[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 117 (Monday, June 17, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 30672-30724]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-14944]
[[Page 30671]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part II
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Railroad Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 232, and 238
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed
Rules
[[Page 30672]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 232, and 238
[FRA Docket No. PCSS-1; Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AA95
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: FRA announces the initiation of rulemaking on rail passenger
equipment safety standards. FRA requests comment on the need for
particular safety requirements and the costs, benefits, and
practicability of such requirements. FRA anticipates this rulemaking
will address the inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger
equipment; equipment design and performance criteria related to
passenger and crew survivability in the event of a train accident; and
the safe operation of passenger train service, supplementing existing
railroad safety standards. FRA also announces the formation of a
working group to assist FRA in developing this rule. FRA makes
available preliminary safety concepts that have been placed before the
working group. This notice is issued in order to comply with the
Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, to respond to
concerns raised by the General Accounting Office and the National
Transportation Safety Board, to respond to public concerns, to respond
to petitions for rulemaking, and to consider possible regulations
derived from experience in application of existing standards.
DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or
before July 9, 1996. Comments received after that date will be
considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense
or delay.
(2) Public Hearing: Requests for a public hearing must be made on
or before July 9, 1996.
ADDRESSES: Address comments to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief
Counsel, RCC-30, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Room 8201, Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should identify the
docket and notice number and be submitted in triplicate. Persons
wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their comments should
include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The dockets are housed in
Room 8201 of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington,
D.C. 20590. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours of 8:30
a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Edward W. Pritchard, Acting Staff
Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety
Assurance and Compliance, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA, 400 Seventh Street,
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-0509 or 202-366-9252),
or Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-0628).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Introduction
Mandate
FRA requests comment on possible regulations governing rail
passenger equipment. FRA believes such regulations are necessary for
several reasons. In particular, effective Federal safety standards for
freight equipment have long been in place, but equivalent standards for
passenger equipment do not currently exist. The Association of American
Railroads (AAR) sets industry standards for the design and maintenance
of freight equipment that add materially to the safe operation of this
equipment. However, over the years AAR has discontinued the development
and maintenance of passenger equipment standards.
Worldwide, passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing.
Several passenger trainsets designed to European standards have been
proposed for operation at high speeds in the United States. In general,
these trainsets do not meet the structural or operating standards that
are common practice for current North American equipment. The North
American railroad operating environment requires passenger equipment to
operate commingled with very heavy and long freight trains, often over
track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment.
European passenger equipment design standards may therefore not be
appropriate for the North American operating environment. A clear set
of safety and design standards for future passenger equipment tailored
to the North American operating environment is needed to provide for
the safety of future rail operations and to facilitate sound planning
for those operations.
The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act),
Pub. L. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619 (November 2, 1994), requires FRA to
develop initial rail passenger equipment safety standards within 3
years of enactment and final regulations within 5 years of enactment.
The Act also gives FRA an important tool to be used to help develop
these safety standards: FRA is allowed to consult with the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), public authorities, passenger
railroads, passenger organizations, and rail labor organizations
without being subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
App.).
Approach
FRA established a Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working
Group (Working Group) comprised of representatives of the types of
organizations listed in the Act to provide the consultation allowed by
the Act. The Working Group first met on June 6, 1995, and continues to
meet to assist FRA in developing passenger equipment safety standards.
This ANPRM describes the issues before the Working Group, and seeks the
assistance of other interested persons in providing information and
views pertinent to this effort. FRA intends to use the Working Group
throughout this rulemaking. The minutes of the Working Group meetings
and the materials distributed at these meetings to date have been
placed in the docket. FRA intends to keep a current record of the
Working Group's activities and decisions in the docket.
Topics Covered
Specific topics discussed by this ANPRM include:
(1) System safety programs and plans;
(2) Passenger equipment crashworthiness;
(3) Inspection, testing and maintenance requirements;
(4) Training and qualification requirements for mechanical
personnel and train crews;
(5) Excursion, tourist and private equipment;
(6) Commuter equipment and operations;
(7) Train make-up and operating speed;
(8) Tiered design standards based on a system safety approach;
(9) Fire safety; and
(10) Operating practices and procedures.
FRA solicits suggestions for other matters related to passenger
train safety standards that should be considered in order to promote
safe and efficient train operations. FRA also solicits suggestions for
alternate approaches or ways to structure passenger equipment safety
standards.
[[Page 30673]]
Purpose of Notice
Section 215 of the Act (49 U.S.C. 20133) requires the Secretary of
Transportation to prescribe minimum standards ``for the safety of cars
used by railroad carriers to transport passengers.'' The Act
specifically requires the Secretary to consider--
(1) The crashworthiness of the cars;
(2) Interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts,
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
(3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;
(4) Emergency procedures and equipment; and
(5) Any operating rules and conditions that directly affect safety
not otherwise governed by regulations.
Given the breadth of the specific items listed in the Act, it is
clear that the Congress intended the agency to consider the safety of
rail passenger service as a whole, determining the extent to which
existing regulations should be supplemented or strengthened. Existing
regulations affecting the safety of rail passenger service include
standards for signal and train control systems, track safety, power
brakes, glazing, programs of testing and training for railroad
operating rules, and hours of service of safety-critical personnel,
among others. While existing locomotive safety regulations address the
structural characteristics of multiple-unit powered cars, non-powered
cars are not subject to the same standards. In addition, FRA has not
issued regulations addressing interior features of passenger equipment.
The Act requires issuance of initial passenger safety regulations
within 3 years and final regulations within 5 years. FRA intends to
establish a reasonably comprehensive structure of necessary safety
regulations for rail passenger service in initial standards. Where
further research is needed to develop a technical foundation for safety
improvements, rulemaking may be completed over the 5-year period
referred to in the Act.
The Act permits FRA to apply new requirements to existing passenger
cars, but requires FRA to explain why any such ``retrofit''
requirements are imposed. FRA believes that passenger equipment
operating in permanent service in the United States has established a
good safety record, proving its compatibility with the operating
environment. Many of the structural design changes identified during
preliminary analyses are likely to be cost effective only if
implemented for new equipment. Appropriate analysis should be conducted
to evaluate whether selected safety measures can be applied to existing
equipment or to rebuilt equipment on a cost-effective basis.
Collaborative Rulemaking and This Advance Notice
FRA is committed to the maximum feasible use of collaborative
processes in the development of safety regulations. As a means to allow
the industry to collaborate with FRA to develop this rulemaking, FRA
established the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, as
described earlier. FRA structured the Working Group to give a balanced
representation of the types of organizations listed in the Act.
A list of the private sector members of the Working Group is given
in Table 1.
Table 1.--Rail Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Working Group Membership List
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Organization represented Representative Mailing address Telephone Fax
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Amtrak.......................... George Binns, National Railroad (215) 349-2731 (215) 349-2767
General Manager Passenger
for Compliance and Corporation, 30th
Standards. Street Station,
4th Floor South,
Philadelphia, PA
19104.
United Transportation Union..... David Brooks, 15200 Brooksview, (301) 888-1277 .................
Conductor. Brandywine, MD
20613.
National Association of Railroad Ross Capon, 900 Second Street, (202) 408-8362 (202) 408-8287
Passengers. Executive Director. N.E., Washington,
DC 20002-3557.
American Public Transit Frank Cihak, Chief 1201 New York (202) 898-4080 (202) 898-4049
Association. Engineer. Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, DC
20005.
Federal Railroad Administration. Grady Cothen, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-0897 (202) 366-7136
Deputy Associate S.W., Washington,
Administrator for DC 20590-0002.
Safety Standards.
Electro-Motive Division, General Harvey Boyd, Senior 9301 West 55th (708) 387-6013 (708) 387-5239
Motors Corporation. Research Engineer. Street, La Grange,
IL 60525.
Federal Transit Administration.. Jeffrey Mora, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-0215 (202) 366-3765
Office of S.W., Washington,
Technology. DC 20590-0002.
American Association of State William Green, New York State Dept (518) 457-4547 (518) 457-3183
Highway and Transportation Senior Railroad of Transportation,
Officials. Inspector. 120 Washington
Avenue, Albany,
New York 12232.
Safe Travel America............. Arthur Johnson, 10600 Red Barn (301) 762-7903 .................
Chairman. Lane, Potomac, MD
20854.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Leroy Jones, 400 North Capitol (202) 347-7936 (202) 347-5237
Engineers. International Vice Street, N.W.,
President. Suite 850,
Washington, DC
20001.
Brotherhood Railway Carmen...... Hank Lewin, Vice AFL/CIO Building, (202) 783-3660 (202) 783-0198
President. Suite 511, 815
16th Street, N.W.,
Washington, DC
20006.
Siemens Transportation Systems, Frank Guzzo, 700 South Ewing, (314) 533-6710 .................
Inc.. Director Rolling St. Louis, MO
Stock. 63103.
Bombardier Corporation, Larry Kelterborn, 1084 Botanical (905) 577-1052 (905) 577-1055
Transportation Equipment Group. Consultant. Drive, Burlington,
Ontario, Canada
L7T 1V2.
National Transportation Safety Russ Quimby, 490 L'Enfant Plaza, (202) 382-6644 (202) 382-6884
Board. Investigator. S.W., Washington,
DC 20594.
American Public Transit Dennis Ramm, Chief 547 W. Jackson (312) 322-6575 (312) 322-6502
Association. Mechanical Blvd., Chicago, IL
Officer, Metra. 60661.
[[Page 30674]]
Federal Railroad Administration. Brenda Moscoso, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-0352 .................
Economist, Office S.W., Washington,
of Safety Analysis. DC 20590-0002.
Federal Railroad Administration. Thomas, Tsai, 400 Seventh Street, (202) 366-1427 .................
Program Manager, SW., Washington,
Office of Research. DC 20590-0002.
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Table 2.--Passenger Train Occupant Casualties; Ten Year Period 1985-1994
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Train accidents Grade crossing Non-accident Total passenger
---------------------- accidents passenger train train occupants
---------------------- incidents ---------------------
Killed Injured ----------------------
Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985............................................................ 0 287 0 30 3 424 3 741
1986............................................................ 1 409 0 72 4 269 5 750
1987............................................................ 17 258 0 20 1 261 18 539
1988............................................................ 2 160 0 39 2 246 4 445
1989............................................................ 1 103 2 123 8 253 11 479
1990............................................................ 0 238 1 41 3 280 4 559
1991............................................................ 9 61 0 29 0 333 9 423
1992............................................................ 0 48 1 114 3 299 4 461
1993............................................................ 54 171 1 86 9 402 64 659
1994............................................................ 3 129 0 96 3 343 6 568
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Totals........................................................ 87 1864 5 650 36 3110 128 5624
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An FRA representative chairs the Working Group, and a
representative of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) serves as
associate member. Staff members from the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) also attend and assist the Working Group. In addition, the
Working Group is supported by FRA program, legal and research staff,
including technical personnel from the Volpe National Transportation
System Center (Volpe Center). Vendors of equipment to passenger
railroads constitute another essential source of information about rail
passenger equipment safety. Accordingly, FRA has included vendor
representatives designated by the Railway Progress Institute (RPI) as
associate members of the Working Group. As one of its first tasks, the
Working Group developed a statement of its charter and scope of effort.
The Working Group is broadly representative of interests involved
in intercity and commuter service nationwide. This service is regularly
scheduled, employs contemporary electric multiple-unit (MU) equipment,
electric or diesel electric power, is often intermingled on common
rights-of-way with freight movements, and often involves maximum speeds
in the range of 79 to 125 miles per hour (mph) with speeds up to 150
mph projected in the near future.
FRA also regulates approximately 100 additional railroads that
provide service often characterized as historic, excursion, or scenic.
These ``tourist'' or ``museum'' railroads often employ steam
locomotives or older generation diesel power, and historic coaches or
freight equipment modified for passenger use. Tourist and museum
railroads vary widely in the nature of their operating environment,
personnel, train speeds, and other characteristics. FRA intends to form
a small, separate working group comprised of tourist and museum
operators and freight or passenger railroads that host or provide this
type of service. FRA will request that the Tourist Railway Association,
the Association of Railway Museums, and AAR provide representation for
this effort.
Regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency response
procedures for rail passenger service will be covered by a separate
rulemaking and are being addressed by a separate working group. Persons
wishing to receive more information regarding this separate effort
should contact Mr. Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices Division,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, RRS-11, Room 8314, FRA, 400
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-0504)
or David H. Kasminoff, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-
0628).
FRA's commitment to developing a proposed rule through the Working
Group necessarily influences the role and purpose of this ANPRM. FRA
sets forth in this ANPRM numerous preliminary ideas regarding
approaches to safety issues affecting passenger service. These are
ideas that have already been placed before the Working Group as
concrete, illustrative approaches to possible improvements in the
safety of passenger service. They are provided in this ANPRM as
information to any interested person not involved in the Working
Group's deliberations. FRA wishes to emphasize, however, that these
concepts do not constitute specific proposals of the agency in this
proceeding, nor do they represent the position of the Working Group. In
addition, issuance of this ANPRM should not be considered a diminution
of FRA's intent to prescribe passenger equipment safety regulations
within the 5-year period required by the Act.
FRA expects that the Working Group will develop proposed rules
based on a consensus process. The proposals will be based on facts and
analysis flowing from the Working Group's deliberations. Accordingly,
FRA has requested that the Working Group's members and the
organizations that they represent refrain from responding formally to
this ANPRM.
Just as FRA will not prejudge the outcome of the Working Group
deliberations, FRA asks organizations represented on the Working Group
to avoid adopting fixed positions that could polarize the discussion
within the Working Group. Rather, the deliberations of the Working
Group should be permitted to mature through a careful, fact-based
dialogue that leads to appropriate recommendations for cost-effective
standards. The evolving positions of the Working Group members--as
reflected in the minutes of the group meetings and associated
documentation, together with data provided by the membership during
their deliberations--will be placed in the docket of this rulemaking.
FRA invites other interested parties to respond to the questions
posed in this ANPRM, submitting information and views that may be of
assistance in developing a proposed rule. All comments provided in
response to this ANPRM will be provided to the Working Group for
consideration in preparation of the proposed rule.
Working Group's Scope of Effort
The Working Group will focus on developing safety standards for
rail passenger equipment by applying a system safety approach--where
practical--to:
(1) Determine and prioritize safety risks;
(2) Determine steps or corrective actions to reduce risks; and
(3) Optimize safety benefits.
The Working Group will recommend future research or test programs
when a technology appears to have the potential for a safety benefit,
but is not yet mature enough to be applied with confidence.
The Working Group will provide advice to FRA on all phases of the
rulemaking process, to include:
(1) Recommending what issues or requirements must be covered by
Federal regulations, and what issues or requirements can be effectively
handled outside the body of Federal regulations by industry standards
or some other means;
(2) Reviewing the written comments in response to the ANPRM, and
recommending those comments that should affect a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM);
(3) Providing cost information to support FRA's economic analysis
of the proposed rule;
(4) Providing information and advice on the potential benefits of
the proposed rule and its individual elements;
(5) Providing advice regarding critical assumptions required for
the economic analysis;
(6) Reviewing and critiquing a draft NPRM prepared by FRA based on
Working Group guidance;
(7) Reviewing the oral and written comments to the NPRM and
recommending those comments that should affect a final rule;
(8) Reviewing and critiquing a draft final rule prepared by FRA
based on Working Group guidance; and
(9) If requested by FRA, recommending actions to take to respond to
any petitions for reconsideration received as a result of the final
rule.
The Working Group will also assist FRA in drafting a second NPRM
for passenger equipment power brake standards.
To ensure full development of the issues, the Working Group will
attempt to draw on all sources within the industry to collect
information necessary to conduct comparative analyses and reach
decisions.
The Working Group will establish a procedure for considering ideas,
approaches, and performance standards
[[Page 30677]]
for use as part of the safety standards. This procedure should be based
on the concept of reaching an overall consensus. Overall consensus
means represented organizations may object--even strongly--to
individual ideas, approaches, or standards, but the organization can
accept and ``live with'' the evolving set of standards as a whole. FRA
believes the success of this entire innovative approach to rulemaking
depends on the ability of the group to reach overall consensus.
The Working Group will consider whether to continue to meet on a
periodic basis after final rulemaking to consider changes necessary to
keep any rules or other standards current and responsive to the needs
of the industry.
Background
Need for Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
Rail passenger service is currently operated with a high level of
safety. However, accidents continue to occur, often as a result of
factors beyond the control of the passenger railroad. Further, the rail
passenger operating environment in the United States is rapidly
changing--technology is advancing; equipment is being designed for
ever-higher speeds; and many potential new operators of passenger
equipment are appearing. With this more complex operating environment,
FRA must become more active to ensure that passenger trains continue to
be designed, built, and operated with public safety foremost.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) recognizes this need in Report
GAO/RCED-93-196, entitled ``AMTRAK Should Implement Minimum Safety
Standards for Passenger Cars.'' In addition, NTSB has issued several
recommendations to FRA and to the railroad industry concerning the
crashworthiness of locomotives. Although the recommendations directly
apply to freight locomotives, the same concerns exist for passenger
train locomotives or power cars.
NTSB's Crashworthiness Concerns
NTSB's interest in locomotive crashworthiness dates to 1970, and
NTSB has made several safety recommendations to FRA and the industry
concerning increased protection for crew members in the cab based on
the following accidents:
On September 8, 1970, a collision between an Illinois
Central (IC) and an Indiana Harbor Belt (IHB) train occurred at
Riverdale, Illinois. The collision caused the IC caboose to override
the heavy under frame of the IHB locomotive demolishing the control cab
of the locomotive. Two following cars continued in the path established
by the caboose, completing the destruction of the locomotive cab. The
IHB engineer was found dead in the wreckage. NTSB recommended that FRA
and the industry expand their cooperative effort to improve the
crashworthiness of railroad equipment (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-71-
44).
An accident on October 8, 1970, involving a Penn Central
Transportation Company freight train and a passenger train near Sound
View, Connecticut, again demonstrated the weakness of the locomotive
crew compartment. This collision caused NTSB to reiterate its
recommendation to improve the crash resistance of locomotive cabs (NTSB
Safety Recommendation R-72-005). This recommendation was ultimately
classified as ``Closed-No Longer Applicable'' following the issuance of
Safety Recommendation R-78-27 which addressed the same issue.
The investigation of the collision of three freight trains
near Leetonia, Ohio, on June 6, 1975, again prompted NTSB to recommend
increased cab crashworthiness, including consideration of a readily
accessible crash refuge (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-76-009). This
recommendation was classified as ``Closed-Acceptable Action'' on August
6, 1978, following FRA's assurance that studies were continuing in this
area.
On September 18, 1978, a Louisville and Nashville freight
train collided head-on with a yard train inside yard limits at
Florence, Alabama. The lead unit of the yard train overrode the lead
unit of the freight train. The cab provided no protection for the head
brakeman and engineer, who jumped but were run over by their train.
On August 11, 1981, a Boston and Maine Corporation freight
train and a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority commuter train
collided head-on near Prides Crossing, Beverly, Massachusetts. The lead
car of the commuter train overrode the freight locomotive, pushing
components of the locomotive into the cab killing three people.
NTSB's investigations of the above accidents resulted in
recommendations to FRA regarding crashworthiness protection to the
locomotive operating compartments (NTSB Recommendations R-77-37, R-78-
27, R-79-11, and R-82-34). As a result of the FRA-sponsored report
``Analysis of Locomotive Cabs,''1 NTSB classified these four
recommendations ``Closed-Acceptable Action'' on November 24, 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Analysis of Locomotive Cabs.'' (Report No. DOT/FRA/ORD-81/
84, National Space Technology Laboratories, September 1982.)
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A rear-end collision of two Burlington Northern (BN)
freight trains occurred near Pacific Junction, Iowa, on April 13, 1983.
The operating compartment of the lead locomotive on the striking train,
BN train 64T85, was overridden by the caboose of train 43J05 when the
trains collided. The locomotive operating compartment was crushed. (In
general, when a locomotive strikes a caboose or a light freight car,
the lighter vehicle overrides the locomotive, frequently with
devastating results.) As a result of this accident, NTSB issued a
recommendation that FRA initiate and/or support a design study to
provide a protected area in the locomotive operating compartment for
the crew when a collision is unavoidable (NTSB Recommendation R-83-
102). This recommendation was subsequently classified as ``Closed-
Unacceptable Action/Superseded'' based on a future investigation that
reiterated similar concerns regarding locomotive crashworthiness.
On July 10, 1986, Union Pacific (UP) freight train CLSA-09
struck a standing UP freight train near North Platte, Nebraska, at a
speed of approximately 32 mph. Three locomotives and eleven cars from
both trains derailed, and the accident resulted in one fatality and
three injuries. This accident, in which the locomotive cab section of
train CLSA-09 was destroyed on impact, probably would have resulted in
fatal injuries to the engineer and head brakeman of train CLSA-09 had
they not jumped from the cab prior to the collision. As a result, NTSB
issued Safety Recommendation R-87-23, which recommends that FRA:
Promptly require locomotive operating compartments to be
designed to provide crash protection for occupants of locomotive
cabs.
NTSB believes that locomotive collision investigations continue to
demonstrate that improvements are needed in the crashworthiness design
standards of locomotives.
As a result of investigations of numerous accidents involving
passenger trains over the past 20 years, NTSB has recommended that FRA
or the passenger railroad industry:
(1) Prescribe regulations requiring emergency means of escape from
railroad passenger cars;
(2) Prescribe regulations requiring emergency lighting for railroad
passenger cars;
(3) Initiate studies to determine the relationship between
passenger car design and passenger injuries;
[[Page 30678]]
(4) Prescribe regulations requiring passenger cars with secured
seats and luggage retention devices;
(5) Apply system safety principles to the acquisition, design,
construction and renovation of passenger cars;
(6) Prescribe regulations to require back-up power for emergency
lights and doors that can be opened in the event of loss of power;
(7) Require that rail passenger equipment be fitted with roof
escape hatches;
(8) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum standards for the
interior of commuter cars so that adequate crash injury protection and
emergency equipment will be provided;
(9) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum standards for the
design and construction of interiors of passenger cars so adequate
crash injury protection will be provided;
(10) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum safety standards
for the inspection and maintenance of railroad passenger cars; and
(11) Amend the power brake regulations to provide appropriate
guidelines for inspecting power brake equipment on modern passenger
cars.
Accident/Incident Data
FRA has compiled a 10-year history of passenger equipment
accidents/incidents that railroads have reported to FRA. FRA supplied
this information to the Working Group and placed it in the docket.
Table 2 summarizes the deaths and injuries reported to FRA by railroads
for occupants of passenger trains during this 10-year period. The
``train accidents'' column of Table 2 includes all collisions,
derailments, or fires involving passenger trains that resulted in more
than $6,300 damage to on-track equipment, signals, track, track
structure, or road bed. The ``grade crossing accidents'' column of
Table 2 includes all reported impacts of a passenger train with cars,
trucks, busses, farm equipment, or pedestrians at grade crossings. The
``non-accident passenger train incidents'' column of Table 2 includes
all reports of injuries or deaths of passenger train occupants not
caused by a train accident or grade crossing accident.
Figure 1 is a pie chart depicting the percentages of deaths to
passenger train occupants caused by train accidents, grade crossing
accidents, and non-accident incidents. Figure 2 shows the 10-year trend
for each of these causes of deaths.
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Figure 3 is a pie chart depicting the percentages of injuries to
passenger train occupants caused by train accidents, grade crossing
accidents, and non-accident incidents. Figure 4 shows the 10-year trend
for each of these causes of injuries to occupants of passenger trains.
(Amtrak has noted that the showing of only 10 years of accident data is
somewhat distorted in that two accidents account for over 80 percent of
the deaths, and one of the accidents had substantial intermodal
implications.)
Comment is requested regarding the significance of this data,
elements of societal and railroad cost not included in the reported
data, and factors to be considered in evaluating the risk of future
catastrophic passenger train accidents.
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Approach/Structure for Safety Standards
Scope and Context
FRA recognizes that safety standards that apply only to passenger
equipment provide only a partial solution to improving rail passenger
safety, and the best way to increase rail passenger safety is to keep
trains on the track and spaced apart.
Keeping trains on the track and apart requires a systems approach
to safety that includes railroad track, right-of-way, signals and
controls, operating procedures, station- and platform-to-train
interface design, as well as equipment. FRA has active rulemaking and
research projects ongoing in a variety of contexts that address non-
equipment aspects of passenger railroad system safety.
While reflecting the other aspects of passenger railroad system
safety, this rulemaking will focus on:
(1) Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance standards;
(2) Equipment design and performance standards;
(3) Platform- and station-to-train interface design and procedures
to promote safe ingress and egress of passengers; and
(4) Other issues specifically related to safe operation of rail
passenger service not addressed in other FRA regulations, proceedings,
or program development efforts.
Existing Rail Passenger Operations
FRA intends to structure any proposed actions to cause a minimum of
disruption to existing safe operations of passenger equipment. This
notice is designed to bring to FRA's attention the special situations
and problems confronting tourist and excursion railroads, private
passenger car owners, commuter railroads, and the existing operations
of Amtrak, which all have a long history of safe operation. FRA
believes the first objective of this rulemaking should be to construct
common sense minimum safety floors under these existing operations. To
the extent new technology or innovative approaches might offer
opportunities for improving safety performance on a cost- effective
basis, FRA seeks the appropriate means to exploit these opportunities.
A common sense safety floor under existing safe operations includes
a complete pre-departure (or daily) safety inspection of each departing
train conducted by skilled inspectors, and a well-planned test and
preventive maintenance program for safety-critical components of the
system triggered by time, mileage, or some other reliability-driven
parameter. (A ``safety critical component'' is a component whose
failure to function as intended results in a greater risk to passengers
and crew.) One of the main purposes of this ANPRM is to solicit
information concerning:
(1) The steps necessary to conduct a complete pre-departure or
daily safety inspection of the equipment;
(2) A means to demonstrate (e.g., training, testing, supervision,
certification) that safety inspectors have the knowledge and skills
necessary to perform effective inspections or tests;
(3) The minimum planned or periodic maintenance program required to
keep the equipment in safe operating condition;
(4) The frequency of required planned or periodic maintenance; and
(5) The costs and benefits associated with the requirements under
consideration.
Special Consideration for Tourist and Excursion Railroads
Tourist and excursion railroads generally provide passenger rail
service as entertainment or recreation, often at low speed on track
dedicated to that service alone. FRA recognizes the extensive service
provided by this growing sector of the railroad industry, and the need
to tailor appropriate safety requirements to the level of risk
involved. Accordingly, FRA will work to identify appropriate criteria
for creating relatively simple system safety plans and programs for
tourist and excursion railroads that recognize the special needs of
this sector of the industry.
Speed and distance limits may be helpful to define tourist and
excursion railroads excepted from many of the effects of any proposed
passenger equipment safety standards. For instance, less stringent
requirements might be applied to a railroad with a maximum operating
speed of 30 mph and a maximum trip distance of 250 miles. In addition,
operations segregated from the general railroad system may warrant
consideration for less stringent requirements. FRA seeks comment on
these proposed limits and, as noted earlier, will request assistance of
an appropriately representative working group to develop these issues.
Special Consideration for Private Passenger Cars
FRA recognizes private passenger cars as another segment of the
industry that may need special consideration. However, some important
differences between the two types of operations exist that need to be
taken into account. Private passenger cars often operate as part of
freight, Amtrak, and commuter trains at track speeds over long
distances. Providing regulatory relief to private passenger car owners
through speed and/or distance limitations could severely restrict
current operations. The host railroads often impose their own safety
requirements on the private passenger cars and have a strong interest
in any Federal safety standards that apply to private passenger cars.
FRA intends to fully involve Amtrak, the American Association of
Private Railcar Owners, and the American Public Transit Association
(APTA) as standards for private passenger cars are developed.
Does the simple system safety program proposed for tourist and
excursion railroads make sense for private passenger cars? If not, why?
Do alternate means exist to provide regulatory relief to private
passenger car owners without imposing restrictive speed and distance
limits? How should railroad business or observation cars be treated?
New Rail Passenger Service or Systems
FRA intends the main thrust of any proposed safety standards for
equipment design to be focused on new equipment and new rail passenger
service. New equipment and new service present the opportunity to
analyze the proposed equipment and its intended use to ensure that a
systematic approach is taken to design safety into the operation.
However, some of the safety enhancements that the final rule resulting
from this ANPRM deem necessary for new equipment may have the potential
to be applied to existing or to rebuilt equipment. Without such
consideration, opportunities to increase safety that stand up to a
cost/benefit analysis could be lost. In addition, not requiring rebuilt
equipment to meet the latest standards provides an incentive to rebuild
equipment rather than purchase new equipment, thus delaying the full
benefit of the new standards.
Passenger Equipment Power Brakes
On September 16, 1994, FRA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking on power brakes. 59 FR 47676. Much of the public testimony
received in response to the NPRM emphasized the differences between
freight operations and passenger operations, and the differences
between freight equipment brake systems and passenger equipment brake
systems. In light of this testimony, and because passenger equipment
power brake standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment
safety standards,
[[Page 30684]]
FRA will separate passenger equipment power brake standards from
freight equipment power brake standards. The Working Group will assist
FRA to develop a second NPRM that covers passenger equipment power
brake standards. Since power brakes have already been the subject of a
recent ANPRM, NPRM, and supplementary notice, FRA is not seeking
additional information on passenger equipment power brakes, and they
will not be addressed in this ANPRM.
Regulatory Flexibility
FRA conducts this proceeding to determine how best to meet the need
to assure the public of continued safe operation of passenger trains in
a more complex operating environment. Although FRA is required by law
to issue minimum standards for passenger equipment safety, FRA
recognizes that the level of detail properly embodied in regulations
can and should be powerfully influenced by the presence of voluntary
standards adhered to by those participating in their development. FRA
encourages the formation of a rail passenger industry forum (similar to
AAR in some functions, but more representative of all segments of the
rail passenger industry) to establish supplementary safety standards
developed through industry consensus. Such an organization could reduce
the need for detailed Federal regulations beyond such basic
requirements as may be appropriate to provide for safety.
FRA desires to structure regulations to provide the flexibility
necessary for introduction of new technology or new operating concepts
that could improve service and safety. Use of performance standards--
where feasible--can best achieve this objective.
FRA desires this ANPRM to stimulate discussion focused on how FRA
can meet its responsibility to the public while imposing a minimum
regulatory burden on the rail passenger industry. Does the industry
have plans to establish a forum with the charter and authority to
develop safety standards by consensus for the industry, or can an
existing organization serve this function? If such a group can be
established, what safety concerns have a high potential of being
resolved through industry consensus and voluntary action? What time
frame would be required to develop industry safety standards by
consensus? What role could/should rail labor organizations, equipment
builders, component suppliers, and state agencies play in developing
these safety standards? What assurances could be provided that the
industry would adhere to these safety standards? What role could/should
FRA play to assist the industry in developing these standards? When
consensus cannot be reached or is not adequate, and Federal regulations
are required, how can the flexibility/adaptability of the regulations
to meet a dynamic operating environment and changing technology be
maximized? To what extent might development of voluntary industry
guidelines limit the need for highly detailed or prescriptive Federal
standards?
Discussion of Issues
An introductory discussion of several concepts--crucial to rail
equipment safety--may convey a better understanding of the approach FRA
is considering to develop safety standards for new passenger equipment.
These concepts are:
(1) system safety plan and program;
(2) rail vehicle crashworthiness;
(3) crash energy management;
(4) suspension system performance; and
(5) wheel thermal stress.
System Safety Plan and Program
The heart of the approach to new passenger equipment safety
standards will be a system safety program. A system safety plan is a
document developed by the operator--with a large input from the builder
of new equipment--to describe the system safety program. The plan
should lay out a top-down approach to how the system--including the
equipment, the inspection, the testing and maintenance program, the
routes over which the equipment will operate, and the operating rules
that will be applied to it--will be designed, tested, and verified to
meet all safety requirements and provide a safe operation.
A true and complete system safety approach begins at the top level
of the system--in this case, the ``system'' is the entire railroad
operation. For the purpose of risk analysis, the railroad system must
be broken down into its component systems. No one--or right--way exists
to perform this breakdown. It can be done many ways. Figure 5 is just
one logical example.
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 30685]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.014
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C
[[Page 30686]]
Many passenger railroads operate at least partially as a tenant on
the right-of-way and property of another railroad. In this case, the
passenger railroad may have little or no control under the contractual
terms of the tenancy arrangement, and little or no prospect of gaining
future control over some of the major risk components of the risk
analysis. The actions of the passenger railroad cannot change these
risk components, and for the purpose of performing a system safety
analysis, they must remain fixed and be accepted as a given unless
subject to separate changes in Federal standards.
For example, a passenger railroad that operates largely as a tenant
would have little or no control over the Interfaces (RC1) and Right-of-
Way (RC2) risk components. By holding these risk components fixed, the
system safety approach degrades to a systems approach applied to the
remaining two subsystems rather than to the railroad as a whole. The
``systems'' methodology still has considerable merit when applied to
the remaining subsystems, but a true system safety approach cannot be
applied to a system that has major risk components that are
constrained. This analysis could help define the equipment
crashworthiness features required for its intended purpose, or the
operational limitations needed to improve or retain safety levels.
What practical constraints must be taken into account when applying
a system safety approach to passenger railroads? When all practical
constraints are taken into account, how should the system safety
approach be applied to help develop passenger equipment safety
standards?
The system safety plan can range from a relatively simple
document--for conventional equipment being procured to continue an
existing service--to a detailed document laying out a comprehensive
approach for designing, testing, and operating state-of-the-art high-
speed passenger rail systems. The outline of the system safety plan
given in Appendix A applies to the procurements of new high-speed
trainsets. For the less complex procurements of replacement equipment
for existing service, the plan should be simplified and tailored to fit
the particular need. It should be emphasized that the purpose of the
system safety plan is to force a thorough thought process to ensure
safety is optimized.
The purpose of a formal system safety program, among other things,
is to ensure safety is adequately addressed during the design of
passenger trainsets and during the development of the inspection,
testing, and maintenance program that supports these trainsets. The
system safety program also permits other high risk components in the
system to be identified, including operational aspects and the
signaling and grade crossing technology employed. The system safety
program requires:
(1) Analysis of the trainset design for identification of safety
hazards (risk assessment) and systematic elimination or reduction of
the risk associated with these hazards (mitigating actions);
(2) Analysis of operational aspects for safety hazards and, where
feasible, systematic elimination or reduction of the associated risk of
these hazards; and
(3) Development of the inspection, testing, and maintenance concept
in a step-by-step process to determine the procedures and maintenance
intervals necessary to keep the trainset operating safely.
MIL-STD-882C defines the approach taken for system safety programs
used by the United States military. A copy has been placed in the
docket. This document is an excellent reference for how to plan and
conduct a system safety program.
FRA solicits comments from all segments of the rail passenger
industry on formal system safety programs. FRA is particularly
interested in ways to tailor the program to meet the multitude of
individual situations that exist in the industry. The purpose of the
program is to ensure that safety is planned into new systems. FRA is
searching for ways to ensure the system safety program is good
business--not a regulatory burden. FRA seeks to determine the process
necessary to ensure system safety is good business and allows
flexibility in tailoring the planning to the level of the safety need.
Are any system safety plans currently in use? How much would it
cost (in terms of time and effort) to update existing or develop new
system safety plans? On average, approximately how often would system
safety plans have to be updated? How would system safety plans improve
safety? Specifically, what areas of safety would be improved, by how
much, and why? Please provide copies of any studies, data, arguments,
or opinions which support your answer.
Rail Passenger Equipment Crashworthiness
Since vehicle crashworthiness is one of the means to reduce safety
risks, it is therefore a major subset of the system safety program.
``Rail passenger equipment crashworthiness'' means a system of
interrelated vehicle design features intended to maximize passenger and
crew survivability of collisions and derailments. Vehicle
crashworthiness is the last line of defense or protection in the event
all other precautions fail, and a serious accident occurs.
A risk assessment done by Arthur D. Little, Inc., (ADL) for Amtrak
regarding operation of high-speed trainsets in the Northeast Corridor
points to the need for attention to passenger equipment crashworthiness
by showing that the following types of collisions could occur on the
Northeast Corridor:
(1) Loaded freight equipment or locomotives might derail on
adjacent track, overturning and fouling a high- speed main line. (The
derailment could be caused by defective freight equipment or
vandalism.)
(2) The braking system on a freight train or light locomotives
could fail to operate properly, causing that consist to split a switch
and occupy a high-speed main line immediately ahead of an oncoming
high-speed passenger train.
(3) A high-speed passenger train could derail on a curve due to a
track defect (e.g., a broken rail initiated by the last freight
movement) and strike a fixed object such as an abutment or pier.
Scenarios with substantially similar consequences are possible even
after the installation of an enhanced train control system. These are
the types of scenarios feared by freight railroads that allow passenger
trains to operate on their systems, and have led the freight railroads
to demand insulation from excessive tort liability.
To ensure crashworthiness, passenger equipment must:
(1) Maintain an envelope or minimum volume of survivability for
passengers and crew which resists extreme structural deformation and
separation of main structural members;
(2) Protect against penetration of the occupied compartments;
(3) Protect the occupants from being ejected from occupied
compartments; and
(4) Protect the occupants from secondary impacts with the interior
of the occupied compartments.
To make a passenger train accident survivable (1) the spaces
occupied by people must be strong enough not to collapse, crushing the
people; and (2) the initial deceleration of the people must be limited
so they are not thrown against the interior of the train with
unsurvivable force. Achieving these general objectives can be the most
difficult challenge facing equipment designers.
[[Page 30687]]
Crash Energy Management
Crash energy management is a design technique to help equipment
designers meet this challenge. The basic concept embodied by crash
energy management is that designated sections in unoccupied spaces or
lightly occupied spaces are intentionally designed to be weaker than
heavily occupied spaces. This is done so that during a collision,
portions of the unoccupied spaces will deform before the occupied
spaces, allowing the occupied spaces of the trainset initially to
decelerate more slowly and minimize the uncontrolled deformation of
occupied space.
The docket contains two technical papers 2 by the Volpe Center
that analyze the merits of crash energy management design techniques.
These studies evaluate the effectiveness of alternative strategies for
providing crashworthiness of passenger rail vehicle structures and
interiors at increased collision speeds by comparing them to a design
permitted by current standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness Strategies for
Passenger Trains.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B. Marquis, U.S.
Department of Transportation Volpe National Transportation System
Center, January 20, 1995; ``Train Crashworthiness Design for
Occupant Survivability.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B. Marquis,
U.S. Department of Transportation Volpe National Transportation
System Center, April 7, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current regulations permit cars of essentially uniform longitudinal
strength. Simplified analysis done using a lumped-mass computer model
and an idealized load-crush curve predicts this type of design to be
effective in maintaining survivable volumes in coaches for train-to-
train collision speeds up to 70 mph. Further analysis needs to be done
using a more complex distributed-mass computer model and a widely
accepted load-crush curve to refine this prediction.
Using a simplified lumped-mass computer model, the assumed uniform
longitudinal strength causes the predicted structural crushing of the
train to proceed uniformly from the front to the rear of the train,
through both the unoccupied and occupied areas of the train. Using a
distributed-mass computer model, structural crushing of uniform
strength equipment tends to be predicted to occur at both ends of the
car, more in agreement with observations from actual accidents.
The crash energy management design approach results in varying
longitudinal strength, with high strength in the occupied areas and
lower strength in the unoccupied areas. This approach attempts to
distribute the structural crushing throughout the train to the
unoccupied areas to preserve the occupant volumes and to control and
limit the decelerations of the cars. The crash energy management
approach has been found to offer significant benefits. (Amtrak has
noted that while this concept seems to work well for single-level
equipment with vestibules at each end, its application to a bi-level
design--which is now Amtrak's long distance standard--was not
considered in these publications.)
The interior crashworthiness study evaluates the influence of
interior configurations and occupant restraints on injuries resulting
from occupant motions during a collision. For a sufficiently gentle
train deceleration, compartmentalization (a strategy for providing a
``friendly'' interior) can provide sufficient occupant protection to
keep widely accepted injury criteria below the threshold values applied
by the automotive industry.
The Volpe Center reports show that, if installed properly and used,
the combination of lapbelts and shoulder restraints can reduce the
likelihood of fatality due to deceleration to near-certain survival for
even the most severe collision conditions considered. However,
individual restraints may have limited practical value on a train,
where mobility within the vehicle is an important attribute of service
quality, and times of most significant risk cannot be predicted. The
most likely application of personal restraints could be in a control
compartment located at the front of the train.
The value of a crash energy management design is not in the energy
absorbed--only a few percent of the kinetic energy of a high-speed
collision can be absorbed in a reasonable crush distance. The real
safety benefit comes from allowing the occupied spaces to decelerate
more slowly, while decreasing the likelihood that occupied spaces will
fail in an uncontrolled fashion. If the occupied spaces are initially
decelerated more slowly, people will be pinned to an interior surface
of the trainset with less force, resulting in fewer and less severe
injuries. Once pinned against an interior surface, occupants can then
sustain much higher subsequent decelerations without sustaining serious
injuries. Also, since unoccupied space is intentionally sacrificed,
less occupied space will be crushed during the collision.
Crash energy management design involves a system of interrelated
safety features, in addition to controlled crushable space, that could
include: (1) design techniques to keep the trainset in line and on the
track for as long as possible during the initial impact;
(2) Interior design that eliminates sharp corners and that pads,
with shock absorbing material, surfaces that are likely to be struck by
people thrown about by a collision;
(3) Attachment of interior fittings and seats with sufficient
strength not to fail and thereby cause additional injuries; and
(4) A crash refuge for the vulnerable crew members in the cab.
To help maintain survivable volumes in passenger equipment,
particularly during collisions at higher closing speeds, minimum
standards for the following structural design parameters would be
needed:
(1) Anti-buckling to keep the train in line and on the track for as
long as possible after impact. (Prevention of buckling is not always
possible, but it can be delayed);
(2) End structures and anticlimbers to prevent override and
telescoping;
(3) Corner posts to deflect glancing collisions;
(4) Rollover strength;
(5) Truck to car body attachment; and
(6) A control cab crash refuge.
``Anti-buckling'' refers to trainset design techniques intended to
prevent to a certain force level or delay both vertical (override) and/
or lateral buckling. The current state-of-the-art in passenger rail
equipment design will impose limitations on the extent to which anti-
buckling can be achieved. (Devices that meet the anti-buckling
requirements have not been developed or tested. Those devices that have
been evaluated by the French National Railroad in actual crash testing
of their latest TGV bi-level design are intended to prevent override
similar to those devices currently required on North American
equipment.)
Standards would be necessary to address the general design
parameters to limit decelerations of passengers and crew, as well as
flying objects striking passengers and crew. One possible approach is
to define, under the dynamic conditions created by a specific collision
scenario:
(1) Limits on the maximum and average deceleration of the crew in
the control cab for the first 250 milliseconds after impact (assuming
the crew had anticipated the collision and placed themselves in the
crash refuge);
(2) Limits on the maximum and average deceleration of passengers in
passenger cars for the first 250 milliseconds after impact;
(3) Minimum longitudinal, lateral, and vertical seat attachment
strength;
(4) Minimum longitudinal, lateral, and vertical fitting attachment
and
[[Page 30688]]
luggage stowage compartment strengths; and
(5) Minimum padding requirements for seat backs and interior
surfaces. Achieving the second item requires careful design to create a
differential in structural strength between passenger seating areas
(``occupied volume'') and certain other areas that would be allowed to
fail before the occupied volume. By contrast, permitting uniform
rigidity throughout the trainset could result in unacceptably high
initial accelerations of the passenger compartments and possibly make
the accident non-survivable.
Suspension System Performance
A passenger train suspension system's purpose is to follow the
track at all speeds of operation and to minimize the vibrations and
motions transmitted to the passengers. An unsafe condition occurs
whenever the suspension system:
(1) Allows a wheel to lift from a rail;
(2) Allows a wheel to climb over a rail;
(3) Transmits excessive vibration or motion to the passengers;
(4) Exerts excessive force on a rail causing it to shift or roll;
or
(5) Allows unstable lateral hunting oscillations of a truck or
wheelset.
The vehicle no longer safely follows the track when a wheel either
climbs the rail or lifts from the rail. Wheel climb may occur in curves
where large lateral forces are generated as the truck negotiates the
curve. These lateral forces, particularly in combination with changes
in vertical wheel load caused by track surface variations, can cause
the wheel to climb the rail.
The ratio of lateral to vertical forces acting on a wheel (L/V
ratio) is generally taken as a measure of the proximity of the wheel to
derailment. If L/V remains less than Nadal's limit, which is 0.8 on
clean, dry, tangent track, then wheel derailment is remote.
Whenever insufficient vertical force exists to support the lateral
force acting on the rail, wheel climb can potentially occur under a
broad range of track alignment and surface geometry combinations. If a
wheel lifts due to excessive rolling, twisting, or other motions of the
car body or truck, it will likely return to the rail as long as no
excessive lateral forces exist to push it out of line with the rail.
However, wheel lift represents a potentially unsafe condition, because
there is no certainty of the absence of a strong lateral force that
prevents the wheel's return to the rail. To assure that the wheel
remains in contact with the rail, each wheel must maintain a minimum
vertical load of 10 percent of the nominal static wheel vertical load
on straight, level track.
Excessive lateral forces acting on a rail can cause the rail to
rollover and/or shift outward, allowing a wheelset to drop between the
rails. For this to happen, all wheels on one side of a truck must be
pushing outward on a rail. The railroad industry generally accepts that
if the ratio of the sum of the lateral forces to the sum of the
vertical forces exerted by all the wheels on one side of a truck on the
rail is less than 0.5, there is little danger of rail rollover or
shift.
Excessive lateral forces, induced by a car traversing the track,
can also cause the track as a unit to shift laterally on its ballast.
To assure that the track does not get pushed out of alignment by a
train, the ratio of the net lateral load exerted by each axle to the
net vertical load exerted by that axle must remain less than 0.5.
Passenger ride quality is generally a comfort rather than a safety
concern, unless ride quality deteriorates so that passengers are
injured by a rough ride. To provide minimum protection for passengers
from injuries due to being thrown about by excessive car body motions,
FRA believes that equipment should be designed such that car body
lateral accelerations are less than 0.30g peak-to-peak and the car body
vertical accelerations are less than 0.55g peak-to-peak, while the
square root of the sum of lateral accelerations squared plus the
vertical accelerations squared (the vector sum) is less than 0.604g
peak-to-peak. Compliance with this design standard would typically be
established as part of an equipment qualification program.
Sustained lateral oscillations of the truck (``truck hunting'') can
lead to derailment. Sensor technology allows the lateral accelerations
of the truck to be constantly monitored under service operating
conditions. FRA proposes that trucks be equipped with accelerometers to
monitor for hunting so that corrective action can be taken when hunting
is detected. FRA proposes to define ``hunting'' as a lateral
acceleration of the truck frame in excess of 0.8g peak-to-peak repeated
for six or more cycles.
Recent experience with the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority's
new bi-level commuter cars demonstrated the close relationship between
suspension system performance and track geometry. The suspension system
must be able to perform at low speed over track with relatively large
surface variations, such as 3-inch cross level deviation, while
maintaining stability and smooth ride quality at maximum service
speeds. FRA is concerned that suspension systems of all new passenger
equipment maintain passenger safety over their entire range of intended
operating conditions. The suspension system requirements, such as wheel
equalization, must therefore be established for all equipment and
service based on analysis from the system safety program. Compliance
with this requirement would typically be established as part of an
equipment qualification program.
Wheel Thermal Stress
FRA is concerned that frequent, repeated braking from high speeds
could induce thermal damage in wheels that can result in cracking and
potential wheel failure in service. New high-speed passenger equipment
may include blended brakes which combine dynamic and friction braking
(either on tread, disk, or both). Such blended systems typically
maximize the available dynamic brake portion at all speeds to minimize
wear and thermal input to the wheels, discs, and friction brake
components. Wheel slide detection and prevention is typically available
to minimize loss of wheel to track adhesion of individual wheelsets
during deceleration.
Thermal demand on wheels due to frictional heating by tread brakes
can be substantial when loaded cars are operated at high braking
ratios. This scenario may apply to blended systems which use tread
brakes more extensively to make up for the loss of failed dynamic
brakes. Recent research has shown that for wheels on some types of
passenger equipment operated at weights of 60 to 80 tons per car, at
speeds from 80 to 100 mph and retardation rates of 2 to 3 mph/second,
the brake horsepower which the wheel must absorb can flash-heat a
shallow layer of the rim to a temperature high enough to damage the
metal and possibly cause a change in its mechanical properties.
An operational test under simulated service conditions was
conducted in October 1992 using wheels instrumented with thermocouples
to measure temperatures in the rim. The test train was operated at
near-empty weight (61 tons per car) and at speeds up to 100 mph. Wheel
temperatures were measured during speed reductions and stops, at
retardation rates from 1.3 to 1.9 mph/second, with tread braking only.
Temperatures as high as 1000 deg.F. (538 deg.C.) were measured by the
thermocouple closest to the tread surface (approximately 0.1 inch below
the tread surface). The S-plate wheel
[[Page 30689]]
design common in commuter service was used to obtain these results.
Current Federal safety standards for locomotives, under which MU
cars are covered, define a defective wheel due to cracking as any wheel
with ``[a] crack or break in the flange, tread, rim, plate, or hub.''
49 CFR 229.75(k). Although the AAR Manual of Interchange Rules (1980)
applies only to interchange freight service, it is often applied to
equipment in passenger service and defines a wheel to be ``condemnable
at any time'' if it contains ``thermal cracks: transverse cracks in
tread, flange or plate * * *'' (Rule 41--Section A). The 1984 edition
of the same manual adds a qualification as follows: ``Thermal or heat
checks: Brake shoe heating frequently produces a fine network of
superficial lines or checks running in all directions on the surface of
the wheel tread. This is sometimes associated with skid burns. It
should not be confused with thermal cracking and is not a cause for
wheel removal.''
Heat checking is recognized by experienced failure analysts as a
phenomenon distinct from thermal cracking. In the absence of other
effects, heat checks are believed--at worst--to progress to minor
shelling or spalling which can be detected and corrected well before
they cause a risk to operational safety. However, recent research has
shown that heat checks are unsafe if the affected wheel has also been
subjected to rim stress reversal.
Wrought wheels used in commuter service are rim-quenched after
forming to create a layer of residual compressive stress in the rim
extending inward from the tread. Depths of penetration of the
compressive layer are estimated at 1.2 inches (30 mm) by finite element
simulations of the quenching process. This residual compressive stress
is beneficial since compression tends to force cracks closed and retard
crack growth.
Repeated wheel excursions to high temperatures can result in stress
reversal in the wheel rim, especially in shallow layers near the tread
surface where cracks are likely to originate. Estimates of residual
stresses in new (as manufactured) wheels were obtained by application
of an advanced finite element-based technique which uses stresses due
to quenching as an input state and then calculates the final residual
stress state after repeated simulated stop-braking from 80 mph at 2
mph/second. The results of this simulation predict stress reversal
(reversal from circumferential compression due to quenching to residual
tension) in a layer approximately \5/8\-inch (16 mm) deep from the
surface of the wheel tread.
This research causes FRA concern regarding the possibility of wheel
failures due to cracking initiated in overbraked wheels. A visual
estimation of thermal damage is difficult in the absence of cracks.
Conventional practices based on wheel discoloration have been
discredited as being unreliable indicators of wheel thermal damage.
Within the limits of current sensor technology, the best means
available to prevent wheel failure resulting from thermal damage is
careful brake system design to limit the frictional heating of wheels
to within safe limits.
Ad hoc recommendations identify the onset of thermal damage at
wheel tread near surface temperatures of 600 to 700 deg.F. In order to
better quantify the effect of temperature on wheel integrity, several
metallurgical experiments of wheel material were done. The base
material condition of a non-thermally abused wheel rim is normally a
pearlitic microstructure hardened to approximately RC 35. Metallurgical
examination near the treads of thermally cracked wheels shows a
spheroidized microstructure with an increased hardness for a layer
approximately \1/2\-inch deep.
This microstructure form is usually associated with formation by a
sequence of heating to extremely high temperatures (above 1400 deg.F.)
followed by rapid quenching to produce martensite (an undesirable steel
microstructure), followed by tempering at high temperature (800 to 900
deg.F.) to transform martensite to spheroidite.
Since field data indicated that wheel temperatures were not
reaching the elevated levels necessary to produce the laboratory
material transformation, more work was done to try to explain this
inconsistency. This laboratory work involved testing of wheel steel
samples that were exposed to combined rapid heating and high
compression. The combination of heat and compression was used to
simulate the environment of material near a wheel tread surface that is
subjected to combined stop-braking (heat) and rail contact
(compression). The results of these laboratory tests showed that the
microstructure of the material can transform at temperatures below 1200
deg.F if the material is also compressed, and the transformed
microstructure can have an appearance similar to that of spheroidite.
Based on this research, FRA is concerned that passenger equipment
in service with frequent stops from high speeds can over brake wheels.
Of particular concern is equipment that utilizes a high percentage of
tread braking and blended brake systems that require a wheel tread
friction brake to carry a greater portion of the braking load when the
dynamic portion of the brake fails.
Disc brakes are commonly used on high speed passenger trainsets as
a companion to the dynamic brake system to avoid some of the thermal
problems that can be caused by tread brakes. Disc air brakes provide
fail-safe braking and high levels of retardation. Disc brakes offer
several advantages as opposed to tread brakes. Disc brakes are less
sensitive to moisture and have more uniform coefficients of friction at
high speeds. Disc brakes can also improve ride quality due to reduced
jerk and less noise. In addition, disc brakes require lower brake
forces than tread brakes, thus permitting smaller cylinders and lighter
rigging. But the main advantage of disc brakes is that they allow
braking heat to be dissipated using a heat sink other than the wheel.
Brake discs can be mounted directly to the wheel with bolts or can
be axle mounted. Axle mounted discs are installed on the axle between
the wheels. The disc consists of two friction rings interconnected by
cooling fins, which exist in several forms, including a vane design and
a ventilated design. The vanes and fins increase the convective cooling
of the disc as it rotates. Retarding force is provided by means of a
caliper--actuated by a pneumatic cylinder--that clamps brake pads
against the rotating disc.
Substantial research and development effort has gone into the
design of disc brakes, especially for European high-speed trains. While
disc brakes are well suited for high-energy dissipation and high-
temperature events, disc pad wear and thermally damaged discs are two
of the cost drivers in maintaining high-speed passenger trainsets.
One manufacturer of disc brakes has recommended limiting disc pad
temperatures to 750 deg.F. to prevent thermal damage to the wheels or
brake pads during stop distance tests of a European trainset to be
tested in the Northeast Corridor.
Based on these concerns and research, FRA wishes to explore
requiring each railroad establish the maximum safe speed that each type
of its equipment can be operated over a specific route, when the
dynamic portion of the brake has failed or is disabled. These speed
limits should be established as part of the system safety program.
Another possible concern involving disc brakes is wheel slide. Due
to the high retardation rate that can be achieved with disc brakes,
failure of the
[[Page 30690]]
wheel slide protection system can cause the formation of martensite in
the vicinity of the wheel/rail contact region. This can lead to wheel
mechanical damage similar to that caused by excessive tread braking.
What steps have the passenger rail industry taken to prevent wheel
damage due to over braking? What wheel thermal problems continue to
occur in the field? How should thermal limits on wheels and discs be
handled in safety regulations?
Tiered Equipment Design Standards Based on Risk Analysis
FRA believes there may be merit in a tiered approach to equipment
safety standards based on a risk analysis of the operating environment
in which the equipment will operate. (Tiers are levels of design
requirements determined by system safety considerations.) The advantage
of such an approach is that it takes into account system safety factors
other than equipment design that reduce safety risks. The tiered
approach also readily lends itself to amending the safety standards for
a new type of service--a new tier could be added without changing the
existing standards. The disadvantage is that such an approach can
rapidly become very complex. Further, when applied to design
performance criteria for new equipment, an excessively tiered approach
could result in purchases of equipment that might be severely limited
with respect to its future uses and marketability.
For simplicity, FRA had initially envisioned tiered safety
standards based on operating speed alone. FRA suggested the following
logical break points to the Working Group for tiered equipment
standards:
Level 1--up to 30 mph--Tourist and Excursion Railroads.
Level 2--up to 79 mph--Conventional Passenger Operations.
Level 3--up to 125 mph--Intermediate Speed Operations.
Level 4--up to 150 mph--High Speed Operations.
However, discussions with the Working Group highlighted several
objections to this approach based on tiering by maximum operating speed
alone. Conventional intercity passenger trains operated by Amtrak,
powered by diesel- electric locomotives, frequently operate at speeds
up to 90 mph, and commuter railroads provide ``conventional'' service
at speeds up to 110 mph. Both Amtrak and commuter railroads expressed a
strong opinion that their ``conventional'' equipment had proven itself
capable of operating safely at ``intermediate'' speeds.
The majority of the Working Group has expressed a preference for
only two tiers of equipment standards for intercity and commuter
service, and for basing the criteria for distinguishing between the
tiers on a system safety approach rather than solely on operating
speed. As a result, the discussion of tiered safety standards that
follows centers around a two-tiered approach. FRA recognizes that
approaches containing more than two tiers may be desirable.
Accordingly, FRA will carefully consider alternate approaches received
in response to this ANPRM that contain more than two tiers of safety
standards. Such alternate approaches should attempt to explain the
safety/economic advantages of safety standards based on more than two
tiers, and should attempt to define and state the logic behind the
criteria used to distinguish between these tiers. (A formal vote by the
Working Group on the number of tiers to use has not been taken. Amtrak
can envision the need for at least three tiers, as specified in the
introduction of Appendix B.)
The basic concept behind a system safety approach for tiering is
that safety risks can be reduced by controlling any number of operating
environment factors in addition to equipment design, inspection,
testing, and maintenance. Factors that should be considered when
performing a risk analysis to determine the correct tier of equipment
requirements include:
(1) Maximum operating speed;
(2) Presence of at-grade rail crossings;
(3) Type of protection at highway grade crossings;
(4) Number of at-grade rail crossings;
(5) Current and projected train traffic densities;
(6) Capabilities of current and planned signal systems;
(7) Tracks shared with freight trains;
(8) Shared rights-of-way with freight or light rail type
operations;
(9) Wayside structures; and
(10) Special right-of-way safety features such as track separation
distance, barriers or track obstruction detection systems.
If the risk analysis shows that the type of operation or non-
equipment safety features result in a very low risk operation, less
restrictive--or Tier I--equipment safety standards would be
appropriate. If the risk analysis shows a higher risk of operation due
to higher operating speeds, traffic densities, or some other factor,
Tier II equipment safety standards--which reduce risk more than Tier I
standards--would be used. A good example of a risk analysis of a
passenger railroad operating environment is provided in a report
prepared by ADL under contract to Amtrak, entitled ``Northeast Corridor
Risk Assessment'' (August 26, 1994). A copy of this report is included
in the docket.
One of the factors that will make an approach to equipment safety
standards based on risk assessment difficult to implement is that the
industry must quantify and make public the degree of risk that is
considered acceptable. Is the level of risk per billion highway
passenger miles the criterion? Is the level of risk per billion
passenger miles in scheduled air carrier service the criterion?
FRA seeks industry comments on a tiered approach or alternate
approaches to passenger equipment safety standards. Does the initial
approach of speed break points suggested by FRA make sense? What would
be the impact of imposing this set of break points? What existing
commuter operations would be caught between conventional and
intermediate speed standards? Should FRA grandfather the current
equipment providing this service and apply the more stringent standards
only to the new or refurbished equipment procured to provide service in
this speed range? Should FRA also grandfather all of Amtrak's equipment
providing service at speeds greater than 79 mph? Should other sets of
break points be considered? If so, which and why? What should be the
major change in equipment safety standards at each break point? What
problems could be caused by the approach to grandfathering current
equipment operating in each speed range?
Rather than the initial FRA approach, does the concept of tiered
standards based on the outcome of a risk analysis make sense? Would
such an approach be too complex? Is the industry willing to undertake
the thorough risk analysis process necessary to make such an approach
effective? What would the industry use as an acceptable level of risk
to determine break points between tiers of requirements?
The discussion of possible safety standards that follows is based
on a two-tiered approach. The question of exactly how to draw the line
between the two tiers of requirements is not answered. For purposes of
discussion, Tier I requirements are broadly applied to operations with
a known low risk or record of proven safe operation, e.g., passenger
equipment operating at speeds of 110 mph or less. Tier II requirements
are broadly applied to higher risk operating environments, e.g.,
Amtrak's planned operation at 150 mph in the Northeast Corridor or
perhaps
[[Page 30691]]
cab-car-forward operations under some sets of higher risk operating
conditions.
Although the discussion of possible safety standards that follows
is based on a two-tiered approach, this does not mean FRA assumes a
proposed rule will be based on two tiers. A discussion of a two-tiered
approach serves only as the simplest means to present the concept of
tiering. FRA remains open to alternate concepts based on more than two
tiers, or concepts that define the break point between two tiers
differently.
FRA recognizes the need to handle special equipment such as that
operated by tourist and excursion railroads and private passengers cars
outside this two-tiered system.
FRA also recognizes the possible future need for a third tier for
equipment intended to operate at very high speeds--in excess of 150
mph. However, operations at such speeds would be considered only on
dedicated rights-of-way with no at-grade highway or rail crossings. In
such instances, FRA will review equipment safety criteria as an
integral part of an overall system safety program, issuing a rule of
particular applicability.
Discussion of Possible Safety Standards
Basis for Safety Parameters Under Consideration
In preparation for rulemaking, FRA considered the service history
of general system railroads in the United States, research and
technical advice from the Volpe Center (incorporating learning from
human trauma studies in other modes of transportation), staff analysis,
and learning gleaned from extensive consultations with knowledgeable
persons (both within the United States and abroad) over several years
of study. In addition, FRA has worked with Amtrak to develop safety
features incorporated into Amtrak's specification for high-speed
trainsets.
Safety features suggested by FRA to Amtrak for high-speed
trainsets--intended for use in the mixed passenger/freight
environment--serve as the basis for sample safety parameters used by
FRA to evoke a discussion of Tier II equipment safety standards.
Current North American passenger rail safety practice, recent NTSB
recommendations, and selective use of requirements gleaned from
recommendations made to Amtrak for high-speed trainsets serve as the
basis for the sample safety parameters used to evoke a discussion of
safety standards appropriate for a less challenging operating
environment (Tier I equipment standards).
FRA made both Tier I and Tier II equipment safety concepts
available to the Working Group for discussion and consideration. The
safety parameters contained in these concepts draw upon AAR
Specification S-580 for locomotive crashworthiness, existing
regulations (49 CFR Part 229), NTSB recommendations, and an analysis of
the forces produced as a result of realistic collision scenarios.
Appendix B outlines safety parameters provided for consideration
for Tier I and Tier II equipment. Given that Tier II equipment is
intended to operate in an environment that can create a greater safety
risk than Tier I equipment, most Tier I parameters outlined in Appendix
B also become Tier II parameters. To simplify the task of responding to
this ANPRM, Appendix B contains only those Tier II requirements that
are in addition to, or different from, Tier I requirements.
It is emphasized that neither FRA nor the Working Group has
endorsed these safety parameters, except to the extent that they mirror
existing regulations. FRA is not proposing their adoption; rather, FRA
makes available for discussion the results of efforts by the technical
staff to identify safety risks and to suggest possible means to address
these risks.
While the basis for many of the safety parameters suggested for
discussion will be self evident, certain of the more novel concepts
warrant explanation. The following discussion addresses that need.
Limiting initial decelerations of passengers to 6g maximum and 4g
average--as suggested in Appendix B--is based on automobile
crashworthiness research. These decelerations are identified as levels
that unrestrained people are likely to survive if the interior of the
vehicle is designed to mitigate secondary impacts (i.e., the
compartmentalization design strategy). Analysis shows peak longitudinal
deceleration of the occupied spaces of coach cars protected by a
leading or trailing locomotive or power car is expected to be
approximately 8g for a train-to-train collision at a speed in excess of
30 mph. Greater collision speed does not significantly increase the
peak deceleration of the occupied coach volume, but it does increase
the time over which the occupied volume is decelerated.
During the collision, unrestrained occupants of such a coach will
be thrown into interior fixtures, such as seatbacks, with a force
substantially greater than that associated solely with the deceleration
of the train. This increase in force is due to the occupant striking
the interior at a relative speed of up to 25 mph. If the seat is to
remain attached during a train-to-train collision in excess of 35 mph,
simulation analysis indicates that coach seat attachment strength must
be able to resist the inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the
seat plus the impact force of the mass of the passenger(s) being
decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph.
FRA believes that sufficient potential crush distance is available
in single-level equipment with end vestibules such that good crash
energy management design can achieve the 6g-maximum and 4g-average
limits for passengers (other than those riding in a leading control
cab) even for a high- speed crash scenario. Other equipment types (bi-
level, gallery, and food service with no vestibules) need to be studied
to determine the limits of potential crush distance.
On the other hand, FRA recognizes the difficulty in limiting the
initial deceleration of the crew in the cab to a survivable level
during a high-speed collision because little unoccupied crush space is
available forward of the control cab. As a result, Appendix B contains
a design goal of limiting decelerations on the crew in the cab to 24g
maximum and 16g average for the first 250 milliseconds of the crash
pulse. (The 250-millisecond duration was selected as the time required
for people to make their initial impact with an interior surface and be
pinned by inertia against that surface. After this time, the peak
deceleration can be greatly increased without causing extensive
injuries.) Based on analysis results, the peak deceleration of a
leading control cab is approximately 12g. Analysis indicates that this
peak deceleration does not increase as collision speed increases, but
it does increase the time over which this peak deceleration is exerted
on the cab. During the collision, unrestrained crew members may be
thrown against the interior of the cab with a force substantially
greater than that associated solely with the deceleration of the train.
This increase in force is due to the crew member striking an interior
surface or object at a relative speed of up to 25 mph. Decelerations of
this magnitude require restraint systems or a crash refuge to protect
the crew in the cab.
FRA believes that many crash survivability issues can be resolved
without great difficulty. However, protecting persons from secondary
impacts is a considerable challenge. To limit the decelerations of
people to survivable levels, high-speed trainsets
[[Page 30692]]
must be designed with a crash energy management feature.
The greater the crush distance that can intentionally be designed
into the trainset before reaching an occupied volume, the more
survivable a collision will be. In equipment operated with a cab car
forward, the control cab is necessarily near the leading surface of the
trainset, so very little crush distance is available to protect people
in the cab. As a result, the decelerations of people will be large,
resulting in more numerous and more severe injuries.
An argument presented against increases in structural strength
requirements for new passenger equipment is that the new equipment
would be a hazard to existing passenger equipment operating in the same
corridor. This argument is based, in part, on a 1972 rear-end collision
between two passenger trains in Chicago. In this collision, an older,
heavier car climbed over a newer car of lighter construction,
telescoping into the passenger compartment of the lighter car,
resulting in the deaths of many people.
Some have contended that increased structural strength for new
passenger equipment would create an equivalent incompatible situation
between new equipment and existing equipment. However, several
differences between the situation in 1972 and today refute this
argument. Today's passenger equipment has collision posts,
anticlimbers, and strong truck-to-car body attachments--all intended to
prevent climbing and telescoping. In addition, both existing equipment
and new equipment will have the same basic static end strength
(backbone). While new equipment may have a more substantial end
structure, the crash energy management system will cause this end
structure to be pushed back into the unoccupied space of the new
equipment rather than forward into the existing equipment.
Alternatively, some of the end structure strength characteristics might
be placed inboard of the crush zones.
Once the crash energy management system crush distance is consumed,
the full height of the collision posts and corner posts recommended for
the new equipment will likely deflect the older equipment up over the
new equipment rather than creating a telescoping situation. The fears
expressed are therefore unlikely to materialize.
The basis of the concern for side impact strength and the point of
application of side impact forces stems from two facts:
(1) Approximately 25 percent of all highway-rail crossing accidents
involve a highway vehicle striking the side of a train; and
(2) Designs of some passenger equipment have floor levels low to
the rail, creating the tendency for a heavy highway vehicle striking
the side of the train to climb into the occupied passenger volume
rather than being driven under the underframe of the passenger rail
car.
Analysis shows that current single-level intercity passenger coach
equipment is sufficiently strong, and will derail in collision
scenarios similar to that described above before a significant amount
of crushing of the occupied passenger volume occurs. FRA believes that
future equipment should perform at least as well as current equipment
in such collisions, and that a need exists to specify minimum side
impact protection for rail cars with low floor levels such as bi-level
equipment.
Other scenarios where reasonable side strength may be of value
include side impacts at switches and at railroad crossing diamonds
(when e.g., a single freight car rolls free during switching).
A proposed concept for a side impact strength design requirement
involves the ability of a car body to withstand--with limited
deformation of the car body structure--the load applied by a loaded
tractor trailer travelling at a selected speed which collides with the
side of the car over an area and at a height typical of tractor trailer
bumpers. What specific parameters should be used to implement this
concept, or what alternate concepts can be proposed for a side impact
strength design requirement?
FRA's concern for a minimum rollover strength requirement is based
on accidents such as that which occurred to Amtrak's Lakeshore Limited
in January 1994. The train derailed while travelling from Albany, New
York, to Chicago, and several cars rolled down an embankment. Very
little crushing of the occupied volumes of any of the cars involved
occurred. The current design of single-level intercity passenger cars
generally performs well when subjected to the impact loads associated
with tipping on a side or rolling onto its roof from an upright
position. While these loads may vary significantly depending upon the
nature of the wayside where the rolling occurs, FRA believes that
passenger cars should have minimum side strength and roof strength to
help minimize the loss of occupied volume should a rollover occur. FRA
also believes that locomotives and power cars should have sufficient
side and roof structural strength to minimize loss of volume in the
operator's cab under such conditions.
The sections of this ANPRM addressing design standards seek input
from the industry on how to take advantage of the safety improvements
offered by a crash energy management design approach for future
passenger equipment.
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements
Pre-Departure or Daily Safety Inspections
A pre-departure or daily safety inspection is an essential element
of a system safety program for all trains that carry passengers. The
pre-departure or daily inspection should include the steps necessary to
ensure the train departs without mechanical, electrical, or electronic
defects that could degrade the safe operation of the train.
Amtrak has voluntarily implemented a pre-departure safety
inspection of all passenger trains. Amtrak developed the inspection
procedures in close cooperation with FRA. The procedures combine a
power brake inspection and test, a mechanical inspection similar to
that required for freight cars, a safety appliance inspection, and spot
checks by supervisors. Amtrak has been using these procedures since
April 1994, and they do not appear to have an adverse impact on train
schedule. Appendix C contains a copy of the inspection procedures used
by Amtrak. These inspection procedures are offered as an example only.
They are not a general solution to how to conduct pre-departure safety
inspections of passenger trains.
Using the Amtrak procedures as a starting point, FRA solicits
comments on how these procedures need to be tailored to fit the needs
of each segment of the industry. What train schedule impacts will
result from implementing a pre-departure or daily safety inspection
program? Does FRA need to be made aware of any circumstances or reasons
for not performing a pre-departure or daily safety inspection? What
range of options should an operating railroad have when the safety
inspection uncovers a defect? How should any proposed safety standards
take into account and encourage the potential that technology provides
to automate pre-departure or daily inspections of future equipment? As
automated features are added to passenger trains, does a train
information system that records and logs inspection and test results
and maintenance status make sense?
[[Page 30693]]
In terms of labor, materials, etc., what additional resources would
each operator need to perform a pre-departure inspection equivalent to
Amtrak's? How many pre-departure or daily inspections are performed
annually by each operator? What potential safety benefits could result
from performing inspections equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain or
document estimates. For those currently performing inspections, what
additional benefits could be realized by modifying those inspection
procedures to meet Amtrak's? Please explain or document.
Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or Unusual Equipment
FRA recognizes that most tourist railroads are small businesses
operating older equipment on a limited budget. As a basis for
discussion, FRA postulates a simple system safety program for excursion
and tourist railroads based on:
(1) A pre-departure safety inspection that takes into account the
type of equipment being used;
(2) A periodic testing and maintenance program based on the type of
equipment and the extent of its use; and
(3) Minimum qualifications for inspectors and maintenance personnel
to ensure that they have the knowledge necessary to perform safety-
critical tasks.
FRA needs the tourist and excursion railroad industry to address
the following questions: What are the effects of such a simple system
safety program on tourist and excursion railroad operations? How can
the requirements for a pre-departure safety inspection be written so
they are enforceable but provide necessary flexibility?
Information available to FRA indicates that there are approximately
100 excursion railroads subject to FRA jurisdiction, operating about
250 locomotives and 1,000 passenger cars. Is this information correct?
What size crews operate excursion and tourist trains? What is the
average annual passenger car mileage for tourist and excursion
railroads? What human and physical resources are available to these
railroads for inspection and maintenance of equipment?
What potential safety benefits are available from the proposed
standards for tourist and excursion railroads? To what extent will they
be realized under the proposal? Please explain.
FRA also solicits comments from the tourist and excursion railroad
industry on how passenger equipment safety standards may impact them in
unintended ways.
Private Passenger Cars
FRA believes a private passenger car should be held to the same
basic inspection standards as the other equipment being hauled in the
train hauling the private car. However, FRA intends to take into
account the financial burden imposed by requiring private passenger car
owners to modify their equipment to meet any new design standards
included as part of proposed passenger equipment safety standards.
FRA needs private passenger car owners to address the following
questions as part of their response to this ANPRM: What minimum set of
inspection requirements should host operators impose on private
passenger cars? How should these minimum standards be incorporated into
Federal regulations? What effects are foreseen from the proposed
passenger equipment safety regulations on the ability to operate this
equipment? Take care to point out all potential unintended impacts.
How many private passenger cars are in operation? On average, how
many miles do private passenger cars travel annually? What potential
safety benefits are available from the proposed standards for private
passenger cars operators? To what extent will they be realized under
the proposal? Please explain.
Tier I Equipment
FRA believes standards for pre-departure and daily inspections of
Tier I equipment should take into account the type of equipment being
used and the type of service. Pre-departure safety inspection and test
criteria implemented by Amtrak should be considered as a guide for
developing a set of core inspection criteria for incorporation into
Federal safety standards for Tier I equipment. These inspection
criteria are given as Appendix C.
FRA recommends that each operator of passenger equipment use these
criteria as a guide, and comment on how similar criteria could be--or
have been--implemented as part of its operation. Members of APTA are
encouraged to comment through the APTA members on the Working Group.
FRA recognizes that the pre-departure inspection need not be a
complete safety inspection. The combination of the daily and the pre-
departure inspections should be considered the complete safety
inspection of the train.
To what extent would daily and pre-departure inspections vary from
current practice? To what extent would these requirements impact
passenger operations? How can the requirements for pre-departure and
daily safety inspections be written so they are enforceable but provide
the flexibility required to meet service requirements, hold down costs,
and encourage innovation?
Tier II Equipment
Since Tier II equipment will be designed for operation in higher
risk and/or consequence operating environments, FRA believes the safety
inspection program to be used with the equipment should be developed
from a thorough risk analysis done as part of the system safety
program. This risk analysis should result in a set of inspection
criteria, tasks, intervals, and skills required to develop a safety
inspection program that reduces the overall risk of operation to an
acceptable level.
Planned Testing, Preventive Maintenance, and Personnel Qualification
Requirements
FRA believes planned testing and preventive maintenance
requirements of safety-critical systems or components-- triggered by
time, mileage, or some other key reliability/safety parameter--are also
an essential feature of a system safety program. A key step in the
system safety program is to perform a reliability analysis or use
accumulated reliability data to determine the planned tests and
preventive maintenance tasks--as well as what should trigger them--that
are required to maintain a safe operation. The system safety plan
should also include an approach to accumulate the data necessary to
justify changes in maintenance approaches or intervals for safety-
critical systems and components.
Most passenger equipment operators already have testing and
maintenance requirements for their equipment, though the extent to
which they are based on formalized risk analysis is not clear. FRA
searches for a means to ensure that all industry system safety programs
include preventive maintenance and planned testing requirements while
allowing the industry the flexibility needed to cope with various
operating environments. FRA also recognizes the desirability of
allowing maintenance or testing intervals to be changed based on
accumulated operating experience with the equipment.
Currently, what equipment is tested and maintained periodically?
How often (in terms of miles, time, or other parameters) is this
equipment tested and maintained? How can standards be structured to
allow testing or maintenance intervals to be changed based on either
good or bad operating
[[Page 30694]]
experience while maintaining adequate safety margins? What do periodic
tests and maintenance currently entail--labor, materials, etc.? What
benefit(s) would be associated with a periodic testing and maintenance
requirement? Please explain.
FRA views the skills and knowledge of the people responsible for
inspections, testing, and maintenance as one of the most important
requisites of an effective system safety program. FRA seeks a means for
passenger equipment operators to demonstrate that the people performing
crucial safety inspections and maintenance tasks--whether they be
mechanical forces or train crews--have the current knowledge and skills
necessary for their jobs. As equipment incorporating new technology--to
include remote sensing and automated testing--comes into widespread
use, a better trained inspection and maintenance workforce will be
required and minimum qualification standards will become more
important.
GAO Report RCED-93-68 ``Improvements Needed for Employees Who
Inspect and Maintain Rail Equipment'' highlights some of the concerns
regarding the knowledge and training of personnel performing safety-
critical tasks. GAO concludes that training programs for mechanical
employees and foremen have weaknesses that leave passenger railroads
vulnerable to skill shortfalls in the inspection, testing, and
maintenance workforce. GAO points out that the personnel who inspect,
test, and maintain European high-speed passenger trains receive much
more training and generally are more skilled than their American
counterparts. European railroads require mechanical employees either to
pass an examination or to demonstrate their proficiency. An internal
FRA assessment confirms the findings of this GAO report. Copies of both
the GAO report and the internal FRA report documenting this assessment
have been placed in the docket.
FRA seeks comment from all segments of the industry on how to
require passenger equipment operators to demonstrate that the people
(whether employees or contractors) performing safety-critical tasks
have the knowledge and skills to do so. FRA does not wish to mandate
specific training programs or experience requirements; FRA believes
that these details are the purview of each individual operator and that
each railroad should establish the minimum training and qualification
requirements based on the equipment being operated. However, an
important feature of proposed passenger equipment safety standards will
be a means to measure or to demonstrate the effectiveness of individual
training programs. Unless people with the necessary knowledge and skill
perform safety-critical tasks, passenger equipment operators cannot
have an effective system safety program.
How should the proposed safety standards be structured to ensure
that each operator meets this important responsibility to demonstrate
the skills and knowledge of personnel that perform safety-critical
tasks on passenger equipment? Currently, how many employees/contractors
are involved in inspecting, testing, and maintaining a passenger car or
locomotive? How many of these people are mechanical personnel? Are
there established minimum training and qualification requirements for
employees and contractors performing inspections, tests, and
maintenance? Approximately how many labor hours does each passenger
service operator spend each year on these activities?
What are the potential benefits of increased training in periodic
testing and maintenance? To what extent are expenditures on such
training cost effective? Historically, does this type of training
produce identifiable safety benefits? Please explain.
Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or Unusual Equipment
FRA believes that tourist and excursion railroads, museums, and
other operators of special or unusual equipment that carry passengers
should have:
(1) A planned testing program;
(2) A preventive maintenance program keyed to mileage, time, or
some other triggering parameter; and
(3) A means to demonstrate that the people carrying out these
programs have the knowledge and skills necessary to correctly perform
the safety-critical tasks identified as part of these programs.
FRA seeks to establish a minimum program for operators of special
or unusual equipment that takes into account the resource constraints
placed on these operators, and yet recognizes that even equipment
operated for short distances and at low speeds requires periodic
maintenance attention by skilled individuals to maintain safety.
What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and
preventive maintenance, and what crucial tasks need to be performed?
How should tourist and excursion railroads demonstrate to FRA that
personnel performing safety-critical tasks have the knowledge necessary
to do the job?
Private Passenger Cars
FRA believes that a private passenger car should be held to the
same basic planned testing and preventive maintenance standards as the
other equipment being hauled in the train hauling the private car.
However, FRA anticipates that since private passenger cars tend not to
be highly used equipment, the events that trigger planned tests or
preventive maintenance (mileage, time, etc.) will occur less frequently
than for equipment in regularly scheduled passenger or commuter
service.
Since private passenger cars tend to be vintage equipment with
parts, and testing and maintenance procedures that are no longer common
in the rail passenger industry, the knowledge and skills necessary to
conduct an effective planned testing and preventive maintenance program
are likely to be possessed by only a few individuals.
What minimum set of planned testing and preventive maintenance
requirements should host operators impose on private passenger cars?
How should these minimum standards be incorporated into Federal
regulations? What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and
preventive maintenance for private passenger cars, and what critical
tasks need to be performed? How should owners of private passenger cars
demonstrate to FRA that personnel performing safety-critical tasks have
the knowledge necessary to do the job? To what extent does any third
party monitor the quality of work performed on passenger cars by
contract shops? (Amtrak currently operates a certification process for
private passenger cars that desire to operate in Amtrak trains.)
Tier I Equipment
Since Tier I equipment will very likely be traditionally designed
equipment that operates in environments with which railroads have a
wealth of experience, planned testing and preventive maintenance
programs should be based on that experience with the type of equipment
and its extent of use. Operators of Tier I equipment should have a
planned testing and maintenance program based on operating experience
with the equipment. Changes to the program would also be based on
operating experience.
As part of the operating experience on Tier I equipment, railroads
need to identify the safety-critical maintenance tasks and the skills
required to perform them. Railroads must use this knowledge to develop
a training
[[Page 30695]]
program to ensure inspection and maintenance personnel have these
skills and are able to demonstrate them.
What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and
preventive maintenance for Tier I equipment? What critical tasks need
to be performed? How should railroads demonstrate to FRA that personnel
performing safety-critical tasks on Tier I equipment have the knowledge
necessary to do the job?
Tier II Equipment
Because Tier II equipment will be new equipment designed for
operation in higher risk operating environments, FRA believes the
planned testing and preventive maintenance program for safety-critical
systems and components should be developed from a thorough risk
analysis done as part of the system safety program. This risk analysis
should result in a set of planned testing and preventive maintenance
criteria, tasks, intervals, and skills required to develop a program
that reduces the overall risk of operation to an acceptable level. What
is an acceptable level of risk in developing risk-based performance
standards for this type of equipment?
Equipment Design Standards
Standards for Tier I Equipment
Current passenger equipment has certainly demonstrated its ability
to operate safely at speeds up to 125 mph. However, the design of this
equipment is largely based on loose industry standards that are no
longer actively maintained or enforced. The design of new Tier I
passenger equipment should not be left to a collection of similarly
loose standards. A practical approach to establish minimum safety
standards for new Tier I equipment would be to consolidate current
safety related design standards or industry practices directly into the
new regulation.
FRA believes train operation has significantly changed since the
design requirements in 49 CFR 229.141 for trains of total empty weight
of less than 600,000 pounds and AAR Specification S-034,``Specification
for the Construction of New Passenger Cars,'' were first promulgated.
Have these requirements outlived their usefulness, and should they be
eliminated? Would a regulation based on the compilation of current
North American industry structural design standards and practices
provide the ``minimum floor'' crashworthiness requirements for Tier I
equipment?
Initial analysis and computer modeling by the Volpe Center, using a
lumped-mass model and idealized force-crush characteristics, predicts
the conventional uniform longitudinal structural strength design
approach to be as effective as a crash energy management design
approach in providing protection for passengers and crew at speeds up
to approximately 70 mph. Although crash energy management design can
benefit passengers of equipment involved in lower speed collisions,
this analysis suggests that the additional expense of a crash energy
management design may not be justified for some new Tier I passenger
equipment, depending upon the upper speed limit in this tier.
The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act (RSERA), Pub. L. No.
102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (September 3, 1992), requires FRA to report to
the Congress on the crashworthiness of locomotives and the
effectiveness of AAR Specification S-580, which is the current industry
standard regarding crashworthiness of locomotives. Much of the research
and analysis done to comply with this law can be applied to head-on
and, potentially, rear-end collisions of passenger trains.
This analysis shows AAR Specification S-580 provides a significant
increase in crashworthiness over locomotives built prior to
implementation of this specification. However, the locomotive collision
computer model developed to support the RSERA shows a weakness in the
way locomotive builders implement the S-580 anticlimber requirement.
The model shows--at all but very low collision speeds--that at the
onset of override, the anticlimber of the locomotive being overridden
is crushed and sheared or bypassed rather than loaded vertically by the
anticlimber of the opposing locomotive. Evidence from several collision
investigations tends to confirm this prediction. Examination of
locomotives and cars equipped with anticlimbers that have been involved
in collisions where override occurred shows evidence of bending of the
anticlimber shelf due to high coupler loads. This bending appears to
prevent the shelf from being capable of resisting a vertical load.
Couplers designed to break away or load some part of the structure so
that the anticlimber shelf is not deformed before being required to
resist a vertical load appear to be necessary to allow the anticlimbers
to function as intended.
FRA believes that if passenger equipment can be designed to fully
involve (bend but not collapse) the underframe to resist collision
forces before collision posts or end structures are loaded, the ability
to maintain uncrushed, survivable volumes will be maximized. Properly
designed anticlimbers can play an important role by allowing the
significant structural strength of the underframe to resist the full
collision forces during the initial phase of an impact. Bending the
underframe before the collision posts or end structures take over the
role of protecting the cab occupants can dissipate a large amount of
the collision's energy that might otherwise cause crushing of occupied
space.
Does other evidence exist to support or refute this computer model
prediction of anticlimber effectiveness? What design analysis has been
done on existing anticlimber designs under dynamic conditions
simulating a collision? Are anticlimber design changes necessary to
ensure that anticlimbers are loaded vertically as intended during
collisions? Are practical design concepts available that may improve
anticlimber performance during collisions? Can anticlimbers be designed
that make bending (but not collapse) of the underframe likely before
collision posts or end structures are required to bear significant
loads? What would be the likely costs associated with alternative
designs to ensure that anticlimbers are loaded vertically during
collisions?
The computer model also predicts collision post designs currently
used by North American manufacturers exceed the requirements of AAR S-
580 by a factor of two for freight locomotives--weight restrictions can
prevent such a large factor of safety in passenger locomotives--and
that this additional strength provides significant additional
protection to the crew in the cab. Should a modified version of AAR S-
580 specifying a more effective anticlimber, stronger and full-height
collision posts, and full-height corner posts be considered as part of
the safety standards for new conventional passenger locomotives? What
would be the likely impacts of such a standard on locomotive weight and
performance? What costs would be associated with specifying full-height
collision posts and full-height corner posts on conventional
locomotives?
Rather than a standard similar to AAR S-580, should a unitized type
of end structure with integral collision and corner posts that extend
to the roof line be considered for a design standard for conventional
passenger locomotives? Would it be feasible to develop a purer
performance specification for train end structural strength that allows
full flexibility in the design of structures? What collision scenarios
and forces should be considered in such an approach? Such an approach
could
[[Page 30696]]
provide weight and performance advantages.
Fuel spills are both an environmental and a safety problem. Fires
resulting from fuel spills can turn a minor accident into a major
event. What is the experience of passenger railroads with fuel spills?
What clean-up costs have been incurred? Should all diesel passenger
locomotives--including self-propelled diesel cars--be equipped with the
type of strengthened fuel tanks that meet the requirements in Appendix
B proposed for Tier II equipment? If not, what performance standard
should be used for Tier I diesel passenger locomotive fuel tanks?
How much would it cost to equip conventional passenger service
locomotives with the type of strengthened fuel tanks discussed in
Appendix B? What levels of safety benefits can be realized from
strengthened fuel tanks? Please explain.
Based on the findings of recent investigations of accidents
involving passenger trains, several factors have contributed to the
number and the extent of the injuries suffered. Among these factors
are:
(1) A lack of reliable backup emergency lighting for coaches;
(2) A lack of means to exit coaches and locomotives more easily--
from both ends and all compartments--especially when they are resting
on their sides;
(3) Seats that break loose from attachment points or that rotate;
and
(4) Luggage and other objects thrown about the interior of coaches.
Amtrak believes that existing industry standards for emergency
lighting are adequate and should become the Federal standard. NTSB
would like a requirement for securing the batteries that provide power
to emergency lights so connections to the emergency lights are not
knocked loose during a collision.
During Working Group meetings, Amtrak pointed out several potential
disadvantages of roof hatches in passenger equipment because they are
difficult to maintain and are often a source of leaks. The hatches
allow passengers or trespassers access to the roof which can be
particularly dangerous in electrified territory. Amtrak has suggested
inclusion of a clearly marked structural weak spot where properly
equipped emergency personnel can quickly gain access to the interior of
the coach or locomotive through the roof as preferable to roof hatches.
Should Tier I equipment safety standards include provisions for:
(1) Emergency lighting?
(2) Roof hatches or a clearly identified structural weak point
where properly equipped emergency personnel can quickly gain access
through the roof?
(3) Minimum strength of seat attachment?
(4) Minimum strength and enclosed luggage compartments?
To what extent does passenger equipment currently have backup power
systems in place? What would it cost to install a backup power system?
What safety benefits would result from backup power systems?
How many coach units have backup emergency lighting? What would it
cost to install a backup emergency lighting system? What rationale is
used to determine whether a unit will have backup emergency lighting?
To what extent would potential safety benefits be realized? Please
explain.
What would it cost to install roof hatches or access areas on cars?
What options exist for enclosing existing luggage compartments? At
what cost? To what extent would potential safety benefits be realized
from enclosing luggage compartments? Please explain.
Safety Glazing
One of the issues addressed by existing regulations that bears on
the safety of passenger train occupants is exterior glazing. Because of
the complexity of the issues in this proceeding, satisfaction with
existing standards, and the need for coordination with freight
interests not represented on the Working Group, the Working Group has
expressed a reluctance to address glazing in this proceeding. In order
to determine whether to renew its request to the Working Group or
another advisory body to examine this issue, FRA seeks information on
incidents of glazing shattering or spalling that caused injuries to
occupants of passenger trains. Some perceived problems with current 49
CFR Part 223 requirements that have come to FRA's attention include the
following:
(1) The witness plate used for testing is too thick, allowing
spalling of pieces of glass large enough to cause injury;
(2) The impact test using a 24-pound cinder block is not
repeatable;
(3) Vendors need to be periodically recertified by an independent
testing laboratory; and
(4) The strength of the framing arrangement securing the glazing is
neither specified nor tested. (Amtrak has noted that it currently
requires glazing to be tested in its intended framing.)
Should FRA revise the glazing standards for conventional passenger
equipment to:
(1) Require testing with a thinner witness plate?
(2) Require a more repeatable impact test? If so, what should the
impact test requirement be?
(3) Require periodic recertification of vendors by an independent
testing laboratory?
(4) Address the strength of the glazing frame? If so, how could
this be practically done?
(5) Require increased strength, impact resistance, or bullet
penetration resistance?
What would the impact on glazing thickness and weight be if FRA
were to modify Part 223 as suggested above? To what extent should
interior glazing be considered in this proceeding? Are appropriate
reference standards already available? What benefits could be derived
from modifying Part 223 as suggested? What would be the cost to realize
these benefits?
Fire Safety
FRA does not have regulations covering fire safety of passenger
equipment. Current industry practice is to follow FRA guidelines
published in the Federal Register on January 17, 1989. (See 54 FR 1837,
``Rail Passenger Equipment; Reissuance of Guidelines for Selecting
Materials to Improve Their Fire Safety Characteristics.'') Fire
resistance, detection, and suppression technologies have all advanced
since these guidelines were published. Amtrak follows more stringent
specifications for fire safety than found in FRA's guidelines. A trend
toward a systems approach to fire safety is evident in most countries
with modern rail systems. Are Federal regulations or more in-depth
guidelines needed to:
(1) Prevent fire or retard its growth?
(2) Detect and suppress fire?
(3) Protect occupants from the effects of fire?
Appendix B
To stimulate thought and generate discussion on passenger equipment
design standards, FRA is providing for consideration the detailed set
of equipment design provisions contained in Appendix B. From experience
with past ANPRM's, FRA learned that such a strategy results in more and
higher quality comments on the specific issues in the proceeding. FRA
does not intend to implement the requirements given in Appendix B
without significant change based on the deliberations of the Working
Group, supplemented by information and views received in response to
this notice. FRA strongly encourages comments on these
[[Page 30697]]
provisions and proposals for alternative standards.
Standards for Tier II Equipment
For the past several years, FRA has held discussions with
manufacturers of foreign high-speed rail equipment seeking a market for
their equipment in the United States. These manufacturers sought a
clear definition of the requirements that their equipment must meet to
be allowed to operate in the United States. Because FRA recognizes
existing North American passenger equipment standards were not intended
to apply to equipment operating at speeds significantly over 100 mph,
and because current Federal regulations do not cover such operations,
FRA could not provide clear guidance. This has caused confusion, and
has led to the perception that competition for the American market is
risky.
Amtrak has hosted test and revenue service demonstrations of two
foreign, high-speed trainsets in the United States. Operating
experience gained in Europe and in the United States with these
trainsets helped place Amtrak in a position to develop a system
specification to procure trainsets to operate at speeds up to 150 mph
in the Northeast Corridor. FRA reviewed drafts of the procurement
specification for these trainsets and made safety-related
recommendations. The resulting discussions between Amtrak and FRA
highlighted the technical issues that must be resolved as part of the
process for developing safety standards for high-speed trainsets.
Sample high-speed passenger trainset design requirements are
outlined in Appendix B. FRA compiled this set of design requirements to
prepare for the review of Amtrak's system specification for high-speed
trainsets. FRA developed this set of proposed requirements based on
discussions with manufacturers and operators of European equipment,
research done or sponsored by the Volpe Center, experience gained in
developing a concept for a proposed rule specifically applicable to the
Texas TGV System, and the results of tests conducted jointly with
Amtrak on high-speed trainsets in the Northeast Corridor. FRA
recognizes that some of the requirements push the state of the art. Of
particular interest to FRA are comments on the technical limits of
crash energy management systems and on how best to define or specify
crash energy management in a set of performance requirements. FRA
attempted to specify a crash energy management system by placing limits
on the acceleration experienced by passengers during the initial phase
of a collision. To design to such a requirement requires a reference
collision scenario with defined collision parameters. The advantage of
such an approach is that it is tied directly to the parameter most
responsible for injuries due to secondary impacts. Can an approach to
designate crash energy management requirements tied to a specific
design collision scenario be adequately defined to serve as the basis
for trainset design?
An alternate approach, advocated as less complex, is to specify the
minimum energy to be absorbed at each location in the trainset designed
to crush before occupied space crushes. Such an approach has the
advantage of not being tied to a design based on a collision scenario.
However, FRA believes that the main value of a crash energy management
design is to increase the duration of the collision, allowing train
occupants to decelerate more slowly, and minimize the uncontrolled
collapse of occupied space. The amount of energy absorbed is of
secondary importance.
FRA also believes that using ability to absorb energy as a crash
energy management design parameter does not focus on the real purpose
of the crash energy management system. FRA invites comments in this
area. Is the amount of energy that can be absorbed in a collision
actually a secondary issue to slower decelerations and more controlled
collapse?
If ability to absorb energy is used as the crash energy management
system performance parameter, what are the limits on controlled crush
distance and energy absorbed that can reasonably be expected to be
achieved? What causes these limitations? How can a performance standard
based on an ability to absorb energy be tied to an ability to decrease
the initial acceleration of train occupants which is the key parameter
for a crash energy management design? What flexibility is needed in
end-strength requirements of occupied versus unoccupied volume to allow
effective crash energy management system design?
A second safety-critical design feature of key interest to FRA is
the strength and construction of the end frame (or end structure) of
both power cars and coaches. As noted above, a unitized or monocoque
end structure with vertical members (collision post(s) and corner
posts) that extend to the roofline, with significant structural
strength where they are tied into the roofline, may be capable of
protecting crew space more effectively and with less weight penalty
than more traditional designs. FRA believes such an end structure may
play a significant role when override occurs to prevent crushing or
penetration of the occupied volume that it protects. When combined with
an effective crash energy management design, such an end structure
would be pushed back as a unit (similar to being mounted on a spring)
through the volume designed to crush.
Through the Working Group, FRA will pursue a thoughtful technical
discussion of such an approach including suggestions on how best to set
performance requirements and reasonable limits for design strengths.
Should a monocoque end structure--or equivalent structure--that ties
together the floor, collision posts, corner posts and roof into a
single structure be required or authorized for high speed passenger
trains? FRA welcomes proposed alternative approaches designed to
provide equivalent protection. What costs would be associated with
alternative approaches designed to prevent crushing or penetration of
the occupied volume in power and coach cars? Please be specific in
defining the alternative approach and its cost elements.
A third safety feature that needs a thorough technical review is
how to design the trainset to stay in line and on the track during the
initial phase of a collision to give the crash energy management system
an opportunity to perform its intended function. If the trainset
buckles laterally and leaves the track too soon, volumes designed to
crush will not be crushed, resulting in higher decelerations of
occupants, and possibly negating the significant structural protection
provided by end structures. If the trainset buckles vertically causing
early override, the protection provided by the underframe may be
bypassed. A discussion of the design innovations necessary to delay
buckling of the trainset as long as possible is needed.
What practical design techniques exist to delay either lateral or
vertical buckling of passenger trainsets involved in collisions? How
much would installation of alternative buckling delay systems cost in
terms of labor hours and materials?
As train speed increases, the human decision and reaction time
necessary to avoid potential calamity decreases. Automatic control
techniques that briefly take the operator out of the control loop are a
means to eliminate the human decision and reaction delays in situations
where taking quick and positive action can be crucial. FRA believes
technology can allow safety-critical parameters pertaining to the
following high-speed trainset
[[Page 30698]]
subsystems or events to be monitored by remote sensors:
(1) Truck hunting;
(2) Dynamic brake status;
(3) Friction brake status;
(4) Fire detection;
(5) Head-end power status;
(6) Alerter;
(7) Horn and bell;
(8) Wheel slip and wheel slide control; and
(9) Tilt control system, if equipped.
FRA intends to require monitoring of dynamic brake status. If the
friction brake of the trainset is designed to be able to safely handle
the entire braking load without assistance from the dynamic brake, the
dynamic brake may not be considered a primary safety-critical system.
FRA considered including bearing overheat in the above list.
However, the Working Group cautioned FRA that on-board bearing sensors
have proven to be unreliable. In the Working Group's view, until on-
board bearing sensor technology matures, the industry will continue to
rely on wayside bearing overheat detection.
Should automatic monitoring for each of the above events/subsystems
be required? Do other safety-critical subsystems/events lend themselves
to monitoring by remote sensors? Could safety be enhanced by requiring
an automatic response from the train control system--such as slowing
the train--when a monitored parameter falls outside pre-determined safe
limits? Which events/subsystems are prime candidates for some form of
initial automatic response followed by a return to operator or manual
control?
Seat arrangement design and passenger restraint systems have a
potential to reduce the number and the extent of injuries in the event
of a passenger train collision. This potential is present at all
speeds, but becomes greater as speed increases. A copy of a technical
paper 3 published by the Volpe Center describes a study of the
occupant dynamics and predicted fatalities due to secondary impact for
passengers involved in train collisions with impact speeds up to 140
mph. The principal focus of the paper is on the effectiveness of
alternative strategies for protecting occupants in train collisions,
including ``friendly'' interior arrangements and occupant restraints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant Survivability.''
See note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Three different interior configurations were analyzed: forward-
facing seats in rows, facing rows of seats, and facing rows of seats
with a table. Two of these three configurations--the forward-facing
consecutive rows of seats and the facing rows of seats--were evaluated
with the occupant unrestrained, restrained with a seat belt alone, and
restrained with a seat belt and shoulder harness.
The injury criteria used to evaluate interior performance included
Head Injury Criteria (HIC), chest deceleration, and axial neck load.
Based upon these criteria, the probability of fatality resulting from
secondary impacts was evaluated for each of the interior configurations
and restraint systems modeled.
In some configurations, such as seats in rows, compartmentalization
is shown to be as effective as a restraint system for the 50th
percentile male occupant simulated. (As noted earlier,
``compartmentalization'' is an occupant protection strategy that
requires seats or restraining barriers to be positioned in a manner
that provides a compact, cushioned protection zone surrounding each
occupant.) FRA intends to work closely with the Working Group to
structure requirements for the interior of new passenger equipment that
take advantage of the compartmentalization concept.
In cases where occupants are allowed to travel relatively long
distances before impacting the interior, such as the facing-seats
interior, restrained occupants have a much greater chance of survival.
Fatalities from secondary impacts are not expected in any of the
scenarios modeled if the occupant is restrained with a lap belt and
shoulder harness.
Design approaches for passenger coaches that exploit this potential
are needed. FRA briefed the Working Group on this research, and the
Working Group has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of
passenger restraint systems (primarily lap belts) and coach interior
arrangement design to mitigate injuries. Effectiveness of restraint
systems can be dependent on the strength of the seat attachment to the
car body. A possible worst case scenario exists when a seat containing
a belted passenger is struck from behind by an unbelted passenger. Such
a situation can require the seat attachment design to carry a double
load.
If the seat is to remain attached under the above conditions during
a train-to-train collision in excess of 35 mph, analysis indicates that
coach-seat attachment strength must be able to resist the inertial
force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat, plus the mass of the belted
passenger(s), plus the impact force of the mass of the passenger(s) in
the following seat being decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph
against the seat back.
Should lap belts be required? Should all seating be rear facing?
Should facing seating be allowed? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of placing tables between facing seats? What are
reasonable performance requirements for padding materials? Where should
padding materials be located? What shock-absorbing characteristics
should be required of padding material? What padding thicknesses are
practical? What seat attachment strength can reasonably be expected to
be achieved?
What seat configurations do passenger cars operating at speeds
greater than 80 mph have? If configurations vary, please explain the
differences and the reasons for the variations. How many seats does the
average passenger car have? If there is no such thing as an average
passenger car, how many seats do the different types of passenger cars
have? How many cars of different types are there?
What costs would be involved with installing lap belts, shoulder
harnesses, and other safety restraints on passenger cars? To what
extent would safety benefits be realized from installing safety
restraints? Please explain. A review of the technical papers placed in
the docket may help with responses to some of these questions.
Due to the forward location of the operator of a high-speed
passenger train, he or she is often the person closest to the point of
impact and at most risk during a collision. Special provisions are
required to protect the operator. How much crushable space can
practically be located forward of the operator? Should a lap belt/
shoulder harness combination be provided for each crew member in the
cab? If lap belts/shoulder harnesses are provided for crew members,
will they wear them?
NTSB has long advocated special protective crash refuges (protected
areas) for locomotive crew members. ADL has done computer modeling to
predict the effectiveness of two types of crash refuge concepts under
dynamic conditions simulating locomotive collisions. One of these
concepts is a padded trench in the floor of the locomotive in front of
the electrical cabinets. Such a trench could be equipped with restraint
systems. The other concept is a seat equipped with a lap belt and
shoulder harness that rotates and locks in a reverse position allowing
the operator to ride out the collision in a rear-facing position. (A
report by ADL describing these concepts is part of the docket.4)
Advanced versions of some European trains
[[Page 30699]]
employ a concept where the operator's position is designed to be pushed
to the rear, relative to the rest of the cab, to provide the operator
additional protection during a collision. Could any of these concepts
be implemented into the design of new passenger equipment? Would they
be effective? Would they be used?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Research,'' Volumes 1-4,
DOT-VNTSC-FRA-95-4.1, Final Report July, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What are some alternative concepts for the design of such
protective refuges? Are they likely to be effective? Are they likely to
be used? What impact would they have on locomotive or power car design?
Should FRA require them as part of high-speed trainset design
requirements? What other, perhaps more practical means exist to reduce
the vulnerability of the cab crew to collisions? In terms of time,
materials, and labor, what would installation of refuges in locomotives
cost?
Lack of an accepted, recognized design tool (computer model) to
predict changes in trainset performance as well as changes in the
ability to protect people as trainset design parameters are changed
inhibits exploiting new design techniques that could result in safer
trainsets. Research by the Volpe Center on the structural response of
portions of the vehicle to the extremely high loads associated with a
collision, and research by AAR to accurately predict the performance of
suspension systems to changing track conditions, have contributed
greatly toward the goal of developing accepted analytical tools.
However, efforts need to be increased and focused on a common goal.
Because full-scale crash testing of passenger equipment is
prohibitively expensive, the development of a design tool that is
widely accepted by the industry is essential. Such a tool could
accelerate investigations of composite materials that hold promise for
increased strength at less weight than current materials. A tool of
this type could aid research into utilizing high-strength, light-weight
composite materials and other technologies to provide operational and
safety benefits.
FRA seeks comment from the industry on what the current state of
the art is regarding modeling techniques for trainset collisions. Up to
what trainset speeds are current models capable of predicting the
collision mechanics of a trainset collision? What confidence levels can
be expected with these models to predict the onset of override and
train set buckling? Are these models capable of accurately predicting
the acceleration levels in the trainset throughout the collision,
particularly for the first 250 milliseconds?
FRA also seeks input from the industry on the potential for such
models to replace full-scale crash testing. Have the current models
that are being used been validated by full-scale, partial-scale or
component impact testing? Will it be necessary to validate new models
by test? Are there limitations as to what type of accident scenarios
existing models are capable of analyzing?
The accuracy of the modeling techniques employed is dependent on
the individual vehicle and trainset crush characteristics used as input
to the models. What means should be used to quantify large deformation
and dynamic crush characteristics of the various parts of a trainset?
Can this be achieved through simulation alone? Has the industry
developed dynamic force-deflection characteristics for existing North
American rolling stock that could be used as a reference in FRA
crashworthiness studies? If these characteristics are available, for
what speeds of collision would they be valid?
What are the essential features of such a modeling tool? How can it
be developed so it will receive wide acceptance, be credible and be
used within the industry?
FRA outlines a sample set of detailed design requirements for high-
speed passenger trainsets in Appendix B to provoke thought and
discussion on these and other technical issues that need to be resolved
to develop high- speed trainset safety standards. As with the
conventional equipment design standards, FRA is pursuing an intentional
strategy by providing this level of detail. From experience with past
ANPRM's, FRA learned that such a strategy results in more and higher
quality comments. FRA does not intend to implement the requirements
given in Appendix B without significant change based on the
recommendations of the Working Group, supplemented by the information
and views obtained in response to this ANPRM. FRA strongly encourages
comments on these provisions and proposals for alternative standards.
Again, comments from interests represented on the Working Group should,
to the maximum extent possible, be expressed through those
representatives during the Working Group's deliberations.
FRA seeks comment from technically knowledgeable individuals on the
initial set of design standards for high-speed passenger trainsets
outlined in Appendix B. FRA recognizes that these standards would
preclude operation of several existing high-speed trainsets in the
United States without structural design changes. FRA believes that
because these trainsets were designed for a much less severe operating
environment, and because the American public demands and deserves the
safest possible transportation system, attention is warranted for
further development of North American standards. Do alternative
approaches exist to safety standards for high-speed trainsets that
could provide an equivalent level of safety at less cost?
Possibility of Design Standards for Other Tiers of Equipment
Amtrak and some commuter railroads have a long operating experience
safely running trains of existing equipment at speeds between 80 and
125 mph. Much of this equipment is the same equipment--designed to the
same standards--used for conventional service (herein defined as
service at speeds less than 80 mph.) This practice supports the notion
that the same set of design requirements used for conventional
equipment is adequate for intermediate-speed equipment (i.e., equipment
designed for service at speeds up to 125 mph). However, components wear
faster and are subject to higher dynamic, mechanical, and thermal
stresses at higher speeds. Perhaps more steps need to be added to the
pre-departure safety inspection for intermediate-speed equipment.
Perhaps maintenance intervals need to be more frequent and/or have more
tasks performed as part of the preventive maintenance program. FRA
seeks information on how inspection, testing, and maintenance programs
for intermediate-speed equipment should differ from those used for
conventional equipment.
If the designation between tiers were based solely on operating
speed, design or performance requirements for intermediate speed
equipment should logically fall between the requirements for
conventional equipment and the requirements for high-speed equipment
(i.e., equipment designed for service at speeds up to 150 mph).
Analysis by the Volpe Center shows a crash energy management design
provides significant benefits in terms of passenger and crew protection
over conventional designs as collision speeds increase to over 70 mph.
This suggests new intermediate- speed equipment would benefit from a
crash energy management design approach.
If standards based on more than two tiers are developed, FRA
currently believes design requirements for new intermediate-speed
equipment should include the requirements for conventional equipment
and some of the (possibly modified) requirements for high-speed
equipment. The following criteria suggested for consideration for
[[Page 30700]]
high-speed equipment may have applicability to intermediate-speed
equipment:
(1) Glazing requirements;
(2) Crash refuge for cab crew;
(3) Crash energy management system--perhaps to modified performance
standards;
(4) Interior arrangement or restraint systems to mitigate secondary
impacts; and
(5) Emergency systems.
FRA seeks comment from builders and operators of intermediate-speed
equipment as to where the design requirements for such equipment should
be placed on the spectrum between the design requirements for
conventional equipment and the design requirements for high-speed
equipment.
Design Standards for Systems with Dedicated Rights-of-Way and No At-
Grade Crossings
FRA recognizes that a system safety program that places emphasis on
the prevention of collisions is highly desirable. However, fundamental
changes are necessary in the North American railroad operating
environment before accident prevention provisions allow equipment
structural design standards to be relaxed. The main problem is North
American passenger trains generally share, or operate adjacent to, the
rights-of-way with an ever-increasing number of very heavy freight
trains, and most passenger rail routes include at-grade crossings used
by heavy highway vehicles. The risk to passengers and crew members in
this operating environment increases as passenger train speed
increases.
FRA encourages passenger systems to operate over dedicated rights-
of-way with no at-grade crossings. FRA believes such systems can
potentially provide the safest means of high-speed passenger
transportation. Should proposed vehicle crashworthiness standards be
modified for such operations? If so, to what degree? Should
consideration of equipment used exclusively on dedicated rights-of-way
be undertaken as part of this proceeding or through a system safety
approach in individual proceedings for rules of specific applicability?
Discussion of Operating Issues
Commuter Equipment and Operations
FRA is aware that unique features of some commuter equipment and
the unique operating cycle of commuter railroads may require specific
attention. Some commuter equipment is stored at outlying locations
overnight to be in position for the first morning trip into the major
city being served. Mechanical employees are generally not available at
these outlying locations to do pre-departure safety inspections. At
those outlying points where mechanical employees are not available, an
abbreviated initial daily safety inspection is generally performed by
train crew members.
During the middle of the day, the pace of commuter operations
generally slows, and the equipment is brought to a central location for
a more comprehensive inspection by mechanical personnel prior to being
dispatched for the evening rush hour. This reality of the commuter
operating cycle must be taken into account for any proposed rules
governing pre-departure safety inspections of commuter equipment.
However, where mechanical employees and facilities are available to
perform the pre-departure inspection, it must be performed by
mechanical employees. Equipment that receives an abbreviated inspection
by the train crew at outlying points at the beginning of the day must
receive a complete pre-departure inspection by mechanical employees at
the earliest opportunity during the day.
Some of the MU equipment operated by commuter railroads is very
different from intercity rail passenger equipment. FRA needs the help
of the operators of such equipment to identify the differences that may
require special regulatory treatment to avoid unintended impacts on
commuter operations. Through participation of APTA on the Working
Group, FRA anticipates that commuter railroads will make a special
effort to point out unique operating or equipment features that should
be taken into account to develop safety standards for commuter
equipment.
Information available to FRA suggests that nationwide there are
about 20 commuter railroads operating roughly 5,400 passenger cars, 400
cab cars, 2,000 multiple unit locomotive pairs, and 400 conventional
locomotives. Are these estimates accurate? What size crews operate
commuter trains? Approximately how many people stand on each train? As
a result of implementing the proposed standards, would commuter
operators realize different levels of safety benefits than intercity
operators? Please explain.
Cab Car Forward and Risk
FRA is concerned regarding operation of passenger trains with cab
cars or MU locomotives positioned at the head of the train at high
speeds. Such operations place the train operator and the passengers in
the lead vehicle at inherently greater risk than operating the trainset
with a locomotive or power car leading. Current designs of cab cars and
MU locomotives provide little structural protection to the operator and
forward-most passengers in the event of a head-on or side-swipe
collision. Cab car locomotives and passenger MU locomotives are
structurally equivalent from a crashworthiness standpoint. (Amtrak has
noted that not all cab car locomotives should be considered equivalent
to MU locomotives when the cab cars are not equipped with stairway
traps in the leading end, such as in the X2000 train).
Computer modeling of passenger train collisions at high speeds by
the Volpe Center predicts a dramatic increase in casualties in head-on
collisions of trainsets operated with a cab car forward when compared
to the same collision with a power car or locomotive leading. This
prediction is based on a limited number of hypothetical accident
scenarios. The prediction is not based on accident statistics. The
technical papers 5 documenting these predictions are part of the
docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 ``Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness Strategies for
Passenger Trains''; ``Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant
Survivability.'' See note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent accidents involving trains operating with cab cars in the
forward position have heightened FRA's concern. On February 9, 1996, a
near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., (NJTR) trains 1254 and 1107 on the borderline of
Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Two crewmembers and one passenger
were fatally injured, and an additional 162 passengers reported minor
injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the injuries occurred on
train 1254, which was operating with the cab control car forward and
the locomotive pushing. In addition, the engineer on train 1254 was
fatally injured.
On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred between
Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MARC) train 286 and Amtrak train
29 on CSX Transportation, Inc., at Silver Spring, Maryland. The MARC
train consisted of a cab control car in the lead, followed by two
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The accident
resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crewmembers and 8 passengers
who were located in the MARC cab car, and at least 13 non-fatal
injuries to other passengers of the MARC train.
Following these accidents, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20,
Notice
[[Page 30701]]
No. 1, on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt action to immediately
enhance passenger train operating rules and emergency egress, and to
develop a more comprehensive interim system safety plan addressing cab
car forward and MU operations that do not have either cab signal,
automatic train stop, or automatic train control systems. 61 FR 6876,
Feb. 22, 1996. FRA subsequently issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order
No. 20 on February 29, 1996, to refine three aspects of the original
order. 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
NTSB recommends that MU cars and control cab locomotives be
equipped with corner posts to provide greater structural protection
from a side-swipe collision. NTSB makes this recommendation based on
the findings of the investigation of a passenger train collision that
occurred on January 18, 1993, in which Northern Indiana Commuter
Transportation District (NICTD) eastbound commuter train 7 and NICTD
westbound commuter train 12 collided in a corner-to-corner impact in
Gary, Indiana, resulting in 7 passenger fatalities and 95 injuries. The
presence of a gauntlet bridge and absence of automatic train control
contributed to the cause of this accident. The damage that both trains
sustained after the initial impact resulted from the action of dynamic
forces that caused the left front corner and sidewall of the passenger
compartment of each car to experience a complete structural failure and
intrude inward. Because little structure was available in the corner
post areas to absorb the forces of the collision, the substantial car
body intrusion into each car left no survivable space in the left front
areas of either car. Consequently, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation R-
93-24, which recommends that:
In cooperation with the Federal Transit Administration and the
American Public Transit Association, [FRA] study the feasibility of
providing car body corner post structures on all self-propelled
passenger cars and control cab locomotives to afford occupant
protection during corner collisions.
The RSERA requires FRA to analyze the crashworthiness of
locomotives. As part of this analysis, the Volpe Center tasked ADL to
do computer modeling of collisions involving cab cars to predict the
benefit of substantial corner posts. The docket contains copies of this
report.6 ADL used the following general approach to evaluate cab
car crashworthiness: Finite element models for the major structural
elements of a typical cab car were developed and utilized to compute
the load versus deformation characteristic curves for major structural
elements involved in collisions. These characteristics were used as
input to the train collision dynamics model developed previously for
freight locomotives. The collision dynamics model was modified as
needed to represent a typical passenger train with a cab car at the
head end and a locomotive at the rear pushing, instead of a freight
train with locomotives at the head end. The modified models were then
validated by comparison of predicted results with the actual damage in
documented collisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 ``Cab Car Crashworthiness Study Final Report,'' April
1995, Reference 63065.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This modeling predicts, for control cab/MU locomotives of current
design, that when the underframe resists the forces of collision, a cab
car will sustain substantial loss of survivable volume in both operator
and passenger compartments in head-on collisions at closing speeds
above 30 mph. The result of such crush would cause severe injury or
fatality to some of the cab car occupants.
When the underframe is bypassed and collision or corner posts
resist the forces of the collision, the cab car will sustain
substantial loss of survivable volume at collision closing speeds in
the 10 to 15 mph range. These predictions emphasize the importance of
designs that increase the probability that the underframe will be fully
involved in resisting the forces resulting from a collision.
ADL took the modeling one step further by repeating the
calculations for a conceptual cab car with a 50 percent underframe
strength increase and a 400 percent corner post strength increase over
current cab car design practice. These structural changes increased the
closing speed required to result in a significant loss of survivable
space by approximately 10 mph. These results suggest that only a small
improvement in protection is possible through structural changes for a
cab car leading, train-to-train collision. However, these structural
changes may provide a much more significant increase in protection for
the less severe scenarios of a grade crossing collision, a collision
with debris including lading that falls from freight trains, or a
collision with an object overhanging the track.
Several system characteristics determine the degree of risk
involved in cab-car-forward or MU equipment operations. These
characteristics include operating speed, traffic density, signal
system, grade crossings and grade crossing warning systems (including
barriers to prevent entry onto the crossing), and right-of-way
features. In addition, the operator of a cab car or MU equipment often
has an opportunity to exit the control stand area and move through the
passenger compartment toward the rear of the car when a collision is
impending.
FRA seeks comment focusing on what is practical and what is
economical to reduce the risk associated with operating cab cars in the
forward position and operating MU equipment. FRA poses the following
set of questions to operators and builders of cab car type equipment:
What can be done to increase the protection provided to the operator
and forwardmost passengers in a head-on collision with a cab car
leading? Advanced versions of some European trains employ a concept
where the operator's position is designed to be pushed to the rear
relative to the rest of the cab to provide the operator additional
protection during a collision. Could such a technique be employed to
protect operators in future North American equipment? What design
changes can be made to increase the probability that the underframe
will be fully involved in resisting the collision forces? Recognizing
that structural changes will have only limited benefit, should speed
restrictions be placed on cab-forward operations? Should passengers be
prohibited from occupying cab cars operating above a certain speed when
in a leading position? What would be the impact of placing speed
restrictions on cab car forward operations? What mitigating factors may
exist that would alleviate FRA's concern for the increased risk
associated with cab-car-forward operations as speeds increase? If speed
restrictions are placed on cab car forward operations, what speed
restrictions should be imposed?
What costs and benefits would be associated with alternatives for
increasing crew and passenger protection in a head-on collision with a
cab car leading?
Data indicate that at least 400 cab cars operate as lead units. Is
this estimate accurate? Approximately how many trips are made each year
with cab cars operating as lead units? At what maximum speeds do trains
operate with the cab car forward?
FRA estimates that 2,000 MU locomotive pairs operate as lead units.
Is this estimate accurate? Approximately how many trips per year
involve multiple unit locomotive pairs?
Combined Passenger and Freight Trains
FRA recognizes that circumstances exist where freight trains haul
passenger cars and where passenger trains haul freight cars. For
example, freight trains on occasion include private or business
[[Page 30702]]
cars, Amtrak trains can include mail cars, and Amtrak has experimented
with roadrailer-type equipment in passenger trains. Passenger safety
standards should cover these special situations as well.
How frequent are such operations? Are any special safety
considerations necessary for passenger cars hauled by freight trains or
is normal passenger equipment safety practice adequate for this special
situation? Are any special safety considerations necessary for freight-
type equipment hauled by passenger trains or for passenger trains that
haul freight-type equipment.
Station/Platform Boarding and Exiting Passenger Trains
FRA requests comment on the safety of persons in station areas,
issues regarding boarding and exiting from trains, and other issues
affecting the safety of passenger operations. The following specific
issues have come to FRA's attention in recent years, and are
illustrative of the concerns that may warrant examination in this
proceeding:
Door Securement
The manner and extent to which end and side doors are secured
varies among passenger operators. When doors may be opened with
excessive ease, a risk exists that passengers will unwittingly fall
from moving trains. Of particular concern is the need to secure
passenger train end doors against casual operation.
However, full, interlocked securement may greatly complicate
evacuation in emergency situations. In some situations when a train is
departing, the train doors must be open as it leaves the station for
the crew to observe the platform area. In some situations when a train
is arriving, the train doors must also be open to allow trap doors to
be raised to minimize dwell time in stations not equipped with floor-
level platforms. A signal light that displays the status of the doors
to the crew in the control cab may have value for departing trains.
Many railroads currently employ such a display light. Should passenger
car doors be secured while the train is in motion during normal
operations? What provision should be made for operation of doors by
passengers in emergency situations? To what extent does the railroad's
operating environment (elevated structures, tunnels, etc.) bear on
resolving this question?
Ground-Level Stations
Ground-level stations are economical responses to light-density
boarding in both commuter and intercity service. However, particularly
where multiple tracks are present, the environment presents the
possibility that passengers may be struck by moving trains. Attention
needs to be directed toward the design of the interface of the ground-
level station to the train to ensure passengers can safely board and
leave the train. What station-to-train interface design features are
desirable to minimize the possibility of injuries resulting from
boarding or departing the train? What warning is appropriate for the
arrival of passenger trains? Should movement of freight trains through
stations be announced? What measures are appropriate to safeguard
passenger movements in stations? What alternatives have been
implemented in the United States? Internationally? With what success?
What costs are associated with alternative measures to safeguard
passenger movements in ground level stations? When is construction of
pedestrian overpasses and fencing warranted?
Floor-Level Platforms
Station platforms that are elevated to the level of the passenger
car floor permit prompt boarding and can be arranged to provide better
access for persons with disabilities. However, concern has been
expressed with regard to movement of trains through stations on tracks
that are adjacent to platforms. Attention needs to be directed toward
the design of the interface of the floor-level platform to the train to
ensure passengers can safely board and leave the train. What platform-
to-train interface design features are desirable to minimize the
possibility of injuries resulting from boarding or departing the train?
What warning is appropriate for the arrival of trains?
High-Speed Movements through Stations
Express trains often move through passenger stations without
stopping, sometimes on tracks immediately adjacent to areas where
passengers are waiting to board local trains. Could movement of high-
speed express trains through stations present an unreasonable risk? If
so, how could that risk be mitigated? What measures are utilized by
passenger railroads currently facing this situation? At what costs can
alternative measures be implemented to mitigate risks of high-speed
express trains through stations?
Additional Economic Impact Information
Information available to FRA suggests that there are about 8,200
passenger cars and 970 conventional locomotives dedicated to rail
passenger service in the United States. Is this information accurate?
What ridership levels are experienced through the year? Would meeting
the new higher standards described in Appendix B result in higher
fares? If so, how much higher? Would a decrease in ridership be
anticipated? If so, to what extent? Please explain the method of
estimation. To which alternative forms of travel would lost ridership
be expected to switch? How has this conclusion been reached? What
assumptions have been made? FRA is interested in obtaining copies of
studies or other documentation addressing the issue of passenger
diversion from rail to other modes of travel as a result of new rail
safety standards. What factors have the greatest effect on ridership
levels: price, seat availability, trip time, variability in trip time,
etc.?
Appendix D lists the economic questions posed by this ANPRM.
Regulatory Impact
FRA will evaluate any proposed action and its potential impacts to
determine whether it would be considered significant under Executive
Order 12866 or DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034, Feb. 26,
1979). Due to the substantial impact this rulemaking may have on a
major transportation safety problem, this rulemaking is expected to be
classified as significant pursuant to DOT Order 2100.5. FRA will also
examine any proposed action and its potential impacts to determine
whether it will have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities under the provisions of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).
FRA will further evaluate any proposed rule pursuant to DOT
regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (42
U.S.C. 432 et seq.).
Any proposed action will be further evaluated to determine
information collection burdens pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act.
Any proposed action will be evaluated pursuant to Executive Order 12612
to determine whether it would have substantial effects on the states,
on the relationship between the national government and the states, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
The economic impact of any rule that may be proposed on the subject
of passenger equipment safety standards cannot be accurately quantified
with the information currently available to FRA. An analysis of the
economic impact will be made after evaluating the data
[[Page 30703]]
submitted in response to this ANPRM, and the findings of that analysis
will be published as part of any further notices of rulemaking issued
in this matter. In addition, without fully evaluating the comments
solicited by this ANPRM, it is impossible to determine what action FRA
will take with regard to the other areas addressed by this ANPRM, and
thus it is impossible to determine the economic impact of those changes
at this time. Furthermore, any action taken by FRA is expected to
result in the prevention or mitigation of accidents, personal injuries
and property damage. However, until FRA fully considers the comments
requested by this ANPRM and determines what action it will take, these
benefits cannot be quantified.
Comments and Hearing
FRA solicits the submission of written comments, which should be
filed in triplicate with the Docket Clerk at the address provided
above. Specific responses to the questions set forth in this notice
would be appreciated. The comment period will close on July 9, 1996, so
that all comments can be presented to the Working Group before its next
scheduled meeting in July 1996. When responding, reference to the topic
or question number in the ANPRM will ensure full consideration of the
comments submitted.
FRA has not currently scheduled a public hearing in connection with
this ANPRM. Any interested party desiring an opportunity for oral
comment should submit a written request to the Docket Clerk before the
end of the comment period.
Issued in Washington, DC on June 5, 1996.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.
Appendix A--Sample System Safety Plan Elements
The outline that follows describes the elements of a system
safety plan for a safety program for the development of a new high-
speed passenger trainset. Safety programs for less complex
procurements of new equipment might be greatly simplified versions
of this plan.
General Description
1. The system safety plan shall describe the system safety
program to be conducted as part of the trainset design process to
ensure all safety-critical issues and Federal safety requirements
are identified and addressed.
2. The system safety program shall ensure safety issues are
treated equal to cost and performance issues when design trade-offs
are made. The basis for making safety-related design trade-offs
shall be documented.
3. The system safety plan shall be the top level document--
completed as one of the first design process deliverables--used as
guidance for the development of the following lower level safety
planning and design guidance documents:
a. Fire Protection Engineering Plan.
b. Software Safety Plan.
c. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Plan.
d. Training Plan.
e. Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Test Plan
4. The system safety plan shall describe the approaches to be
taken to accomplish the following tasks or objectives:
a. Identification of all safety requirements including Federal
requirements governing the design of the trainset and its supporting
systems.
b. Evaluation of the total system--including hardware, software,
testing and support activities--to identify known or potential
safety hazards over the entire life cycle of the equipment.
c. The process to be used to raise safety issues during design
reviews.
d. The process to be used to eliminate or reduce the risk of the
hazards identified.
e. The monitoring and tracking system to be used to track the
progress made toward resolving safety issues, reducing hazards, and
meeting safety requirements.
f. The development of the testing program to demonstrate that
safety requirements have been met.
5. The system safety program shall include periodic safety
reviews that result in safety action items being assigned and
tracked.
6. The system safety program shall include adequate
documentation to audit how the design meets safety requirements and
to track how safety issues were raised and resolved.
7. The system safety plan shall address how operational
limitations may be imposed if the design cannot meet certain safety
requirements.
Fire Protection Engineering Plan
1. Develop a Fire Protection Engineering Plan to be used to
design adequate fire safety into the trainset.
2. The Fire Protection Engineering Plan shall:
a. Require the system developer to complete a thorough analysis
of the fire protection problem.
b. Require the system developer to use good fire protection
engineering practice as part of the design of the trainset design
process.
c. Describe and analyze the effectiveness of the steps to be
taken to design the train to be sufficiently fire resistant to
ensure the detection of a fire and the evacuation of the train
before the fire, smoke or toxic fumes cause injury to the passengers
or crew.
d. Identify, analyze and prioritize the fire hazards inherent in
the design of the trainset.
e. Describe the design approach taken and justify the design
trade-offs made to minimize the risk of each fire hazard.
f. Present an analysis and propose tests to demonstrate how the
fire protection engineering approach taken will lead to a train
which meets these fire protection standards.
g. Be a major subset of the overall System Safety Plan, and
dovetail with the railroad's Emergency Preparedness Plan.
h. Present the analysis required to select materials which
provide sufficient fire resistance to ensure adequate time to detect
the fire and safely evacuate the train. The system developer shall
also propose the tests to be conducted to demonstrate this analysis
has basis in fact.
i. Present the analysis done to ensure the ventilation system
does not contribute to the lethality of a fire.
j. Include the analysis performed to determine which train
components require overheat protection. If overheat protection is
not provided for a component at risk of being a source of fire, a
solid rationale and justification for the decision shall be included
in the plan.
k. Identify all unoccupied train compartments which contain
equipment or material which poses a fire hazard, and analyze the
benefit provided from including a fire or smoke detection system in
each compartment identified. Fire or smoke detectors shall be
installed in compartments where the analysis determines that they
are necessary to ensure time for safe evacuation of the train. The
analysis shall provide the reasoning why a fire or smoke detector is
not necessary if the decision is made not to install one in any of
the unoccupied compartments identified in the plan.
l. Include an analysis of the occupied and unoccupied spaces
which require portable fire extinguishers. The analysis will include
the proper type and size of fire extinguisher for each location.
m. Identify all unoccupied train compartments that contain
equipment or material which poses a fire hazard risk. On a case-by-
case basis, the plan shall analyze the benefit provided by including
a fixed, automatic fire-suppression system in each compartment
identified. The type and size of the automatic fire-suppression
system for each necessary application shall be determined. A fixed,
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in compartments
where the analysis determines they are necessary and practical to
ensure time for safe evacuation of the train. The analysis shall
provide the reasoning why a fixed, automatic fire suppression system
is not necessary or practical if the decision is made not to install
one in any of the unoccupied compartments identified in the plan.
n. Describe the procedures to be used for inspection,
maintenance, and testing of all fire safety systems and equipment.
3. The system developer shall follow the design criteria,
perform the tests, and follow the operating procedures called for in
the plan.
Software Safety Plan
1. Trainset system software that controls or monitors safety
functions shall be treated as safety-critical.
2. The system operator shall require the system developer to
develop a software safety plan to guide the design, development,
testing, integration and verification of computer programs used to
control and/or monitor trainset functions.
[[Page 30704]]
3. The software safety plan shall include a description of how
the following tasks will be accomplished or objectives achieved to
ensure reliable, fail-safe system software:
a. Software design process used.
b. Software design documentation to be produced.
c. Software hazard analysis.
d. Software safety reviews.
e. Software hazard monitoring and tracking.
f. Software module level safety tests.
g. Safety tests of multiple modules combined to function as a
software system.
h. Hardware/software integration safety tests.
i. Demonstration of overall software safety as part of the pre-
revenue service tests of the trainset.
Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Plan
1. The plan shall:
a. Provide adequate technical detail on the procedures to be
followed by the system operator to ensure trainset safety does not
deteriorate over time.
b. Be used as the basis for the trainset inspection, testing,
and maintenance safety standards.
c. Contain the specific, detailed inspection, testing, and
maintenance procedures and intervals required to ensure safe,
reliable long-term operation of all train systems.
d. Focus on, and give priority to, those inspections, preventive
maintenance procedures, and tests required to prevent any
deterioration in train safety.
e. Include an inspection and maintenance program that ensures
all systems and components of the train are free of general
conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or
equipment. These conditions include but are not limited to:
i. Insecure attachment of components.
ii. Continuous accumulations of oil or grease.
iii. Improper functioning of components.
iv. Cracks, breaks, excessive wear, structural defects or
weakness of components.
v. Leaks.
vi. Use of components or systems under conditions that exceed
those for which the component or system is designed to operate.
2. The plan shall include a description of the process to be
used to develop detailed information on the inspection, testing and
maintenance procedures necessary for long-term safe operation of the
trainset. This information shall include:
a. Safety Inspection Criteria and Procedures.
b. Testing Procedures/Intervals.
c. Predetermined corrective action to take upon failure of an
inspection or test.
d. Scheduled Preventive Maintenance.
e. Maintenance Procedures.
f. Special Testing Equipment.
3. The plan shall set initial scheduled maintenance intervals
conservatively. The intervals shall be extended only when thoroughly
justified by accumulated operating data.
Training Plan
1. Develop a training plan to provide employees and contract
personnel including supervisors with the knowledge and skills
necessary to effectively implement the inspection, maintenance and
testing program, and to safely do his/her job.
2. The training plan shall include the knowledge and skills
necessary for electronic, computer software, and mechanical
personnel.
3. The plan shall contain detailed descriptions of the
training--crucial to the safe operation of the trainset-- which will
be required for each craft.
4. The plan shall contain the certification process to be used
to be sure each employee in a safety sensitive position is fit and
well qualified to do his/her job.
5. The training plan shall include the training necessary for
supervisors to be able to adequately spot check the work of the
inspection, maintenance and testing personnel that they supervise.
6. The training plan shall include:
a. Identification of all the knowledge and skills necessary to
accomplish the tasks described in the inspection, testing, and
maintenance plan.
b. Design of a training program including classroom instruction
and hands-on experience to ensure that employees and supervisors are
given the necessary knowledge and skills.
c. A means to measure that employees--including supervisors--
have the necessary knowledge and skills.
d. Modules that specifically address technology used as part of
the trainset that is new to the railroad industry.
e. A program of periodic refresher training to recertify
employees and contract personnel.
f. A schedule to have the work force adequately trained prior to
the start of revenue service.
Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
1. Develop a pre-revenue service testing plan and fully execute
the plan prior to introducing new equipment into revenue service.
2. The plan shall include:
a. Identification of any waivers of Federal safety regulations
required for the tests or for revenue service operation of the
trainset.
b. A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the major
objectives shall be to demonstrate that the trainset meets safety
design requirements when operated in the environment in which it is
to be used.
c. A planned schedule for conducting the tests.
d. A description of the railroad property or facilities to be
used to conduct the tests.
e. A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted
including:
i. Which components are to be tested;
ii. How they are to be tested;
iii. How frequently they are to be tested;
iv. What criteria are to be used to judge their performance; and
v. How the test results are to be reported.
f. A description of any special instrumentation to be used
during the tests.
g. A description of the information or data to be obtained.
h. A description of how the information or data obtained is to
be analyzed or used.
i. A clear description of any criteria to be used as safety
limits during testing.
j. A description of the criteria to be used to measure or
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to
be based on extrapolation of less than full level testing results,
the analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation
shall be described.
k. A description of any special safety precautions to be
observed during the testing.
l. A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to
ensure that the testing is done safely.
m. A verification of the inspection, maintenance, and testing
procedures and criteria to be used for the revenue service operation
of the trainset.
3. The system operator shall report the results of the pre-
revenue service tests and correct any safety deficiencies in the
design of the trainset or in the inspection, testing, and
maintenance procedures.
4. If safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design changes,
operational limitations may be imposed on the revenue service
operation of the trainset.
Standard Operating Procedures
1. Develop step-by-step standard operating procedures for
performing all safety-critical or potentially hazardous trainset
inspection, testing, maintenance or repair tasks.
2. Standard operating procedures shall:
a. Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the
task;
b. Describe the qualifications necessary to safely perform the
task;
c. Describe any precautions that must be taken to safely perform
the task;
d. Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform
the task;
e. Be approved by the chief mechanical officer of the system
operator;
f. Be approved by the responsible official for safety of the
system operator;
g. Be read and understood by the employees and contractors
performing the tasks;
h. Be enforced by supervisors with responsibility for
accomplishing the tasks; and
i. Be updated and approved annually.
3. Knowledge of standard operating procedures shall be required
to qualify an employee or contractor to perform a task.
Appendix B--Sample Design Standards Based on a Tiered Approach
Introduction
FRA offers this sample outline of tiered design requirements to
help generate discussion on how to set safety standards for
equipment. As discussed in the body of the ANPRM, it is not clear
whether the distinction between various tiers would be based solely
on operating speed, a risk analysis of the envisioned operating
environment, or another method. For purposes of discussion, this
appendix is based on two tiers determined solely by operating speed:
Tier I: Existing and future equipment designed for operation in
an environment
[[Page 30705]]
with known risk or proven safe operation, e.g., existing passenger
equipment operating at speeds of 110 mph or less or up to 125 mph
under specific waiver conditions.
Tier II: Equipment that is envisioned to operate in higher risk
operating environments, e.g., Amtrak's planned operation at 150 mph
in the Northeast Corridor, or perhaps cab car forward operations
under some sets of higher risk operating conditions.
(APTA takes exception to the possibility of including cab car
forward operations in the Tier II category.)
FRA recognizes the need to address special equipment outside
this two-tiered system, such as that operated by tourist and
excursion railroads and private passenger cars. FRA also recognizes
the possible need to identify additional tiers in the future,
whether it be for an intermediate tier between Tiers I and II
described above or for equipment intended to operate at very high
speeds, i.e., in excess of 150 mph.
(Amtrak agrees with the logic behind the tiered safety standard
based on speed. The logical breaks for Amtrak are 0 to 90 mph, 90 to
125 mph, and 125 mph and above, thus creating a three-tiered
standard.)
It is important to emphasize that neither FRA nor the Working
Group has endorsed the parameters provided, except to the extent
that they mirror existing rail safety laws. FRA intends that the
parameters suggested in this appendix serve only as the starting
point for discussion to help determine the parameters to be included
in a subsequent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).
A. Crash Energy Management System Design Requirements
Tier I: (Note: Existing equipment designs do not typically
incorporate crash energy management principles in an effort to
mitigate the consequences of a collision. However, future designs of
Tier I equipment should embrace the following guidelines.)
(APTA believes crash energy management design requirements
should be applied only to Tier II equipment.)
1. Both the power vehicle and the passenger vehicle shall be
designed with a crash energy management system to dissipate kinetic
energy during a collision. The crash energy management system shall
cause a controlled deformation and collapse of designated sections
within the unoccupied volumes to absorb collision energy and reduce
the decelerations on passengers and crew resulting from dynamic
forces transmitted to occupied volumes.
2. The design of the power vehicle and each unit of the
passenger vehicle shall consist of an occupied volume located
between two normally unoccupied volumes. Where practical, sections
within the unoccupied volumes shall be designed to be structurally
weaker than the occupied volume. During a collision or derailment,
the designated sections within the unoccupied volumes shall start to
deform and eventually collapse in a controlled fashion to dissipate
energy before any structural damage occurs to the occupied volume.
Alternately, a crash energy management strategy shall be implemented
by trainset.
3. The crash energy management system shall keep the train in
line and on the track long enough to maximize the energy absorbed by
controlled crushing of designated sections within unoccupied volumes
of the train. The train shall be designed for controlled collapse of
the designated sections within unoccupied volumes of the train,
starting from the ends of the train and working toward the center of
the train as the energy to be dissipated increases.
4. The trainset shall be designed for a crush distance and crush
force that result in survivable volumes in all occupied areas of the
trainset under the conditions of the collision scenario. A collision
scenario needs to be defined to serve as a basis for design analysis
of Tier I equipment's crash energy management system and structure.
What parameters should be used to define this collision scenario?
5. The locomotive or power car cab shall be designed to limit
the secondary impact deceleration of crew members to a maximum of
24g and an average of 16g for 250 milliseconds after initial impact
under the conditions of the collision scenario.
6. The trainset shall be designed to limit the secondary impact
deceleration acting on passengers in the leading passenger
compartment to a maximum of 6g and an average of 4g for 250
milliseconds after initial impact under the conditions of the
collision scenario.
7. The occupied volume of the power vehicle and the occupied
volumes of the passenger vehicle shall be designed and constructed
in a manner to preclude telescoping of the crushed unoccupied volume
structure into the occupied volume.
8. The unoccupied volume of the power vehicle shall have a
static end yield strength of no less than 50 percent of the required
static end strength of the power vehicle occupied volume. The
unoccupied volume of each unit of the passenger vehicle shall have a
static end yield strength of no less than 50 percent of the required
static end strength yield of the passenger unit occupied volume. Any
deviation form this requirement must be fully justified by analysis
or test.
9. The crash energy management system shall start to function at
a static end load of no less than 50 percent of the required static
end strength of the occupied volume, but no more than 90 percent of
the actual static end strength of the occupied volume.
10. An analysis based on the collision scenario shall be
performed to verify that the trainset crash energy management system
meets the requirements of this section. Assumptions made as part of
the analysis to calculate how the kinetic energy of the colliding
passenger train is dissipated shall be fully justified. The analysis
must clearly show that the designated energy absorbing sections
within the unoccupied volumes of the trainset crush before collapse
of the occupied volumes start and that the deceleration of people in
the occupied volumes is limited to the levels required by paragraphs
5 and 6 above. This analysis shall be made available to FRA upon
request.
(APTA points out that crash energy management design concepts
have not been validated by tests or analysis for equipment operating
in the speed range envisioned for Tier I equipment. APTA points to
the need for a major research and physical testing program to
demonstrate and validate crash energy management design benefits.)
(Amtrak is in full agreement with the concept of crash energy
management, but similarly feels that some form of full-scale testing
may be required to validate the computer simulations. Further,
Amtrak warns that this type of testing is expensive by nature, and
an effort to identify a funding source needs to be initiated now in
order not to delay the rulemaking process.)
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
B. Structural Design Requirements
1. Static End Strength
Tier I: The current U.S. practice is to require both locomotives
and coaches to have a minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds
without deformation. If a crash energy management design approach is
taken, this requirement applies only to the occupied volume of the
equipment. Unoccupied volumes may have a lesser static end yield
strength.
Tier II: The longitudinal static yield strength of the trainset
occupied volumes shall be no less than 1,000,000 pounds ultimate
strength.
(APTA suggests that the static end strength requirements for
both Tier I and Tier II equipment should be the same. APTA believes
the occupants of the weaker car may suffer unduly in a collision of
cars of differing strength.)
2. Anticlimbing Mechanism
Tier I: The current U.S. practice is to require locomotives
(power cars) to have an anticlimbing mechanism capable of resisting
an upward or downward vertical force of 200,000 pounds. This
requirement is given in Association of American Railroads (AAR)
Specification S-580, that became effective in August, 1990.
Passenger coaches and MU locomotives (49 CFR 229.141(a)(2)) are
required to have an anticlimbing mechanism capable of resisting an
upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds. How should the
anticlimber requirements for Tier I equipment be specified to ensure
maximum advantage is taken of the strength of the underframe to
resist collision forces?
Tier II: a. Anticlimber engagements of each end of each interior
trainset unit shall be designed to keep the trainset in line and on
the track until the energy-absorbing capability of the crash energy
management system has been exceeded and the strength of occupied
volumes of the train start to be overcome.
b. Anticlimber engagements shall be capable of resisting both
vertical and lateral buckling forces between units due to an
acceleration of 1g acting on the total loaded mass including trucks
of the heavier of the two coupled units.
3. Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Carbody
Tier I: The mechanical link which attaches the front coupling
mechanism to the car body shall be designed to resist a vertical
[[Page 30706]]
downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for any
horizontal position of the coupler, without exceeding the yield
points of the materials used.
Does this requirement provide protection to passengers and crew?
If not, how should this parameter be specified?
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
4. Short Hood Structure (Non-MU Locomotives Only)
Tier I: The skin covering the short hood or forward-facing end
of the locomotive shall be equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate
with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-inch yield strength. Higher yield
strength material may be used to decrease the thickness of the
material as long as an equivalent strength is maintained. This skin
shall be securely attached to the forward collision posts and shall
be sealed to prevent the entry of flammable fluids into the occupied
cab area. Does this requirement inhibit the application of crash
energy management technology to Tier I equipment?
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
5. Collision Posts
Tier I: a. Locomotive Forward Collision Posts--Two collision
posts are required, each capable of withstanding a shear load of
500,000 pounds at the joint of the collision post to the underframe
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint. Each post must
also be capable of withstanding, without exceeding the ultimate
strength, a 200,000 pound shear force exerted 30 inches above the
joint of the post to the underframe (AAR Specification S-580). This
requirement is independent of train weight. Alternately, an
equivalent end structure may be used in place of the two collision
posts. The single end structure must withstand the sum of the forces
required for each collision post.
b. MU Locomotive Rear Collision Posts--Two collision posts are
required, each having an ultimate shear value of not less than
300,000 pounds at a point even with the top of the underframe member
to which it is attached. If reinforcement is used to provide the
shear value, the reinforcement shall have full value for a distance
of 18 inches up from the underframe connection and then taper to a
point approximately 30 inches above the underframe connection (49
CFR 229.141(a)(4)). FRA believes this requirement needs to be
improved. The collision posts can easily be strengthened and
lengthened (preferably full height to the roofline). An equivalent
single end structure may be used in place of the two collision
posts. The single end structure must be designed to withstand the
sum of the forces required for the end posts. For analysis purposes,
the required forces can be assumed to be evenly distributed at the
end structure at the underframe joint.
c. Passenger Coach Collision Posts--Current U.S. practice is to
require a pair of collision posts at each end of a passenger coach.
If a passenger coach consists of articulated or otherwise
permanently joined units, collision posts are required only at the
ends of the permanently coupled assembly of units, not at the ends
of each unit of the assembly. In other words, collision posts are
required at ends of passenger equipment where coupling and
uncoupling are expected. The requirements for passenger coach
collision posts are identical to the requirements for locomotive
rear collision posts. FRA believes this requirement needs to be
improved. The collision posts can easily be strengthened and
lengthened (preferably full height to the roofline). An equivalent
end structure may be used in place of the two collision posts.
FRA believes a unified collision post requirement should apply
to all Tier I passenger vehicles, to include coaches and power/cab
cars. The collision posts should be stronger and preferably extend
to the roofline. How should collision posts for Tier I passenger
vehicles be specified?
Tier II: As discussed in the body of the ANPRM, FRA believes
that a unitized type of end structure with integral collision and
corner posts that extend to the roof line should be considered for a
design standard for passenger equipment.
a. Strength of the Leading and Trailing Ends of a Trainset.
i. The leading and trailing ends of the trainset shall be
equipped with an end structure capable of transmitting to the frame
of the leading or trailing unit a horizontally applied longitudinal
load of 1,000,000 pounds uniformly applied at floor level decreasing
uniformly with height to no less than 400,000 pounds uniformly
applied at the roof line without exceeding the ultimate strength of
the end structure.
(APTA points out that the need for and basis of the high
roofline strength requirement has not been established.)
ii. A leading/trailing end structure may be used to meet
requirements for corner posts and collision posts.
b. Strength of Collision Posts or End Structures. (Ends of
trainset other than leading or trailing ends.)
i. Each end of a trainset unit designed for automatic coupling
that is not a leading or trailing end of the trainset shall be
equipped with collision posts or an end structure capable of
transmitting to the frame of that unit a horizontal, longitudinal
load of 600,000 pounds applied at floor level decreasing uniformly
with height to no less than 240,000 pounds applied at the roof line
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the collision posts or
end structure.
(APTA points out that the need for and basis of the high
roofline strength requirement has not been established.)
ii. A unitized end structure may be used to meet requirements
for corner posts and collision posts.
6. Corner Posts
Tier I: Corner posts shall be full height (extending from
underframe structure to roof structure) and capable of resisting a
horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the point of attachment to the
underframe and a load of 80,000 pounds at the point of attachment to
the roof structure without failure. The orientation of the applied
horizontal load shall range from longitudinal inward to transverse
inward. The corner posts may be positioned to provide protection or
structural strength to the occupied volume.
Tier II: As discussed in the body of the ANPRM, FRA believes
that a unitized type of end structure with integral collision and
corner posts that extend to the roof line should be considered for a
design standard for passenger equipment.
a. Strength of Corner Posts at the Leading or Trailing End of a
Trainset:
i. The leading and trailing ends of the trainset shall be
equipped with a corner post at the intersection of the end with each
side.
ii. Each corner post shall be capable of resisting--without
failure or deformation--a horizontal load applied at any point in a
90 degree arc from lateral to longitudinal of 333,000 pounds applied
at floor level decreasing uniformly to no less than 133,000 pounds
at the roof line.
iii. The corner posts may be part of the end structure.
b. Strength of Corner Posts Not at the Leading or Trailing End
of a Trainset:
i. Each end of a trainset unit that is not a leading or trailing
end of the trainset and that is equipped with automatic couplers
shall be equipped with a corner post at the intersection of the end
with each side.
ii. Each corner post shall be capable of resisting--without
failure or deformation--a horizontal load applied at any point in a
90-degree arc from lateral to longitudinal of 200,000 pounds applied
at floor level decreasing uniformly to no less than 80,000 pounds at
the roof line.
iii. The corner posts may be part of the end structure.
(APTA does not believe that the corner post requirements
proposed by FRA are realistic. APTA believes these proposed corner
post requirements should be replaced with a requirement that the
post be able to resist a load of 65,000 pounds applied at a point
30'' above the floor without permanent deformation.)
7. Crash Refuge
Tier I: (Note: Existing equipment designs do not typically
incorporate crash energy management principles in an effort to
mitigate the consequences of a collision. However, future designs of
Tier I equipment should embrace the following guidelines.)
(APTA does not believe that crash refuge requirements should be
applied to future designs of Tier I equipment.)
a. A refuge or survivable area to which the crew can retreat in
the event of an impending collision shall be provided. This refuge
or survivable area shall take maximum advantage of the structural
strength of the power vehicle or control cab and include shock-
mitigating material.
b. This refuge shall have the structural integrity and shock
mitigation necessary to allow the crew to survive the accelerations
and forces resulting from the collision scenario described as part
of the recommended crash energy management system requirements.
c. The crash refuge shall be readily accessible for quick entry
by the crew.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
[[Page 30707]]
8. Rollover Strength
Tier I: There are no current industry or Federal specifications
for rollover protection in locomotives or passenger equipment. The
following are proposed examples of such requirements to protect crew
and passengers in the event of a rollover scenario:
a. Locomotives should be able to withstand a uniformly applied
load equal to 2g acting on the mass of the locomotive without
failure of the cab side structure or the cab roof structure. (Local
deformation of the side sheathing or roof sheathing in the cab area
is permitted as long as a survivable volume is preserved in the crew
compartment.)
(APTA believes that this specific requirement should be replaced
with a more general requirement stating that locomotives shall be
designed to provide a survivable volume in the crew compartment in
the event of a rollover.)
b. Passenger coach and MU locomotive sides and roofs shall have
sufficient structural strength to withstand the dynamic rollover
force exerted by an acceleration of 2g acting on the mass of an
individual vehicle or unit without collapse of the occupied volume.
The occupied volume may deform to the extent that no more than 10
percent of initial volume is lost due to crush caused by the
rollover. FRA believes existing North American designs will likely
meet this requirement.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
9. Side Impact Strength
Tier I:
a. A side impact design requirement would, among other things,
protect passengers and crew from side collisions by heavy highway
vehicles at grade crossings. Such a requirement may be particularly
important for equipment with a floor height less than 36 inches
above the top of the rail. A concept for the requirement is an
ability to withstand the load applied by a loaded tractor trailer
travelling at a selected speed colliding with the side of the car
over an area and at a height typical of tractor trailer bumpers with
a limited deformation of the car body structure. What specific
parameters should be used to implement this concept or what
alternate concepts can be proposed for a side impact strength design
requirement?
b. If the highway vehicle is likely to override the trainset
unit floor structure, the trainset unit side structures shall be
designed to resist the resulting forces without penetration of the
highway vehicle into the occupied volume of the trainset unit.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
(APTA believes the advanced bus design side penetration
requirements should be considered as an option to the requirements
proposed by FRA.)
10. Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment
Tier I: The intent of the requirement in 49 CFR 229.141(a)(5)
and (b)(5) is to keep the truck attached to the car body in the
event of a derailment or rollover. In place of this requirement, new
designs might be required to resist without failure a minimum force
applied in any horizontal direction for the link which attaches the
truck to the car body. The requirement under consideration is as
follows:
a. For all trainset units, ultimate strength of the truck-to-
car-body attachment shall be sufficient to resist without failure a
force of 250,000 pounds or the force due to an acceleration of 4g
acting in any direction on the mass of the truck, whichever is
greater.
b. The mass of the truck includes axles, wheels, bearings,
truck-mounted brake system, suspension system components, and any
other components attached to the truck.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
11. Strength of Attachment of Interior Fittings
a. Seat Strength:
Tier I:
i. All seat components shall be designed to withstand loads due
to the impact of passengers at a relative speed of 25 mph.
ii. The seat back shall include shock-absorbent material to
cushion the impact of passengers with the seat ahead of them.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
b. Seat Attachment Strength:
Tier I:
i. Passenger and crew seats shall be securely fastened to the
car structure in a manner so as to withstand an acceleration of 4g
acting in the vertical direction on the deadweight of the seat or
seats, if a tandem unit.
ii. The ultimate strength of a seat attachment must be such that
the seat attachment is able to resist the longitudinal inertial
force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat plus the impact force of
the mass of the passenger(s) being decelerated from a relative speed
of 25 mph.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
(APTA questions the basis for the seat strength and seat
attachment strength requirements. APTA also believes the
requirements should apply only to passenger seats, not to crew
seats.)
c. Other Interior Fittings:
Tier I: Other interior fittings shall be attached to the car
body with sufficient strength to withstand accelerations of 8g/4g/4g
acting longitudinally/laterally/vertically on the mass of the
fitting.
Tier II: In addition to the Tier I requirement provided above,
the following is required:
The ultimate strength of a locomotive cab interior fitting and
equipment attachment shall be sufficient to resist without failure
loads due to accelerations of 12g/4g/4g longitudinally/laterally/
vertically acting on the mass of the fitting or equipment.
(APTA recommends a 3g/3g/3g requirement for the strength of
attachment of interior fittings for both Tier I and Tier II
equipment.)
d. Luggage Stowage Compartment Strength:
Tier I:
i. Luggage stowage compartments shall be of enclosed aircraft
type.
ii. Ultimate strength shall be sufficient to resist loads due to
accelerations acting longitudinally/laterally/vertically of 8g/4g/4g
on the mass of the luggage stowed.
(APTA recommends the following requirement for Tier I equipment:
Passenger luggage stowage racks shall provide longitudinal restraint
for stowed articles.)
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
(APTA recommends 3g/3g/3g for Tier II equipment luggage stowage
compartments)
e. Interior Surface Fittings:
Tier I:
i. To the extent possible, interior fittings shall be recessed
or flush-mounted.
ii. Corners and sharp edges shall be avoided.
iii. Energy-absorbent material shall be used to pad surfaces
likely to be impacted by passengers or crew members during
collisions or derailments. (APTA recommends deleting this
requirement.)
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
C. Glazing
Tier I: As addressed in the body of the ANPRM, FRA believes that
portions of the current glazing requirements in 49 CFR Part 223 may
need to be revised to adequately protect crew members and
passengers. In this proceeding or a separate future proceeding, FRA
may ask for consideration of modifications to 49 CFR Part 223 to
address the concerns listed below:
1. The witness plate used for testing is too thick, allowing
spalling of pieces of glass large enough to cause injury;
2. The impact test using a 24-pound cinder block is not
repeatable;
3. Vendors or materials should be periodically recertified by an
independent testing laboratory;
4. The strength of the framing arrangement securing the glazing
is neither specified nor tested; and
5. Interior glass breakage in the event of a collision poses a
significant hazard to passengers.
Tier II: FRA believes that the following requirements address
the concerns listed above, and also address additional issues
necessary to provide adequate protection to crew and passengers in
the higher risk environments in which Tier II equipment will be
operating.
1. Anti-Spalling Performance--.001 aluminum witness plate, 12
inches from glazing surface, no marks in witness plate after any
test.
2. Bullet Impact Performance--Able to stop without spall or
bullet penetration a single impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet
traveling at an impact velocity of 900 feet/second with no bullet
penetration or spall.
3. Large Object Impact Performance.
a. End Facing--Impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere at the
maximum speed at which the vehicle will operate, at an angle equal
to the angle between the glazing surface as installed and the
direction of travel, with no penetration or spall.
b. Side Facing--Impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere at 15
mph, at an angle of 90 degrees to the surface of the glazing, with
no penetration.
4. Small Object Impact Performance.
a. Side Facing--Impact of a granite ballast stone with major and
minor axes of no
[[Page 30708]]
greater than 10 percent difference in length, weighing a minimum of
0.5 pounds, travelling at 75 mph, impacting at a 90-degree angle to
the glazing surface, with no penetration or spall.
5. Frame Strength--Frame holds glazing in place against all
forces that do not cause glazing penetration.
6. Passing Trains--Glazing and frame shall resist the forces due
to air pressure differences caused by trains passing with the
minimum separation for two adjacent tracks while traveling in
opposite directions, each traveling at maximum speed.
7. Interior Glazing--Interior trainset glazing shall meet the
minimum requirements of AS1 type laminated glass as defined in
American National Standard ``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for
Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard
Z26.1-1966.
D. Emergency Systems--Each Unit and Each Level of Bi-Level Units
Tier I:
1. Emergency Lighting.
a. Illumination level shall be a minimum of 5 foot-candles at
floor level for all potential trainset evacuation routes.
b. A back-up power system capable of operating all emergency
lighting for a period of at least two hours shall be provided.
c. The back-up power system shall be capable of operation in all
trainset unit orientations. (APTA recommends adding ``within 45
degrees of vertical'' to the end of this requirement.)
d. The back-up power system shall be capable of operation after
the initial shock of a collision or derailment. (APTA proposes a 3g
shock load.)
2. Emergency Communication.
a. Both interior and exterior locations of emergency
communications equipment shall be specified. Exterior locations must
be compatible with communication equipment normally carried by
emergency response personnel. Interior locations must be provided at
both ends of every level of passenger units, for passengers to
communicate emergency conditions to the trainset operator.
b. Back-up power--Emergency communication system back-up power
shall be provided for a minimum time period of two hours.
c. Clear, concise instructions for emergency use shall be posted
at all potential evacuation locations.
(APTA recommends that these requirements be deferred to the
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group.)
3. Emergency Equipment.
a. Locations of emergency equipment shall be clearly marked.
b. Clear, concise instructions for use of emergency equipment
shall be posted at each location.
(APTA recommends that these requirements be deferred to the
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group.)
4. Emergency Exits.
a. Locations of emergency exits shall be clearly marked and
lighted.
(APTA recommends eliminating lighted)
b. Clear, concise instructions for use of the emergency exits
shall be posted at each location.
c. Number of exits required:
i. Four windows--one located at each end of each side--of a
passenger coach shall operate as emergency exits.
ii. If the coach is bi-level, four windows--one located at each
end of each side--on each level shall operate as emergency exits.
iii. For special design cars, such as sleepers, each compartment
shall have at least one emergency exit.
d. Size--Passenger coach sealed window emergency exits shall
have a minimum free opening of 30 inches wide by 30 inches high.
(APTA recommends 18 inches wide by 24 inches high.)
e. Each locomotive or power cab shall have a minimum of one roof
hatch emergency exit with either a minimum opening of 18 inches by
24 inches or a clearly marked structural weak point in the roof to
provide quick access for properly equipped emergency personnel.
(APTA recommends eliminating this requirement.)
f. Each passenger coach or passenger service car shall be
equipped with either a minimum of two roof hatch emergency exits
with a minimum opening of 18 inches by 24 inches (APTA recommends
eliminating the size requirement) or a clearly marked structural
weak point in the roof to provide quick access for properly equipped
emergency personnel.
g. Each emergency exit shall be easily operable by passengers
and crew members without requiring the use of any special tools.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
E. Doors (APTA recommends this section apply only to exterior
powered side doors.)
Tier I:
1. The status of exterior doors shall be displayed to the crew.
If door interlocks are used, the sensors used to detect train motion
shall be accurate to within 2 mph.
2. Doors shall be powered by the emergency back-up power system.
3. Doors shall be equipped with a manual override that can be
used to open doors without power both from outside and inside the
trainset. Instructions for manual override shall be clearly posted
in the car interior at door locations.
4. Doors shall be easily operable by passengers and crew members
following a derailment or collision without requiring the use of any
special tools to accomplish the manual override in the event of
head-end power loss.
5. Doors shall open outward to facilitate timely egress in the
event of a collision or derailment.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
F. Fuel Tanks
Tier I:
1. External Fuel Tanks.
a. Height off rail--With all locomotive wheels resting on the
ties beside the rail, the lowest point of the fuel tank shall clear
an 8.5-inch combined tie plate/rail height by a minimum of 1.5
inches. This requirement results in a minimum 10-inch vertical
distance from the lowest point on the wheel tread to the lowest
point on the fuel tank.
b. Bulkhead and skin--material, thickness, and strength.
i. Bulkheads--1-inch steel plate with 25,000 psi yield strength.
Higher yield-strength steel may be used to decrease the thickness
required as long as equivalent strength is maintained.
ii. Skin--1/2-inch steel plate with 25,000 psi yield strength or
equivalent. Higher yield-strength steel may be used to decrease the
thickness required as long as equivalent strength is maintained.
iii. The material used for construction of fuel tank exterior
surfaces shall not exhibit a decrease in yield strength or
penetration resistance in the temperature range of 0 to 160 deg.F.
c. Compartmentalization--The interior of fuel tanks shall be
divided into a minimum of four separate compartments designed so
that a penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment shall
result in loss of fuel only from that compartment.
d. Vent system spill protection--Fuel tank vent systems shall be
designed to prevent them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the
event the tank is placed in any orientation due to a locomotive
overturning.
e. The bottom surface of the fuel tank shall be equipped with
skid surfaces to prevent sliding contact with the rail or the ground
from easily wearing through the tank.
f. Structural Strength--The structural strength of the tank
shall be adequate to support 1.5 times the dead weight of the
locomotive without deformation of the tank.
2. Internal Fuel Tanks.
a. ``Internal fuel tank'' is defined as a tank whose lowest
point is at least 18 inches above the lowest point on the locomotive
wheel tread and that is enclosed by, or is part of, the locomotive
structure.
b. Compartmentalization--The interior of fuel tanks shall be
divided into a minimum of four separate compartments designed so
that a penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment shall
result in loss of fuel only from that compartment.
c. Vent system spill protection--Fuel tank vent systems shall be
designed to prevent them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the
event the tank is placed in any orientation due to a locomotive
overturning.
d. Internal fuel tank bulkheads and skin shall be 3/8-inch steel
plate with 25,000-lb yield strength or material with equivalent
strength. Skid plates are not required.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
G. Cab Controls, Interior and Safety Features
Tier I:
1. Slip/Slide Alarms (49 CFR 229.115).
a. Each power vehicle/control cab shall be equipped with an
adhesion control system designed to automatically detect a loss of
adhesion during power application and then reduce power to limit
wheel slip. (APTA recommends eliminating this requirement.)
b. The adhesion control system shall also automatically adjust
the braking force on
[[Page 30709]]
each wheel to prevent sliding during braking. In the event of a
failure of this system to prevent wheel slip/slide within preset
parameters, a visual and/or audible wheel slip/slide alarm shall
alert the train operator. The slip/slide alarm shall alert the
operator in the cab of the controlling power vehicle/control car to
slip/slide conditions on any powered axle of the train. (APTA
recommends eliminating this requirement.)
c. Each powered axle shall be monitored for slip/slide. (APTA
recommends moving this requirement to passenger equipment power
brake rules.)
2. Operator controls in the power vehicle/control cab shall be
arranged to be comfortably within view and within easy reach when
the operator is seated in the normal train control position.
3. The control panels shall be laid out to minimize the chance
of human error.
4. Control panel buttons, switches, levers, knobs, etc., shall
be distinguishable by sight and by touch.
5. An alerter shall be provided. The alerter may allow the
operator freedom of movement in the control cab but shall not allow
the operator to move outside the area in which control of the train
is exercised while the train is in motion.
6. Cab Information Displays.
a. Simplicity and standardization shall be the driving criteria
for design of formats for the display of information in the cab.
b. Essential, safety-critical information shall be displayed as
a default condition.
c. Operator selection shall be required to display other than
default information.
d. Cab/train control signals shall be available as a display
option for the operator.
e. Displays shall be easy to read from the operator's normal
position under all lighting conditions.
7. Pilots, Snowplows, Endplates.
a. The power vehicle/control cab car shall be equipped with a
structurally substantial endplate, pilot or snowplow which extends
across both rails of the track.
b. The height of the endplate, pilot, or snowplow shall be
greater than 3 inches and less than 6 inches off the rails.
8. Headlights (49 CFR 229.125)
a. The power vehicle/control cab shall be equipped with more
than one headlight producing no less than 200,000 candela.
b. The headlights shall be focused to illuminate a person
standing between the rails at 800 feet (1000 feet for Tier II) under
clear weather conditions.
9. Crew's Field of View.
a. The cab layout shall be arranged so the crew has an effective
field of view in the forward direction and to the right and left of
the direction of travel.
b. Field-of-view obstructions due to required structural members
shall be minimized.
c. The crew's position in the cab shall be located to permit the
crew to be able to directly observe traffic approaching the train
from either side of the train. (APTA recommends this requirement be
revised to be measurable or be eliminated.)
10. Seat Placement/Features.
Seats provided for crew members shall:
a. Be equipped with quick-release lap belts and shoulder
harnesses.
b. Be secured to the car body with an attachment having an
ultimate strength capable of withstanding the loads due to
accelerations of 12g/4g/4g acting longitudinally/laterally/
vertically on the mass of the seat and the crew member occupying it.
(APTA recommends a 3g/3g/3g requirement that applies only to the
mass of the seat.)
c. Be designed so all adjustments have the range necessary to
accommodate a 5th-percentile female to a 95th-percentile male.
d. Be equipped with lumbar support that is adjustable from the
seated position.
e. Be equipped with force-assisted, vertical-height adjustment,
operated from the seated position.
f. Have manually reclining seat backs, adjustable from the
seated position.
g. Have adjustable headrests.
h. Have folding, padded armrests.
(APTA recommends that these requirements only apply to floor
mounted seats.)
11. Impact Mitigation.
a. Sharp edges and corners shall be eliminated from the interior
of the cab.
b. Interior surfaces of the cab likely to be impacted by crew
members during a collision or derailment shall be padded with shock-
absorbent material.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
H. Fire Safety
Tier I:
1. A Fire Protection Engineering Plan shall be developed as part
of the system planning process.
a. The fire protection engineering plan shall identify and
evaluate the major sources of fire risk. (APTA recommends that this
requirement be deleted.)
b. The plan shall describe the design steps taken to delay the
onset of lethal conditions until the fire can be detected, the train
stopped and all personnel safely evacuated. (APTA recommends that
this requirement be deleted.)
2. The trainset ventilation system shall be designed so as not
to contribute to the spread of flames or products of combustion.
3. Trainset roof design shall prevent high-voltage arcs from
overhead catenaries from penetrating the skin or shell of the
occupied spaces in the trainset. The roof shall not be susceptible
to ignition due to high-voltage arcing. (APTA recommends that this
requirement be deleted.)
4. Where possible, components that are potential sources of fire
ignition shall be located outside occupied volumes and shall be
separated from occupied volumes by a structural fire-resistant
barrier. (APTA recommends that this requirement be deleted.)
5. Portions of the trainset structure separating major sources
of ignition, of energy storage, or of fuel loading from the occupied
volumes of the trainset shall have sufficient resistance to fire,
smoke and fume penetration to allow time for fire detection and safe
evacuation of the trainset. (APTA recommends that this requirement
be deleted.)
6. All materials and finishes used or installed in the
construction of the trainset shall have sufficient resistance to
fire, smoke and fume production to allow sufficient time for fire
detection, for the trainset to stop, and for safe evacuation of
passengers before lethal conditions develop. (APTA recommends that
this requirement be deleted.)
7. At a minimum, the materials used for the construction of cab
interiors including but not limited to walls, floors, ceilings,
seats, doors, windows, electrical conduits, air ducts and any other
internal equipment shall meet FRA guidelines published in the
Federal Register on January 17, 1989. (See 54 FR 1837, ``Rail
Passenger Equipment; Reissuance of Guidelines for Selecting
Materials to Improve Their Fire Safety Characteristics''; see also
the latest National Fire Protection Association ``NFPA 130, Standard
for Fixed Guideway Transit Systems.'')
8. Detection and Suppression.
a. Fire extinguishers shall be placed in each unit.
b. All trainset components with a potential to overheat in the
event of a malfunction to the extent they could be the source of an
on-board fire shall be equipped with overheat warning devices. These
components shall include, but not be limited to:
i. Diesel Engines;
ii. Traction Motors;
iii. Dynamic Brake Energy Dissipation System Components;
iv. Transformers;
v. Inverters; and
vi. Head-End Power Generation Systems.
(APTA recommends that the system safety plan determine how to
handle components that could overheat rather than requiring
detection devices.)
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
I. Electrical System Design
No one specific, industry electrical standard adequately
addresses all of the electrical safety issues relating to the
operation of a trainset. As safe operation of trains becomes more
dependent on electronic technology, reliable electrical and
electronic systems become crucial. The industry standard most
appropriate for each major component of the trainset electrical
system needs to be carefully selected.
The requirements provided below are intended for Tier I and Tier
II equipment, as applicable.
1. Conductor Sizes--Conductor sizes shall be selected on the
basis of current-carrying capacity, mechanical strength,
temperature, flexibility requirements and maximum allowable voltage
drop. Current-carrying capacity shall be derated for grouping and
for operating temperature in accordance with nationally recognized
standards.
2. Circuit Protection.
a. The main propulsion power line shall be protected with a
lightning arrestor, automatic circuit breaker and overload relay.
The lightning arrestor shall be run by the most direct path possible
to ground with a connection to ground of not less than No. 6 AWG.
These overload protection devices shall be housed in an enclosure
designed specifically for that purpose with arc chute vented
directly to outside air.
[[Page 30710]]
b. Head end power including trainline power distribution shall
be provided with both overload and ground fault protection.
c. Circuits used for purposes other than propelling the trainset
shall be connected to their power source through correctly sized
circuit breakers or circuit breaking contactors.
d. Each auxiliary circuit shall be provided with a circuit
breaker located as near as practical to the point of connection to
the source of power for that circuit. Such protection may be omitted
from circuits controlling crucial safety devices.
3. Battery System.
a. The battery compartment shall be isolated from the cab by a
non-combustible barrier.
b. Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against
overcharging.
c. Battery circuits shall include an emergency battery cut-off
switch to completely disconnect the energy stored in the batteries
from the load.
d. If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive
gases, the battery compartment shall be adequately ventilated to
prevent accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
4. Power Dissipation Resistors.
a. Power dissipating resistors shall be adequately ventilated to
prevent overheating under worst-case operating conditions.
b. Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with
adequate air space between resistor elements and combustible
material.
c. Power dissipation resistor circuits shall incorporate warning
or protective devices for low ventilation air flow, over-temperature
and short circuit failures.
d. Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from
resistor frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from
the supports that hold them.
e. The current value used to determine the size of resistor
leads shall not be less than 120 percent of the RMS load current
under the most severe operating conditions.
5. Electromagnetic Interference/Compatibility.
a. No trainset system shall produce electrical noise that
interferes with trainline control and communications or with wayside
signaling systems.
b. To contain electromagnetic interference emissions,
suppression of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
c. Trainset electrical/electronic systems shall be capable of
operation in the presence of external electromagnetic noise sources.
d. All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage
and/or improper operation due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions.
J. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Tier I: The operating railroad shall provide detailed
information on the inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures
necessary for long-term safe operation of the trainset. This
information should include:
1. Testing Procedures/Intervals;
2. Scheduled Preventive Maintenance;
3. Maintenance Procedures;
4. Special Testing Equipment; and
5. Training of Mechanical Forces.
Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
K. Brake System
Existing brake system equipment must meet the applicable
requirements of 49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232, and 49 U.S.C.
Chapters 203 and 207 as they relate to the specific equipment and
operation.
FRA has recognized that the current regulations fail to
adequately delineate between requirements for conventional freight
braking systems and the more diverse systems for various categories
of passenger service. FRA also recognizes that the regulations
should be updated to recognize the contemporary electronic systems
that are used to control elements of power brake systems.
In response to the above concerns, FRA published a NPRM for
power brake regulations in September 1994. Four public hearings were
held to discuss particular issues regarding the proposed rules, and
FRA is in the process of reviewing comments received for inclusion
in a revision to the original proposed rule.
Proposed brake system design requirements for Tier I and II
equipment will be determined by the Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards Working Group using the information on passenger equipment
brakes accumulated in docket PB-9 in response to the NPRM on power
brakes.
L. Automated Monitoring and Diagnostics
As train speed increases, the human decision and reaction time
necessary to avoid potential calamity decreases. Automatic control
techniques that briefly take the operator out of the control loop
are a means to eliminate the delays associated with human decision
and reaction in situations where taking quick and positive action
can be crucial. (APTA recommends that this paragraph be deleted.)
Tier I: There are no current requirements for Tier I equipment
to incorporate automatic monitoring and control measures as
described above. Specific functions are identified below for Tier II
equipment, as increased train speeds and higher risk operating
environments make reactions to these functions more time-sensitive
with respect to safety. If the functions identified below can be
shown to be practically and economically feasible in Tier I
equipment, implementation should be considered. (APTA recommends no
such requirements for Tier I equipment.)
Tier II:
1. The trainset shall be equipped with a system that monitors
the performance of the following safety-critical items:
a. Reception of Cab Signals/Train Control Signals;
b. Truck Hunting;
c. Dynamic Brake Status;
d. Friction Brake Status;
e. Fire Detection Systems;
f. Head End Power Status;
g. Alerter;
h. Horn and Bell;
i. Wheel Slip/Slide; and
j. Tilt System, if so equipped.
2. The monitoring system shall alert the operator when any of
the monitored parameters are out of predetermined limits. In
situations where the system safety analysis indicates that operator
reaction time is crucial to safety, the monitoring system shall take
immediate, automatic corrective action such as limiting the speed of
the train.
3. The self-monitoring system shall be designed with an
automatic self-test feature that notifies the operator that the
system is functioning correctly.
M. Trainset System Software
The requirements provided below are intended for Tier I and Tier
II equipment, as applicable.
1. Software used to monitor and control trainset safety features
or functions shall be treated as safety-critical.
2. A formal system software safety program shall be used to
develop the system software. This program shall include a software
hazard analysis and thorough software design walk-through and
verification tests to ensure software is reliable and designed to be
fail-safe.
(APTA recommends that Section M be eliminated.)
N. Trainset Hardware/Software Integration
The requirement provided below is intended for Tier I and Tier
II equipment, as applicable.
1. A comprehensive hardware/software integration program shall
be planned and conducted to demonstrate that the software functions
as intended when installed in a hardware system identical to that to
be used in service.
O. Suspension System Design Requirements
Tier I: FRA does not currently address suspension system
requirements for passenger equipment.
Tier II:
1. The suspension system shall be designed so no single wheel
lateral to vertical force
(L/V) ratio is greater than 0.8 for a duration required to travel 3
feet at any operating speed or over any class of track used by the
trainset unless the axle sum ratio is less than 1.0. The L/V should
be measured with an instrument with a band pass of 0 to 25 Hz.
2. Net axle lateral force may not exceed 0.5 times the static
vertical axle load.
3. The minimum vertical wheel/rail force shall be a minimum of
10 percent of the static vertical wheel load.
4. The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall not exceed 0.5.
5. When positioned on track with a uniform 6-inch
superelevation, trainsets shall have no wheel unload to a value less
than 60 percent of its static value on perfectly level track.
6. When the equipment is positioned on level, tangent track, and
any one wheel is raised by three inches, no other wheel of the
equipment shall unload to a value of less than 0.65 times the weight
of the unit divided by the number of wheels supporting the unit.
(Builders of passenger equipment take exception to this proposed
requirement as too stringent. They prefer a more flexible
requirement allowing individual railroads to
[[Page 30711]]
define wheel unloading requirements for safe operation under worst
case track conditions for the intended use of the equipment.
Compliance with this requirement must be demonstrated as part of the
vehicle qualification tests.)
7. All Tier II equipment shall be equipped with lateral
accelerometers mounted above an axle of each truck. The
accelerometer output signals shall be accurately calibrated and
shall be passed through signal conditioning circuitry designed to
determine if hunting oscillations of the truck are occurring.
Hunting oscillations are defined as six or more consecutive
oscillations having a peak acceleration in excess of 0.8g peak-to-
peak at a frequency of between 1 and 10 Hz. If hunting oscillations
are detected, the train monitoring system shall provide an alarm to
the operator and automatically slow the train to a speed where
hunting oscillations no longer occur before returning total control
of the trainset to the operator.
8. Ride Vibration (Quality)--While traveling at the maximum
operating speed over the intended route, the train suspension system
shall be designed to:
a. Limit the vertical acceleration as measured by a vertical
accelerometer mounted over the leading truck of each trainset unit
to no greater than 0.55g single event, peak-to-peak.
b. Limit the lateral acceleration as measured by a lateral
accelerometer mounted over the leading truck of each trainset unit
to no greater than 0.3g single event, peak-to- peak.
c. Limit the combination of lateral and vertical events
occurring within any time period of 2 consecutive seconds to the
square root of (V2+L2) to no greater than 0.604--where L
may not exceed 0.3g and V may not exceed 0.55g.
9. If hunting oscillations are detected on any equipment in the
train, the maximum speed of that train shall be limited to 10 mph
less than the speed at which hunting stops as the train speed is
decreased from the initial hunting speed.
10. If the ride quality limitations of paragraph 8 of this
section are exceeded, the operating speed shall be restricted to
that which would result in a peak-to-peak lateral acceleration no
greater than 0.25g and a peak-to- peak vertical acceleration no
greater than 0.5g.
11. Passenger cars of a non-tilting design shall not operate
under conditions resulting in a cant deficiency of greater than 6
inches or that corresponds to a steady-state lateral acceleration of
0.1g, whichever is less.
12. Trainsets of a tilting design shall not operate under
conditions resulting in a cant deficiency greater than 9 inches or
that corresponds to a steady-state lateral acceleration of 0.1g
(measured parallel to the car floor), which ever is less.
13. All wheels shall be heat treated, curved-plate type or a
design with equivalent resistance to thermal abuse.
14. Bearing overheat sensors are required. These are not
required to be on board, and may be placed at reasonable wayside
intervals. Periodic bearing inspection required at 50 percent of the
L10 life at a load factor of 2.
P. General Locomotive/Power Car Design Requirements
Tier I: 1. All moving parts, high voltage equipment, electrical
conductors and switches, and pipes carrying hot fluids or gases
shall be installed in non-exposed locations or shall be
appropriately equipped with interlocks or guards to minimize the
chance of personal injury. (APTA recommends eliminating this
requirement for Tier I equipment.)
Tier II: Same requirement as above for Tier I equipment.
Q. Power Vehicle/Control Cab Health and Comfort Design Features
Issues under this heading may be added to this proceeding
following submission of FRA's Report to Congress on Locomotive
Crashworthiness and Working Conditions.
R. Coupler/Draft System Performance (Only Leading and Trailing
Couplers of Integral Trainsets)
Note: This requirement is applicable only for use in integral
trainsets, envisioned to be prevalent in the higher speed operating
environments of Tier II equipment. Otherwise, guidance regarding
coupler/draft system performance requirements remain as specified.
Tier II: 1. Leading and trailing automatic couplers of the
trainset shall be compatible with standard AAR couplers with no
special adapters used. These couplers shall include automatic
uncoupling devices that comply with the Safety Appliance Standards
(49 CFR Part 231) and 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(A).
2. The leading and trailing trainset unit's coupler/draft system
design shall include an anti-climbing feature capable of resisting
without failure a minimum vertical force between the coupled units
in either the up or the down direction resulting from an
acceleration of 1g acting on the total mass including trucks of the
leading or trailing unit of the trainset. The coupler/draft system
itself may fail (shear back type coupler) to allow the anti-climbing
feature to engage.
S. Safety Appliance Design Requirements
Tier I: Current safety appliance requirements are found at 49
CFR Parts 229, 231 and 232, and 49 U.S.C. Chapters 203 and 207.
(Existing requirements which are statutorily based cannot be changed
by this rulemaking.)
Tier II: 1. The leading and the trailing ends of the trainset
shall be equipped with automatic couplers that:
a. Couple on impact and allow uncoupling without necessitating a
person going between cars; and
b. Shall be activated either by a traditional uncoupling lever
or some other means of automatic uncoupling mechanism that does not
require a person to go between equipment units.
2. Leading and trailing end automatic couplers and uncoupling
devices may be stored within a shrouded housing, but shall be easily
removed when required for emergency use.
3. If the units of the trainset are semi-permanently coupled,
with uncoupling done only at maintenance facilities, the trainset
units need not be equipped with sill steps, end or side handholds.
4. If the units of the trainset are coupled with automatic
couplers, the units shall be equipped with sill steps, end handholds
and side handholds that meet the requirements of 49 CFR 231.14.
5. Passenger handrails or handholds shall be provided on both
sides of steps used to board or depart the train.
6. Power vehicle and control cab exits shall be equipped with
handholds and sill steps.
7. Safety appliance mechanical strength.
a. All handrails and sill steps shall be made of 1-inch diameter
steel pipe or \5/8\-inch thickness steel or a material of equal or
greater mechanical strength.
b. All safety appliances shall be securely fastened to the
carbody structure with mechanical fasteners that have mechanical
strength greater than or equal to that of a \1/2\-inch diameter SAE
steel bolt mechanical fastener.
8. Handrails.
a. Throughout their entire length, handrails shall be a
contrasting color to the surrounding vehicle body.
b. Vertical handrails shall be installed so as:
i. The maximum distance above the top of the rail to the bottom
of the handrail shall be 51 inches and the minimum distance shall be
21 inches.
ii. To continue to a point at least equal to the height of the
top edge of the control cab door.
iii. Minimum hand clearance distance between the handrail and
the vehicle body shall be 2\1/2\ inches for the entire length.
iv. All vertical handrails shall be securely fastened to the
vehicle body.
v. If the length of the handrail exceeds 60 inches, it shall be
securely fastened to the power vehicle body with two fasteners at
each end.
9. Sill steps.
a. Each power vehicle or control cab shall be equipped with sill
steps below each door.
b. Power vehicle or control cab sill steps shall be a minimum
cross-sectional area \1/2\ by 3 inches, of steel or a material of
equal or greater strength and fatigue resistance.
c. Sill steps shall be designed and installed so:
i. The minimum tread length of the sill step shall be 10 inches.
ii. The minimum clear depth shall be 8 inches.
iii. The outside edge of the tread of the sill step shall be
flush with the side of the power vehicle or cab car body structure.
iv. Sill steps shall not have a vertical rise between treads
exceeding 18 inches. The lowest sill step tread shall be not more
than 20 inches above the top of the track rail.
v. The sill step shall be a color which contrasts with the
surrounding power vehicle body color.
vi. All sill steps shall be securely fastened.
vii. As a minimum, 50 percent of the tread surface area shall be
open space.
viii. The portion of the tread surface area which is not open
space and is normally contacted by the foot shall be treated with an
anti-skid material.
10. Safety appliance mechanical fasteners.
[[Page 30712]]
a. Safety appliance mechanical fasteners shall have mechanical
strength and fatigue resistance equal to or greater than a \1/2\-
inch diameter SAE steel bolt.
b. Fasteners shall be installed with a positive means to prevent
unauthorized removal.
c. Fasteners shall be installed to facilitate inspection.
11. Safety appliances installed at the option of the system
operator shall be firmly attached with mechanical fasteners and
shall meet the design and installation requirements given herein.
12. If two trainsets are coupled to form a single train by an
automatic coupler, the coupled ends must be equipped with end
handholds, side handholds and sill steps. If the trainsets are semi-
permanently coupled, these safety appliances are not required.
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 30713]]
Appendix C.--AMTRAK Passenger Train Safety Inspection Criteria
(Serves as a Sample Only)
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.000
[[Page 30714]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.001
[[Page 30715]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.002
[[Page 30716]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.003
[[Page 30717]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.004
[[Page 30718]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.005
[[Page 30719]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.006
[[Page 30720]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.007
[[Page 30721]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.008
[[Page 30722]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP17JN96.009
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C
[[Page 30723]]
Appendix D--Economic Questions for Passenger Equipment Safety
Standards
Economic questions which appear in the body of this document are
posed to help FRA gain a clear understanding of what costs the
industry would incur to meet possible passenger equipment safety
standards. To estimate the total costs that the industry would incur
as a result of complying with possible passenger equipment safety
standards, we need to understand how performance of existing
structures, equipment, programs, and procedures compare with what
would be required to meet the standards. FRA also needs to gain a
better understanding of both the qualitative and quantitative
benefits associated with the requirements under consideration.
FRA would appreciate receiving economic information from all
concerned parties including individual passenger service operators
and equipment manufacturers. Information regarding only one
particular sector or operator is useful. Use of this information
will result in a more accurate analysis of costs and benefits.
1. Questions on System Safety Plans
Are any system safety plans or similar plans currently in use?
How much would it cost (in terms of time and effort) to update
existing or develop new system safety plans? On average,
approximately how often would system safety plans have to be
updated?
How would system safety plans improve safety? Specifically, what
areas of safety would be improved, by how much, and why? Please
provide copies of any studies, data, or arguments which support your
answer.
2. Questions on Pre-Departure or Daily Safety Inspections
In terms of labor, materials, etc., what additional resources
would each operator need to perform a pre departure inspection
equivalent to Amtrak's? How many pre-departure or daily inspections
are performed annually by each operator?
What potential safety benefits would result from performing
inspections equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain/document
estimates. For those currently performing inspections, what
additional benefits could be realized by modifying those inspection
procedures to meet Amtrak's? Please explain/document. What
additional costs would result from performing inspections equivalent
to Amtrak's, or for those operators currently performing
inspections, what additional costs would be incurred by modifying
inspection procedures to be equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain/
document.
3. Questions on Periodic Testing and Maintenance
Currently, what equipment is tested and maintained periodically?
How often (in terms of miles or time) is this equipment tested and
maintained? What do periodic tests and maintenance currently
entail--labor, materials, etc.? What benefit(s)/costs would be
associated with a periodic testing and maintenance requirement?
Please explain.
4. Questions on Personnel Qualifications
Currently, how many employees/contractors are involved in
inspecting, testing, and maintaining a passenger car or locomotive?
How many of these people are mechanical personnel? Are there
established minimum training and qualification requirements for
employees and contractors performing inspections, testing, and
maintenance? Approximately how many labor hours does each passenger
service operator spend each year on these activities?
What are the potential benefits of increased training in
periodic testing and maintenance? To what extent are expenditures on
such training cost effective? Historically, does this type of
training produce identifiable safety benefits? Please explain.
5. Questions on Tourist and Excursion Railroads
Information available to FRA indicates that there are
approximately 100 excursion railroads operating about 250
locomotives and 1,000 passenger cars. Is this information correct?
What size crews operate excursion and tourist trains? What is the
average annual passenger car mileage for tourist and excursion
railroads?
What potential safety benefits are available from possible
passenger equipment standards for tourist and excursion railroads?
To what extent can these safety benefits be realized, and what will
they cost? Please explain.
6. Questions on Private Passenger Cars
How many private passenger cars are in operation? On average,
how many miles do private passenger cars travel annually?
What potential safety benefits are available from possible
passenger equipment standards for private passenger car operators?
To what extent can these safety benefits be realized, and what will
they cost? Please explain.
7. Questions on Commuter Equipment and Operations
Information available to FRA suggests that there are about 20
commuter railroads nationwide operating roughly 5,400 passenger
cars, 400 cab cars, 2,000 multiple unit locomotive pairs, and 400
conventional locomotives. Are these estimates accurate? What size
crews operate commuter trains? Approximately how many people stand
on each train?
As a result of implementing possible passenger equipment
standards, would commuter operators realize different safety
benefits and costs than intercity operators? Please explain.
8. Questions on Operations With Cab Car Forward and MUs
What costs and benefits would be associated with alternatives
for increasing crew and passenger protection in a head-on collision
with a cab car leading?
Data indicate that at least 400 cab cars operate as lead units.
Is this estimate accurate? Approximately, how many trips are made
each year with cab cars operating as lead units? At what maximum
speeds do trains operate cab car forward?
Information available to FRA suggests approximately 2,000
multiple unit locomotive pairs operate as lead units. Is this
estimate accurate? Approximately how many trips per year involve
multiple unit locomotive pairs?
9. Questions on Operating Practices and Procedures
a. What costs and potential benefits are associated with
alternative measures to safeguard passenger movements in ground
level stations?
b. At what costs can alternative measures to mitigate risks of
high-speed express trains through stations be implemented?
10. Questions on Equipment Design Standards
a. What would be the likely costs associated with different
alternatives available for ensuring that anticlimbers are loaded
vertically during collisions?
b. What costs would be associated with specifying a more
effective anticlimber, stronger and full height collision posts, and
full height corner posts on conventional passenger locomotives?
c. How much would it cost to equip conventional passenger
service locomotives with the type of strengthened fuel tanks
discussed in Appendix B? What levels of safety benefits can be
realized from strengthened/ruggedized fuel tanks?
d. How many units have backup power systems currently in place?
What would it cost to install a backup power system? What levels of
safety benefits would result from backup power systems?
How many coach units have backup emergency lighting? What would
it cost to install a backup emergency lighting system? What
rationale is used to determine whether a unit will have backup
emergency lighting? To what extent would potential safety benefits
be realized? Please explain.
What would it cost to install roof hatches on cars?
What options exist for enclosing existing luggage compartments?
At what cost? To what extent would potential safety benefits from
enclosing luggage compartments be realized? Please explain.
e. What levels of benefits would be realized from modifying 49
CFR Part 223 as suggested? At what cost would these benefits be
realized?
11. Questions on Design Standards for High-Speed Equipment
a. What costs would be associated with alternative approaches
designed to prevent crushing or penetration of the occupied volume
in power and coach cars? Please be specific in defining the
alternative approach and its cost elements.
b. How much would installation of alternative buckling delay
systems cost in terms of labor hours and materials?
c. What seat configurations do passenger cars operating at
speeds greater than 80 mph have? If configurations vary, please
explain the differences and why they vary. How many seats does the
average passenger car have? If there is no such thing as an average
passenger car, how many seats do the different types of passenger
cars have? How many cars are there of each different type?
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What costs would be involved with installation of lap belts,
shoulder harnesses, and other safety restraints on passenger cars?
To what extent would safety benefits be realized from installing
safety restraints? Please explain.
d. In terms of time, materials, and labor, what would
installation of crash refuges (protected areas for the crew when a
collision is unavoidable) in locomotives cost?
12. Question Regarding Size of Fleet Affected
Information available to FRA suggests that there are about 8,200
passenger cars and 970 conventional locomotives dedicated to rail
passenger service in the United States. Is this information
accurate?
13. Questions Regarding Ridership and Ticket Prices
What ridership levels are experienced through the year? Would
meeting the new higher standards described in Appendix B result in
higher fares? If so, how much higher? Would a decrease in ridership
be expected? If so, to what extent? Please explain the method of
estimation. To which alternative forms of travel would any lost
ridership be expected to switch? How has this conclusion been
reached? What assumptions are made? FRA is interested in obtaining
copies of studies or other documentation addressing the issue of
passenger diversion from rail to other modes of travel as a result
of new rail safety standards. What factors have the greatest effect
on ridership levels: price, seat availability, trip time,
variability in trip time, etc.?
[FR Doc. 96-14944 Filed 6-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P