[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 59 (Tuesday, March 26, 1996)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13084-13097]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-6857]



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CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

16 CFR Part 1500 and Part 1507


Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices; Final Rule

AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Commission is amending its fireworks regulations under the 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act. This final rule will require that 
large multiple-tube fireworks devices that have any tube with an inner 
diameter of 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or greater pass a performance test for 
stability. Under the test, these devices may not tip over when inclined 
at an angle of 60 degrees from the horizontal. This requirement is 
intended to reduce the risk of injury posed when these fireworks 
devices tip over during firing. If they tip over, subsequent tubes may 
discharge in the direction of spectators or others in the vicinity.

DATES: The rule will take effect on March 26, 1997, and will apply to 
multiple-tube fireworks devices in which any tube has an inner diameter 
of 1.5 inches or greater and that first enter interstate commerce or 
are imported on or after that date.
    Adversely affected persons have until April 25, 1996 to file 
objections to this rule, stating grounds therefor and requesting a 
public hearing on those objections. Objections and requests for 
hearings must be mailed to the Office of the Secretary, Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C. 20207, or delivered to the 
Office of the Secretary, Room 502, 4330 East-West Highway, Bethesda, 
Maryland 20814 telephone (301) 504-6800.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel B. Hall, Office of Compliance, 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207-0001; 
telephone (301) 504-0400, ext. 1371.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

A. Background

    Multiple-tube mine and shell fireworks devices (also called 
``display racks'' and referred to in this notice as ``multiple-tube 
devices'') are non-reloadable devices that fire multiple aerial shells, 
comets, or other effects into the air to produce visual and audible 
effects. These devices consist of several vertical tubes with a common 
fuse, either with or without a horizontal base. They are classified by 
the Department of Transportation (``DOT'') as 1.4G explosive devices 
(formerly Class C common fireworks devices) which are suitable for use 
by consumers.
    The devices are designed to fire sequentially. This creates the 
danger that the device's reaction to one shot may cause it to tip over. 
Subsequent shots may then fire horizontally or at an angle and hit the 
operator or spectators. The Commission is aware of two deaths to 
spectators involving multiple-tube devices that occurred in this 
manner. Both of these incidents involved devices with tubes larger than 
1.5 inches in diameter.
    The Commission regulates fireworks devices under the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act (``FHSA''). 15 U.S.C. 1261-1278. Under its 
current regulations, the Commission has declared certain fireworks 
devices to be ``banned hazardous substances.'' 16 CFR 1500.17(a) (3), 
(8) and (9). Other fireworks devices must meet specific requirements to 
avoid being classified as banned hazardous substances. 16 CFR Part 
1507. Commission regulations also prescribe specific warnings required 
on various legal fireworks devices, 16 CFR 1500.14(b)(7), and designate 
the size and location of these warnings. 16 CFR 1500.121.
    On July 1, 1994, the Commission issued an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking (``ANPR'') discussing the

[[Page 13085]]
hazard presented by multiple-tube devices of all sizes, but noted that 
more severe incidents have occurred with large devices. 59 FR 33928. 
The ANPR used 1 inch (2.54 cm) as the cutoff between small and large 
devices. The ANPR explained that the Commission was considering the 
following regulatory alternatives: (1) ban all multiple-tube devices; 
(2) ban multiple-tube devices with an inside tube diameter of greater 
than 1 inch; (3) require additional labeling on all multiple-tube 
devices; (4) establish performance or design criteria to modify these 
devices; (5) pursue individual product recalls; and (6) take no 
mandatory action, but encourage development of a voluntary standard.
    On July 5, 1995, the Commission issued a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (``NPR'') in which it proposed a performance standard for 
multiple-tube devices with any tube inner diameter of 1.5 inches or 
more. 60 FR 34922. The Commission found that 1.5 inches is a more 
appropriate measure to distinguish between large and small devices than 
is 1 inch, and decided not to propose any further regulatory 
requirements for smaller devices.1 The proposed performance 
standard provided that all large multiple-tube devices have a minimum 
tip angle greater than 60 degrees. With this notice, the Commission 
issues the performance standard as a final rule.

    \1\ The Commission concluded that additional work would be 
needed to develop a standard that adequately addressed the tip-over 
hazard with small (less than 1.5 inch diameter) multiple-tube 
devices. For example, the Commission would need to test small 
devices to determine if the 60-degree tip angle is the proper 
criterion for this size device. Further, smaller devices are likely 
to produce less force on impact, and may be less likely to cause 
fatal injuries. Because not many small devices are marketed and the 
known incidents involve large devices, a performance standard for 
small multiple-tube devices may not be necessary. Accordingly, the 
Commission decided to apply the stability criterion only to large 
devices.
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B. Statutory Authority

    This proceeding is conducted under the FHSA. 15 U.S.C. 1261-1278. 
Fireworks are ``hazardous substances'' within the meaning of section 
2(f)(1)(A) of the FHSA because they are flammable or combustible 
substances, or generate pressure through decomposition, heat, or other 
means, and ``may cause substantial personal injury or substantial 
illness during or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably 
foreseeable handling or use * * *.'' 15 U.S.C. 1261(f)(1)(A).
    Under section 2(q)(1)(B) of the FHSA, the Commission may classify 
as a ``banned hazardous substance'' any hazardous substance intended 
for household use which, notwithstanding the precautionary labeling 
that is or may be required by the FHSA, presents such a hazard that 
keeping the substance out of interstate commerce is the only adequate 
way to protect the public health and safety. Id. at 1261(q)(1)(B). A 
proceeding to classify a substance as a banned hazardous substance 
under section 2(q)(1) of the FHSA is governed by sections 3(f)-(i) of 
the FHSA, and by sections 701(e)-(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (``FDCA''), 21 U.S.C. 371(e)-(g). See 15 U.S.C. 
1261(q)(2).
    The July 1, 1994, ANPR was the required first step to declare the 
specified multiple-tube devices to be banned hazardous substances under 
section 2(q)(1). See 15 U.S.C. 1262(f). The proposed rule, published on 
July 5, 1995, continued the regulatory process in accordance with 15 
U.S.C. 1262(h). To fulfill additional statutory requirements, this 
notice includes the text of the final rule and a final regulatory 
analysis. Id. at 1262(i)(1). As required by the FHSA, the Commission 
also makes findings here that: (1) compliance with any relevant 
voluntary standard is unlikely to adequately reduce the risk of injury, 
or substantial compliance by the industry with the voluntary standard 
is unlikely; (2) the expected benefits of the regulation bear a 
reasonable relationship to its expected costs; and (3) the regulation 
imposes the least burdensome requirement that would adequately reduce 
the risk of injury. Id. at 1262(i)(2).

C. Filing Objections Under Section 701(e) of the FDCA

    The procedures established under section 701(e) of the FDCA also 
govern this rulemaking. 15 U.S.C. 1261(q)(2). These procedures provide 
that once the Commission issues a final rule, persons who would be 
adversely affected by the rule have 30 days in which to file objections 
with the Commission stating the grounds therefor, and to request a 
public hearing on those objections. 21 U.S.C. 371(e). If objections are 
filed, a hearing to receive evidence concerning the objections would be 
held. The presiding officer would then issue an order, based upon 
substantial evidence. Id. The Commission's procedural rules at 16 CFR 
Part 1502 would apply to such a hearing.
    Any objections and requests for a hearing must be filed with the 
Commission's Office of the Secretary. They will be accepted for filing 
if they meet the following conditions: (1) they are submitted within 
the 30-day period specified; (2) each objection is separately numbered; 
(3) each objection specifies with particularity the provision(s) of the 
regulation to which the objection is directed; (4) each objection on 
which a hearing is requested specifically requests a hearing; and (5) 
each objection for which a hearing is requested includes a detailed 
description of the basis for the objection and the factual information 
or analysis in support thereof (failure to include this information 
constitutes a waiver of the right to a hearing on that objection). 16 
CFR 1502.6.
    The Commission will publish a notice in the Federal Register 
specifying any parts of the regulation that have been stayed by the 
filing of proper objections or, if no objections have been filed, 
stating that fact. Id. at Sec. 1502.7. As soon as practicable, the 
Commission will review any objections and hearing requests that have 
been filed to determine whether the regulation should be modified or 
revoked, and whether a hearing is justified. Id. at Sec. 1502.8.

D. The Product

    As explained in the proposed rule, this rulemaking only applies to 
multiple-tube devices that have any tube equal to or greater than 1.5 
inches in inner diameter (referred to below as ``large devices''). 
Large devices were first introduced by domestic manufacturers around 
1986. Generally, they consist of three or more tubes grouped together, 
sometimes on a wooden base, and fused in a series to fire sequentially. 
Bases, where used, come in a variety of sizes. The devices fire aerial 
shells, comets, or other effects from the tubes, producing visual and 
audible effects. These devices are among the largest fireworks 
available to consumers. [13] 2

    \2\ Numbers in brackets refer to documents listed at the end of 
this notice.
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    The tubes may be individually labeled or have a single label 
surrounding them. Commission regulations require that all multiple-tube 
devices display the following conspicuous label:

Warning (or Caution) Emits Showers of Sparks (or Shoots Flaming Balls, 
if More Descriptive)

Use only under [close] adult supervision.3

    \3\ The word ``close'' is optional.
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For outdoor use only.
Place on a hard smooth surface (or place upright on level ground, if 
more descriptive).
Do not hold in hand.
Light fuse and get away.

16 CFR 1500.14(b)(7)(ix).
    The National Fireworks Association (``NFA'') reports that retail 
sales of large multiple-tube devices are between $24

[[Page 13086]]
and $36 million annually, with an estimated 400,000 to 700,000 units 
sold per year. Prices range from $30 to $130 per unit, with most 
devices in the $50 to $60 range. The NFA also reports that domestic 
devices account for about 75 percent of the market by dollar volume and 
somewhat less by unit sales. Imported devices are manufactured 
primarily in China, and go through several wholesalers before reaching 
the retail vendor. [13] Some devices have tubes that are imported from 
China and then are inserted into larger tubes and assembled with bases 
in the United States. CPSC considers such devices to be imported.

E. Risk of Injury

    The devices fire sequentially, and under some conditions the force 
from one shot can tip the device over, causing it to fall into a 
horizontal position. A subsequent shot can discharge as the device is 
falling or when it is horizontal. When this occurs, there is a risk 
that one of the projectiles may strike the operator of the device or 
spectators and cause serious injury, or even death.
    The Commission is aware of two deaths involving large multiple-tube 
devices. In both incidents, the device tipped over while functioning. A 
projectile then fired horizontally from the device and struck the 
victim. In each case, the victim was a spectator.
    The first fatality occurred in July of 1991. A 3-year-old boy was 
standing between his father's legs approximately 40 feet from an area 
where fireworks were being set off at a family reunion. The device had 
been placed on concrete blocks. The device tipped over after the third 
shot, and the fourth shell fired horizontally in the direction of the 
boy, striking him in the left ear. He died the next morning. [2, Tab A]
    The second fatality occurred in July of 1992. The victim, a 65-
year-old grandmother, was sitting at the end of a picnic table watching 
a family fireworks display approximately 40 feet away. Her son placed a 
large multiple-tube device on a piece of wafer board that extended 
about one foot over the end of a boat dock. He placed a 2x4 block of 
wood under the end of the board so that the device would shoot out over 
the lake. After lighting the device, he walked toward the shore and 
noticed that the device had tipped over after the third shot. The 
fourth shell discharged horizontally and struck his mother in the 
temple and eye. She died the next morning. [2, Tab A]
    CPSC's compliance testing indicates that the tip-over risk 
evidenced by these two incidents continues to exist. In fiscal year 
1994, all 24 samples of imported devices tested for the Commission's 
routine compliance program, and 1 of 8 samples of domestic devices, 
tipped over while functioning. In fiscal year 1995, 22 of 27 imported 
samples and 1 of 5 domestic samples tipped over. [19]

F. Commission Tests to Develop a Standard

1. Testing Prior to the ANPR

    After the first fatality, several domestic manufacturers of large 
multiple-tube devices began developing a test for the potential of 
these devices to tip over while functioning. The test used a 2-inch (5 
cm) thick block of medium-density (2 pounds per cubic foot or 0.032g/
cm\3\) polyurethane upholstery foam to simulate uneven surfaces. When 
placed on this surface, if a device tipped over while functioning, it 
was deemed too unstable.
    The American Fireworks Standards Laboratory (``AFSL'') then began 
work to revise its standard for these devices to incorporate such a 
dynamic stability test. AFSL issued an interim revised voluntary 
standard in January 1993 and adopted it without changes on September 5, 
1995. The Commission also collected samples of large multiple-tube 
devices and tested them for tip-over using the industry's dynamic 
stability test. [1 and 14]

2. CPSC's Dynamic Stability Testing

    After issuing the ANPR, the Commission staff attempted to develop a 
dynamic stability test that could provide a reliable performance 
standard for multiple-tube devices. The staff's objective was to 
develop a test that could reliably distinguish between large multiple-
tube devices that are dangerously unstable and those that do not 
present an unreasonable tip-over risk. The staff attempted to identify 
a test surface that would simulate grass (the surface believed to be 
commonly used for fireworks displays), and that would produce 
consistent results in repeated tests.
    To accomplish this goal, the Commission had to identify a surface 
on which the devices would consistently tip over or remain upright in a 
manner corresponding to how the devices perform on grass. If the tip-
over rate was substantially greater on the test surface than on grass, 
the standard might be too stringent, causing unnecessary changes to 
reasonably safe products. If the tip-over rate was substantially lower 
on the test surface than on grass, the standard might not adequately 
protect consumers.
    As explained in detail in the Federal Register notice that 
published the proposed rule, the staff's testing did not yield 
sufficiently reliable results to propose a dynamic standard. 60 FR 
34922, 34924. The staff tested devices on several types of foam. First 
it tested with 2-inch thick foams of three different densities. This 
thickness was chosen, in part, because the AFSL standard specifies 2-
inch thick medium-density foam. However, the tip-over rates with all 
three densities of two-inch thick foam in this initial test were 
significantly greater than with grass (39 to 50 tip-overs out of 50 
devices on foam compared with 4 out of 50 on grass). The staff then 
tested three high-density foams of smaller thicknesses (0.75, 1.0, and 
1.5 inches), hoping to better match the tip-over rates on grass. [6, 8] 
However, none of the these three foams agreed consistently with grass 
for all three devices tested. The results of this phase of testing are 
summarized in Table 1.

   Table 1.--Phase I--Incidence and Percentage of Tip-Over With Large   
 Multiple-Tube Devices on Grass or High Density Polyurethane Upholstery 
                                  Foam                                  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Polyurethane foam     
                                           -----------------------------
             Device                 Grass     0.75                      
                                              inch    1.0 inch  1.5 inch
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1...............................      4/50      4/50    14/50*    40/50*
                                        8%        8%       28%       80%
2a..............................     32/50     9/50*     25/50    43/50*
                                       64%       18%       50%       86%
3a..............................     27/50     2/50*     3/50*     7/50*

[[Page 13087]]
                                                                        
                                       54%        4%        6%      14% 
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* Significantly different from grass, P<0.05.                           
a Device modified to increase tip-over rate.                            


    Of the three foams, 1-inch foam appeared to offer the best overall 
relationship to grass, even though it produced inconsistent results. 
[6, 8] Therefore, the staff continued testing with this foam.
    In phase II of the Commission's testing, six additional devices 
were tested on grass and on 1.0-inch thick high density foam. The 
results were then combined with the results from phase I. Once again, 
however, there was not consistent agreement between the tip-over rates 
on foam and on grass (see Table 2).

   Table 2.--Phase II--Incidence and Percentage of Tip-Over With Large  
  Multiple-Tube Devices on Grass or 1.0-Inch High Density Polyurethane  
                             Upholstery Foam                            
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Device                           Grass     Foam  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 a.................................................      4/50   14/50 *
                                                            8%       28%
2 b.................................................     32/50     25/50
                                                           64%       50%
3 b.................................................     27/50    3/50 *
                                                           54%        6%
4 b.................................................     30/50     36/50
                                                           60%       72%
5...................................................      0/90      0/50
                                                            0%        0%
6 a.................................................     10/50   25/50 *
                                                           20%       50%
7...................................................      0/50      0/50
                                                            0%        0%
8...................................................      0/90      0/50
                                                            0%        0%
9...................................................      0/50      0/50
                                                            0%       0% 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Significantly different from grass, P<0.05.                           
a Device has no base.                                                   
b Device modified to increase tip-over rate.                            

    The staff concluded that the dynamic stability test it attempted to 
develop could not reasonably form the basis for a standard addressing 
the tip-over hazard with large multiple-tube devices. Particularly 
problematic was the dynamic test's inconsistency. There were two cases 
(devices 1 and 6) in which foam significantly overpredicted the tip-
over rate with grass. In another case (device 3) foam significantly 
underpredicted the tip-over rate with grass. [6, 8] These tests showed 
a highly significant ``interaction'' between the device and test 
surface, so that one could not accurately predict, based on a device's 
performance on foam, how the device would behave on grass. An accurate 
test is needed to avoid unwarranted market disruption and, more 
importantly, because a tip-over can lead to a fatality.

3. The Tip-Angle Test

    Since the Commission's testing on foam did not yield a reliable 
dynamic test, the staff looked to the physical properties of large 
multiple-tube devices to develop a static test. The staff measured the 
dimensions, mass, and static tip-over resistance (``tip angle'') of all 
the devices tested. The angle at which a device will first tip over 
depends on its base-height ratio, mass, and center of gravity. A 
device's dynamic stability--its ability to remain upright when fired--
depends on its tip angle and other factors, such as its lift force, the 
firing order, and the time between firings. The staff found that tip 
angle could predict whether a device would tip over while functioning 
and also be sufficiently sensitive for routine compliance testing. [9]
    The staff measured the tip angle of devices by placing one edge of 
the device against a mechanical stop approximately \1/16\-inch high (to 
prevent sliding) at the edge of a horizontal hinged platform. The 
platform was slowly raised from the horizontal until the device tipped 
over. The tip angle was considered to be the angle at which the device 
first tips over. The staff repeated the test for each edge of the 
device to determine its minimum tip angle. In this manner, the staff 
measured the tip angle for the nine large devices used in the dynamic 
tests. The staff then compared these measurements and the results of 
the dynamic tests to determine whether there was a relationship between 
the minimum tip angle of a device and its dynamic stability on grass 
(see Table 3). [9]

 Table 3.--Static Tip-Over Resistance and Dynamic Tip-Over Rate of Large
                          Multiple-Tube Devices                         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Tip-over rate on            
                                                  grass                 
       Minimum tip angle (degrees)       ----------------------  Device 
                                           Percent   Incidence          
------------------------------------------------------------------------
35, 42 b................................       54        27/50       3 a
37......................................       64        32/50       2 a
37......................................       20        10/50         6
37......................................        8         4/50         1
40......................................       60        30/50       4 a
61......................................        0         0/90         5
64......................................        0         0/50         7
65......................................        2.5       1/40         4
68......................................        0         0/40         2
69......................................        0         0/50         9
70......................................        0         0/40         3
78, 80 b................................        0         0/90        8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Device modified to increase tip-over rate.                            
b Different samples of same device.                                     

    The staff also tested several large devices other than those it had 
examined when considering a dynamic test. One device was a modified 
form of device 1, that originally had no base. The staff glued a 12-
inch (30.5-cm) square particleboard base to the device. With this 
modification, the tip angle increased from 37 degrees to 68 degrees. 
The tip-over incidence on grass also decreased, from 4/50 to 0/50. This 
additional test demonstrates that a device's stability can be improved 
by adding a base. [9]
    The second additional device that the staff tested, an imported 
one, had a square plastic base. The tip angle of this device ranged 
from 54 to 55 degrees (based on measurements of four individual 
samples), and it did not tip over in 50 dynamic tests on grass. [16] 
4

    \4\ The staff had previously tested this type of device (tip 
angle: 52-55 degrees and tip-over rate: 2/40), but the bases of some 
of the devices in the earlier test were cracked. Therefore, the 
Commission does not consider the earlier tests to be reliable and 
has not considered them in determining an appropriate tip angle. [10 
and 11]
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    None of the seven devices originally tested had tip angles between 
43 and 61 degrees. Therefore, the staff modified the base of a device 
that had a large particleboard base in order to obtain a tip angle near 
50 degrees. The staff

[[Page 13088]]
trimmed 2\1/16\ inches off each of the two long edges of the base. The 
minimum tip angle of the device then ranged from 50 to 51 degrees 
(based on measurements of eight individual samples). This modified 
device tipped over in 33 out of 51 tests on grass. [16] Table 4 shows 
the tip angles and tip-over rates of the three additional devices that 
the staff tested.

   Table 4.--Static Tip-Over Resistance and Dynamic Tip-Over Rate of Additional Large Multiple-Tube Devices a   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Tip-over rate on grass                                                   
     Minimum tip angle (degrees)     --------------------------               Description of device             
                                        Percent     Incidence                                                   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50-51 b.............................           65        33/51  Four-tube device with base. Base trimmed to     
                                                                 obtain 50 degree tip angle.                    
54-55 b.............................            0         0/50  Seven-tube device with plastic base.            
68..................................            0         0/50  Seven-tube device. Same as device 1, but with   
                                                                 added 12 inch base.                            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Does not include devices that the staff considered to present inconclusive results.                           
bRange of values for replicate samples.                                                                         

    The Commission proposed and now issues in final a standard 
requiring that large multiple-tube devices must have a minimum tip 
angle above 60 degrees. The Commission's data indicate that 
substantially all of the devices measuring a tip angle above 60 degrees 
did not tip over while functioning on grass. Among such devices, there 
was only one tip-over in 450 tests. On the other hand, devices with tip 
angles below 60 degrees had tip-over rates on grass as high as 65 
percent. Among all devices tested with tip angles below 60 degrees, 
there were 136 tipovers in 351 tests.
    The Commission believes that requiring devices to have minimum tip 
angles above 60 degrees offers an appropriate margin of safety. The 
fact that the staff observed no tip-overs with one device that had a 
tip angle of 54-55 degrees might appear to suggest that a tip angle of 
54 degrees would be sufficient to protect against the tip-over hazard. 
However, a device that had a tip angle of 50-51 degrees had a very high 
incidence of tip-overs (33/51). This device had a small base, and would 
have been even less stable if, like a number of other devices on the 
market, it had no base extending outward from the tube configuration. 
Thus, it is likely that some devices with 55-degree tip angles would 
tip over when tested on grass. Furthermore, the tests were performed on 
level ground, and in actual use there probably will be significant 
variations from level in a number of cases. The Commission concludes 
that in order to adequately protect the public, it is appropriate to 
require that the minimum tip angle be above 60 degrees.
    AFSL submitted comments on the NPR that included results from its 
testing of 43 units (13 different devices). AFSL reported that 35 
percent of the units it tested met a 60-degree tip-angle test and that 
none of the devices it tested tipped in actual firing. As explained 
below in Section G of this notice, this limited testing does not show 
that a requirement for a tip angle above 60 degrees is too stringent a 
measure of whether a multiple-tube device is unlikely to tip over in 
use.

G. Comments Responding to the Proposed Rule

    The Commission received eight comments in response to the proposed 
rule. Some commenters stated that they support the proposed rule. 
Significant issues raised by other comments, and the Commission's 
responses, are summarized below.

1. Scope of the Rule

    AFSL stated that it agreed with the Commission's decision to limit 
the scope of the proposed rule to large multiple-tube devices and that 
the Commission was correct in concluding that devices with inside 
diameters greater than 1 inch, but less than 1.5 inches, are not 
common.

2. Need for a Rule

    Some commenters stated that the need for a rule had not been 
demonstrated because the number of reported injuries is low or because 
the injuries are caused by consumer misuse. As explained below, the 
Commission disagrees with these contentions.
a. Injury Data
    Comments: One commenter claimed that the number of multiple-tube 
devices has increased, but that the number of injuries associated with 
them has not. The commenter concludes that the small number of injuries 
and deaths associated with multiple-tube devices or Class C fireworks 
does not justify further regulation. This commenter also claimed that 
multiple-tube fireworks devices are no different from other fireworks 
with respect to the potential for injury.
    One group of commenters stated that in their evaluation of injuries 
recorded in the state of Indiana, multiple-tube devices and other 
consumer fireworks either have not tipped over or have caused few or no 
injuries.
    Response: Mine and shell devices (both single and multiple shot) 
are more powerful than most consumer fireworks. Although the number of 
deaths and injuries associated with mine and shell devices is 
relatively low, the severity of injuries is greater than with other 
devices. Any tip-over of large multiple-tube devices has the potential 
to cause death or serious injury. Two individuals are known to have 
been struck by large multiple-tube devices. Both suffered fatal 
injuries.
    The yearly unit sales figures for fireworks are unknown. Therefore, 
the Commission cannot accurately assess any possible trends in exposure 
to large multiple-tube devices. However, the cases show that the 
potential for tip-over and serious injury or death is high under 
certain conditions of foreseeable use. Since, as explained below, there 
is no voluntary standard that can adequately reduce this risk, the 
mandatory standard proposed by the Commission is necessary.
    Comment: The commenters on the Indiana data also requested that the 
Commission survey dealers to inquire about reported cases or instances 
of a problem with a multiple-tube mine and shell device.
    Response: As noted above, a mandatory standard is appropriate 
despite the low number of reported deaths and injuries. In view of 
this, there is no need to perform the requested survey.
    Comment: AFSL contends that the lack of any known serious injury 
attributed to large multiple-tube devices since the adoption of the 
AFSL standard in 1993 supports their view that the voluntary standard 
is adequate.

[[Page 13089]]

    Response: These devices had been on the market for 6 years by the 
time the two known deaths occurred. Thus, the absence of any known 
deaths since 1993 is not statistically significant. The adequacy of 
AFSL's standard, and the extent to which it is adopted by industry, are 
discussed below under the responses to comments favoring a dynamic test 
and to comments favoring the alternative of a voluntary standard.
b. Possible Role of Misuse and Alcohol in Tip-Over Incidents
    Comment: One commenter alleged that any increase in mortality 
related to these items is the direct result of misuse and the failure 
of consumers to follow the appropriate instructions. The same commenter 
stated that the fireworks industry cannot be held accountable for all 
injuries, particularly when the item is being blatantly misused. The 
commenter also claimed that many fireworks-related injuries involve 
some level of intoxication by the operator and that the correlation 
between alcohol use and injury should be considered in the hazard 
analysis for any product.
    Response: The incident reports do not indicate that the fatalities 
involving large multiple-tube devices were a result of misuse. Rather, 
they appear to have occurred during reasonably foreseeable use of the 
product. The two fatalities occurred during family gatherings a day or 
two after the July 4th holiday.
    The labels on multiple-tube devices generally state that the device 
should be placed on a solid level surface prior to firing. In one 
fatality, concrete blocks were stacked in the yard as a staging area. 
In the other fatality, the fireworks device had been placed on a board 
so that it would fire over a lake. The use of the devices on either of 
these surfaces appears to indicate concern with the appropriate 
placement of the fireworks device prior to firing.
    Thus, the known cases involving fatalities support the conclusion 
that the users were attempting to follow the instructions for proper 
placement of the devices. In addition, there is no indication that 
alcohol was a factor in either of the deaths. Accordingly, the 
Commission disagrees with the commenter's contention that consumer 
misuse or intoxication was the cause of these accidents.
    Comment: One commenter claimed that, based on a 1992 CPSC study of 
hospital emergency-room-treated injuries, ``a major problem with 
fireworks injuries were the result of consumer misuse.''
    Response: The study cited does not support this proposition for the 
devices at issue here. In discussing the category of Shells and Mines 
(the major two types of devices included in the this rulemaking), the 
report states that ``little can be said to characterize this category 
of fireworks due to the small sample size (five investigations). 
However, it appeared that the flight path of the projectile, 
particularly when tip-over was involved, may be a major concern.'' [23]
    There may well have been misuse of the multiple shell devices 
associated with some of the injuries in the study. However, nothing in 
the report indicated that the injuries could be attributed to any such 
misuse, as opposed to erratic flight path, tip-over, or other problems 
with the devices.
c. Section 15 of the CPSA
    Comment: One commenter stated that the proposed rule is unnecessary 
because existing regulations and section 15 of the Consumer Product 
Safety Act (``CPSA'') are adequate. 15 U.S.C. 2064. Section 15 
authorizes the Commission to take corrective actions regarding product 
defects that create a substantial risk of injury to the public. See 16 
CFR 1115.4, 1115.12 (e) and (g).
    Response: Existing fireworks regulations require only a base-to-
height ratio of at least 1:3. 16 CFR 1507.4. All the devices tested by 
CPSC that tipped over during actual use complied with this standard. 
Therefore, this requirement does not adequately address the tip-over 
hazard.
    In addition, the ongoing problem of numerous section 15 recalls of 
multiple-tube devices under section 15 of the CPSA due to tip-over 
indicates that existing regulations are not effective. Under these 
circumstances, a performance standard that effectively addresses the 
problem for all devices is more appropriate than case-by-case 
investigation and recall.

3. Selection of the Tip-Over Angle

    Comment: One commenter stated that there is no logical or 
statistically valid reason for choosing any particular angle as the 
minimum angle required by the static test.
    Response: In developing the proposed rule, the staff considered 
specifying minimum tip angles as low as 45 degrees. However, as noted 
above, the Commission concluded that, to provide a margin of safety and 
to address the likelihood that the devices will not be used on level 
ground, the static test should require that a device not tip at an 
angle of 60 degrees.
    It is possible that a fireworks device might be constructed that 
would not tip over in a static test at 60 degrees but would tip over 
under foreseeable conditions on grass. In fact, 1 of the 450 devices 
tested by the Commission with a tip angle over 60 degrees did tip over 
when tested on grass. Increasing the stringency of the static test to 
address such hypothetical ``outliers'' would make the requirement 
unduly restrictive for the vast majority of designs that are likely to 
be marketed. If such easy-to-tip designs are marketed in the future, 
the Commission will consider action under section 15 of CPSA. 15 U.S.C. 
2064.
    Comment: One commenter suggested a more lenient tilt test for items 
that do not present as much of a tip-over hazard as other available 
designs. The commenter stated that a more lenient tilt test was 
especially appropriate for devices with tubes clustered in the center 
of the base. The commenter asserted that multiple-tube items with tubes 
clustered close to the center of the base will more likely fail the 
static test, but be more stable when tested on foam or grass than 
multiple-tube items with tubes near the edge of the base. The commenter 
provided sketches to illustrate this point, and also suggested a 
formula to determine the tilt angle based on the geometry of the 
devices relative to the geometry of the base:

T=45+15 (d/b), where:
T is the tip angle in degrees; d is the length of the diagonal of a 
square (or diameter of a circle) enclosing the tubes; and b is the 
length of the diagonal of a square base or diameter of a circular base.

    The commenter stated that preliminary testing supports the formula, 
but provided no data and admits that further tests are needed.
    Response: The staff of the Commission's Engineering Laboratory 
agrees that there are configurations that could provide greater or 
lesser stability for a fired multiple-tube device. The commenter lists 
base size, base thickness, lift charge, and size of the aerial load as 
relevant factors affecting stability. However, firing order and rate, 
as well as other variables, also affect the dynamic stability of 
multiple-tube devices.
    The commenter supplied no data on which to evaluate the suggested 
formula. The Commission has very limited data on the tip-over 
characteristics of devices with tip angles in the range of 45 to 60 
degrees. As explained above, the Commission selected the 60-degree tip 
angle criterion based on a device with a tip angle of 50 to 51 degrees 
that tipped over a large proportion of the time (33/51) when tested 
dynamically on grass. In addition, various combinations of the factors 
that affect tip-over could cause a device with

[[Page 13090]]
a similar configuration to tip over more readily than the tested 
device. The suggested formula does not account for these other 
factors--such as load, firing rate, etc. The Commission's criterion 
does account for these factors by correlating tip angle to dynamic tip-
over on grass.
    The commenter's formula is intended to be applied to devices with a 
square or circular base. The device with the 50-51 degree tip angle 
that had a high tip-over rate had a rectangular base. It is not clear 
how, if at all, the commenter would apply the formula in this case. 
However, it can be expected that the formula will produce tip-angle 
criteria ranging between 50 and 60 degrees, depending on the 
configuration. Available data do not show that such criteria would 
provide an adequate margin of safety. Accordingly, the Commission is 
not adopting this commenter's suggestion.
    Comment: As explained above, the Commission selected the 60-degree 
criterion based on the performance on grass of a large number of tests 
of various large devices. Some comments questioned the adequacy of this 
testing. One commenter asked why the Commission did not test the 
devices that were recalled as a result of failing the 2-inch foam test 
and the device known to have been involved in the death of a 3-year-old 
boy. The same commenter suggested that CPSC conduct additional tests 
comparing the static test to the dynamic test with foam. Another 
commenter questioned why the Commission did not test a larger sampling 
of the various multiple-tube devices, including the W-800 inserts with 
a wooden base and a tube around the insert.
    Response: In developing the proposed standard, the Commission 
selected devices that represented a cross section of the devices 
available at the time and that provided a range of tip-over rates. The 
Commission considered design characteristics such as base size, firing 
order, internal fuse-burn time, lift charge, shell mass, device shape, 
center of gravity, and quality of materials and construction. This 
cross-section of devices is sufficient to ensure that the test selected 
by the Commission is reasonable.
    Devices that had been previously recalled--as well as the device 
involved in the death of the 3-year-old boy--were not available at the 
time that the CPSC conducted its tests. It is expected that had they 
been available for testing, they would have been among those devices 
found to be unstable. However, the Commission believes that it is more 
reasonable to test currently available devices, rather than devices 
that are no longer manufactured or available.
    Comment: Some commenters stated that there are devices that are 
stable in actual use even though they do not comply with the proposed 
rule. AFSL submitted test data to support this view. These commenters 
asserted that the proposed rule unfairly penalizes such devices.
    Response: As explained above, AFSL presented limited test data on 
12 large multiple-tube devices (one device included in AFSL's testing 
was actually a small device). Seven of these did not meet the 60-degree 
tip angle, but did not tip over in AFSL's dynamic tests.
    AFSL's testing was very limited--only one sample of each device on 
three surfaces (concrete, 2-inch foam, and grass), and one device was 
not even tested on grass. A single test is not sufficient to establish 
the dynamic stability of a device. For example, a device that tips over 
1 in 10 times may present a serious risk of injury, but there is only a 
1-in-10 chance of observing a tip-over in a single test. In CPSC's 
tests, the staff tested from 40 to 90 samples of each device. The 
Commission cannot conclude based on AFSL's limited data that the seven 
devices it tested are stable when operated on grass.

4. Static v. Dynamic Test

    Introduction. As noted above, the Commission's requirement involves 
inclining the device at an angle of 60 degrees while it is prevented 
from sliding by a stop on the inclined supporting surface. If the 
device does not tip over further at that angle, it complies with the 
requirement. This is a static test; it is affected only by the location 
of the center of gravity of the device with respect to the edge of the 
device that is against the stop.
    Comments: A number of commenters would prefer a dynamic test, which 
would involve actually firing the device while it rests on a specified 
supporting surface to see if the device tips over. The American 
Pyrotechnic Association (``APA'') and AFSL stated that, although they 
support a requirement for static stability, a static requirement is not 
sufficient by itself to address the tip-over hazard. These two 
organizations and other commenters stated that, in addition to a static 
test, the proposed rule should require dynamic testing, either for all 
large devices or for those with tip angles between 45 and 60 degrees.
    Response: Under the FHSA, manufacturers must consider whether their 
products pose a hazard during ``reasonably foreseeable handling and 
use.'' The Commission considers operation of multiple-tube devices on 
grass to be ``reasonably foreseeable.'' Further, the resilient and 
variable nature of grass makes it more likely that a device will tip 
over when fired from a grass surface than from other common supporting 
surfaces, such as dirt or pavement. Thus, an adequate test should 
address the hazard of tip-over of these devices when fired while 
sitting on grass as well as on more forgiving surfaces.
    A substantial problem with dynamic testing of these devices is that 
grass is not a reproducible test surface. Even patches of grass that 
appear to be identical can react differently to the forces produced 
when a device is fired.
    Foams of various characteristics have been suggested as suitable 
test surfaces for determining whether a device will tip over when 
fired. AFSL uses 2-inch thick medium-density foam in its tip-over 
testing.
    The staff considered whether foam is an adequate surrogate for 
grass--that is, whether there is a consistent relationship between the 
tip-over behaviors on grass and foam for a variety of devices. Based on 
the CPSC's tests, however, there was no consistent relationship between 
the tip-over rates measured on grass and foam. In fact, the tests 
suggested that there may be cases where devices that do not tip over 
when tested on foam may tip over frequently on grass.
    The Commission concludes that, because of the absence of any 
suitable test surface, the use of dynamic testing for devices, 
regardless of their tip angle, is not presently feasible. However, the 
results of any voluntary dynamic tests by industry may provide valuable 
information when considered in conjunction with a device's tip angle. 
And, as explained above, the Commission will examine whether devices 
that tip over when fired despite passing the 60-degree tip-angle test 
present a substantial product hazard under section 15 of the CPSA.

5. Dynamic Variations in Tip-Over Potential

    Comment: One commenter noted that the potential for tip-over from 
multiple-tube mine and shell devices is not equal among all of the 
various shapes, sizes, and configurations of devices.
    Response: The Commission agrees that the potential for dynamic tip-
over from multiple-tube fireworks devices can differ among the various 
shapes, sizes, and configurations of devices with the same static tip 
angle. For example, devices that have larger or heavier bases or 
smaller lift (propellant) charges are less likely to tip over. 
Nevertheless, for

[[Page 13091]]
the reasons explained above, the 60-degree tip-angle test is the best 
means available to determine whether a multiple-tube device is 
unreasonably likely to tip over when fired.
    Comments on specific factors that may affect tip-over potential are 
discussed below.
    Comment: One commenter stated that the rate of firing of the 
projectiles from the tubes can affect dynamic stability and that this 
should be examined.
    Response: The Commission agrees that the rate of firing--the time 
between the firing of individual tubes--may affect the dynamic 
stability of multiple devices. A multiple-tube device can become less 
stable as a result of rapid sequential tube firings. In compliance 
testing, the Commission considers whether the firing rate may 
contribute to tip-over. The staff has discussed with AFSL the 
possibility of incorporating into their standard a minimum time between 
the firing of successive tubes. However, the rate of firing is only one 
of many variables that affect the dynamic stability of multiple-tube 
devices. The 60-degree tip-angle test requirement, which takes into 
account several factors, is the best known way to address the tip-over 
hazard.
    Comment: Several commenters stated that, in addition to the static 
test, the proposed rule should limit the lift charge--i.e., the 
propellant powder weight--to 12 grams per tube. AFSL presented test 
data showing that increasing the lift charge above the 12-gram limit 
may decrease the dynamic stability of multiple-tube devices. A 
specially made device (not commercially available), with 20 grams of 
lift charge per tube, tipped over in one test on 2-inch foam. A similar 
device with 12 grams of lift charge did not tip over in one test on 
foam. Another specially-made device did not tip over in one test on 
foam, even though the lift charge was increased to 20 grams.
    Several commenters asked why the CPSC did not study the effects on 
stability of the amount of lift charge in devices.
    Response: U.S. Department of Transportation (``DOT'') regulations 
permit a maximum of 20 grams of lift charge per tube. The AFSL 
voluntary standard limits the lift charge to 12 grams per tube. The 
proposed rule did not separately address lift charge. The DOT mandatory 
20-gram upper limit and AFSL voluntary 12-gram upper limit are 
unaffected by this rulemaking.
    The staff measured the lift charge in all the devices that were 
tested. The lift charges in the two devices that tipped over on grass 
(before they were modified) were 3.6 and 4.7 grams per tube. The lift 
charges in devices that did not tip over ranged from 4.7 to 11.6 grams 
per tube. [6] These results do not support limiting the lift charge. 
Devices with a lift charge greater than 12 grams per tube were not 
available to the staff.
    The lift charge is only one of the variables that affect dynamic 
stability. Other variables include firing order, firing rate, weight, 
the configuration of the tubes, and base dimensions. Further, the lift 
force (or propellant force)--rather than the lift charge--relates more 
directly to dynamic stability. The lift force depends on factors in 
addition to the lift charge, such as the type of powder and the design 
of the product. Again, the staff's data show that the dynamic 
performance of the device is better predicted by a static test.
    It may be possible to construct a device that will tip over in 
actual use, even though it passes the 60-degree static stability test. 
AFSL's tests suggest this may be the case. But, the small number of 
tests conducted by AFSL (two devices, one test each) and the mixed 
results it reported (one device with 20 grams of lift powder tipped 
over on foam while another did not) are not adequate to support a 
mandatory 12-gram limit on the lift charge.
    Manufacturers, importers, and distributors must see that their 
products do not pose a substantial product hazard. Increasing the lift 
charge might increase the tendency of multiple-tube devices to tip over 
during operation. Devices developed in the future that exceed 12 grams 
of lift charge will be tested by the Commission. Any device that tips 
over while functioning, even though it complies with the static test, 
may present a substantial product hazard. As explained above, the 
Commission may take enforcement action in such a case under section 15 
of the CPSA. Thus, although the Commission lacks data to warrant a 
mandatory limit at this time, the Commission encourages manufacturers 
and importers to continue compliance with the voluntary limit of 12 
grams of lift charge per tube since the amount of lift charge may 
affect tip-over.

6. Other Advantages of a Static Test

    Comment: The AFSL and the APA stated that they favor a static test, 
as in the proposed standard, because it is safer to perform than 
dynamic testing. One commenter stated that it appears that the 
Commission proposed a standard based on a static test, in part, because 
it is easier to perform than dynamic testing.
    Response: The Commission proposed a mandatory standard based on the 
static test because it adequately addresses the hazard and a suitable 
dynamic test is not available. That the static test is easier and safer 
to perform are additional advantages.

7. Other Alternatives to the Proposed Rule

a. Additional Labeling
    Comment: One commenter suggested requiring the warning label on 
multiple-tube devices to include a phrase such as, ``PLACE UPRIGHT ON 
HARD, SMOOTH LEVEL SURFACE BEFORE IGNITING. DO NOT FIRE ON GRASS OR 
OTHER UNSTABLE SURFACE.''
    Response: The Commission's current labeling requirement for mine 
and shell devices includes the following statement: ``Place on hard 
smooth surface (or place upright on level ground, if more 
descriptive).'' 16 CFR 1500.14(a)(7)(ix). Except for the admonition not 
to fire on grass, the commenter's suggested label is equivalent to the 
Commission's current requirement. As to the statement ``do not fire on 
grass,'' it is likely that users will place these devices on whatever 
surface is at the desired location, including grass. Thus, the 
Commission cannot conclude that there would be significant safety 
benefits from a label advising against use on grass. Furthermore, the 
longer label statement suggested by this commenter could reduce the 
extent to which the basic message is noticed and read by users. 
Although the Commission lacks the evidence to mandate the ``do not fire 
on grass'' statement, and questions its effectiveness, the Commission 
would not object if manufacturers voluntarily supply such a statement 
after the required label.
    In addressing a product hazard, the most effective approach is to 
design the hazard out of the product. A warning does not remove the 
hazard; it only informs the consumer of the hazard. Some users may read 
and follow the information on a warning label. However, fireworks are 
frequently used at night when it is too dark for the user to read a 
warning label. Fireworks also are often used at a party or celebration 
in which users are unlikely to take the time to read and follow warning 
labels. And, spectators, like the two victims killed by multiple-tube 
devices that tipped over, probably will not have an opportunity to read 
the label.
    Even if consumers read and follow a warning label, the device may 
tip over. In the two death incidents, the fireworks devices were placed 
on hard, smooth surfaces and they still tipped over. The Commission 
believes that the proposed

[[Page 13092]]
tip-over performance requirement for multiple-tube devices will result 
in less hazardous multiple-tube devices.
b. Defer to AFSL's Voluntary Standard
i. Adequacy of the Voluntary Standard
    Comments: Several commenters supported AFSL's voluntary standard. 
One group of commenters stated that they would prefer that the 
Commission allow the industry to adopt a voluntary standard, rather 
than issue a mandatory standard. Specifically, one commenter referred 
to AFSL's standard--i.e., the 2-inch foam test--and asserted that foam 
is a standard, reproducible test surface, even though it is not an 
adequate surrogate for grass. Another commenter questioned CPSC's 
conclusion that the AFSL standard did not adequately address the tip-
over hazard. AFSL commented that the foam test is intended to simulate 
a worst-case scenario and that, even though the foam test may not be 
suitable for a mandatory standard, it adequately addresses the tip-over 
hazard.
    Response: AFSL's foam test has many substantial shortcomings. AFSL 
does not specify the properties of the foam--such as compressibility, 
resiliency, and density--that are essential for a reproducible 
test.5 Neither does AFSL specify the environmental conditions, 
such as temperature and wind speed, that may affect the test results, 
or the number of devices to be tested. All of these parameters must be 
specified before the foam test could be considered a standard, 
reproducible test. And, perhaps most significantly, there is simply no 
evidence of a consistent relationship between tip-over rates on grass 
and foam. Thus, a test on foam would not be appropriate even if all the 
test parameters were specified.

    \5\  Although AFSL specifies medium-density foam, the definition 
of ``medium'' may differ among foam suppliers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    AFSL has never released test results showing that 2-inch foam is a 
worst-case surface compared to grass. CPSC has only limited data from 
tests of devices on both 2-inch foam and grass. The Commission's 
initial tests showed that the 3 different densities of 2-inch foam 
tested had considerably higher tip-over rates than did grass.
    The more extensive tests that the Commission performed on other 
thickness of foam show that, depending on the device tested, the tip-
over rate on foam may be greater than, equal to, or less than that on 
grass. Furthermore, the Commission's compliance testing in 1995 showed 
a domestic device that tipped over on grass (1 of 5 tested), but not on 
2-inch medium-density foam. Therefore, the Commission concludes that 
the currently available information does not support the conclusion 
that 2-inch foam (or foam in other thicknesses) is a worst-case test 
surface that is consistently more stringent than grass.
    As regards tip angle, the AFSL standard requires a tip angle of 
only 18 degrees, whereas CPSC tests show that a tip angle of 60 degrees 
is needed to reasonably prevent tip-over. The Commission concludes that 
the AFSL standard's tip-angle provision does not adequately address the 
tip-over hazard with large multiple-tube fireworks devices.
ii. Likelihood of Compliance With the Voluntary Standard
    Comment: AFSL commented that a domestic testing program to allow 
manufacturers to obtain certification for their products has not been 
established and that the decision to follow the voluntary standard 
rests solely with individual manufacturers. However, AFSL states that 
its recent testing of large multiple-tube mine and shell devices 
indicated that products received from known manufacturers ``appeared to 
comply with the stability provisions of the AFSL standard.'' According 
to AFSL, under its China-based testing and certification program, all 
large multiple-tube mine and shell devices (with tubes larger than 1'' 
inside diameter) from participating firms are tested for compliance 
with the voluntary standard. Any devices that fail to comply are 
``withheld from shipment to the participating U.S. importer.''
    Response: Even if using 2-inch thick medium-density foam were 
effective, the Commission concludes that AFSL's voluntary standard 
would not adequately reduce the risk of tip-over because it is unlikely 
that there will be substantial industry compliance with that standard.
    The AFSL standard was adopted in January 1993. However, the results 
of CPSC's compliance testing indicate that these devices still tip 
over. In fiscal year 1994, all 24 imported devices tested by CPSC, and 
1 of 8 domestic devices, tipped over on either grass or 2-inch thick 
medium density foam. Of the 32 devices tested on the foam, 25 tipped 
over, and 4 of these also tipped over when tested on grass. In fiscal 
year 1995, 22 of 27 imported devices and 1 of 5 domestic devices tipped 
over. Of the 32 devices tested that year on 2-inch medium-density foam, 
21 tipped over, and 10 tipped over when tested on grass. If there were 
substantial compliance with the AFSL standard, these high rates of tip-
over on foam would not likely occur.
    There is no information to support a conclusion that the rates of 
compliance with the AFSL standard will improve. The Commission 
concludes, therefore, that there will not likely be substantial 
compliance with the AFSL standard.
c. A Ban of Large Devices
    The Commission also considered whether large multiple-tube devices 
should be banned entirely.
    Comment: The National Fire Protection Association (``NFPA'') 
generally has taken the position that fireworks should be used only by 
licensed professionals. However, in this case, NFPA agreed with the 
Commission's conclusion that limiting multiple-tube devices to 
professionals would not eliminate the tip-over hazard. Some commenters 
stated that the performance standard is preferable to a total ban of 
large devices.
    Response: The Commission agrees that a performance standard is the 
most appropriate option in this case.

8. Effective Date

    Comment: One commenter stated that manufacturers need 1 year to 
redesign devices, use up current inventory, order new packaging, and 
obtain Department of Transportation (``DOT'') approval for that 
packaging.
    Response: The Commission proposed an effective date of 6 months 
after publication of a final rule. The rule will apply only to devices 
first introduced into commerce or imported on or after that date. The 
vast majority of fireworks are ordered by dealers from July to December 
and delivered from December to June. The Commission expects that most 
of the devices currently not complying with the standard can be 
modified to meet it--e.g., by adding a base. Consequently, any devices 
still in manufacturers' or importers' inventories on the effective date 
would not be rendered useless.
    According to the DOT official responsible for enforcing regulations 
on new packaging, it may take 6 to 12 months for firms to obtain DOT 
approval of changes to the devices, order new packaging, and obtain DOT 
approval for that packaging. Larger firms are likely to be the ones 
that will need the full 12-month period, due to the larger number of 
models that could be affected.
    Therefore, a number of firms will need an effective date that is 
longer than the proposed date of 6 months, and up to 12 months, 
following publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. 
Accordingly, the Commission is extending the effective date to 12 
months following publication. The final

[[Page 13093]]
rule will thus become effective March 26, 1997.

    As noted previously, fireworks deliveries are concentrated in the 
period December through June. The effective date falls within that 
period. Therefore, it is likely that some but not all large multiple-
tube devices sold at retail for the 1997 summer season will comply with 
the tip-angle requirement.

9. The Costs of the Regulation

a. Portion of Existing Large Devices To Be Changed by the Rule
    Comment: AFSL presented test data with large multiple-tube mine and 
shell devices from what it claims are all five domestic 
manufacturers.6 Based on these tests, AFSL claimed that only 35 
percent of domestic devices complied with the proposed rule (60-degree 
tilt test), although all were stable in dynamic testing. The 
Commission's preliminary regulatory analysis assumed that almost all 
domestic devices would comply with the proposed rule.

    \6\  Although AFSL stated that all the devices tested were 
``domestically manufactured,'' some contained imported inserts. CPSC 
classifies these devices as imports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Response: AFSL's results contrast with CPSC staff's tests, in which 
all domestic large multiple-tube devices met the proposed 60-degree 
tip-angle test. Several aspects of AFSL's testing lead the Commission 
to question AFSL's conclusions about the anticipated level of 
compliance with the 60-degree tip-angle test.
    AFSL presented test results for 13 models of multiple-tube mine and 
shell devices. Device number 7 had an inside tube diameter of only 1.25 
inches, and is not subject to the rule (which applies only to devices 
with tube inner diameters measuring 1.5 inches or more). The devices 
numbered 1, 2, 3, 12, and 13 are essentially imported devices or 
``inserts'' to which wooden bases have been added. Based on AFSL's test 
data, 5 of 7 (71 percent) large domestic multiple-tube devices will 
satisfy the rule. The only two domestic devices tested by AFSL that 
would fail to comply with the rule are devices 8 and 11, since their 
tip angles were about 57 degrees. Both are new devices that were not 
available at the time that the CPSC tests were conducted. Combining 
AFSL's test data with CPSC's, 11 of 13 (85 percent) of large domestic 
multiple-tube devices would comply with the rule.\7\ Therefore, the 
Commission disagrees with AFSL's claim that only 35 percent of domestic 
devices will comply with the proposed rule.

    \7\  It appears that one device was tested by both AFSL and 
CPSC. In combining the data, this device was counted only once.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Cost of Modifying Noncomplying Devices
    Comment: One commenter argued that retail prices of the modified 
devices would increase by 35 to 45 percent. The commenter did not 
present any basis for this estimate.
    Response: The Commission's cost estimates are based on an average 
per-unit increase of 25-30 percent. These estimates were provided by 
the National Fireworks Association (NFA). The NFA is the fireworks 
trade association with the largest number of members, and the only one 
with a large contingent of retailers. The NFA estimate is the best one 
available to the Commission's staff.

10. Environmental Impact

    Comment: One commenter stated that there would be a significant 
environmental impact due to increased rubbish from the larger bases.
    Response: The rule is expected to result in modifications to 
devices representing sales of 100,000-to-175,000 items per year. [21] 
Consequently, the rule will result in a similar number of larger or new 
bases, and added packaging, being discarded. Most of these devices are 
expected to be thrown away after use with other residential trash (as 
is currently being done). The added costs of disposing of the bases and 
packaging will be negligible. The environmental impact of disposing of 
the relatively small amount of additional material required to provide 
a base, or increase its size, will be negligible. The additional cost 
to landfills of handling the extra rubbish also will be negligible.

H. The Standard

    The Commission is issuing a standard requiring that multiple-tube 
devices that have any tube measuring 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or more in 
inner diameter must have a minimum tip angle greater than 60 degrees. 
Large multiple-tube devices that do not meet the tip-angle requirement 
will be banned. The tip angle may be measured by placing the device on 
a smooth, flat surface inclined at 60 degrees from the horizontal. The 
device must not tip over at the 60-degree angle when tested at any edge 
of the device.
    An apparatus or ``testing block'' for testing multiple-tube devices 
is illustrated in Figure 1 to Sec. 1507.12. The height and width of the 
inclined plane (not including the portion of the plane below the 
mechanical stop) must be at least 1 inch (2.54 cm) greater than the 
largest dimension of the base of the device to be tested. The test 
apparatus must be placed on a smooth, hard surface that is horizontal, 
as determined by a spirit level or equivalent instrument. The 
mechanical stop must be \1/16\ inch (1.6 mm) in height and 
perpendicular to the inclined plane. The stop must be positioned 
parallel to the bottom edge of the inclined plane in such a way that no 
portion of the device to be tested or its base touches the horizontal 
surface.
    Any device that cannot be tested using the apparatus described 
above, or that presents a tip-over hazard while functioning even though 
it complies with the static test, may be examined to determine whether 
it presents a ``substantial product hazard'' under section 15 of the 
CPSA. 15 U.S.C. 2064. If the Commission determines that a substantial 
product hazard exists, appropriate enforcement action may be taken. See 
15 U.S.C. 2064.

J. Regulatory Analysis [22]

1. Introduction

    The Commission is amending the FHSA fireworks regulations to 
establish new stability requirements for multiple-tube fireworks 
devices that have any tube with an inside tube diameter of 1.5 inches 
or greater. These devices present a tip-over hazard when firing that 
has resulted in an average of about one death every 3 years over the 
period for which data are available.
    The amendment will reduce the risk of injury and death from tip-
overs. Devices that do not remain stable at an angle 60 degrees or 
below in prescribed tests will be banned hazardous substances under the 
amendment. It is expected that devices that do not currently pass this 
test will be able to comply by adding or enlarging a base.
    In the Federal Register of July 1, 1994, the Commission issued an 
ANPR to develop a mandatory requirement to address the tip-over hazard. 
Although the ANPR addressed both large and small multiple-tube 
fireworks devices, the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) published 
July 5, 1995, covered only large multiple-tube devices.
    To issue this amendment under the FHSA, the Commission is required 
to publish preliminary and final regulatory analyses containing a 
discussion of various factors. These factors include a description of 
the potential benefits and potential costs of the rule, including any 
benefits and costs that cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and an 
identification of those most likely to receive the benefits or bear the 
costs. The FHSA also requires a description of any reasonable 
alternatives to the rule,

[[Page 13094]]
together with a summary description of their costs and benefits, and a 
brief explanation of why such alternatives were not chosen.

2. Background

    Large multiple-tube devices became popular in the mid-1980's. These 
devices typically consist of three or more tubes fused in a series to 
fire sequentially; these tubes are grouped together, sometimes on top 
of a wooden base. The devices are designed to fire aerial shells, 
comets, or mines producing visual and audible effects from non-
reloadable tubes. They are among the largest fireworks available for 
direct consumer use.
    The National Fireworks Association (NFA) reports that retail sales 
of these devices are between $24 million and $36 million annually, with 
an estimated 400,000 to 700,000 units sold per year. Prices range from 
$30 to $130 per unit, with most devices priced in the $50-$60 range. 
The NFA reports that domestic devices account for about 75 percent of 
the market by dollar value, and somewhat less by unit sales. There may 
be hundreds of firms engaged in manufacturing, importing, and 
distributing these fireworks. Imported devices are primarily 
manufactured in China, and may go through several wholesalers before 
reaching the retail vendor.
    To comply with the standard, devices that do not have a base would 
have to add one, and some currently used bases would have to be 
enlarged. However, consumers are not likely to perceive any significant 
loss of enjoyment as a result. While some devices may be discontinued, 
loss of consumer choice would be minimized by the availability of 
devices that do comply with the standard. Smaller (less than 1.5 inch 
ID) multiple-tube devices are not covered by the rule and would 
continue to be available without any change.

3. Regulatory Analysis of the Amendments

    a. Potential Benefits. One of the potential risks of injury 
associated with large multiple-tube fireworks devices results from the 
tip-over hazard. The Commission's Directorate for Epidemiology and 
Health Sciences reports two deaths associated with the tip-over hazard 
from January 1, 1988, through December 1993. This averages to about 1 
death every 3 years. The Commission has received no reports of injuries 
with the product.
    The Commission is issuing a performance standard that will require 
these devices to have a minimum tip angle greater than 60 degrees. 
According to the Commission's tests, devices that do not tip over at 
this angle are not likely to tip while functioning. Thus, the 
Commission believes that devices meeting this requirement are not 
likely to fall over while firing, thereby minimizing this risk of death 
and injury to operators or spectators. The avoidance of these deaths 
and injuries represents the potential societal benefits of the proposed 
amendments.
    The costs per life saved of this rule are estimated to be between 
$4.5 and $8 million. These costs are within the range of statistical 
values of life suggested in the recent professional literature. [22] 
Given that no significant substitution of more hazardous products is 
expected, no offsetting reduction in these safety benefits is 
anticipated. To the extent that nonfatal injuries are avoided, the 
potential benefits would be somewhat higher.
    b. Potential Costs. Most devices that already have bases will not 
have to be modified to meet the amendments. The devices that are not 
expected to need to be modified are generally manufactured domestically 
and, according to the NFA, account for at least 75 percent of the 
retail dollar volume of the market. It is expected that most of the 
remaining devices (mainly imports) will be modified to meet the 
amendments, with a resulting increase in cost of between 25 to 30 
percent per modified unit.8

    \8\  Trade and industry sources report that modifying the 
devices would add about 25 to 30 percent to production costs 
(although one commenter on the NPR stated that the per-unit cost 
increase would be 35 to 45 percent). Various sales catalogs also 
indicate that comparable devices without bases are significantly 
less expensive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its comments responding to the NPR, AFSL reported that for the 
43 units it examined, 65 percent did not meet the 60-degree tip-angle 
test. The Commission is not using AFSL's estimate of 35 percent 
compliance with the tip-angle test, since the Commission's staff raised 
several questions about the accuracy of AFSL's estimate. Thus, the 
Commission continues to use the industry-wide data provided by NFA to 
estimate the portion of devices that would require modification (25 
percent).
    Assuming costs are passed on to consumers (as expected), the total 
annual cost to consumers of modifying the affected devices would be 
between $1.5 million and $2.7 million. While certain devices may be 
discontinued, the loss of consumer choice would be minimized by the 
availability of close substitutes--i.e., other large multiple-tube 
devices that comply with the amendments. Additionally, since most 
suppliers of currently noncomplying devices are expected to maintain 
current sales levels and pass on costs to consumers, no significant 
adverse impact is expected in the suppliers' competitive positions.
    If the changes eliminate all deaths associated with these devices, 
the cost per life saved would be between about $4.5 and $8 million. 
This is within the range of statistical values of life suggested in the 
recent professional literature. [22]

4. Alternatives to the Rule

    The Commission considered several alternatives to the performance 
standard issued below, including a product ban, deferral to the 
voluntary standard, and additional labeling.
    a. Product Ban. The expected benefits to society of banning all 
large multiple-tube devices would be one life saved every 3 years, the 
same as the potential benefits of the amendments. However, costs to 
society of a ban (as opposed to the performance standard) in terms of 
lost utility would be greater, because under a ban consumers would not 
be able to use large multiple-tube devices.
    Large multiple-tube devices are unique with respect to the height 
and duration of their displays. There are no close substitutes for the 
product. Single-tube devices are available, but they do not provide the 
rapid sequential display of multiple-tube devices. The lost utility to 
consumers of not being able to use large multiple-tube devices cannot 
be measured precisely. However, the fact that consumers are willing to 
spend $24-$36 million annually to buy these devices suggests that the 
lost utility could be substantial.
    The Commission believes that a ban of all large multiple-tube 
devices is not necessary, because a performance standard will likely 
achieve similar benefits with lower costs.
    b. Defer to the Voluntary Standard. Another alternative is for the 
Commission to take no mandatory action, and to depend on a voluntary 
standard.
    The AFSL revised its standard for mines and shells on an interim 
basis on January 29, 1993, and adopted it on September 5, 1995. In 
order to address the potential tip-over hazard associated with 
multiple-tube fireworks devices, AFSL's Voluntary Standard for Mines 
and Shells--Single or Multiple Shot requires that large multiple-tube 
devices not tip over (except as the result of the last shot) when fired 
on a 2-inch thick medium-density foam pad. [14] However, the Commission 
has concerns about the adequacy of the provisions of, and the level of 
conformance to, the AFSL standard.

[[Page 13095]]

    The Commission also does not believe that AFSL's existing voluntary 
standard adequately reduces the risk of injury due to large devices 
tipping over while functioning. The Commission's tests using 
polyurethane foam did not find sufficient agreement between tip-over 
performance on foam and on grass. The Commission has no data that would 
support AFSL's dynamic test. As explained in section G above, the test 
results AFSL submitted in response to the NPR were limited and the 
Commission does not believe they show that this dynamic test is 
reliable.
    In addition, even if the AFSL standard were effective, the 
Commission concludes that compliance with the standard would not be 
adequate. The majority of large multiple-tube devices are domestic. In 
the NPR, the Commission stated that according to AFSL, not a single 
domestically manufactured device has been certified as complying with 
the AFSL standard. In comments responding to the NPR, AFSL stated that 
their standards are voluntary ``and the decision to comply with the 
standards rests solely with individual manufacturers.'' However, the 
Commission must have assurance of an adequate level of compliance with 
a voluntary standard in order to depend on that standard to reduce a 
risk. AFSL's limited testing conducted in response to the NPR does not 
substitute for an ongoing and comprehensive testing program.
    AFSL reports that some shipments of imported large multiple-tube 
devices have been tested and certified in China this year and that, 
since January 1994, 30 percent of the lots it tested were rejected for 
failure to comply with the AFSL standard. However, the results of 
CPSC's compliance testing indicate that multiple-tube devices still tip 
over while functioning in dynamic tests on grass. In fiscal year 1994, 
all 24 imported devices the Commission tested, and 1 of 8 domestic 
devices, tipped over while functioning. In fiscal year 1995, 22 of 27 
imported devices and 1 of 5 domestic devices tipped over. [19]
c. Additional Labeling
    The current product has extensive labeling. The text of the labels 
required by the Commission is quoted in section D above. One 
alternative available to the Commission is to add further warning or 
instructional labeling to large multiple-tube devices or to modify the 
existing warning. Although this may have less impact on manufacturers 
and importers than a performance standard, the Commission believes that 
any additional or altered labeling is unlikely to be effective in 
reducing the risk of injury.
    Fireworks are frequently used at night, reducing the likelihood 
that warning labels will be read. The fact that fireworks are commonly 
used at parties or celebrations further reduces the likelihood that the 
user will read and follow a warning label. Moreover, tip-over may occur 
even if the user reads and follows the warning label. In both incidents 
involving large multiple-tube devices, the victims were spectators who 
were approximately 40 feet (12 meters) away from the device, which they 
probably believed was a safe distance. The devices were placed on 
smooth, hard surfaces, although one was angled to shoot over a lake. In 
light of these facts, it is unlikely that a warning label would have 
prevented these deaths. [1, Tab E]

K. Regulatory Flexibility Certification

    Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 601-612, 
agencies generally are required to prepare proposed and final 
regulatory flexibility analyses describing the impact of the rule on 
small businesses and other small entities. However, these analyses are 
not required if the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant effect on a substantial number of small entities. As 
described below, the Commission has analyzed the potential effect of 
the amendment on industry.
    The Commission has determined that the proposed standard will not 
have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses. 
The devices subject to the standard constitute less than 1 percent of 
the overall fireworks market. The foreign firms that make the types of 
devices subject to this rule that are likely to require modification in 
order to comply also make other types of fireworks. Only a small 
portion of the total production of these firms involves the large 
multiple-tube devices subject to the rule. Thus, the Commission 
certifies that no significant adverse impact on a substantial number of 
small firms, or other entities, will result from the amendment issued 
below.

L. Environmental Considerations

    The Commission's regulations governing environmental review 
procedures state that the amendment of rules or safety standards 
establishing design or performance requirements for products normally 
have little or no potential for affecting the human environment. 16 CFR 
1021.6(c)(1). The Commission does not foresee that this amendment to 
the existing fireworks regulations will involve any special or unusual 
circumstances that would alter this conclusion. The Commission 
determines, therefore, that no significant environmental effects will 
result from the standard. Accordingly, no environmental assessment or 
environmental impact statement is required in this proceeding.

M. Effective Date

    The rule will take effect in 1 year and will apply to multiple-tube 
fireworks devices with any tube measuring 1.5 inches or more in inner 
diameter that first enter commerce or are imported on or after the 
effective date. However, provisions may be stayed by the filing of 
proper objections. Notice of the filing of any objections or lack 
thereof will be given by publication in the Federal Register.

List of Subjects in 16 CFR Part 1500

    Consumer protection, Hazardous materials, Hazardous substances, 
Imports, Infants and children, Labeling, Law enforcement, and Toys.

Conclusion

    For the reasons given above, the Commission finds that cautionary 
labeling required by the FHSA is not adequate for multiple-tube devices 
having any tube 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or larger in inner diameter and 
having a minimum tip angle larger than 60 degrees. Further, in order to 
protect the public health and safety and due to the degree and nature 
of the tip-over hazard presented by these devices, it is necessary to 
keep them out of commerce if they fail to meet this standard. Thus, the 
Commission amends Parts 1500 and 1507 Title 16 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations as follows:

PART 1500--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority for Part 1500 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1261-1278

    .2. Section 1500.17 is amended by adding a new paragraph (a)(12) to 
read as follows:


Sec. 1500.17  Banned hazardous substances.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (12) (i) Large multiple-tube devices. Multiple-tube mine and shell 
fireworks devices that first enter commerce or are imported on or after 
[insert date that is 1 year after publication], that have any tube 
measuring 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or more in inner diameter, and that have 
a minimum tip angle greater than 60 degrees when tested in accordance 
with the procedure of Sec. 1507.12 of this part.

[[Page 13096]]

    (ii) Findings. (A) General. In order to issue a rule under the 
section 2(q)(1) of the FHSA, 15 U.S.C. 1261(q)(1), classifying a 
substance or article as a banned hazardous substance, the FHSA requires 
the Commission to make certain findings and to include these in the 
regulation. These findings are discussed in paragraphs (a)(12)(ii)(B) 
through (D) of this section.
    (B) Voluntary standard. (1) One alternative to the tip-angle 
requirement that the Commission considered is to take no mandatory 
action, and to depend on a voluntary standard. The American Fireworks 
Safety Laboratory (AFSL) has a standard for mines and shells intended 
to address the potential tip-over hazard associated with multiple-tube 
fireworks devices. AFSL's Voluntary Standard for Mines and Shells--
Single or Multiple Shot requires that large multiple-tube devices not 
tip over (except as the result of the last shot) when shot on a 2-inch 
thick medium-density foam pad. The Commission cannot conclude that 
AFSL's existing voluntary standard adequately reduces the risk of 
injury from large devices that tip over while functioning. The 
Commission's tests using polyurethane foam did not find sufficient 
agreement between performance on foam and on grass. No other data are 
available to show that this dynamic test is reliable.
    (2) In addition, even if the AFSL standard is effective, the 
Commission does not believe that compliance with the standard will be 
adequate. AFSL reports that it has been testing in accordance with its 
standard since January 1994. However, the results of CPSC's compliance 
testing indicate that multiple-tube devices still tip over while 
functioning. In fiscal year 1994, all 24 imported devices the 
Commission tested, and 1 of 8 domestic devices, tipped over while 
functioning. In fiscal year 1995, 22 of 27 imported devices and 1 of 5 
domestic devices tipped over during Commission testing. The Commission 
finds that there is unlikely to be substantial compliance with the 
voluntary standard applicable to multiple-tube devices.
    (C) Relationship of benefits to costs. The Commission estimates 
that the 60-degree tip-angle standard will eliminate the unreasonable 
tip-over risk posed by these devices. This will provide benefits of 
saving one life about every 3 years, and preventing an unknown number 
of nonfatal injuries. The annual cost of modifying affected devices is 
estimated to be between $1.5 million and $2.7 million. The Commission 
finds that the benefits from the regulation bear a reasonable 
relationship to its costs.
    (D) Least burdensome requirement. The Commission considered the 
following alternatives: a ban of all multiple-tube devices with inner 
tube diameters 1.5 inches or greater; a dynamic performance standard; 
additional labeling requirements; and relying on the voluntary 
standard. Although a ban of all large multiple-tube devices would 
address the risk of injury, it would be more burdensome than the tip-
angle standard. The Commission was unable to develop a satisfactory 
dynamic standard that would reduce the risk of injury. Neither 
additional labeling requirements nor reliance on the voluntary standard 
would adequately reduce the risk of injury. Thus, the Commission finds 
that a standard requiring large multiple-tube devices to have a minimum 
tip angle greater than 60 degrees is the least burdensome requirement 
that would prevent or adequately reduce the risk of injury.

PART 1507--[AMENDED]

    1. The authority for Part 1507 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Sec. 2(q)(1)(B), (2), 74 Stat. 374 as amended 80 
Stat. 1304-1305; (15 U.S.C. 1261); sec. 701(e), 52 Stat. 1055 as 
amended; 21 U.S.C. 371(e)); sec. 30(a), 86 Stat. 1231; 15 U.S.C. 
2079(a)).

    2. Part 1507 is amended by adding a new Sec. 1507.12 to read as 
follows:


Sec. 1507.12  Multiple-tube Fireworks Devices.

    (a) Application. Multiple-tube mine and shell fireworks devices 
with any tube measuring 1.5 inches (3.8 cm) or more in inside diameter 
and subject to Sec. 1500.17(a)(12) of this part shall not tip over when 
subjected to the tip-angle test described in this section.
    (b) Testing procedure. The device shall be placed on a smooth 
surface that can be inclined at 60 degrees from the horizontal, as 
shown in Figure 1 of this section. The height and width of the inclined 
plane (not including the portion of the plane below the mechanical 
stop) shall be at least 1 inch (2.54 cm) greater than the largest 
dimension of the base of the device to be tested. The test shall be 
conducted on a smooth, hard surface that is horizontal as measured by a 
spirit level or equivalent instrument. The mechanical stop on the 
inclined plane shall be 1/16 inches (1.6 mm) in height and 
perpendicular to the inclined plane. The stop shall be positioned 
parallel to the bottom edge of the inclined plane and so that no 
portion of the device to be tested or its base touches the horizontal 
surface. The device shall not tip over when the plane is inclined at 
60-degrees from the horizontal. The procedure shall be repeated for 
each edge of the device. Figure 1 to Sec. 1507.12

BILLING CODE 6355-01-P

[[Page 13097]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR26MR96.011



BILLING CODE 6355-01-C
    Dated: March, 18, 1996.
Sadye E. Dunn,
Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission.
    Reference Documents. (The following list of documents will not 
be printed in the Code of Federal Regulations.)
    The following documents contain information relevant to this 
rulemaking proceeding and are available for inspection at the Office 
of the Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Room 502, 4330 
East-West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland 20814:
    1. Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices: Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comments and Information, 
59 Fed. Reg. 33928 (July 1, 1994).
    2. Briefing Package: Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks 
Devices, Consumer Product Safety Commission, May 31, 1994.
    3. Briefing Memorandum on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks 
Devices, from Ronald L. Medford, EXHR and Michael Babich, EHHE, to 
the Commission, June 8, 1995.
    4. Memorandum from Michael Babich, Project Manager, HSHE, 
``Responses to Public Comments on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell 
Devices,'' May 22, 1995.
    5. Memorandum from Leonard Schachter, EPHA, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Annual Estimated Injuries Associated with Multiple-tube Mine 
and Shell Fireworks Devices,'' June 1, 1995.
    6. Memorandum from James Carleton and Jay Sonenthal, LSHS, to 
Michael Babich, HSHE, ``Results for Dynamic Stability Testing of 
Large Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Devices,'' May 18, 1995.
    7. Memorandum from Thomas Caton, ESME, to Michael Babich, HSHE, 
``Fireworks Testing: Test Surface Roughness,'' May 22, 1995.
    8. Report from Terry Kissinger, EPHA, to Michael Babich, HSHE, 
``A Comparison of the Tip-over Performances of Multiple-tube Mine 
and Shell Devices on Grass and Foam,'' January 1995.
    9. Memorandum from George F. Sushinsky, LSEL, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Dimensional and Stability Measurements of Fireworks,'' March 
10, 1995.
    10. Memorandum from George F. Sushinsky, LSEL, to Michael 
Babich, HSHE, ``Tip Angle Measurements of a Device with a Plastic 
Base,'' April 13, 1995.
    11. Memorandum from Jay Sonenthal, LSHL, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Test of a Device with a Plastic Base,'' May 22, 1995.
    12. Memorandum from Sam Hall, CERM, to Michael Babich, HSHE, 
``Acceptable Tipover Rate for Multiple-tube Devices,'' November 21, 
1994.
    13. Memorandum from Anthony Homan, ECPA, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices--Regulatory 
Analysis,'' May 18, 1995.
    14. Memorandum from Sam Hall, CERM, to Michael Babich, HSHE, 
``AFSL's Interim Voluntary Standard for Large Multiple-tube Mine and 
Shell Devices and Staff's Proposed Mandatory Static Performance 
Standard, May 25, 1995.
    15. Product and Performance Standard for Mines and Shells--
Single or Multiple Shot,'' Version 1.1, American Fireworks Standards 
Laboratory, Bethesda, Maryland, January 28, 1993.
    16. Memorandum from Neal Gasser, LSHL, to Michael Babich, HSHE, 
``Additional Tests of Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Devices,'' June 
8, 1995.
    17. Briefing Memorandum on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell 
Fireworks Devices--Final Rule, from Michael Babich, EHHE, and Ronald 
L. Medford, HIR, to the Commission, January 23, 1996.
    18. Memorandum from Michael A. Babich, EHHE, ``Responses to 
Comments on Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Devices,'' January 16, 
1996.
    19. Memorandum from Samuel B. Hall, CRM, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Compliance Tests of Large Multiple-tube Mine and Shell 
Devices under FY 1994 and FY 1995 Fireworks Enforcement Programs,'' 
December 8, 1995.
    20. Memorandum from Leonard Schacter, EHHA, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Annual Estimated Injuries Associated with Multiple-tube Mine 
and Shell Fireworks Devices,'' November 1, 1995.
    21. Memorandum from Anthony Homan, ECPA, to Michael Babich, 
HSHE, ``Multiple-tube Mine and Shell Fireworks Devices--Final 
Regulatory Analysis,'' January 16, 1996.
    22. Viscusi, W.K., ``The Value of Risks to Life and Health,'' 
Journal of Economic Literature, December 1993.
    23. Kissinger, T.L., Fireworks Injuries--results of a 1992 NEISS 
study. U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, DC 
20207. September 1993.

[FR Doc. 96-6857 Filed 3-25-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P