[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 21, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6633-6637]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-3884]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials at the Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Supplemental Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final 
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential 
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials 
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until 
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented.
    On December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300), DOE issued a Record of Decision 
(ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives on the interim management of 
several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. DOE is now issuing 
its decisions on actions that will stabilize two additional categories 
of materials at the SRS, which present environment, safety and health 
vulnerabilities in their current storage condition or may present 
vulnerabilities within the next 10 years. The decisions on the 
stabilization of two additional categories of nuclear materials, 
neptunium-237 solution and targets, and H-Canyon plutonium-239 
solutions, are not being made at this time.

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels

    DOE has decided to stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels by 
processing them in the SRS canyon facilities and blending down the 
resulting highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU). 
The LEU solution will be stored or converted to an oxide in the FA-
Line. Neptunium-237 separated during the stabilization processing of 
the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels will be stabilized with the other SRS 
neptunium. The Department is still considering which of the management 
options for neptunium to implement.

Other Aluminum-Clad Targets

    DOE has decided to stabilize the ``other aluminum-clad targets'' by 
dissolving them in the SRS canyon facilities and transferring the 
resulting nuclear material solution to the high level waste tanks for 
future vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim 
management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the 
Final EIS, the Facility Utilization Strategy study, the initial ROD and 
Notice, or this supplemental ROD contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA 
Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River 
Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031, 
(800) 242-8259, Internet: [email protected].
    For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or 
leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final 
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials'', (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential 
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials 
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until 
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented.
    The Final EIS identified continued storage (i.e., No Action) as the 
preferred alternative for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the ``other 
aluminum-clad targets'' until DOE could complete additional reviews of 
costs, schedules, and technical uncertainties associated with dry 
storage techniques for failed fuel.
    On December 12, 1995 (60 FR 65300), DOE issued a Record of Decision 
(ROD) and Notice of Preferred Alternatives on the interim management of 
several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. At that time, DOE 
announced new preferred alternatives for the management of the Mark-16 
and Mark-22 fuels (processing and blending down to LEU) and the ``other 
aluminum-clad targets'' (processing and storage for vitrification in 
the DWPF). In addition, DOE indicated that neptunium-237 solution and 
targets would be stabilized through either processing to oxide or 
vitrification, and that plutonium-239 solutions in H-Canyon would be 
stabilized through processing to metal, processing to oxide, or 
vitrification. For each of these material categories, only one 
stabilization method will be implemented. The stabilization alternative 
chosen is dependent upon whether the materials would be stabilized in 
the SRS's F- or H-Canyon, as discussed in a DOE staff study, Facility 
Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River Site Chemical Separation 
Facilities (December 1995). DOE is still considering the facility 
utilization strategy study and other related information. 

[[Page 6634]]


II. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

    DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the Mark-16 
and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets at the SRS: (A) 
Continuing Storage (i.e., ``No Action'' within the context of NEPA), 
(B) Processing to Oxide, (C) Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, (D) 
Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF, and (E) Improving 
Storage. The following is a brief description of the alternatives 
evaluated.

A. Continuing Storage (No Action)

    This alternative was evaluated for the fuels and targets considered 
in this supplemental ROD. Under this alternative, DOE would continue to 
store the materials in their current physical and chemical form. DOE 
would relocate, repackage, or re-can materials stored in basins to 
consolidate the material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. 
Periodic sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, 
weighing, visual inspection and similar activities would continue in 
order to monitor the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear 
material. Repackaging would include removing materials from a damaged 
storage container and placing them in a new container or placing the 
damaged container in a larger container. Re-canning would primarily 
entail placing damaged or degraded fuel or targets in metal containers, 
sealing the containers, and keeping them in wet storage.
    Many activities would be required by DOE irrespective of the 
management alternative used. For example, DOE would maintain facilities 
in good working condition and would continue to provide utilities 
(water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and services 
(security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each facility. 
Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the skills 
necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would continue 
with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related vulnerabilities 
associated with storage of the materials and projects to upgrade or 
replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).

B. Processing to Oxide

    For purposes of this supplemental ROD, this alternative is only 
relevant to the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels. DOE would dissolve and 
process the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing HEU in the H-Canyon 
and would convert the resulting HEU solution to HEU oxide. To provide 
conversion capability, DOE would complete the partially constructed 
Uranium Solidification Facility (USF) in H-Canyon. The HEU oxide would 
be packaged and stored in a vault in USF.

C. Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

    This alternative is only relevant to the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels. 
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing HEU would be transported to H-
Canyon and/or F-Canyon by rail casks, and dissolved in nitric acid. If 
processed through F-Canyon, due to criticality constraints, the 
dissolved fuel material would be blended down to LEU prior to 
separation from fission products and other materials. If processed 
through H-Canyon, the dissolved fuel material would be separated from 
fission products and other materials and subsequently blended down to 
LEU. In either case, the HEU would be blended at the SRS with existing 
depleted or natural uranium to produce LEU solutions. The LEU solutions 
would be stored or converted to an oxide using FA-Line. The oxide would 
be stored in drums in existing facilities or in a new warehouse to be 
constructed at the SRS. Decisions on a potential new warehouse at the 
SRS will be made after or coincident with the ROD for the disposition 
of surplus HEU. The Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium 
Final EIS is expected to be issued in mid 1996.

D. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF

    This alternative could apply to both the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels 
and the other aluminum-clad targets considered in this supplemental 
ROD. DOE would perform research and development work to develop a 
method for chemically adjusting solutions that would result from the 
dissolution of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the other aluminum-
clad targets in order to transfer them to the high level waste tanks in 
F- or H-Area. The research and development work would be to ensure 
nuclear criticality safety due to the large amounts of uranium-235 
contained in the fuels, and to evaluate the effects of the nuclear 
materials on the systems and facilities used to store and treat the 
liquid high level waste.
    Upon completion of the studies, DOE would transport the fuel and 
targets stored in the water-filled basins by rail casks to F- or H-
Canyon and would dissolve them in nitric acid. The resulting solutions 
from dissolution would be chemically adjusted and transferred to the 
high level waste tanks via underground pipelines. The solutions would 
be mixed with the existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- 
and H-Area tanks. The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would 
eventually be immobilized in borosilicate glass by the DWPF. The glass 
would be contained within stainless steel canisters that would be 
stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending geologic disposal by 
DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be immobilized by the Saltstone 
facility into a grout containing very low levels of radioactivity. The 
grout would be poured into concrete vaults located at the Saltstone 
facility.

E. Improving Storage

    This alternative could be applicable to both the Mark-16 and Mark-
22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets. For this alternative, DOE 
would remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad 
targets from the basins and place them in dry storage. Because of 
technical uncertainties (e.g., potentially pyrophoric hydrides of 
uranium, elimination of potential reactive material) associated with 
the dry storage of failed fuel and targets, DOE would perform 
additional research to demonstrate the feasibility of drying and 
placing the materials into canisters for storage. Work related to the 
dry storage of LEU and commercial spent nuclear fuel has already been 
done in the United States and other countries. This work has not been 
focused on the storage of aluminum-clad HEU fuels. In conjunction with 
this work, DOE would design and construct a Dry Storage Facility at 
SRS.
    A typical dry storage facility would be a Modular Dry Storage 
Vault. This facility would consist of four major components: a 
receiving/unloading area, fuel storage canisters, a shielded container 
handling machine, and a modular vault for storing the fuel in storage 
canisters. As a variation, canisters could be stored in dry storage 
casks rather than a vault. The degraded fuel and target materials would 
be removed from the basins and dried, canned or placed directly in 
canisters; the cans or canisters would be filled with an inert gas to 
inhibit further corrosion; if cans were used they would be loaded into 
storage canisters. This process could be varied as dictated by the 
condition of the material. After the fuel or targets were loaded in a 
canister, a machine would transport the canister to the modular storage 
vault. The vault would consist of a large concrete structure with an 
array of vertical tubes to hold the canisters. The canister 

[[Page 6635]]
transport machine would move into the vault and load the canister into 
a storage tube. A shielded plug would be placed on top of the tube. The 
transport machine and the vault storage tubes would be heavily shielded 
to reduce the effects of radiation from the canister. To use dry 
storage casks, the machine would transport the canister to a cask 
(horizontal or vertical) and discharge the canister into the cask, and 
then the cask would be sealed.
    DOE evaluated the potential environmental impacts associated with 
two variations for implementing this alternative. The first involved 
the use of a traditional project schedule for the design and 
construction of the Dry Storage Facility, estimated to take about ten 
years. The second was an accelerated schedule for design and 
construction, estimated to take about five years. Until the Dry Storage 
Facility was completed, DOE would store the materials in existing 
basins, as described under Continued Storage (No Action).

III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

    The Final EIS for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials 
analyzed the potential environmental impacts that could result from 
implementation of the candidate management alternatives. DOE has 
concluded that there would be minimal environmental impact from 
implementation of any of the alternatives for any of the material 
groups in the areas of geologic resources, ecological resources 
(including threatened or endangered species), cultural resources, 
aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land use. Impacts in these 
areas would be limited because facility modifications or construction 
of new facilities would occur within existing buildings or 
industrialized portions of the SRS. DOE anticipates that the existing 
SRS workforce would support any construction projects and other 
activities required to implement any of the alternatives. As a result, 
DOE expects negligible socioeconomic impacts from implementation of any 
of the alternatives.
    Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical 
separations facilities (the canyons) would have greater environmental 
impacts (e.g., radiological, waste generation) during the time 
dissolving, processing or conversion activities are underway than when 
these facilities are storing nuclear materials. After materials have 
been stabilized, impacts of normal facility operations related to 
management of those materials would decline, and potential impacts of 
accidents associated with those materials would be reduced with certain 
kinds of accidents eliminated (e.g., solution spills or releases). 
Potential health effects from normal operations from any of the 
alternatives, including those involving the operation of the canyon 
facilities, would be low and well within regulatory limits. 
Alternatives requiring the use of the canyons are: Processing to Oxide, 
Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, and Processing and Storage for 
Vitrification in the DWPF.
    The Improving Storage alternatives generally have lower impacts in 
the near term because they involve only heating, drying and repackaging 
the nuclear materials. These alternatives involve the use of new 
facilities, such as a Dry Storage Facility. New facilities would 
incorporate improved designs for remote handling, shielding, 
containment, air filtration, etc.; these improvements could reduce 
worker exposures and releases to the environment below levels 
associated with existing storage basins and vaults.
    Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents 
associated with nuclear material storage would be reduced after 
material stabilization alternatives are implemented. Due to the 
substantial influence actively operating facilities have upon potential 
environmental impacts, stabilization alternatives requiring longer 
periods of time to complete are estimated to have relatively higher 
impacts from normal operation and potential accidents than alternatives 
requiring less time to complete.
    Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives would result in 
low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts would continue for an 
indefinite period of time. Stabilization alternatives typically would 
result in slightly higher annual environmental impacts than ``No 
Action'' in the near-term, but upon completion of the stabilization 
action would result in lower annual impacts. Under Continuing Storage 
alternatives, no actions would be taken to chemically or physically 
stabilize the storage conditions and reduce the potential for 
accidents. All of the stabilization alternatives, upon completion of 
the actions required, would reduce the potential for accidents and 
associated consequences. Several of the stabilization alternatives 
would involve a short-term increase in the risks from accidents until 
the required actions are completed.
    Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous 
liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable 
federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS 
facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste, 
mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by 
implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing 
waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are 
within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities 
for storage, treatment or disposal.
    SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear 
materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential 
impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the 
environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls 
are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the 
facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified; 
therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

IV. Other Factors

    In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing 
the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in making the 
decisions announced in this supplemental ROD. These other factors 
included: (1) the need to construct and operate modified or new 
facilities (e.g., a Dry Storage Facility) and the reliability of old 
facilities, (2) nonproliferation concerns, involving potential impacts 
to U.S. nonproliferation policy as affected by both the operation of 
certain facilities and the attractiveness of the managed nuclear 
materials for potential weapons use, (3) implementation schedules, (4) 
technology availability, (5) labor availability and core competency, 
(6) level of custodial care for the continued safe management of the 
nuclear materials, (7) cost and budget considerations, (8) technical 
uncertainty (i.e., dry storage of failed HEU fuels), and (9) comments 
received during the scoping period for the EIS on the Interim 
Management of Nuclear Materials, and comments received on the Draft and 
Final EISs.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

    As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear 
Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in 
lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative 
was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental 
factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an 

[[Page 6636]]
alternative might be expected to result in lower releases of hazardous 
pollutants to air or water than the other alternatives, but might 
generate slightly higher amounts of radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the 
environmental impacts estimated for the alternatives evaluated for the 
Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the other aluminum-clad targets, and 
identified the following as the environmentally preferable alternative 
for each material category. The health and environmental effects from 
any of the alternatives are all low and well within regulatory limits.

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels and Other Aluminum-Clad Targets--Improving 
Storage (Accelerated Schedule)

    Improving Storage, on an accelerated schedule, is the 
environmentally preferable alternative for the fuels and targets. This 
alternative is estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to 
the offsite public with doses to the SRS workers comparable to the 
other alternatives; has the lowest estimates of air and water 
emissions; and, results in the generation of the least amount of high 
level, transuranic, mixed, and low level waste.

VI. Decision

    As indicated in the ROD and Notice issued December 12, 1995, DOE 
received several comments from stakeholders on issues related to the 
interim management of nuclear materials at the SRS. These comments 
dealt principally with: (1) The method to be used for the management of 
spent nuclear fuel, and (2) the operational status and potential plans 
for the F- and H-Canyon processing facilities. Subsequent to issuing 
the initial ROD and Notice, DOE received a letter from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region IV, on the Final EIS 
offering additional comments for consideration in making the decisions 
on the stabilization of the SRS nuclear materials. EPA identified, as 
did the Final EIS, processing to oxide as the preferred alternative for 
stabilizing the neptunium-237 and plutonium-239 materials. EPA stated 
that the principal advantage over the environmentally preferable 
vitrification alternative is that shipping nuclear material solutions 
across the SRS would not be required. For the Mark-16 and Mark-22 
fuels, EPA recommended that the fuels be blended to LEU and processed 
to an oxide. EPA recommended that DOE proceed with the construction of 
a dry storage facility on an accelerated basis for storing the other 
aluminum-clad targets because this alternative would take a shorter 
time to implement.
    After careful consideration of the issues and public comments, 
along with the analyses of environmental impacts and other factors, DOE 
has made the following decisions for the interim management of Mark-16 
and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets:

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels--Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

    DOE has decided to stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels through 
processing in the canyon facilities, blending down the HEU to LEU. DOE 
will dissolve depleted uranium oxide in the FA-Line as necessary to 
blend down the HEU to LEU.
    DOE will remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels from the water-filled 
basins in which they are stored and transport them to the canyon 
facilities using the existing SRS rail casks. All of the cask shipments 
will be confined within the boundaries of the SRS, occurring near the 
center of the site. The fuel assemblies will be dissolved in nitric 
acid. If processed through the F-Canyon, the resulting HEU solution 
will be blended down to LEU and then separated from fission products 
and other materials. If processed through the H-Canyon, the resulting 
HEU solution from dissolution will be separated from fission products 
and other materials and then blended down to LEU. DOE will transfer 
depleted or natural uranium solutions to the canyon facilities for 
blending with the HEU from the fuels. The LEU solution will be stored 
or converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The LEU solution or oxide will be 
stored at the SRS until disposition decisions are made. Dependent upon 
the timing of future DOE decisions, the uranium from the Mark-16 and 
Mark-22 fuels could be dealt with in conjunction with the disposition 
of other HEU (by commercial sale, etc.).
    Neptunium-237 will be separated from the fuel during the 
stabilization process. This material will be managed in conjunction 
with the other neptunium at the SRS. The Department is still 
considering which of the management options for neptunium-237 and 
plutonium-239 to implement.
    DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons. 
Stabilization of the fuels with their removal from basin wet storage 
and elimination of the wet storage vulnerabilities through processing 
can be accomplished two to seven years earlier than the improved 
storage alternative. Improving storage on an accelerated schedule is 
the environmentally preferable alternative. Blending down to LEU 
reduces the HEU inventory and eliminates nonproliferation and security 
issues associated with the indefinite storage of HEU fuel which is not 
self-protecting. (Self-protecting fuel is highly radioactive, so that 
substantial shielding (or distance) is required to prevent unhealthy 
radiological effects from handling or storage conditions; non self-
protecting fuel could be contact-handled and therefore is of greater 
theft or sabotage concern.) Cost and cost uncertainties also have 
played a significant role in the selection of this stabilization 
action. Near-term annual costs to process and blend down the HEU to LEU 
are estimated at $20 million to $95 million less than for the improved 
storage alternatives. Substantial uncertainty exists concerning the 
disposition of dry-stored (improved storage) HEU spent fuel, while less 
uncertainty exists with the stabilization of the fuels through blending 
down to LEU and the storage and disposition of the resulting waste 
through the DWPF. Life-cycle cost evaluations favor blending down to 
LEU ($38 million to greater than $1 billion advantage)[Facility 
Utilization Strategy, Attachment 2]. Although potential safety, health 
and environmental impacts evaluated in the Final EIS are lower in the 
interim period for the improved storage alternatives than the selected 
blending down to LEU alternative, the potential impacts from any of the 
stabilization alternatives are shown to be very low and well below any 
regulatory or management control limits. It is anticipated, however, 
that the secondary impacts associated with the eventual or periodic 
need to handle stored spent fuel for management or disposal purposes 
may increase over time the potential impacts of the improved storage 
alternatives.

Other Aluminum-Clad Targets--Processing and Storage for Vitrification 
in the DWPF

    DOE has decided to implement the processing and storage for 
vitrification in the DWPF alternative for the other aluminum-clad 
targets stored in the reactor disassembly basins at the SRS. DOE will 
remove the targets stored in the reactor disassembly basins and 
transport them to the canyon facilities by SRS rail casks. The targets 
will be dissolved in a canyon, the resulting solutions chemically 
adjusted and transferred to the adjacent underground high level waste 
tanks. The solutions will be stored in the high level waste tanks until 
they are processed in conjunction with the other high level waste in 
the tanks. The high level waste will eventually be vitrified in the 
DWPF. The resulting stainless steel 

[[Page 6637]]
canisters of glass produced from the DWPF process will be stored in a 
facility adjacent to the DWPF pending geological disposal by DOE.
    DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons. 
These targets are in a variety of physical forms and shapes and contain 
no or small amounts of fissile materials; primarily they contain such 
materials as thorium, cobalt, and thulium. Their dissolution and 
transfer for vitrification in the DWPF will place these physically and 
chemically diverse materials into a uniform medium suitable for future 
emplacement in a geologic repository. Improved storage (the 
environmentally preferable alternative) would require the development 
of one or more packaging configurations for repository emplacement. 
Although vitrification in the DWPF will not occur for several years, 
processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF can be implemented 
one to six years earlier than the improved storage alternatives. This 
will remove the targets in their deteriorating condition from the 
reactor disassembly basins, precluding further release of radioactivity 
to the basin water. Near-term costs are considerably less for the 
processing alternative as compared with the improved storage 
alternative. As with the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, potential safety, 
health and environmental impacts for the improved storage alternatives 
are lower than the selected stabilization alternative of processing and 
storage for vitrification in the DWPF. However, the potential impacts 
from any of the stabilization alternatives are acceptable and well 
below any regulatory or management control limits.

VII. Conclusion

    While the Final EIS focuses on the interim management of nuclear 
materials at the SRS, the decisions associated with the safe management 
of these materials directly affect the operational status of the 
nuclear material processing facilities at the Site. The decisions in 
this supplemental ROD and the initial ROD and Notice are structured to 
effect the earliest completion of actions necessary to stabilize or 
convert nuclear materials into forms suitable for safe storage and 
prepare the facilities for subsequent shutdown and deactivation. The 
actions being implemented will support efficient, cost-effective 
consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials and, to a great 
extent, will result in stabilization of the nuclear materials and 
alleviation of associated vulnerabilities within the timeframe 
recommended by the DNFSB.
    The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and 
processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected 
budget constraints and with minimal additional training to required 
personnel; rely upon proven technology; use an integrated approach; and 
represent the optimum use of facilities to stabilize the materials in 
the shortest amount of time. Only minor modifications of the canyon 
facilities will be required, and these were also supported by the 
decisions made in the initial ROD and Notice.
    Several years will be required to achieve stabilization of the 
nuclear materials within the scope of this and the initial ROD. 
Stabilization of the candidate nuclear materials at SRS will entail the 
operation of many portions of the chemical processing facilities. 
Consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, this will preserve DOE's 
capabilities related to the management and stabilization of other 
nuclear materials until programmatic decisions are made.
    In summary, the Department has structured its decisions on interim 
actions related to management of the nuclear materials at SRS to 
achieve stabilization as soon as possible.

    Issued at Washington, DC, February 8, 1996.
Thomas P. Grumbly,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 96-3884 Filed 2-20-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P