[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 28 (Friday, February 9, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5058-5060]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-2995]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[FRA Emergency Order No. 18, Notice No. 1]


Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company; Burlington 
Northern Santa Fe Railroad; Emergency Order Requiring Capability To 
Initiate Emergency Application of Air Brakes From the Head End and Rear 
of Trains

    The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that public safety 
compels issuance of this Emergency Order requiring that all westward 
trains operated by the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company 
(ATSF) on the Cajon Subdivision, between Barstow milepost 745.9 and 
Baseline milepost 79.9, have the capability to initiate an emergency 
application of the air brakes from both the head and rear of the train. 
ATSF recently merged with the Burlington Northern Railroad to form 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe. To the extent this new entity's 
activities have an effect on the train operations in question, it is 
covered by this order.

Authority

    Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been 
delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal Railroad 
Administrator. 49 CFR Sec. 1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety 
jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws. 49 U.S.C. 20101, 
20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where an unsafe 
condition or practice ``causes an emergency situation involving a 
hazard of death or personal injury.'' 49 U.S.C. 20104. These orders may 
immediately impose such ``restrictions and prohibitions * * * that may 
be necessary to abate the situation.'' (Ibid.)

Background

    ATSF's line of railroad between Barstow and Los Angeles, 
California, consists of double main track which passes through the San 
Bernardino Mountains via ``Cajon Pass.'' The route for westward moving 
trains involves a steady climb from Barstow to Summit, California, a 
distance of approximately 55 miles. At Summit, the line begins a 
descent westward with a more than 3 percent grade on one track and a 
more than 2 percent grade on the other track. The descent for eastward 
trains is not nearly as severe. Trains in this area operate by 
authority of a centralized traffic control system managed by ATSF train 
dispatchers. The Union Pacific Railroad (UP) also operates its trains 
through this same corridor via a trackage rights agreement with ATSF. 
The Southern Pacific Railroad operates trains through Cajon Pass, but 
on a right-of-way separate from that of ATSF.
    On December 14, 1994, a westbound Santa Fe intermodal freight train 
operating between Barstow and San Bernardino, California collided with 
the rear end of a UP unit coal train resulting in the serious injury of 
two crew members and total estimated damages in excess of $4 million. 
Investigation of the accident revealed that an apparent blockage or 
restriction of the trainline (i.e., the connected system of metal pipes 
and flexible air hoses that runs end-to-end through the train) 
inhibited the normal brake pipe air flow resulting in incomplete train 
braking. After investigation of this incident, the National 
Transportation Safety Board 

[[Page 5059]]
(NTSB) concluded that, had the train been equipped with a two-way end-
of-train device (EOT), the collision could have been avoided because 
the engineer could have initiated an emergency brake application from 
the rear of the train. A two-way EOT provides the engineer with 
information on the status of brake pressure at the rear of the train 
and permits the locomotive crew to initiate, via telemetry, an 
emergency brake application from the rear of the train forward. This 
permits the application of effective braking force even if there is 
blockage somewhere on the trainline.
    On December 15, 1995, based on the conclusions reached above, the 
NTSB recommended that FRA separate the two-way end-of-train device 
provisions of its 1994 proposed rule on power brakes from the rest of 
the proposal, and immediately conclude the end-of-train device 
rulemaking so as to require the devices on all cabooseless trains. FRA 
had independently decided to take separate action on the EOT 
provisions, and has so informed NTSB. NTSB also recommended to all 
major railroads that, pending completion of FRA's final rule, those 
railroads implement the use of two-way EOTs on all cabooseless trains 
by March 31, 1996.
    Subsequent to the December 1994 accident, Santa Fe worked with the 
railroad safety staff of the California Public Utilities Commission 
(PUC) to voluntarily implement various changes in its operations, which 
included a plan to commence equipping trains with two-way end-of-train 
devices. Measures implemented by Santa Fe following the accident 
included changes in its rules of operations to provide for use of 
manned helper locomotives on certain westward moving trains; issuing 
instructions to maximize the use of the track with a lesser grade; 
issuing instructions to avoid stopping trains on a descending grade and 
avoid allowing following trains in the next block to the rear of 
westward moving trains; and appointing an operating officer to focus 
exclusively on train operations through Cajon Pass.
    On February 1, 1996, westward ATSF freight train HBALT-131 derailed 
on a descending 3 percent grade at milepost 60.7, approximately 4 miles 
west of Summit and 20 miles east of San Bernardino. The derailment 
occurred when the train entered a more than 7 degree curve at a speed 
estimated to be in excess of 50 mph (maximum operating speed at that 
location is 25 mph). The incident resulted in fatal injuries to the 
conductor and brakeman, serious injury to the engineer, and the 
derailment of 45 of 49 cars and all four locomotives. The train 
consisted of hazardous material cars that subsequently caught fire. 
Area residents were evacuated and highways were closed, including 
Interstate 15. The NTSB is heading the investigation. FRA is providing 
expert assistance in the investigation. Although investigation of this 
accident is currently in progress, it appears as though it could have 
been avoided had the train been equipped with a means for the train 
crew to have effected an emergency brake application from the rear of 
the train. Although the train was equipped with a two-way EOT device, 
it appears that it was not ``armed,'' i.e., that it was not activated 
in such a way that it could have been used to effect an emergency 
application from the rear of the train. At this early juncture, it 
appears that a contributory cause of this incident may have been a 
blocked brake pipe.
    Based on its investigatory efforts, FRA has reason to believe that 
ATSF's procedures for ensuring the safe passage of trains through Cajon 
Pass are presently inadequate to protect public and employee safety. 
Although FRA believes the accidents described above are reason enough 
to warrant that conclusion, FRA is also concerned about other 
indications that ATSF has not been taking appropriate actions to 
prevent such accidents. FRA has reason to believe that ATSF has not 
consistently followed its own protocols for operations through Cajon 
Pass designed to prevent such accidents and is not consistently taking 
proper preventive actions at Barstow, such as ensuring, during pre-
departure inspections, that EOTs have been properly activated to permit 
brake application from the rear of the train. This additional evidence 
of inadequate practices on the part of ATSF underscores the need for 
immediate action to prevent a recurrence.

Finding and Order

    FRA concludes that ATSF's current operation of freight trains on 
the Cajon Subdivision, between Barstow milepost 745.9 and Baseline 
milepost 79.9, poses an imminent and unacceptable threat to public 
safety. I find that the unsafe conditions discussed above create an 
emergency situation involving a hazard of death or injury to persons. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104, delegated to 
me by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR Sec. 1.49), it is hereby 
ordered that, on all of ATSF's westward freight trains operating 
through Cajon Pass:
    (1) ATSF must ensure that it is possible for the train crew to 
effect an emergency brake application from the rear of the train by at 
least one of the following methods:
    (A) Use of a two-way end-of-train device that has been tested, is 
functioning, and is armed (activated) to permit a brake application 
from the rear. When this method is used.
     ATSF must determine, after all other required brake 
inspections and before the train departs Barstow, that the EOT is 
functioning in two-way operation by testing the device's ability to 
effectuate an emergency application; and
     The person making this determination must document in 
writing (the railroad may prescribe a form for this purpose) that the 
device is functioning in two-way operation and its battery is fully 
charged. That person must sign the form and ensure that it is kept in 
the cab of the locomotive with the daily inspection form; OR
    (B) Use of an occupied helper locomotive at the end of the train. 
If this method is used:
     The helper locomotive engineer will initiate and maintain 
two-way voice radio communication with the engineer on the head end of 
the train; this contact shall be verified just prior to passing Summit. 
If there is a loss of communication prior to passing Summit, the helper 
locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer will act immediately to 
stop the train until voice communication is resumed. If there is a loss 
of communication once the descent has begun beyond Summit, the helper 
locomotive engineer and the head-end engineer will act to stop the 
train if the train has reached a predetermined rate of speed that 
indicates the need for emergency braking.
     The dynamic brakes must be tested, cut in, and known to be 
functioning by both the helper engineer and the head end engineer;
     The brake pipe of the helper locomotive must be connected 
and cut in to the train line and tested to ensure operation; and
     Trains will be stopped when helpers are cut in or cut off 
from trains being assisted; OR
    (C) Use of an occupied caboose at the end of the train with a 
tested, functioning brake valve capable of initiating an emergency 
brake application from the caboose. If this method is used:
     The train service employee in the caboose and the engineer 
on the head end of the train will establish and maintain two-way voice 
radio communication and respond appropriately to the loss of such 
communication in the same manner as prescribed for helper locomotives, 
above; OR 

[[Page 5060]]

    (D) Use of a radio-controlled locomotive in the rear third of the 
train under continuous control of the engineer in the head end by means 
of telemetry, but only if such radio-controlled locomotive is capable 
of initiating an emergency application on command from the lead 
locomotive.
    (2) Once such a train has received the required brake test at 
Barstow, ATSF must test the emergency braking capacity of the train by 
initiating an emergency application of the brakes and determining that 
the emergency application propagates throughout the train. Where no EOT 
device is used, this determination must be made by visual observation 
that the brakes have set on the rear car. Where an EOT device is used, 
this determination is made by seeing that the brake pipe pressure drops 
rapidly to zero.
    (3) ATSF shall immediately report to the Emergency Response Center 
(1-800-424-0201) any incidents involving loss of braking control over 
the affected territory.

Relief

    ATSF may obtain relief from this order by demonstrating to FRA 
that, through compliance with this order and any additional measures 
ATSF may adopt on its own or through partnership efforts described 
below, it is consistently sending trains westward from Barstow with 
fully functioning air brake systems that can be successfully operated 
in emergency application from the rear of the train through use of one 
of the methods described above. At a minimum, FRA will require a 
showing that, for a period of 180 consecutive days, there has been no 
violation of this order. Following such a 180-day period, ATSF may 
request in writing to the Administrator that FRA rescind this order. At 
that time, FRA will take into account both evidence indicating 
compliance with this order and any other information it has gathered 
concerning ATSF's relevant practices that may affect the safety of 
train operations at Cajon Pass.
    FRA will, at any time, consider requests by ATSF to exclude certain 
train operations from the scope of this order based on satisfactory 
demonstration that those operations can be safely performed using other 
procedures. However, all aspects of this order apply to all westward 
trains departing Barstow unless and until written special approval is 
granted permitting other procedures for specific train operations. The 
Associate Administrator for Safety is authorized to issue such special 
approvals without amending this order.

Effective Safety Partnerships

    Over the past year, FRA has been encouraged by the formation of 
various partnerships involving FRA, major railroads, and affected labor 
organizations in collaborative actions to improve railroad safety. FRA 
is ready to work in partnership with ATSF and the affected labor 
organizations to improve the safety of operations in the Cajon Pass 
area in the same way that such partnerships have improved safety across 
the industry.

Penalties

    Any violation of this order shall subject the person committing the 
violation to a civil penalty of up to $20,000. 49 U.S.C. 21301. FRA 
may, through the Attorney General, also seek injunctive relief to 
enforce this order. 49 U.S.C. 20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

    This order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m (PST) on February 8, 
1996, and apply to all westward trains leaving Barstow on or after that 
time. Notice of this Order will be provided by publishing it in the 
Federal Register. Copies of this Emergency Order will be sent by mail 
or facsimile prior to publication to the Vice President-Operations of 
ATSF, counsel for ATSF, officials of interested labor organizations, 
the California PUC, and the Association of American Railroads.

Review

    Opportunity for formal review of this Emergency Order will be 
provided in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and section 554 of Title 
5 of the United States Code. Administrative procedures governing such 
review are found at 49 CFR Part 211. See 49 CFR Secs. 211.47, 211.71, 
211.73, 211.75, and 211.77.

    Issued in Washington, D.C. on February 6, 1996.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 96-2995 Filed 2-8-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P