures would need to be taken in regard 
to these resources. Mitigation measures in place for the PFP Facility 
have been discussed in the Final EIS (e.g., High-efficiency particulate 
air filtration of exhaust pathways).
    To ensure that activities and consequences (e.g., radiological dose 
to PFP Facility workers) for normal/routine activities would remain 
within established requirements, and to ensure that the risk of 
accidents would be minimized, numerous measures would be taken in 
association with the preferred alternative. These measures include 
adequate (engineered) design features for gloveboxes, systems, and 
components; the development of safety analyses consistent with the 
process established by DOE; and the implementation of numerous programs 
that already exist at the Hanford Site. Examples of these programs are 
as follows:
     Maintenance program--Ensures that hardware performs as 
expected when demanded
     Fire protection program--Mitigates property loss and 
minimizes human health impacts due to fire
     Criticality prevention program--Mitigates potential human 
health impacts of an inadvertent criticality
     Radiological controls program--Mitigates routine and 
accident-related doses
     Industrial hygiene program--Mitigates routine and 
accident-related chemical exposure
     Training program--Minimizes and mitigates adverse impacts 
to personnel by training them in proper ways to perform their job and 
to respond during emergency events.
    Certain removal activities will substantially alter or demolish 
existing equipment and facilities at the PFP Facility which have been 
found to be eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic 
Places. A Memorandum of Agreement between DOE and the Washington State 
Historic Preservation Officer has been accepted by the Advisory Council 
on Historic Preservation. This agreement addresses the measures that 
will be required to mitigate these adverse impacts. Because all 
practical means to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts from this 
removal action are incorporated in the PFP Facility and practices, DOE 
has determined that there is no need to prepare a Mitigation Action 
Plan in accordance with Section 1021.331(a) of DOE's regulations 
implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021).

    Issued: This ROD for PFP Stabilization EIS is issued by DOE, 
Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington on June 25, 1996.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 96-17561 Filed 7-10-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P