[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 52 (Friday, March 15, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 10736-10740]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-6291]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision: Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel From the K 
Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, WA

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Notice of Record of Decision (ROD).

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SUMMARY: DOE has prepared and issued a final environmental impact 
statement (FEIS) on the ``Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel from the K 
Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington'' (DOE/EIS-0245F, 
January 1996). A notice of availability of the FEIS was published in 
the Federal Register on February 2, 1996 (61 FR 3932). The FEIS 
evaluates the potential environmental impacts of alternatives for 
managing the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) located in the K-East (KE) and K-
West (KW) SNF storage basins at the Hanford Site located in 
southeastern Washington State.
    Based on the analysis in the FEIS and after careful evaluation of 
environmental impacts, costs, compliance requirements, engineering 
considerations, worker and public health and safety, and public, agency 
and tribal comments, DOE has decided to implement the preferred 
alternative evaluated in the FEIS with two modifications and is 
documenting that decision in this ROD. The preferred alternative 
consists of removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying, 
conditioning and sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry 
vault storage in a new facility, to be built at Hanford, for up to 40 
years pending decisions on ultimate disposition. The K Basins will 
continue to be operated during the period over which the preferred 
alternative is implemented. The preferred alternative also includes 
transfer of the basin sludge to Hanford's double-shell tanks for 
management, disposal of non-SNF basin debris in a low-level burial 
ground at the Hanford Site, disposition of the basin water, and 
deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning. The two 
modifications in the ROD are with respect to management of the sludge, 
and the timing of placement of the SNF into the transportation casks. 
The modification for management of the sludge is that should it not be 
possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will 
either continue to be managed as SNF, or disposed of as solid waste. 
The modification regarding placement of the SNF into the transportation 
casks would reduce the radiation exposure to the workers by placing the 
multicanister overpacks (MCOs) inside the transportation casks before 
the SNF is loaded into the MCOs, instead of loading the SNF into the 
MCOs prior to placing them inside the transportation casks.

ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Requests for copies of the FEIS and 
for further information on the FEIS or ROD should be directed to: Dr. 
Phillip G. Loscoe, U.S. Department of Energy, P.O. Box 550, M/S S7-41, 
Richland, Washington 99352-0550. Dr. Loscoe may be contacted by 
telephone at (509) 376-7434 or at (800) 321-2008.

[[Page 10737]]

    For further information on the DOE NEPA process please contact: Ms. 
Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-
42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., 
Washington, D.C. 20585-0002. Ms. Borgstrom may be reached by telephone 
at (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    This ROD was prepared in accordance with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts 
1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). 
The ROD is based on the analysis of environmental impacts identified in 
the FEIS, consideration of project costs, compliance requirements, 
engineering considerations, worker and public health and safety, and 
public, agency and tribal comments.
    This ROD covers the management of approximately 2,100 metric tons 
(2,300 tons) of U.S. Government-owned SNF stored in the KE and KW 
storage basins at DOE's Hanford Site (about 80% of DOE's total 
inventory). Most of the SNF is from the N Reactor at Hanford, which 
operated from December 1963 until January 1987 producing materials for 
the U.S. national defense program and also producing steam that was 
used for generation of electricity. This SNF consists primarily of 
metallic uranium, but also contains about five metric tons (six tons) 
of plutonium and about one metric ton (1.1 ton) of radioactive fission 
products within the uranium fuel elements.
    The KE and KW storage basins are concrete basins constructed in 
1951 to temporarily store SNF from the adjacent KE and KW Reactors 
(nominally 0.5 to 1.5 years prior to reprocessing). The basins are 
located in the 100-K Area at the Hanford Site about 420 m (1,400 ft) 
from the Columbia River. The volume of each basin is about 4,900 
m3 (1.3 M gallons) and each basin is filled to about 93% of 
capacity with water. The water level in each basin is maintained at a 
depth of about 5 m (16 ft) to absorb heat from the radioactive decay of 
the fuel rods and to provide a radiation shield for protection of 
facility workers. SNF from the N Reactor has been stored in the KE 
Basin since 1975 and the KW Basin since 1981.
    Prior to receiving N Reactor SNF the KW Basin was drained, cleaned 
and refurbished. The bare concrete surfaces were given an epoxy coating 
which helps keep radioactive elements such as cesium-137 from being 
absorbed into the concrete. The KW Basin has remained relatively clean 
because of this refurbishment and also because only sealed canisters of 
SNF have been stored there. The KE Basin did not receive refurbishment 
prior to receiving N Reactor SNF. In addition, the SNF in the KE Basin 
is in open canisters which allows water to come in contact with the 
fuel elements inside the canisters.
    The principal environmental and safety concerns are associated with 
the KE Basin and arise from the presence of broken and corroding SNF, 
buildup of radioactive sludge on the bottom of the basin, deteriorating 
concrete with vulnerability to earthquake damage, leakage of 
contaminated water to the soil below the basin, and the presence of 
cesium-137 contamination of the concrete at the water line which, 
unshielded, can contribute to worker exposure to radiation. Conditions 
in KW Basin are not as serious because the SNF stored there is in 
sealed canisters.
    In a November 1993 report entitled ``Spent Fuel Working Group 
Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel 
and other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and their Environmental, 
Safety, and Health Vulnerabilities,'' DOE identified K Basins storage 
problems as requiring priority attention. Similarly, the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in its recommendation 94-1 to the 
Secretary of Energy dated May 26, 1994, recommended ``That the [DOE's] 
program be accelerated to place the deteriorating reactor fuel in the 
KE Basin at Hanford in a stable configuration for interim storage until 
an option for ultimate disposition is chosen. This program needs to be 
directed toward storage methods that will minimize further 
deterioration.''

Purpose and Need

    The purpose of and need for DOE's action to which this ROD applies 
is to reduce risks to human health and the environment, specifically 
(1) to prevent the release of radioactive materials into the air or the 
soil surrounding the K Basins and the potential migration of 
radionuclides through the soil column to the nearby Columbia River, (2) 
to reduce occupational radiation exposure, and (3) to eliminate the 
risks to the public and to workers from the deterioration of SNF in the 
K Basins.

Alternatives Considered

Preferred Alternative

    The preferred alternative is referred to in the FEIS as ``drying/
passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage''. In addition to 
construction of a staging/storage building at the Canister Storage 
Building (CSB) site, the proposed series of operations to achieve the 
preferred alternative is presented below. The details of the processes 
and perhaps their order are expected to change somewhat as the designs 
evolve and as the results of ongoing testing become available. However, 
the impacts of the following steps bound those necessary to place the K 
Basins SNF in safe dry storage:
     continue K Basin operations until the removal of SNF, 
sludge and debris, and disposition of the water is completed. Make 
modifications to the K Basins, as necessary, for maintenance, 
monitoring and safety, and provide systems necessary to support the 
activities described below
     remove K Basin SNF from existing canisters, clean and 
desludge
     repackage the SNF into fuel baskets designed for multi-
canister overpack (MCO) dimensions, that would include provision for 
water removal, SNF conditioning requirements, and criticality control
     after loading SNF into the MCOs and draining the MCOs, dry 
the SNF under vacuum at approximately 50  deg.C (120  deg.F), flood the 
MCOs with inert gas, seal penetrations, and place in transportation 
casks
     transport the SNF (in MCOs) in these casks via truck to 
the Canister Storage Building (CSB) site in the 200 East Area, and 
provide for temporary vented staging, as necessary
     further condition the SNF in MCOs, as soon as practicable, 
heating the SNF in a vacuum to about 300  deg.C (570  deg.F) to remove 
water that is chemically bound to the SNF and canister corrosion 
products, and to dissociate, to the extent practicable, any reactive 
uranium hydride present.
     following conditioning, weld-seal the SNF in an inert gas 
in the MCOs for dry interim storage in a vault for up to 40 years (a 
storage period of 40 years was used in estimating impacts)
     collect and remove the sludge from the basins and 
disposition as waste in Hanford's double-shell tanks
     collect the non-SNF debris from the basins and dispose of 
as low-level waste in Hanford's existing low-level waste burial grounds
     remove and transport basin water to the 200 Area Effluent 
Treatment Facility

[[Page 10738]]
for disposal at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site.
     prepare the K Basins for deactivation and transfer to 
decontamination and decommissioning program
    Principal advantages of the drying/passivation (conditioning) with 
dry vault storage alternative are that it would accelerate removal of 
SNF from aging facilities in proximity to the Columbia River, would 
result in passive vault storage of dry SNF requiring only minimal 
surveillance, would retard continued degradation of the SNF and would 
reduce or eliminate reactive uranium hydrides in the SNF.
    Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the 
construction of new facilities would be required, and some uncertainty 
exists in the chemical state of the SNF and sludge and, therefore, in 
the extent to which drying and passivation processes would be required. 
However, defense-in-depth measures will be engineered to assure safety 
of the process. Moreover, characterization of K Basins SNF is presently 
being conducted to address these uncertainties which may result in a 
more cost-effective conditioning process.

Other Alternatives Considered

    The FEIS analyzed six other alternatives for the management of SNF 
from the K Basins at the Hanford Site. The other alternatives examined 
in detail were:
     No action alternative: Under this alternative DOE would 
continue SNF storage in the KE and KW Basins for up to 40 years with no 
modifications except for maintenance, monitoring, and ongoing safety 
upgrades. Consideration of the no action alternative is required by CEQ 
regulation [40 CFR 1502.14(d)].
    The principal advantage of the no action alternative is that it 
would require no movement of SNF and no construction of new facilities.
    Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the K Basins 
were not designed for an 80-year life (40 years to date and up to an 
additional 40 years) and would require increasing maintenance of aging 
facilities with associated potential for increased radiological impacts 
on workers, would not place the SNF in a safer storage configuration, 
would not preclude leakage of radionuclides to the soil beneath the 
basins and near the Columbia River, and would fail to alleviate 
concerns expressed by regulatory agencies, advisory bodies and the 
public relative to environmental impacts induced by seismic events.
     Enhanced K Basins storage alternative: Under this 
alternative DOE would perform facility life extension upgrades for KW 
Basin, containerize KE Basin SNF and sludge, and consolidate with KW 
Basin SNF for up to 40-year storage.
    Principal advantages of the enhanced K Basins storage alternative 
are that it would remove degrading SNF from the KE Basin, permit 
deactivation of the KE Basin, and would require no construction of new 
facilities.
    Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that the KW Basin 
was not designed for an 80-year life and would require increasing 
maintenance of the aging facility. Despite completion of practical 
upgrades, this alternative would not arrest continued fuel degradation, 
might result in conditions favorable to the production of reactive 
uranium hydrides in the repackaged KE Basin SNF transferred to the KW 
Basin, and would fail to alleviate concerns expressed by regulatory 
agencies, advisory bodies and the public relative to environmental 
impacts potentially induced by seismic events.
     New wet storage alternative: Under this alternative DOE 
would remove SNF from the K Basins and provide for up to 40 years of 
new wet storage in a new facility located on the 200 Areas plateau that 
meets current design criteria.
    Principal advantages of the new wet storage alternative are that it 
would accelerate removal of SNF from aging facilities in the proximity 
to the Columbia River, would make use of a proven storage technology 
(at least for commercial fuel) coupled with design to modern seismic 
criteria, and would maintain flexibility for preparing SNF for ultimate 
disposition.
    Principal disadvantages of this alternative are that it would 
require construction expense and continued maintenance, would not 
prevent the continuation of SNF degradation, and would not eliminate 
the potential for further hydriding of the SNF.
     Calcination with dry storage: Under this alternative DOE 
would remove SNF from the K Basins, calcine it, and provide for up to 
40-year dry storage of SNF-oxides in a new cask or vault facility.
    The principal advantages of the calcination with dry storage 
alternative are that it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near 
the Columbia River and that it would convert the SNF into stable 
oxides, which are readily storable in a dry form and may be suitable 
without further processing for ultimate disposal in a geologic 
repository.
    The principal disadvantage of this alternative is the need to 
construct and operate a relatively expensive calcining facility.
     Onsite processing: Under this alternative the DOE would 
remove and chemically process K Basins SNF and provide for up to 40-
year dry storage of the recovered uranium (as uranium trioxide) and 
plutonium (as plutonium dioxide), and manage fission product waste in 
tanks with other wastes under Hanford's Tank Waste Remediation System 
program.
    Principal advantages of the onsite processing alternative are that 
it would remove the SNF from aging facilities near the Columbia River, 
convert uranium (the major constituent of SNF) into uranium trioxide 
that is readily storable in dry form and for which future use 
(constituent of power reactor fuel) might be found, convert plutonium 
to a stable oxide for which a future use (constituent of power reactor 
fuel) might be found or for which storage in a geologic repository may 
be suitable without further processing, and convert fission products 
into a form suitable for storage in a geologic repository.
    Principal disadvantages of this alternative are the need to 
construct and operate a relatively expensive separations facility, the 
plutonium dioxide product would no longer be self-protecting and would 
require special storage and accountability that in turn may require 
construction of additional storage capacity, and no immediate need 
exists for either the separated uranium or plutonium.
     Foreign processing: Under this alternative, the DOE would 
remove K Basins SNF, ship overseas for processing, provide for up to 
40-year dry storage of returned uranium (as uranium trioxide) and 
plutonium (as plutonium dioxide), and store vitrified fission product 
waste, pending ultimate disposition.
    With the exception that foreign processing would obviate the need 
for construction of additional processing facilities at Hanford, the 
principal advantages of the foreign processing alternative are 
essentially the same as those for onsite processing.
    Principal disadvantages of the foreign processing alternative are 
the need to transport the K Basins SNF to a U.S. shipping/receiving 
port, transload the SNF to ocean vessels, ship the SNF to a foreign 
port, transport the SNF to an operating reprocessing plant, and ship 
the uranium and plutonium products and vitrified high-level waste back 
to Hanford or elsewhere, as appropriate. Additional disadvantages 
include issues associated with the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation 
policy, unfavorable agency and public opinion regarding

[[Page 10739]]
shipping the degraded fuel off the Hanford Site, costs of new shipping 
casks, and construction of a new head-end facility at the processing 
plant. The need for special storage for plutonium product would be the 
same as in the onsite processing alternative.
    In all but the no action alternative, sludge, debris, and 
contaminated water would be removed from the basins and managed 
appropriately.
    DOE considered, but did not analyze in detail, four additional 
alternatives identified during the public scoping process. DOE 
determined that these alternatives were not reasonable in the sense of 
satisfying the purpose and need for this action. These alternatives, 
which involved relocation of the K Basins SNF to existing facilities 
that were in most cases adjacent to the Columbia River, would not meet 
the Department's objectives of expeditious removal of K Basins SNF and 
management of the SNF at a location away from the Columbia river.

Comments Received

    DOE received comments on the draft EIS from six individuals and 
representatives of BNFL, Inc., the State of Washington Department of 
Fish and Wildlife, the State of Washington Department of Ecology, the 
Oregon Department of Energy, the Nez Perce Tribe, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of the 
Interior (DOI).
    Responses to individual comments are provided in the FEIS (which 
consists of the draft EIS and an Addendum to the draft EIS). 
Reproductions of the as-received comment letters and the transcript of 
oral comments received are presented in Appendix A to the FEIS. 
Comments from EPA and DOI were received after the close of the public 
comment period and publication of the FEIS; these comments and DOE's 
responses will be made available in the public reading rooms listed in 
the FEIS.
    Several representative comments and DOE's responses are paraphrased 
below.
    Comment. Some commentors voiced concern about the pyrophoricity of 
the SNF, the potential for ignition and sustained combustion, and the 
potential for releases of radionuclides to the atmosphere.
    Response. The concern for uncertainties in the potential for 
ignition of SNF is one of the principal drivers for both the DOE's 
defense-in-depth approach, which includes conditioning of the SNF 
followed by dry vault storage in sealed, inert-gas filled canisters, 
and the SNF characterization effort which is currently underway. The 
characterization work is intended to confirm the efficacy of planned 
process steps to assure safe SNF management via laboratory analyses of 
samples of the K Basins SNF.
    Comment. Some commentors contended that SNF as packaged would not 
meet geologic repository requirements, hence the SNF should be 
processed so that the SNF and high-activity fission products could be 
put in a form acceptable to repository disposal.
    Response. Acceptance criteria for the proposed geologic repository 
have not yet been determined. In the absence of the criteria for 
accepting defense SNF or high-level waste into the repository, it is 
not prudent to base currently needed SNF management decisions too 
heavily on the criterion of suitability for ultimate geologic 
disposition.
    Comment. The EPA expressed concern that estimates of some accident 
probabilities were given without describing how the probabilities were 
derived.
    Response. Except in a few instances, such as crane drops, there is 
no actual experience on which to base estimates of the probability of 
occurrence of accidents in SNF management as presented in the EIS. As a 
consequence, engineering judgement is used to qualitatively assess the 
likelihood of a postulated accident occurring. These qualitative 
judgments are then expressed as a numerical range of annual frequency 
of occurrence to permit development of some quantitative estimate of 
accident impacts that may be compared among the alternatives. While 
imprecise, these estimates represent the best information available to 
DOE at this time.
    Comment. DOI acknowledged that radiological and nonradiological 
exposure risks to humans and consideration for special habitats 
occurring on the Hanford Site were addressed, but expressed concern 
that environmental impacts in terms of other biota were not addressed 
in the EIS and thus comparison among alternatives was not complete.
    Response. As may be noted in the EIS, impacts on humans (including 
onsite noninvolved workers, which may be taken as representative of 
other onsite biota) from normal operations associated with any 
alternative were estimated to be very small. As a consequence, 
exposures to other biota and the consequences therefrom are also 
believed to be trivial to very small. Thus, while zero impact to other 
onsite biota cannot be claimed, scrutiny of environmental impacts to 
levels expressed by DOI is believed to be of minimal value in forming a 
basis for making decisions among the alternatives.
    Comment. EPA noted that contrary to Section 6.10 of the draft EIS, 
DOE must apply for permission to construct any facility, regardless of 
emission projections expressed in Appendix D of the regulation.
    Response. It is DOE's intent to comply with the letter and spirit 
of all applicable environmental requirements, and DOE will file for 
permission to construct the facilities associated with the preferred 
alternative. Although, as indicated by EPA, the requirement was 
misstated in Section 6.10, the requirement and intent to comply was 
correctly stated elsewhere in the EIS.
    Comment. DOI commented that DOE should provide compensatory 
mitigation for habitat lost in the initial development of the canister 
storage building site.
    Response. DOE does not plan to provide mitigation for the CSB site 
per se. However, DOE is committed to implementing the Hanford 
Biological Resources Management Plan (BRMP) when it is completed. This 
plan is intended to provide for responsible management of the Hanford 
ecosystem.

Environmentally Preferred Alternative

    CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require identification of the 
environmentally preferred alternative(s). Overall environmental impacts 
under normal operating conditions were found to be neither large nor to 
vary markedly among the alternatives. Since the no action alternative 
would involve the least handling of SNF and require no new facilities, 
under normal operating conditions it would have the lowest overall 
impacts. Hence, the no action alternative is the environmentally 
preferred alternative under normal operating conditions.
    However, over the long term, implementation of the no action 
alternative is not prudent because it does not address the continuing 
degradation of the SNF, the increasing accumulation of radioactive 
sludge, the further contamination of the basin water and the unlikely, 
but not impossible, occurrence of an earthquake releasing substantial 
quantities of radionuclides to the air, ground and possibly the 
Columbia River.

Decision

    Based on consideration of environmental impacts, costs, compliance 
requirements, engineering practicability, worker and public health and 
safety, and on comments received on the draft EIS, DOE will implement 
the preferred alternative, as described

[[Page 10740]]
above, with two modifications. The preferred alternative will involve 
removing the SNF from the basins, vacuum drying, conditioning and 
sealing the SNF in inert-gas filled canisters for dry vault storage for 
up to 40 years pending decisions on its ultimate disposition. The 
preferred alternative also calls for transfer of the basin sludge to 
Hanford's double-shell tanks for management, disposal of non-SNF basin 
debris in a low-level burial ground at Hanford, disposition of the 
basin water at the 200 Area State-Approved Land Disposal Site (SALDS), 
and deactivation of the basins pending decommissioning.
    The first modification is with respect to sludge management. In the 
preferred alternative, sludge is to be dispositioned as waste in 
Hanford's double-shell tanks. However, while in the basins, the sludge 
will continue to be managed as spent nuclear fuel. Should it not be 
possible to put the sludge into the double-shell tanks, the sludge will 
either continue to be managed and treated as SNF, or grouted and 
packaged to meet the Solid Waste Burial Ground waste acceptance 
criteria. The impacts of alternate sludge management were analyzed in 
the FEIS and are small. By mass the sludge is about 0.5% of the SNF and 
impacts of continuing to manage the sludge as SNF would be negligible 
by comparison.
    The second modification is with respect to the timing of the 
placement of the MCOs into the transportation casks. In the preferred 
alternative, the fuel baskets would be loaded into the MCO's, then 
drained and vacuum dried prior to placement in the transportation 
casks. However, placing the MCOs in the transportation casks prior to 
loading the fuel baskets into the MCOs will reduce the exposure of the 
workers to radiation during draining and vacuum drying.
    The DOE selected the preferred alternative principally because it 
will alleviate concerns for protection of workers, public health and 
safety, and the environment (by expeditious removal of the SNF from the 
vicinity of the Columbia River), will utilize a partially completed 
existing facility (the CSB), will have few, if any, impacts on the 
physical environment (minimal new construction) and will be implemented 
at a cost on par with or substantially less than that of the other 
alternatives.

Mitigation

    Implementation of the preferred alternative, which is drying/
passivation (conditioning) with dry vault storage at the CSB site, is 
not expected to result in adverse impacts. As a consequence, 
preparation of a Mitigation Action Plan (10 CFR 1021.331) in the event 
of adverse impacts is not planned. Nevertheless, DOE is responding to 
Executive Order 12856 (58 FR 41981) and associated DOE Orders and 
guidelines by reducing the use of toxic chemicals, improving emergency 
planning, response and accident notification, and encouraging the 
development of clean technologies and the testing of innovative 
pollution prevention technologies. The pollution prevention program at 
the Hanford Site is formalized in a Hanford Site Waste Minimization and 
Pollution Prevention Awareness Program Plan. Moreover, DOE aggressively 
applies the principle of reducing exposure to both radioactive and 
toxic chemicals to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) throughout 
its operations.

Issued

    This Record of Decision for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
from the K Basins at the Hanford Site, Richland, Washington is issued 
by the Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, 
Washington on March 4, 1996.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, DOE Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 96-6291 Filed 3-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P