[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 127 (Monday, July 1, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33909-33911]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-16679]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials--
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of intent; request for public comment.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy intends to conduct a Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of the weapons-usable
fissile materials storage and disposition alternatives contained in the
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Draft
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (Draft PEIS) (February
1996, DOE/EIS-0229-D). While not conducted as part of the formal
National Environmental Policy Act process, the study will be performed
to provide the fullest possible public involvement in the Department's
consideration of weapons-usable fissile materials storage and plutonium
disposition. The Assessment will be considered in identifying preferred
alternatives for storage of weapons-usable fissile materials and
disposition of plutonium. The goals of the proposed Assessment will be
to help identify the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control benefits
and vulnerabilities associated with each of the storage and disposition
alternatives considered in the Draft PEIS and identify potential steps
to maximize nonproliferation and arms control benefits and mitigate any
vulnerabilities associated with the various alternatives.
DATES: All comments on the outline are due by August 9, 1996 and those
received by that time will be considered by DOE in drafting the
nonproliferation and arms control assessment. Comments received after
that date will be considered by DOE to the extent practicable.
Meetings will be held in following locations:
July 23, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), University of Texas at
Austin, Texas Union, North Entrance, 3.304, Quadrangle Room, 24th and
Guadalupe, Austin, Texas 78712.
July 25, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), Stanford University, Galvez
House Conference Room, 320 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA 94305.
July 29, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), Northwestern University,
Norris Student Center, Louis South, 2nd Floor, 1999 South Campus Drive,
Evanston, IL 60208.
July 31, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm (local time), Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Stratton Student Center, Mezzanine Lounge, 3rd Floor, 84
Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02139.
August 1, 1996, 2:00pm-4:30pm, Department of Energy Headquarters,
Forrestal Building, Room 1E245, Washington, DC 20585.
ADDRESSES: The Department of Energy invites interested agencies,
organizations, and the general public to provide oral and/or written
comments on the outline of the proposed Nonproliferation and Arms
Control Assessment as set forth in this Notice. Written and oral
comments will be accepted at the public meetings to be held at the
times and locations listed above. Persons desiring to participate in
the meetings are requested to pre-register by calling the toll-free
number listed no later than one week prior to the meeting.
Written comments on the outline, requests for the President's
Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy Statement, the National
Academy of Sciences report, or the Draft Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement should be sent to: Mr. Jon B. Wolfsthal, Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NN-42), Attn.: Assessment, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Ave, S.W., Washington, DC
20585-0001. Electronic mail comments can be sent to
[email protected]. Comments are due by August 9, 1996.
Persons wanting additional information or to pre-register for any
of the public meetings can do so by calling 1-800-835-8009. Additional
information can be obtained by visiting the Office of Nonproliferation
and National Security's world wide web homepage at HTTP:/
WWW.NN.DOE.GOV/NN/.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: There are a number of reasons behind the
Department's effort to identify and implement safe, secure and timely
storage and disposition of these weapons-usable materials. Many of
these reasons relate to U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons to additional nations or sub-national groups, and to encourage
safe and secure storage and disposition of weapons-usable materials by
other countries. Identifying the various implications for these goals
presented
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by the alternatives being evaluated by the Department is the central
goal of the proposed Assessment.
The end of the Cold War and the east-west confrontation have
significantly affected the way in which the United States and other
countries approach the management of weapons-usable fissile materials
(primarily highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium). The reductions
of nuclear weapons agreed to by the United States and Russia in
bilateral treaties and through other initiatives has reduced U.S.
national security requirements for fissile materials and, as a result,
substantial amounts of weapons-usable fissile materials have been
declared surplus to U.S. defense needs, and decisions about the storage
of all weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of
plutonium will therefore be required. The national policy, as outlined
by the President on September 27, 1993 (White House Press Release), is
to seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of
HEU and plutonium, and to ensure that where these materials already
exist they are subject to the highest standards of safety, security and
international accountability.
In addition, the President in September 1993 initiated a
comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition,
taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental,
budgetary and economic considerations. The proposed Nonproliferation
and Arms Control Assessment represents a vital part of that review.
In early 1994, the National Academy of Sciences published a report,
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This study,
commissioned by the President's National Security Council, provides
information regarding management and disposition of surplus nuclear
materials, in particular plutonium.
In the United States, weapons-usable fissile nuclear materials are
currently stored at several DOE sites, including the Pantex Plant
(Amarillo, Texas), the Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), the Rocky Flats
Environmental Technology Site (Golden, Colorado), the Savannah River
Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(Livermore, California), Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos,
New Mexico), and the Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak Ridge, Tennessee).
Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with
Presidential decisions concerning what stocks of nuclear materials are
surplus to national defense and defense-related program needs, will
largely determine how much material will be available for disposition,
and when.
The outline will be used to draft a Nonproliferation and Arms
Control Assessment, which will then be reviewed and commented on by a
panel of experts. This panel, which will be convened as a sub-committee
of the Secretary of Energy's Advisory Board (SEAB), will include
members of the SEAB and other experts and will be chaired by a SEAB
member. The comments by the SEAB panel will be incorporated into the
draft assessment, which will then be published and made available for
public comment and additional public meetings in the fall. Following
those meetings and comments, a final assessment will be prepared and
published by the end of 1996.
Alternatives Considered
The Department is evaluating the following reasonable long-term
storage alternatives: (1) Upgrade or replacement of current Plutonium
and HEU storage facilities at multiple DOE sites, (2) consolidation of
Plutonium at a single DOE site, and (3) collocation of Plutonium and
HEU at a single DOE site. The six candidate storage sites are: the
Hanford Site, Washington; the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(INEL), Idaho; the Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada; the Oak Ridge
Reservation (ORR), Tennessee; the Pantex Plant, Texas; and the Savannah
River Site (SRS), South Carolina. For disposition, the Draft PEIS
analyzes broader, programmatic strategies and technologies. The
reasonable disposition alternatives fall into three categories: (1) The
Deep Borehole Category consisting of two alternatives--Direct
Disposition, and Immobilized Disposition; (2) the Immobilization
Category consisting of three alternatives--Vitrification, Ceramic
Immobilization, and Electrometallurgical Treatment; and (3) the Reactor
Category consisting of four alternatives--Existing Light Water Reactors
(LWRs), Evolutionary LWRs, Partially Completed LWRs, and the Canadian
Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) Reactor. In addition, No Action Alternatives
are analyzed, in which no change in storage and/or no disposition would
occur.
The outline and the subsequent study will review the
nonproliferation and arms control implications of the reasonable
alternatives under evaluation, assess the relative nonproliferation and
arms control benefits and vulnerabilities of each alternative, and
identify potential steps that could be taken to maximize the associated
benefits and to minimize the associated liabilities. The report will be
used in conjunction with environmental impact analyses, analyses of the
cost, schedule and technical viability assessments of each option,
other reports and public comments in making a final decision on how to
store weapons-usable fissile materials and dispose of surplus
plutonium.
Dated: June 26, 1996.
Kenneth N. Luongo,
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation Policy
and Director, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation,
Outline for Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Material Storage and Disposition Alternatives
(A) Introduction and Summary
I. Current situation and upcoming developments
II. Need for action
(a) Internal U.S. management of materials
(b) International imperatives/objectives
III. Background and previous studies
IV. Alternatives under consideration
V. Main nonproliferation considerations (Summary)
(a) Technical factors
(b) Policy factors
(B) Policy Factors
I. Relevant policy documents
(a) Relevant Presidential Decision Directives and statements
(b) US/Russian & P-8 summit statements
(c) Other documents and guidance
II. International initiatives/cooperation
(C) Long-Term Storage of Fissile Materials
I. Description of four main storage alternatives (contained in Draft
PEIS)
(a) Upgrade facilities at multiple sites (separate/multiple HEU and
Pu Storage sites)
(b) Consolidation of Plutonium storage
(c) Collocation of Plutonium and Highly enriched uranium storage
(d) No action
II. Nonproliferation and arms control analysis of four main storage
alternatives
(a) Nonproliferation and arms control-related benefits
--Technical
--Policy
(b)--Nonproliferation and arms
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control liabilities/vulnerabilities
--Technical
-- Policy
III. Identify/Recommend steps to maximize positive and reduce negative
impacts of main storage options
(D) Disposition Options for Surplus Plutonium
I. Description and analysis of four groups of alternatives (See Figure
1 for factors to be considered)
(a) Reactor Options (US and/or European MOX fabrication)
Evolutionary LWRs
Partially Completed LWRs
Existing LWRs
Candu Reactor in Canada
(b) Immobilization
Vitrification
Ceramic Immobilization
Electrometalurgical Treatment
(c) Deep Borehole Review
Direct Disposition
Immobilized Disposition
(d) No Action
II. Nonproliferation analysis of three main categories of options (See
Figure I).
(a) Nonproliferation and arms control benefits
Technical
Policy
(b) Nonproliferation and arms control liabilities/vulnerabilities
Technical
Policy
III. Identify/Recommend steps to maximize benefits and reduce any
negative nonproliferation impacts of options
(E) General Recommendations/Conclusions
(The Assessment will not rank the alternatives based on
nonproliferation criteria, but will recommend possible ways to maximize
benefits or mitigate any negative nonproliferation implications
associated with particular alternatives.)
Figure 1.--Technical/Policy Factors and Mitigating Steps
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Technical factors Policy factors Mitigating steps
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TIME LINES Impacts on foreign programs and Safeguards and Security
--Time to Start activities International monitoring and access
--Time to Finish Impact on current and future U.S. Implementation variations
RISK OF DIVERSION IN PROCESS policy Stated justifications
--Material form and attractiveness Impacts on nonproliferation Bilateral or multilateral agreements
--Material security and accounting agreements and regimes or PAGE arrangements
--Transport security Political implementability
--Process through-put Impacts on current and future
--Other process issues fissile material related
--Material inventories negotiations
--Number of facilities and sites Impact on future dismantlement
--Bilateral and international activities
monitoring
--Political and security
conditions in countries involved
RISK OF RE-USE IN WEAPONS
--Final material form and
attractiveness
--Physical access to material
--Cost, time and observability of
recovery
--Bilateral and international
monitoring.
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[FR Doc. 96-16679 Filed 6-28-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P