[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 36 (Thursday, February 22, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6876-6882]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-4204]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Emergency Order No. 20, Notice         No. 1]


Commuter and Intercity Passenger Railroads, Including Public 
Authorities Providing Passenger Service, and Affected Freight 
Railroads; Emergency Order Requiring Enhanced Operating Rules and Plans 
for Ensuring the Safety of Passengers Occupying the Leading Car of a 
Train

Introduction

    The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that the safety of 
passengers and railroad employees compels issuance of this Emergency 
Order. Based on the historical record, rail passenger transportation in 
the United States is an extremely safe mode of transportation. However, 
recent train accidents in New Jersey and Maryland, which have claimed a 
total of fourteen lives, have caused DOT, FRA, and the Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA) (also part of DOT) to have very serious concerns 
about the safety of certain aspects of rail passenger transportation. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has the lead in 
investigating both accidents. FRA is assisting in both investigations. 
Although NTSB will not reach final conclusions as to probable cause of 
either accident for some time, NTSB's preliminary conclusions and what 
FRA has learned from the investigations (set forth in detail, below) 
compel that certain steps be taken now to reduce the risks to 
passengers and crew that apparently exist under certain operating 
conditions.
    Of particular concern are those operations that involve carrying 
passengers in the lead car of a train over segments of track that do 
not have either cab signal systems (which provide the engineer with an 
on-board display of signal indications alongside the tracks) or 
automatic train stop or automatic train control systems (which 
automatically cause the train to stop or reduce speed where an engineer 
fails to respond appropriately to a trackside signal). Both of the 
recent accidents involved such operations. While thousands of such 
operations occur daily without incident, the occurrence of two fatal 
accidents in one week has caused DOT, FRA, and FTA to examine closely 
the need for immediate enhancements in the safety of such operations. 
Also of great concern, based 

[[Page 6877]]
on the Maryland accident, is passenger and crew egress after an 
accident.
    In summary, this order requires that commuter and intercity 
passenger railroads, including public authorities providing passenger 
service through contracts with other railroads, and any other entities 
(e.g., freight railroads with affected passenger service on their 
lines) whose actions are necessary to effectuate this order, take 
certain immediate steps with regard to any of their operations above 30 
miles per hour that do not entail cab signal, automatic train stop, or 
automatic train control protections and that permit passengers to 
occupy the leading car (i.e., using either cab cars as the forward car 
in the push-pull mode or self-propelled locomotives with passenger 
seating (MU locomotives)). As set forth in detail below, those 
railroads are required to: (1) adopt and comply with an operating rule 
requiring that, when a passenger train stops for any reason, including 
a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train 
shall proceed under any speed limitations set forth in applicable 
railroad operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop 
before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed 
speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal 
displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear; 
(2) adopt and comply with an operating rule requiring that a crew 
member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab 
car, or MU car, shall have a means to orally communicate and will 
communicate to another crew member the indication and location of each 
wayside signal affecting the movement of the train as soon as the 
signal becomes visible, for all signals which require either that the 
train be prepared to stop at the next wayside signal or that the train 
be prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed; (3) 
take certain measures to instruct and test employees on the 
aforementioned operating rules; and (4) submit to FRA an interim system 
safety plan for enhancing the safety of such operations that includes 
(i) a description of circumstances in which the leading car is 
permitted to be occupied by passengers; (ii) a review of operating 
rules relevant to such operations; (iii) plans for any short-term 
technology enhancements that would enhance train control; (iv) a review 
of crew management practices to see what steps can be taken to improve 
crew alertness; (v) a review of the hazards posed to passengers in the 
forward car by vehicles using highway-rail grade crossings; and (vi) a 
review of practices, in addition to marking exits, used by the railroad 
to inform passengers of the location and operation of emergency exits, 
specifying any plans for enhancing such information. In addition, each 
of these commuter and intercity passenger railroads, regardless of the 
speeds or equipment they use, is required to ensure that each emergency 
window on every passenger car is clearly marked on the outside and 
inside and that a representative sample has been inspected to make sure 
they are operable.
    FRA may amend this order at any time to require other actions to 
ensure safety. For example, depending on what FRA learns from the 
railroads' interim safety plans and other sources after issuance of 
this order, it may decide that safety requires it to prohibit one or 
more railroads from carrying passengers in the lead car in the absence 
of a cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control 
system.

Authority

    Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been 
delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal Railroad 
Administrator. 49 CFR Sec. 1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety 
jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 
Secs. 20101, 20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where 
an unsafe condition or practice ``causes an emergency situation 
involving a hazard of death or personal injury.'' 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104. 
These orders may immediately impose ``restrictions and prohibitions      
 . . . that may be necessary to abate the situation.'' (Ibid.)

Background

    New Jersey Transit Accident, Secaucus, NJ. On February 9, 1996, at 
about 8:40 a.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey 
Transit trains 1254 and 1107 at mile post 2.8, on the borderline of 
Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Speed at the point of collision 
was approximately 7 m.p.h. for train 1254 and 53 m.p.h. for train 1107. 
Of the 325 passengers on both trains, one received fatal injuries and 
162 reported minor injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the 
nonfatal injuries to passengers occurred on train 1254, which was 
operating with the cab control car forward and the locomotive pushing. 
In addition, the engineer was fatally injured. The cab control car 
incurred substantial damage as a result of near-frontal impact with the 
heavier locomotive of train 1107, operating in the ``pull'' mode. The 
locomotive engineer on train 1107 was fatally injured as a result of 
``cornering'' of the locomotive cab that bypassed the collision posts 
in the short hood. Railroad property damage was estimated at more than 
$3.5 million. Although the trains involved were equipped with cab 
signal and automatic train control (ATC) apparatus, the wayside portion 
of the signal system on the lines in question did not provide cab 
signals. The method of operation was by wayside signal indication.
    Based on preliminary information derived from the joint 
investigation of the NTSB, FRA, and other parties, the accident appears 
to have resulted from failure of train 1254 to observe signal 
indications requiring that the train be stopped short of the junction 
where the accident occurred. Agencies are investigating whether lack of 
alertness on the part of the locomotive engineer, who was working the 
second portion a night ``split shift,'' may have contributed to the 
failure to observe signal indications. Since the accident, New Jersey 
Transit has eliminated use of the night split shift, which had 
previously been a longstanding practice on the railroad.
    MARC accident, Silver Spring, MD. On February 16, 1996, at 
approximately 5:40 p.m., a near-head-on collision occurred between 
Maryland Rail Commuter Authority (MARC) train P28616 and National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) train PO2916 on the CSX 
Transportation line at Silver Spring, Maryland (milepost 8.3). The 
Amtrak train consisted of two locomotives in the lead and 15 cars. The 
MARC train consisted of a cab control car in the lead followed by two 
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist.
    The accident resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crew 
members and 8 passengers who were located in the MARC cab car. Non-
fatal injuries were sustained by at least 13 additional passengers of 
the MARC train. As this order was prepared, one passenger remained in 
critical condition.
    Early investigative findings by staff of the NTSB and FRA indicate 
that the MARC train, proceeding eastbound toward Washington Union 
Station on Track No. 2, passed an intermediate signal conveying an 
approach indication (proceed prepared to stop at next signal), made a 
scheduled station stop immediately past the signal, accelerated to 
approximately 63 miles per hour (maximum timetable speed 70 miles per 
hour), and then applied the train's emergency brakes upon rounding a 
curve and establishing sight distance for the home signal governing a 
crossover between the two main tracks, which is believed to have 
displayed a stop signal. 

[[Page 6878]]
The MARC train proceeded past the signal and struck the midpoint of the 
lead locomotive of the Amtrak train, which was diverging from Track No. 
2 to Track No. 1 through the crossover. The initial impact sheared off 
the left collision post of the MARC cab car, together with a 
substantial portion of the front, side, and roof structure on the left 
side approximately one-third of the way back along the length of the 
car. The impact also ruptured the left diesel fuel tank of the Amtrak 
lead locomotive, discharging an undetermined amount of diesel fuel into 
the MARC cab car. The MARC train continued substantially in line, 
apparently raking the second locomotive and coming to rest 
substantially parallel with the Amtrak train. Diesel fuel present in 
the cab car ignited.
    Both of these accidents involved casualties in so-called ``push/
pull'' operations with the consist being pushed by a locomotive at the 
rear. Control of such operations is conducted from the front of a cab 
control car, or ``cab car,'' where an engineer compartment is located. 
Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical lines 
providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes throughout the 
train.
    Cab cars provide passenger seating, as well as providing a location 
from which the train is operated. Cab cars are built with the same 
minimum longitudinal strength as locomotives and with substantial 
collision posts at each end to prevent incursion of other vehicles into 
the occupied volume. However, cab cars are lighter than powered 
vehicles, and no combination of structural measures can wholly prevent 
harm to persons in collisions involving substantial forces. Occupants 
of cab cars may incur a significantly higher risk of serious injury 
when compared with occupants of a locomotive-hauled consist, if the cab 
car collides with a heavier rail vehicle or any highway or rail vehicle 
transporting hazardous materials. Similar risks may obtain in the case 
of electric multiple-unit (EMU) service and diesel multiple-unit (DMU) 
service, because those vehicles have a structure similar to that of a 
cab car.
    FRA recognizes that cab cars have provided hundreds of millions of 
miles of safe transportation since they were introduced in the late 
1950s. EMU and DMU service has been provided with a high degree of 
safety since the early decades of this century. However, the recent 
accidents noted above compel FRA to review the safety of these 
operations to determine whether means can be found to further reduce 
the risk of serious injury in the subject service.
    Prior accidents further illustrate the potential risk. For 
instance, on August 1, 1981, at Beverly, Massachusetts, a commuter 
train engineer was killed and 28 passengers were injured when a 
commuter train in the push mode collided head-on with a freight train 
due to dispatcher error. On January 2, 1982, at Southhampton, 
Pennsylvania, a single rail diesel car commuter train collided with a 
gas truck at a highway-rail crossing due to malfunction of the 
automated warning device at the crossing (loss of shunt). On November 
12, 1987, at Boston, Massachusetts, a train in the push mode struck the 
locomotive at the back of a train proceeding in the same direction on 
the same track, resulting in injuries to 3 crew members and 220 
passengers, due in part to a wayside signal malfunction. At Gary, 
Indiana, on January 18, 1993, two EMU consists struck in a cornering 
collision at the approach to a gauntlet bridge, resulting in 7 
fatalities and 95 persons injured, due to failure of one of the 
engineers to observe signal indications.

Related FRA Rulemaking Actions

    FRA is engaged in a broad range of actions designed to further 
enhance the safety of passenger operations. In September of 1994, the 
Secretary of Transportation announced that FRA would develop passenger 
equipment safety standards in two phases: initial regulations dealing 
with the most critical issues in three years, and final regulations 
dealing with all related subjects in five years. In November 1994, 
Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, 
section 215 of which requires the Secretary to issue regulations under 
the timetable the Secretary had previously announced, as measured from 
the enactment of the statute. FRA has begun a rulemaking concerning 
comprehensive passenger equipment safety standards. A Passenger 
Equipment Working Group, including representatives of passenger 
operators, employee representatives, rail passenger organizations, and 
States, assisted by railway suppliers, began work last summer on 
proposed rules. An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking describing the 
issues under consideration by the working group will be published this 
spring, followed by one or more notices of proposed rulemaking on 
issues such as the following:
     Inspection, testing and maintenance of passenger 
equipment;
     Crashworthiness of passenger equipment, including cab car 
and passenger coach structural strength;
     Emergency features integral to the train (e.g., emergency 
lighting, operation of doors, access points in the event equipment is 
on its side);
     Standards for high-speed equipment; and
     Passenger car interiors.
    The working group will also prepare a second Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) for passenger power brakes (which may be combined 
with other subject matter). FRA anticipates publication of an NPRM on 
passenger equipment safety measures in 1996, followed by a final rule 
in 1997, as required by law. Issues requiring further research and 
technology development may be included in a subsequent NPRM.
    Under the same statutory authority, FRA has also established an 
Emergency Preparedness Working Group for rail passenger service that is 
broadly representative of interested parties. This effort builds on a 
process of research and consultation initiated in 1993. The working 
group is presently preparing an NPRM addressing issues such as on-board 
emergency equipment, availability of first aid, liaison with emergency 
responders, communication capability, and advance planning. Publication 
of the NPRM is anticipated in early summer.
    The measures taken in this emergency order address matters of 
immediate concern as identified in the investigation of recent 
accidents. These measures will be integrated into the process of 
dialogue and discussion already underway with respect to passenger 
equipment safety and emergency preparedness. However, FRA believes that 
public safety requires the actions called for by this order now rather 
than waiting for the rulemaking process to run its course.

The Need for Action

    Although definitive conclusions have not been reached, preliminary 
indications are that both the Secaucus and Silver Spring accidents 
could have been prevented had wayside signal indications been followed, 
and the death tolls might have been reduced significantly had occupied 
cab cars not been the lead cars. Additionally, the Silver Spring 
accident indicates a need to ensure that emergency windows are clearly 
marked and operable. FRA believes that certain immediate measures are 
necessary to prevent a recurrence of these problems.
    There is no evidence that push/pull or EMU operations are in any 
way over represented in passenger train accidents. All rail passenger 
operations, like other forms of transportation, 

[[Page 6879]]
involve some risk of injury due to collision with other vehicles or 
fixed structures. In certain accident scenarios (e.g., where the 
passenger consist in question is impacted from the rear), push-pull 
operations with the cab car forward actually offer greater protection. 
However, in collisions involving the front of the passenger train, cab 
car forward and MU operations do present an increased risk of severe 
personal injury or death when compared with locomotive-hauled service. 
This risk is of particular concern where operations are conducted at 
relatively higher speeds, where there is a mix of various types of 
trains, and where there are numerous highway-rail crossings over which 
large motor vehicles are operated.
    As the accidents of past two weeks illustrate, this potential for 
accidents of greater severity warrants a review of measures taken to 
prevent such accidents. Since most train collisions on the railroad 
result from human factors, the most effective preventive measure is a 
highly effective train control system. Cab signal systems serve an 
important safety purpose because they provide a constant display of the 
governing signal indication. This provides a corrective measure should 
an engineer fail to note, forget, or misread a restrictive wayside 
signal indication. Even greater security is provided by a train control 
system capable of intervening should the engineer fail to observe 
signals and operating rules for whatever reason (e.g., lack of 
alertness due to fatigue, sudden incapacitation, loss of situational 
awareness due to unusual events). Such systems are referred to as 
automatic train control or automatic train stop systems. New 
technologies currently under development and demonstration that can 
prevent collisions and overspeed derailments are known as ``positive 
train separation'' (PTS), ``positive train control'' (PTC), or advanced 
train control (ATCS) systems.

1. Necessary Rule Changes

    With regard to cab car forward and MU operations over territory 
lacking at least cab signals, the immediate need is to ensure that 
signal indications are followed. FRA believes that certain operating 
rules, already in place on many railroads, will assist engineers in 
remembering and adhering to signal indications. One rule will require 
that signal indications for an approach or less favorable than an 
approach be called out by the engineer as they are seen. A designated 
crewmember elsewhere in the train will acknowledge the communication 
and, in the absence of an appropriate response to a restrictive 
indication that has been communicated, take action to ensure the 
appropriate response. This will serve as a simple device to help the 
engineer remember to abide by signal indications and will add safety 
redundancy by involving other crew members in responsibility for safety 
with regard to compliance with signals.
    The second rule will require that, if a passenger train enters a 
block on a signal indication and the train stops for any reason, 
including a station stop, or its speed is reduced below 10 m.p.h., the 
train shall proceed under speed limitations set forth in existing 
applicable operating rules, and in addition, must be prepared to stop 
before passing the next signal; the train must maintain the prescribed 
speed until the next wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal 
displays a proceed indication, and the track to that signal is clear. 
(For purposes of this order, a ``block'' is a length of track of 
defined limits the use of which is governed by wayside signal 
indications.) This will prevent situations where a signal displays an 
aspect less favorable than ``clear'' prior to a station stop but the 
engineer, after stopping and resuming movement, forgets that he or she 
should be operating at a reduced speed. This very well may be what 
happened in the Silver Spring accident. Under this rule, if the next 
signal is clear, timetable speed may be resumed. However, if the next 
signal requires a stop, the engineer will have the train under control 
and be prepared to stop short of the signal. This rule will presumably 
result in a certain amount of slowing of operations between station 
stops and the next forward signal, but FRA believes such relatively 
minimal delay is warranted to ensure safety.

2. Interim Safety Plans

    FRA believes there is a broader need to have railroads carefully 
evaluate their passenger operations with a view toward enhancing the 
safety of those operations, with particular attention given to the 
safety of operations where passengers are in the lead car and to ways 
that train control systems might be upgraded. FRA has concluded that 
the safety of such operations can be enhanced by having each railroad 
develop an interim system safety plan addressing these subjects. This 
will both focus the attention of those railroads on avoiding 
occurrences similar to the recent accidents and provide FRA with 
detailed information allowing it to determine what further action may 
be necessary.
    Therefore, this order will require railroads operating scheduled 
intercity or commuter rail service to conduct an analysis of their 
operations and file with FRA an interim safety plan indicating the 
manner in which risk of a collision involving a cab car is addressed. 
Railroads are encouraged to implement identified opportunities for risk 
reduction immediately. Upon review of these plans and the subject 
operations, FRA will determine whether further action is warranted.
    Plans will be reviewed with the following factors in mind:
     Railroads operating trains with the benefit of cab signals 
incur reduced risk. Augmentation of cab signals with ATC or PTC further 
reduces risk.
     Lower speed operations (e.g., not to exceed 30 miles per 
hour) involve less risk because of lower potential collision forces.
     The presence of automated warning devices, particularly 
flashing lights with gates, reduces risk of highway-rail crossing 
accidents involving heavy vehicles, particularly if crossing surfaces 
and approaches do not create a ``hump'' capable of hanging up a long, 
low truck or trailer.
    Moreover, each interim safety plan will address these specific 
issues:
    Passenger occupancy of cab/MU cars in lead. Each interim safety 
plan must include a review of the use of leading cab cars and MU cars 
for transportation of passengers. In the Silver Spring accident, most 
train occupants were located in the cab car, even though two very 
lightly loaded passenger coaches were available for occupancy. Some 
operating authorities limit access to cab cars when seating capacity is 
not required. This order asks other authorities to review this 
potential for risk reduction. For instance, an operator whose service 
gathers small numbers of passengers on branch lines, with heavier 
loadings at stops on a cab-signal-equipped main line, might direct 
passengers to trailing coaches until the train arrives on the main 
line.
    Operating rules. As noted above, this order requires early 
amendment of operating rules to make passenger operations subject to 
the ``delayed in block'' provisions of most existing rule books and to 
require engineer-to-train crew communication of certain signals. These 
steps will enhance safety by adding a layer of redundancy in safety 
procedures where presently none exists. In addition to these steps, the 
order requires passenger railroads to review other operating rules 
applicable to their particular methods of operation to determine if 
enhancements in safety can be achieved consistent with provision of 
efficient rail passenger service. 

[[Page 6880]]

    Adverse operating conditions. Crew performance and other aspects of 
operational safety can be affected by unusual conditions such as heavy 
snow, fog, high water, and other unusual conditions. This order 
requires a review of existing procedures to determine if reasonable 
enhancements in safety can be made by compensating for the challenges 
these conditions pose to system performance.
    Short-term technology enhancements. Where the railroad and all 
trains are not already cab signal/ATC-equipped, positive train control 
systems will offer the most secure means of preventing train 
collisions. However, PTC systems remain under development and will be 
deployed over a period of several years. The order requires review of 
possible technology enhancements that can be achieved over a short time 
period. For instance, FRA believes that virtually all passenger 
operations include the use of an alerting device that will stop the 
train should the engineer become incapacitated. However, certain 
freight operations on the same railroad may be conducted without such a 
device. Depending upon the number of units involved, equipping 
remaining trains with alerting devices (a readily available item) could 
close a gap in accident prevention at relatively low cost.
    Crew management. Following the accident of February 9, New Jersey 
Transit found that it was able to eliminate night split shifts without 
adversely affecting operations. Night split shifts present special 
problems because of the effect of biological rhythms and fatigue on 
human performance. This order requires other passenger operators using 
cab car/MU forward trains to review their management of operating crews 
to determine if opportunities exist for risk reduction similar to the 
action taken by New Jersey Transit. FRA emphasizes that the issue of 
on- and off-duty periods is governed by the hours of service law, as 
codified at 49 U.S.C. 21102-21108, 21303-21304. The order requires 
passenger operators to consider safety improvements that may be 
undertaken voluntarily in a manner that is consistent with statutory 
law. FRA is also authorized to approve pilot projects involving 
variances from the periods specified by the statute upon petition by 
the railroad and designated representatives of the employees involved.
    Highway-rail crossings. Cab-forward and MU operations pose a 
somewhat heightened risk of severe injury for passengers should an 
accident occur, in comparison to locomotive-hauled passenger coaches. 
Operators should give consideration to closer interface with private 
crossing holders that use the crossings for truck access, give greater 
attention to liaison with law enforcement authorities, and explore 
other means that may reduce risk at both public and private crossings. 
Accelerated application of locomotive alerting lights (already 
authorized by regulation and required by statute) may offer another 
opportunity for risk reduction. This order requires that each 
railroad's interim safety plan address these grade crossing issues in 
the context of cab-forward and MU operations. FRA is very concerned 
about the safety of such operations in absence of a plan to address 
grade crossing hazards.
    Information on emergency exits. The Silver Spring accident has 
raised serious concerns about whether the MARC passengers had 
sufficient information about the location and operation of emergency 
exits to enable them to find and use those exits in a crisis. FRA 
believes it would be very useful for all commuter and intercity 
passenger railroads to review their practices, in addition to marking 
the exits, for providing this information.

3. Emergency Exits

    Finally, there is a need to ensure that emergency exits are clearly 
marked and in operable condition on all passenger lines, regardless of 
the equipment used or train control system. FRA's regulations generally 
require that all passenger cars be equipped with at least four 
emergency opening windows, which must be designed to permit rapid and 
easy removal during a crisis situation. The investigation of the Silver 
Spring accident has raised some concerns that at least some of the 
occupants of the MARC train attempted unsuccessfully to exit through 
the windows. Whether those same people eventually were among those who 
exited safely, or whether those persons were attempting to open windows 
that were not emergency windows is not known at this time. However, 
there is sufficient reason for concern to require that measures be 
taken to ensure that such windows are readily identifiable and operable 
when they are needed. Accordingly, the order requires that any 
emergency windows that are not already legibly marked as such on the 
inside and outside be so marked, and that a representative sample of 
all such windows be examined to ensure operability. (FRA Safety Glazing 
Standards, 49 CFR Part 223, require that each passenger car have a 
minimum of four emergency window exits ``designed to permit rapid and 
easy removal during a crisis situation.'')

Finding and Order

    FRA concludes that certain current conditions and practices on 
commuter and intercity passenger railroads pose an imminent and 
unacceptable threat to public and employee safety. Of greatest concern 
are push-pull and MU operations lacking the protection provided by cab 
signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control systems. I 
find that the unsafe conditions discussed above create an emergency 
situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104, 
delegated to me by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR Sec. 1.49), 
it is hereby ordered that each commuter and intercity passenger 
railroad, and any other entity (e.g., freight railroads over whose 
lines affected passenger operations are conducted) whose actions are 
necessary to effectuate the directives in this order, take the 
following actions:
(1) Delayed in Block Rule.
    Note: This rule applies to all push-pull and MU operations 
unless cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control 
is in operation, speeds do not exceed 30 m.p.h., or within yard or 
terminal limits as specified for this purpose by the railroad.

     (A) Within 10 days of this order, have in effect, publish 
in its code of operating rules, and comply with a rule that requires: 
If a passenger train enters a block on a signal indication and the 
train stops for any reason, including a station stop, or its speed is 
reduced below 10 m.p.h., the train shall proceed under speed 
limitations set forth in existing applicable railroad operating rules, 
and in addition, must be prepared to stop before passing the next 
signal. The train must maintain the prescribed speed until the next 
wayside signal is clearly visible and that signal displays a proceed 
indication, and the track to that signal is clear. A copy of the rule 
will be provided to the FRA Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance 
in care of James T. Schultz, Staff Director, Operating Practices.
     (B) Within 30 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule, 
a railroad operating supervisor shall personally contact each engineer 
and conductor in passenger service and inform them in a face-to-face 
meeting of the requirements of that rule. Such briefing shall be 
documented and such documentation shall be available for FRA review 
upon request, including date, time, location, crew members contacted, 
and supervisor making the contact.

[[Page 6881]]

     (C) Within 60 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule, 
each engineer/conductor in such passenger service shall receive an 
unannounced operational (``efficiency'') test on the rule which 
requires a full stop at the signal ahead; and, within 90 days of rule 
publication, an on-board operational monitoring ride shall be conducted 
by an operating supervisor of the railroad to ensure a complete 
understanding of rule provisions. Such tests and operational monitoring 
checks shall be documented and such documentation shall be available 
for FRA review upon request, including date, time, location, crew 
members involved, and supervisor making the test/monitoring ride.
     (D) The railroad's program of operational tests and 
inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to 
include this rule, and shall specifically include a minimum of two such 
tests per year for each passenger engineer.
(2) Crew Communications Rule
    Note: This rule applies to all push-pull and MU operations 
unless cab signal, automatic train stop, or automatic train control 
is in operation, speeds do not exceed 30 m.p.h., or within yard or 
terminal limits as specified for this purpose by the railroad.

     (A) Within 10 days of this order, have in effect, publish 
in its operating rules, and comply with a rule that requires: A crew 
member located in the operating cab of a controlling locomotive, cab 
car, or MU car, shall have means to communicate orally and shall 
communicate the indication and location of each wayside signal 
affecting the movement of the train as soon as the signal becomes 
visible, for all signals which require either (1) that the train be 
prepared to stop at the next wayside signal, or (2) that the train be 
prepared to pass the next wayside signal at restricted speed. In 
multiple track territory, the crew member shall include the affected 
track number. A copy of the rule shall be provided to the FRA Office of 
Safety Assurance and Compliance in care of James T. Schultz, Staff 
Director, Operating Practices.
     (B) A designated crew member located on a trailing unit or 
car shall immediately acknowledge the transmission, and confirm the 
information to the crew member(s) on the controlling locomotive by 
repeating the message. If the designated crew member fails to 
acknowledge the communication, the engineer must ascertain at the next 
scheduled stop why the message is not being confirmed. If necessary due 
to radio equipment failure, alternative means shall be established by 
the operating crew (e.g., via intercom, cellular telephone, etc.) to 
accomplish the procedure.
     (C) If the engineer fails to control the train movement in 
accordance with either a wayside signal indication or other 
restrictions imposed upon the train, the designated crew member in a 
trailing unit or car shall at once communicate with and caution the 
engineer regarding the restriction, and, if necessary, take appropriate 
action to ensure the safety of the train, including stopping the 
movement if appropriate.
     (D) Within 30 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule, 
a railroad operating supervisor shall personally contact each engineer 
and conductor in passenger service and inform them in a face-to-face 
meeting of the requirements of this rule. Such briefing shall be 
documented and such documentation shall be available for FRA review 
upon request, including date, time, location, crew members contacted, 
and supervisor making the contact.
     (E) Within 60 days of the issuance of the railroad's rule, 
each engineer/conductor in such passenger service shall receive an 
unannounced operational ``efficiency'' test on the rule; and, within 90 
days of rule publication, an on-board operational monitoring ride shall 
be conducted by an operating supervisor of the railroad to ensure a 
complete understanding of rule provisions. Such tests and operational 
monitoring checks shall be documented and such documentation shall be 
available for FRA review upon request, including date, time, location, 
crew members involved, and supervisor making the test/monitoring ride.
     (F) The railroad's program of operational tests and 
inspections under 49 CFR Part 217 shall be revised as necessary to 
include this rule, and shall specifically include a minimum of two such 
tests per year for each passenger engineer.
(3) Emergency Egress: Marking and Inspecting Exits
     (A) Within 60 days of this order, ensure that each 
emergency exit location is marked both inside the car for passenger and 
crew information and, with regard to emergency window exits, on the 
exterior of the car as well for emergency responders. Markings for 
egress from inside the car shall be accompanied by clear and legible 
instructions for operation of the exit. Such markings must be clearly 
visible and legible at egress locations. This paragraph does not 
require action where reasonably conspicuous and fully legible markings 
and instructions already exist.
     (B) Immediately begin, and within 60 days of this order 
complete, a program to test a representative sample of emergency window 
exits on cars in its fleets to verify proper operation. Defective units 
will be repaired before the car is returned to service. Additionally, 
when a defective exit is discovered, all exits on that specific series/
type of car will be tested and every defective exit replaced. Railroads 
must report to FRA when such action is necessary, and shall include a 
timetable for window inspection and replacement on the car series to 
remedy the problem in the most expedient manner.
     (C) Records of the date, car number, and verification of 
proper exit operation shall be maintained and available for FRA review 
upon request. Each railroad shall also verify emergency exit operation 
as part of routine vehicle maintenance cycles.
(4) Interim System Safety Plans
    Each authority operating or contracting for the operation of push-
pull, EMU or DMU service (including Amtrak) shall, not later than 45 
days from this order, submit to FRA an interim system safety plan for 
the purpose of enhancing the safety of such operations. In developing 
such plans, the authority shall provide opportunity for the riding 
public and designated representatives of railroad employees to comment 
on proposed actions that may affect the quality of service, including 
passenger safety.
    The plan shall address the following hazards associated with 
passenger occupancy of lead units:
     Train-to-train collisions.
     Derailments giving rise to the hazard of impact with fixed 
structures.
     Collisions with heavy vehicles at highway-rail crossings.
    The plan shall take into consideration the overall safety of all 
passengers and crew members and shall, at a minimum, address the 
following opportunities for risk reduction:
    (A) Use of cab car/MU car. The authority shall specify the 
circumstances under which occupancy of a cab or MU car in the lead 
position is permitted, by route and train assignment. The authority 
shall propose or report appropriate modifications in such practices, 
taking into consideration service needs (e.g., equipment capacity, 
passenger loadings) and safety issues (e.g., train densities, method of 
operation, availability of cab signals and automatic control, issues 
related to standing passengers, grade crossing exposure, and other 
relevant factors).
    (B) Operating rules. The authority shall review railroad operating 
rules and 

[[Page 6882]]
practices pertinent to the hazards listed above to determine if further 
enhancements in safety are warranted and advise FRA as to what action 
is necessary to enhance the level of safety. Changes in existing rules 
shall be specified. In conducting this review, the operating authority 
shall analyze the measures imposed in sections 1 and 2 of this order 
and may propose alternative approaches that ensure the same 
enhancements in safety associated with those measures.
    (C) Adverse conditions. In conducting the review of railroad 
operating rules and practices, consideration shall be given to adverse 
or unusual operating conditions such as weather (e.g., fog, heavy rain 
or snow, flooding, etc.).
    (D) Short-term technology enhancements. The authority shall 
consider short-term enhancements in technology that may improve the 
safety of train operations, such as use of alerting devices, equipping 
of additional locomotives with cab signal/ATC apparatus (where in 
effect on the territory), or other available enhancements to enhance 
engineer performance or provide warning of operation in excess of 
authority provided by the wayside signal system. In addition, the 
authority shall consider whether the installation of additional signals 
on any particular line would appreciably reduce the risk of train 
collisions.
    (E) Crew management. The authority shall review crew management 
practices in light of contemporary literature regarding shift work and 
cumulative fatigue to determine if the alertness and performance of 
employees can be promoted by changes in those practices. Special 
attention shall be given to the issue of night split shifts.
    (F) Highway-rail grade crossings. The authority shall review risks 
to passengers associated with occupancy of cab or MU cars in the lead 
while passing over highway-rail crossings, particularly crossings 
utilized by heavy vehicles and vehicles transporting hazardous 
materials, and shall address measures that can reduce these risks.
    (G) Emergency exit notification. The authority shall review methods 
it uses, in addition to marking emergency exits, to inform passengers 
of the location and operation of those exits, such as flyers dropped on 
seats, announcements to passengers, explanations on the face of 
passenger tickets, etc. The authority shall specify any plans it has to 
increase passenger awareness of the location and operation of emergency 
exits.
    Upon receipt of plans responsive to the above-referenced 
requirements, the Administrator, in consultation with the FTA 
Administrator, will determine whether other mandatory action appears 
necessary to address hazards associated with the subject rail passenger 
service.

Relief

    Petitions for special approval to take actions not in accordance 
with this order may be submitted to the Associate Administrator for 
Safety, who shall be authorized to dispose of those requests without 
the necessity of amending this order.

Penalties

    Any violation of this order shall subject the person committing the 
violation to a civil penalty of up to $20,000. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1301. FRA 
may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to 
enforce this order. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

    This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m on February 21, 1996. 
This notice will be published in the Federal Register as soon as 
possible. Prior to publication, copies of this notice will be delivered 
by overnight mail or facsimile to the affected passenger railroads, 
public authorities, and railroad labor organizations.

Review

    Opportunity for formal review of this Emergency Order will be 
provided in accordance with 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20104(b) and section 554 of 
Title 5 of the United States Code.
    Administrative procedures governing such review are found at 49 CFR 
Part 211. See 49 CFR Secs. 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on February 20, 1996.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-4204 Filed 2-21-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P