[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 61 (Thursday, March 28, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13834-13846]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-7464]



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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[A-428-816]


Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate From Germany: Final 
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of final results of antidumping duty administrative 
review.

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SUMMARY: On July 13, 1995, the Department of Commerce (the Department) 
published the preliminary results of the administrative review of the 
antidumping duty order on certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate from 
Germany. This review covers one manufacturer/exporter of the subject 
merchandise to the United States during the period of review (POR), 
February 4, 1993, through July 31, 1994. We gave interested parties an 
opportunity to comment on our preliminary results. Based on our 
analysis of the comments received, we have changed the results from 
those presented in the preliminary results of review.

EFFECTIVE DATE: March 28, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nancy Decker or Linda Ludwig, Office 
of Agreements Compliance, Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 
482-3793.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On July 13, 1995, the Department published in the Federal Register 
(60 FR 36105) the preliminary results of the administrative review of 
the antidumping duty order on certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate 
from Germany (58 FR 44170, August 19, 1993). The Department has now 
completed this administrative review in accordance with section 751 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the Act).

Applicable Statute and Regulations

    Unless otherwise stated, all citations to the statute and to the 
Department's regulations are references to the provisions as they 
existed on December 31, 1994.

Scope of These Reviews

    The products covered by this administrative review constitute one 
``class or kind'' of merchandise: Certain cut-to-length carbon steel 
plate. These products include hot-rolled carbon steel universal mill 
plates (i.e., flat-rolled products rolled on four faces or in a closed 
box pass, of a width exceeding 150 millimeters but not exceeding 1,250 
millimeters and of a thickness of not less than 4 millimeters, not in 
coils and without patterns in relief), of rectangular shape, neither 
clad, plated nor coated with metal, whether or not painted, varnished, 
or coated with plastics or other nonmetallic substances; and certain 
hot-rolled carbon steel flat-rolled products in straight lengths, of 
rectangular shape, hot rolled, neither clad, plated, nor coated with 
metal, whether or not painted, varnished, or coated with plastics or 
other nonmetallic substances, 4.75 millimeters or more in thickness and 
of a width which exceeds 150 millimeters and measures at least twice 
the thickness, as currently classifiable in the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule (HTS) under item numbers 7208.31.0000, 7208.32.0000, 
7208.33.1000, 7208.33.5000, 7208.41.0000, 7208.42.0000, 7208.43.0000, 
7208.90.0000, 7210.70.3000, 7210.90.9000, 7211.11.0000, 7211.12.0000, 
7211.21.0000, 7211.22.0045, 7211.90.0000, 7212.40.1000, 7212.40.5000, 
and 7212.50.0000. Included are flat-rolled products of nonrectangular 
cross-section where such cross-section is achieved subsequent to the 
rolling process (i.e., products which have been ``worked after 
rolling'')--for example, products which have been bevelled or rounded 
at the edges. Excluded is grade X-70 plate. These HTS item numbers are 
provided for convenience and Customs purposes. The written description 
remains dispositive.
    The POR is February 4, 1993, through July 31, 1994. This review 
covers entries of certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate by AG der 
Dillinger Huttenwerke (Dillinger).

Analysis of Comments Received

    We gave interested parties an opportunity to comment on the 
preliminary results. We received case and rebuttal briefs from the 
respondent (Dillinger) and petitioners (Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 
U.S. Steel Company a Unit of USX Corporation, Inland Steel Industries, 
Inc., Geneva Steel, Gulf States Steel Inc. of Alabama, Sharon Steel 
Corporation, and Lukens Steel Company). Dillinger requested a hearing 
then subsequently withdrew its request; therefore, no hearing was held.
    Comment 1: Petitioners assert that based on the overwhelming number 
of problems with Dillinger's information, the Department has no choice 
but to apply total best information available (BIA). Petitioners base 
their assertion on a claim that, despite an inordinate number of 
opportunities to correct its deficient submissions, Dillinger has still 
failed to provide reliable data on even the most fundamental elements 
of the Department's analysis. According to petitioners, the 
Department's verification reports and exhibits demonstrate Dillinger 
failed verification. Petitioners assert that problems with Dillinger's 
data include: a majority of Dillinger's home market sales transactions 
examined at verification contained erroneous data; Dillinger's product 
coding contains systemic problems; Dillinger failed to demonstrate 
complete reporting of U.S. sales for 1994 and home market sales for 
1992 and 1994; Dillinger failed to resolve a discrepancy between 
verification documentation and reported U.S. sales quantities; 
Dillinger did not provide the necessary actual to theoretical weight 
conversion factors for cost of production (COP), constructed value 
(CV), and differences in merchandise (DIFMER) adjustment; Dillinger 
miscoded customer levels of trade; Dillinger failed to demonstrate that 
certain freight services provided by related parties were at arm's-
length; Dillinger failed to demonstrate that commissions paid to 
related parties were at arm's-length; Dillinger failed to provide 
information regarding 500 related companies thus preventing the 
Department from verifying whether they provide Dillinger with services 
related to subject merchandise; Dillinger extensively misreported dates 
of sale and failed to demonstrate to the Department that its reported 
sales took into account changes in price and payment date; Dillinger 
reported as date of payment the date on which payment was due to it 
rather than the actual date on which payment for home market sales was 
received; and Dillinger's data contains numerous additional 
inaccuracies and omissions.
    Petitioners cite the Department's recent decision to assign total 
(uncooperative) BIA to Mannesmannrohren-Werke AG (MRW)

[[Page 13835]]
in Small Diameter Circular Seamless Carbon and Alloy Steel, Standard, 
Line and Pressure Pipe from Germany (60 FR 31978-79--June 19, 1995). 
Petitioners argue that this makes the case for applying total BIA to 
Dillinger all the more compelling because Dillinger's errors and 
omissions are far more egregious than those committed by MRW. In the 
Seamless Pipe case, petitioners note that the Department found that: 
MRW company officials were unable to explain or provide adequate 
documentation for numerous discrepancies and omissions; DIFMER data 
could not be tied to the financial statements; and MRW did not 
adequately demonstrate that sales data reported to the Department took 
into account changes in price, quantity, and date of sale. Similarly, 
the petitioners assert that the Department's verification reports and 
exhibits indicate that the Department encountered essentially the same 
problems with respect to Dillinger's responses, and demonstrate that 
the Department was unable to verify the completeness of either 
Dillinger's reported home market or U.S. sales databases. Therefore, 
according to petitioners, Dillinger's home market and U.S. sales 
databases have not been demonstrated to be reliable and thus cannot be 
used to calculate accurate dumping margins.
    According to petitioners, significant errors in reporting product 
characteristics, sale dates, and levels of trade effectively eliminate 
any possibility of matching home market and U.S. sales. Petitioners 
assert that the failure to identify related parties renders reported 
charges and expenses meaningless.
    Petitioners argue that Dillinger has significantly impeded the 
Department's administration of this review by providing seriously 
deficient information. Furthermore, petitioners claim that Dillinger 
failed to alert the Department to any difficulties with respect to, 
among other deficient areas, the reporting of: levels of trade; prime/
non-prime merchandise; actual/theoretical weights and conversion 
factors; and dates of sale. Moreover petitioners argue that Dillinger 
has repeatedly ignored or provided incomplete and/or inaccurate 
responses to the Department's requests for information. Therefore, 
petitioners continue, the Department should disregard Dillinger's 
responses and use as BIA, the highest rate ever applicable to the firm 
for the same class or kind of merchandise from the investigation.
    Finally, petitioners assert that if the Department determines to 
contradict its standard practice (see Defrost Timers from Japan (59 FR 
1928--January 13, 1994), Tapered Roller Bearings from Japan (60 FR 
22349--May 5, 1995), and Certain Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Belgium (58 FR 37083, 37084, 37090--July 9, 1993)) and erroneously 
concludes not to apply total BIA, it should make certain adjustments 
which are discussed in petitioners' other comments.
    Respondent argues that petitioners concentrate on arguments which 
are either not supported by the record evidence, supplant the 
Department's judgment of what data should have been verified or taken 
into evidence as verification exhibits, or take out of context judicial 
opinions and ignore the relevant case law and standard practices of the 
Department. Certain of petitioners' comments (i.e., regarding the 
majority of Dillinger's home market sales containing erroneous data) 
are nothing more than unsupported statements.
    Specifically, respondent contends that contrary to petitioners' 
assertions, the Department verified the completeness of Dillinger's 
reported home market and U.S. sales databases. Concerning petitioners' 
allegation that there is a significant discrepancy in Dillinger's 
reported value of U.S. sales, respondent argues that it satisfactorily 
demonstrated that its own accounting records list only the price of the 
merchandise as it leaves Germany. This value does not include expenses, 
which are incurred by Francosteel (Dillinger's related U.S. selling 
agent), included in the sales price to the first unrelated purchaser 
(e.g., U.S. duty, U.S. inland freight, etc.). The respondent contends 
that the Department verified the total sales value and quantity for 
both 1993 and 1994 at Francosteel and tied these amounts to 
Francosteel's financial statements. Therefore, respondent argues that 
petitioners' allegation has no foundation in fact.
    Respondent further argues that petitioners' assertions of 
significant errors in reporting product characteristics, sales dates, 
levels of trade, and failure by Dillinger to identify related parties, 
are without merit. Respondent contends that the evidence on the record 
unequivocally shows that the data submitted by Dillinger was verified 
and accurate in all material respects.
    With respect to partial BIA, the respondent does not believe any 
adverse changes should be made to any item addressed by the 
petitioners, but if the Department decides to change its calculations, 
only the actual figure attributable to the sale in question should be 
changed. Alternatively, a reasonable figure, such as an average of the 
data provided, should be used rather than the most adverse number 
advocated by petitioners.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent that the use of 
total BIA is not warranted in this administrative review. Dillinger has 
been cooperative throughout the proceeding. While we did discover some 
errors and discrepancies at verification, the extent and magnitude of 
the errors and discrepancies did not exceed those that are commonly 
found at verification and were not so large as to render the 
Dillinger's reported information unusable. Therefore, we find the use 
of total BIA unjustified. Regarding date of sale, while changes in 
price or quantity may have occurred after the date of sale Dillinger 
reported, the reported price and quantity were correct. In other words, 
only the date of sale may have been wrong. As the verification report 
notes, home market date of sale is the date a sale is originally booked 
in the computer; the date is not changed in this database if the order 
is subsequently modified. As noted in the preliminary results, we have 
used shipment date as date of sale for home market sales in our 
calculations. The rest of petitioners' individual allegations are 
addressed in other comments.
    Comment 2: Respondent argues that the Department incorrectly added 
a reserve for demolition of an old coking plant. It states that the 
plant was torn down in 1984--ten years prior to the POR, and that it 
ended production in July 1984. Accordingly, it states that the cost to 
demolish this plant can correctly be allocated only to the steel which 
was the beneficiary of this plant's production. Respondent summarizes 
that since that steel is not subject to this review, no adjustment is 
permissible.
    Petitioners respond that the Department correctly added this 
accrual to COP and CV. They state that Dillinger apparently capitalized 
the costs of demolishing the coke plant because these costs were 
expected to benefit future periods. Petitioners argue that the 
subsequent accruals, therefore, represent the periodic benefit which 
Dillinger associated with the demolition. Petitioners argue that the 
fact that these expenses were included in Dillinger's fiscal 1993 
financial records indicates that the accruals continued through the 
period of review. The petitioners further state that this accrual 
differs from the reversal of prior year operating expense accruals 
(which represent a correction of an estimate made in a prior year) 
which the Department does not include in COP and CV (see, e.g., Small 
Diameter

[[Page 13836]]
Circular Seamless Carbon and Alloy, Standard Line, and Pressure Pipe 
from Italy, 60 FR 31981, 31991, June 19, 1995).
    Department's Position: We disagree with the respondent. This 
accrual was recorded in Dillinger's accounting records during the POR. 
It is the Department's general practice to include accruals which are 
recognized in the respondent's audited financial statements in the COP/
CV calculations. While the old coking plant does not benefit current 
operations, its removal does by rationalizing operations which was 
recognized in the financial statements during the POR. In Steel Pipe 
from Italy, 60 FR 31981, 31992 (June 19, 1995), we found that upon 
disposal of assets, the gain or loss associated with them would be 
included in COP/CV at that time. The demolition of the coke plant is 
equivalent to the disposal of an asset; therefore we are continuing to 
include this accrual in the calculation of COP/CV.
    Comment 3: Respondent argues that the Department should not have 
added an amount for Rogesa's (Dillinger's supplier of pig iron and a 
partially owned subsidiary) write-off of receivables from Saarstahl AG 
(SAG) (Dillinger's sister company), to COP and CV. Respondent argues 
that this amount resulted from sales of pig iron by Rogesa to SAG, 
which were written-off by Rogesa as an extraordinary loss solely 
because of SAG's bankruptcy. Dillinger further states that because 
Rogesa is a producer of pig iron and because SAG uses the pig iron to 
manufacture non-scope products (neither Rogesa nor SAG are producers of 
carbon steel plate), there is no link between this sale of pig iron and 
the antidumping order on sales of carbon steel plate by Dillinger. 
Respondent cites the fact that in prior cases, the Department has 
determined an extraordinary loss should be included in COP only if it 
relates to the production of subject merchandise (Antifriction Bearings 
from Japan: Final Results, July 11, 1991, 56 FR 31692, 31734). Finally, 
respondent states that if the Department continues to include this 
amount in COP and CV, it should at least reduce the amount by 50 
percent. It states that the cost verification report acknowledges that 
Rogesa would be responsible for only half the amount written off 
because of Rogesa's profit/loss sharing agreement with its parents.
    Petitioners respond that the Department has considered expenses 
related to bankruptcy proceedings to be ordinary operating expenses, as 
opposed to extraordinary expenses (see Fresh and Chilled Atlantic 
Salmon From Norway, 58 FR 37912, 37915, July 14, 1993); even if these 
expenses were extraordinary, they still may be included in the COP and 
CV if they are related to the subject merchandise. The petitioners 
further state that the relevance of the SAG bankruptcy expenses to 
Rogesa is indicated by the fact that the expenses were incurred by 
Rogesa and were entered on Rogesa's accounting records in the normal 
course of business. Petitioners continue that since Rogesa booked these 
expenses as extraordinary rather than operating expenses relating to 
particular merchandise, these expenses relate to Rogesa as a whole 
rather than to particular merchandise manufactured or sold by Rogesa. 
Petitioners claim that accordingly, these expenses are properly 
included in COP and CV. Petitioners note that COP and CV comprise all 
costs of producing the subject merchandise including general and 
administrative (G&A) expenses which relate to the company as a whole 
rather than to the production process. According to the petitioners, 
including these expenses in the COP of the pig iron was correct since 
the pig iron sold to Dillinger is used in the production of subject 
merchandise. Finally, petitioners disagree with respondent that if the 
Department includes this expense in COP and CV, it should at least be 
reduced by 50 percent. Petitioners assert that the fact that Rogesa's 
parent companies absorb its profit or loss has no relevance to the 
determination of Rogesa's cost of producing the pig iron used in 
manufacturing the subject merchandise.
    Department's Position: We agree with petitioners that these 
expenses are properly included in the COP for pig iron. We found these 
expenses to be write-offs of receivables from SAG. Write-offs of 
receivables are bad debt expenses. The Department considers these to be 
ordinary operating expenses because they are by their very nature 
indirect selling expenses since, under generally accepted accounting 
principles, bad debt is recovered over time by future price increases 
(see Fresh Cut Roses from Columbia, 60 FR 6980, 7014). Since cost 
information was used for the purchase of pig iron from Rogesa (rather 
than acquisition price) and since these expenses are ordinary operating 
expenses, which relate to Rogesa as a whole, they are properly included 
in Rogesa's COP along with Rogesa's other general expenses. The fact 
that Rogesa's parents absorb its profit or loss has no relevance. 
Rogesa's sales must cover all of its expenses (production and general). 
Rogesa's G&A costs were divided by total production to give a cost per 
ton of pig iron. We have treated the bankruptcy costs like Rogesa's 
other general or overhead expenses.
    Comment 4: Respondent argues that Department should not have 
included two expenses related to SAG's bankruptcy in COP and CV. 
According to respondent, one of the costs related to Dillinger's 
assumption of SAG's debt to another company. Respondent states that 
since SAG does not produce carbon steel plate, this cost is not 
relevant to the antidumping duty order because it is not related to the 
production or sale of carbon steel plate by Dillinger. According to 
respondent, the other cost was an extraordinary loss that resulted from 
the write-off of claims against SAG for pension obligations, which were 
to be reimbursed to Dillinger. Again, Dillinger claims that since these 
expenses do not concern the production of carbon steel plate, they have 
no relevance to the antidumping duty order.
    Petitioners argue that Dillinger: booked these expenses as 
extraordinary expenses rather than operating expenses relating to 
particular merchandise; entered into an arrangement to assume various 
debts of SAG and to write-off receivables owed by SAG; and was jointly 
liable for SAG's tax liability. Petitioners assert that the bankruptcy 
expenses assumed by Dillinger, therefore, relate to Dillinger ``as a 
whole'' and should be included in the G&A component of COP and CV.
    Department's Position: We disagree with respondent. Contrary to 
respondent's characterization, we found these expenses to be write-offs 
of receivables from SAG and its subsidiaries. Write-offs of receivables 
are bad debt expenses. The Department considers these to be ordinary 
operating expenses because they are by their very nature indirect 
selling expenses since, under generally accepted accounting principles, 
bad debt is recovered over time by future price increases (see Fresh 
Cut Roses from Columbia, 60 FR 6980, 7014). Therefore, we have included 
these in the indirect selling expense portion of COP/CV.
    Comment 5: Petitioners argue that the Department should include all 
the bankruptcy expenses related to Dillinger Htte Saarstahl (DHS) 
(Dillinger's and SAG's parent company) and SAG. Petitioners assert the 
Department considers bankruptcy costs to be ordinary operating expenses 
(see Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (58 FR 37912, 
37915--July 14, 1993)). According to petitioners, even extraordinary 
expenses may be included in calculating the COP and CV under

[[Page 13837]]
the principle of full absorption costing provided they are related to 
the subject merchandise (see Tapered Roller Bearings from Japan (56 FR 
41508, 41516--August 21, 1991) and Welded Stainless Steel Pipe from 
Korea (57 FR 53693 and 53694--November 12, 1992)). Petitioners argue 
that although Dillinger contended SAG was not involved in the 
manufacture of subject merchandise, the information Dillinger submitted 
at verification indicated otherwise. Petitioners assert that the 
majority of expenses booked by Dillinger and Rogesa involve write-offs 
of receivables owed by SAG to Dillinger and Rogesa. According to 
petitioners, these receivables were generated as a result of the 
operations of Dillinger and Rogesa. Petitioners claim that while the 
Department adjusted for Rogesa's write-off of receivables from SAG in 
the preliminary results, it did not adjust for receivables forgiven by 
Dillinger or for debts assumed by Dillinger and Rogesa, or other 
expenses of bankruptcy. Petitioners assert that these remaining 
bankruptcy expenses should be included in Dillinger's COP/CV. 
Petitioners note that Dillinger and Rogesa incurred G&A costs (which 
the questionnaire describes as those which relate to the company as a 
whole rather than to the production process) to save DHS (their parent) 
from bankruptcy. Petitioners argue that the exclusion of such costs is 
contrary to Department practice, and therefore, the costs should be 
included in G&A.
    Respondent argues that the Department correctly excluded certain 
expenses related to SAG's bankruptcy. It argues that these expenses are 
not G&A, regardless of the petitioners' characterization, and 
therefore, don't relate to the company as a whole. According to 
respondent, many are selling expenses unrelated to scope merchandise 
(incurred by SAG on purchases unrelated to plate). According to 
respondent, petitioners do not explain how sales of pig iron by Rogesa 
to SAG, another non-producer of plate, can be tied to the product under 
review because there is no connection.
    Department's Position: Of the bankruptcy expenses, the Department 
included: Rogesa's write-off of receivables from SAG in the cost of 
manufacturing (COM), as explained in Comment 3; and Dillinger's write-
off of receivables from SAG and its subsidiaries in the indirect 
selling expense portion of COP/CV, as explained in Comment 4. The 
Department did not include the following in COP/CV: Dillinger's and 
Rogesa's assumption of DHS and SAG liabilities (including VAT 
responsibilities) and bank debts (that is Dillinger and Rogesa assumed 
some of SAG's bank debts) because these expenses are not directly 
related to production. The fact that Rogesa and Dillinger assumed some 
of SAG's debts does not relate to the manufacture of subject 
merchandise.
    Comment 6: Petitioners argue that the Department should include 
severance payments made during the POR in Dillinger's COP/CV. They 
state that during the POR, part of a prior period accrual for severance 
payments was reversed, and a certain amount was actually paid. Neither 
was included in the COP/CV calculations, but the petitioners argue, the 
actual payments should have been included. Petitioners assert that 
although Dillinger had claimed earlier in the proceeding that the 
reversal should have been included, this amount was properly excluded. 
Petitioners claim that this conforms with the Department's recent 
statement in Steel Pipe from Italy (60 FR 31981, 31991--June 19, 1995). 
However, the petitioners argue that the severance payments made in 1993 
should be included in COM because they relate to the manufacturing 
expenses during the POR. According to petitioners, in Steel Flat 
Products from Japan (58 FR 37174), the Department stated that 
termination allowances represent an expense recognized within the 
period of investigation and should be reflected in the product cost in 
accordance with full absorption costing principles.
    The respondent argues that the Department should not just exclude 
the reversal of the accrual for severance payments but deduct the 
reversal from COP/CV. It claims that the Department included accruals 
of severance expenses in its COP calculations in the original 
investigation of Dillinger. It would be inequitable and without 
justification for the Department to now ignore the reversal of the 
accrual for the identical expense. Unlike the case cited by 
petitioners, Dillinger claims it will achieve revenue or reduced 
operating costs because it will no longer have to pay the sums 
involved. According to the respondent, the Department's general view in 
Steel Pipe from Italy does not make sense. According to the respondent, 
the Department will only accept a reversal of an accrual in the same 
year as the original accrual. Respondent argues that in that case, 
there would be no accrual in the financial statement in the first 
place. Respondent argues that this type of adjustment is conceptually 
identical to a warranty expense. According to respondent, most warranty 
expenses do not occur for sales within the period of review; they are 
often granted later, yet the Department recognizes this as a legitimate 
expense to be allocated over sales to which they do not apply. 
Respondent argues that the same holds true for reversals of accruals.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners that the actual 
severance payments should be included in COM. These expenses are 
applicable to the COM of the period in which they were accrued, which 
is not the period of review. This is in accordance with full absorption 
costing principles, which, contrary to petitioners' assertion, is 
consistent with the Japanese Flat Products case. In that case, the 
termination allowances were recognized within the period of 
investigation and therefore reflected in the product cost in accordance 
with full absorption costing principles. In the instant review, the 
severance expenses were recognized and accrued in a prior period. In 
the period of review, Dillinger is simply paying severance amounts out 
of the prior period expense/accrual.
    We also disagree with respondent that the reversal of the accrual 
should be included in COM. The original accrual occurred in 1990. The 
accrual being reversed relates to costs expensed in 1990, which was 
before the period of investigation. Therefore, these costs do not 
relate to the merchandise under review. While reversals of accruals are 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), the 
Department relies on GAAP if it does not distort costs. In this case, 
reversing costs that were accrued in 1990 distorts costs in the POR. 
Furthermore, as we found in Steel Pipe from Italy, we do not consider 
it appropriate to reduce current year production costs by the reversal 
of prior year operating expense accruals and write-downs of equipment 
and inventory. The subsequent year's reversal of these estimated costs 
does not represent revenue or reduced operating costs in the year of 
the reversal. Rather, they represent a correction of an estimate which 
was made in a prior year. The position of the Department in Steel Pipe 
from Italy considered the facts in that case, which included write-offs 
and write-downs. These types of costs are not the costs at issue here. 
There is not justification for distorting actual production costs 
incurred in a subsequent year by reducing subsequent year costs by the 
overestimated amount.
    Comment 7: Petitioners argue that the Department should correct the 
reduction Dillinger made to its COP and CV by reversing a prior period 
accrual for its Stahlzulage (steel subsidy program). As petitioners 
discussed in

[[Page 13838]]
Comment 6, the Department does not consider it appropriate to reduce 
current year production costs by the reversal of prior year operating 
expense accruals (see Small Diameter Circular Seamless Pipe from Italy 
(60 FR 31991) and Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. U.S., 651 F. Supp. 
1421, 1430 (CIT 1986)). Petitioners assert that because Dillinger has 
reduced its production costs by the reversal of prior period operating 
expense accruals, the inclusion of Stahlzulage in COM is improper.
    The respondent argues that Dillinger's financial statements, in 
accordance with GAAP, reversed an accrual for a Stahlzulage subsidy. 
They state that this was verified, and the Department treated this item 
correctly in the Preliminary Results and should continue to do so in 
the Final Results.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. The reversal 
of the Stahlzulage is permitted by German GAAP, and it is related to 
assets in use during the POR. Therefore, it is appropriate to include 
this amount in COM. In Italian Steel Pipe, the Department did not 
consider it appropriate to reduce current year production costs by the 
reversal of prior year operating expense accruals based on the fact 
that these were estimated expenses. In the instant review, the 
Stahlzulage is not an estimate but an amount which is intrinsically 
linked to assets (currently used in production) based on a program 
which was allowed by German law. Also, petitioners' citation to Al Tech 
is inapposite. The issue in that case was whether a subsidy 
determination could be made in the context of an antidumping 
proceeding. The court ruled that such an investigation could not be 
undertaken. With respect to the present proceeding, there has been no 
countervailing duty investigation that has resulted in a determination 
that the ``Stahlzulage'' is in fact a subsidy. Pursuant to Al Tech, the 
Department is precluded from making such a determination in this 
antidumping administrative review.
    Comment 8: The petitioners argue that the Department should correct 
the understated amount of Usinor Sacilor's G&A attributed to Dillinger. 
Dillinger's method of identifying the share of its parent's (Usinor 
Sacilor's) G&A attributable to Dillinger's operations is flawed. 
Petitioners contend that the unconsolidated amount (i.e., parent 
operating expenses less operating revenue) used to calculate this part 
of G&A equals net operating income or loss, not G&A as should have been 
calculated. Given the oversight nature of Usinor Sacilor and that no 
information regarding Usinor Sacilor's unconsolidated expenses is on 
the record, the Department should consider all of Usinor Sacilor's 
unconsolidated operating expenses as G&A and should recalculate the 
parent company portion of Dillinger's G&A accordingly.
    Respondent contends that it correctly reported Usinor Sacilor's G&A 
expenses. According to respondent, only the net expenses of Usinor 
Sacilor, a holding company without any production of its own, are 
allocated to affiliated companies; therefore, the net expenses 
represent G&A expenses which are allocated to operating subsidiaries. 
Respondent claims that as a non-operating company, Usinor Sacilor only 
incurs G&A expenses. Although Dillinger disagrees that Usinor Sacilor's 
G&A expense should be included at all, if it is, the Department's 
methodology was correct.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. The amount 
Dillinger used to calculate Usinor Sacilor's G&A attributable to 
Dillinger was taken from Usinor Sacilor's financial statements. Because 
the unconsolidated company is a non-producing holding company, the only 
expenses it incurs are general in nature. It would incur expenses on 
its own behalf and on behalf of its subsidiaries. Revenue it receives 
(including reimbursements from subsidiaries) offsets the G&A it incurs 
on behalf of its subsidiaries. The difference between these two amounts 
is the G&A expense of the parent company itself. A more detailed 
allocation is not possible, and is not required, given the absence of 
more detailed information on the record.
    Comment 9: Petitioners contend that the Department should include 
home market commissions paid to related parties in the calculation of 
home market selling expenses for COP/CV (SELLCOP). The preliminary 
margin program determines whether sales were made below cost by 
comparing net price with COP. Yet, the petitioners claim, the 
Department did not include in this program the expenses related to 
Dillinger's related party commissions despite the fact that these are 
clearly costs of production. Petitioners assert that home market 
commissions should have been included in SELLCOP (which only included 
indirect selling expenses in the preliminary results).
    Respondent argues that the Department should exclude home market 
commissions paid to related parties in the calculation of home market 
selling expenses for purposes of COP. Since Dillinger included both its 
own indirect selling expenses as well as those of its related sales 
agent, Saarlux, in the indirect selling expense field, the petitioners' 
methodology of including Saarlux's sales commissions as well would be 
double counting.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. Since Saarlux's 
expenses are included in indirect selling expenses, commissions to 
Saarlux should not also be included in total selling expenses for COP/
CV. Since Dillinger pays Saarlux commissions to cover Saarlux's costs 
related to Dillinger's sales, to include both the commissions and 
Saarlux's actual costs would be double-counting. Since Dillinger did 
not demonstrate that commissions were at arm's-length, we would not use 
these commissions as a cost in any event.
    Comment 10: Petitioners contend that the Department should apply 
BIA to determine the COP, CV, and DIFMER of sales for which no weight 
conversion factor was provided. The weight of steel is an essential 
element in determining unit price. Dillinger reported all U.S. sales on 
a theoretical weight basis and home market sales on either a 
theoretical or actual basis. Petitioners assert that Dillinger did not 
provide conversion factors to compare home market prices reported on a 
theoretical weight basis to COP reported on an actual weight basis. 
Petitioners argue that the Department, therefore, cannot apply the 
sales-below-cost test to such home market sales. In addition, 
petitioners assert that conversion factors were not provided to compare 
the CV amounts, reported on an actual weight basis, to U.S. sales on a 
theoretical weight basis. In the flat-rolled steel investigation, the 
Department recognized that U.S. and home market prices, as well as COP 
and CV, must be on the same weight basis to accurately calculate 
margins (see Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Finland (58 FR 37122 
and 37123--July 9, 1993) and Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipes from 
Taiwan (57 FR 53705, 53711--November 12, 1992)). Petitioners assert 
that although Dillinger eventually provided conversion factors to 
permit price-to-price comparisons on the same weight basis, it did not 
provide factors for converting the costs of producing merchandise from 
an actual to theoretical weight basis. Therefore, petitioners continue, 
sales prices, on a theoretical weight basis, cannot be compared to COP 
and CV, which are based on actual weight.
    Petitioners argue that Dillinger ignored the questionnaire's 
explicit instruction to report COP and CV on the same basis as sales 
were reported. Dillinger's responses state that its cost accounting 
system uses actual material prices and actual material quantities,

[[Page 13839]]
and that the average actual cost of materials and processing per ton 
for all production, at each step, is calculated monthly. The factors 
Dillinger provided to convert the weight of home market merchandise 
sold on an actual weight basis to a theoretical weight basis cannot be 
used to convert COP or CV to a theoretical weight basis because the 
conversion factors provided are transaction specific and not control 
number (CONNUM) specific. Accordingly, the Department should apply BIA 
to all sales for which Dillinger failed to provide a conversion factor 
to enable the COP/CV to be compared on the same measure of weight as 
prices (i.e., all U.S. sales compared to CV and all home market sales 
made on a theoretical weight basis).
    Respondent contends that it reported COP, CV, and DIFMER on a 
theoretical weight basis. Dillinger reported actual costs and actual 
weights of inputs at the beginning of the production process. According 
to respondent, the actual cost per ton of the finished product was 
calculated using theoretical weight. According to Dillinger, it used 
theoretical weight as the denominator for the per ton calculation of 
COP, CV, and DIFMER amounts. Respondent further asserts that there is 
no weighing station at the end of the production line in the factory. 
Dillinger does not know the actual weight of each production run, much 
less record it for cost accounting purposes. The Department can 
therefore correctly calculate dumping margins using COP, CV, and DIFMER 
data.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners that Dillinger 
reported its costs on an actual weight basis. When Dillinger reported 
that it uses actual material prices and actual material quantities, the 
``actual'' in that sense refers to the actual in actual cost accounting 
versus standard cost accounting (used for cost inputs), as opposed to 
the actual in actual weight versus theoretical weight. Verification 
Exhibit 2 includes a map of the plate rolling mill. This reveals, as 
respondent contends, that there is a scale at the entrance to the mill, 
but there is not one at the end of the process. Therefore, they cannot 
weigh the finished product at the end of the product line, which 
indicates that finished product costs are based on theoretical weight. 
Also, on pages 5-6 of Dillinger's November 14, 1994, Section VI 
response, Dillinger indicates that its inventory value, which is 
calculated from the actual average cost system, is based on theoretical 
production. The inventory amount is only adjusted to actual at year-
end. Therefore, Dillinger's day-to-day costs in their accounting system 
are based on theoretical weight. We agree with petitioners that costs 
and prices must be on the same weight basis to accurately calculate 
margins. In this case, the costs and prices are on the same weight 
basis (theoretical), so the petitioners' argument for BIA moot.
    Comment 11: Petitioners argue that the Department should assign BIA 
to Dillinger's misreported product characteristics. As petitioners have 
previously pointed out and the Department recognized in its preliminary 
results, Dillinger has misreported non-prime products (Y-grades) as 
prime products. Petitioners argue that by including non-prime products 
within the same product specification as prime products, Dillinger has 
precluded the agency from comparing prime merchandise to prime 
merchandise in both markets. The Department's computer program excludes 
all home market sales of products with specifications that cover Y-
grade merchandise. However, petitioners assert, by simply excluding all 
products with those particular specifications, the Department likely 
has excluded sales of prime merchandise as well. The petitioners argue 
that the exclusion of the home market control numbers (CONNUMHs) with 
these particular product specifications from the margin calculation 
program in the preliminary results, actually favors Dillinger by 
lowering its margin. According to petitioners, it was inappropriate to 
reward Dillinger for this error. The petitioners argue that when a 
respondent fails to provide the information requested, the Department 
must use BIA. When employing BIA, there should be an adverse assumption 
on the part of the Department unless special circumstances dictate 
otherwise. Petitioners assert that as BIA, all U.S. sales matched to 
the sale of a home market product in which the specification code is 
one which includes Y-grade products, should be assigned the higher of 
the highest, non-aberrant margin calculated on any individual 
transaction for this review or the 36.00 percent margin assigned to 
Dillinger in the investigation.
    Respondent argues that the Department incorrectly assumed that Y-
grade material contained both prime and non-prime merchandise. 
Dillinger informed the Department that non-prime merchandise sold in 
the home market should not be compared to prime material. In order to 
facilitate the Department's calculations, Dillinger reported all non-
prime home market sales in a separate file. Thus, respondent contends, 
only prime Y-grade material is contained in Dillinger's primary home 
market sales file. Dillinger claims that it informed the verification 
team that Y-grade material was guaranteed for chemistry, dimensions and 
for tensile strength. According to respondent, no mill test certificate 
was issued for mechanical properties because none was requested by the 
customer. Dillinger did provide an analysis report to the customer. 
There is a published specification sheet for Y-grade material, 
indicating it is a prime product, made to order. Thus, respondent 
argues, while the chemical composition of the products in question did 
not meet their originally intended specifications, they were 
nevertheless prime material, meeting the requirements of the published 
Y-grade specifications. Generally speaking, according to Dillinger, it 
treats Y-grades no differently from any other prime grade (i.e., A36). 
Dillinger claims that the verification team simply misinterpreted the 
facts. According to respondent, all sales reported as Y-grade 
specifications were treated by Dillinger as prime merchandise. 
Dillinger argues that its non-prime sales are sold in rail car lots 
containing mixed products (e.g., carbon and alloy), without reference 
to type, specification, measurement, or grade. According to the 
respondent, there is nothing on the record (e.g., verification report) 
to suggest that Y-grade material is considered to be non-prime 
material. Respondent asserts that the only record evidence (in the 
verification report) confirms that all non-prime material is sold in 
unmarked lots.
    Department's Position: We disagree with respondent that Y-grades 
should be treated as prime merchandise. This is a question of 
methodology. Dillinger believes this to be prime material, since this 
is how it was reported and sold. We found at verification that there 
were ``Misfit Cast'' products, which were characterized as such because 
of an error in pouring. These were classified as Y-grades. The term 
``Misfit Cast'' denotes non-prime merchandise. Since Dillinger did not 
provide enough information to refute this classification, we are 
continuing to treat Y-grades as non-prime merchandise. However, since 
Dillinger provided all requested information, and given the relatively 
small number of sales involved, we have determined simply to exclude 
from the home market sales database all specification codes containing 
Y-grade material. We do not agree with petitioners that our methodology 
(disregarding sales with specifications

[[Page 13840]]
that contain Y-grades) actually favors Dillinger. Even though these 
specification codes contain some prime material, given the structure 
and hierarchy of the model match, these specification codes would not 
match to any U.S. sales. Therefore, the impact on the dumping margin is 
essentially non-existent.
    Comment 12: The petitioners argue that the Department should use 
adverse BIA to account for Dillinger's unreported and unverified home 
market sales. Petitioners assert that there is no indication that 
Dillinger's 1994 financial statements were ever examined by the 
Department during the sales verification. Petitioners continue that the 
absence of such financial statements during the verification prevented 
the Department from tying home market sales for 11 of the 23 months for 
which home market sales were reported, to Dillinger's audited financial 
statements. The petitioners argue that it is not possible to conclude 
that all 1992 and 1994 sales in the home market were reported or that 
accurate information was provided for home market sales in 1992 and 
1994 since neither years' sales were traced to their respective audited 
financial statements. Since Dillinger presented 1994 semi-annual 
financial statements to the cost verification team but not to the sales 
verification team, the petitioners assert that this indicates selective 
presentation of information, which casts further doubt on the 
completeness of Dillinger's home market sales database. If the 
Department erroneously concludes that Dillinger's reported home market 
sales are usable, petitioners argue that BIA should be used to account 
for unreported or unverified home market sales. Petitioners continue 
that any U.S. sale made in February or March 1993, or between November 
1993 and July 1994, should be assigned as BIA the higher of the highest 
non-aberrant margin or the 36.00 percent margin from the investigation
    Respondent contends that the Department verified the total quantity 
and value in both the U.S. and home markets for the entire period of 
review, 1993 and 1994. Dillinger provided all data requested by the 
Department during verification. Respondent argues that as the 
petitioners are well aware, the Department does not trace sales to the 
financial reports for each month in the period of review.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. We consider 
total home market sales to be verified. Contrary to petitioners' 
assertion, we were not prevented from verifying certain months during 
the POR. Verification is a testing procedure and not every single item 
is examined (see Monsanto Co. v. U.S., 698 F. Supp 275, 281 (CIT 
1988)). In the present case, we traced 1993 totals to the audited 
financial statements and performed completeness checks on various 
months in 1993 and 1994. For example, we reviewed the general ledger, 
sales ledger, sales journal, and profit and loss statement from the 
general ledger for the months of October 1993, February 1994, and June 
1994. Dillinger provided all requested information, and contrary to 
petitioners' assertion, we were not prevented from verifying any month 
of the period. Because no discrepancies were found, we consider total 
home market sales to be reported and verified.
    Comment 13: Respondent notes that in comparing foreign market value 
(FMV) to end-user sales in the United States, the Department made an 
adjustment to FMV to compensate for the problem discovered at 
verification where Dillinger incorrectly coded the customer code and 
level of trade for six home market sales. Respondent argues that as a 
result, the Department used one level of trade in the home market and 
increased the price of all end-user sales--both those incorrectly coded 
as well as those correctly coded--by the level of the discount granted 
to service centers/distributors when compared to end-user sales in the 
U.S. Respondent argues that this methodology added the full amount of 
the discount to sales that were correctly coded. Instead, respondent 
proposes that a smaller adjustment be made to all end-user sales which 
would be calculated by applying to the discount the ratio of 
incorrectly coded sales to total sales examined.
    Petitioners note that the Department's adjustment incorrectly 
assumes Dillinger misreported the home market customer level of trade 
in only one manner--by identifying service center sales as end-user 
sales. Petitioners note Dillinger also misreported end-user sales as 
service center sales. Because of Dillinger's improper reporting of 
level of trade and failure to adequately explain the Handlerrabatt and 
its commissions have precluded the Department from identifying the 
correct level of trade, the Department should assume all sales 
constituted sales to end-users and increase all home market prices by 
the amount of the discount.
    Department's Position: We agree with petitioners that respondent's 
improper reporting of level of trade and its failure to report 
separately certain other adjustments have precluded the Department from 
identifying the correct level of trade. Since the only known difference 
in terms of sale to service centers/distributors and end-users was that 
service centers/distributors received a trader discount 
(Handlerrabatt), in matching home market sales to sales to U.S. end-
users, we have adjusted FMV for this discount. We disagree with 
petitioners that this amount should be added to FMV for all home market 
sales matching to U.S. service center sales. The Department's 
methodology in effect treats all home market sales as service center 
sales. Therefore, there is no reason to increase the FMV for home 
market sales matched to U.S. service center sales. We also disagree 
with respondent that we should adjust FMV by a ratio applied to the 
discount, rather than the full discount. Given the pervasive errors in 
the respondent's database in the coding of the customer and the level 
of trade, it is appropriate to treat all home market sales as service 
center sales and increase FMV for all such home market sales matched to 
U.S. end-users by the full trader discount.
    Comment 14: Respondent states that the sales verification report 
contained misstatements concerning discounts for home market sales and 
other expenses. The verification report states that the reported gross 
unit price is net of a market discount and trader's commission. The 
report also states that the reported gross unit price includes an end-
user discount which is paid directly to the customer and is reported in 
the other expense field. Respondent states that all discounts granted 
to service centers/distributors, whether market, trader's or end-user, 
are subtracted by Dillinger during negotiation with the purchaser, and 
the invoice price is net of these discounts. Thus, according to 
respondent, the end-user discount is not found in the other expense 
field. Respondent states that if the verification report were correct, 
the other expense field would have an amount corresponding to discounts 
given to service centers for end-user sales.
    Department's Position: We disagree with respondent. Respondent is 
confusing the end-user rebate with discounts given to service centers 
for end-user sales. In the verification report the term ``trader's 
commission'' refers to discounts given to service centers for end-user 
sales. This discount is netted out of reported gross unit price. 
However, end-user rebates--paid directly to the service center's 
customer--are included in reported gross unit price and are reported in 
the other expense field.
    Comment 15: Petitioners state that the Department should correct 
Dillinger's reported home market gross unit prices

[[Page 13841]]
to account for the conversion from actual to theoretical weight.
    Respondent agrees that the Department should compare sales in each 
market on a same weight basis.
    Department's Position: We agree that Dillinger's reported home 
market gross unit prices should be adjusted from actual to theoretical 
weight and have done so in these final results. Additionally, we have 
converted to a theoretical weight basis, other Dillinger adjustments 
which were reported on an actual weight basis (see Analysis Memorandum, 
November 6, 1995).
    Comment 16: Petitioners argue that the Department should deny 
Dillinger's home market credit expenses because Dillinger reported 
payment due dates rather than the actual dates of payment. Should the 
Department erroneously grant Dillinger a downward adjustment for home 
market credit expenses, this adjustment should be limited to the 
smallest credit expense reported by Dillinger for any home market sale.
    Respondent notes that the Department verified the actual dates of 
payment for Dillinger's home market sales. These dates, according to 
respondent, were substantially the same as those reported in the 
responses. Respondent argues that no change in methodology should be 
made to that used in the preliminary results.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent that we should not 
deny Dillinger's adjustment to home market price for credit expenses. 
However, contrary to Dillinger's assertion, at verification we found 
that Dillinger's actual payment dates were different than reported in 
that they generally were later than those reported. As such, 
Dillinger's actual expenses, on those sales that were verified, 
generally exceeded those that were claimed. Accordingly, we are 
allowing the claimed expense.
    Comment 17: Petitioners argue that the Department should deny 
Dillinger's claimed adjustment for global credit and debit notes and 
other expenses. Petitioners state that Dillinger has not given a 
consistent explanation of these adjustments. Both global credits and 
debits are reported for certain transactions. According to petitioners, 
it appears that the other expenses field also includes global credit 
notes, which would result in double counting of global credit notes. 
Petitioners question whether gross unit price has already been adjusted 
for end-user discounts.
    Respondent disputes petitioners' claims, noting that Dillinger gave 
the Department a detailed explanation of the global credit and debit 
notes at verification and provided the identity of all customers 
receiving these credits and debits. Respondent asserts that the 
Department verified how Dillinger allocated these notes on a customer-
by-customer basis, and the Department correctly accounted for these 
notes in the preliminary results. Respondent explains that global 
credits and debits could have been granted for the same sales because a 
particular customer could have been granted credits on some sales and 
debits on other sales. With respect to the other expense variable, 
respondent notes that this variable is correctly described on page 31 
of the sales verification report, which states that this field contains 
rebates, invoicing errors, or warranty expenses.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. At 
verification we verified Dillinger's methodology for allocating global 
credits and debits on a customer-by-customer basis. We found that 
global credits and debits were accurately reported. We agree with 
respondent that global credits and debits could have been granted for 
the same sales because a particular customer could have been granted 
credits on some sales and debits on other sales. As noted in our 
verification report, we found at verification that gross unit price had 
not been adjusted for end-user discounts and this discount was reported 
in the other expense field. The other expense field does not include 
global credits or debits. Hence there is no double counting.
    Comment 18: Petitioners state that the Department should 
recalculate Dillinger's overly inclusive and misallocated home market 
indirect selling expenses. According to petitioners, Dillinger included 
both their sales cost as well as those of Saarlux. Petitioners assert 
that this is different than the methodology used to calculate the U.S. 
indirect selling expenses. Petitioners continue that Dillinger reduced 
its costs to account for functions performed by Francosteel and Daval 
(Francosteel's parent and a commission agent on U.S. sales). 
Petitioners further assert that Dillinger did not provide an 
explanation for how it determined cost of manufacturing used to 
allocate U.S. indirect selling expenses. Because of the complete 
miscalculation of its home market indirect selling expenses, the 
Department should deny Dillinger any adjustment for home market selling 
expenses. If the Department determines to grant this adjustment, then 
at a minimum, the Department should assign the smallest reported home 
market selling expense for any sale to all home market sales.
    Respondent states that it did not double count any home market 
indirect selling expenses. Dillinger argues that it did not 
artificially reduce any sales expenses attributable to U.S. sales. 
According to Dillinger, it simply did not incur many traditional 
selling expenses applicable to U.S. sales because those functions are 
performed by Daval and Francosteel. Dillinger asserts that it also does 
not incur all home market selling expenses because many of them are 
performed by Saarlux. Dillinger argues that it correctly calculated 
indirect selling expenses in both markets predicated on cost of 
manufacturing, and that this is confirmed in verification exhibits.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. We found both home 
market and U.S. indirect selling expenses to be allocated on the basis 
of cost of manufacturing. The methodology used by Dillinger for 
calculating home market indirect selling expenses was reasonable and 
not overly inclusive. U.S. indirect selling expenses have not been used 
in the calculation of antidumping duty margins as we consider 
Dillinger's U.S. sales to be purchase price and there are no home 
market commissions to offset with U.S. indirect selling expenses. 
Therefore, issues relating to the use or calculation of U.S. indirect 
selling expenses are moot.
    Comment 19: Petitioners state that the Department should deny the 
erroneous adjustment for inventory carrying costs it granted to 
Dillinger. Petitioners assert that Dillinger failed to provide any 
support for its method of calculating the number of days between the 
date of production and the date of shipment. Petitioners summarize that 
Dillinger has thus failed to demonstrate entitlement to this 
adjustment, and the Department should deny it.
    Respondent argues that it provided a detailed explanation of how it 
derived inventory carrying costs at verification. According to the 
respondent, the Department accepted and verified that explanation.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. At 
verification, Dillinger provided the Department with a copy of a 
submission estimating the number of days between the date of production 
and the date of shipment. These figures appeared reasonable at 
verification, and result in an extremely small adjustment for inventory 
carrying costs. We note that inventory carrying costs are included in 
indirect selling expenses. As stated above in the Department's position 
on question 18, we have not used U.S. indirect selling expenses in our 
calculations. We further

[[Page 13842]]
note that home market indirect selling expenses are only included to 
the extent that they do not exceed U.S. commissions. As home market 
indirect selling expenses exceed U.S. commissions even if inventory 
carrying costs are not included, this issue is moot.
    Comment 20: Petitioners argue that the Department should treat 
Dillinger's U.S. sales as exporter's sales price (ESP) transactions. 
According to petitioners, there is no documentary evidence that 
supports Dillinger's assertion that its related selling arm in the 
United States, Francosteel, is only a processor of sales-related 
documentation. Petitioners assert that Dillinger's sales through 
Francosteel do not meet the statutory definition of purchase price. The 
Department uses a three-part test to determine whether ESP or purchase 
price should be used to determine United States price (USP) when the 
sale is made prior to the date of importation. Petitioners argue that 
only the third factor in this test (whether the related selling agent 
in the U.S. acted only as a mere processor of sales-related 
documentation and a communications link with the unrelated U.S. buyers) 
directly addresses the question for whether the sales took place in a 
foreign country for exportation to the United States. Before the 
Department can make a finding that the related party is just a 
processor of documentation, there has to exist evidence in the record 
to support that conclusion. Petitioners assert that in this case, the 
Department only has Dillinger's assertion. Petitioners argue that there 
is nothing in the record that indicates that Francosteel communicated 
with Daval before it issued its confirmation of sale. Petitioners argue 
that the price at which the merchandise is sold to the unrelated 
purchaser is different from the price at which it was purchased from 
Daval. Petitioners assert that in PQ Corp v. U.S., 652 F. Supp. 732 
(CIT 1987), the court noted that this is a factor that supports a 
determination that the sale is an ESP transaction. Petitioners argue 
that Dillinger has the burden of producing the information that proves 
Francosteel is only a processor of sales related documentation, and it 
has not done so.
    Petitioners further argue that Francosteel sells for its own 
account in the United States. According to petitioners, Francosteel's 
agreement with Daval demonstrates that Francosteel has undertaken to 
sell, in the United States, the products of a related party, and that 
it, Francosteel, not the unrelated purchaser, obtains those products 
through a purchase from Daval. Because the sale takes place in the 
United States between a party related to the foreign seller and an 
unrelated purchaser, the sale is clearly ESP. Petitioners assert that 
since Francosteel purchases the products from the foreign seller and 
the unrelated purchaser does not, the transaction falls outside of the 
purchase price definition.
    Petitioners further argue that declarations made on Customs Form 
7501 clearly indicate that Francosteel is the purchaser of the imported 
merchandise. Petitioners assert that given these declarations, this 
merchandise was apparently entered for appraisement by Dillinger under 
transaction value, the most common basis of determining Customs value. 
According to petitioners, transaction value is defined as the price 
actually paid or payable for the merchandise when sold for exportation 
to the United States. Petitioners assert that this definition is 
largely the same as purchase price. Petitioners argue that given the 
similarity of the statutes, Dillinger's claim that its U.S. sales to 
the first unrelated purchaser should be treated as purchase price 
transactions is inconsistent with a claim that the merchandise should 
be appraised under transaction value at the price established by the 
Daval/Francosteel transaction.
    Respondent asserts that the first unrelated customer purchases the 
merchandise from Dillinger, not Francosteel. Respondent argues that at 
the time of the order and order confirmation, Francosteel does not have 
title to the merchandise. According to respondent, Francosteel merely 
receives the order from the unrelated customer and forwards it to 
Dillinger for approval. Respondent further states that once Dillinger 
approves the order, it notifies Francosteel, and then Francosteel 
notifies the customer. Dillinger treats the date of sale as the date it 
enters the order confirmation into its system. According to respondent, 
only after the plate is produced does the contract between Daval and 
Francosteel become applicable. Respondent states that at this time the 
steel has already been sold to the first unrelated customer. Respondent 
asserts that Francosteel's agreement with Daval operates only from the 
time that Francosteel obtains the merchandise at the European port 
until it invoices the U.S. customer upon arrival at the U.S. port. Even 
if Francosteel took title, in Outokumpu Copper Rolled Products AB v. 
U.S., 829 F. Sup. 1371 (CIT 1993), the Court held that where the 
subsidiary took title to the exported merchandise and paid customs 
duties, the sales were nevertheless properly classified as purchase 
price transactions.
    The respondent further asserts that a related U.S. company can 
receive purchase orders directly from U.S. customers, send invoices 
directly to those customers, act as an importer of record and receive 
payment, and still be deemed to be a mere processor of documentation 
and a communication link (see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. U.S., 841 
F. Supp. 1237 (CIT 1993)). Therefore, the Department should continue to 
treat U.S. sales as purchase price transactions.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. The Department 
determined that purchase price, as defined in section 772 of the Tariff 
Act, was the appropriate basis for calculating USP. All sales were made 
through Francosteel, a related sales agent in the United States, to 
unrelated purchasers. Whenever sales are made prior to the date of 
importation through a related sales agent in the United States, we 
typically determine that purchase price is the most appropriate 
determinant of the USP based upon the following factors: 1) the 
merchandise in question was shipped directly from the manufacturer to 
the unrelated buyer, without being introduced into the inventory of the 
related shipping agent; 2) direct shipment from the manufacturer to the 
unrelated buyers was the customary commercial channel for sales of this 
merchandise between the parties involved; and 3) the related selling 
agent in the United States acted only as a processor of sales-related 
documentation and a communication link with the unrelated U.S. buyers. 
See Certain Stainless Steel Wire Rods from France: Final Determination 
of Sales at Less than Fair Value, 58 FR 68865, 68868 (December 29, 
1993); Granular Polytetrafluoroethylene Resin from Japan: Final Results 
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 58 FR 50343, 50344 
(September 27, 1993). In the present review, we found that: the 
essential terms of sale were set prior to importation by or on approval 
by Dillinger; the merchandise was shipped immediately to the customer 
upon importation into the United States, without being introduced into 
the inventory of the related shipping agent; direct shipment from the 
manufacturer to the unrelated buyers was the customary commercial 
channel for sales of this merchandise; the merchandise was not 
warehoused by Francosteel during the normal course of business; and the 
related selling agent in the United States acted only as a processor of 
sales-related documentation and a

[[Page 13843]]
communication link with the unrelated U.S. buyers.
    Even if Francosteel temporarily takes title to the merchandise, it 
is not inventoried by them. The term ``inventory'', as it is commonly 
used in business, implies that the merchandise is in storage and is 
available for sale. We have determined that the subject merchandise 
that Francosteel imports (the merchandise is not physically warehoused 
by Francosteel during the normal course of business) is not generally 
available for sale. It is awaiting delivery to a specific customer (see 
Stainless Steel Wire Rods from France).
    Although Francosteel takes title to the merchandise and 
participates in sales negotiations, we found at verification that it 
does not have the flexibility to set the price of the steel and only 
acts as a processor of sales-related documentation (see Stainless Steel 
Wire Rods from France). Furthermore the Court of International Trade 
found in Independent Radionic Workers of America v. U.S., (Slip Op. 95-
45, March 15, 1995 CIT), that while the respondent processed purchase 
orders, performed invoicing, collected payments, arranged U.S. 
transportation, and was the importer of record, these duties, while 
substantial, are not necessarily disqualifying of purchase price 
treatment.
    For all of the above reasons, we are continuing to treat U.S. sales 
as purchase price sales.
    Comment 21: Petitioners argue that the Department should apply BIA 
to the value of a discrepancy in Dillinger's reported U.S. sales for 
1993 and its sales ledger information. Petitioners state that Dillinger 
underreported both the quantity and value of its U.S. sales.
    Respondent counters that it explained at verification the double 
counting of one invoice. Respondent also states that the discrepancy in 
the value of U.S. sales is accounted for by expenses incurred by 
Francosteel which are not contained in Dillinger's books.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. As Francosteel 
explained at verification, Dillinger only retained one entry for the 
same tonnage in its calculations of total volume and value, thinking 
that the second identical tonnage was a duplication. However, the same 
tonnage was reported on two separate invoices, and was properly 
reported in Dillinger's U.S. sales listing. This second ``duplicate'' 
invoice accounts for virtually all of the tonnage discrepancy. The 
difference in value is accounted for by expenses incurred by 
Francosteel.
    Comment 22: Petitioners argue that the Department should apply BIA 
to the value of all 1994 Francosteel imports, as Dillinger failed to 
demonstrate the completeness of its 1994 U.S. sales at verification.
    Respondent states that petitioners' assertion is without any 
foundation on the record. Nowhere in the verification report does the 
Department state that any material data was not verified. Accordingly, 
the Department should continue to use Dillinger's 1994 sales data.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. As discussed 
above, verification is a testing procedure and not every single item 
need be examined. See Monsanto Co. v. U.S., 698 F. Supp 275, 281 (CIT 
1988). We consider total U.S. sales to be verified. We traced 1993 
totals to the audited financial statements and performed completeness 
tests on various months in 1993 and 1994. For example, we randomly 
selected sales from Francosteel's invoice registers for the months of 
August 1993 and August 1994 to determine if products were properly 
included and/or excluded from Dillinger's U.S. sales listing. Because 
no discrepancies were found, we consider total U.S. sales to be 
reported and verified.
    Comment 23: Petitioners claim that the Department should apply BIA 
to unreported sales made by Berg Steel Pipe (Berg). Petitioners state 
that they gave the Department information indicating that Dillinger 
failed to report sales of subject merchandise (pipe) by Berg Steel 
Pipe, a related party to Dillinger. According to petitioners, the 
Department did not confirm whether there were any sales of subject 
merchandise made by Berg to unrelated customers in the United States 
during the POR. Petitioners argue that simply because Dillinger stated 
that Berg did not purchase subject merchandise from it during the POR 
does not foreclose the possibility that Berg already had subject 
merchandise in stock which it could have sold during the POR. 
Petitioners argue that furthermore, Dillinger permitted the Department 
to select invoices only from a computer-generated listing at 
verification, rather than an actual sales journal, and did not 
demonstrate that the computer program which generated the listing was 
outputting appropriate and complete information. Publicly available 
data shows that Francosteel imported and shipped steel plate to Panama 
City, Florida, where Berg is located, during the POR.
    Respondent states that the Department verified that all sales and 
entries in the POR by Dillinger to Berg were of non-scope merchandise. 
Respondent asserts that assuming, arguendo, that Berg had sales of 
scope merchandise in the POR which were entered prior to the POR, the 
petitioners' point is moot. Respondent argues that entries prior to the 
POR are not subject to this review and have already been liquidated in 
any case.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. While it is true 
that Dillinger sold plate to Berg during the POR, there is no evidence 
that any of this steel was subject merchandise. To establish whether 
any sales of subject merchandise were made to Berg, we examined random 
invoices selected from a company computer report listing all sales to 
Berg at verification. This report was generated from Dillinger's normal 
sales accounting system. The sales invoices we examined described the 
plate sold to Berg as X-70 grade steel, which is outside the scope of 
this review. We reviewed mill certificates for certain invoices, 
confirming that this steel was X-70 grade and the strength levels were 
above 70,000 pounds per square inch. We found this to be sufficient 
proof that Dillinger did not sell subject merchandise to Berg during 
the POR.
    Comment 24: Petitioners state that the Department should use BIA 
for foreign brokerage and handling. Because there has been no 
demonstration of arm's-length transactions between Dillinger and the 
related company that provided its foreign brokerage and handling 
services, the Department should apply adverse BIA.
    Respondent notes that the Department verified that the brokerage 
and handling fees charged by this related company were at arm's-length.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. As noted 
above, verification is a testing procedure and not every single item 
need be examined. See Monsanto Co. v. U.S., 698 F. Supp 275, 281 (CIT 
1988). We performed an arm's-length test on one related party (a barge 
company) and found that prices for comparable services charged by the 
unrelated party were less than those charged by the related party. We 
also found that another related party providing services to Dillinger 
was profitable. We have no reason to believe that foreign brokerage and 
handling were provided on other than an arm's length basis and we are 
allowing this adjustment.
    Comment 25: Petitioners argue that the Department should use BIA 
for ocean freight. They claim that there has been no demonstration of 
arm's-length transactions between Dillinger and the

[[Page 13844]]
related company that provided ocean transportation services.
    Respondent notes that the related party does not own the ships 
which carry the plates to the United States; this related party simply 
arranges transportation. Respondent argues that none of the ocean 
carriers are related to Dillinger, and the payments made for ocean 
freight were made to unrelated parties.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. While ocean 
freight is arranged by a related party, the actual ocean carriers are 
unrelated parties. As such, there is no need to perform an arm's length 
test because the actual ocean freight is not provided by a related 
party.
    Comment 26: Petitioners state that the Department should use BIA 
for foreign inland freight. First, the petitioners argue, Dillinger 
reported related-party foreign inland freight charges, but failed to 
demonstrate that they were incurred at arm's-length prices. According 
to petitioners, Dillinger attempted to demonstrate its foreign inland 
freight expenses were at arm's-length by providing information at 
verification concerning a transaction between Dillinger and an 
unrelated freight company. However, the petitioners assert, the 
verification report does not indicate the product shipped, the route, 
or the basis for calculating the rate. Moreover, the petitioners argue, 
the invoices examined were for a different period than those to its 
related party. The petitioners argue that Dillinger also claimed its 
transactions were at arm's-length based on transportation charges 
between this related party and an unrelated customer. However, the 
petitioners assert, the supporting documentation provided is merely a 
translation of an agreement, with no actual original documentation. The 
petitioners argue that the verification report does not indicate that 
this information was ever verified. According to petitioners, 
verification documentation also reveals that Dillinger often incurred 
foreign inland freight expenses through another related company; 
Dillinger did not attempt to demonstrate those transactions were at 
arm's-length. Second, the petitioners assert, the Department's program 
fails to correct the weight basis used for foreign inland freight. The 
petitioners argue that Dillinger incorrectly converted a theoretical 
weight figure to an actual weight figure, even though U.S. sales were 
reported on a theoretical weight basis. Third, the petitioners assert, 
Dillinger has failed to include costs associated with loading, 
unloading, and transportation of the merchandise from Dillinger's 
factory to the port of Dillingen.
    Respondent counters that the verification report accurately 
portrays the arm's-length nature of the foreign inland freight 
expenses. According to respondent, the documents inspected by the 
verification team completely satisfied the Department. The respondent 
argues that concerning the weight basis of the shipped plate, the 
Department is confused on the facts. Respondent states that the barge 
company bills Dillinger on an actual weight basis. Respondent argues 
that it converted this figure to a theoretical weight basis for 
purposes of its responses.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioners. Verification 
is a testing procedure and not every single item need be examined. See 
Monsanto Co. v. U.S., 698 F. Supp 275, 281 (CIT 1988). We performed an 
arm's-length test on one related party (a barge company) and found that 
foreign inland freight charges charged by an unrelated party were less 
than those charged by the related party. In addition to the checks 
performed at verification, we have compared the prices charged by this 
unrelated party to reported foreign inland freight expenses for 1994 
U.S. sales. We again found the related expenses to be greater than the 
unrelated charges. Thus, we believe Dillinger's foreign brokerage and 
handling expenses to be at arm's length. We agree with respondent that 
verification exhibits demonstrate that these expenses were reported on 
a theoretical weight basis. Regarding the costs associated with 
loading, unloading, and transportation of the merchandise from 
Dillinger's factory to the port, we found (on the basis of the 
information submitted and verification findings) these expenses to be 
included in COP/CV. In Dillinger's accounting system, these expenses 
are embedded in the cost of production and are not easily separated. 
These expenses are incurred on both home market and U.S. sales. Also, 
because of the very short distance from the plant to port, these 
expenses are extremely minor. Therefore, we are allowing Dillinger's 
treatment of these loading, unloading, and transportation expenses.
    Comment 27: Petitioners state that the Department should reject 
Dillinger's reported U.S. short-term interest rate. In determining 
whether to use loans obtained from related parties to calculate credit 
and inventory carrying costs, the Department examines the terms of 
these loans to determine whether they were made at arm's-length 
interest rates. When a respondent fails or is unable to demonstrate 
that such loans are at arm's-length, the Department excludes these 
loans from its calculation of interest rate. According to the 
petitioners, Dillinger did not demonstrate this and failed to exclude 
these related party interest rates from the weighted-average interest 
rate used to calculate credit and inventory carrying costs. Petitioners 
argue that verification exhibits demonstrate that the related party 
interest rates were not arm's-length. Petitioners assert that there is 
no indication that Dillinger attempted to demonstrate the reported 
interest rates reflected all of Francosteel's borrowing during the POR. 
Petitioners argue that there is no indication of any review of 
Francosteel's accounts to verify whether Francosteel used other sources 
of financing. Since Dillinger did not establish the arm's length nature 
of its related party borrowings or demonstrate that all borrowings were 
reported, its reported U.S. short-term interest rate should be denied 
altogether. The Department should use the U.S. prime lending rate or, 
at a minimum, use the weighted-average short-term interest rate 
reported by Dillinger calculated without the related party interest 
rates.
    Respondent argues that the Department verified that loans from 
related parties were at arm's length by comparing them to those 
obtained from unrelated parties. Therefore, no change should be made to 
the Department's methodology.
    Department's Position: During verification, we examined 
Francosteel's accounts to determine that all short-term borrowings had 
been reported for use in the short-term interest rate. To accomplish 
this, we inquired about all interest expenses on Francosteel's books 
and their sources. We were satisfied that all borrowings had been 
reported. We disagree with petitioners in part in that some of the 
related party loans are considered to be arm's-length when compared for 
contemporaneous periods. That is, we compared the loan from a related 
party to those from unrelated parties, looking at when they were made. 
Some of the related party loans were found to have rates at or above 
those of unrelated parties, using time and term as the criteria. 
Accordingly, loans from related parties whose loans were below arm's-
length were excluded from the interest rate calculation for purposes of 
these final results (in the preliminary results, all loans from related 
parties had been included in the calculations).
    Comment 28: Petitioners state that the Department should apply BIA 
to an unreported U.S. sale. Petitioners state that the Department's 
examination of

[[Page 13845]]
one observation at verification revealed the amount invoiced to the 
U.S. customer was less than the total amount appearing on the bill of 
lading. Petitioners argue that although this sale should be included in 
Dillinger's sales listing, the verification report provides no 
indication the sales listing was examined to verify that the sale had 
been reported, nor does it indicate any follow-through during 
verification to determine similar discrepancies. Therefore, the 
Department should presume the difference is caused by a missing sale 
and should apply total BIA to the value of that sale.
    Respondent notes that sales to one end user were made each time 
that customer released tonnage from its inventory. Respondent asserts 
that all tonnage contained in the bill of lading is accounted for in 
the observations reported to the Department, and there are no 
unreported U.S. sales.
    Department's Position: We agree with respondent. In verifying the 
calculation of U.S. duty on the observation in question, we examined 
the total volume on the entry and verified it was totally reported in 
Dillinger's submissions across a number of other observations. 
Therefore, there is no missing U.S. sale.
    Comment 29: Petitioners argue that the Department should adjust its 
program to account for understated U.S. commissions. Petitioners assert 
that the Department correctly treated Dillinger's U.S. commissions as a 
direct selling expense. Petitioners argue that although the Department 
found at verification that some of the reported commissions were 
understated, the Department's program fails to adjust for this 
understatement. As BIA, the Department should increase all commissions 
by the average difference between Dillinger's reported commission and 
its actual commission on these sales.
    Respondent agrees that the Department found a discrepancy in U.S. 
sales commissions for some sales, but points out that these 
discrepancies are de minimis. If the Department makes a correction, it 
should only be for the three sales in question.
    Department's Position: After further examination of U.S. 
commissions, we have determined that this expense has been correctly 
reported. The sales referred to in the verification report include 
multiple observations for each sale. We have found that taking the 
total weighted-average of all the U.S. commissions corresponding to all 
observations on a given invoice results in the amount described in the 
verification report as the correct value for U.S. commissions (see 
Analysis Memorandum, November 6, 1995).
    Comment 30: Petitioners argue that the Department should adjust 
U.S. price for warehousing expenses. Petitioners assert that although 
the record indicates that Dillinger incurred warehousing costs for its 
U.S. sales, Dillinger failed to report these expenses. The Department 
should make an adjustment to USP to account for the cost of 
warehousing. The Department should use, as BIA for warehousing 
expenses, data provided in Francosteel's financial statements.
    Respondent argues that the Department verified that Francosteel 
incurred no warehousing expenses applicable to subject merchandise in 
the period of review; therefore no adjustment is necessary. According 
to respondent, warehousing in Francosteel's accounting documents is 
merely an accounting term, and not a reference to a physical warehouse.
    Department's Position: We agree with the respondent. We extensively 
examined this topic at verification and found that Francosteel did not 
physically inventory, i.e., warehouse, subject merchandise during the 
POR (as discussed in the Francosteel verification report). Consequently 
it did not incur any warehousing costs related to subject merchandise 
during the POR.
    Comment 31: Petitioners argue that the Department must ensure that 
the value-added tax (VAT) amount added to USP is no more than the VAT 
amount added to/included in FMV. Petitioners assert that the Department 
neglected to adhere to the instructions of the CIT in Federal-Mogul v. 
U.S., 862 F. Supp. 384, 394-95 (CIT 1994), requiring the Department to 
impose a cap on the VAT adjustment made to USP. Accordingly, the 
Department should ensure that the VAT amount added to USP is, in every 
instance, no greater than the VAT amount which is added to the FMV to 
which USP is being compared. The petitioners assert that the deposit 
rate will be affected by an unwarranted increase in USP caused by the 
Department's failure to apply a VAT cap.
    Department's Position: In light of the Federal Circuit's decision 
in Federal Mogul v. United States, CAFC No. 94-1097, the Department has 
changed its treatment of home market consumption taxes. Where 
merchandise exported to the United States is exempt from the 
consumption tax, the Department will add to the U.S. price the absolute 
amount of such taxes charged on the comparison sales in the home 
market. This is the same methodology that the Department adopted 
following the decision of the Federal Circuit in Zenith v. United 
States, 988 F. 2d 1573, 1582 (1993), and which was suggested by that 
court in footnote 4 of its decision. The Court of International Trade 
(CIT) overturned this methodology in Federal Mogul v. United States, 
834 F. Supp. 1391 (1993), and the Department acquiesced in the CIT's 
decision. The Department then followed the CIT's preferred methodology, 
which was to calculate the tax to be added to U.S. price by multiplying 
the adjusted U.S. price by the foreign market tax rate; the Department 
made adjustments to this amount so that the tax adjustment would not 
alter a ``zero'' pre-tax dumping assessment.
    The foreign exporters in the Federal Mogul case, however, appealed 
that decision to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the CIT and held 
that the statute did not preclude Commerce from using the ``Zenith 
footnote 4'' methodology to calculate tax-neutral dumping assessments 
(i.e., assessments that are unaffected by the existence or amount of 
home market consumption taxes). Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
recognized that certain international agreements of the United States, 
in particular the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
Tokyo Round Antidumping Code, required the calculation of tax-neutral 
dumping assessments. The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the CIT 
with instructions to direct Commerce to determine which tax methodology 
it will employ.
    The Department has determined that the ``Zenith footnote 4'' 
methodology should be used. First, as the Department has explained in 
numerous administrative determinations and court filings over the past 
decade, and as the Federal Circuit has now recognized, Article VI of 
the GATT and Article 2 of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code required 
that dumping assessments be tax-neutral. This requirement continues 
under the new Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Second, the URAA explicitly amended the 
antidumping law to remove consumption taxes from the home market price 
and to eliminate the addition of taxes to U.S. price, so that no 
consumption tax is included in the price in either market. The 
Statement of Administrative Action (p. 159) explicitly states that this 
change was intended to result in tax neutrality.
    While the ``Zenith footnote 4'' methodology is slightly different 
from the URAA methodology, in that section 772(d)(1)(C) of the pre-URAA 
law required that the tax be added to United States price rather than 
subtracted from home market price, it does result in tax-

[[Page 13846]]
neutral duty assessments. In sum, the Department has elected to treat 
consumption taxes in a manner consistent with its longstanding policy 
of tax-neutrality and with the GATT.

Final Results of Review

    As a result of our review, we have determined that the following 
margin exists:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Margin  
      Manufacturer/exporter              Time period          (percent) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AG der Dillinger Huttenwerke....  2/4/93-7/31/94                    1.42
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department shall determine, and the Customs service shall 
assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. Individual 
differences between United States price and foreign market value may 
vary from the percentages stated above. The Department will issue 
appraisement instructions directly to the Customs Service.
    Furthermore, the following deposit requirements will be effective 
upon publication of this notice of final results of review for all 
shipments of plate from Germany entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, 
for consumption on or after the publication date, as provided for by 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act: (1) the cash deposit rates for the 
reviewed company will be the rate for that firm as stated above; (2) 
for previously reviewed or investigated companies not listed above, the 
cash deposit rate will continue to be the company-specific rate 
published for the most recent period; (3) if the exporter is not a firm 
covered in this review, or the original less than fair value (LTFV) 
investigation, but the manufacturer is, the cash deposit rate will be 
the rate established for the most recent period for the manufacturer of 
the merchandise; and (4) if neither the exporter nor the manufacturer 
is a firm covered in this review, the cash rate will be 36.00 percent. 
This is the ``all others'' rate from the LTFV investigation. See 
Antidumping Duty Order and Amendment of Final Determination of Sales at 
Less Than Fair Value: Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon Steel Plate from 
Germany, 58 FR 44170 (August 19, 1993). These deposit requirements, 
when imposed, shall remain in effect until publication of the final 
results of the next administrative review.
    This notice serves as a final reminder to importers of their 
responsibility under section 353.26 of the Department's regulations to 
file a certificate regarding the reimbursement of antidumping duties 
prior to liquidation of the relevant entries during this review period. 
Failure to comply with this requirement could result in the Secretary's 
presumption that reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the 
subsequent assessment of double antidumping duties.
    This notice also serves as a reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with section 353.34(d) of the Department's 
regulations. Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials 
or conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure 
to comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a 
sanctionable violation.
    This administrative review and this notice are in accordance with 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and section 353.22 
of the Department's regulations.

    Dated: March 20, 1996.
Susan G. Esserman,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 96-7464 Filed 3-27-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P