[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 94 (Tuesday, May 14, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24212-24214]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-12085]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
14 CFR part 25

[Docket No. NM-124; Special Conditions No. 25-ANM-114]


Special Conditions: Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 
Airplane; High-Intensity Radiated Fields

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Dassault Aviation, 
Mystere Falcon 50 airplane modified by K-C Aviation of Appleton, 
Wisconsin. This airplane will be equipped with a Flight Visions FV-2000 
Head-up Display System that provides critical data to the flightcrew. 
The applicable regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate 
safety standards for the protection of these systems from the effects 
of high-intensity radiated fields. These special conditions contain the 
additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary 
to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the 
existing airworthiness standards.

DATES: The effective date of these special conditions is May 3, 1996. 
Comments must be received on or before June 28, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments on these final special conditions, request for 
comments, may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation 
Administration, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Attn: Rules 
Docket (ANM-7), Docket No. NM-124, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 
Washington, 98055-4056; or delivered in duplicate to the Office of the 
Assistant Chief Counsel at the above address. Comments must be marked: 
Docket No. NM-124. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket 
weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dale Dunford, FAA, Flight Test and 
Systems Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, 98055-
4056; telephone (206) 227-2239; facsimile (206) 227-1100.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA has determined that good cause exists for making these 
special conditions effective upon issuance; however, interested persons 
are invited to submit such written data, views, or arguments as they 
may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket and 
special conditions number and be submitted in duplicate to the address 
specified above. All communications received on or before the closing 
date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. These 
special conditions may be changed in light of comments received. All 
comments submitted will be available in the Rules Docket for 
examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing 
date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact 
with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the 
docket. Persons wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their 
comments submitted in response to this request must be submitted with 
those comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the 
following statement is made: ``Comments to Docket No. NM-124.'' The 
postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Background

    On June 27, 1995, K-C Aviation of Appleton, Wisconsin, applied for 
a supplemental type certificate to modify Dassault Aviation, Mystere 
Falcon 50 airplanes. The Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 is a 
business jet with three aft mounted turbine engines. The airplane can 
carry three crew and 19 passengers depending on the configuration, and 
is capable of operating to an altitude of 49,000 feet. The proposed 
modification incorporates the installation of a digital avionics system 
that will present critical functions on the Head-up Display System 
(HUD), which are potentially vulnerable to a high-intensity radiated 
fields (HIRF) external to the airplane

Supplemental Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of Sec. 21.101 of the Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR), K-C Aviation must show that the altered Dassault 
Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 airplane continues to meet the applicable 
provisions of Sec. 21.29; and part 25, effective February 1, 1965, as 
amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-34 and Sec. 25.255 of Amendment 
25-42; Sec. 25.979 (d) and (e) of Amendment 25-38; Sec. 25.1013(b)(1) 
of Amendment 25-36; Sec. 25.1351(d) of Amendment 25-41; 
Sec. 25.1353(c)(6) of Amendment 25-42; part 36 of the FAR effective 
December 1, 1969, as amended through Amendment 36-9; Special Federal 
Aviation Regulations (SFAR) 27 effective February 1, 1974, as amended 
through Amendment SFAR 27-1; and Special Conditions 25-86-EU-24. In 
addition, the certification basis may include other special conditions 
that are not relevant to these proposed special conditions.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations (i.e., part 25, as amended) do not contain adequate or 
appropriate safety standards for the Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 
50 airplane because of a novel or unusual design feature, special 
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16 to 
establish a level of safety equivalent to that established in the 
regulations.
    Special conditions, as appropriate, are issued in accordance with 
Sec. 11.49 of the FAR after public notice, as required by Secs. 11.28 
and 11.29, and become part of the type certification basis in 
accordance with Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended 
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or 
unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the 
other model under the provision of Sec. 21.101(a)(1).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 airplane incorporates a 
Flight Visions FV-200 Head-up Display system that provides critical 
data to the flightcrew. These systems may be vulnerable to HIRF 
external to the airplane.

Discussion

    There is no specific regulation that addresses protection 
requirements for electrical and electronic systems from HIRF. Increased 
power levels from ground-based radio transmitters and the growing use 
of sensitive electrical and electronic systems to command and control 
airplanes have made it necessary to provide adequate protection.
    To ensure that a level of safety is achieved equivalent to that 
intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, special 
conditions are proposed for the Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50, 
which would require that new technology electrical and electronic 
systems, such as the HUD, etc., be designed and installed to preclude 
component damage and interruption of function due to both the direct 
and indirect effects of HIRF.

High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

    With the trend toward increased power levels from ground-based 
transmitters, plus the advent of space and satellite communications, 
coupled with electronic command and control of the airplane, the 
immunity of critical

[[Page 24214]]

digital avionics systems to HIRF must be established.
    It is not possible to precisely define the HIRF to which the 
airplane will be exposed in service. There is also uncertainty 
concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. 
Furthermore, coupling of electromagnetic energy to cockpit-installed 
equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined. Based on 
surveys and analysis of existing HIRF emitters, an adequate level of 
protection exists when compliance with the HIRF protection special 
condition is shown with either paragraphs 1 or 2 below:
    1. A minimum threat of 100 volts per meter peak electric field 
strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.
    a. The threat must be applied to the system elements and their 
associated wiring harnesses without the benefit of airframe shielding.
    b. Demonstration of this level of protection is established through 
system tests and analysis.
    2. A threat external to the airframe of the following field 
strengths for the frequency ranges indicated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Peak (V/   Average 
                     Frequency                          M)       (V/M)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 KHz-100 KHz....................................         50         50
100 KHz-500 KHz...................................         60         60
500 KHz-2000 KHz..................................         70         70
2 MHz-30 MHz......................................        200        200
30 MHz-100 MHz....................................         30         30
100 MHz-200 MHz...................................        150         33
200 MHz-400 MHz...................................         70         70
400 MHz-700 MHz...................................      4,020        935
700 MHz-1000 MHz..................................      1,700        170
1 GHz-2 GHz.......................................      5,000        990
2 GHz-4 GHz.......................................      6,680        840
4 GHz-6 GHz.......................................      6,850        310
6 GHz-8 GHz.......................................      3,600        670
8 GHz-12 GHz......................................      3,500      1,270
12 GHz-18 GHz.....................................      3,500        360
18 GHz-40 GHz.....................................      2,100        750
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, the proposed special conditions would be 
applicable initially to the K-C Aviation modified Dassault Aviation, 
Mystere Falcon 50. Should K-C Aviation apply at a later date for a 
change to the supplemental type certificate to include another model 
incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special 
conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of 
Sec. 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain design features on the Dassault 
Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 airplane. It is not a rule of general 
applicability and affects only the manufacturer who applied to the FAA 
for approval of these features on the airplane.
    The substance of these special conditions for this airplane has 
been subjected to the notice and comment procedure in several prior 
instances and has been derived without substantive change from those 
previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would 
result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For 
this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the 
certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has 
determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and 
impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special 
conditions immediately. Therefore, these special conditions are being 
made effective upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow 
interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in 
response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

    Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    The authority citiation for these special conditions is as follows

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

    According, the following special conditions are issued as part of 
the supplemental type certification basis for the K-C Aviation modified 
Dassault Aviation, Mystere Falcon 50 series airplanes.
    1. Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-Intensity Radiated 
Fields (HIRF). Each electrical and electronic system that performs 
critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the 
operation and operational capability of these systems to perform 
critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is 
exposed to high-intensity radiated fields.
    2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following 
definition applies: Critical Functions. Functions whose failure would 
contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the 
continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 3, 1996.
Stewart R. Miller,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service, ANM-100.
[FR Doc. 96-12085 Filed 5-13-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-M