*Grant, March 6, 1996, Exemption No. 6401*

[FR Doc. 96–9246 Filed 4–12–96; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–M**

**[Summary Notice No. PE–96–18]**

## Petitions for Exemption; Summary of Petitions Received; Dispositions of Petitions Issued

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of petitions for exemption received and of dispositions of prior petitions.

**SUMMARY:** Pursuant to FAA's rulemaking provisions governing the application, processing, and disposition of petitions for exemption (14 CFR Part 11), this notice contains a summary of certain petitions seeking relief from specified requirements of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Chapter I), dispositions of certain petitions previously received, and corrections. The purpose of this notice is to improve the public's awareness of, and participation in, this aspect of FAA's regulatory activities. Neither publication of this notice nor the inclusion or omission of information in the summary is intended to affect the legal status of any petition or its final disposition.

**DATES:** Comments on petitions received must identify the petition docket number involved and must be received on or before May 6, 1996.

**ADDRESSES:** Send comments on any petition in triplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, Attn: Rule Docket (AGC–200), Petition Docket No. _____, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20591.

Comments may also be sent electronically to the following internet address: nprmcmts@mail.hq.faa.gov.

The petition, any comments received, and a copy of any final disposition are filed in the assigned regulatory docket and are available for examination in the Rules Docket (AGC–200), Room 915G, FAA Headquarters Building (FOB 10A), 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20591; telephone (202) 267–3132.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. Michael D. Smith, Office of Rulemaking (ARM–1), Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20591; telephone (202) 267–7470.

This notice is published pursuant to paragraphs (c), (e), and (g) of § 11.27 of Part 11 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR Part 11).

Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 9, 1996.

Donald P. Byrne,

*Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulations.*

Dispositions of Petitions

*Docket No.*: 28386.

*Petitioner:* Heart of Georgia Technical Institute.

*Sections of the FAR Affected:* 14 CFR 141.35(d) (2) and (3).

*Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition:* To allow the Heart of Georgia Technical Institute to designate Mr. William James Breazeale to serve as chief flight instructor without meeting certain experience requirements for such a designation.

*Denial, March 22, 1996, Exemption No. 6413*

*Docket No.*: 28414.

*Petitioner:* Zebra Air, Inc.

*Sections of the FAR Affected:* 14 CFR 135.143(c)(2).

*Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition:* To permit Zebra Air, Inc., to operate its Bell JetRanger BIII aircraft (Registration No. N1080N, Serial No. 3459; and Registration No. N750LT, Serial No. 1767) under part 135 without a TSO–C112 (Mode S) transponder installed.

*Grant, March 7, 1996, Exemption No. 6407*

*Docket No.*: 28434.

*Petitioner:* Mercy Air Service, Inc.

*Sections of the FAR Affected:* 14 CFR 135.143(c)(2).

*Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition:* To permit Mercy Air Service, Inc., to operate certain of its aircraft under part 135 without a TSO–C112 (Mode S) transponder installed.

*Grant, March 7, 1996, Exemption No. 6406*

*Docket No.*: 28450.

*Petitioner:* Mr. Arthur J. Farmer.

*Sections of the FAR Affected:* 14 CFR 121.383(c).

*Description of Relief Sought/ Disposition:* To permit Mr. Farmer to act as a pilot in operations conducted under part 121 after reaching his 60th birthday.

*Denial, March 19, 1996, Exemption No. 6410*

[FR Doc. 96–9247 Filed 4–12–96; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–M**

## In-Flight Beta Operations

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of public meeting.

**SUMMARY:** This notice announces a public meeting which is being held by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the purpose of soliciting and reviewing information from the public on what type of FAA action would be appropriate to prevent future occurrences of in-flight beta operation on all turboprop airplanes certified in the transport category under part 25 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and certified in the commuter category under part 23 of the FAR, Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) 23 and SFAR 41. Numerous reports have been made relating to intentional or inadvertent operation of the propellers in the beta range during flight. Initial examination of these events indicate that the throttle lever flight idle stop has not adequately prevented beta operation during flight and that additional actions to prevent such operation may be appropriate. In order to make a determination what action to take, the FAA is holding a public meeting for the purpose of soliciting and reviewing comments from the public. The FAA will evaluate all comments and ideas in deciding whether rulemaking (including airworthiness directive action) is warranted for airplanes currently type certificated and equipped with turboprop engines.

**DATES:** The public meeting is scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday, June 11 and 12, 1996. On-site registration will begin at 7:30 a.m. on Tuesday, June 11, and the public meeting will begin at 8:30 a.m. on that day.

**REGISTRATION:** Persons planning to attend the public meeting should pre-register by contacting Mark Quam, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Ave. SW, Renton, WA 98055–4056, telephone (206) 227–2145; fax (206) 227–1149; internet address MARK__QUAM@mail.hq.faa.gov. Arrangements for oral presentation must be made by May 10, 1996.

**ADDRESSES:** The public meeting will be held at the Red Lion Hotel Seattle Airport, 18740 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, WA 98188, telephone (206) 246–8600. Guest room reservations should be made in advance. A block of guest rooms has been reserved for meeting participants at the Red Lion Hotel at a group rate of $74.77 (plus tax). This block of rooms will be held until May 20, 1996. Persons planning on attending the public meeting should contact the hotel directly for room reservations and identify themselves as participants in the FAA In-flight Beta

Operations Public Meeting to receive the special room rate.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** For information regarding turbopropeller airplanes certificated in the transport category under part 25 (14 CFR part 25): Mark Quam, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW, Renton, WA 98055–4056; telephone (206) 227–2145; fax (206) 227–1149; internet address MARK__QUAM@mail.hq.faa.gov. For information regarding turbopropeller airplanes certificated in the commuter category under part 23 (14 CFR part 23), SFAR 23 and SFAR 41: Mike Kiesov, Aerospace Engineer, FAA Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1201 Walnut Street, Suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri 64106, telephone (816) 426–6934; fax (816) 426–2169.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** Notice is herewith given of a public meeting to be on Tuesday and Wednesday, June 11 and 12, 1996, at the Red Lion Hotel Seattle Airport, Seattle, Washington. The purpose of this meeting is to hear comments from the general public regarding what type of FAA action, if any, would be appropriate to prevent future occurrences of in-flight beta operation on turboprop airplanes certified in the transport category under part 25 of the FAR and certified in the commuter category under part 23, SFAR 23 and SFAR 41. The FAA will consider information presented at the public meeting in the course of making its decision as to the type of action to take on this issue. Attendance is open to the interested public, but will be limited to the space available.

Request To Be Heard

Persons planning to present data or comments at the public meeting are requested to provide the FAA an abstract of their presentation no later than May 10, 1996. The abstract should include an estimate of the time needed to make the presentation, and should be sent to Mark Quam, Aerospace Engineer, Standardization Branch, ANM–113, FAA Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW, Renton, Washington 98055–4056; internet address MARK__QUAM@mail.hq.faa.gov. Following each presentation, a discussion period will be allowed. Requests received after the date specified above will be scheduled only if time is available during the meeting; however, the name of those individuals may not appear on the written agenda for the public meeting.

The FAA will prepare an agenda of speakers who will be available at the meeting. Every effort will be made to accommodate as many speakers as possible. The amount of time allocated to each speaker may be less than the amount of time requested.

Discussion

Sections 23.1155 and 25.1155 (''Reverse thrust and propeller pitch settings below the flight regime'') of the FAR (14 CFR 23.1155 and 25.1155) state:

''* * * each control for * * * propeller pitch settings below the flight regime must have a means to prevent its inadvertent operation. The means must have a positive lock or stop at the flight idle position and must require a separate and distinct operation by the crew to displace the control from the flight regime * * *''

Reverse thrust and propeller settings below the flight regime are referred to as beta operation. ''Beta'' is the range of propeller operation intended for use during taxi, ground idle and reverse operations, as controlled by the power lever settings aft of the flight idle stop.

Generally, compliance with this requirement has been the installation of a stop or detent that requires a separate distinct pilot action (such as lifting the power levers up and beyond the stop or detent) to displace the power levers from the flight regime. Despite these requirements of §§ 23.1155 and 25.1155, the FAA has received fifteen reports over the last seven years involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines in which the propeller control was intentionally or inadvertently displaced from the flight regime into the beta range during flight.

Of those fifteen in-flight beta events, five have been classified as accidents. In-flight beta operation that preceded these accidents has resulted in two different kinds of consequences:

1. Permanent engine damage and total loss of thrust on all engines when the propellers that were operating in the beta range drove the engines to overspeed; and

2. Loss of airplane control because at least one propeller operated in the beta range during flight.

In the most recent accident, both engines of a turboprop airplane lost power during descent after eight seconds of operation with the propellers in beta range. The propellers subsequently drove the engines into overspeed, which resulted in internal engine failure.

In light of this service history, the FAA is issuing this notice of public meeting to provide an opportunity for the general public to participate in deciding what type of action would be appropriate to prevent future occurrences of in-flight beta operation on all turboprop airplanes certified in the transport category under part 25 and certified in the commuter category under parts 23, SFAR 23 and SFAR 41. Interested persons are encouraged to provide information that describes what they consider the best action (if any) to be taken to correct the problem. In addition, the FAA is especially interested in comments and viewpoints on the following items:

Item 1. Most turboprop propeller control designs allow the pilot to intentionally move the power levers aft of the flight idle stop in flight into the beta range while the airplane is in flight.

a. Do you know of any occurrence of in-flight unintentional movement of the power levers aft of the flight idle regime? If so, please provide all the incident history details.

b. Do you consider the intentional selection of in-flight beta a design issue or an aircrew training issue? Why is it a design issue or a training issue?

c. What training methods or systems/design concepts would best deny the pilot the capability to access beta inflight? Why?

Based on the FAA's past experience with airworthiness directives that have required increased flightcrew training and intensified AFM warnings concerning the use of beta during flight, these actions alone may not provide an adequate level of safety for turbopropeller airplanes certificated in the commuter category under SFAR 23 and SFAR 41 and airplanes certified in the transport category.)

Item 2. The FAA is considering requiring ''beta lockout system'' retrofits on all turboprop airplanes certified in the transport category and certified in the commuter category under part 23, SFAR 23 and SFAR 41. (A beta lockout system is an electro-mechanical system that typically uses air-ground sensor logic, wheel spin-up, air-ground (squat) switch activation, gear-up switch activation, or combinations of these to activate (or deactivate) a solenoid that physically blocks the power levers from being retracted beyond the flight idle stop and prevents obtaining beta in flight.)

Until recently, the collective operational history of these airplanes did not indicate that a problem existed beyond a few models. Recent experience, however, indicates that the flight idle stop will not prevent beta operation during flight, and that beta operation during flight could occur on

any airplane equipped with a turboprop engine(s) unless the airplane design is such that it will actually prevent a beta-related event from occurring. Service experience has not been an adequate predictor of beta lockout problems and does not justify exemption from any retrofit requirement.

If the FAA was to consider a system that would deny the pilot the capability of accessing beta inflight (i.e., a beta lockout system):

a. Should airworthiness directive(s) be issued requiring the installation of a beta lockout system that would prevent the pilot from obtaining the beta model during flight, unless the airplane has been certified for in-flight beta operation? Why or why not?

b. Should rulemaking require installation of a beta lockout system under parts 91, 121, and 135 of the FAR (14 CFR parts 91, 121, and 135)? Why or why not?

Item 3. Of the existing systems that will deny the pilot the capability to access beta in flight?

a. What airplanes are these systems used on?

b. What are the costs of these systems?

Design Objectives

The FAA also invites comments from the public regarding the design objectives that could be used to prevent intentional and inadvertent selection of beta operation during flight. The following design objectives, or design objectives altered as a result of the public meeting, would be used to evaluate systems that would prevent obtaining the beta range in flight if required by FAA rulemaking actions in the future:

*Beta Lockout General Design Objectives*

Objective 1. Provide a means (''beta lockout'') in the beta control system to prevent or deter the flightcrew from either intentionally or inadvertently selecting the propeller beta range during flight. The FAA would consider a ground override feature for use in the event failure of the beta lockout system inhibits the selection of beta for landing or rejected takeoff.

Basis for Objective 1: Data from the fifteen reports involving inadvertent or deliberate selection of beta operation during flight indicate that the flight idle stop does not prevent beta operation during flight; beta operation can occur on any airplane unless the airplane design prevent such an occurrence.

Objective 2. Automatic arming of the beta lockout system.

Basis for Objective 2: The pilot may inadvertently put the propellers into the beta range during flight after forgetting to manually arm the beta lockout system.

Objective 3. Installation of beta lockout system circuit breakers (separate breakers for the indication systems) in such a manner as to deter the flightcrew from using the circuit breakers as a lockout override.

Basis for Objective 3: Service history has indicated that pilots have pulled circuit breakers to disarm beta lockout systems that use wheel spin-up signals or air/ground logic. Typically, these beta lockout system designs did not allow beta operation in a timely manner when landing on contaminated runways.

Objective 4. Inclusion of an indication system in the beta lockout system design that shows when the beta lockout system's lock:

a. Fails to engage or does not remain engaged while airborne.

Basis for Objective 4a: The flightcrew should be advised when the beta lockout system fails to engage at liftoff or when it fails to remain engaged during flight, even though the failure condition may be relatively remote. An amber caution light is recommended. Without a caution light to indicate that the beta lockout system has failed to engage or has not remained engaged, the possibility exists that the pilot will inadvertently select beta during flight. Further, the flightcrews may become dependent on the beta lockout system functioning properly, thereby increasing the potential that the flightcrew will inadvertently select beta during flight, following a failure of the beta lockout system.

b. Fails to disengage or does not remain disengaged while on the ground. The indication should remain ''on'' or ''latched'' after landing so that maintenance action is initiated prior to the next flight.

Basis for Objective 4b: An amber caution light is recommended. If during the landing, the beta lockout system fails to disengage upon landing or does not remain disengaged during the landing or takeoff roll, beta will not be available on the ground. The landing performance of airplanes equipped with turboprop engines is predicated on the availability of ground idle, which is part of the beta range. This condition is a potential hazard if the landing is field-length limited. Overruns are more likely to occur if operating under part 91 (unfactored field lengths); however, the risks are also present if operating under parts 121 or 135 (factored field lengths). For this reason, the flightcrew should be advised if the beta lockout system fails to disengage on the ground.

Objective 5. Include a method to ensure that the beta indication system does not flash messages from the time of the takeoff power setting speed until the airplane reaches a minimum of 400 feet above ground level (AGL), unless immediate crew action is required to prevent an unsafe condition.

Basis for Objective 5: The concern is that the pilot not be distracted during the critical takeoff phase by a failure that in itself is not catastrophic.

*Beta Lockout System and Indication System Reliability Design Objectives*

Objective 6. Demonstration that beta lockout systems designed for commuter (SFAR 23/41) and transport category airplanes comply with all applicable subparagraphs of parts 23 and 25, respectively.

Basis for Objective 6: This is a reminder that the proposed objectives are in addition to the FAR requirements, which must also be complied with.

Objective 7. Design the beta lockout system to ensure that inadvertent access to beta during flight is improbable (a failure rate of $1 \times 10$ E–5 or less per operating hour).

Basis for Objective 7: The flightcrews may become dependent on the beta lockout system functioning properly, potentially increasing the possibility that the flightcrew will inadvertently select beta during flight following a beta lockout system failure. The beta lockout design should provide failure protection in that it would make inadvertent access by the flightcrew to in-flight beta operation improbable.

Objective 8. Design of a system that will ensure that a single failure does not disable both the lockout system and the indication system.

Basis for Objective 8: Certain beta lockout system designs prevent accessibility to beta operation on the ground if electrical power to the beta lockout systems is lost during flight. However, the pilot still needs to be informed, upon landing, that beta may not be available; therefore, the warning system source of power should be independent of the beta lockout system source of power.

Objective 9. Demonstration that the probability of the failure of both the beta lockout system and the beta lockout indication is extremely remote (a failure rate of $1 \times 10$ E–7 or less per operating hour).

Basis for Objective 9: If flightcrews become dependent on the beta lockout system functioning properly, the potential exists for the flightcrew to inadvertently select beta during flight. Therefore, the beta lockout and indication systems should be reliable.

Objective 10. For systems that do not have a beta override (mechanism or

switch), demonstration that any failure or combination of failures that will lock out the flightcrew's capability to obtain the propeller beta range during landing (provided it is not detectable prior to landing) is improbable (a failure rate of $1 \times 10$ E–5 or less per operating hour).

Basis for Objective 10: For turbopropeller-powered airplanes,landing with beta locked out on field length-limited runways may be hazardous. Overruns are more likely to occur if operating under part 91 (unfactored field lengths); however, the risks are also present if operating under parts 121 and 135 (factored field lengths) on wet and contaminated runways.

Objective 11. Design of a system that will ensure that the probability of failure of the beta lockout system (with independent locks), which prevents one engine from obtaining reverse pitch while allowing the other engine(s) to go into reverse pitch (beta), is $1 \times 10^{-7}$ or less.

Basis for Objective 11: Certain failures may cause asymmetric thrust in certain beta lockout system designs if the lockouts for each lever are independent.

Objective 12. Coordination with the cognizant FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group of any required system maintenance, inspections, or functional checks that are required to achieve the reliability of beta lockout systems as iterated in the objectives described above.

Basis of Objective 12: This is to ensure that the inspections or functional checks are contained in the appropriate maintenance documents.

*Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Information*

Objective 13. Inclusion of an AFM limitation that prohibits use of beta during flight.

Basis for Objective 13: The flightcrews should continue to be advised not to use beta during flight. The remote possibility still exists that the beta lockout system may fail to provide protection during flight; this does not constitute a hazard if the pilot does not select beta during flight.

Objective 14. Inclusion in the AFM of approved abnormal/emergency procedures for failure indications if the system's lock has failed to engage or does not remain engaged while in flight or on the ground (as specified in the previous paragraphs).

Basis for Objective 14: The flightcrew should be advised of what or what not to do if they receive a warning.

Objective 15. Inclusion of information in the AFM that prohibits initiating flight with the beta lockout system inoperative unless the beta lockout system is capable of being permanently engaged in the locked position. For this scenario, the information should provide FAA-approved takeoff and landing field lengths (based on tests) for landings with the propellers set at the flight idle power setting.

Basis for Objective 15: Dispatch without beta lockout system in-flight protection is considered unsafe unless the airplane has been approved for in-flight beta operation. Dispatch with a failed or deactivated beta lockout system would be acceptable if access to beta is physically prevented and the FAA-approved takeoff and landing field lengths, based on tests, have been provided in the AFM for the flight idle power setting.

*Beta Override Design Objectives (The Override System Could Be Optional)*

Objective 16. Inclusion of an indication to the flightcrew that the override (mechanism or switch) has been used. The indication system should include an independent annunciation, or should be connected to the master caution system.

Objective 17. A design that will ensure that the flightcrew is not able to reset the override mechanism or switch once override has been used.

Objective 18. A design that will ensure that the activation of the override system is enunciated to prevent subsequent takeoffs until the override mechanism or switch has been reset by maintenance action. As an example, include the override activation in the takeoff configuration warning system (or similar warning system).

Basis for Objectives 16, 17, and 18: Typical beta lockout systems currently use wheel spin-up, squat switch activation, gear-up switch activation, or combinations of these. Certain airplanes, especially those with low wings and without ground spoilers, have a tendency to float during landing. In the case of these airplanes, the application of beta may be delayed on a wet runway because, while the airplane is floating, the ground logic or the wheel spin-up may not activate immediately.

Landing performance of turbopropeller-powered airplanes is based on ground idle availability, which is part of the beta range. Turbopropeller-powered airplanes landing on field length-limited runways with delayed beta application, or without beta after the beta lockout system fails to disengage, presents a potential hazard. Overruns are more likely to occur if operating under part 91 (unfactored field lengths); however, the risks are also present if operating under part 121 or 135 (factored field lengths) on a wet runway. There are several acceptable methods that may be used to overcome the deficiencies of the squat switch or wheel spin-up logic, such as the use of an override switch or the use of a radar altimeter.

Because of the safety concerns discussed above and the concerns expressed by airplane manufacturers, the FAA is considering allowing a beta override in the design objectives if the beta override is used for emergency use only and has the design constraints specified in the paragraphs presented above. The FAA is concerned that the flightcrew may reset the annunciation without reporting that they had utilized the beta override feature of the beta lockout system either in the air or after failure of the beta lockout system on the ground. Therefore, it appears that the design of the override system should provide enunciation that would prevent subsequent takeoffs after override activation, as recommended above.

If the manufacturer's airplane design already has a beta lockout system installed, the FAA may request a review of that system using the design criteria that evolve from this public meeting. If the existing beta lockout system design does not fully comply with the design criteria, the FAA may request that the airplane manufacturer develop a method to comply with these criteria, or to provide justification as to why its design provides an equivalent level of safety.

Public Meeting Procedures

Persons who plan to attend the public meeting should be aware of the following procedures which are established to facilitate the workings of the meeting.

1. The meeting will be open on a space available basis to all persons registered. If practicable, the meeting will be accelerated to enable adjournment in less than the time scheduled.

2. There will be no admission fee or other charge to attend or participate in the meeting. The opportunity to speak will be available to all persons, subject to availability of time.

3. Representatives of the FAA will preside over the meeting. A panel of FAA personnel involved in this issue will be present.

4. The FAA will try to accommodate all questions, time permitting. However, the FAA reserves the right to exclude some questions, if necessary, to present a balance of viewpoints and issues.

5. The meeting will be recorded by a court reporter. Anyone interested in

purchasing the transcript should contact the court reporter directly. A copy of the court reporter's transcript will be docketed.

6. The FAA will consider all materials presented at the meeting by participants. Position papers and other handout material may be accepted at the discretion of the chairperson. Participants are requested to provide 10 copies of all materials to be presented, for distribution to the panel members. Enough copies should be provided for distribution to all conference participants.

7. Statements made by FAA participants at the meeting will not be taken as expressing final FAA positions.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 5, 1996.

Ronald T. Wojnar,

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, ANM–100.*

[FR Doc. 96–9250 Filed 4–12–96; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–M**

## Situational Awareness for Safety Systems Requirements Team Meeting

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of meeting.

**SUMMARY:** Situational Awareness for Safety (SAS) focuses on: increasing pilot situational awareness of self, others, and environment; establishing enabling standards, specifications, and technologies for Free Flight; and facilitating means and opportunities for *affordable* avionics. The SAS concept increases the pilot awareness of position, terrain, weather, and other information, through next-generation avionics. SAS promotes more efficient, safe, and free use of airspace. As a project, SAS teams the FAA critical players with industry to implement the SAS concept through certification of *affordable* avionics in all aircraft.

**DATES:** The meeting will be held May 7–8, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

**ADDRESSES:** The meeting will be held at the Holiday Inn, Annapolis.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Mr. Mark Cato, Crown Communications, Inc., 1133 21st Street NW Suite 300, Washington, DC 20036; telephone (202) 785–2600, extension 3020.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463; 5 U.S.C. app. II), notice is hereby given of a meeting to solicit information from the aviation community concerning the standards and technical guidelines necessary to certify affordable avionics for Free Flight applications. The information is requested to assist the SAS Systems Requirement Team (SAS–SRT) in its deliberations with regard to a task assigned to SAS–SRT by the Federal Aviation Administration. Specifically the task is as follows:

Develop guidance, standards, and procedures that will: foster implementation of Situational Awareness for Safety (SAS) Systems; develop standards for the manufacture of equipment, hardware, software, and operational procedures; and coordinate validation of the SAS concept. This information exchange will contribute to an environment that will promote an efficient and safe National Airspace System.

Attendance is open to the interested public, but may be limited to the space available. An agenda and background material will be provided to all interested parties before the meeting. In addition, sign and oral interpretation can be made available at the meeting, as well as an assistive listening device, if requested 10 calendar days before the meeting. Arrangements may be made by contacting the meeting coordinator listed under the heading **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT**.

Issued in Washington, DC, on April 8, 1996.

James I. McDaniel,

*Program Manager, Situational Awareness for Safety.*

[FR Doc. 96–9248 Filed 4–12–96; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–M**

## Notice of Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) Approvals and Disapprovals

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Monthly Notice of PFC Approvals and Disapprovals. In March 1996, there were eight applications approved. Additionally, seven approved amendments to previously approved applications are listed.

**SUMMARY:** The FAA publishes a monthly notice, as appropriate, of PFC approvals and disapprovals under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 40117 (Pub. L. 103–272) and Part 158 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 158). This notice is published pursuant to paragraph d of § 158.29.

PFC Appications Approved

*Public Agency:* Manchester Airport Authority, Manchester, New Hampshire.

*Application Number:* 96–02–U–00–MHT.

*Application type:* Use PFC revenue.

*PFC Level:* $3.00.

*Total Net PFC Revenue:* $5,461,000.

*Charge Effective Date:* January 1, 1993.

*Estimated Charge Expiration Date:* March 1, 1997.

*Class of Air Carriers Not Required to Collect PFC's:* No change from previous approval.

*Brief Description of Project Approved for Use:* Part 150 noise mitigation.

*Decision Date:* March 4, 1996.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Priscilla A. Scott, New England Region Airports Division, (617) 238–7614.

*Public Agency:* City of Bismark, North Dakota.

*Application Number:* 96–01–C–00–BIS.

*Application Type:* Impose and use a PFC.

*PFC Level:* $3.00.

*Total Net PFC Revenue Approved in This Application:* $336,388.

*Estimated Charge Effective Date:* July 1, 1996.

*Estimated Charge Expiration Date:* July 1, 1997.

*Class of Air Carriers Not Required to Collect PFC's:* Air Taxis filing FAA Form 1800–31.

*Determination:* Disapproved. The FAA has determined that the class of air carriers defined as air taxis filing FAA Form 1800–31 enplanes in excess of 1 percent of the total annual enplanements at Bismarck Municipal Airport. The FAA notes that the public agency consulted with all air carriers during the consultation process; therefore, the disapproval of this class will not adversely affect the adequacy of the consultation.

*Brief Description of Projects Approved for Concurrent Authority To Impose and Use:* Reconstruct general aviation and regional airline ramps, Airfield signage and replacement of rotating beacon, Part 107 security access control, Airfield signing and marking, Construct service roads, Runway rejuvenation and construct blast erosion protection, Airfield lighting and electrical improvements, and improve airport access control system, Snow removal equiment storage addition, Update airport layout plan and prepare utility maps, Environmental assessment for runway 3/21 improvements, Snow removal equipment acquisition, Apron reconstruction, and expansion and reconfigure Part 107.14 security system, Drainage improvements, Installation of security fencing and apron lighting, Electronic decelerometer, Acquisition of snow removal equipment, Master plan update, Plans and specifications for extension and widening of runway 3/21, PFC application preparation costs.