

(1) Suspend the operating license of Maine Yankee pending resolution of the Petition; (2) examine and test by plug sampling—or other ASME approved method—all large piping welds that may have been susceptible to micro-fissures at the time of construction; (3) reanalyze Maine Yankee containment as one located in an area where seismic risk is not “low”; (4) reduce the licensed operating capacity of Maine Yankee to a level consistent with a flawed containment and/or flawed reactor coolant piping welds; (5) provide an informal public hearing in the area of the plant regarding the Petition; and (6) place Petitioner on service and mailing lists relevant to its interests in safety at Maine Yankee and all public forums opened by the NRC.

As the basis for these requests, the Petition states that: (1) The containment is inadequate for power operation in excess of the original license, and may be inadequate for the original power operation limits because of insupportable original design acceptance criteria, yet the NRC staff recommended to the Commission that it grant a license amendment permitting this design. It is further stated that the Maine Yankee containment was designed and constructed without diagonal reinforcement rods, based on low seismic risk. Additionally, after a 1979 earthquake of 4.2 magnitude and an epicenter less than 10 miles from the plant site, the NRC ordered the shutdown of Maine Yankee until piping and piping supports could be seismically qualified. There is no public record, however, that the NRC reevaluated this marginally acceptable containment design, including prior to granting license amendments to operate at increased power; and (2) the Maine Yankee emergency core cooling system (ECCS), reactor coolant piping, and other large piping have not been adequately analyzed for materials degradation to ensure integrity at power operation in excess of the originally licensed power level, or under accident conditions. The Atomic Energy Commission's concern with “micro-fissures” in reactor coolant system welds led to appointment of a task force, and prompted studies and reports in 1971 (prior to heightened awareness of embrittlement phenomena) that concluded that the microfissures would not propagate or grow under foreseeable conditions. The Petitioner asserts that large pipe welds next to the reactor vessel have endured 23 years of corrosion, stress, vibration, and radiation and may fail, initiating a loss-of-coolant accident, or may be subject to

thermal shock failure initiated by use of the ECCS.

The Petition has been referred to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. As provided by Section 2.206, appropriate action will be taken on the Petition within a reasonable time. By letter dated May 13, 1996, the Director denied the Petitioner's request for suspension of Maine Yankee's operating license, pending resolution of the Petition.

A copy of the Petition is available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room at 2120 L Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 and the local public document room in the Wiscasset Public Library, High Street, P.O. Box 367, Wiscasset, ME 04578.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 13th day of May 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-12693 Filed 5-20-96; 8:45 am]
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Regulatory Guide; Issuance, Availability

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a revision to a guide in its Regulatory Guide Series. This series has been developed to describe and make available to the public such information as methods acceptable to the NRC staff for implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations, techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review of applications for permits and licenses.

Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.82, “Water Sources for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident,” has been revised to provide current guidance on methods acceptable to the NRC staff for meeting the Commission's requirements with respect to the sumps and suppression pools that perform the functions of water sources for emergency core cooling, containment heat removal, and containment atmosphere cleanup. This guide also updates the guidance on evaluating blockage by debris in the sumps and suppression pools of boiling water nuclear power reactors.

Comments and suggestions in connection with items for inclusion in guides currently being developed or improvements in all published guides are encouraged at any time. Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Review and Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and

Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Regulatory guides are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writing the Office of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by fax at (301) 415-2260. Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. Regulatory guides are not copyrighted, and Commission approval is not required to reproduce them.

(5 U.S.C. 552(a))

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 6th day of May 1996.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Themis P. Speis,
Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.

[FR Doc. 96-12696 Filed 5-20-96; 8:45 am]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[File No. 1-8627]

Issuer Delisting; Notice of Application To Withdraw From Listing and Registration; (Santa Fe Pacific Gold Corporation, Common Stock, \$0.01 Par Value)

May 15, 1996.

Santa Fe Pacific Gold Corporation (“Company” or “SFPG”) has filed an application with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), pursuant to Section 12(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”) and Rule 12d2-2(d) promulgated thereunder, to withdraw the above specified security (“Security”) from listing and registration on the Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc. (“CHX”).

The reasons alleged in the application for withdrawing the Security from listing and registration include the following:

According to the Company, the Security of SFPG is currently traded on the NYSE and the CHX. The Company incurs annual fees for each of the exchanges. Currently SFPG is paying an annual fee of \$2,500 to the CHX.

From time to time SFPG has issued additional shares of Security for use in connection with its employee benefit