[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 29 (Monday, February 12, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5378-5381]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-3067]



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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[C-401-401]


Certain Carbon Steel Products From Sweden; Final Results of 
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative 
Review.

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SUMMARY: On August 24, 1995, the Department of Commerce (the 
Department) published in the Federal Register its preliminary results 
of administrative review of the countervailing duty order on certain 
carbon steel products from Sweden for the period January 1, 1993 
through December 31, 1993. We have completed this review and determine 
the net subsidy to be 2.98 percent ad valorem for all companies. We 
will instruct the U.S. Customs Service to assess countervailing duties 
as indicated above.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 12, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stephanie Moore or Gayle Longest, 
Office of Countervailing Compliance, Import Administration, 
International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th 
Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20230; 
telephone: (202) 482-2849; (202) 482-3338.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    On August 24, 1995, Department published in the Federal Register 
(60 FR 44014) the preliminary results of its administrative review of 
the countervailing duty order on certain carbon steel products from 
Sweden. The Department has now completed this administrative review in 
accordance with section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the 
Act).
    We invited interested parties to comment on the preliminary 
results. On September 25, 1995, a case brief was submitted on behalf of 
U.S. Steel Group, a unit of USX Corporation, petitioner. On October 2, 
1995, rebuttal comments were submitted by SSAB Svenskt Stal AB (SSAB), 
respondent.
    The review covers the period January 1, 1993 through December 31, 
1993. The review involves one company, SSAB, the sole known producer/
exporter of the subject merchandise during the review period, and nine 
programs.

Applicable Statute and Regulations

    The Department is conducting this administrative review in 
accordance with section 751(a) of the Act. Unless otherwise indicated, 
all citations to the statute and to the Department's regulations are in 
reference to the provisions as they existed on December 31, 1994. 
However, references to the Department's Countervailing Duties; Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments, 54 FR 23366 
(May 31, 1989) (Proposed Regulations), are provided solely for further 
explanation of the Department's countervailing duty practice. Although 
the Department has withdrawn the particular rulemaking proceeding 
pursuant to which the Proposed Regulations were issued, the subject 
matter of these regulations is being considered in connection with an 
ongoing rulemaking proceeding which, among other things, is intended to 
conform the Department's regulations to the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act. See 60 FR 80 (Jan. 3, 1995).

Scope of the Review

    Imports covered by this review are shipments of certain carbon 
steel products from Sweden. These products include cold-rolled carbon 
steel, flat-rolled products, whether or not corrugated or crimped; 
whether or not corrugated or crimped: whether or not pickled, not cut, 
not pressed and not stamped to non-rectangular shape; not coated or 
pleated with metal and not clad; over 12 inches in width and of any 
thickness; whether or not in coils. During the review period, such 
merchandise was classifiable under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 
item number 7209.11.0000, 7209.12.0000, 7209.13.0000, 7209.21.0000, 
7209.22.0000, 7209.23.0000, 7209.24.5000, 7209.31.0000, 7209.32.0000, 
7209.33.0000, 7209.34.0000, 7209.41.0000, 7209.43.0000, 7209.44.0000, 
7209.90.0000, 7211.30.5000, 7211.41.7000 and 7211.49.5000.
    The HTS item numbers are provided for convenience and customs 
purposes. The written description remains dispositive.

Calculation Methodology for Assessment and Cash Deposit Purposes

    Because SSAB is the only manufacturer/exporter of the subject 
merchandise to the United States, SSAB's net subsidy rate is also the 
country-wide rate.

Privatization

    SSAB was partially privatized twice, in 1987 and in 1989. In the 
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel 
Products from Sweden (58 FR 37385; July 9, 1993) (Final Determination), 
the Department found that SSAB had received countervailable subsidies 
prior to these partial privatizations. Further, the Department found 
that a private party purchasing all or part of a government-owned 
company can repay prior subsidies on behalf of the company as part or 
all of the sales price (see the General Issues Appendix appended to the 
Final Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Products from 
Austria (58 FR 37217, at 37262; July 9, 1993) (General Issues 
Appendix)). Therefore, to the extent that a portion of the sales price 
paid for a privatized company can be reasonably attributed to prior 
subsidies, that portion of those subsidies will be extinguished.
    To calculate the subsidies remaining with SSAB after each partial 
privatization, we performed the following calculations. We first 
calculated the net present value (NPV) of the future benefit stream of 
the subsidies at the time of the sale of the shares. We then multiplied 
the NPV by the percentage of shares the government retained after the 
sale and derived the amount of subsidies not affected by privatization. 
Next, we estimated the portion of the purchase price which represents 
repayment of prior subsidies in accordance with the methodology 
described in the ``Privatization'' section of the General Issues 
Appendix (58 FR at 37259). This amount was then subtracted from the 
NPV, and the result was divided by the NPV to calculate the ratio 
representing the amount of subsidies remaining with SSAB after each 
partial privatization.
    With respect to sale of ``productive units'' by SSAB, we have 
followed the 

[[Page 5379]]
same methodology used in the Final Determination (58 FR 37385). In 
accordance with that methodology, a portion of the price paid when a 
productive unit is sold is allocable to the repayment of subsidies 
received in prior years by the seller of the productive unit. The 
subsidies allocated to the POR have been reduced for all of the 
programs, as described above. These subsidies were further adjusted by 
the asset value of the productive unit. For a further explanation of 
the Department's methodology regarding ``sales of productive units'' 
and these calculations, see the ``Restructuring'' section of the 
General Issues Appendix (58 FR at 37265).
    To calculate the benefit provided to SSAB, we multiplied the 
benefit calculated for 1993, adjusted for sales of productive units, by 
the ratio representing the amount of subsidies remaining with SSAB 
after the partial privatization. We then divided the results by the 
company's total sales in 1993.

Analysis of Programs

    Based upon our analysis of the questionnaire responses, 
verification, and written comments from the interested parties, we 
determine the following:

I. Programs Conferring Subsidies

1. Equity Infusion
    In the preliminary results we found that this program conferred 
countervailable benefits on the subject merchandise. Our analysis of 
the comments submitted by the interested parties, summarized below, has 
not led us to change our preliminary finding that the net subsidy for 
this program is 0.82 percent ad valorem.
2. Structural Loans
    In the preliminary results we found that this program conferred 
countervailable benefits on the subject merchandise. Our analysis of 
the comments submitted by the interested parties, summarized below, has 
not led us to change our preliminary finding that the net subsidy for 
this program is 0.38 percent ad valorem.
3. Forgiven Reconstruction Loans
    In the preliminary results we found that this program conferred 
countervailable benefits on the subject merchandise. Our analysis of 
the comments submitted by the interested parties, summarized below, has 
not led us to change our preliminary finding that the net subsidy for 
this program is 1.77 percent ad valorem.
4. Grants for Temporary Employment for Public Works
    In the preliminary results we found that this program conferred 
countervailable benefits on the subject merchandise. Our analysis of 
the comments submitted by the interested parties, summarized below, has 
not led us to change our preliminary findings that the net subsidy for 
this program is 0.01 percent ad valorem.

II. Program Found Not To Confer Subsidies

    In the preliminary results we found the Research & Development 
(R&D) Loans and Grants program did not confer countervailable benefits 
during this period of review. Our analysis of the comments submitted by 
the interested parties, summarized below, has not led us to change our 
preliminary findings.

III. Programs Found Not To Be Used

    In the preliminary results we found the following programs to be 
not used:

1. Regional Development Grants
2. Transportation Grants
3. Location-of-Industry Loans

    Our analysis of the comments submitted by the interested parties, 
summarized below, has not led us to change our preliminary findings.

IV. Program Found To Be Terminated

    In the preliminary results we found the State Stockpiling Subsidies 
program to be terminated. Our analysis of the comments submitted by the 
interested parties, summarized below, has not led us to change our 
preliminary findings.

Analysis of Comments

    Comment 1: Petitioner argues that the Department's privatization 
methodology is contrary to economic reality and the requirements of the 
countervailing duty law. According to petitioner, the Department's 
determination that privatization ``repays'' a portion of the subsidies 
received before privatization is contrary to economic reality because 
the resources provided by the government to SSAB, which the market 
would not have provided, still remain with SSAB after privatization and 
continue to benefit the production of the merchandise. No resources 
were transferred from SSAB to the Government of Sweden (GOS). 
Furthermore, they contend that the Department's privatization 
methodology is contrary to the countervailing duty law because the 
countervailing duty statute, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1671(a), requires that 
subsidies bestowed upon the production, manufacture, or exportation of 
merchandise imported into the United States be countervailed. Since the 
subsidies received by SSAB continue to benefit its production of the 
subject merchandise after the partial privatizations, these subsidies 
continue to be fully countervailable.
    The respondent argues in rebuttal that the new shareholders' arm's 
length purchases result in the repayment of prior subsidies as a matter 
of economic reality and as a result of the functional identity between 
a company and its shareholders in the context of privatization.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioner. The Department 
previously addressed this issue in the Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products from Sweden (58 FR 37385, 
July 9, 1993) (Final Determination) and in the General Issues Appendix 
appended to the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: 
Certain Steel Products from Austria (58 FR 37261-2, July 9, 1993) 
(General Issues Appendix). In this proceeding, petitioner has not 
submitted any new arguments which would warrant reconsideration of this 
issue.
    Comment 2: Petitioner argues that the Department's privatization 
methodology is flawed and not supported by facts. Petitioner contends 
that the basis of the Department's methodology is that purchasers of 
shares in a subsidized company paid more for those shares than they 
would otherwise have absent subsidization; that because the new owners 
are presumably profit-maximizers, the privatized firm must now generate 
a reasonable rate of return on the owner's investment; and that to the 
extent that the new owners invested more in the company because of the 
subsidies, the company presumably faces an obligation to generate more 
earnings so as to provide a reasonable rate of return. Petitioner 
argues that this premise is incorrect, and that the Department is 
confusing countervailable subsidy benefits with the effects of 
subsidies on the value of the company. Petitioner also argues that the 
Department's repayment methodology assumes that private investors have 
different expectations than government investors, however the 
Department offers no evidence to support this assumption. Finally, 
petitioner argues that if the repayment methodology applies to 
purchases of shares in state-owned companies, it must also apply to 
purchases of shares in private companies that have received subsidies.
    Department's Position: The arguments presented by the petitioner 
have been previously addressed by the 

[[Page 5380]]
Department. See General Issues Appendix (58 FR 37217, at 37259, 37264). 
In this proceeding petitioner has presented no new evidence or 
arguments regarding this issue that would warrant reconsideration of 
the Department's determination that past subsidies bestowed upon SSAB 
are affected by privatization. Thus, the Department's preliminary 
results remain unchanged with respect to this issue.
    We note, however, that petitioner went beyond the Department's 
position in outlining their interpretation of the basis of the 
Department's methodology by stating that ``purchasers of shares in a 
subsidized company paid more for those shares than they would have, and 
that to the extent that the new owners invested more in the company 
because of the subsidies, the company presumably faces an obligation to 
generate more earnings to provide a reasonable rate of return.'' The 
Department neither stated nor implied such a position. The Department 
has stated that the owner-shareholders' expectations of a return on 
their investment cannot be separated from the profitability of the 
newly privatized company, and that the owners will seek to extract a 
rate of return from their company at least equal to that of alternative 
investments of similar risk. The Department also stated that to the 
extent that a portion of the price paid for a privatized company can 
reasonably be attributed to prior subsidies, that portion of those 
subsidies will be extinguished. See General Issues Appendix (58 FR 
37217, at 37262).
    Comment 3: Petitioner contends that the Department's privatization 
methodology was rejected by the Court of International Trade (CIT) in 
British Steel plc v. United States, British Steel plc v. U.S., 879 F. 
Supp. 1254 (CIT 1995) (British Steel). Petitioner contends that in 
British Steel, the court stated that it would seem at best that the 
only way to extinguish a previously given gift or subsidy would be to 
repay the gift or subsidy to the original donor government. To the 
extent that the sale of shares involves only a change in the beneficial 
ownership of the company, it does not cause any change in the company 
itself and no such repayment occurs.
    Petitioner also contends that although the CIT's statements in 
British Steel regarding repayment are dicta, in the final remand 
determinations in British Steel, the Department accepted the CIT's 
reasoning and abandoned its repayment methodology. Therefore, the 
petitioner argues that because SSAB has not repaid the GOS for prior 
subsidies, such benefits remain with the company, and are 
countervailable.
    Respondent contends that because the CIT has yet to issue its final 
judgment in British Steel, it is inappropriate to even suggest that the 
CIT's opinion has any bearing on this case.
    Department's Position: We disagree with petitioner. The CIT has not 
entered an order with respect to the remand determinations in British 
Steel. The Department is not required to follow a CIT opinion that is 
still subject to litigation and to which the Department has not 
acquiesced. In such instances, the Department does not change its 
methodology while litigation is pending. See, Color Television 
Receivers from the Republic of Korea: Final Results of Antidumping Duty 
Administrative Review. (59 FR 13700, at 13702; March 23, 1994). 
Therefore, we have followed our privatization methodology as set forth 
in the Final Determination.
    Comment 4: Petitioner argues that the Department has failed to 
explain the logic underlying its privatization methodology. 
Specifically, petitioner argues that the Department has failed to 
explain why a ratio of the subsidies received by a company each year to 
the company's net worth in that year serves as a ``reasonable 
surrogate'' for the percentage of the company's net value that the 
subsidies represent, and how a simple arithmetic average of these 
ratios relates to the value of the subsidies at the time the company is 
sold, much less to the extinguishment of subsidy benefits.
    Respondent argues that the Department has substantial discretion 
and wide latitude in developing reasonable methodologies to properly 
implement the countervailing duty law. As a factual matter, the 
Department has adequately explained the bases for its repayment formula 
in the General Issues Appendix.
    Department's Position: As explained in the General Issues Appendix, 
the methodology applied by the Department attempts to estimate the 
proportion of the purchase price attributable to subsidies. The ratio, 
cited by petitioner, represents, in the Department's view, the most 
reasonable approach to that estimation. In arguing the issue of the 
impact of privatization upon formerly government-owned companies which 
previously benefitted from subsidies, petitioners in the Final 
Determination stated that privatization does not affect the amount of 
subsidies allocable to the privatized steel companies, while 
respondents argued that privatization of a government-owned company 
extinguishes any pre-existing subsidies. The Department considered, but 
ultimately rejected, both of these extreme positions. The Department 
determined that prior subsidies are allocable to the privatized 
companies upon their sale to private parties. However, it also 
concluded that a portion of the price paid by the private parties 
constituted repayment for the subsidies previously bestowed on the 
formerly government-owned companies.
    The Department recognized that any methodology developed to 
determine what portion of the sales price constituted repayment for 
prior subsidies would yield only a rough estimate.
    In attempting to estimate that portion of the purchase price 
attributable to prior subsidies, the Department concluded that the most 
reasonable approach was to look at the ratio of the privatized 
company's subsidies (over time) to the company's net worth during the 
period from 1977 (the earliest point at which subsidies providing 
countervailable benefits in the period of investigation could have been 
bestowed) until the year before privatization. The subsidy-to-net worth 
ratio is intended to provide the Department with an estimate of the 
contribution subsidies have made to the value of a company.

Final Results of Review

    For the period January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1993, we 
determine the net subsidy to be 2.98 percent ad valorem for all 
companies.
    The Department will instruct the U.S. Customs Service to assess the 
following countervailing duties:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Manufacturer/exporter                        Rate  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSAB Svenskt Stal AB..........................................      2.98
Country-wide rate.............................................      2.98
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department will also instruct the U.S. Customs Service to 
collect a cash deposit of estimated countervailing duties of 2.98 
percent of the f.o.b. invoice price on all shipments of the subject 
merchandise from Sweden, entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for 
consumption on or after the date of publication of the final results of 
this review.
    This notice serves as a reminder to parties subject to 
administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility 
concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under 
APO in accordance with 19 C.F.R. 355.34(d). Timely written notification 
of return/destruction of APO materials or conversion to judicial 
protective order is hereby requested. Failure to comply with the 
regulations 

[[Page 5381]]
and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable violation.
    This administrative review and notice are in accordance with 
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and 19 CFR 355.22.

    Dated: January 30, 1996.
Susan G. Esserman,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 96-3067 Filed 2-9-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P