[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 127 (Monday, July 1, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33909-33911]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-16679]


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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials--
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of intent; request for public comment.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy intends to conduct a Nuclear 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of the weapons-usable 
fissile materials storage and disposition alternatives contained in the 
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Draft PEIS) (February 
1996, DOE/EIS-0229-D). While not conducted as part of the formal 
National Environmental Policy Act process, the study will be performed 
to provide the fullest possible public involvement in the Department's 
consideration of weapons-usable fissile materials storage and plutonium 
disposition. The Assessment will be considered in identifying preferred 
alternatives for storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and 
disposition of plutonium. The goals of the proposed Assessment will be 
to help identify the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control benefits 
and vulnerabilities associated with each of the storage and disposition 
alternatives considered in the Draft PEIS and identify potential steps 
to maximize nonproliferation and arms control benefits and mitigate any 
vulnerabilities associated with the various alternatives.

DATES: All comments on the outline are due by August 9, 1996 and those 
received by that time will be considered by DOE in drafting the 
nonproliferation and arms control assessment. Comments received after 
that date will be considered by DOE to the extent practicable.
    Meetings will be held in following locations:

July 23, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), University of Texas at 
Austin, Texas Union, North Entrance, 3.304, Quadrangle Room, 24th and 
Guadalupe, Austin, Texas 78712.
July 25, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), Stanford University, Galvez 
House Conference Room, 320 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA 94305.
July 29, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), Northwestern University, 
Norris Student Center, Louis South, 2nd Floor, 1999 South Campus Drive, 
Evanston, IL 60208.
July 31, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Stratton Student Center, Mezzanine Lounge, 3rd Floor, 84 
Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139.
August 1, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm, Department of Energy Headquarters, 
Forrestal Building, Room 1E245, Washington, DC 20585.

ADDRESSES: The Department of Energy invites interested agencies, 
organizations, and the general public to provide oral and/or written 
comments on the outline of the proposed Nonproliferation and Arms 
Control Assessment as set forth in this Notice. Written and oral 
comments will be accepted at the public meetings to be held at the 
times and locations listed above. Persons desiring to participate in 
the meetings are requested to pre-register by calling the toll-free 
number listed no later than one week prior to the meeting.
    Written comments on the outline, requests for the President's 
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy Statement, the National 
Academy of Sciences report, or the Draft Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement should be sent to: Mr. Jon B. Wolfsthal, Office of 
Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NN-42), Attn.: Assessment, U.S. 
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave, S.W., Washington, DC 
20585-0001. Electronic mail comments can be sent to 
[email protected]. Comments are due by August 9, 1996.
    Persons wanting additional information or to pre-register for any 
of the public meetings can do so by calling 1-800-835-8009. Additional 
information can be obtained by visiting the Office of Nonproliferation 
and National Security's world wide web homepage at HTTP:/
WWW.NN.DOE.GOV/NN/.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: There are a number of reasons behind the 
Department's effort to identify and implement safe, secure and timely 
storage and disposition of these weapons-usable materials. Many of 
these reasons relate to U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear 
weapons to additional nations or sub-national groups, and to encourage 
safe and secure storage and disposition of weapons-usable materials by 
other countries. Identifying the various implications for these goals 
presented

[[Page 33910]]

by the alternatives being evaluated by the Department is the central 
goal of the proposed Assessment.
    The end of the Cold War and the east-west confrontation have 
significantly affected the way in which the United States and other 
countries approach the management of weapons-usable fissile materials 
(primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium). The reductions 
of nuclear weapons agreed to by the United States and Russia in 
bilateral treaties and through other initiatives has reduced U.S. 
national security requirements for fissile materials and, as a result, 
substantial amounts of weapons-usable fissile materials have been 
declared surplus to U.S. defense needs, and decisions about the storage 
of all weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of 
plutonium will therefore be required. The national policy, as outlined 
by the President on September 27, 1993 (White House Press Release), is 
to seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of 
HEU and plutonium, and to ensure that where these materials already 
exist they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security and 
international accountability.
    In addition, the President in September 1993 initiated a 
comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, 
taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, 
budgetary and economic considerations. The proposed Nonproliferation 
and Arms Control Assessment represents a vital part of that review.
    In early 1994, the National Academy of Sciences published a report, 
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This study, 
commissioned by the President's National Security Council, provides 
information regarding management and disposition of surplus nuclear 
materials, in particular plutonium.
    In the United States, weapons-usable fissile nuclear materials are 
currently stored at several DOE sites, including the Pantex Plant 
(Amarillo, Texas), the Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site (Golden, Colorado), the Savannah River 
Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(Livermore, California), Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, 
New Mexico), and the Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak Ridge, Tennessee).
    Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with 
Presidential decisions concerning what stocks of nuclear materials are 
surplus to national defense and defense-related program needs, will 
largely determine how much material will be available for disposition, 
and when.
    The outline will be used to draft a Nonproliferation and Arms 
Control Assessment, which will then be reviewed and commented on by a 
panel of experts. This panel, which will be convened as a sub-committee 
of the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board (SEAB), will include 
members of the SEAB and other experts and will be chaired by a SEAB 
member. The comments by the SEAB panel will be incorporated into the 
draft assessment, which will then be published and made available for 
public comment and additional public meetings in the fall. Following 
those meetings and comments, a final assessment will be prepared and 
published by the end of 1996.

Alternatives Considered

    The Department is evaluating the following reasonable long-term 
storage alternatives: (1) Upgrade or replacement of current Plutonium 
and HEU storage facilities at multiple DOE sites, (2) consolidation of 
Plutonium at a single DOE site, and (3) collocation of Plutonium and 
HEU at a single DOE site. The six candidate storage sites are: the 
Hanford Site, Washington; the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
(INEL), Idaho; the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada; the Oak Ridge 
Reservation (ORR), Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, Texas; and the Savannah 
River Site (SRS), South Carolina. For disposition, the Draft PEIS 
analyzes broader, programmatic strategies and technologies. The 
reasonable disposition alternatives fall into three categories: (1) The 
Deep Borehole Category consisting of two alternatives--Direct 
Disposition, and Immobilized Disposition; (2) the Immobilization 
Category consisting of three alternatives--Vitrification, Ceramic 
Immobilization, and Electrometallurgical Treatment; and (3) the Reactor 
Category consisting of four alternatives--Existing Light Water Reactors 
(LWRs), Evolutionary LWRs, Partially Completed LWRs, and the Canadian 
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) Reactor. In addition, No Action Alternatives 
are analyzed, in which no change in storage and/or no disposition would 
occur.
    The outline and the subsequent study will review the 
nonproliferation and arms control implications of the reasonable 
alternatives under evaluation, assess the relative nonproliferation and 
arms control benefits and vulnerabilities of each alternative, and 
identify potential steps that could be taken to maximize the associated 
benefits and to minimize the associated liabilities. The report will be 
used in conjunction with environmental impact analyses, analyses of the 
cost, schedule and technical viability assessments of each option, 
other reports and public comments in making a final decision on how to 
store weapons-usable fissile materials and dispose of surplus 
plutonium.

    Dated: June 26, 1996.
Kenneth N. Luongo,
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy 
and Director, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation,

Outline for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Material Storage and Disposition Alternatives

(A) Introduction and Summary

I. Current situation and upcoming developments
II. Need for action
    (a) Internal U.S. management of materials
    (b) International imperatives/objectives
III. Background and previous studies
IV. Alternatives under consideration
V. Main nonproliferation considerations (Summary)
    (a) Technical factors
    (b) Policy factors

(B) Policy Factors

I. Relevant policy documents
    (a) Relevant Presidential Decision Directives and statements
    (b) US/Russian & P-8 summit statements
    (c) Other documents and guidance
II. International initiatives/cooperation

(C) Long-Term Storage of Fissile Materials

I. Description of four main storage alternatives (contained in Draft 
PEIS)
    (a) Upgrade facilities at multiple sites (separate/multiple HEU and 
Pu Storage sites)
    (b) Consolidation of Plutonium storage
    (c) Collocation of Plutonium and Highly enriched uranium storage
    (d) No action
II. Nonproliferation and arms control analysis of four main storage 
alternatives
    (a) Nonproliferation and arms control-related benefits
    --Technical
    --Policy
    (b)--Nonproliferation and arms

[[Page 33911]]

control liabilities/vulnerabilities
    --Technical
    -- Policy
III. Identify/Recommend steps to maximize positive and reduce negative 
impacts of main storage options

(D) Disposition Options for Surplus Plutonium

I. Description and analysis of four groups of alternatives (See Figure 
1 for factors to be considered)
    (a) Reactor Options (US and/or European MOX fabrication)
        Evolutionary LWRs
        Partially Completed LWRs
        Existing LWRs
        Candu Reactor in Canada
    (b) Immobilization
        Vitrification
        Ceramic Immobilization
        Electrometalurgical Treatment
    (c) Deep Borehole Review
        Direct Disposition
        Immobilized Disposition
    (d) No Action
II. Nonproliferation analysis of three main categories of options (See 
Figure I).
    (a) Nonproliferation and arms control benefits
        Technical
        Policy
    (b) Nonproliferation and arms control liabilities/vulnerabilities
        Technical
        Policy
III. Identify/Recommend steps to maximize benefits and reduce any 
negative nonproliferation impacts of options

(E) General Recommendations/Conclusions

(The Assessment will not rank the alternatives based on 
nonproliferation criteria, but will recommend possible ways to maximize 
benefits or mitigate any negative nonproliferation implications 
associated with particular alternatives.)

                            Figure 1.--Technical/Policy Factors and Mitigating Steps                            
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          Technical factors                      Policy factors                       Mitigating steps          
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TIME LINES                            Impacts on foreign programs and       Safeguards and Security             
  --Time to Start                      activities                           International monitoring and access 
  --Time to Finish                    Impact on current and future U.S.     Implementation variations           
RISK OF DIVERSION IN PROCESS           policy                               Stated justifications               
  --Material form and attractiveness  Impacts on nonproliferation           Bilateral or multilateral agreements
  --Material security and accounting   agreements and regimes                or PAGE arrangements               
  --Transport security                Political implementability                                                
  --Process through-put               Impacts on current and future                                             
  --Other process issues               fissile material related                                                 
  --Material inventories               negotiations                                                             
  --Number of facilities and sites    Impact on future dismantlement                                            
  --Bilateral and international        activities                                                               
 monitoring                                                                                                     
  --Political and security                                                                                      
 conditions in countries involved                                                                               
RISK OF RE-USE IN WEAPONS                                                                                       
  --Final material form and                                                                                     
 attractiveness                                                                                                 
  --Physical access to material                                                                                 
  --Cost, time and observability of                                                                             
 recovery                                                                                                       
  --Bilateral and international                                                                                 
 monitoring.                                                                                                    
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[FR Doc. 96-16679 Filed 6-28-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P