[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 66 (Thursday, April 4, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 15044-15053]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-8330]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Manual for Courts-Martial
Agency: Joint Service Committee on Military Justice (JSC).
Action: Notice of proposed amendments.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is considering recommending changes
to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 Edition). The
proposed changes are the 1996 draft annual review required by the
Manual for Courts-Martial and DoD Directive 5500.17, ``Review of the
Manual for Courts-Martial,'' January 23, 1985.
The majority of the proposed changes to the MCM implement
amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), made
pursuant to the Military Justice Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
106, 110 Stat. 461 (1996). Among other things, these changes to the MCM
would implement recent statutory amendments that: (1) make flight from
apprehension a punishable offense; (2) make the offense of carnal
knowledge gender neutral and recognize the defense of a mistake of fact
as to age under certain conditions; (3) change the effective date for
forfeitures of pay and allowances and reductions in grade by sentence
of court-martial; (4) provide for forfeiture of pay and allowances
during confinement; (5) authorize deferment of confinement during the
pendency of
[[Page 15045]]
certain appeals; (6) authorize Article 32 pretrial investigating
officers to investigate uncharged offenses under certain circumstances
and conditions; (7) provide that post-trial matters be submitted by the
accused in writing to the convening authority; (8) provide for the
commitment of the accused to a treatment facility by reason of lack of
mental capacity or mental responsibility; and (9) authorize the United
States to appeal rulings relating to the disclosure of classified
information. The proposed changes to the MCM would also: (1) place
contempt proceeding within the control and discretion of the military
judge, vice court members; (2) increase the maximum authorized sentence
for assaults committed with an unloaded firearm; and (3) provide that
newly discovered evidence is not a basis for a petition for a new trial
of the facts when the accused has pled guilty.
The proposed changes have not been coordinated within the
Department of Defense under DoD Directive 5500.1, ``Preparation and
Processing of Legislation, Executive Orders, Proclamations, and Reports
and Comments Thereon'', May 21, 1964, and do not constitute the
official position of the Department of Defense, the Military
Departments, or any other government agency.
This notice is provided in accordance with DoD Directive 5500.17,
``Review of the Manual for Courts-Martial'', January 23, 1985. This
notice is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Federal government. It is not intended to create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.
The Proposed Changes Follow in Their Entirety
The Discussion following R.C.M. 103 is amended by adding the
following two sections:
(14) The term classified information (A) means any information or
material that has been determined by an official of the United States
pursuant to law, an Executive order, or regulation to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
security, and (B) any restricted data, as defined in section 2014(y) of
title 42, United States Code.
(15) The term ``national security'' means the national defense and
foreign relations of the United States.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 103 is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: The definitions of ``classified information'' in
(14) and ``national security'' in (15) are identical to those used in
the Classified Information Procedures Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1). They were
added in connection with the change to Article 62(a)(1) (Appeals
Relating to Disclosure of Classified Information). See R.C.M. 908
(Appeals by the United States) and M.R.E. 505 (Classified Information).
R.C.M. 405(e) is amended to read as follows:
(e) Scope of investigation. The investigating officer shall inquire
into the truth and form of the charges, and such other matters as may
be necessary to make a recommendation as to the disposition of the
charges. If evidence adduced during the investigation indicates that
the accused committed an uncharged offense, the investigating officer
may investigate the subject matter of such offense and make a
recommendation as to its disposition, without the accused first having
been charged with the offense. The accused's rights under subsection
(f) are the same with regard to the investigation of both charged and
uncharged offenses.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 405(e) is amended by adding the
following paragraph at the end of the Discussion:
In investigating uncharged misconduct identified during the
pretrial investigation, the investigating officer will inform the
accused of the general nature of each uncharged offense investigated,
and otherwise afford the accused the same opportunity for
representation, cross examination, and presentation afforded during the
investigation of any charged offense.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 405 is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: This change is based on the amendments to Article
32 enacted by Congress in the DoD Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996). It authorizes the Article 32
investigating officer to investigate uncharged offenses when, during
the course of the Article 32 investigation, the evidence indicates that
the accused may have committed such offenses. Permitting the
investigating officer to investigate uncharged offenses and recommend
an appropriate disposition benefits both the government and the
accused. It promotes judicial economy while still affording the accused
the same rights the accused would have in the investigation of
preferred charges.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 703(e)(2)(G) is amended by adding
the following sentence at the end of the second paragraph:
Failing to comply with such a subpoena is a felony offense, and may
result in a fine or imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the
district court.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 703 is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: Congress amended Article 47 in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), to
remove limitations on the punishment that a federal district court may
impose for a civilian witness' refusal to honor a subpoena to appear or
testify before a court-martial. Previously, the maximum sentence for a
recalcitrant witness was ``a fine of not more than $500.00, or
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both.'' The law now
leaves the amount of confinement or fine to the discretion of the
federal district court.
R.C.M. 706(c)(2)(D) is amended to read as follows:
(D) Is the accused presently suffering from a mental disease of
defect rendering the accused unable to understand the nature of the
proceedings against the accused or to conduct or cooperate
intelligently in the defense of the case?
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 706 is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: Subsection (c)(2)(D) was amended to reflect the
standard for incompetency set forth in Article 76b.
R.C.M. 707(b)(3) is amended by adding subsection (E) which reads as
follows:
(E) Commitment of the incompetent accused. If the accused is
committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization as
provided in R.C.M. 909(f), all periods of such commitment shall be
excluded when determining whether the period in subsection (a) of this
rule has run. If, at the end of the period of commitment, the accused
is returned to the custody of the general court-martial convening
authority, a new 120-day time period under this rule shall begin on the
date of such return to custody.
R.C.M. 707(c) is amended to read as follows:
(c) Excludable delay. All periods of time during which appellate
courts have issued stays in the proceedings, the accused is
hospitalized due to incompetency or otherwise in the custody of the
Attorney General, shall be excluded when determining whether the period
in subsection (a) of this rule has run. All other pretrial delays
approved by a military judge or the
[[Page 15046]]
convening authority shall be similarly excluded.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 707(c) is created as follows:
Periods during which the accused is hospitalized due to
incompetency or otherwise in the custody of the Attorney General are
excluded when determining speedy trial under this rule.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 707(c) is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: In creating Article 76b, UCMJ, Congress mandated
the commitment of an incompetent accused to the custody of the Attorney
General. As an accused is not under military control during any such
period of custody, the entire time period is excludable delay under the
120-day speedy trial rule.
R.C.M. 809(b)(1) is amended by deleting:
``In such cases, the regular proceedings shall be suspended while
the contempt is disposed of.''
R.C.M. 809(c) is amended to read as follows:
(c) Procedure. The military judge shall in all cases determine
whether to punish for contempt, and, if so, what the punishment shall
be. The military judge shall also determine when during the court-
martial the contempt proceedings shall be conducted; however, if the
court-martial is composed of members, the military judge shall conduct
the contempt proceedings outside the members' presence. The military
judge may punish summarily under subsection (b)(1) only if the military
judge recites the facts for the record and states that they were
directly witnessed by the military judge in the actual presence of the
court-martial. Otherwise, the provisions of subsection (b)(2) shall
apply.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 809 is amended by adding the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: R.C.M. 809 was amended to modernize military
contempt procedures, as recommended in United States v. Burnett, 27
M.J. 99, 106 (C.M.A. 1988). Thus, the amendment simplifies the contempt
procedure in trials by courts-martial by vesting contempt power in the
military judge and eliminating the members' involvement in the process.
The amendment also provides that the court-martial proceedings need not
be suspended while the contempt proceedings are conducted. The
proceedings will be conducted by the military judge in all cases,
outside of the members' presence. The military judge also exercises
discretion as to the timing of the proceedings and, therefore, may
assure that the court-martial is not otherwise unnecessarily disrupted
or the accused prejudiced by the contempt proceedings. See Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 10, 72 S. Ct. 451, 455, 96 L. Ed. 717, 724
(1952). The amendment also brings court-martial contempt procedures
into line with the procedure applicable in other courts.
R.C.M. 908(a) is amended to read as follows:
(a) In general. In a trial by a court-martial over which a military
judge presides and in which a punitive discharge may be adjudged, the
United States may appeal an order or ruling that terminates the
proceedings with respect to a charge or specification, or excludes
evidence that is substantial proof of a fact material in the
proceedings, or directs the disclosure of classified information, or
that imposes sanctions for nondisclosure of classified information. The
United States may also appeal a refusal by the military judge to issue
a protective order sought by the United States to prevent the
disclosure of classified information or to enforce such an order that
has previously been issued by the appropriate authority. However, the
United States may not appeal an order or ruling that is, or amounts to,
a finding of not guilty with respect to the charge or specification.
In making this determination, the military judge is not bound by
the rules of evidence except with respect to privileges.
(3) If the military judge finds the accused is incompetent to stand
trial, the judge shall report this finding to the general court-martial
convening authority, who shall commit the accused to the custody of the
Attorney General.
(f) Hospitalization of the accused. An accused who is found
incompetent to stand trial under this rule shall be hospitalized by the
Attorney General as provided in section 4241(d) of title 18, United
States Code. If notified that the accused has recovered to such an
extent that he or she is able to understand the nature of the
proceedings and to conduct or cooperate intelligently in the defense of
the case, then the general court-martial convening authority shall
promptly take custody of the accused. If, at the end of the period of
hospitalization, the accused's mental condition has not so improved,
action shall be taken in accordance with section 4246 of title 18.
(g) Excludable delay. All periods of commitment shall be excluded
as provided by R.C.M. 707(c). The 120-day time period under R.C.M. 707
shall begin anew on the date the general court-martial convening
authority takes custody of the accused at the end of any period of
commitment.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 909(f) is amended by adding the
following:
Under section 4241(d) of title 18, the initial period of
hospitalization for an incompetent accused shall not exceed four
months. However, in determining whether there is a substantial
probability the accused will attain the capacity to permit the trial to
proceed in the foreseeable future, the accused may be hospitalized for
an additional reasonable period of time.
This additional period of time ends either when the accused's
mental condition is improved so that trial may proceed, or when the
pending charges against the accused are dismissed. If charges are
dismissed solely due to the accused's mental condition, the accused is
subject to hospitalization as provided in section 4241 of title 18.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 909 is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: The rule was changed to provide for the
hospitalization of an incompetent accused after the enactment of
Article 76b, UCMJ, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996).
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 908 is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: This change resulted from Congress' amendment to
Article 62 in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996). It permits interlocutory appeal of
rulings disclosing classified information.
R.C.M. 909 is amended to read as follows:
(a) In general. No person may be brought to trial by court-martial
if that person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect
rendering him or her mentally incompetent to the extent that he or she
is unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against that
person or to conduct or cooperate intelligently in the defense of the
case.
(b) Presumption of capacity. A person is presumed to have the
capacity to stand trial unless the contrary is established.
(c) Determination before referral. If an inquiry pursuant to R.C.M.
706 conducted before referral concludes that an accused is suffering
from a mental disease or defect that renders him or her mentally
incompetent to stand trial, and the general court-martial convening
authority concurs with that conclusion,
[[Page 15047]]
the accused shall be committed by the general court-martial convening
authority to the custody of the U.S. Attorney General. If the general
court-martial convening authority does not concur, that authority may
refer the charges to trial.
(d) Determination after referral. After referral, the military
judge may conduct a hearing to determine the mental capacity of the
accused. If an inquiry pursuant to R.C.M. 706 conducted after referral
but before trial concludes that an accused is suffering from a mental
disease or defect that renders him or her mentally incompetent to stand
trial, the military judge shall conduct a hearing to determine the
mental capacity of the accused. Any such hearing shall be conducted in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(e) Incompetency determination hearing.
(1) Nature of issue. The mental capacity of the accused is an
interlocutory question of fact.
(2) Standard. Trial may proceed unless it is established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the accused is presently suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him or her mentally
incompetent to the extent that he or she is unable to understand the
nature of the proceedings against the accused or to conduct or
cooperate intelligently in the defense of the case.
R.C.M. 916(b) is amended to read as follows:
(b) Burden of proof. Except for the defense of lack of mental
responsibility and the defense of mistake of fact as to age as
described in Part IV, para. 45.c.(2) in a prosecution for carnal
knowledge, the prosecution shall have the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defense did not exist. The accused has the
burden of proving the defense of lack of mental responsibility by clear
and convincing evidence, and has the burden of proving mistake of fact
as to age in a carnal knowledge prosecution by a preponderance of the
evidence.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 916(b) is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: In enacting the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), Congress amended
Article 120, UCMJ, to create a mistake of fact defense to a prosecution
for carnal knowledge. The accused must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person with whom he or she had sexual intercourse was
at least 12 years of age, and that the accused reasonably believed that
this person was at least 16 years of age. The changes to R.C.M. 916(b)
& (j) implement this amendment.
R.C.M. 916(j) is amended to read as follows:
(j) Ignorance or mistake of fact.
(1) Generally. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, it
is a defense to an offense that the accused held, as a result of
ignorance or mistake, an incorrect belief of the true circumstances
such that, if the circumstances were as the accused believed them, the
accused would not be guilty of the offense. If the ignorance or mistake
goes to an element requiring premeditation, specific intent,
willfulness, or knowledge of a particular fact, the ignorance or
mistake need only have existed in the mind of the accused. If the
ignorance or mistake goes to any other element requiring only general
intent or knowledge, the ignorance or mistake must have existed in the
mind of the accused and must have been reasonable under all the
circumstances. However, if the accused's knowledge or intent is
immaterial as to an element, then ignorance or mistake is not a
defense.
(2) Carnal knowledge. It is a defense to a prosecution for carnal
knowledge, which the accused must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, that at the time of the sexual intercourse, the person with
whom the accused had sexual intercourse was at least 12 years of age,
and that the accused reasonably believed the person was at least 16
years of age.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 916(j), third paragraph, is amended
to read as follows:
Examples of offenses in which the accused's intent or knowledge is
immaterial include: carnal knowledge (if the victim is under 12 years
of age); improper use of countersign (mistake as to authority of person
to whom disclosed not a defense). Such ignorance or mistake may be
relevant in extenuation and mitigation, however.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 916(j) is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: In enacting the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), Congress amended
Article 120, UCMJ, to create a mistake of fact defense to a prosecution
for carnal knowledge. The accused must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person with whom he or she had sexual intercourse was
at least 12 years of age, and that the accused reasonably believed that
this person was at least 16 years of age. The changes to R.C.M. 916(b)
& (j) implement this amendment.
R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(D) is amended to read as follows:
(D) The burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused is
upon the Government. [When the issue of lack of mental responsibility
is raised, add: The burden of proving the defense of lack of mental
responsibility by clear and convincing evidence is upon the accused.
When the issue of mistake of fact as to age in a carnal knowledge
prosecution is raised, add: The burden of proving the defense of
mistake of fact as to age in carnal knowledge by a preponderance of the
evidence is upon the accused.]
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 920(e) is amended by inserting the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: This change to R.C.M. 920(e) implemented Congress'
creation of a mistake of fact defense for carnal knowledge. Article
120(d), UCMJ provides that the accused must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the person with whom he or she had sexual intercourse
was at least 12 years of age, and that the accused reasonably believed
that this person was at least 16 years of age.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 1003(b)(2) is amended by adding the
following paragraph between the existing first and second paragraphs in
the Discussion:
Forfeitures of pay and allowances adjudged as part of a court-
martial sentence, or occurring by operation of Article 58b are
effective 14 days after the sentence is adjudged or when the sentence
is approved by the convening authority, whichever is earlier.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 1003(b)(2) is amended by adding the
following at the end of the Discussion:
Forfeiture of pay and allowances under Article 58b is not a part of
the sentence, but is an administrative result thereof.
At general courts-martial, if both a punitive discharge and
confinement are adjudged, then the operation of Article 58b results in
total forfeiture of pay and allowances during that period of
confinement. If only confinement is adjudged, then if that confinement
exceeds six months, the operation of Article 58b results in total
forfeiture of pay and allowances during that period of confinement. If
only a punitive discharge is adjudged, Article 58b has no effect on pay
and allowances. A death sentence results in total forfeiture of pay and
allowances.
At a special court-martial, if a bad conduct discharge and
confinement are adjudged, then the operation of Article 58b results in
a total forfeiture of two-thirds of pay and allowances during that
[[Page 15048]]
period of confinement. If only confinement is adjudged, however, then
Article 58b has no effect on adjudged forfeitures.
If the sentence, as approved by the convening authority or other
competent authority, does not result in forfeitures by the operation of
Article 58b, then only adjudged forfeitures are effective.
Article 58b has no effect on summary courts-martial.
R.C.M. 1005(e) is amended to read as follows:
(e) Required Instructions. Instructions on sentence shall include:
(1) A statement of the maximum authorized punishment which may be
adjudged and of the mandatory minimum punishment, if any;
(2) A statement of the effect any sentence announced including a
punitive discharge and confinement, or confinement in excess of six
months will have on the accused's entitlement to pay and allowances.
(3) A statement of the procedures for deliberation and voting on
the sentence set out in R.C.M. 1006;
(4) A statement informing the members that they are solely
responsible for selecting an appropriate sentence and may not rely on
the possibility of any mitigating action by the convening or higher
authority; and
(5) A statement that the members should consider all matters in
extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation, whether introduced before or
after findings, and matters introduced under R.C.M. 1001(b)(1), (2),
(3) and (5).
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1005(e) is amended by inserting
the following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: The requirement to instruct members on the effect a
sentence including a punitive discharge and confinement or confinement
exceeding six months may have on adjudged forfeitures was made
necessary by the creation of Article 58b, UCMJ in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996).
The catch line for R.C.M. 1101 is amended as follows:
Rule 1101. Report of result of trial; post-trial restraint;
deferment of confinement, forfeitures and reduction in grade; waiver of
Article 58(b) forfeitures
R.C.M. 1101(c) is amended as follows:
(c) Deferment of confinement, forfeitures or reduction in grade.
(1) In general. Deferment of a sentence to confinement, forfeitures
or reduction in grade is a postponement of the service and of the
running of a sentence.
(2) Who may defer. The convening authority, or if the accused is no
longer in the convening authority's jurisdiction, the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command to which
the accused is assigned, may, upon written application of the accused,
at any time after the adjournment of the court-martial, defer the
accused's service of a sentence to confinement, forfeitures or
reduction in grade which has not been ordered executed.
(3) Action on deferment request. The authority acting on the
deferment request may, in that authority's discretion, defer service of
a sentence to confinement, forfeitures or reduction in grade. The
accused shall have the burden of showing that the interests of the
accused and the community in deferral outweigh the community's interest
in imposition of the punishment on its effective date. Factors that the
authority acting on a deferment request may consider in determining
whether to grant the deferment request include, where applicable: the
probability of the accused's flight; the probability of the accused's
commission of other offenses, intimidation of witnesses, or
interference with the administration of justice; the nature of the
offenses (including the effect on the victim) of which the accused was
convicted; the sentence adjudged; the command's immediate need for the
accused; the effect of deferment on good order and discipline in the
command; the accused's character, mental condition, family situation,
and service record. The decision of the authority acting on the
deferment request shall be subject to judicial review only for abuse of
discretion. The action of the authority acting on the deferment request
shall be in writing and a copy shall be provided to the accused.
(4) Orders. The action granting deferment shall be reported in the
convening authority's action under R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(E) and shall
include the date of the action on the request when it occurs prior to
or concurrently with the action. Action granting deferment after the
convening authority's action under R.C.M. 1107 shall be reported in
orders under R.C.M. 1114 and included in the record of trial.
(5) Restraint when deferment is granted. When deferment of
confinement is granted, no form of restraint or other limitation on the
accused's liberty may be ordered as a substitute form of punishment. An
accused may, however, be restricted to specified limits or conditions
may be placed on the accused's liberty during the period of deferment
for any other proper reason, including a ground for restraint under
R.C.M. 304.
(6) End of deferment. Deferment of a sentence to confinement,
forfeitures or reduction in grade ends when:
(A) The convening authority takes action under R.C.M. 1107, unless
the convening authority specifies in the action that service of
confinement after the action is deferred;
(B) The confinement, forfeitures or reduction in grade are
suspended;
(C) The deferment expires by its own terms; or
(D) The deferment is otherwise rescinded in accordance with
subsection (c)(7) of this rule. Deferment of confinement may not
continue after the conviction is final under R.C.M. 1209.
(7) Rescission of deferment.
(A) Who may rescind. The authority who granted the deferment or, if
the accused is no longer within that authority's jurisdiction, the
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command
to which the accused is assigned, may rescind the deferment.
(B) Action. Deferment of confinement, forfeitures, or reduction in
grade may be rescinded when additional information is presented to a
proper authority which, when considered with all other information in
the case, that authority finds, in that authority's discretion, is
grounds for denial of deferment under subsection (c)(3) of this rule.
The accused shall promptly be informed of the basis for the rescission
and of the right to submit written matters on the accused's behalf and
to request that the rescission be reconsidered. However, the accused
may be required to serve the sentence to confinement, forfeitures, or
reduction in grade pending this action.
(C) Execution. When deferment of confinement is rescinded after the
convening authority's action under R.C.M. 1107, the confinement may be
ordered executed. However, no such order to rescind a deferment of
confinement may be issued within 7 days of notice of the rescission of
a deferment of confinement to the accused under subsection (c)(7)(B) of
this rule, to afford the accused an opportunity to respond. The
authority rescinding the deferment may extend this period for good
cause shown. The accused shall be credited with any confinement
actually served during this period.
(D) Orders. Rescission of a deferment before or concurrently with
the initial action in the case shall be reported in the action under
R.C.M. 1107(f)(4)(E), which action shall include the dates of the
granting of the deferment and the rescission. Rescission of a deferment
of confinement after the convening
[[Page 15049]]
authority's action shall be reported in supplementary orders in
accordance with R.C.M. 1114 and shall state whether the approved period
of confinement is to be executed or whether all or part of it is to be
suspended.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 1101 (c)(6) is amended to read as
follows:
When the sentence is ordered executed, forfeitures, or reduction in
grade may be suspended but may not be deferred; deferral of confinement
may continue after action in accordance with R.C.M. 1107. A form of
punishment cannot be both deferred and suspended at the same time. When
deferment of confinement, forfeitures, or reduction in grade ends, the
sentence to confinement, forfeitures, or reduction in grade begins to
run or resumes running, as appropriate. When the convening authority
has specified in the action that confinement will be deferred after the
action, the deferment may not be terminated, except under subsections
(6)(B), (C), or (D), until the conviction is final under R.C.M. 1209.
See R.C.M. 1203 for deferment of a sentence to confinement pending
review under Article 67(a)(2).
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1101(c) is amended by inserting
the following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: In enacting the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), Congress amended
Article 57(a) to make forfeitures of pay and allowances and reductions
in grade effective either 14 days after being adjudged by a court-
martial, or when the convening authority takes action in the case,
whichever was earlier in time. Until this change, any adjudged
forfeitures or reduction in grade took effect only at convening
authority action, which meant the accused often retained the privileges
of his or her rank and pay for several months. The intent of the
amendment to Article 57(a) was to change this situation so that the
desired punitive and rehabilitative impact on the accused occurred more
quickly.
Congress, however, desired that a deserving accused be permitted to
request a deferment of any adjudged forfeitures or reduction in grade,
so that a convening authority, in appropriate situations, might
mitigate the effect of Article 57(a).
This change to R.C.M. 1101 is in addition to the change to R.C.M.
1203. The latter implements Congress' creation of Article 57a, giving
the Service Secretary concerned the authority to defer a sentence to
confinement pending review under Article 67(a)(2).
R.C.M. 1101 is amended by adding the following new subparagraph
(d):
(d) Waiving forfeitures resulting from a sentence to confinement to
provide for dependent support.
(1) With respect to forfeiture of pay and allowances resulting only
by operation of law and not adjudged by the court, the convening
authority may waive all or part of the forfeitures for the purpose of
providing support to the accused's dependents for up to six months.
(2) Factors that may be considered by the convening authority in
determining the amount of forfeitures, if any, to be waived include,
but are not limited to, the length of the accused's confinement, the
number and age(s) of the accused's family members, whether the accused
requested waiver, any debts owed by the accused, the ability of the
accused's family members to find employment, and the availability of
transitional compensation for abused dependents permitted under 10
U.S.C. 1059.
(3) For the purposes of this Rule, a ``dependent'' means any person
qualifying as a ``dependent'' under section 1072 of title 10.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 1101(d) is created as follows:
Any waived forfeitures should be expressed in a dollar amount and
for a period of months, not to exceed the months of confinement
adjudged.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1101(d) is created as follows:
1996 Amendment: All references to ``postponing'' service of a
sentence to confinement were changed to the more appropriate term
``defer.''
R.C.M. 1102A is created to read as follows:
Rule 1102A. Post-trial hearing for person found not guilty only by
reason of lack of mental responsibility.
(a) In general. The military judge shall conduct a hearing not
later than forty days following the finding that an accused is not
guilty only by reason of a lack of mental responsibility.
(b) Psychiatric or psychological examination and report. Prior to
the hearing, the military judge or convening authority shall order a
psychiatric or psychological examination of the accused, with the
resulting psychiatric or psychological report transmitted to the
military judge for use in the post-trial hearing.
(c) Post-trial hearing.
(1) The accused shall be represented by defense counsel, and shall
have the opportunity to testify, present evidence, call witnesses on
his or her behalf, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who
appear at the hearing.
(2) The military judge is not bound by the rules of evidence except
with respect to privileges.
(3) An accused found not guilty only by reason of a lack of mental
responsibility of an offense involving bodily injury to another, or
serious damage to the property of another, or involving a substantial
risk of such injury or damage, has the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that his or her release would not create a
substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage
to property of another due to a present mental disease or defect. With
respect to any other offense, the accused has the burden of such proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
(4) If, after the hearing, the military judge finds the accused has
satisfied the standard specified in subsection (3) of this section, the
military judge shall inform the general court-martial convening
authority of this result and the accused shall be released. If,
however, the military judge finds after the hearing that the accused
has not satisfied the standard specified in subsection (3) of this
section, then the military judge shall inform the general court-martial
convening authority of this result and that authority may commit the
accused to the custody of the Attorney General.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1102A is created as follows:
1996 Amendments. This new Rule implements Article 76b(b), UCMJ.
Created by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), it provides for a post-
trial hearing within forty days of the finding that the accused is not
guilty only by reason of a lack of mental responsibility. Depending on
the offense concerned, the accused has the burden of proving either by
a preponderance of the evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence,
that his or her release would not create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property of another due
to a present mental disease or defect. The intent of the drafters is
for R.C.M. 1102A to mirror the provisions of sections 4243 and 4247 of
title 18, United States Code.
R.C.M. 1105(b) is amended to read as follows:
(b) Matters which may be submitted. The accused may submit to the
convening authority any matters which may reasonably tend to affect the
convening authority's decision whether to disapprove any findings of
guilty or to approve the sentence. The convening
[[Page 15050]]
authority is only required to consider written submissions. Submissions
are not subject to the Military Rules of Evidence and may include:
(1) Allegations of errors affecting the legality of the findings or
sentence;
(2) Portions or summaries of the record and copies of documentary
evidence offered or introduced at trial;
(3) Matters in mitigation which were not available for
consideration at the court-martial; and
(4) Clemency recommendations by any member, the military judge, or
any other person. The defense may ask any person for such a
recommendation.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 1105(b) is amended by adding the
following at the end of the Discussion:
Although only written submissions must be considered, the convening
authority may consider any submission by the accused, including, but
not limited to, videotapes, photographs, and oral presentations.
R.C.M. 1107(b)(4) is amended to read as follows:
(4) When proceedings resulted in a finding of not guilty or not
guilty only by reason of lack of mental responsibility, or there was a
ruling amounting to a finding of not guilty. The convening authority
shall not take action approving or disapproving a finding of not
guilty, a finding of not guilty only by reason of lack of mental
responsibility, or a ruling amounting to a finding of not guilty. The
convening authority, however, shall commit the accused to a suitable
facility pending a hearing and disposition in accordance with R.C.M.
1102A.
The Discussion following R.C.M. 1107(b)(4) is created as follows:
Commitment of the accused to the custody of the Attorney General
for hospitalization is discretionary.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1107(b) is amended by inserting
the following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: Congress created Article 76b, UCMJ in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106
(1996). It gives the convening authority discretion to commit an
accused found not guilty only by reason of a lack of mental
responsibility to the custody of the Attorney General.
The catch line for R.C.M. 1107(d)(3) is amended as follows:
(3) Deferring service of a sentence to confinement.
R.C.M. 1107(d)(3)(A) is amended to read as follows:
(A) In a case in which a court-martial sentences an accused
referred to in subsection (B), below, to confinement, the convening
authority may defer service of a sentence to confinement by a court-
martial, without the consent of the accused, until after the accused
has been permanently released to the armed forces by a state or foreign
country.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1107(d) is amended by inserting
the following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: This new subsection implements the creation of
Article 58b, UCMJ in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996). This article permits the
convening authority (or other person acting under Article 60) to waive
any or all of the forfeitures of pay and allowances forfeited by
operation of Article 58b(a) for a period not in excess of six months.
Any forfeitures waived shall be paid to the accused's dependent(s) for
support.
R.C.M. 1203(c)(1) is amended to read as follows:
(1) Forwarding by the Judge Advocate General to the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. The Judge Advocate General may forward
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals to the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces for review with respect to any matter of law. In
such a case, the Judge Advocate General shall cause a copy of the
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the order forwarding the
case to be served on the accused and on appellate defense counsel.
While a review of a forwarded case is pending, the Secretary concerned
may defer further service of a sentence to confinement which has been
ordered executed in such a case.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1203(c) is amended by inserting
the following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: The change to the rule implements Congress'
creation of Article 57a, UCMJ, contained in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996). A
sentence to confinement may be deferred by the Secretary concerned when
it has been set aside by a Court of Criminal Appeals and a Judge
Advocate General certifies the case to the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces for further review under Article 67(a)(2). Unless it can
be shown that the accused is a flight risk or a potential threat to the
community, the accused should be released from confinement pending the
appeal. See Moore v. Adkins, 30 M.J. 249 (C.M.A. 1990).
R.C.M. 1210(a) is amended by adding at the end thereof the
following sentence:
A petition for a new trial of the facts may not be submitted on the
basis of newly discovered evidence when the petitioner was found guilty
of the relevant offense pursuant to a guilty plea.
The analysis accompanying R.C.M. 1210 is amended by adding the
following at the end thereof:
1996 Amendment: R.C.M. 1210(a) was amended to clarify its
application consistent with interpretations of Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 that
newly discovered evidence is never a basis for a new trial of the facts
when the accused has pled guilty. See United States v. Lambert, 603
F.2d 808, 809 (10th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Gordon, 4
F.3d 1567, 1572 n.3 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1236
(1994); United States v. Collins, 898 F. 2d 103 (9th Cir. 1990)(per
curiam); United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1976);
Williams v. United States, 290 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1961). But see United
States v. Brown, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 207, 211, 29 C.M.R. 23, 27 (1960) (per
Latimer, J.) (newly discovered evidence could be used to attack guilty
plea on appeal in era prior to the guilty plea examination mandated by
United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969) and
R.C.M. 910(e)). Article 73 authorizes a petition for a new trial of the
facts when there has been a trial. When there is a guilty plea, there
is no trial. See R.C.M. 910(j). Additionally, R.C.M. 1210(f)(2)(C)
provides that a new trial may not be granted on the basis of newly
discovered evidence unless ``[t]he newly discovered evidence, if
considered by a court-martial in the light of all other pertinent
evidence, would probably produce a substantially more favorable result
for the accused.'' The amendment is made in recognition of the fact
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether newly
discovered evidence would have an impact on the trier of fact when
there has been no trier of fact and no previous trial of the facts at
which other pertinent evidence has been adduced.
Part IV, paragraph 19, is amended to read as follows:
19. Article 95--Resistance, flight, breach of arrest, and escape
a. Text.
``Any person subject to this chapter who--
(1) resists apprehension;
(2) flees from apprehension;
(3) breaks arrest; or
(4) escapes from custody or confinement; shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct.''
b. Elements.
(1) Resisting apprehension.
(a) That a certain person attempted to apprehend the accused;
(b) That said person was authorized to apprehend the accused; and
[[Page 15051]]
(c) That the accused actively resisted the apprehension.
(2) Flight from apprehension.
(a) That a certain person attempted to apprehend the accused;
(b) That said person was authorized to apprehend the accused; and
(c) That the accused fled from the apprehension.
(3) Breaking arrest.
(a) That a certain person ordered the accused into arrest;
(b) That said person was authorized to order the accused into
arrest; and
(c) That the accused went beyond the limits of arrest before being
released from that arrest by proper authority.
(4) Escape from custody.
(a) That a certain person apprehended the accused;
(b) That said person was authorized to apprehend the accused; and
(c) That the accused freed himself or herself from custody before
being released by proper authority.
(5) Escape from confinement.
(a) That a certain person ordered the accused into confinement;
(b) That said person was authorized to order the accused into
confinement; and
(c) That the accused freed himself or herself from confinement
before being released by proper authority. [Note: If the escape was
from post-trial confinement, add the following element]
(d) That the confinement was the result of a court-martial
conviction.
c. Explanation.
(1) Resisting apprehension.
(a) Apprehension. Apprehension is the taking of a person into
custody. See R.C.M. 302.
(b) Authority to apprehend. See R.C.M. 302(b) concerning who may
apprehend. Whether the status of a person authorized that person to
apprehend the accused is a question of law to be decided by the
military judge. Whether the person who attempted to make an
apprehension had such a status is a question of fact to be decided by
the factfinder.
(c) Nature of the resistance. The resistance must be active, such
as assaulting the person attempting to apprehend. Mere words of
opposition, argument, or abuse, and attempts to escape from custody
after the apprehension is complete, do not constitute the offense of
resisting apprehension although they may constitute other offenses.
(d) Mistake. It is a defense that the accused held a reasonable
belief that the person attempting to apprehend did not have authority
to do so. However, the accused's belief at the time that no basis
exists for the apprehension is not a defense.
(e) Illegal apprehension. A person may not be convicted of
resisting apprehension if the attempted apprehension is illegal, but
may be convicted of other offenses, such as assault, depending on all
the circumstances. An attempted apprehension by a person authorized to
apprehend is presumed to be legal in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Ordinarily the legality of an apprehension is a question of
law to be decided by the military judge.
(2) Flight from apprehension. The flight must be active, such as
running or driving away.
(3) Breaking arrest.
(a) Arrest. There are two types of arrest: pretrial arrest under
Article 9 (see R.C.M. 304) and arrest under Article 15 (see paragraph
5c(3), Part V). This article prohibits breaking any arrest.
(b) Authority to order arrest. See R.C.M. 304(b) and paragraphs 2
and 5b, Part V concerning authority to order arrest.
(c) Nature of restraint imposed by arrest. In arrest, the restraint
is moral restraint imposed by orders fixing the limits of arrest.
(d) Breaking. Breaking arrest is committed when the person in
arrest infringes the limits set by orders. The reason for the
infringement is immaterial. For example, innocence of the offense with
respect to which an arrest may have been imposed is not a defense.
(e) Illegal arrest. A person may not be convicted of breaking
arrest if the arrest is illegal. An arrest ordered by one authorized to
do so is presumed to be legal in the absence of some evidence to the
contrary. Ordinarily, the legality of an arrest is a question of law to
be decided by the military judge.
(4) Escape from custody.
(a) Custody. ``Custody'' is restraint of free locomotion imposed by
lawful apprehension. The restraint may be physical or, once there has
been a submission to apprehension or a forcible taking into custody, it
may consist of control exercised in the presence of the prisoner by
official acts or orders. Custody is temporary restraint intended to
continue until other restraint (arrest, restriction, confinement) is
imposed or the person is released.
(b) Authority to apprehend. See subparagraph (1)(b) above.
(c) Escape. For a discussion of escape, see subparagraph c(4)(c),
below.
(d) Illegal custody. A person may not be convicted of this offense
if the custody was illegal. An apprehension effected by one authorized
to apprehend is presumed to be lawful in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. Ordinarily, the legality of an apprehension is a question of
law to be decided by the military judge.
(e) Correctional custody. See paragraph 70.
(5) Escape from confinement.
(a) Confinement. Confinement is physical restraint imposed under
R.C.M. 305; 1101; or paragraph 5b, Part V. For purposes of the element
of post-trial confinement (subparagraph b (5)(d), above) and increased
punishment therefor (subparagraph e (4), below), the confinement must
have been imposed pursuant to an adjudged sentence of a court-martial
and not as a result of pretrial restraint or nonjudicial punishment.
(b) Authority to order confinement. See R.C.M. 304(b); 1101; and
paragraphs 2 and 5b, Part V concerning who may order confinement.
(c) Escape. An escape may be either with or without force or
artifice, and either with or without the consent of the custodian.
However, where a prisoner is released by one with apparent authority to
do so, the prisoner may not be convicted of escape from confinement.
See also paragraph 20c(1)(b). Any completed casting off of the
restraint of confinement, before release by proper authority, is an
escape, and lack of effectiveness of the restraint imposed is
immaterial. An escape is not complete until the prisoner is momentarily
free from the restraint. If the movement toward escape is opposed, or
before it is completed, an immediate pursuit follows, there is no
escape until opposition is overcome or pursuit is shaken off.
(d) Status when temporarily outside confinement facility. A
prisoner who is temporarily escorted outside a confinement facility for
a work detail or other reason by a guard, who has both the duty and
means to prevent that prisoner from escaping, remains in confinement.
(e) Legality of confinement. A person may not be convicted of
escape from confinement if the confinement is illegal. Confinement
ordered by one authorized to do so is presumed to be lawful in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. Ordinarily, the legality of
confinement is a question of law to be decided by the military judge.
d. Lesser included offenses.
(1) Resisting apprehension. Article 128--assault; assault
consummated by a battery
(2) Breaking arrest.
(a) Article 134--breaking restriction
(b) Article 80--attempts
(3) Escape from custody. Article 80--attempts
[[Page 15052]]
(4) Escape from confinement. Article 80--attempts
e. Maximum punishment.
(1) Resisting apprehension. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.
(2) Flight from apprehension. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of
all pay and allowances, and confinement for 1 year.
(3) Breaking arrest. Bad-conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay
and allowances, and confinement for 6 months.
(4) Escape from custody, pretrial confinement, or confinement on
bread and water or diminished rations imposed pursuant to Article 15.
Dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for 1 year.
(5) Escape from post-trial confinement. Dishonorable discharge,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 5 years.
f. Sample specifications.
(1) Resisting apprehension.
In that ________ (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board--
location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about
________ 19____, resist being apprehended by ________, (an armed force
policeman) (________), a person authorized to apprehend the accused.
(2) Flight from apprehension.
In that ______________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on
board--location) (subject matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or
about ______________ 199____, flee apprehension by______________ (an
armed force policeman) (______________), a person authorized to
apprehend the accused.
(3) Breaking arrest.
In that ________ (personal jurisdiction data), having been placed
in arrest (in quarters) (in his/her company area) (________) by a
person authorized to order the accused into arrest, did, (at/on board--
location) on or about ________ 19____, break said arrest.
(4) Escape from custody.
In that ________ (personal jurisdiction data), did, (at/on board--
location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about
________ 19____, escape from the custody of ________, a person
authorized to apprehend the accused.
(5) Escape from confinement.
In that ________ (personal jurisdiction data), having been placed
in (post-trial) confinement in (place of confinement), by a person
authorized to order accused into confinement did, (at/on board ________
location) (subject-matter jurisdiction data, if required), on or about
________ 19____, escape from confinement.
The following analysis is inserted after the analysis to Article
95:
1996 Amendment: Subparagraphs a, b, c and f were amended to
implement the amendment to 10 U.S.C. Sec. 895 (Article 95, UCMJ)
contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996). The amendment proscribes fleeing from
apprehension without regard to whether the accused otherwise resisted
apprehension. The amendment responds to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces decisions in United States v. Harris, 29 M.J. 169
(C.M.A. 1989), and United States v. Burgess, 32 M.J. 446 (C.M.A. 1991).
In both cases, the court held that resisting apprehension does not
include fleeing from apprehension, contrary to the then-existing
explanation in Part IV, paragraph 19b(i), MCM, of the nature of the
resistance required for resisting apprehension. The 1951 and 1969
Manuals for Courts-Martial also explained that flight could constitute
resisting apprehension under article 95, an interpretation affirmed in
the only early military case on point, United States v. Mercer, 11
C.M.R. 812 (A.F.B.R. 1953).
Flight from apprehension should be expressly deterred and punished
under military law. Military personnel are specially trained and
routinely expected to submit to lawful authority. Rather than being a
merely incidental or reflexive action, flight from apprehension in the
context of the armed forces may have a distinct and cognizable impact
on military discipline.
Part IV, paragraphs 45.a & b, are amended to read as follows:
45. Article 120--Rape and carnal knowledge
a. Text.
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual
intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall
be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may
direct.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who, under circumstances not
amounting to rape, commits an act of sexual intercourse with a person--
(1) who is not his or her spouse; and
(2) who has not attained the age of sixteen years; is guilty of
carnal knowledge and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
(c) Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete either
of these offenses.
``(d)(1) In a prosecution under subsection (b), it is an
affirmative defense that--
(A) the person with whom the accused committed the act of sexual
intercourse had at the time of the alleged offense attained the age of
twelve years; and
(B) the accused reasonably believed that the person had at the time
of the alleged offense attained the age of sixteen years.
(2) The accused has the burden of proving a defense under paragraph
(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.''
b. Elements.
(1) Rape.
(a) That the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse; and;
(b) That the act of sexual intercourse was done by force and
without consent.
(2) Carnal knowledge.
(a) That the accused committed an act of sexual intercourse with a
certain person;
(b) That the person was not the accused's spouse; and
(c) That at the time of the sexual intercourse the person was under
16 years of age.
The following analysis is inserted after the analysis to Article
120:
1996 Amendment: In enacting the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106 (1996), Congress amended
Article 120, UCMJ, to create a mistake of fact defense to a prosecution
for carnal knowledge. The accused must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the person with whom he or she had sexual intercourse was
at least 12 years of age, and that the accused reasonably believed that
this person was at least 16 years of age.
Part IV, paragraph 45.c.(2), is amended to read as follows:
(2) Carnal knowledge. ``Carnal knowledge'' is sexual intercourse
under circumstances not amounting to rape, with a person who is not the
accused's spouse and who has not attained the age of 16 years. Any
penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. It
is a defense, however, which the accused must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence, that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, the
person with whom the accused committed the act of sexual intercourse
was at least 12 years of age, and that the accused reasonably believed
that this same person was at least 16 years of age.
c. Part IV, paragraph 54.e.(1), is amended to read as follows:
(1) Simple Assault.
(A) Generally. Confinement for 3 months and forfeiture of two-
thirds pay per month for 3 months.
[[Page 15053]]
(B) When committed with an unloaded firearm. Dishonorable
discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and confinement for 2
years.
The following analysis is inserted after the analysis to Article
128, para. e:
1996 Amendment: A separate maximum punishment for assault with an
unloaded firearm was created due to the serious nature of the offense.
Threatening a person with an unloaded firearm places the victim of that
assault in fear of losing his or her life. Such a traumatic experience
is a far greater injury to the victim than that sustained in the course
of a typical simple assault and therefore calls for an increased
punishment.
ADDRESSES: Comments on the proposed changes should be sent to Maj. Paul
Holden, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Criminal Law Division,
2200 Army Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-2200.
DATES: Comments on the proposed changes must be received no later than
[insert date of publication +75 days] for consideration by the Joint
Service Committee on Military Justice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: LT J. Russell McFarlane, JAGC, USNR,
Executive Secretary, Joint Service Committee on Military Justice,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Criminal Law Division, Building
111, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. 20374-1111; (202) 433-5895.
Dated: April 1, 1996.
Patricia L. Toppings,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 96-8330 Filed 4-3-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5000-04-P