[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 97 (Friday, May 17, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25092-25103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12420]




[[Page 25091]]


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Part IV





Department of Energy





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Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a 
Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign 
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Notice

  Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 97 / Friday, May 17, 1996 / Notices  

[[Page 25092]]



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision for the Final Environmental Impact Statement 
on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning 
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided 
to implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance 
policy as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained in the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons 
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent 
Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-218F of February 1996), subject to 
additional stipulations specified in Section VII of this Record of 
Decision. The new policy applies only to aluminum-based and TRIGA 
(Training, Research, Isotope, General Atomics) foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel and target material containing uranium enriched in 
the United States. The purpose of the acceptance policy is to support 
the broad United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy 
calling for the reduction and eventual elimination of the use of highly 
enriched (weapons-grade) uranium in civil commerce worldwide.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The new policy set forth in this Record of Decision is 
effective upon being made public May 13, 1996, in accordance with DOE's 
NEPA implementation regulations (10 CFR Sec. 1021.315).

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a 
Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign 
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-0218F, the Final EIS) and 
this Record of Decision are available in the public reading rooms and 
libraries identified in the Federal Register Notice that announced the 
availability of the Final EIS (61 FR 6983, February 23, 1996), or by 
calling 1-800-736-3282 (toll free).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the management of 
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel or this Record of Decision 
contact: Mr. Charles Head, Program Manager, Office of Spent Fuel 
Management (EM-67), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, Telephone (202) 586-9441.
    For information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, contact: Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy 
and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence 
Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, Telephone (202) 586-4600, or leave 
message at 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Synopsis of the Decision

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of State 
jointly issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed 
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research 
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS, DOE/EIS-218F) on February 
16, 1996. In this Final EIS, DOE and the Department of State considered 
the potential environmental impacts of a proposed policy to manage 
spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. After consideration 
of the Final EIS, public comments submitted on the Draft EIS and 
concerns expressed following issuance of the Final EIS, DOE, in 
consultation with the Department of State, has decided to implement the 
proposed policy as identified in the Preferred Alternative contained in 
the Final EIS, subject to additional stipulations specified in Section 
VII of this Record of Decision. This implementation will involve 
acceptance of approximately 19.2 MTHM (metric tonnes of heavy metal) of 
foreign research reactor spent fuel and approximately 0.6 MTHM of 
target material into the United States over a 13 year period, beginning 
on the effective date of the policy. The spent fuel will be received 
from abroad through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South 
Carolina (about 80%) and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in 
California (about 5%). Most of the target material and some of the 
spent fuel (about 15%) will be received overland from Canada. Shipment 
through Charleston is expected to begin in the summer of 1996 and 
through Concord in mid-1997. Shipments from Canada have not been 
scheduled at this time. The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel 
and target material could be safely transported overland within the 
United States by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either 
transportation mode may be used. Nevertheless, based on initial input 
from the public near the ports of entry indicating a preference for 
shipment by rail, DOE will generally seek to use rail for shipments 
from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the Savannah River Site in 
South Carolina and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho. 
The particular mode of transportation to be used will be determined 
after further discussions between DOE and State, Tribal and local 
officials. After a limited period of interim storage, the spent fuel 
will be treated and packaged, or chemically separated, at the Savannah 
River Site and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory as necessary to 
prepare it for transport to a final disposal repository.

II. Background

    Beginning in the 1950's, as part of the ``Atoms for Peace'' 
program, the United States provided nuclear technology to foreign 
nations for peaceful applications in exchange for their promise to 
forego development of nuclear weapons. A major element of this program 
was the provision of research reactor technology and the highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) needed in the early years to fuel the research 
reactors. Research reactors play a vital role in important medical, 
agricultural, and industrial applications. Nevertheless, the highly 
enriched uranium initially used in the fuel elements for these reactors 
can also be used in nuclear weapons. In the past, after irradiation in 
the research reactor, the used fuel elements (often referred to as 
``spent nuclear fuel'' or ``spent fuel'') were transported to the 
United States, where they were chemically separated to extract the 
uranium still remaining in the spent nuclear fuel. In this way, the 
United States maintained control over disposition of the HEU that it 
provided to other nations.
    Before 1964, bilateral agreements with the countries operating 
research reactors provided for the lease of the enriched uranium, with 
explicit provision for the return of the spent nuclear fuel to the 
United States. After 1964, most agreements provided for the sale of 
this material to the foreign nation, and the United States began to 
operate under a policy known as the ``Off-Site Fuels Policy'', under 
which the United States continued to accept, temporarily store, and 
chemically separate the spent nuclear fuel.
    Research reactors have become the major civilian users of HEU. To 
further reduce the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation, the United 
States in 1978 initiated the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test 
Reactors (RERTR) program, which was aimed at reducing the use of HEU in 
civilian programs by promoting the conversion of foreign and domestic 
research reactors from HEU fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel (LEU 
cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons). As part of the RERTR 
program, DOE developed LEU fuel and

[[Page 25093]]

worked with foreign research reactor operators to convert their 
reactors to run on such fuel.
    The foreign research reactor operators who converted to LEU fuel 
did so in support of nuclear weapons nonproliferation objectives, even 
though such conversions were expensive and generally resulted in 
reduced reactor capabilities and increased operating costs. From the 
beginning of the RERTR program, foreign research reactor operators made 
it clear that their willingness to convert their research reactors to 
LEU fuel was contingent upon the continued acceptance by DOE of their 
spent nuclear fuel for disposition in the United States.
    The United States accepted foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel until the ``Off-Site Fuels Policy'' expired (in 1988 for HEU fuels 
and 1992 for LEU fuels). At that time, DOE committed to conduct an 
environmental review of the impacts of extending the program for 
accepting foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. In 1991, DOE 
issued an environmental assessment of the potential environmental 
impacts of the proposed extension. DOE received numerous comments from 
the public stating that a new, long-term policy should not be 
implemented until an EIS had been prepared. DOE decided in mid-1993 to 
prepare an EIS to evaluate the impacts of implementing a new foreign 
research reactor spent nuclear fuel acceptance policy.
    On October 21, 1993, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) (58 FR 
54336) to prepare an environmental impact statement on a proposed 
policy for the acceptance of foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States. The NOI 
announced public scoping meetings and requested public comments and 
suggestions for DOE to consider in its determination of the scope of 
the EIS. Nine public scoping meetings were held in November and 
December 1993. DOE received a total of 2,215 scoping comments from 493 
commentors.
    On April 21, 1995, DOE published a Notice of Availability (60 FR 
19899) of the Draft EIS. The Draft EIS analyzed three Management 
Alternatives for implementing the proposed action:

Management Alternative 1--Accept and manage foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel in the United States;
Management Alternative 2--Facilitate the management of foreign research 
reactor spent nuclear fuel overseas; and
Management Alternative 3--A hybrid, or combination, of elements from 
the first two Management Alternatives.

    During the 90-day public comment period (April 21, 1995 to July 20, 
1995), about 900 individuals attended 17 public hearings held in or 
near candidate ports, management sites, and in Washington, DC. In 
addition to oral comments, DOE received approximately 5,040 written 
comments contained within approximately 1,250 comment documents on a 
wide range of policy, economic, and technical issues. Many commentors 
supported the United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy 
objective of seeking to reduce the use of HEU (i.e., nuclear weapons-
grade uranium) in civil commerce. However, the comments also reflected 
a wide range of views as to which Management Alternative should be 
adopted. Some commentors supported management of the spent nuclear fuel 
in the United States. Other commentors questioned the need to accept 
spent nuclear fuel from allies of the United States and those countries 
that appear to have the capability to manage their own spent nuclear 
fuel abroad. These commentors generally believed that such spent 
nuclear fuel should be managed overseas. With regard to implementation 
of the policy in the United States, some commentors preferred the use 
of military ports, a practice DOE has followed in the recent past based 
on strong public preference. Risks during transport, including those 
from terrorism, a sunken cask, severe shipboard fires, and the level of 
emergency preparedness at ports were frequently raised as matters of 
concern.
    In consideration of public comments, DOE added information to the 
Final EIS, including: clarification of the proposed United States 
policy on accepting spent nuclear fuel from allies; examination of the 
consequences of sabotage or terrorist attack; safety of transportation 
casks; re-examination of the shipboard fire analysis; and general 
descriptions of transportation and emergency response regulations and 
management activities related to safe transport of the spent fuel and 
target material. In addition, the Naval Weapons Station at Charleston, 
South Carolina was analyzed along with the other terminals of the port 
of Charleston that had been included in the Draft EIS.
    On February 23, 1996, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
published a Notice of Availability (61 FR 6983) of the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons 
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent 
Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-0218F of February 1996), after DOE had 
distributed approximately 3,000 copies of the EIS and/or the EIS 
Summary to government officials and interested groups and individuals.
    DOE has prepared this Record of Decision in accordance with the 
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for Implementing 
NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures 
(10 CFR Part 1021). This Record of Decision is based on DOE's Final 
Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons 
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent 
Nuclear Fuel (the Final EIS). In making the decisions announced in this 
Record of Decision, DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, 
considered environmental impacts and other factors, such as nuclear 
weapons nonproliferation policies; public comments received on the 
Draft EIS and concerns expressed following issuance of the Final EIS; 
analysis of impacts and alternatives in the DOE Programmatic Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0203-F of April 1995, the 
``Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS'') and the Records of Decision for that EIS 
(60 FR 28680, June 1, 1995 and 61 FR 9441, March 8, 1996).

III. Policy Considerations

    A key goal of United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation 
policy is to reduce international civil commerce in HEU, since HEU can 
be used directly in the production of nuclear weapons. The proposal by 
DOE and the Department of State to adopt a policy to manage foreign 
research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the 
United States is intended to support efforts by the United States to 
convert foreign research reactors from HEU to LEU fuels (the latter 
cannot be used directly in nuclear weapons) and to gain worldwide 
acceptance of the use of LEU fuels in new research reactors.
    Failure of the United States to manage foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel could have a number of adverse consequences. Foreign 
governments and research reactor operators have participated in the 
RERTR program in large part because the United States previously 
accepted the spent nuclear fuel from their research reactors. The 
United States has not accepted HEU spent nuclear fuel for more than 
seven years, with the exception of recent limited shipments made after 
completion of the Environmental Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance

[[Page 25094]]

of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EA-0912, April 
1994). As a result, several foreign research reactor operators are 
running out of space to store their spent nuclear fuel, and others will 
run out soon. Under such conditions, the foreign research reactor 
operators must either shut down their reactors, construct new storage 
facilities, or ship the spent nuclear fuel offsite for storage or 
reprocessing. Many of the reactor operators do not have the option of 
increasing their storage capacities due to local regulatory 
restrictions. Moreover, construction and licensing of new storage 
facilities cannot be accomplished in time to support continued 
operations. The most realistic near-term option for a limited number of 
the reactor operators (particularly those in countries with power 
reactor programs that have an infrastructure to accept the return of 
the radioactive waste generated during reprocessing) is to ship their 
spent nuclear fuel offsite for reprocessing.
    The current practice followed in overseas reprocessing of research 
reactor spent fuel results in separated HEU that is placed back into 
commerce (some or all of it may be refabricated into new HEU research 
reactor fuel), a result that undermines United States' nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation goals. Furthermore, none of the foreign reprocessing 
facilities have the capability to reprocess the new, high density LEU 
fuel developed under the RERTR program. Thus, in the absence of action 
to resolve the question of the disposition of spent nuclear fuel, many 
foreign research reactor operators who could reprocess to control their 
spent fuel inventory would likely continue to use, or convert back to, 
fuel containing HEU. In such a case, the foreign research reactor 
operator community as a whole would have little incentive to convert 
their reactors to LEU fuels. This would have the effect of encouraging 
the foreign research reactor operators to use HEU (weapons-grade 
uranium) as fuel for their reactors, would increase the amount of HEU 
in international commerce, and would inevitably increase the 
opportunity for diversion of HEU into a nuclear weapons program.
    DOE and the Department of State do not seek to indefinitely accept 
or otherwise manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. 
Rather, the purpose of the new policy is to recover as much HEU that 
originated in the United States as possible from international 
commerce, while providing the foreign research reactor operators and 
their host countries time to convert the reactors to LEU fuel and to 
make their own arrangements for disposition of subsequently generated 
LEU spent nuclear fuel. The foreign research reactor operators and host 
countries must be prepared to implement their own arrangements for 
disposition of their spent nuclear fuel after the policy expires (i.e., 
after 10 years of spent fuel generation following the effective date of 
the policy).

IV. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

    DOE evaluated the following alternatives for management of the 
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel:

A. Management Alternative 1: Accept and Manage Foreign Research Reactor 
Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States

    Under Management Alternative 1, foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be 
transported to the United States in casks designed to comply with 
international regulations that are essentially identical to those 
promulgated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 
certified by the U.S. Department of Transportation. In accordance with 
the Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS, all of 
the aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel accepted 
by DOE (about 18.2 MTHM) would be managed at the Savannah River Site in 
South Carolina, and the TRIGA elements (about 1 MTHM) would be managed 
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, pending ultimate 
disposition.
    The basic implementation elements of Management Alternative 1 
provide the foundation for the analyses of impacts presented in the 
EIS. They are:
    Policy Duration. The policy duration would be 10 years. Spent 
nuclear fuel that is currently being stored or that is generated during 
a 10 year policy period would be accepted. Actual shipments of spent 
nuclear fuel to the United States could be made for a period of 13 
years, starting from the effective date of policy implementation. A 
five year policy duration and an indefinite duration for acceptance of 
HEU (with a ten year duration for LEU) were also analyzed as 
alternatives in the EIS.
    Amount of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. The amount 
of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel that would be accepted 
under the basic implementation of Management Alternative 1 is up to 
about 19.2 MTHM in up to approximately 22,700 individual spent nuclear 
fuel elements. These spent nuclear fuel elements would be received from 
41 countries. Alternative amounts of spent nuclear fuel considered as 
implementation alternatives were: receipt of spent fuel only from 
countries that do not have high-income economies, acceptance of HEU 
spent fuel only, and acceptance of target material in addition to spent 
fuel.
    Marine Transport. Under the basic implementation alternative, the 
spent fuel and target materials would be transported by sea in either 
chartered or regularly scheduled commercial ships. DOE estimates that 
721 cask loads of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (a cask 
load is one spent fuel shipping cask loaded with spent fuel) would be 
sent to the United States by ship over a 13-year acceptance period 
under Management Alternative 1. Acceptance of an additional 15 cask 
loads of target material by sea is also analyzed.
    Potential Port(s) of Entry for Foreign Research Reactor Spent 
Nuclear Fuel. The following potential ports of entry were selected for 
analysis because they met basic criteria designed to identify the most 
appropriate ports for use in accepting foreign research reactor spent 
fuel:

Charleston, SC (includes Charleston Naval Weapons Station and Wando 
Terminal, Mt. Pleasant)
Concord Naval Weapons Station, CA
Galveston, TX
Hampton Roads, VA (includes Terminals at Newport News, Norfolk, and 
Portsmouth, VA)
Jacksonville, FL
Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, NC
Portland, OR
Savannah, GA
Tacoma, WA
Wilmington, NC

    Ground Transport. The basic implementation of Management 
Alternative 1 would involve transporting casks containing foreign 
research reactor spent nuclear fuel by truck, rail, or barge from the 
ports of entry or Canadian border crossings to potential management 
sites.
    Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Sites. The 
analysis considered five potential management sites selected to be 
consistent with the management sites evaluated in the Programmatic 
SNF&INEL EIS (i.e., the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, the 
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Oak Ridge Reservation in 
Tennessee, the Hanford Site in Washington State, and the Nevada Test 
Site). The Record of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS 
subsequently eliminated

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the last three sites from consideration as management sites for spent 
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.
    Storage Technologies. During the first few years, storage would 
take place in existing storage facilities that use either wet or dry 
storage technologies. Under the basic implementation of Management 
Alternative 1, any new storage capacity that would be built would be 
dry storage. Wet storage was also evaluated as an alternative to dry 
storage.
    Near-Term Conventional Chemical Separation in the United States. As 
an alternative to storage of the spent fuel in the United States, the 
Final EIS evaluated chemical separation of foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel and target material in existing facilities at the 
Savannah River Site or the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The 
HEU could be blended down to LEU to preclude its use in nuclear 
weapons. The resulting high-level waste could be vitrified and managed 
onsite until a geologic repository becomes available.
    Developmental Treatment and/or Packaging Technologies. As another 
alternative for management of the spent fuel, the Final EIS discussed a 
potential development program that DOE could conduct leading to a 
decision on whether to construct and operate a new treatment and/or 
packaging facility. The objective of this technical strategy would be 
to treat, package, and store spent nuclear fuel in a manner suitable 
for direct placement into a geologic repository without necessarily 
separating the fissile materials, while meeting or exceeding all 
applicable safety and environmental requirements.
    Financing Arrangements. Under the basic implementation of 
Management Alternative 1, high-income-economy countries would be 
charged a competitive fee. The United States would bear the full cost 
of transporting and managing foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel received from other countries. The Final EIS also evaluated 
alternatives in which:
    1) All countries would be subsidized;
    2) All countries would be charged a full-cost recovery fee; or
    3) Countries with high income economies would be charged a full-
cost recovery fee, while other countries would be subsidized.
    Location for Taking Title. Under the basic implementation of 
Management Alternative 1, the United States would take title to spent 
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors at the limit of United 
States territorial waters or continental border (for shipments from 
Canada). The Final EIS also evaluated alternatives in which the United 
States would take title prior to shipment, at the ports of entry, or at 
the DOE management sites.
    Ultimate Disposition. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (as 
amended) authorizes disposal of the foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel in a geologic repository. DOE is working with staff from 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure that the spent fuel 
management actions it is undertaking for all of its spent fuel, and 
actions that would be undertaken for any additional foreign research 
reactor spent fuel to be accepted, will allow either direct emplacement 
of the spent fuel in a geologic repository or acceptance of the spent 
fuel in a treated form at a geologic repository.
    Decisions regarding the actual disposal of DOE's spent nuclear fuel 
would follow appropriate environmental review under the National 
Environmental Policy Act.

B. Management Alternative 2: Facilitate the Management of Foreign 
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Overseas

    Under this Management Alternative, two subalternatives were 
analyzed. In the first subalternative, DOE and the Department of State 
would provide assistance, incentives, and coordination for spent fuel 
storage at one or more locations overseas, with appropriate storage 
technologies, regulations, and safeguards. In the second 
subalternative, DOE and the Department of State would provide 
nontechnical assistance, incentives, and coordination to foreign 
research reactor operators and reprocessors to facilitate reprocessing 
of spent nuclear fuel overseas in facilities operated under 
international inspections and safeguards. Facilities operated by the 
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority at Dounreay, United Kingdom, and 
by Cogema at Marcoule, France might be used for this purpose. After 
reprocessing, the recovered HEU would be blended down to LEU at these 
same facilities. The wastes resulting from this reprocessing would be 
sent to the country in which the spent nuclear fuel was irradiated. If 
the reprocessing wastes could not be sent to the country in which the 
spent nuclear fuel was irradiated, such wastes would be accepted by the 
United States for storage and ultimate geologic disposal. It is 
important to note that the foreign reprocessing facilities do not have 
the capability to reprocess the new, high density, LEU fuel developed 
under the RERTR program.

C. Management Alternative 3: A Combination of Elements from Management 
Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative)

    Under Management Alternative 3, DOE and the Department of State 
would combine elements from Management Alternatives 1 and 2 to develop 
new alternatives for management of foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel in the United States or abroad. For example, DOE and the 
Department of State could combine partial storage or reprocessing 
overseas with partial storage or chemical separation in the United 
States. Implementation alternatives for the portion of the spent 
nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors to be managed in the United 
States would be the same as those for Management Alternative 1.

D. No Action Alternative

    In the No Action Alternative, the United States would neither 
manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium 
enriched in the United States, nor provide technical assistance or 
financial incentives for overseas storage or reprocessing. In this 
case, there would be no foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel 
shipments to the United States and no assistance to foreign countries 
for managing foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel overseas.

E. Preferred Alternative

    Under the Preferred Alternative (which is a combination of the 
implementation elements of Management Alternative 1), DOE would accept 
and manage in the United States up to 19.2 MTHM of foreign research 
reactor spent nuclear fuel in up to approximately 22,700 individual 
spent fuel elements and up to an additional 0.6 MTHM of target 
material. This spent fuel and target material would come from the 
following countries:

Table 1--High-income economy countries:

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Israel
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan

[[Page 25096]]

United Kingdom

Table 2--Other Countries:

Argentina
Bangladesh
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Greece
Indonesia
Iran
Jamaica
Malaysia
Mexico
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Thailand
Turkey
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zaire

    The types of Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel and Target 
Material that would be accepted under the Preferred Alternative are as 
follows:
     Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors 
operating on LEU fuel or in the process of converting to LEU fuel when 
the policy becomes effective.
     Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors 
that operate on HEU fuel when the policy becomes effective but that 
agree to convert to LEU fuel. (Spent nuclear fuel would not be accepted 
from research reactors that could convert to LEU fuel but do not agree 
to do so.)
     Spent nuclear fuel (HEU) from research reactors having 
lifetime cores, from research reactors planning to shut down by a 
specific date while the policy is in effect, and from research reactors 
for which a suitable LEU fuel is not available.
     Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from research reactors 
that are already shut down.
     Unirradiated fuel (HEU and/or LEU) from eligible research 
reactors would be accepted as spent nuclear fuel. (This material could 
be a particular nuclear weapons proliferation concern because it is not 
highly radioactive and thus can be handled manually. Thus could allow 
it to be stolen more easily.)
    For research reactors with both HEU and LEU spent nuclear fuel 
available for shipment, LEU spent nuclear fuel would not be accepted 
until all HEU spent nuclear fuel has been accepted, unless there are 
extenuating circumstances (e.g., deterioration of one or more LEU 
elements sufficient to cause a health or safety problem if acceptance 
were delayed). Spent nuclear fuel (HEU and/or LEU) would not be 
accepted from new research reactors starting operation after the date 
of implementation of the policy.
    The duration of the policy under the Preferred Alternative would be 
10 years. Shipments of spent nuclear fuel to the United States could be 
made for a period of up to 13 years, starting from the effective date 
of policy implementation, as long as the spent nuclear fuel had already 
been discharged prior to the beginning of the policy period or is 
discharged during the policy period. The additional three years in the 
shipping period were included to provide time for the radiation levels 
of the last spent fuel discharged during the 10 year policy period to 
decay enough to allow its transportation, to provide time for logistics 
in arranging for shipment of the last spent fuel discharged, and to 
allow for potential shipping delays.
    The aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel 
(about 18.2 MTHM) and target material (about 0.6 MTHM) would be 
transported to and managed at the Savannah River Site and the TRIGA 
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel (about 1 MTHM) would be 
transported to and managed at the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory, in accordance with the Records of Decision for the 
Programmatic SNF&INEL EIS and the settlement agreement reached between 
DOE and the State of Idaho [Public Service Co. of Colorado v. Batt, No. 
CV 91-0035-S-EJL (D. Id.) and United States v. Batt, No. CV-91-0054-S-
EJL (D. Id.)]. According to this agreement, DOE could accept up to 61 
TRIGA spent nuclear fuel shipments from foreign research reactors prior 
to December 31, 2000 for management at the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory. Before DOE would accept any shipments, the Governor of 
Idaho would be notified and the Secretary of Energy would certify that 
the shipments are necessary to meet national security and 
nonproliferation requirements.
    The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material 
would be shipped by either chartered or regularly scheduled commercial 
ships from the foreign ports to the United States.
    Although all of the candidate ports listed in Management 
Alternative 1 above would be appropriate ports to use for receipt of 
the spent fuel and target material shipments, DOE would prefer to use 
the military ports in proximity to the spent nuclear fuel management 
sites (i.e., Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the Concord Naval 
Weapons Station) to take advantage of the characteristics of these 
ports to increase the safety and security of the spent fuel 
transportation process. (Note: Section VII of this notice designates 
these two ports as the ports of entry.)
    DOE would take title to the foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel and target material that is shipped by sea after it is unloaded 
from the ship at the port of entry, and to the spent nuclear fuel and 
target material shipped solely overland (i.e., from Canada) at the 
border crossing between Canada and the United States.
    The foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and target material 
would be transported from the United States ports to the management 
sites by truck or rail.
    The financing arrangement under the Preferred Alternative would be 
to charge high-income-economy countries a competitive fee and for the 
United States to bear the full cost associated with acceptance of spent 
fuel and target material from other countries. The fee policy for 
countries with high-income economies would be established in a Federal 
Register notice to allow DOE flexibility to adjust the fee policy to 
account for inflation, or further development of spent nuclear fuel 
management practices in the United States.
    For the aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel, 
the following three-point management strategy would be implemented:
    1. New Technology Development/ Dry Storage. DOE would embark 
immediately on an accelerated program at the Savannah River Site to 
identify, develop, and demonstrate one or more non-reprocessing, cost-
effective treatment and/or packaging technologies to prepare the 
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel for ultimate disposal. The 
purpose of any new facilities that might be constructed to implement 
these technologies would be to change the foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel into a form that is suitable for geologic disposal, 
without necessarily separating the fissile materials, while meeting or 
exceeding all applicable safety and environmental requirements.
    In conjunction with the examination of new technologies, variations 
of conventional direct disposal methods would also be explored. After 
treatment and/or packaging, the foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel would be managed on site in ``road ready'' dry storage until 
transported off-site for continued storage or disposal. DOE

[[Page 25097]]

would select, develop, and implement, if possible, one or more of these 
treatment and/or packaging technologies by the year 2000. DOE is 
committed to avoiding indefinite storage of this spent nuclear fuel in 
a form that is unsuitable for disposal.
    2. Potential Chemical Separation/Wet Storage. Despite DOE's best 
efforts, it is possible that a new treatment and/or packaging 
technology may not be ready for implementation by the year 2000. It may 
become necessary, therefore, for DOE to use the F-Canyon at the 
Savannah River Site to chemically separate some foreign research 
reactor spent nuclear fuel elements, while the F-Canyon is operating to 
stabilize at-risk materials in accordance with the Records of Decision 
(60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995 and 61 FR 6633, February 21, 1996) 
issued after completion of the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0220 of October 1995). 
Under current schedules, this chemical separation of foreign research 
reactor spent fuel could take place between the years 2000 and 2002. In 
that event, the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would be 
converted into LEU and wastes. The high-level radioactive wastes would 
be vitrified in the Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing 
Facility, while other wastes (all low level) would be solidified in the 
Savannah River Site Saltstone facility. In order to provide a sound 
policy basis for making a determination on whether and how to utilize 
the F-Canyon for chemical separation tasks that are not driven by 
health and safety considerations, DOE will commission or conduct an 
independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and 
timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from 
foreign research reactors. The study will be initiated in mid-1996 and 
will be completed in a timely fashion to allow a subsequent decision 
about possible use of the F-Canyon for chemical separation of foreign 
research reactor spent nuclear fuel to be fully considered by the 
public, the Congress and Executive Branch agencies. Pending disposition 
of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel by either a new 
treatment and/or packaging technology or chemical separation in the F-
Canyon, the spent nuclear fuel would be placed in existing wet storage 
at the Savannah River Site.
    3. Spent Nuclear Fuel Monitoring (Wet Storage). DOE would conduct a 
program of close monitoring of any foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel and target material that would be accepted for storage in 
existing wet storage facilities. DOE is presently unaware of any 
technical basis for believing that this spent nuclear fuel cannot be 
safely stored until one or more of the treatment and/or packaging 
technologies becomes available. Nevertheless, if health and safety 
concerns involving any of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel elements are identified prior to development of an appropriate 
treatment and/or packaging technology, DOE would use the F-Canyon to 
chemically separate the affected spent nuclear fuel elements, if it is 
still operating to stabilize at-risk materials.
    Because the F-Canyon is only configured to handle LEU, under no 
circumstances would it be possible to produce separated HEU that is 
suitable for a nuclear weapon. Instead, depleted uranium would be added 
to the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel near the beginning 
of the chemical separations process, so that only LEU would be produced 
when the uranium is separated from the fission products. The trace 
quantities of plutonium in the spent nuclear fuel would be left in and 
solidified along with the high-level radioactive wastes. This would 
further the President's policy to discourage the accumulation of excess 
weapons-grade fissile materials, to strengthen controls and constraints 
on these materials and, over time, to reduce worldwide stocks.
    The TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel would be 
stored at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in the Fluorinel 
Dissolution and Fuel Storage facility (wet storage) or preferably in 
the dry storage Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility and the CPP-749 dry 
storage area. After 2003, all foreign research reactor spent nuclear 
fuel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be managed in 
accordance with specific provisions of the settlement agreement between 
DOE and the State of Idaho, until transported off-site for ultimate 
disposition. Depending on the nature of any new treatment and/or 
packaging technology that might be developed, the TRIGA spent nuclear 
fuel would also be processed using such a new technology, if necessary 
for disposal.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

    CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require identification of the 
environmentally preferred alternative(s). The analysis of alternatives 
presented in the EIS indicates that the three Management Alternatives 
and the Preferred Alternative (a modification of subelements of 
Management Alternative 1) would have only small impacts on the human 
environment on or around the DOE management sites, the populations near 
the cask transportation routes, or the affected ports of entry. Using 
conservative assumptions (i.e., assumptions that tend to overestimate 
risks), the only measurable potential impacts from incident-free 
operations are associated with low radiation exposure to workers near 
the loaded transportation casks, particularly during transportation 
cask loading or unloading, or near the spent fuel during storage, and, 
to a much lesser degree, to the general population in and around the 
ports of entry and the transportation routes. These conservatively 
calculated impacts are extremely small, and are well within regulatory 
standards for health and safety.
    Although the impacts would be small for each alternative 
considered, there are differences among the estimated impacts for the 
various alternatives. Besides the no-action alternative and overseas 
storage subalternative of Management Alternative 2, which would 
generate no direct environmental impact in the United States because 
they would result in no activity in the United States, the lowest 
impacts in the United States would be associated with implementing the 
proposed policy overseas under the overseas reprocessing subalternative 
of Management Alternative 2. In the overseas reprocessing 
subalternative, the foreign research reactor spent fuel would be 
reprocessed overseas and only the vitrified reprocessing wastes would 
be accepted in the United States. This alternative would have a very 
small environmental impact in the United States since only a small 
volume of waste in an inert, vitrified form would enter the United 
States. This would require only a small amount of transportation, 
handling, and storage in the United States and therefore would result 
in very little radiation exposure in the United States. Hence, 
Management Alternative 2 is the environmentally preferred alternative, 
next to the no action alternative. Both of the other alternatives, the 
hybrid alternative and the basic implementation of Management 
Alternative 1, would have relatively higher, but still extremely low, 
radiation exposure impacts because of the acceptance of a greater 
volume of material in the United States, resulting in more shipments 
and increased handling and storage requirements.
    Among the Implementation Alternatives to Management Alternative 1 
discussed in the Final EIS, accepting foreign research reactor spent 
fuel into the United States only from developing

[[Page 25098]]

nations (i.e., the ``Other Nations'' listed in Table 2 above) would 
present the lowest radiological risk in the United States. This is 
because this subalternative would deal with the least amount of spent 
fuel. The remaining subalternatives and implementation alternatives 
discussed in the EIS (including the acceptance of target material in 
addition to spent fuel, a policy duration of five years instead of ten 
years, use of wet storage, and chemical separation) do not measurably 
change the overall potential radiation exposure impact. The chemical 
separation subalternative would generate slightly higher accident and 
incident-free radiological exposure risk to the general population, but 
once again, this is a small variation within the overall small impacts 
from each of the alternatives.
    Implementation of the Preferred Alternative would result in 
relatively higher, but still extremely low, environmental and health 
impacts because of the acceptance of the target material (in addition 
to the maximum amount of spent fuel), resulting in the maximum number 
of shipments and increased handling and storage requirements, and 
because of the potential chemical separation of a limited amount of 
spent fuel.

VI. Comments on the Final EIS

    After issuing the Final EIS, DOE and the Department of State 
received approximately 35 letters commenting on the Preferred 
Alternative. These included letters from Governor Beasley of South 
Carolina, Senators Feinstein of California and Glenn of Ohio, 
Congressmen Baker and Miller of California, and Clyburn of South 
Carolina, California State officials, mayors and other local officials 
from the areas around the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the 
Concord Naval Weapons Station, and several members of the public. Many 
of the comments covered issues previously addressed in the Final EIS, 
such as the following:
     Why is the new spent fuel and target material acceptance 
policy required?
     How were the preferred ports of entry chosen?
     Why are military ports preferred?
     Has DOE adequately considered the risks associated with 
shipments through the Concord Naval Shipyard due to its proximity to 
the highly populated San Francisco Bay area and the potential for 
seismic activity?
     What kinds of training and other assistance would be 
provided by DOE to prepare local jurisdictions to deal with the spent 
fuel shipments?
    All of these issues are covered in the Final EIS, either in the 
body of the EIS or in the responses to comments submitted on the Draft 
EIS. In the interests of brevity, readers are requested to refer to the 
Final EIS for information on these issues. In addition, individual 
responses will be sent to each of the commentors.
    The comments on the Final EIS also raised several new issues (i.e., 
issues not raised during public review of the Draft EIS), as follows:
    A. Many commentors from the area around the Concord Naval Weapons 
Station were concerned that the cost of services required from local 
police or other city and county departments (e.g., services associated 
with emergency response, crowd control, etc.) to prepare for or respond 
to events associated with the spent fuel shipments would unfairly be 
left to the local communities to fund. The comments stated that DOE 
should provide funding to cover these additional expenses. To address 
this concern, DOE has replied that it is willing to enter into an 
appropriate agreement to reimburse local agencies or provide the 
incremental resources, either in kind or financial, that would be 
necessary to enable emergency response personnel to respond to an 
incident involving the proposed shipments of spent fuel, to provide for 
public safety in situations that are attributable to the shipment of 
spent fuel from foreign research reactors, and to allow a greater level 
of assurance of the protection of the health and safety of the public.
    B. Several individuals commented that the Final EIS did not 
identify the specific local streets and roads over which the spent fuel 
shipments would travel and did not include site-specific analyses of 
the risk of the shipments through the ports of entry. DOE replied that 
the Final EIS does estimate the potential radiological and other 
health-related impacts (e.g., traffic accidents) of transporting the 
spent fuel through the ports of entry (see, for example, Volume 1, 
Table 4-7 in Section 4.2.2.3 of the Final EIS). However, the Final EIS 
did not address specific characteristics of local streets since local 
street, or rail, conditions could well change between the time the 
Final EIS was written and the time the shipments would be made. As a 
result, the actual route that would be taken for the overland 
transportation, whether by truck or rail, would be chosen closer to the 
time the transportation takes place. Selection of the actual route 
would be accomplished in consultation with the affected States, Tribes, 
local officials, and the carrier, and considering the conditions of the 
potential shipment routes at that time. Any route that is chosen would 
have to meet specific requirements imposed by the Department of 
Transportation, taking into account specific characteristics of local 
streets. Thus, when potential impacts are estimated, certain 
assumptions can be made about the transportation route, without knowing 
the actual route. Indeed, because the Final EIS analyses are 
conservative (i.e., they tend to overstate the transportation risks), 
changes in local conditions would be unlikely to result in changes in 
transportation risks that would exceed those analyzed in the Final EIS. 
The Final EIS contains enough information to accurately assess the 
foreseeable impacts so that the public and Government decision makers 
are adequately informed of potential consequences.
    The same can be said about emergency services, personnel, emergency 
preparedness and facilities (i.e., specific circumstances may change 
between issuance of the Final EIS and the time an actual shipment would 
take place). For this reason, DOE is required to prepare a detailed 
Transportation Plan in cooperation with State, Tribal and local 
officials before a shipment is made. The Transportation Plan would 
specify details concerning how the shipments will be carried out and 
the routes to be used, planned shipment schedules, roles and 
responsibilities of emergency response personnel for jurisdictions 
along the transportation route, emergency plans and communications 
strategies. The Transportation Plan would also discuss any training to 
be carried out in preparation for the shipments, and would identify any 
equipment or other resources required to allow local responders and law 
enforcement personnel to be adequately prepared for the shipments. This 
procedure ensures that local officials would be well informed and 
prepared to handle any contingency before a shipment would be made.
    C. One commentor questioned whether an alternate West Coast port 
would be required if scheduling conflicts occurred at the Concord Naval 
Weapons Station. DOE explained that this issue had been discussed with 
the Commander of the Naval Weapons Station and that he had informed DOE 
that they currently have about 20% slack time available, and that this 
should be more than adequate to accommodate 5 shipments over 13 years.
    D. Recently, new information has come to light regarding the 
ability of the F and H Canyons (chemical separations

[[Page 25099]]

facilities used at the Savannah River Site) to withstand a severe 
earthquake. One commentor requested that DOE delay issuance of the 
Record of Decision on the proposed acceptance policy until completion 
of an on-going detailed safety analysis of the facilities. The 
commentor noted that the Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS would 
allow chemical separation under certain circumstances, and that 
chemical separation followed by vitrification of the high-level 
radioactive wastes remains the one proven means of stabilizing spent 
fuel and preparing it for ultimate disposition.
    In response, DOE explained that, until the on-going analysis is 
complete, it will not be known with certainty whether the new 
information will result in a significant change in the range of 
potential impacts of chemical separation described in the Final EIS. 
Analysis to date, however, provides reasonable assurance that 
completion of the seismic analysis will soon demonstrate that chemical 
separation in the F and H Canyons remains a viable alternative for 
management of spent fuel. DOE had not contemplated chemical separation 
of foreign research reactor spent fuel, if at all, until approximately 
the year 2000, and the Canyons will not be used if the seismic analysis 
indicates that they pose an unacceptable risk. Chemical separation 
however, may never need to be pursued because the Preferred Alternative 
provides for an aggressive new program to develop and implement new 
treatment and/or packaging technologies to prepare the spent fuel for 
ultimate disposition without the use of the F and H Canyons. In light 
of these factors, and in order to encourage the research reactor 
operators not to withdraw from the Reduced Enrichment for Research and 
Test Reactors program (and resume or continue using HEU fuels), DOE and 
the Department of State believe it is necessary to issue the Record of 
Decision now, rather than awaiting completion of the seismic analysis. 
Because research reactors are the major users of HEU in civil programs, 
it is essential that they support the Reduced Enrichment for Research 
and Test Reactors program if the United States is to achieve the goal 
of eventually eliminating the use of HEU in civil commerce, thereby 
reducing the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide.
    DOE further notes that the Final EIS discusses the potential 
impacts of chemical separation as merely one means of managing the 
foreign research reactor spent fuel. Under the Preferred Alternative, 
chemical separation would be considered only after completion of a 
study of the impacts of chemical separation on United States nuclear 
weapons nonproliferation policy, and then only if DOE is not ready to 
implement a new technology to prepare the spent fuel for ultimate 
disposition in approximately the year 2000 (see Section IV.E.). Even if 
both chemical separation and a new technology were not available in the 
year 2000, the Final EIS fully analyzes the potential impacts of 
storing the spent fuel in wet and dry storage facilities for up to 40 
years, so that the full range of reasonable alternative management 
options is covered in the Final EIS. Therefore, the decision of whether 
to accept foreign research reactor spent fuel into the United States 
does not depend on the availability of chemical separation as a 
management option.
    E. Several commentors objected to the fact that DOE spent 
Government funds to print and mail the Final EIS (or its Summary) to 
members of the public. DOE explained that the regulations implementing 
the National Environmental Policy Act require agencies to provide a 
copy of a Final EIS to any individual who submits ``substantive'' 
comment on the draft of that EIS. DOE limited the cost of printing and 
mailing to the greatest extent possible by mailing only the Summary of 
the Final EIS to commentors from locations other than Augusta, Georgia, 
and the States of California, Idaho, and South Carolina who had not 
specifically requested a copy of the full Final EIS (all individuals 
and organizations who were sent only a Summary were offered an 
opportunity to receive the entire Final EIS).

VII. Decision

    DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to 
implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy, 
as specified in the Preferred Alternative in the Final EIS, subject to 
the additional stipulations noted below. In summary, implementation of 
the new foreign research reactor spent fuel acceptance policy will 
involve acceptance of aluminum-based spent fuel, TRIGA spent fuel, and 
target material containing uranium enriched in the United States, as 
defined in the Final EIS. This material will be accepted from the 41 
countries listed in Section III of this notice. The spent fuel 
acceptance will involve approximately 19.2 MTHM (metric tonnes of heavy 
metal) of foreign research reactor spent fuel in up to 22,700 separate 
spent fuel elements and approximately 0.6 MTHM of target material. This 
amount of material is the amount that is currently in storage at the 
foreign research reactors, plus that which DOE estimates will be 
discharged over the next ten years. Shipments of this spent fuel into 
the United States will be accepted over a 13 year period, beginning on 
the effective date of the policy. The foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel will be shipped by either chartered or regularly scheduled 
commercial ships. The majority of the spent fuel will be received from 
abroad through the Charleston Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina 
(about 80%) and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in California (about 
5%). Most of the target material and some of the spent fuel (about 15%) 
will be received overland from Canada. Shipment through Charleston will 
begin in the summer of 1996 and through Concord in mid-1997. Shipments 
from Canada have not been scheduled at this time. After a limited 
period of interim storage, the spent fuel will be treated and packaged 
at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory as necessary to prepare it for transportation to a final 
disposal repository.
    DOE will apply the following additional stipulations to 
implementation of the new spent fuel acceptance policy:
    A. DOE will reduce the number of shipments necessary by 
coordinating shipments from several reactors at a time (i.e., by 
placing multiple casks [up to eight] on a ship). DOE currently 
estimates that a maximum of approximately 150 to 300 shipments through 
the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and five shipments through the 
Concord Naval Weapons Station will be necessary during the 13 year 
spent fuel acceptance period.
    B. Target material containing uranium enriched in the United States 
will be accepted only if a reactor operator wishing to ship target 
material formally commits to convert to the use of LEU targets, when 
such targets become available (a program to develop LEU targets is 
underway as an adjunct to the RERTR program). To demonstrate this 
commitment, DOE will require that the affected reactor operators enter 
into an agreement with DOE that sets forth the milestones and schedule 
for the conversion. Reactor operators currently operating on HEU fuel 
will be required to enter into a similar agreement regarding conversion 
of their reactors to operate on LEU fuel.
    C. The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target 
material could be safely transported overland within the United States 
by either truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either

[[Page 25100]]

transportation mode may be used. However, based on input from the 
public in the vicinity of the ports of entry, there appears to be a 
strong preference for the use of rail. Therefore, DOE will seek to use 
rail for shipments from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory in Idaho, pending further discussions with the 
States, Tribes and local jurisdictions along the proposed 
transportation routes.
    D. During the period starting with initial implementation of the 
new spent fuel acceptance policy through approximately the end of 1999, 
the Department will aggressively pursue one or more new technologies 
that would put the foreign research reactor spent fuel in a form or 
container that is eligible for direct disposal in a geologic 
repository.
    Should a new treatment or packaging technology not be ready for 
implementation by the year 2000, DOE has under active consideration 
chemical separation of some of the foreign research reactor spent fuel 
in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River Site, where it would be blended 
down to LEU and potentially placed under International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards. The Department intends to conduct a study that will 
look in more depth at the issues associated with a decision to 
chemically separate this spent fuel. Issues to be considered include 
minimizing any potential proliferation risks, cost and timing. The 
State of South Carolina will be invited to participate in the study.
    A subsequent Record of Decision will be issued at approximately the 
end of 1999 (or sooner if possible) to announce DOE's future management 
plans for the foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material 
based on the results of the Department's program to develop the new 
treatment and/or packaging technologies by that time (including any 
necessary environmental reviews), and the study discussed above.
    Staff from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have agreed to 
undertake an independent review of any new technology, or application 
of existing technologies, that DOE proposes to develop, to provide a 
high degree of confidence that implementation of such a technology 
would produce a product that will be acceptable for disposal in a 
geologic repository.

VIII. Use of All Practicable Means To Avoid or Minimize Harm

    Implementation of this decision will result in low environmental 
and health impacts. However, DOE will take the following steps to avoid 
or minimize harm wherever possible:
    A. DOE will use current safety and health programs and practices to 
reduce impacts by maintaining worker radiation exposure as low as 
reasonably achievable and by meeting appropriate waste minimization and 
pollution prevention objectives.
    B. DOE will require that the shipping contractors implement a 
system to keep records of which ships are used to transport foreign 
research reactor spent fuel and target materials and which ship crew 
members, port workers and land transportation workers are involved in 
the shipments. DOE will include a clause in the contract for shipment 
of the spent fuel and target material requiring that other ship crew 
members, port workers and land transportation workers be used if any 
worker in these categories could approach a 100 mrem dose in any year 
(the regulatory limit set in 10 CFR Part 20 for radiation exposure to a 
member of the general public).
    C. DOE will reduce the risk associated with shipment of the spent 
fuel by shipping multiple casks per shipment, up to a maximum of eight, 
whenever possible, thus reducing the total number of shipments.
    D. DOE will implement a process of detailed transportation 
planning, involving States, Tribes and local jurisdictions through 
which the shipments will pass, to ensure that all organizations that 
would respond to an accident involving a foreign research reactor spent 
fuel shipment will be fully prepared and informed prior to any shipment 
taking place.
    E. DOE will conduct the program to identify and develop an improved 
means of treating and/or packaging the foreign research reactor spent 
fuel with the intent of providing a technology to be used to prepare 
the spent fuel for geologic disposal that has less environmental 
impacts than the technologies that are currently available.
    Items A, C, D, and E above will be accomplished under existing 
business practices in the normal course of implementing the new spent 
fuel acceptance policy. For item B, DOE will prepare a Mitigation 
Action Plan under the provisions of DOE's NEPA implementation 
procedures (10 CFR 1021.331).

IX. Basis for the Decision

    The elements of the decision discussed in Section VI above (i.e., 
the Preferred Alternative with additional stipulations) have been 
selected based on the following considerations:

A. Management Alternative.

    The various management alternatives considered are discussed in 
Section 2 of the Final EIS. The analyses in Section 4 of the Final EIS 
demonstrate that the impacts on the environment, involved workers, and 
the citizens of the United States from implementation of any of the 
management alternatives or implementation alternatives analyzed (other 
than beneficial impacts associated with support for United States 
nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy) would be small and within 
applicable regulatory limits, and would not provide a basis for 
discrimination among the alternatives. As a result, the process for 
selection of the elements of the action to be taken focused on 
programmatic considerations:
    1. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded 
that the No Action Alternative and Management Alternative 2, 
Implementation Alternative 1a (Overseas Storage) would be unacceptable 
since these alternatives are not consistent with United States nuclear 
weapons nonproliferation policy objectives.
    2. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, also believes 
that Management Alternative 2, Implementation Alternative 1b (Overseas 
Reprocessing) would not provide an incentive for reactor operators to 
switch to LEU fuel or continue using LEU fuel. Since there is no 
overseas reprocessing capability for the new, high density LEU fuel 
developed by the RERTR program, foreign research reactor operators 
would have to continue using HEU fuel in order to be able to rely on 
reprocessing as a spent fuel management approach. In addition, 
reprocessing could result in the continued production of HEU, which 
could then be made available in civil commerce. Furthermore, the two 
countries that provide reprocessing require that the resulting wastes 
be returned to the countries of origin. Many of the countries in which 
the foreign research reactors are located do not have the technical or 
regulatory infrastructure to manage these wastes. Finally, the United 
States would not be able to impose conditions on the reactor operators 
or reprocessing firms to assure that its nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation objectives would be met.
    3. The sample hybrid alternative (Management Alternative 3) 
analyzed in the Draft EIS involved partial reprocessing overseas 
coupled with partial management in the United States. Even though the 
use of overseas reprocessing would be more limited in

[[Page 25101]]

this alternative, many of the concerns raised above with regard to 
reprocessing would apply. Because of these concerns and uncertainties, 
DOE and the Department of State do not believe it would be prudent to 
rely on the use of overseas reprocessing to meet United States' nuclear 
weapons nonproliferation objectives.
    DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has concluded 
that a modification of the basic implementation of Management 
Alternative 1 as specified in the Preferred Alternative balances 
policy, technical, cost and schedule requirements, and provides the 
strongest support for United States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation 
policy objectives because all aspects of the alternative will be under 
the control of DOE, either directly or through the spent nuclear fuel 
acceptance contracts with the reactor operators.

B. Management Technology

    The alternative spent nuclear fuel management technologies 
considered are discussed in Sections 2.2.2.7 and 2.6.5 of the Final 
EIS. The approaches fall into four broad categories, as follows:
    Wet Storage. Wet storage is a proven technology, that has been used 
for decades to safely store research reactor spent fuel from both 
domestic and foreign reactors. The impacts of continued use of wet 
storage would be small, and completely within applicable regulatory 
limits. Furthermore, DOE currently has wet storage facilities in 
operation at the Savannah River Site and the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory that can be used for storage of foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel. The water chemistry of the wet storage pools is 
carefully controlled to minimize the possibility of degradation and 
allow continued safe operation of the pools.
    Dry Storage. Dry storage is also a proven technology that would 
also have no more than small impacts, completely within applicable 
regulatory limits. It is the storage medium that is being selected at 
all commercial power reactor sites where additional storage capacity is 
being built. Dry storage capacity could be provided at the management 
sites in time to meet the program's projected needs, if initial spent 
nuclear fuel receipts were placed into the available wet storage.
    Chemical Separation. Chemical separation is also a proven 
technology, the impacts of which would be small, and completely within 
applicable regulatory limits. However, DOE is phasing out its chemical 
separation activities and is currently conducting chemical separations 
only at the Savannah River Site to stabilize materials for health and 
safety reasons. Because these chemical separations facilities could be 
used to treat the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel, they 
provide a contingency to be considered pending availability of an 
alternate means of treating and/or packaging the spent nuclear fuel 
prior to ultimate disposition.
    New Technologies. In order to prepare the spent fuel for ultimate 
disposition, some form of treatment and/or packaging may be required. 
Several promising new technologies, as well as variations of existing 
technologies, have been proposed and are under evaluation. Relatively 
simple technologies appear to be feasible, although they require more 
development work to confirm their viability and the cost of their 
implementation. This development will take place before DOE makes a 
decision on implementation of any of the new technologies.
    In order to effectively accept and manage the foreign research 
reactor spent nuclear fuel in the United States, DOE, in consultation 
with the Department of State, developed the three point strategy for 
management of aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel discussed in the 
description of the Preferred Alternative (see Section IV.E.). This 
strategy draws on the strengths of each of the spent nuclear fuel 
management technologies discussed above, while avoiding sole reliance 
on any of them. Due to the relatively more robust nature of the TRIGA 
spent nuclear fuel, DOE believes that minimal additional development 
may be needed to prepare it for storage and final disposition. 
Accordingly, the decision specified in this Record of Decision is to 
place the TRIGA spent nuclear fuel in existing dry storage facilities 
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. However, the analysis to 
determine what treatment, if any, will be necessary to qualify the 
TRIGA spent fuel for geologic disposal will continue and the 
appropriate treatment, if any, will be identified and implemented.
    DOE will issue a second, separate Record of Decision at 
approximately the end of 1999 (or sooner if possible) to provide 
assurance to the States hosting the DOE spent fuel management sites 
that DOE will place sufficient priority on the new technology 
development effort, and to ensure that the decision on which spent fuel 
management approach to adopt for use past the year 2000 receives 
appropriate scrutiny by Executive Branch agencies, Congress and the 
public.

C. Duration of the Policy

    The alternatives for the duration of the policy that were 
considered are discussed in Sections 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 of the Final 
EIS. In analyzing these alternatives, DOE concluded that the 5-year 
option is unlikely to provide sufficient time for the reactor operators 
to arrange for alternative spent nuclear fuel disposal mechanisms, and 
thus might result in some reactor operators refusing to participate in 
the program to convert or continue to use LEU fuel. That would 
substantially undermine the goal of eliminating civil commerce in HEU.
    On the other hand, the analysis determined that there was 
insufficient benefit to be gained from extending acceptance of all 
foreign research reactor spent fuel containing HEU into the indefinite 
future because such an approach would be unlikely to provide sufficient 
incentive for other countries to proceed expeditiously with development 
of alternative arrangements for disposal not involving the United 
States.
    The approach selected provides the incentive needed to gain the 
reactor operators' cooperation, while specifying a definite cut-off 
point. This alternative provides sufficient lead time to allow the 
reactor operators to make other arrangements for disposition of their 
spent nuclear fuel, and provides sufficient time to accept all spent 
nuclear fuel containing HEU enriched in the United States.

D. Amount of Material to Manage

    The alternative amounts of material that might be covered by the 
proposed policy are described in Sections 2.2.1.3 and 2.2.2.1 of the 
Final EIS. DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded 
that management of spent nuclear fuel only from countries that do not 
have high income economies would strongly encourage the resurgence of 
the use of HEU in the high-income economy countries, as well as opening 
the United States, fairly or unfairly, to charges that it was not 
living up to commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons. Management of only spent nuclear fuel containing HEU 
would penalize those reactors that have already converted to the use of 
LEU fuel, and would provide an incentive for reactors to continue to 
use HEU fuel, or switch back to its use.
    DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that 
management of all of the aluminum-

[[Page 25102]]

based and TRIGA foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel currently 
in storage or projected to be discharged during the policy period, and 
target material containing uranium enriched in the United States, will 
provide the best support for United States' nuclear weapons 
nonproliferation policy. Implementation of this approach will provide 
an opportunity for removal of all United States origin HEU from civil 
commerce and will provide an incentive for the continued conversion to 
and use of LEU as fuel for foreign research reactors, in place of HEU.
    DOE added the stipulation specifying that target material will be 
accepted only from foreign research reactors whose operators who 
formally agree to switch to use of LEU targets, when such targets 
become available, to provide an additional incentive for the reactor 
operators to make the switch to LEU targets.

E. Marine Transport

    The alternative approaches to marine transport of foreign research 
reactor spent nuclear fuel are discussed in Section 2.2.1.5 of the 
Final EIS. The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts 
to the environment, workers, or the public from transport of the spent 
nuclear fuel using any of these types of ships would be small, and 
within applicable regulatory limits. The analyses do not identify any 
difference in the small impacts that would result from the use of 
purpose-built vs. general purpose ships. In addition, ``military 
transports'' are in fact the same type of ship as chartered commercial 
cargo ships and are crewed by civilians, use of ``military transports'' 
would not actually result in any difference in impacts. DOE, after 
consultation with the Department of State, believes that use of actual 
warships would be unnecessary from a security standpoint.
    The approach selected by DOE, after consultation with the 
Department of State, (use of chartered or commercial ships) provides 
maximum flexibility for marine transport.
    DOE has decided to specify the additional stipulation on reduction 
of the number of shipments as a means of responding to public concerns 
regarding the risk of the shipments and to reduce shipping costs.

F. Ground Transport

    The ground transportation alternatives (i.e., truck, rail and 
barge) are discussed in Section 2.2.1.7 of the Final EIS. The analyses 
in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts to the environment, 
workers, or the public, from any of these modes of ground transport 
(counting barge as a mode of ``ground transport'') would be small and 
within the applicable regulatory limits. Furthermore, the differences 
in potential impacts between the truck, rail and barge alternatives 
were not significant.
    Both the truck and rail transportation options have been used 
successfully to transport foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel 
in the past. Truck transport was the predominant mode used for over 
twenty years, until the old ``Off-Site Fuels Policy'' lapsed in 1988. 
Rail was the mode used for both shipments under the Environmental 
Assessment of Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor 
Spent Nuclear Fuel. Since neither of the ports of entry (see item H 
below) can reasonably provide barge transport to either of the 
management sites, barge transport was not included in the preferred 
alternative.
    The Final EIS demonstrates that the spent fuel and target material 
could be safely transported overland within the United States by either 
truck or rail, and DOE has decided that either transportation mode may 
be used. However, there appears to be a strong preference by some 
members of the public in the port areas for the use of rail. Therefore, 
in response to this preference, DOE has decided that it will seek to 
use rail for shipments from the ports of entry to DOE facilities at the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina and the Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory in Idaho as a general matter, subject to further 
discussions with the States, Tribes and local jurisdictions along the 
proposed transportation routes.

G. Title Transfer Location

    The alternative points at which DOE might take title to the spent 
nuclear fuel and target material are discussed in Sections 2.2.1.4 and 
2.2.2.4 of the Final EIS.
    The point at which title will be transferred has no effect on the 
physical processes that would take place, and thus will not have any 
effect on the impacts on the environment, workers, or the public. The 
Price-Anderson Act would provide liability protection in the unlikely 
event of a nuclear accident in the United States, whether or not DOE 
has taken title to the spent nuclear fuel at the time of such an 
accident. As a result, DOE, after consultation with the Department of 
State, concluded that the selection of the title transfer location 
could be made solely on programmatic considerations.
    Acceptance of title at the foreign research reactor sites could 
make the United States Government liable for any accident that might 
occur in the country of origin, or on the high seas. DOE has been 
unable to identify any advantage to the United States of taking title 
outside the United States. Taking title at the limit of United States 
territorial waters would make the title transfer depend solely on when 
the ship enters United States waters, which could be difficult for DOE 
to control in certain circumstances (e.g., during a storm). Acceptance 
of title when the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel actually 
enters the land mass of the United States (the approach selected) 
provides the most certainty for implementation. The approach selected 
ensures that liability for accidents during the transportation process 
outside the United States will remain with the reactor operators, while 
reinforcing in the minds of the public that the United States 
Government will be accountable in the unlikely event of an accident 
within United States territory.

H. Ports of Entry

    The alternative ports of entry considered are discussed in Sections 
2.2.1.6 and 3.2 of the Final EIS. The analyses in the EIS demonstrate 
that the impacts on either the environment, workers, or the public due 
to use of any of the potential ports of entry analyzed would be small 
and within applicable regulatory limits.
    Although any one or all of the ten ports of entry described in the 
Final EIS would be acceptable ports of entry, DOE, in consultation with 
the Department of State, concluded that foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel marine shipments to the United States should be made via 
the military ports (selected from among those analyzed in the Final EIS 
and found acceptable) in closest proximity to the spent nuclear fuel 
management sites (i.e., the Charleston Naval Weapons Station and the 
Concord Naval Weapons Station). DOE will seek to transport multiple 
casks per ship to keep the total number of shipments as small as 
possible, as well as to reduce risks and costs.
    Use of military ports will provide additional confidence in the 
safety of the shipments due to the increased security associated with 
the military ports. This could also require much of the spent nuclear 
fuel to be shipped via chartered ships because commercial ships do not 
schedule stops at military ports. Use of chartered ships will increase 
the cost of shipping spent nuclear fuel. This additional cost will be 
borne by the reactor operators for

[[Page 25103]]

shipments from high-income economy countries, and by the United States 
for reactor operators from other countries. The additional cost will be 
kept to a minimum by shipping as many casks as possible on each ship 
(up to a maximum of eight per ship).

I. Management Sites

    The question of which sites should be used for management of all of 
DOE's spent nuclear fuel was addressed in the Programmatic SNF&INEL 
Final EIS, including consideration of the potential receipt of the 
foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The initial Record of 
Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS (60 FR 28680, June 1, 
1995), specifies that any aluminum-based foreign research reactor spent 
nuclear fuel accepted in the United States will be managed at the 
Savannah River Site; and that the remaining foreign research reactor 
spent nuclear fuel will be managed at the Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory. This decision was not affected by the second Record of 
Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS (61 FR 9441, March 8, 
1996). The site for management of the target material was left to be 
decided under the Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed 
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research 
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (i.e., the Final EIS). All of the target 
material currently in DOE's possession is managed at the Savannah River 
Site. The approach selected (i.e., management of target material at the 
Savannah River Site) is not inconsistent with the decision specified in 
the Records of Decision for the Programmatic SNF&INEL Final EIS.
    The analyses in the Final EIS demonstrate that the impacts to 
either the environment or the public through use of any of the sites 
for management of the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel and 
target material would be small, and well within applicable regulatory 
limits.

J. Financing Arrangement

    The alternative financing arrangements are discussed in Sections 
2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.3 of the Final EIS. The financing arrangement 
selected will have no effect on the physical processes that will take 
place, and thus will not have any direct environmental effects. 
However, it could affect how many foreign research reactor operators 
elect to ship spent nuclear fuel to the United States. For instance, if 
DOE and the Department of State were to charge a full cost recovery fee 
to all reactors, some of the reactors in high-income countries and 
many, if not all, of the reactors in other countries would not have the 
financial resources to participate. This would reduce the amount of 
spent fuel to be accepted and also reduce the potential environmental 
impacts that would be associated with shipment and management of the 
spent fuel, but would result in an increased risk of diversion of 
highly enriched uranium into a foreign nuclear weapons program. On the 
other hand, if the United States subsidized all of the reactors, the 
United States would bear the full financial burden, even for reactors 
that can afford to pay their fair share.
    DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, concluded that, 
to encourage that reactor operators in countries with other-than-high-
income-economies to participate in the program, the United States 
should subsidize receipt of their spent nuclear fuel. DOE and the 
Department of State also concluded that DOE should strive to recover as 
much of the cost of managing the spent nuclear fuel as possible from 
high-income economy countries. DOE concluded that it will announce the 
fee policy in a Federal Register notice (separate from this Federal 
Register notice announcing the Record of Decision), so that the fee 
policy may be changed from time to time as necessary to reflect changes 
in cost or new information that may be relevant to the policy.
    Such an approach will recover as much as possible of the United 
States' expenses for management of spent nuclear fuel from high-income 
economy countries (without encouraging any of them to resort to 
reprocessing of their spent nuclear fuel), will encourage participation 
by other countries, and will provide a mechanism through which to 
account for changes in cost and future definition of program details.

X. Conclusion

     DOE, in consultation with the Department of State, has decided to 
implement a new foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material 
acceptance policy, as specified in the Preferred Alternative contained 
in the Final EIS, subject to the additional stipulations noted in 
Section VII and including the mitigation activities identified in 
Section VIII. This new policy is effective upon being made public, in 
accordance with DOE's NEPA implementation regulations (10 CFR 
Sec. 1021.315). The goals of this policy are to support the United 
States' nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy calling for the 
reduction, and eventual elimination, of HEU from civil commerce, and to 
encourage foreign research reactors to switch from HEU fuels to 
alternative LEU fuels developed under the RERTR program. In reaching 
this decision, DOE has considered the concerns expressed by the 
Department of State, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Security Council, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the need for such a 
policy. A critical result of implementing this policy will be the 
continued viability and vitality of the RERTR program because foreign 
research reactor operators will have a continued incentive to 
participate. Similarly, implementation of programs similar to the RERTR 
program in Russia, the other newly-independent states of the former 
Soviet Union, China, South Africa, and other countries, and the 
establishment of a world-wide norm discouraging the use of HEU depends 
on a commitment by the United States to action such as that embodied in 
the new foreign research reactor spent fuel and target material 
acceptance policy. At the same time, the impacts on the environment, 
workers, and the public from implementing the acceptance program are 
estimated to be small and well within applicable regulatory limits.
    The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the 
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 
et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts 1500-1508 and 
10 CFR Part 1021.

    Issued in Washington, D.C., this 13th day of May, 1996.
Hazel R. O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy.
[FR Doc. 96-12420 Filed 5-16-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P