been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent improper operation of the nose landing gear (NLG) door and consequent inability to extend the NLG due to a reduced stroke of the spring bungee, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 90 days after the effective date of this AD: Perform a one-time inspection of the spring bungee assembly of the NLG to ensure proper torque of the collar and correct clearance between the collar and the body of the bungee; in accordance with Canadair Regional Jet Alert Service Bulletin A601R–32–037, Revision 'A,' dated December 2, 1994 (for Model CL–600–2B19 series airplanes); or Canadair Challenger Service Bulletin 601–0454, dated May 15, 1995, as amended by Service Bulletin Information Sheet 601–0454, dated July 14, 1995 (for Model CL–600–2B16 series airplanes); as applicable.

(b) If improper torque of the collar is found, or if incorrect clearance between the collar and the body of the bungee is found: Prior to further flight, replace the spring bungee assembly with a serviceable (new or reworked) unit that has been inspected in accordance with Canadair Regional Jet Alert Service Bulletin A601R–32–037, Revision ''A'', dated December 2, 1994 (for Model CL–600–2B19 series airplanes); or Canadair Challenger Service Bulletin 601–0454, dated May 15, 1995, as amended by Service Bulletin Information Sheet 601–0454, dated July 14, 1995 (for Model CL–600–2B16 series airplanes); as applicable. Accomplish the replacement in accordance with the applicable service bulletin.

(c) As of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install a spring bungee assembly having part number 600–86115–1 (for Model CL–600–2B16 series airplanes) or 600–86115–5/70 (for Model CL–600–2B19 series airplanes) on any airplane unless that assembly has been inspected and reworked, as necessary, in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD.

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the New York ACO.

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on July 1, 1996.

S. R. Miller,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–17218 Filed 7–5–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

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14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD]

Airworthiness Directives; Aerospace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd. (formerly Government Aircraft Factory) Models N22B, N24A, and N22S Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to Aerospace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd. (ASTA) Models N22B, N24A, and N22S airplanes that are not equipped with a part number (P/N) 1E/N–12–57 fuselage stub fin plate (MOD N759). The proposed action would require replacing the existing fuselage stub fin plate with one of improved design, P/N 1E/N–12–57. Several reports of cracks along the forward flange of the fuselage stub fin plate in the area of Rib Water Line (WL) 138.87 prompted the proposed action. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the fuselage area caused by a cracked stub fin plate, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 6, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments may be inspected at this location between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, holidays excepted.

ADDRESSES: Service information that applies to the proposed AD may be obtained from Aerospace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd., ASTA DEFENCE, Private Bag No. 4, Beach Road Lara 3212, Victoria, Australia. This information also may be examined at the Rules Docket at the address below. Send comments on the proposal in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments may be inspected at this location between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, holidays excepted.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Ron Atmur, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627–5224; facsimile (310) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ''Comments to Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), which is the airworthiness authority for Australia, recently notified the FAA that an unsafe condition may

exist on certain ASTA Models N22B, N24A, and N22S airplanes. The CASA reports several incidents of cracks along the forward flange of the fuselage stub fin plate in the area of Rib Water Line (WL) 138.87. Investigation has revealed fretting and fatigue of this plate, part number (P/N) 1D/N–12–57. These conditions, if not detected and corrected, could result in structural failure of the fuselage area, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.

ASTA has issued Nomad Service Bulletin (SB) ANMD- 53–13, Revision 3, dated October 24, 1995, which specifies procedures for installing a fuselage stub fin plate of improved design, P/N 1E/N–12–57.

The CASA of Australia classified this service bulletin as mandatory and issued FCAA AD/GAF-N22/63, amendment 1, dated July 1994, in order to assure the continued airworthiness of these airplanes in Australia.

This airplane model is manufactured in Australia and is type certificated for operation in the United States under the provisions of section 21.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.29) and the applicable bilateral airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to this bilateral airworthiness agreement, the CASA of Australia has kept the FAA informed of the situation described above. The FAA has examined the findings of the CASA of Australia, reviewed all available information including the service information referenced above, and determined that AD action is necessary for products of this type design that are certificated for operation in the United States.

Explanation of the Provisions of the Proposed AD

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop in other ASTA Models N22B, N24A, and N22S airplanes of the same type design that are registered in the United States and are not equipped with a P/N 1E/N–12–57 fuselage stub fin plate (MOD N759), the proposed AD would require replacing the existing fuselage stub fin plate with one of improved design, P/N 1E/N–12–57. Accomplishment of the proposed installation would be in accordance with Nomad SB ANMD-53–13, Revision 3, dated October 24, 1995.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 15 airplanes in the U.S. registry would be affected by the proposed AD, that it would take approximately 22 workhours per airplane to accomplish the proposed action, and that the average labor rate is approximately $60 an hour. Parts cost approximately $150 per airplane. Based on these figures, the total cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be $22,050 or $1,470 per airplane. This figure is based on the assumption that no affected owner/operator of the affected airplanes has accomplished the proposed replacement.

ASTA has informed the FAA that it has no records of parts distribution. The FAA believes that several of the affected airplanes already have the proposed replacement incorporated, which would reduce the cost impact upon the public.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a ''significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a ''significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation prepared for this action has been placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained by contacting the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption **ADDRESSES**.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40101, 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD) to read as follows:

Aerospace Technologies of Australia PTY Ltd: Docket No. 95–CE–103–AD.

Applicability: Models N22B, N24A, and N22S airplanes (all serial numbers), certificated in any category, that are not equipped with a part number (P/N) 1E/N–12–57 fuselage stub fin plate (MOD N759).

Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished.

To prevent structural failure of the fuselage area caused by a cracked stub fin plate, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following:

(a) Replace the fuselage stub fin plate with one of improved design, P/N 1E/N–12–57 (MOD N759), in accordance with the ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS section of Nomad Service Bulletin ANMD–53–13, Revision 3, dated October 24, 1995.

(b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard., Lakewood, California 90712. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(d) All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the document referred to herein upon request to Aerospace Technologies of Australia Pty Ltd., ASTA DEFENCE, Private Bag No. 4, Beach Road Lara 3212, Victoria, Australia; or may examine this document at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on June 25, 1996.

James E. Jackson,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 96–17295 Filed 7–5–96; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

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14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Raytheon Aircraft Corporation (formerly Beech Aircraft Corporation) Models 1900C, 1900D, and 2000 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) that would apply to certain Raytheon Aircraft Corporation (Raytheon) Models 1900C, 1900D, and 2000 airplanes. The proposed action would require inspecting (one-time) the fuel filter assemblies to detect any bypass valve that is glued shut. If a bypass valve is glued shut, the proposal would require replacing the associated fuel filter assembly. Three in-flight occurrences where the low fuel pressure light illuminated prompted the proposed action. In each of the instances, a bypass valve on the affected engine was glued shut with anaerobic thread lock adhesive and when the fuel filter became clogged, proper fuel flow to the engine was not obtained. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent lack of fuel to the engine and eventual engine shutdown caused by a clogged fuel filter and a contaminated fuel filter by-pass valve.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 6, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Comments may be inspected at this location between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, holidays excepted.

Service information that applies to the proposed AD may be obtained from the Raytheon Aircraft Corporation, P.O. Box 85, Wichita, Kansas 67201–0085. This information also may be examined at the Rules Docket at the address above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace Safety Engineer, FAA, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 946–4146; facsimile (316) 946–4407.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments, specified above, will be considered before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ''Comments to Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD.'' The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96–CE–30–AD, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.

Discussion

The FAA has received three reports of in-flight occurrences involving Ratheon Model 1900 D airplanes, where the low fuel pressure light illuminated. Fortunately, the airplane landed safely in these incidents. In each of the instances, a bypass valve on the affected engine was glued shut with anaerobic thread lock adhesive and when the fuel filter became clogged, proper fuel flow to the engine was not obtained. Further investigation has revealed that some fuel filter assemblies were contaminated with anaerobic thread lock adhesive during the manufacturing process.

Raytheon reports that the following airplane models and serial numbers could have fuel filter assemblies contaminated with anaerobic thread lock adhesive:

Models	Serial numbers
1900C	UC–1 through UC–174
1900C (C–12J)	UD–1 through UD–6
1900D	UE–1 through UE–205
2000	NC–4 through NC–53

Raytheon has issued Service Bulletin (SB) No. 2677 (for Model 2000), dated March, 1996; and Beechcraft SB No. 2678 (for Models 1900C and 1900D), dated May, 1996. These service bulletins specify procedures for (1) inspecting the fuel filter assemblies to detect any bypass valves glued shut; and (2) replacing the fuel filter assembly.

After examining the circumstances and reviewing all available information related to the incidents described above, including the referenced service information, the FAA has determined that AD action should be taken to prevent lack of fuel to the engine and eventual engine shutdown caused by a clogged fuel filter and a contaminated fuel filter by-pass valve.

Explanation of the Provisions of the Proposed AD

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop in other Raytheon Models 1900C, 1900D, and 2000 airplanes of the same type design that were manufactured during the period when the fuel filter assembly bypass valves were susceptible to anaerobic thread lock adhesive contamination, the FAA is proposing AD action. The proposed AD would require inspecting (one-time) the fuel filter assemblies to detect any bypass valve that is glued shut. If a bypass valve is glued shut, the proposal would require replacing the fuel filter assembly. Accomplishment of the inspection and replacement (if necessary) would be in accordance with Raytheon SB No. 2677 (for Model 2000), dated March, 1996; or Beechcraft SB No. 2678 (for Models 1900C and 1900D), dated May, 1996, as applicable.

Cost Impact

The FAA estimates that 379 airplanes in the U.S. registry would be affected by the proposed AD, that it would take approximately 2 workhours per airplane to accomplish the proposed inspection,