[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 133 (Wednesday, July 10, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 36352-36359]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-17561]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Record of Decision for Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization
Final Environmental Impact Statement, Hanford Site, Richland, WA
AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared this Record
of Decision (ROD) pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality
regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR]
1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA regulations (10 CFR 1021). The ROD is based
on the analyses of environmental impacts identified in the Plutonium
Finishing Plant Stabilization Final Environmental Impact Statement
(DOE/EIS-0244-F); consideration of project costs; compliance
requirements for systems involved in stabilizing plutonium-bearing
material; and public and agency comments.
DOE has prepared the Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to
provide an objective technical basis for evaluating alternatives to:
(1) Convert the plutonium-bearing materials at the Plutonium Finishing
Plant (PFP) Facility into a more stable, safer form; (2) reduce
radiation exposure to PFP Facility workers; and (3) reduce the cost of
maintaining the PFP Facility and its contents at the Hanford Site,
Benton County, Washington. The actions evaluated in the Final EIS would
stabilize PFP Facility materials that represent environmental, safety,
or health vulnerabilities in their current condition. Existing
vulnerabilities are the result of discontinuing nuclear material
production and processing operations following the end of the Cold War.
Although DOE has initiated programmatic environmental evaluations on
the ultimate disposition of nuclear materials in the DOE complex which
are now surplus to national defense requirements, the implementation of
decisions regarding ultimate disposition will take several years. In
the interim, DOE wants to eliminate vulnerabilities associated with
certain current nuclear material storage
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configurations in order to protect the environment and the health and
safety of workers and the public.
Reviews by DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB) have identified environmental, safety, and health
vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of certain
nuclear materials at the PFP Facility in their current location and
physical condition. The Final EIS evaluates alternatives for managing
these materials. In making the decisions announced in this ROD, DOE
considered environmental and health impacts, costs, engineering
feasibility, technology availability, and, to the greatest possible
extent, stakeholder concerns and preferences.
After careful consideration of environmental impacts, costs,
engineering evaluations, and public and agency comments, DOE has
decided to implement a select group of stabilization alternatives
identified in the Final EIS. These include three out of four of the
preferred stabilization alternatives supplemented by other
stabilization and immobilization processes analyzed in the final EIS.
DOE is documenting this determination in this ROD. The action will
involve the removal of readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material
in hold-up at the PFP Facility, and the stabilization of this and other
plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility. Following
stabilization, plutonium-bearing material will be in a form suitable
for interim storage in existing vaults at the PFP Facility. Plutonium-
bearing material having low plutonium content (less than 50 weight
percent) and meeting criteria established by DOE may be immobilized
through a cementation process at the PFP Facility. All immobilized
material will be transferred to solid waste management facilities at
the Hanford Site and, as a consequence, will be removed from safeguards
control. In selecting these alternatives, DOE has identified the most
suitable strategy for reducing the long-term risk to the public,
workers, and the environment.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The actions set forth in this ROD are effective upon
being made public on June 28, 1996, in accordance with DOE's NEPA
implementation regulations (10 CFR 1021.315).
ADDRESSES: For further information on the stabilization of material at
the PFP Facility or this ROD or to receive a copy of the Final EIS,
please contact: Mr. Ben F. Burton, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland
Operations Office, Attn: PFP-EIS, P.O. Box 550, MSIN B1-42, Richland,
Washington 99352, (509) 946-3700.
For further information on DOE's NEPA process, please contact: Ms.
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-4600 or (800) 472-2756.
The ROD, Final EIS, and reference documents are available in the
public reading rooms and libraries identified in the Federal Register
Notice that announced the availability of the Final EIS (61 FR 26178)
or by calling (509) 946-3700.
I. Background
In 1943, the federal government selected the Hanford Site as part
of the Manhattan Project to produce plutonium for national defense
needs. Metallic uranium fuel was irradiated in nuclear reactors at the
Hanford Site to produce plutonium. Chemical processing separated the
irradiated plutonium from the other elements in the irradiated fuel.
The product was plutonium nitrate, which needed further processing to
produce the metallic form used in nuclear weapons. Initially, the
plutonium nitrate was shipped offsite for this additional processing.
The post-war construction of the PFP Facility at the Hanford Site's 200
West Area eliminated this necessity.
Located approximately 51 kilometers (32 miles) northwest of
Richland, Washington, the PFP Facility includes production and recovery
areas, laboratories for routine analysis and research, and secure
vaults for storage of plutonium. Currently, about 240 employees are
physically located within the fenced area of the PFP Facility.
Additional staff is located outside the fenceline, bringing the total
number of employees to 592 people.
When PFP Facility production operations stopped in 1989, most of
the processing residues remained either in storage containers or on
surfaces in enclosed process areas as hold-up. DOE has recognized the
need for a plan that would result in the:
Stabilization of plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP
Facility to a form suitable for interim storage;
Removal of readily retrievable, plutonium-bearing
materials left behind in process equipment, process areas, and air and
liquid waste management systems as a result of historic uses; and
Placement of stabilized fissile material in existing
vaults at the PFP Facility for interim storage.
In June 1993, DOE announced its proposal to operate certain
processes in the PFP Facility to stabilize plutonium-bearing materials
and to prepare an Environmental Assessment (EA) pursuant to NEPA. As
part of the NEPA process for the EA, DOE conducted public meetings in
the summer and fall of 1993 to discuss the proposal to stabilize the
plutonium-bearing materials. As a result of the public comments
received, DOE decided that an EIS would be the appropriate level of
NEPA review.
On October 27, 1994, a Notice of Intent was published in the
Federal Register (59 FR 53969) that identified the purpose, scope, and
preliminary alternatives for the Draft EIS and invited the public to
participate in the scoping process. Public meetings on the EIS scope
were conducted in six Washington and Oregon cities. The public scoping
process ended on December 12, 1994. Both oral and written comments were
received during the Draft EIS scoping process.
The Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0244-D) was issued in November 1995. The
Draft EIS presented alternatives that would achieve the purpose and
need of the program and included analyses of the potential
environmental impacts that would result.
On December 5, 1995, a Notice of Availability was published in the
Federal Register (60 FR 62244) which formally announced the release and
availability of the Draft EIS. The public hearing date, time, and
location were also published and public comments on the Draft EIS were
requested. A public meeting on the Draft EIS was held in Pasco,
Washington, on January 11, 1996. While the comment period officially
ended on January 23, 1996, DOE decided to accommodate comments received
through February 15, 1996. Both oral and written comments were received
during the comment period.
Based on existing and draft DOE policy on plutonium disposition,
and a comment received during the public hearing, DOE decided to
evaluate another alternative not contained in the Draft EIS. This
alternative would involve the immobilization of materials that have a
low associated plutonium content and thus do not warrant stabilization
measures and vault storage as do the other plutonium-bearing materials
analyzed in this EIS. These materials would be immobilized through a
cementation process, packaged, and transported to a Hanford Site solid
waste management facility.
The plan to include this alternative in the Final EIS was announced
in the Federal Register on May 2, 1996. The announcement also opened
the alternative for public comment during a
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21-day comment period. Comments received are considered in this ROD.
The Final EIS was issued in May 1996. In addition to the analysis
presented in the Draft EIS, the Final EIS contained responses to
comments received on the Draft. On May 24, 1996, a Notice of
Availability was published in the Federal Register (61 FR 26178) which
formally announced the release and availability of the Final EIS.
II. Alternatives Evaluated in EIS
Preferred Alternative: The plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP
Facility can be separated into two categories: (1) Materials that are
stored in vaults or gloveboxes; and (2) materials referred to as hold-
up. The preferred alternative identified in the Final EIS would involve
the removal of readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material in hold-
up and the stabilization of this and plutonium-bearing materials in
vaults and gloveboxes.
The PFP Facility contains a variety of reactive plutonium-bearing
materials that are chemically and physically dissimilar. These
materials have been grouped into four inventory categories. The
preferred alternative includes the following stabilization process for
the four inventory groups:
(1) Plutonium-bearing solutions
--Ion exchange, vertical calcination, and thermal stabilization;
(2) Oxides, fluorides, and process residues
--Thermal stabilization using a continuous furnace;
(3) Metals and alloys
--Repackaging; and
(4) Polycubes and combustibles
--Pyrolysis.
The preferred alternative for stabilization would involve
processing the plutonium-bearing materials at the PFP Facility into a
form suitable for interim storage in existing PFP Facility vaults. When
stabilized, the material would have minimal chemical reactivity and
would remain in solid form with a low water and organic content.
The preferred alternative would also involve removing and
stabilizing plutonium-bearing material currently in hold-up at the PFP
Facility. Hold-up is material that has accumulated or been retained in
PFP Facility gloveboxes, hoods, process equipment, piping, exhaust and
ventilation systems, and canyons as a result of 40 years of plutonium-
processing operations at the Facility. The removal activities would be
limited to substantive quantities of readily retrievable plutonium-
bearing material currently in hold-up. Due to the nature and location
of the material in hold-up, various technologies would be employed to
remove the material for subsequent stabilization. The removal methods
would include chemical and mechanical processes and disassembly. No
exterior construction or major internal modification to the PFP
Facility is planned for facility stabilization.
Alternatives: In addition to the preferred alternative, alternative
stabilization processes and an immobilization process have been
analyzed. These alternatives include:
Plutonium-bearing solutions
--Hydroxide precipitation followed by thermal stabilization;
Oxides, fluorides, and process residues
--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces and
--Immobilization;
Metals and alloys
--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces; and
Polycubes and combustibles
--Batch thermal stabilization,
--Molten salt oxidation, and
--Immobilization.
No Action Alternative: Under the no action alternative, actions
would be limited to ongoing maintenance and security activities
necessary for safe and secure management of the PFP Facility. DOE would
not install processes to stabilize the plutonium-bearing materials at
the PFP Facility. However, plutonium-bearing materials stored in the
PFP Facility vaults that constitute an immediate safety hazard would
continue to be repackaged as necessary for interim storage. In
addition, the DOE would not remove plutonium-bearing materials in hold-
up at the PFP Facility. The plutonium-bearing materials would remain
within or on PFP Facility systems.
III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
In the Final EIS, DOE evaluated each alternative to assess the full
range of potential environmental impacts.
The impact analysis showed that there would be no measurable
impacts to geology, seismology, and soils; water resources and
hydrology; air quality; noise and sound levels; ecosystems;
transportation; land use; or archaeological resources. No income or
population group would experience disproportionate health or
environmental effects under any of the alternatives. Environmental
categories where potential impacts were identified include population
and socioeconomics, historic resources, and anticipated health effects.
Preferred Alternative: Environmental effects identified under the
preferred alternative are primarily related to health, population and
socioeconomics, cost, and historic resources.
For the preferred alternative, the total PFP Facility worker
radiation dose for stabilization and removal would be 930 person-rem.
The total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 14 person-rem.
Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, the
probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups would
be 0.37 and 0.0070, respectively. Therefore, no latent cancer
fatalities would be anticipated.
Population and socioeconomic effects resulting from the preferred
alternative would be small. The estimated staff of 592 at the PFP
Facility would be temporarily increased by approximately 10 percent.
Following the completion of the preferred alternative, staff levels
would be reduced to approximately 250. There would be less than a 1
percent change to the area's population or economics from this
alternative. The anticipated change from the preferred alternative
would be too small to meaningfully influence the Benton and Franklin
County economies or impact the existing infrastructure.
The removal activities under the preferred alternative would be
intrusive and destructive, and would involve equipment removal. Impacts
to the Remote Mechanical A Line, the Plutonium Reclamation Facility,
and any of the PFP facilities currently eligible for the National
Register of Historic Places would require mitigation to preserve the
history of these historic resources. These mitigation measures have
been agreed to in a Memorandum of Agreement between DOE and the
Washington State Historic Preservation Officer.
Alternatives: Environmental effects identified under the
alternative stabilization processes are primarily related to health,
population and socioeconomics, and historic resources. The
environmental effects associated with these alternative stabilization
processes to population and socioeconomics and historic resources are
similar to those discussed for the preferred alternative.
Environmental effects from implementing an immobilization process
are primarily related to waste storage capacity. It is anticipated that
the immobilization alternative would generate up to 1,600 drums of
transuranic waste, with each drum containing approximately 170 grams of
plutonium. Hanford Site solid waste management facilities would manage
all transuranic waste generated by this process over the six-year
period. There
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is currently space for approximately 500 drums at the Transuranic Waste
Storage and Assay Facility. Additional space would become available
when existing drums at the facility are transferred to other Hanford
Site solid waste management facilities.
No Action Alternative: For the no action alternative, the total PFP
Facility worker radiation dose would be 53 person-rem per year. The
total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 0.26 person-rem
per year. Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors,
the probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups
during an assumed 30 years operational life of the no action
alternative would be 0.64 and 0.0039, respectively.
Population and socioeconomic effects resulting from the no action
alternative would be small. The existing staff at the PFP Facility
would be reduced by approximately 100 because ongoing cleanup and
stabilization activities would cease. The decrease in staff would be
too small to meaningfully influence the Benton and Franklin County
economies or impact the existing infrastructure. However, the PFP
Facility would be required to maintain this work force indefinitely.
Selected Alternatives: As with the preferred alternatives, the
environmental effects identified under the selected alternatives are
primarily related to health, population and socioeconomics, cost, and
historic resources.
For the selected alternative, the total PFP Facility worker
radiation dose for stabilization and removal would be 1,120 person-rem.
The total radiation dose to offsite individuals would be 25 person-rem.
Based on commonly accepted dose to risk conversion factors, the
probability of latent cancer fatalities to these affected groups would
be 0.45 and 0.013, respectively. Therefore, no latent cancer fatalities
would be anticipated.
Population and socioeconomic effects would be the same as the
preferred alternative. Impacts on historic resources and proposed
mitigations would also be the same.
IV. Environmentally Preferred Alternative
To determine the environmentally preferred alternative, the short-
term (six years or the time required to implement the selected
alternatives) and long-term (greater than six years) time frames are
considered.
Over the short-term, the no action alternative would not result in
increased PFP Facility worker or public radiation exposure, costs, or
loss of historic resources. These impacts would occur under all other
alternatives analyzed. Therefore, in the short-term, the no action
alternative could be considered preferable to the other alternatives.
However, implementation of the no action alternative would not resolve
the long-term health risks associated with the current form of the
plutonium-bearing material within the PFP Facility.
Implementation of the preferred alternative, identified in the
Final EIS, or the alternatives selected by this ROD would result in
increased exposure to Hanford Site workers and the public during the
anticipated six-year period of operation. However, following completion
of all proposed activities the radiation exposure to in-facility
workers would drop to 45 percent of its current level. Continued
exposure following the completion of stabilization and immobilization
would be the result of facility transition until final disposition of
the facility. Under the no action alternative the high background
radiation levels would continue indefinitely. In about 30 years the
radiation exposure to workers from the no action alternative would
exceed the radiation exposure from the preferred or selected
alternatives and would correspondingly result in greater health risk.
Therefore in the long-term, the environmentally preferred alternative
would be to stabilize and immobilize reactive plutonium-bearing
material in the facility.
The no action alternative does not address the continued
degradation of the PFP Facility and the containers in which the
plutonium-bearing materials are stored. Since the PFP Facility is over
40 years old, there is a higher likelihood in the long-term of a
release to the environment under accident conditions than would be
anticipated under the preferred alternative, other stabilization
alternatives, or the immobilization alternative.
V. Other Considerations
In addition to the assessment of environmental impacts provided by
the Final EIS, DOE considered the plutonium disposition criteria,
costs, the recommendations of the DNFSB, the Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0229-D), and
comments received on the immobilization alternative and Final EIS in
determining a course of action to meet the need for interim management
of the plutonium-bearing material. Comments received on the
immobilization alternative and the Final EIS are discussed in Section
VI.
Plutonium Disposition Criteria: In January 1996, A DOE office
internally circulated for review and comment a draft policy for the
disposition of excess plutonium-bearing residues containing less than
50 weight percent plutonium. Under this draft policy, plutonium-bearing
material would be processed to one of two end-states: (1) Plutonium
packaged for storage in accordance with DOE storage standard; or (2)
waste suitable for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. This
policy would require that a determination of which end-state is more
cost-effective be made by the responsible field office and approved by
the appropriate DOE Secretarial Officer. As a result, the Final EIS
included an alternative to immobilize candidate plutonium-bearing
material through cementation.
The cementation process was favored for immobilization because: (1)
The ingredients are inexpensive, safe, and readily available; (2) the
equipment needs are simple; (3) the final waste form has proven
stability; (4) it meets the safeguards and security requirements; and
(5) it meets the Hanford Site solid waste acceptance criteria and has
been used extensively at the Hanford Site for immobilizing wastes. In
contrast, immobilizing of materials in a glass (i.e., vitrification) or
a ceramic matrix was not considered desirable because of the cost,
specialized equipment required, lack of such equipment on the Hanford
Site, and lack of site experience. These factors would result in delays
in implementing these alternatives and additional health and safety
risks. Another alternative would be to mix the plutonium with uranium
to produce a mixed oxide fuel suitable for energy production in a
nuclear power reactor. Because of the relatively small quantity of
plutonium material being considered, it was not considered reasonable
to develop the technology at the Hanford Site to support this
alternative.
The Final EIS contains the statement, ``The * * * Record of
Decision will not include a decision on the immobilization alternative
unless this draft policy or a comparable policy has been finalized.''
This policy has not been finalized, therefore decisions to immobilize
plutonium-bearing materials will continue to be made in accordance with
factors and provisions contained in the April 1994 DOE memorandum from
Mr. C. Halsted, then Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Weapons
Management.
The Halsted memorandum provides evaluation factors for discard
decisions for plutonium-bearing material. These factors are: worker
safety, minimizing
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environmental impact, regulatory concerns, waste minimization, disposal
technical factors, technical risk, stakeholder interest, risk
assessment, implementation time and feasibility, proliferation
potential, cost, and interim storage feasibility. These factors will be
applied to the categories of plutonium-bearing material potentially
suitable for immobilization. Future policies of this nature will be
evaluated in connection with decisions to immobilize low concentration
materials.
Costs: In the long-term, cost savings would be achieved by
removing, stabilizing, and/or immobilizing the plutonium-bearing
material at the PFP Facility versus continuing to operate the Facility
in its current condition.
Implementation of the preferred alternative would result in a ten
percent increase in expenditures from the estimated fiscal year 1995
level of $80 million to approximately $89 million. Following completion
of stabilization and removal activities in about six years, the
expenditures at the PFP Facility would decline to approximately $34
million per year.
The cost of implementing the other alternatives would be comparable
to the cost of the preferred alternative.
Under the no action alternative, the cost of operating the Facility
would drop by approximately 17 percent from the fiscal year 1995 level
of $80 million to approximately $67 million in fiscal year 1997. This
reduction would result from a cessation of ongoing interim actions.
This expenditure would go on indefinitely and may increase as the
Facility ages and needs additional maintenance. In approximately 10
years, the cost of continuing to maintain the PFP Facility would exceed
the cost of stabilization.
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB): The DNFSB is
chartered by Congress to review and evaluate the content and
implementation of the standards relating to the design, construction,
operation, and decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities
(including applicable DOE Orders, regulations, and requirements). The
DNFSB recommended to the Secretary of Energy those specific measures
that should be adopted to ensure that public health and safety are
adequately protected. In Recommendation 94-1, the DNFSB noted that it
was concerned that the halt in production of materials to be used in
nuclear weapons froze the manufacturing pipeline in a state that, for
safety reasons, should not be allowed to persist unremediated.
In Recommendation 94-1, the DNFSB specifically advised: ``that an
integrated program plan be formulated on a high priority basis, to
convert within two to three years the materials'' plutonium metal that
is in contact with, or in proximity to, plastic ``to forms or
conditions suitable for safe interim storage;'' that the plan ``will
require attention to limiting worker exposure and minimizing generation
of additional waste and emission of effluents to the environment;'' and
finally, that the plan ``should include a provision that, within a
reasonable period of time (such as eight years), all storage of
plutonium metal and oxide should be in conformance with the DOE
standard on storage of plutonium.''
All alternatives evaluated in the Final EIS, with the exception of
the no action alternative would achieve the recommendation of the
DNFSB.
Fissile Material Programmatic EIS: The Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Programmatic Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0229-D)
evaluates alternatives for the long-term storage and disposition of
plutonium and other special nuclear material. None of the alternatives
considered in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Stabilization Final EIS
would preclude alternatives considered in the programmatic EIS.
VI. Comment on Immobilization Alternative and Final EIS
DOE received three comments from individuals and organizations on
the Immobilization Alternative and the Final EIS.
1. Comment: Gordon Rogers provided the following comment:
I have no objection to the alternative for immobilization in
general. However, DOE should consider the additional security costs
associated with the relatively large amount of plutonium-bearing
material to be sent to the solid waste management facilities. The
security provisions in place at the PFP Facility are more stringent
than at the Hanford Site solid waste management facilities.
Response: According to DOE Order 5632.1C, Protection and Control of
Safeguards and Security Interests, protection and control shall be
provided in a graded, cost-effective fashion in accordance with the
potential risks to the national security and/or health and safety of
DOE and contractor employees, the public, and the environment. By a
graded approach, the DOE intends that the level-of-effort and magnitude
of resources expended for the protection of a particular security
interest are commensurate with the security interest's importance or
the impact of its loss, destruction, or misuse.
DOE Order 5633.3B, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials,
defines materials attractiveness levels for the purpose of applying
safeguards and security requirements. Prior to implementing the
immobilization of plutonium residues, DOE will ensure that the material
in its final form is placed in a category which will not impose
additional safeguards and security requirements upon the Hanford Site
solid waste facilities.
2. Comment: The following comment was received from the Washington
State Department of Ecology, Nuclear Waste Program:
The fact that U.S. Department of Energy has not made a decision on
whether this material has beneficial use seems inconsistent with the
proposal to immobilize and transfer it to the Hanford Site Solid Waste
Management Facilities. The new alternative addendum should fully
describe the applicability of the State of Washington Hazardous Waste
Management Act (HWMA) to the immobilization of the plutonium bearing
material being considered. The addendum should provide a regulatory
rationale that supports this new alternative. Please refer to our
letter to Mr. James E. Mecca, dated April 7, 1996, where we clearly
state the materials which contain Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at PFP
are regulated wastes under the HWMA, so long as 1) they classify as a
solid waste, 2) they classify as a mixed waste, and 3) they designate
pursuant to Chapter 173.303.070 WAC.
Response: The DOE has not classified any special nuclear material
(SNM) currently in storage at the PFP Facility as waste. The materials
stored at the PFP Facility have been determined to be excess to the
nuclear weapons program needs, but an ultimate disposition for the
material has not been determined.
There is currently existing guidance contained in a 1994 DOE
memorandum from Mr. C. Halsted, then Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Weapons Management, providing evaluation criteria for the economic and
other discard related approaches for these materials. Lacking updated
policy for these materials, the Final EIS provides an approach to
utilize the existing guidance to evaluate the SNM inventory at the PFP
Facility.
Before proceeding with the alternative to immobilize residues, DOE
recognizes that agreement upon an acceptable regulatory strategy will
need to be reached with the Washington State Department of Ecology
(Ecology). In the event that a regulatory path cannot be achieved, then
the economic factors in the evaluation of candidate residues
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will likely drive the residues to be thermally stabilized for storage
or result in a further evaluation of the alternatives for recovery of
the plutonium rather than it being immobilized for discard. The
discussion below assumes that a path forward can be achieved.
As the total inventory of material is evaluated, those items that
are determined to be suitable for discard will be immobilized to the
current Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) criteria and the Nuclear
Safeguards and Security criteria. The SNM material would be removed
from the PFP Facility inventory and transferred to a Hanford Site solid
waste management facility for future shipment to the WIPP disposal
area. The material would be defined as a waste at the point where the
DOE requirements for discard are met; i.e., the material form and
plutonium quantity are such that non-proliferation protection
(safeguards) are no longer required. At the point of solid waste
generation, DOE would designate the wastes as applicable under
Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-303-070, and would implement
any applicable requirements of WAC 173-303 for dangerous waste
accumulation, transportation, and storage to the extent that non-SNM
components are present which would require designation as dangerous
waste.
As discussed above, DOE is currently working with Ecology to
develop a regulatory path forward. Resolution of this issue will be
needed before DOE can implement plans to immobilize plutonium-bearing
material in vault storage and hold-up.
3. Comment: The following comment was received from the Washington
State Department of Ecology, Nuclear Waste Program:
The new alternative does not clearly compare or contrast the
difference between the description and quantities of plutonium-bearing
materials potentially suitable for immobilization under Section 3.1.3
of the PFP-EIS and the new alternative. Please provide further
clarification of the description and quantities between the two.
Response: The description and quantity of plutonium-bearing
materials potentially suitable for immobilization, discussed in Section
3.1.3 and Appendix E of the Final EIS, are equivalent. Because the
inventory of the plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility is of a
varied nature, the material was grouped into inventory categories.
These categories correspond to the inventory categories presented for
stabilization.
Up to 272 kg (599 lbs) of plutonium are candidates for
immobilization. This number includes approximately 222 kg (489 lbs) of
plutonium contained in 1,500 items that are currently stored in PFP
Facility vaults and 50 kg (110 lbs) of plutonium in hold-up. The
plutonium-bearing material in vault storage includes approximately 91
kg (200 lbs) of oxides with less than 50 weight percent of plutonium,
81 kg (178 lbs) of ash residues, 43 kg (95 lbs) of slag and crucible
residues, and 7 kg (15 lbs) of miscellaneous plutonium-bearing
material. The plutonium-bearing material in hold-up includes up to 4.5
kg (10 lbs) of plutonium from the E-4 ventilation system ductwork; up
to 4.3 kg (9.5 lbs) of plutonium from vacuum process piping; up to 28
kg of plutonium from gloveboxes and hoods; and up to 12.5 kg (27.5 lbs)
of plutonium from the Plutonium Reclamation Facility canyon.
VII. Decision
DOE prepared the Draft and Final EIS to evaluate environmental and
human health impacts associated with operation of systems to continue
the safe management of plutonium-bearing material at the PFP Facility.
After careful consideration of environmental impacts, costs,
engineering evaluations, and public and agency comments, DOE has
decided to implement a select group of stabilization alternatives
identified in the Final EIS. These include three out of four of the
preferred stabilization alternatives supplemented by other
stabilization and immobilization processes analyzed in the Final EIS.
The action will also involve the removal of readily retrievable
plutonium-bearing material in hold-up at the PFP Facility and the
stabilization of this and other plutonium-bearing material at the PFP
Facility. Following stabilization, plutonium-bearing material will be
in a form suitable for interim storage in existing vaults at the PFP
Facility. Plutonium-bearing material having low plutonium content and
meeting criteria established by DOE may be immobilized through a
cementation process at the PFP Facility and transferred to a Hanford
Site solid waste management facility for storage. By selecting a suite
of alternatives, DOE anticipates that health impacts to workers, and
the cost to implement the action will be reduced. DOE is documenting
this determination in this ROD.
This action will reduce radiation exposure and risk to workers and
the public, and future resources needed to safely manage the PFP
Facility.
Since the PFP Facility contains a variety of reactive plutonium-
bearing materials that are chemically and physically dissimilar,
various processes will be required to stabilize these materials. The
primary means to accomplish this will be through the implementation of
the stabilization processes described under the preferred alternative
in the Final EIS. However, stabilization of some portion of the
plutonium-bearing materials may be better accomplished through one of
the alternative stabilization processes analyzed in the Final EIS. For
this reason, DOE may implement these alternative processes on a case-
by-case basis. The primary stabilization processes which will be
implemented for each inventory category are:
(1) Plutonium-bearing solutions: For Plutonium-bearing solutions
two alternatives are selected.
--Ion exchange, vertical calcination, and thermal stabilization. Most
plutonium-bearing solutions will be stabilized by thermal treatment
using a vertical calciner. For this application, the feed material will
include plutonium nitrate solutions, solutions containing chlorides,
caustic solutions, and dissolved plutonium fluoride.
In order to utilize the vertical calcination process, some of the
plutonium-bearing solutions will require pretreatment by ion exchange
to remove chemical constituents that are not compatible with the
vertical calcination process or the process equipment. In addition, the
calciner product may require further thermal stabilization in order to
meet DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides''
(DOE-STD-3013-94).
The combined ion exchange/vertical calciner/thermal treatment
process will be capable of processing most of the inventory of
plutonium nitrate and chloride solutions. It also will be able to
process the plutonium fluoride solids if they are first dissolved and
converted to the nitrate form using an acid dissolution pretreatment
operation. This will increase the quantity of material to be stabilized
from 335 kg (738 lb) plutonium to 338 kg (745 lb) of plutonium
associated with approximately 4,800 l (1,268 gal) of solution.
--Hydroxide precipitation followed by thermal stabilization. Plutonium-
bearing solutions could be alternatively treated by a relatively simple
hydroxide precipitation process. The resultant plutonium precipitate
will then be thermally stabilized to an oxide form capable of meeting
DOE's ``Criteria for Safe
[[Page 36358]]
Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides,'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). This
alternative would be applied to the portion of the plutonium-bearing
solutions that are determined to be unsuited for vertical calcination.
An example would be material that could create a resinous residue or
cause corrosion within the vertical calciner. No more than 20 percent
of the plutonium solutions are anticipated to fall into this category.
Caustic or other hydroxide-forming reagents will be added to the
solution, gradually increasing the pH until insoluble plutonium
hydroxide is formed. The plutonium hydroxide and other metal
impurities, such as nickel, chromium, and iron, will precipitate out
and be filtered from solution. The filtered solids will then be
thermally processed into a stable oxide form.
(2) Oxides, fluorides, and process residues: For oxides, fluorides,
and process residues one alternative was selected.
--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces. Although it would
result in additional radiation exposure to the PFP Facility worker,
over the preferred alternative, this alternative was selected because
development of the continuous process furnace has not proceeded as
anticipated and the continuous furnace may not be capable of producing
product that meets DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium
Metals and Oxides'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). In addition, some of the
materials are not amenable to continuous process furnace due to their
size, moisture content, or high organic content. These materials,
however, can be processed through a batch thermal stabilization
process.
Under the batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces
process, the plutonium-bearing solids will be fed into a muffle furnace
which is elevated to a temperature of approximately 1,000 deg.C
(1,832 deg.F). The high temperature air environment lowers the residual
moisture level and facilitates conversion of incompletely oxidized
plutonium to plutonium oxides.
Material that meets the DOE storage standard would not require any
additional thermal stabilization and will be directly repackaged.
Plutonium fluorides will pose problems in the muffle furnace due to the
corrosive nature of fluoride-bearing gases that could be liberated. The
plutonium fluorides may be pretreated using an acid dissolution process
and blended with the plutonium-bearing solutions. Alternately, a
corrosion control program may be established and the fluorides sent
through the muffle furnace.
This process may stabilize 2,417 kg (5,329 lb) of plutonium. The
resultant plutonium oxides will be tested in accordance with the DOE
storage standard. Product deemed acceptable may be packaged using
existing capabilities at the Hanford Site and placed in the vault(s) at
the PFP Facility for storage. Product not meeting the DOE storage
standard will be recycled through the muffle furnace. The product may
be retrieved and repackaged at a later date to meet the DOE storage
standard specifying organic-free containers when a bagless transfer
system becomes available at the Hanford Site. Alternatively, the
material may go directly to an organic free container.
(3) Metals and alloys: For metals and alloys two alternatives are
selected.
--Batch thermal stabilization using muffle furnaces. The plutonium-
bearing solids will be fed into a muffle furnace and elevated to a
final temperature of approximately 1,000 deg.C (1,832 deg.F). The high
temperature air environment facilitates conversion of the metal and
alloys to metal oxides (i.e., plutonium oxides).
A total of 770 kg (1,698 lb) of plutonium may be stabilized using
this process. The resultant product will be tested in accordance with
the DOE storage standard. Product deemed acceptable will be packaged
using existing capabilities at the Hanford Site and placed in the
vault(s) at the PFP Facility for storage. It is assumed that the metals
and alloys may require more than one thermal processing cycle to
achieve the desired oxide product. The product may be retrieved and
repackaged at a later date to meet the DOE storage standard specifying
organic-free containers once a bagless transfer system becomes
available at the Hanford Site. Alternatively, the material may go
directly to an organic-free container.
--Repackaging. Non-destructive testing could indicate that some
plutonium metals and alloys may safely be repackaged without thermal
stabilization. These materials would be repackaged using methods that
do not rely upon organic seals or plastic bags. The repackaged
materials will be stored in the vault(s) at the PFP Facility and
routinely monitored until final disposition.
(4) Polycubes and combustibles: For polycubes and combustibles,
because of technical uncertainties associated with the preferred
alternative, two alternatives are selected.
--Pyrolysis. This alternative is a thermal process involving
distillation and decarbonization, that separates the plutonium oxides
from the polystyrene. The product, stable plutonium oxides, will be
packaged and returned to the vaults at the PFP Facility.
The pyrolysis process has the capability for processing other
combustibles such as rags and polyethylene. If part of the inventory of
combustibles is not suitable for pyrolysis, those combustibles may be
sent to the Hanford Site solid waste management facilities for storage.
A total of 35 kg (77 lb) of plutonium may be stabilized by this
alternative. The resultant plutonium oxide will be thermally tested in
accordance with DOE's ``Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals
and Oxides'' (DOE-STD-3013-94). Product determined to be acceptable
will be packaged using existing packaging capabilities and placed in
the vault(s) at the PFP Facility for storage. Product not meeting the
DOE storage standard will be run through additional thermal
stabilization processes.
--Batch thermal stabilization. Alternatively, a process involving batch
thermal stabilization of the plutonium-bearing polycubes and
combustibles could be used. Although the thermal stabilization method
used for the two types of materials is the same, each type of material
will be processed separately. The polycubes or combustibles will be fed
into a muffle furnace, which is elevated to a temperature of
approximately 300 deg.C (572 deg.F). Initially, the furnace will be
purged with nitrogen gas to maintain an inert environment and prevent
combustion of the organic component. At 300 deg.C (572 deg.F), the
organic component of the feed will be driven off into a secondary
combustion chamber. The plutonium-bearing material remaining in the
muffle furnace will be exposed to air and elevated to approximately
1,000 deg.C (1,832 deg.F). The high temperature environment facilitates
conversion of incompletely oxidized plutonium to plutonium oxides.
(5) Removal of holdup: This ROD will also implement the preferred
alternative for removal. The removal activities will be limited to
plutonium-bearing materials that are readily retrievable. Plutonium-
bearing material with a high quantity of plutonium will be stabilized
as described above. Material with a low plutonium content may be
immobilized and sent to a Hanford Site solid waste management facility
for storage. Due to
[[Page 36359]]
the nature and location of the material in hold-up, various
technologies will be employed to remove the material for subsequent
stabilization. All technologies analyzed in the Final EIS will be
utilized to some degree. Four areas of the PFP Facility have been
identified for removal of readily retrievable hold-up material:
ductwork, vacuum system piping, gloveboxes and hoods, and the Plutonium
Reclamation Facility canyon floor. These areas represent locations
where a high quantity of plutonium-bearing material exists as hold-up
and where removal actions will be beneficial in reducing the exposure
risk. Non-readily retrievable plutonium-bearing material with a low
quantity of plutonium will remain in hold-up at the PFP Facility. This
material will be addressed when DOE makes a decision to decontaminate
and decommission the PFP Facility.
(6) Immobilization: Candidate plutonium-bearing material with low
plutonium content may be immobilized and discarded. The plutonium-
bearing material will include: (1) Materials that are containerized and
stored in vaults or gloveboxes; and (2) hold-up material.
The immobilization process will be applicable for up to 272 kg (599
lbs) of plutonium from selected quantities of the following plutonium-
bearing materials:
Oxides, fluorides, and process residues (not applicable for any
fluorides or for oxides greater than 50 weight percent plutonium)
--Immobilization of candidate materials
Polycubes and combustibles (not applicable for polycubes)
--Immobilization of candidate materials
Low plutonium content material removed from hold-up (less than 50
weight percent plutonium)
The immobilization process will include a cementation step which
will fix the plutonium-bearing material into a solid matrix, packaging
the cemented materials into appropriate shipping containers, and
transporting the containers to a Hanford Site solid waste management
facility for storage.
VIII. Mitigation
Since land use and water resources would not be impacted by the
preferred alternative or other stabilization alternatives analyzed in
the Final EIS, no mitigation measures would need to be taken in regard
to these resources. Mitigation measures in place for the PFP Facility
have been discussed in the Final EIS (e.g., High-efficiency particulate
air filtration of exhaust pathways).
To ensure that activities and consequences (e.g., radiological dose
to PFP Facility workers) for normal/routine activities would remain
within established requirements, and to ensure that the risk of
accidents would be minimized, numerous measures would be taken in
association with the preferred alternative. These measures include
adequate (engineered) design features for gloveboxes, systems, and
components; the development of safety analyses consistent with the
process established by DOE; and the implementation of numerous programs
that already exist at the Hanford Site. Examples of these programs are
as follows:
Maintenance program--Ensures that hardware performs as
expected when demanded
Fire protection program--Mitigates property loss and
minimizes human health impacts due to fire
Criticality prevention program--Mitigates potential human
health impacts of an inadvertent criticality
Radiological controls program--Mitigates routine and
accident-related doses
Industrial hygiene program--Mitigates routine and
accident-related chemical exposure
Training program--Minimizes and mitigates adverse impacts
to personnel by training them in proper ways to perform their job and
to respond during emergency events.
Certain removal activities will substantially alter or demolish
existing equipment and facilities at the PFP Facility which have been
found to be eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic
Places. A Memorandum of Agreement between DOE and the Washington State
Historic Preservation Officer has been accepted by the Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation. This agreement addresses the measures that
will be required to mitigate these adverse impacts. Because all
practical means to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts from this
removal action are incorporated in the PFP Facility and practices, DOE
has determined that there is no need to prepare a Mitigation Action
Plan in accordance with Section 1021.331(a) of DOE's regulations
implementing NEPA (10 CFR 1021).
Issued: This ROD for PFP Stabilization EIS is issued by DOE,
Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington on June 25, 1996.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 96-17561 Filed 7-10-96; 8:45 am]
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