[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 22 (Thursday, February 1, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 3644-3657]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-1974]



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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 69

[CC Docket Nos. 95-185 and 94-54, FCC 95-505]


Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial 
Mobile Radio Service Providers; Equal Access and Interconnection 
Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Commission is issuing this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
seeking comment on possible changes in the regulatory treatment of 
interconnection compensation arrangements between LECs and CMRS 
providers and related issues. The Notice tentatively concludes that in 
order to ensure the continued development of wireless services as a 
potential competitor to LEC services, the Commission should move 
expeditiously to adopt interim policies governing the rates charged for 
LEC-CMRS interconnection. The Notice further tentatively concludes 
that, at least for an interim period, interconnection rates for local 
switching facilities and connections to end users should be priced on a 
``bill and keep'' basis (i.e., both the LEC and the CMRS provider 
charge a rate of zero for the termination of traffic), and that rates 
for dedicated transmission facilities connecting LEC and CMRS networks 
should be set based on existing access charges for similar transmission 
facilities. The Notice seeks comment on these tentative conclusions and 
on a number of alternative pricing options for LEC-CMRS interconnection 
arrangements. The Notice tentatively concludes that information about 
interconnection compensation arrangements should be made publicly 
available, and seeks comment on what method to use to achieve this 
objective, such as tariffing, public disclosure, or some other 
approach. The Notice seeks comment on how to implement both interim and 
permanent interconnection policies (i.e., a non-binding model, or 
mandatory general or specific federal requirements), and tentatively 
concludes that the Commission has authority to adopt these approaches. 

[[Page 3645]]
The Notice also proposes compensation arrangements that should apply to 
interstate, interexchange traffic traversing interconnections between 
LECs and CMRS providers, which typically involve an interexchange 
carrier (IXC).

DATES: Comments are due on or before February 26, 1996 and Reply 
comments are due on or before March 12, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments should be sent to Office of the 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, NW, Room 
222, Washington, DC 20554, with a copy to Janice Myles of the Common 
Carrier Bureau, 1919 M Street, NW, Room 544, Washington, DC 20554. 
Parties should also file one copy of any documents filed in this docket 
with the Commission's copy contractor, International Transcription 
Services, Inc., 2100 M Street, NW, Suite 140, Washington, DC 20037. 
Comments and reply comments will be available for public inspection 
during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 1919 M 
Street, NW, Room 239, Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Sieradzki at (202) 418-1576 or 
Kathleen Franco at (202) 418-1932, Common Carrier Bureau, Policy and 
Program Planning Division.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking adopted December 15, 1995 and released January 
11, 1996 (FCC-95-505). The full text of this Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking is available for inspection and copying during normal 
business hours in the FCC Reference Center (Room 239), 1919 M St., NW, 
Washington, DC. The complete text also may be obtained through the 
World Wide Web, at http: //www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Notices/
fcc95505.wp, or may be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor, 
International Transcription Service, Inc., (202) 857-3800, 2100 M St., 
NW, Suite 140, Washington, DC 20037.

Synopsis of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

I. Introduction

A. Summary
    1. In this Notice, the Commission continues its examination of 
whether our policies related to interconnection between commercial 
mobile radio service (CMRS) providers and local exchange carriers 
(LECs) are sufficient to advance the public interest. We currently 
require LECs to offer interconnection to CMRS providers on reasonable 
terms and conditions, and to do so under the principle of mutual 
compensation. We have not, however, set specific limits on the price of 
such interconnection, nor have we required that interconnection 
agreements be filed with regulatory authorities or that interconnection 
be provided pursuant to tariff.
    2. We are concerned that existing general interconnection policies 
may not do enough to encourage the development of CMRS, especially in 
competition with LEC-provided wireline service. LECs unquestionably 
still possess substantial market power in the provision of local 
telecommunications services. If commercial mobile radio services, such 
as broadband personal communications services (PCS), cellular telephone 
services, satellite telephony, and interconnected specialized mobile 
radio (SMR) services, are to begin to compete directly against LEC 
wireline services, it is important that the prices, terms, and 
conditions of interconnection arrangements not serve to buttress LEC 
market power against erosion by competition.
    3. This Notice therefore considers the policy issues involved in 
establishing compensation arrangements for LEC-CMRS interconnection. We 
tentatively conclude that in order to ensure the continued development 
of wireless services as a potential competitor to LEC services, we 
should move expeditiously to adopt interim policies governing the rates 
charged for LEC-CMRS interconnection. We further tentatively conclude 
that, at least for an interim period, interconnection rates for local 
switching facilities and connections to end users should be priced on a 
``bill and keep'' basis (i.e., both the LEC and the CMRS provider 
charge a rate of zero for the termination of traffic), and that rates 
for dedicated transmission facilities connecting LEC and CMRS networks 
should be set based on existing access charges for similar transmission 
facilities. We seek comment on these tentative conclusions and on a 
number of alternative pricing options for LEC-CMRS interconnection 
arrangements. We also tentatively conclude that information about 
interconnection compensation arrangements should be made publicly 
available, and seek comment on what method to use to achieve this 
objective, such as tariffing, public disclosure, or some other 
approach. We also seek comment on how we should implement both interim 
and permanent interconnection policies (i.e., a non-binding model, or 
mandatory general or specific federal requirements), and we tentatively 
conclude that we have authority to adopt these approaches. In addition, 
we propose compensation arrangements that should apply to interstate, 
interexchange traffic traversing interconnections between LECs and CMRS 
providers, which typically involve an interexchange carrier (IXC).
B. Overview
    1. Goals. 4. In developing policies regarding LEC-CMRS 
interconnection, our overriding goal is to maximize the benefits of 
telecommunications for the American consumer and for American society 
as a whole. As with other areas of common carrier policy, we adopt 
policies that are intended to create or replicate market-based 
incentives and prices for both suppliers and consumers. By relying on 
market-based incentives and prices, where possible, and replicating 
them, where necessary, our policies have sought to ensure the 
availability to consumers of goods and services at the lowest overall 
cost. With the most efficient firms producing goods and services at the 
lowest cost, consumers benefit from lower prices. With consumers 
receiving cost-based pricing signals, they purchase communications 
goods and services only when they receive value greater than or equal 
to the cost of producing them. In general, reasonable and non-
discriminatory rates should give consumers incentives to purchase the 
combination of services that they most value. As a matter of long-term 
policy, functionally equivalent services--including services related to 
network interconnection--should be available to all classes of 
consumers at the same prices, unless there are cost differences or 
policy considerations that justify different rates. In addition, these 
policies, over time, should ensure an efficient level of innovation in 
terms of the development of new services and the deployment of new 
technology, as well as the efficient entry of new firms. Service 
providers should make optimal levels of investments in developing new 
technologies and new services, and consumers should receive the maximum 
benefit from their purchases of telecommunications services.
    5. Our policies also have sought to ensure and advance universal 
basic telephone service. For individual households, being connected to 
telecommunications networks--whether wireline LEC networks or wireless 
CMRS networks--facilitates access to emergency services, employment and 
educational opportunities, and social interaction. We recognize that 
not all the societal benefits accrue to the 

[[Page 3646]]
individual being connected with the network. Thus, we have pursued our 
mandate under the Communications Act by adopting specific programs 
designed to advance universal service in areas and for individuals 
where special needs exist.
    6. Our primary means for achieving these public interest goals has 
been competition. Competition drives prices toward cost: In a 
competitive market, rival service providers will have strong incentives 
to reduce their prices to attract customers until prices approach their 
costs. The cost-based prices achieved in competitive markets ensure 
optimal utilization of the network by consumers and give service 
providers accurate information regarding the benefits and costs of 
introducing new services and incentives for investing in technological 
innovations. In addition, competition gives producers strong incentives 
to stimulate demand and reduce costs. By forcing producers to minimize 
the per-unit costs of providing service, competition generally 
advances, rather than hinders, universal service. It increases the 
number of consumers willing and able to connect to the nation's 
telecommunications networks.
    7. Of course, full competition does not exist in many areas of 
telecommunications, and, because of the general benefits society 
derives from universal service, even full competition by itself may not 
be sufficient to further our public interest goals. In those 
circumstances, policymakers may need to intervene. Regulatory policies 
should be capable of implementation in a timely manner, cost-effective 
to both regulators and industry, and enforceable.
    2. Need for Reform. 8. The Communications Act provides that 
carriers shall offer interconnection when it is determined to be in the 
public interest. The ability to interconnect has become more important 
because today telecommunications is increasingly provided by a system 
of independent, interconnected networks, often referred to as a 
``network of networks.'' In this environment, the ability of 
communications to move seamlessly from one network to another is 
becoming increasingly vital. Uneconomic and unnecessary barriers to the 
flow of communications between the increasing number of diverse 
networks would seriously undermine the benefits of telecommunications 
to consumers and the American economy and would impede the development 
of competition between network providers.
    9. Efficient interconnection with LEC networks, which reach, on a 
nationwide basis, 93.8% of all households, benefits both subscribers 
and providers of services. First, interconnection enables new providers 
to compete with incumbent LECs on the basis of the services they offer 
the public and the prices, quality, and features of those services. In 
the complete absence of interconnection, prospective new entrants would 
have to attract enough capital to build and provide origination, 
transport, and termination services for an entire geographic area, such 
as a metropolitan area. Second, interconnection allows subscribers of 
one network to obtain access to subscribers of all other interconnected 
networks. In a market with multiple and possibly competing networks, it 
is unlikely that all people would subscribe to all networks. Thus, 
without interconnection, subscribers to one network may be unable to 
reach people who subscribe only to some other network.
    10. The availability of interconnection cannot, however, be 
divorced from its price. Interconnection that is priced too high can be 
the marketplace equivalent of no interconnection. An interconnection 
obligation is undermined if the charges imposed for interconnection are 
excessive, and society will not enjoy the benefits described above. On 
the other hand, if interconnection is available at an unreasonably low 
price, service providers that otherwise may have built their own 
facilities to serve part of a LEC's service territory in competition 
with the LEC may decline to do so. Facilities-based competition can 
confer benefits on customers such as lower prices, accelerated 
innovation, and deployment of new technologies. Interconnection at 
efficient prices should lead to the highest and best use of the 
existing telecommunications infrastructure, as well as the expansion of 
this infrastructure, because proper pricing will send economically 
efficient signals to firms to decide whether the costs of 
interconnection in a particular case are less than or greater than the 
benefits of interconnection.
    11. In the absence of market power or other distortions, efficient 
forms of interconnection may develop through private negotiation. For 
example, small interexchange carriers interconnect with one another, 
and purchase and resell one another's services, with little or no 
outside involvement. Similarly, Internet service providers have 
developed interconnection arrangements without intervention by outside 
parties.
    12. LECs, however, unquestionably still possess substantial market 
power in the provision of local telecommunications services. Thus, a 
LEC may have the incentive and the ability to prevent or reduce the 
demand for interconnection with a prospective local competitor, such as 
a CMRS provider, below the efficient level by denying interconnection 
or setting interconnection rates at excessive levels. Such abuse of 
market power could lead to at least two problems. First, a LEC may 
extract monopoly rents for interconnection. Excessive prices for 
termination of CMRS-originated traffic would lead to retail prices 
(charged to CMRS customers) that are above the efficient level and thus 
discourage CMRS customers from placing calls to wireline customers that 
would be made if LEC interconnection rates were set at efficient 
levels. Second, a LEC may attempt to restrict the entry of potential 
competitors. To the extent that certain CMRS providers are potential 
competitors to a LEC's local telephone service, or to the extent that a 
LEC may wish to provide certain wireless services, a LEC may have an 
incentive to withhold interconnection from some CMRS providers. Even 
where interconnection is mandated, a LEC still could potentially 
restrict entry either by setting the interconnection rates 
prohibitively high or by specifying technical requirements for 
interconnection that are disadvantageous for the connecting network.
    13. Another potential problem is that a LEC and an interconnecting 
CMRS provider may have the incentive and the ability to engage in 
collusive behavior. If the CMRS provider constitutes a substitute for 
the LEC network, the two networks could negotiate a high per minute 
charge to terminate each other's traffic as a means of giving each 
incentives to charge customers supra-competitive rates for local 
exchange service. It may be particularly likely that such collusive 
behavior could occur in cases where the CMRS provider is an affiliate 
of the LEC. Negotiation of interconnection arrangements could be used 
as a vehicle to keep the retail price of their respective retail 
services uneconomically high at the expense of customers. Depending on 
market structure developments, intervention may be necessary to prevent 
such outcomes.
    14. As set forth below, we have recognized LEC market power by 
requiring that LECs interconnect with CMRS providers. Under our rules, 
LECs must negotiate in good faith to provide the type of 
interconnection arrangement desired by CMRS providers under the 
principle of mutual compensation, and to furnish interconnection for 
interstate 

[[Page 3647]]
traffic at reasonable and non-discriminatory rates. In response to an 
earlier Notice relating to CMRS interconnection issues, many commenters 
strongly argued, however, that our current policy can be and is being 
used by LECs to reduce competition. LECs typically terminate many more 
calls that originate from the cellular network than an interconnecting 
cellular network terminates LEC-originated calls. This is due, in part, 
to cellular customers' reluctance to give out their wireless telephone 
numbers (since they generally are charged for incoming calls), charges 
for cellular air time, or technical limitations on cellular telephones 
(e.g., limited battery life). Because of this imbalance, LECs clearly 
would benefit competitively from maintaining high, even if symmetrical, 
interconnection charges. With the growing significance of 
interconnection and competition in today's telecommunications 
environment, we believe that a reexamination of our policies addressing 
compensation arrangements for LEC-CMRS interconnection is essential.

II. Compensation for Interconnected Traffic Between LECS and CMRS 
Providers' Networks

A. Compensation Arrangements
    1. Existing Compensation Arrangements. 15. According to the 
comments received in this proceeding, at present, cellular carriers 
typically pay LECs three types of usage-sensitive charges for local 
calls from cellular subscribers to LEC subscribers, regardless of the 
physical interconnection facility used: (1) Per-call charges for call 
set-up; (2) per-minute charges for usage; and (3) per-minute, per-mile 
charges for transport between the cellular carrier's mobile telephone 
switching office (MTSO) and the LEC's tandem or end-office switch. Some 
cellular carriers contend that, notwithstanding our mutual compensation 
requirement, they typically are forced to pay LECs these charges for 
calls originating from cellular customers and terminating to LEC 
wireline customers, as well as for calls originating from LEC customers 
and terminating to cellular customers. Commenters also submit that, 
typically, substantially more traffic flows from cellular carriers to 
LECs than vice versa. This may be due to cellular customers' reluctance 
to give out their wireless telephone numbers, because of charges for 
cellular air time, technical limitations on cellular telephones (e.g., 
limited battery life), or other factors. On the other hand, for 
services such as paging, most (or all) of the interconnected traffic 
flows from LECs to CMRS providers, rather than vice versa, because most 
pager devices are incapable of originating calls.
    16. We invite commenting parties to provide more detailed 
information about existing LEC-CMRS interconnection arrangements. 
Specifically, we are interested in data regarding the rate structures 
and price levels in those arrangements. We also request comment on what 
facilities and technical arrangements are used in providing LEC-CMRS 
interconnection, what rate elements are applicable to providing the 
services, and the functions that are associated with each rate element. 
To what extent are these arrangements filed in tariffs before state 
commissions, or are otherwise publicly disclosed? To what extent do 
these arrangements make use of provisions in FCC tariffs? We also seek 
comment on the extent of, and reasons for, the imbalance of traffic 
flowing between LECs and CMRS providers. Are traffic flows likely to be 
more balanced in the future for existing commercial mobile radio 
services or new services such as PCS? Do LECs' current charges/tariffs 
differ depending on the flow of traffic? We also invite parties to 
submit data on the extent to which existing LEC-CMRS interconnection 
arrangements involve both interstate and intrastate traffic. In 
particular, we seek empirical data and analysis on the extent to which 
significant levels of interstate wireless traffic are being carried 
under such arrangements. We also seek comment on the extent to which 
our mutual compensation requirement is not being observed in the 
marketplace.
    2. General Pricing Principles. a. Rate Structure. 17. In general, 
we believe that costs should be recovered in a manner that reflects the 
way they are incurred. Network providers incur costs in providing two 
broad categories of facilities, dedicated and shared. Dedicated 
facilities are those that are used by a single party--either an end 
user or an interconnecting network. Shared facilities are those that 
are used by multiple parties. Shared facilities can be further divided 
into two sub-categories, those that need to be augmented to increase 
the network's capacity and those that need not. In the first such sub-
category are facilities, such as switches and multiplexing electronics, 
for which incremental investments can increase the volume of traffic 
that the network can handle during peak periods. In the second such 
sub-category are facilities, such as telephone poles and buildings that 
house equipment, whose capacity will not restrict the volume of traffic 
that the network can handle during peak periods.
    18. The cost of a dedicated facility can be attributed directly to 
the party ordering the service that uses that facility. To the extent 
that the benefits of a dedicated facility accrue to the party to whom 
it is dedicated, it is efficient for that party to pay charges that 
recover the full cost of the facility. To ensure that the party pays 
the full fixed cost of the facility, the cost should be recovered on a 
non-traffic sensitive (NTS) basis (i.e., without regard to actual 
usage). Charging a flat, cost-based rate ensures that a customer will 
pay the full fixed cost of the facility, and no more; this ensures that 
the customer will, for example, add additional lines if and only if the 
customer believes that the benefits of the additional lines will exceed 
their cost. An additional advantage of a flat fee is that it does not 
distort usage. The alternative, a usage-based charge, would cause 
parties with high traffic volumes to overpay (i.e., pay more than the 
fixed cost of the facility), while parties with low traffic volumes 
would underpay (i.e., pay less than the fixed cost of the facility). In 
addition, a usage-based charge would give all parties an uneconomic 
incentive to reduce their traffic volumes or to avoid connecting with 
networks that impose such charges. It would also give parties with low 
volumes of traffic, who face below-cost prices, an incentive to add 
lines that they valued below their cost.
    19. The costs of shared facilities whose cost varies with capacity, 
such as network switching, should be recovered in a manner that 
efficiently apportions costs among users. Since the cost of capacity is 
a function of the volume of traffic the facilities are able to handle 
during peak load periods, we believe, as a matter of economic theory, 
that network capacity costs should primarily be recovered through 
traffic-sensitive (TS) rates charged for peak period traffic, with 
lower rates for non-peak usage. The peak load price should be designed 
to recover at least the cost of the incremental network capacity added 
to carry peak period traffic. Pricing traffic during peak periods based 
on the cost of the incremental capacity needed to handle additional 
traffic is economically efficient because additional traffic will be 
placed on the network if and only if the user or interconnecting 
network is willing to pay the cost of the incremental network capacity 
required to handle this additional traffic. Such pricing also ensures 
that a call made during the peak period generates enough revenue to 

[[Page 3648]]
cover the cost of the facilities expansion it requires, and it thus 
gives carriers an incentive to expand and develop the network 
efficiently. In contrast, off-peak traffic imposes relatively little 
additional cost because it does not require any incremental capacity to 
be added, and consequently, the price for carrying off-peak traffic 
should be lower.
    20. We recognize that there may be practical problems in 
implementing a peak sensitive pricing system. For example, different 
parts of a given provider's network may experience peak traffic volumes 
at different times (e.g., in LEC networks, business districts may 
experience their peak period between 10 and 11 a.m., while suburban 
areas may have their peak periods between 7 and 8 p.m.). Moreover, peak 
periods may change over time. For instance, charging different prices 
for calls made during different parts of the day may cause some 
customers to shift their calling to the less expensive time periods, 
which could potentially shift the peak or create new peaks. We seek 
comment on whether a system with a long peak period (e.g., 8 a.m. to 9 
p.m.) and with peak and off-peak rates that reflect both the difference 
in costs across these periods and customers' propensity to substitute 
across time periods would improve the utilization rates of the network 
and would be administratively simple. We seek comment on this analysis, 
and on possible methods for implementing peak-load pricing or other 
schemes to recover shared network capacity costs. We also seek comment 
on possible administrative costs associated with peak-load pricing or 
other schemes to recover shared network capacity costs.
    21.There are also certain shared facilities, such as land, 
buildings, and telephone poles, whose costs do not vary with capacity 
(or peak period traffic volumes). As we discuss in the following 
section on rate levels, there are theoretical and practical problems 
associated with recovering these shared costs and overheads. We seek 
comment on how these costs should be recovered and, in particular, on 
whether they should be recovered entirely through peak rate charges, or 
through off-peak rates as well. Finally, we note that a carrier may 
incur varying costs to provide a given service in different geographic 
areas. We seek comment on how this should be taken into account.
    b. Rate Levels. (1) Long Run Incremental Costs. 22. The long run 
incremental cost (LRIC) of a service is the theoretical foundation for 
efficient pricing of interconnection and other network services. 
Economists generally agree that prices based on LRIC reflect the true 
economic cost of a service and give appropriate signals to producers 
and consumers and ensure efficient entry and utilization of the 
telecommunications infrastructure. Since customers will buy a good only 
if the benefit to the customer exceeds the price, prices based on LRIC 
ensure that customers purchase a good only when the benefit exceeds the 
cost. Similarly, since firms will offer a service when the revenue 
exceeds the cost, prices based on LRIC ensure a firm has an incentive 
to offer a service when customers' willingness to pay for the service 
exceeds the cost of providing it.
    23. Pricing at LRIC raises some difficulties, however. First, 
attempting to determine the LRIC of a specific service for a particular 
LEC is likely to raise significant practical and administrative 
problems. In addition, given that services are provided over shared 
facilities and there are economies of scale and scope, setting the 
price of each discrete service based on the LRIC of that service will 
not recover the total costs of the network. Similarly, where 
technological developments are reducing the costs of providing service, 
setting the price of discrete services equal to the forward-looking 
LRIC of each service is not likely to recover the historical, embedded 
costs of the network (or the interstate share of such costs assigned by 
our Part 36 separations rules). We seek comment on the empirical 
magnitude of these cost differentials.
    (2) Recovering Costs in Excess of Long Run Incremental Costs. 24. 
The fact that pricing based on the LRIC of specific services may not 
cover all common costs raises difficult issues for pricing 
interconnection. In particular, this problem means that, if all costs 
are to be recovered, some services must be priced above LRIC, which 
will cause some distortions. It is therefore necessary to consider 
whether terminating carriers should be allowed to recover such costs in 
excess of LRIC, and if so, to address the method of recovering such 
costs that would minimize economic distortions and best advance our 
goals. We seek comment on how best to deal with this recovery issue 
and, in particular, on the following approaches.
    25. One approach would be to allow carriers to set LEC-CMRS 
interconnection rates equal to the LRIC of the individual services 
associated with interconnection, and to recover common costs by having 
the rates for other services, such as vertical calling features (e.g., 
call waiting, call forwarding, or caller ID), exceed LRIC. This would 
clearly benefit those CMRS and LEC networks that seek to interconnect 
with one another's network. We seek comment on whether, and on what 
basis, LEC-CMRS interconnection offerings should be treated differently 
from a carrier's other service offerings, which generally are priced to 
recover some portion of shared costs and overheads.
    26. Another approach would be to allocate shared costs and overhead 
among services in an inverse relationship to the sensitivity of demand 
for each of the services. Under this ``Ramsey rule,'' a higher 
percentage of shared costs and overheads would be allocated to services 
for which the quantity demanded declines less as the price increases, 
than to services for which demand is more sensitive to changes in 
price. In theory, this approach has the advantage that it efficiently 
minimizes reductions in the quantities of services demanded due to 
prices above LRIC. While demand sensitivity is clearly relevant to 
setting efficient prices, there is some concern about how Ramsey 
principles should be applied to markets subject to actual or potential 
competition. We recognize that Ramsey pricing principles were developed 
in the context of a regulated monopoly and not for markets subject to 
existing or potential competition. We seek comment on whether such an 
approach is desirable for markets in which competition is developing. 
We also seek comment on whether such a pricing rule is in the public 
interest, given that it may result in imposing the greatest burdens on 
those customers who have the fewest alternatives.
    27. A third commonly employed alternative would be to allocate 
shared costs and overheads among all services based on some specified 
allocator. For example, shared costs and overheads could be allocated 
among services uniformly in proportion to each service's LRIC or direct 
costs, or could be apportioned based on some measure of usage. The 
advantages of these allocators are that they are relatively simple to 
administer and result in full recovery of all shared and overhead 
costs. A principal drawback of this approach, however, is that it may 
have undesirable effects on demand for particular services. More 
specifically, such allocators do not minimize the distortions in demand 
caused by divergences between price and LRIC, and may induce 
inefficient investment by incumbents and entrants. In addition, or in 
the alternative, we could limit the permissible overhead loading factor 
a LEC could collect from an interconnecting CMRS provider to the 
overhead loading factor that the LEC 

[[Page 3649]]
uses for some comparable service or services that compete with CMRS 
offerings.
    28. A fourth approach would be to allow incumbent carriers such as 
LECs to employ the ``efficient component pricing rule'' (ECPR) proposed 
by economist William Baumol and others. Under this approach, an 
incumbent carrier that sells an essential input service, such as 
interconnection, to a competing network would set the price of that 
input service equal to ``the input's direct per-unit incremental cost 
plus the opportunity cost to the input supplier of the sale of a unit 
of input.'' The ECPR essentially guarantees that the incumbent will 
recover not only all of its overheads, but also any profits that it 
would otherwise forego due to the entry of the competitor. Proponents 
of the ECPR argue that the ECPR creates an incentive for services to be 
provided by the least-cost provider and that it makes the incumbent 
indifferent between selling an input service to a competitor or a final 
service to an end user. Critics, however, have shown that these 
properties only hold in special circumstances. On the other hand, some 
express concern that the ECPR may inhibit beneficial entry. In 
addition, because the ECPR would permit an incumbent carrier to recover 
its opportunity costs, including any monopoly profits in the sale of 
the final service, the use of this rule may prevent competitive entry 
from driving prices towards competitive levels. These arguments cast 
significant doubts on claims that the rule will yield efficient 
outcomes. Finally, as an administrative matter, it would be difficult 
for a regulatory agency to determine the actual level of a carrier's 
opportunity cost.
    29. Finally, we might adopt an approach that permits a range of 
permissible rates (and implicitly of overhead allocations). We note, 
for example, that the Commission has repeatedly expressed concern about 
preventing cross-subsidies. Some economists have defined the following 
alternative tests for cross-subsidy: (1) The price of each individual 
service, and of any group of services, must be less than the stand-
alone cost of that service (i.e., the cost of providing that service 
alone but no other services); or (2) the revenue from each service and 
from all subsets of services must exceed the incremental cost of the 
service or the subset of services. According to these definitions, if 
either of the two tests is satisfied, there is no cross-subsidy. This 
test effectively requires that the revenues generated by any group of 
services that share a common facility recover at least the incremental 
cost of that facility. We seek comment on this theory, and on whether 
it reduces the range of acceptable prices, and hence, implicitly, the 
range of acceptable allocation schemes.
    30. We seek comment on the foregoing approaches to determining rate 
levels, how they might apply in the context of LEC-CMRS 
interconnection, the extent to which they are administratively 
feasible, and how they will affect rates for other services including 
intrastate services. We also seek comment on how these LEC-CMRS 
interconnection rate levels could affect telecommunications network 
subscribership and universal service. We also ask parties to address 
the extent to which these approaches could be implemented in the 
context of the specific pricing options discussed in the following 
section.
    c. Practical Considerations Regarding Cost-Based Pricing. 31. LEC-
CMRS interconnection rates could be based on a specific demonstration 
of the costs of providing service, much as we do for establishing rates 
for new services under our price cap rules. The new services test 
requires price cap LECs to demonstrate that the rates for a new service 
recover the direct costs of that service plus a reasonable share of 
overhead loadings. We seek comment on whether we should provide 
guidance with respect to such a cost showing similar to our 
interpretation of the new services test in Telephone Company-Cable 
Television Cross Ownership Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Reconsideration, 59 FR 63909 (December 12, 1994) (Video Dialtone 
Reconsideration Order). In addition, we seek comment on how we should 
deal with overhead loadings and whether we should employ any of the 
alternative approaches discussed in the previous section. We also note 
that similar cost justification requirements could be enforced by state 
commissions.
    32. The approaches described in the preceding paragraph have a 
number of advantages, in that they result, at least in theory, in cost-
based rates for particular services. On the other hand, these 
approaches have the disadvantage, typically, of requiring contentious, 
and time-consuming administrative proceedings to resolve the complex 
issues raised by cost studies.
    3. Pricing Options. a. Interim Approach. 33. Any significant delays 
in the resolution of issues related to LEC-CMRS interconnection 
compensation arrangements, combined with the possibility that LECs 
could use their market power to stymie the ability of CMRS providers to 
interconnect (and may have incentives to do so), could adversely affect 
the public interest. We tentatively conclude that it will better serve 
the public interest to give providers some degree of certainty, within 
a short time, that reasonable interconnection arrangements will be 
available. Some of the alternatives described below may approximate the 
results of cost studies, and thus provide most of the advantages of the 
theoretical model described above, but avoid the main disadvantages--
administrative costs and delays.
    34. Accordingly, we tentatively conclude that an interim pricing 
approach should be adopted that could be implemented relatively quickly 
and with minimal administrative burdens on CMRS providers, LECs, and 
regulators. We plan to move forward expeditiously so as to have an 
interim pricing approach in place in the near term. Below, we discuss 
our tentative conclusion that a bill and keep approach (zero rate for 
termination of traffic) should apply with respect to local switching 
facilities and connections to end users, with the exception of 
dedicated transmission facilities linking the two networks. We also set 
out a number of alternative approaches. Our preferred approach or the 
alternative options could be adopted as interim solutions for some 
limited period of time. We seek comment on whether such an approach 
should apply for a prescribed time period, whether months or years, or 
until the occurrence of a specific triggering event. With respect to 
our preferred approach and each of the alternative options discussed 
below, we ask parties to address whether some combination of these 
options should be made available, and on the implementation costs for 
carriers, as well as the speed with which such options could be 
implemented. In particular, we seek comment on the extent to which 
modifications would be required in the network to implement such 
options (e.g., to collect information necessary for billing and 
collection), the cost of such modifications, and who should bear such 
costs. We also solicit parties' analysis of the relevant administrative 
burdens on the Commission caused by the various options, and the ease 
with which these options can be enforced. Finally, we seek comment on 
any changes to our approaches that would be necessary or advisable if 
LECs and CMRS providers were to change current arrangements for 
recovering costs from end users.
    (1) Tentative Conclusions. 35. Bill and Keep. We tentatively 
conclude that a ``bill and keep'' arrangement represents the best 
interim solution with respect to 

[[Page 3650]]
terminating access from LEC end offices to LEC end-user subscribers, 
and with respect to terminating access from equivalent CMRS facilities 
to CMRS subscribers. Under bill and keep arrangements, neither of the 
interconnecting networks charges the other network for terminating the 
traffic that originated on the other network, and hence the terminating 
compensation rate on a usage basis is zero. Instead, each network 
recovers from its own end-users the cost of both originating traffic 
delivered to the other network and terminating traffic received from 
the other network. Bill and keep arrangements yield results that are 
equivalent to the networks charging one another incremental cost-based 
rates for shared network facilities if the incremental cost of using 
such facilities is equal to (or approximates) zero for both networks. 
We note that several states, including California, Connecticut, Texas 
and Pennsylvania, have implemented bill and keep arrangements, at least 
on an interim basis. We tentatively conclude that, as an interim 
solution, such bill and keep arrangements should cover both peak and 
off-peak time periods.
    36. Bill and keep arrangements appear to have a number of 
advantages, especially as an interim solution. First, such arrangements 
are administratively simple and would require the development of no new 
billing or accounting systems. Second, the bill and keep approach 
prevents incumbent LECs that possess market power from charging 
excessively high interconnection rates. Third, according to proponents, 
a bill and keep approach is economically efficient if either of two 
conditions are met: (1) Traffic is balanced in each direction, or (2) 
actual interconnection costs are so low that there is little difference 
between a cost-based rate and a zero rate. Proponents of bill and keep 
submit that condition (2) is satisfied in the case of LEC-CMRS 
interconnection because they allege that the average incremental cost 
of local termination on LEC networks is approximately 0.2 cents per 
minute.
    37. In view of these advantages, we tentatively conclude that, for 
terminating access between the end office (or equivalent CMRS 
facilities) and the end-user subscriber, a bill and keep arrangement 
applied to both peak and off-peak periods represents the best interim 
solution. We also tentatively conclude that a requirement that LECs and 
CMRS providers not charge one another for terminating traffic from the 
other network would not violate any party's legal rights. Specifically, 
we believe that a bill and keep requirement would not deprive either 
LECs or CMRS providers of a reasonable opportunity to recover costs 
they incurred to terminate traffic from the other's network, because 
these costs could be recovered from their own subscribers. We seek 
comment on these tentative conclusions. We also seek comment on the 
effect that a bill and keep approach is likely to have on traffic flows 
between LEC and CMRS networks: is this approach likely to lead to more 
balanced traffic flows, or will it create incentives to perpetuate or 
exacerbate existing traffic imbalances between LEC and CMRS networks?
    38. Transport Costs between the CMRS and LEC Networks. The analysis 
of bill and keep presented in comments by Dr. Gerald W. Brock, Director 
of the Graduate Telecommunications Program, George Washington 
University, appears not to consider the costs associated with the 
physical transmission circuits connecting CMRS MTSOs with LEC end 
offices. Transmitting calls between CMRS and LEC networks can be 
accomplished through the use of dedicated facilities between CMRS MTSOs 
and LEC end offices, or through dedicated facilities between CMRS MTSOs 
and LEC tandem switches. When tandem switches are used, additional 
tandem-switched transport, consisting of tandem switching and 
transmission over common transport facilities, is used to transmit 
traffic between LEC tandem switches and LEC end offices. These 
facilities are generally provided by LECs. With respect to dedicated 
transport facilities, cost-causation principles suggest that the costs 
of such facilities be recovered from the cost-causer through flat 
rates. With respect to shared facilities used to provide tandem-
switched transport, cost-causation principles suggest traffic-sensitive 
cost recovery, at least during peak periods.
    39. LECs' existing interstate access tariffs include flat rates for 
dedicated transport (entrance facilities and direct-trunked transport) 
that we have concluded, in general, are reasonably cost-based. Similar 
charges are included in many LEC intrastate access tariffs. These 
tariffed charges could be applied to CMRS providers relatively rapidly, 
with virtually no additional administrative proceedings. Moreover, we 
believe that the dedicated transport facilities used to connect LEC and 
IXC networks are similar or identical to the facilities connecting LEC 
and CMRS networks. Accordingly, we tentatively conclude that, when LECs 
provide the dedicated transmission facilities between CMRS MTSOs and 
LEC networks, they should be able to recover the costs of those 
facilities from CMRS providers through appropriate dedicated transport 
rates found in their existing access tariffs. We seek comment on this 
tentative conclusion.
    40. We also seek comment on whether and how LECs should recover 
from CMRS providers the costs of tandem switching and common transport 
between tandem switches and end offices, in cases where such LEC-
provided facilities are used. The LECs' interstate access tariffs 
include usage-sensitive charges for tandem-switched transport, as do 
many state tariffs. Should these tandem-switched transport charges be 
applied to CMRS providers? Should such charges apply to all minutes, or 
only to traffic during peak periods?
    (2) Other Options. 41. While we tentatively conclude that the 
proposals outlined above would lead to LEC-CMRS interconnection 
arrangements that best serve our public interest objectives during an 
interim period, we also seek comment on a number of alternative 
approaches. We seek comment on the relative costs and benefits of our 
proposals and these options. We also invite parties to suggest other 
alternatives or combinations of these options that would advance our 
public interest objectives and that could be implemented rapidly and 
with minimal administrative costs.
    42. Bill and Keep for Off-Peak Usage Only. Brock acknowledges that 
``[i]f interconnection charges are imposed, they should be assessed at 
the long run incremental cost of adding capacity.'' He also 
acknowledges that ``the true cost for peak period usage is much greater 
than the cost for off peak usage * * * (which) may be near zero,'' and 
that the cost for peak period usage is much higher than the average 
incremental cost of local usage, which he estimates to be 0.2 cents 
($0.002) per minute. In light of Brock's comments, we seek comment on 
whether a bill and keep approach should be limited to off-peak traffic, 
with charges assessed for peak-period traffic. We seek comment on what 
charges should apply for peak period traffic under this approach. For 
instance, we seek comment on whether some subset of existing access 
charges should apply, or whether an incremental capacity cost for peak-
period traffic should be developed. We also seek comment on the peak 
periods for both LEC and CMRS networks, and the appropriate period for 
a peak capacity charge. In addition, we seek comment on whether 
charging different prices for peak and off-peak traffic has any 
disadvantages and whether it is 

[[Page 3651]]
likely to result in a shift in the peak period. In addition, we seek 
comment on the potential administrative costs and complexity involved 
in this approach.
    43. Subset of Access Charges. To the extent that LEC-CMRS 
interconnection arrangements are similar to the interconnection 
arrangements between LECs and IXCs or other access customers, the rates 
for LEC-CMRS interconnection could be based on a subset of the LECs' 
existing interstate access charges (or comparable rates from their 
intrastate access tariffs). As noted above, LECs could charge existing 
local transport rates for the transmission facilities that they provide 
to link LEC and CMRS networks. Similarly, LECs could charge CMRS 
providers existing local switching rates for minutes of use originating 
on CMRS networks and terminating on LEC networks. We do not envision 
that the LECs would charge CMRS providers the carrier common line (CCL) 
charge. The CCL charge, in essence, represents a subsidy from LECs' 
interstate access customers to reduce the subscriber line charges (SLC) 
paid by end-user subscribers for loop facilities that are dedicated to 
their use. We do not believe that such a subsidy should be imposed on 
CMRS providers. Under this alternative, we are also inclined not to 
permit LECs to charge CMRS providers the transport interconnection 
charge (TIC), given that the extent to which the TIC recovers 
transport-related costs is unclear. We seek comment on what subset of 
access charges should apply if we select this option as an interim 
compensation mechanism. We also seek comment on whether per-minute 
access charges should be converted into peak-sensitive capacity charges 
(either per-peak minute or flat-rate) in the context of LEC-CMRS 
interconnection, and, if so, on how to do so. In addition, we seek 
comment on whether the LECs' access charges would be an appropriate 
framework for LEC-CMRS interconnection once our Access Reform 
proceeding is completed.
    44. Existing Interconnection Arrangements Between Neighboring LECs. 
In the alternative, LEC-CMRS interconnection arrangements could be 
based on existing arrangements between neighboring LECs. We seek 
comment on whether LECs should be required to disclose publicly the 
terms of their interconnection arrangements with neighboring LECs and 
to offer CMRS providers comparable arrangements. This option could help 
ensure that CMRS providers receive interconnection on terms and 
conditions that are at least as favorable as neighboring LECs. 
Neighboring LECs generally are larger and more established than CMRS 
providers and thus more likely to have been able to negotiate 
reasonable interconnection arrangements. We ask parties for comment on 
this option. In particular, we ask parties to describe existing 
arrangements between neighboring LECs and to comment on whether these 
arrangements would be workable in the context of other forms of LEC-
CMRS interconnection.
    45. Existing Interconnection Arrangements Between LECs and Cellular 
Carriers. Another possibility would be to apply the same rates, terms, 
and conditions in existing LEC-cellular interconnection arrangements to 
broadband PCS providers, or to other categories of CMRS providers. Like 
the previous option, this option could help ensure that CMRS providers 
would receive interconnection on terms and conditions that are at least 
as favorable as cellular carriers. We seek comment on whether cellular 
carriers, like neighboring LECs, are better established than broadband 
PCS providers and thus are more likely to have negotiated reasonable 
interconnection arrangements. We ask the parties to describe existing 
interconnection arrangements between LECs and cellular carriers and to 
comment on whether these arrangements could be extended to other forms 
of LEC-CMRS interconnection.
    46. Intrastate Interconnection Arrangements Between LECs and New 
Entrants. In a few states, LECs have filed tariffs providing for 
interconnection arrangements with competing wireline providers of local 
exchange service. We invite parties to comment on the various state 
approaches, such as those in Illinois, Michigan, Maryland, and 
California, in particular on whether CMRS providers should be eligible 
for these offerings or whether there is any technical or economic basis 
for distinguishing CMRS from wireline interconnection. We also ask 
parties to provide us with other relevant information about state 
regulations in this area, and to comment on the extent to which state 
actions in wireline-wireless interconnection may serve as a model for 
LEC-CMRS interconnection. We note that, as part of broader initiatives 
to remove the statutory or regulatory barriers to entry into the local 
telephone market, several states have initiated proceedings, and in 
some cases adopted interim or permanent rules, governing 
interconnection arrangements between LECs and competing local carriers. 
We ask parties to comment on these state regulations and on the 
relative costs and benefits of various approaches states have taken in 
this area.
    47. Measured Local Service Rates. With respect to rates that 
recover the costs of shared facilities whose costs vary in proportion 
to capacity, we seek comment on whether interconnection rates should be 
set at some fixed percentage of the measured local service rates that 
LECs currently charge their local customers. For example, if a LEC 
currently charges its own measured local service customers 5 cents per 
minute, it could charge an interconnecting CMRS provider half that 
amount--2.5 cents per minute. This option essentially would assume that 
the existing measured service rates are cost-based, and that the LEC's 
cost in terminating a call placed by a CMRS customer is one-half (or 
some other percentage) of the cost of both originating and terminating 
a call placed by a LEC customer to another LEC customer. Under a 
variant of this option, if a LEC does not offer measured local service, 
or if few LEC customers select such service, an imputed per-minute rate 
could be derived by dividing the LEC's monthly local service rate by 
the average customer's number of local minutes originated per month. 
Both the basic option and the variant discussed here have the appeal of 
facilitating competition between CMRS providers and LECs, by ensuring 
that CMRS providers never pay more for interconnection than LECs charge 
for a complete call. A disadvantage of these options is that they would 
not necessarily result in cost-based interconnection rates.
    48. Uniform Rate. We also seek comment on whether a presumptive 
uniform per-minute interconnection rate should be established for all 
LECs and CMRS providers. Such a rate could be developed from generic, 
forward-looking studies of LEC network costs. We invite parties to 
submit any such studies into the record of this proceeding. A second 
option would be to develop such a rate based on one or more (or an 
average) of the state policy decisions cited in the preceding 
paragraph. Interconnection rates that have been ordered or accepted by 
state commissions range between 0.5 cents to 2.4 cents per minute, with 
a median of around one cent per minute. A third possibility would be to 
set such a uniform rate based on the average level of LECs' interstate 
access charges. For example, the per minute rate for terminating 
traffic interconnected at an end-office (exclusive of flat-rate charges 
for circuits connecting LEC and CMRS networks and per-minute charges 
for tandem switched transport) could be set 

[[Page 3652]]
based on the average level of LECs' interstate local switching charges, 
but not transport interconnection charges or carrier common line 
charges. We seek comment on the advantages and disadvantages of 
establishing a uniform interconnection rate level, whether establishing 
such a uniform rate would be lawful, the basis on which such a rate 
might be set, and the practical problems of implementing such a rate 
scheme. We also seek comment on whether such a rate, instead of being a 
presumptively lawful rate, should be a prescription, and on what 
showing a carrier would need to make to charge a different rate. In the 
alternative, we seek comment on whether carriers should apply different 
interconnection rate levels in different geographic areas that they 
serve.
    49. Bill and Keep Until a Satisfactory Rate Is Developed. Finally, 
we seek comment on whether a bill and keep arrangement should be 
imposed on a LEC pending the negotiation of a satisfactory 
interconnection arrangement between the LEC and a CMRS provider or the 
approval of other cost based charges. If the negotiations were to break 
down, a reasonable basis for resolving the dispute might be the 
imposition of a rate equal to the lowest of: (1) Existing 
interconnection arrangements between the LEC and neighboring LECs; (2) 
intrastate interconnection arrangements between the LEC and new 
entrants; or (3) a subset of LEC interstate access charges for 
terminating traffic. A LEC would be allowed, however, to demonstrate 
that the lowest of the charges described above does not provide the LEC 
with a reasonable opportunity to recover all the costs incurred in 
terminating CMRS traffic on the local landline network, and some 
overhead costs. This approach would preserve the primary role of 
negotiations between the parties in reaching interconnection 
arrangements, but would limit the LEC's ability to exercise its market 
power, while simultaneously creating an incentive for it to negotiate a 
satisfactory rate expeditiously. We also seek comment on whether CMRS 
providers would have an incentive to negotiate under this approach.
    b. Long Term Approach. 50. We seek comment on what the long-term 
approach to interconnection pricing should be, whether one of the 
interim options outlined above should be the permanent methodology, or 
whether interconnection rates should be based on a specific 
demonstration of the cost of providing service, much as we require for 
establishing rates for new services under our price cap rules. We 
believe that, in the long term, pro-competitive LEC-CMRS 
interconnection arrangements should be developed that advance our 
public interest objectives. First, these arrangements should give 
efficient incentives regarding both consumption and investment in 
telecommunications services. To this end, prices should be reasonably 
cost-based. Cost-based prices could be derived through cost studies, or 
could be based on potentially reasonable proxies in lieu of developing 
rates based on complete cost justifications, possibly including one or 
more of the interim approaches described above. Moreover, over time, we 
believe that price cap regulation and increasing competition will force 
interconnection rates toward cost. Ultimately, markets may become 
sufficiently competitive that cost-based interconnection prices should 
result without any regulatory intervention.
    51. Second, functionally equivalent forms of network 
interconnection arguably should be available to all types of networks 
at the same prices, unless there are cost differences or other policy 
considerations that justify different rates. Thus, in the long run, if 
LECs provide essentially similar interconnection services to CMRS 
providers and to IXCs, then it may well be in the public interest for 
the rates in LEC-CMRS interconnection arrangements not to differ from 
the rates for LEC-IXC interconnection--i.e., access charges. We 
acknowledge, however, that there may be significant reasons, including 
our interest in facilitating the competitive development of CMRS and 
considerations relating to the Part 36 jurisdictional separations 
rules, that may necessitate differences in regulatory regimes. We also 
recognize that current interstate access charges are problematic, and 
in the near future we intend to initiate a comprehensive proceeding to 
reform the access charge regime. We also seek comment on the impact of 
each of the pricing options on universal service considerations. 
Finally, we note that substantially different prices for similar forms 
of interconnection raise the possibility that parties could seek to 
deflect traffic from a more costly form of interconnection to a less 
costly form. We invite comment on the implications of this possibility, 
including methods to prevent such traffic deflection.
    c. Symmetrical Compensation Arrangements. 52. We tentatively 
conclude that LEC-CMRS interconnection rates should be symmetrical--
that is, LECs should pay CMRS providers the same rates as CMRS 
providers pay LECs. Most existing interconnection arrangements between 
LECs and competing wireline providers of local exchange service require 
that interconnection rates be symmetrical.
    53. We recognize that symmetrical interconnection rates have 
certain disadvantages. Asymmetrical, cost-based rates have the benefit 
of providing each of the carriers (and, if passed through to them, 
their customers) incentives to use resources such as interconnection 
commensurate with the actual cost of those resources. LEC networks and 
CMRS networks use different technologies that may have different costs. 
If interconnection rates were fully cost-based, then a LEC might pay a 
CMRS provider different interconnection rates than the CMRS provider 
would pay the LEC.
    54. On the other hand, symmetrical compensation rates would be 
administratively easier to derive and manage than asymmetrical rates 
based on the costs of each of the respective networks. Moreover, 
symmetrical rates could reduce LECs' ability to use their bargaining 
strength to negotiate an excessively high termination charge that CMRS 
providers would pay LECs and an excessively low termination rate that 
LECs pay CMRS providers. Setting asymmetric, cost-based rates might 
require evaluating the cost structure of non-dominant carriers, which 
would be complex and intrusive. Accordingly, we tentatively conclude 
that interconnection arrangements should include symmetrical 
compensation rates, at least during an interim period. We seek comments 
on the foregoing analysis. Commenters should discuss any other reasons 
why symmetrical or asymmetrical compensation rates would be in the 
public interest and the relative merits of these approaches. We also 
seek comment on whether we should revisit our existing policy of 
forbearing from regulating CMRS providers' rates in order to enforce 
our interim policies with respect to the rates CMRS providers charge to 
LECs.
    55. In addition, we note that, according to a number of parties, 
many LECs do not now pay any compensation to CMRS providers for LEC-
originated traffic that terminates on their networks, and that some 
LECs even impose charges on CMRS providers for such traffic. Such 
conduct would appear to violate our existing mutual compensation 
requirement. We seek comment on whether such violations are occurring 
and what methods could and should be used to enforce this requirement. 
In Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, 
Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and Order, 59 FR 
18493 (April 

[[Page 3653]]
19, 1994), we stated that CMRS providers may file complaints, under 
section 208 of the Act, if a LEC violates the requirement that they 
charge the same rates to CMRS providers for interstate interconnection 
as they charge other mobile service providers. Is this avenue for 
obtaining remedies sufficient, or should we institute some other 
procedure or other mechanism to ensure that LECs comply with our 
existing rules? For example, should we require LECs to report to us on 
the amounts of compensation they are paying to CMRS providers for 
traffic that originates on LEC networks and terminates on CMRS 
networks? Are alternative dispute resolution procedures necessary?
C. Implementation of Compensation Arrangements
    1. Negotiations and Tariffing. 56. As discussed above, we believe 
that some involvement in the formation and administration of 
interconnection arrangements between LECs and CMRS providers would help 
to counter possible abuses of market power and would help ensure that 
these arrangements are efficient and advance the public interest. We 
also have addressed the types of compensation arrangements that we 
believe would best serve the public interest. We seek more detailed 
comment on the type of involvement that would be optimal in light of 
our views on the compensation arrangements. In particular, we ask 
parties to comment on the interrelationship of the procedural issues 
addressed in this section to the substantive policy options regarding 
compensation arrangements discussed above. Some of the substantive 
options discussed above might make some procedural approaches 
infeasible, or could make certain protections unnecessary.
    57. In considering how to implement our policies regarding 
interconnection arrangements, we seek to promote arrangements that 
foster competition and advance economic efficiency and our other goals. 
We also desire to enable LECs and CMRS carriers to respond rapidly and 
flexibly to changing interconnection needs. We seek comment on whether 
an open process in which a LEC and a CMRS provider freely discuss and 
negotiate a wide variety of interconnection options is preferable to a 
process whereby the LEC presents the CMRS provider with a limited 
choice of preset interconnection options. There may be a useful purpose 
in some level of intervention to prevent abuse of market power or 
unreasonable discrimination. This may be particularly critical in cases 
in which the parties are unable to negotiate a satisfactory agreement, 
but may also be valuable as a ``backstop'' measure even when parties 
can reach agreement, to prevent unreasonable discrimination against 
other parties or anticompetitive collusion that might disadvantage 
consumers.
    58. If LECs and CMRS providers were to negotiate interconnection 
arrangements consistent with the compensation framework discussed 
above, the public interest would be served while avoiding the need for 
intervention. As discussed above, however, we believe that optimal 
compensation arrangements are unlikely to result from purely private 
negotiations. At least for the near future, there is likely to be an 
imbalance in negotiating power between the incumbent LECs, which 
currently possess monopoly power in local exchange markets, and new 
CMRS providers seeking to enter such markets. The LECs may seek to 
impose unduly high interconnection rates or other unreasonable 
conditions that could reduce CMRS entry. Moreover, there is a 
significant risk that LECs may not offer new CMRS carriers 
interconnection agreements that are as financially advantageous as 
those that large and incumbent CMRS providers have already secured. 
Finally, in cases where LECs and CMRS providers compete directly 
against one another, there is a significant risk that LECs and CMRS 
providers could engage in collusive behavior and voluntarily agree to 
arrangements that would not advance the public interest. Thus, 
participation in the process by regulators may be warranted for some 
period of time.
    59. An alternative would be a requirement that voluntarily-
negotiated interconnection contracts be filed publicly. Such public 
filing--either at the Commission (pursuant to section 211) or at state 
commissions--could reduce the LECs' ability to engage in unreasonable 
discrimination among CMRS providers, although we recognize that such a 
procedure would not necessarily ensure that arrangements will comply 
with the substantive standards discussed above. We also seek further 
comment on possible ways to minimize the burden of such disclosure and 
protect the confidentiality of LECs' and CMRS providers' proprietary 
data, while still obtaining disclosure of enough information to advise 
new entrants about rates, terms, and conditions. Finally, we seek 
comment on whether filing at a regulatory agency is necessary if the 
carriers themselves were required to make publicly available relevant, 
specified information about the agreement upon request.
    60. As noted above, even public disclosure of negotiated agreements 
may not be sufficient to prevent anticompetitive behavior by LECs 
possessing market power and to ensure that interconnection compensation 
arrangements are structured in an optimal manner. A more forceful 
approach would be to require that interconnection arrangements be filed 
as tariffs. The tariff process is a well-established mechanism for 
regulatory commissions to protect the public interest by rejecting 
unreasonable provisions in carriers' offerings. On the other hand, 
tariffing requirements could entail administrative costs. We 
tentatively disagree with the position taken by some of the commenting 
parties that any tariffing requirement would automatically preclude 
flexible interconnection arrangements. We note that, even in a 
contractual environment, one party might inflexibly present a limited 
number of options and refuse to negotiate alternatives; by contrast, 
even under a tariffing requirement, parties can cooperatively negotiate 
provisions in a flexible manner. Such provisions can later be 
incorporated as tariffed options. Thus, tariffed interconnection 
arrangements need not be ``one size fits all.''
    61. The major difference we see between non-tariffed arrangements 
and arrangements subject to a contract tariff process is that, in the 
latter case, the regulator has additional mechanisms to protect against 
terms that may be unreasonable or unreasonably discriminatory, such as 
issuing an order for investigation pursuant to section 205 of the Act. 
We seek comment on the costs and benefits of amending our rules to 
permit the use of contract tariffs to implement LEC-CMRS 
interconnection arrangements. We also seek comment on whether a 
different form of contract tariffing for LEC-CMRS interconnection would 
better serve the public interest. For instance, should a special notice 
period apply to LEC-CMRS interconnection contracts? Should some level 
of cost showing be required for LEC-CMRS interconnection contracts, 
unlike contract tariffs generally?
    62. In sum, we tentatively conclude that information about 
interconnection compensation arrangements should be made publicly 
available in order to foster competition and to advance the public 
interest. As to what form this information should take--tariff, public 
disclosure or other approach--we seek comment from parties as to the 
costs and benefits of each option, keeping in mind the goals of 
promoting economic 

[[Page 3654]]
efficiency through competition and negotiating flexibility.
    2. Jurisdictional Issues. 63. We seek comment on three alternative 
approaches to implementing the interconnection policies discussed 
above. We recognize that states share our goals of stimulating economic 
growth by promoting the development of CMRS, which would upgrade the 
nation's telecommunications infrastructure and would help make 
available broader access to communications networks. We also recognize 
that, as detailed above, some state public utility commissions have 
begun to develop their own policies governing interconnection 
arrangements. We intend to continue to work cooperatively with state 
regulators to formulate interconnection policies that advance our 
common public interest goals.
    64. One approach to implementing these goals would be to adopt a 
federal interconnection policy framework that would directly govern 
LEC-CMRS two-carrier interconnection with respect to interstate 
services and that would serve as a model for state commissions 
considering these issues with respect to intrastate services. 
Essentially, we would recommend that states voluntarily follow our 
guidelines, rather than making them mandatory requirements. Under this 
informal model, we would give guidance to the states while not 
directing state regulators in interconnection matters. For example, if 
we were to affirm our tentative conclusions discussed above regarding 
bill and keep compensation, we could require LECs and CMRS providers to 
use that approach with respect to terminating interstate traffic 
originating on the other's network, and encourage states to adopt the 
same approach with respect to intrastate traffic. On the other hand, 
there would be no guarantee that states would adopt our proposed model. 
We seek comment on this option and whether there might be some way to 
supplement it to better achieve the goals discussed above. For example, 
would it be beneficial to have an industry group develop specific 
standards to govern the terms and conditions for interconnection 
arrangements, based on our informal model? If so, should we set a date 
certain by which such an industry group should develop these standards?
    65. A second approach would be to adopt a mandatory federal policy 
framework or set of general parameters to govern interconnection 
arrangements between LECs and CMRS providers with respect to interstate 
and intrastate services, but allow state commissions a wide range of 
choices with respect to implementing specific elements of these 
arrangements. Thus, although compliance with these policy parameters 
would be mandatory, state commissions would have substantial latitude 
in developing specific arrangements that would comply with these 
parameters. One example of a general policy parameter is our existing 
mutual compensation requirement--which generally requires that there be 
mutual compensation between LECs and CMRS providers for the reasonable 
costs of terminating each other's traffic--without precluding the 
states from setting the actual interconnection rates that LECs and CMRS 
providers charge. We could also adopt more specific policy parameters, 
while still preserving a degree of discretion for state commissions. 
For example, we could require the use of bill and keep compensation, as 
discussed above, for all off-peak traffic, but allow states to decide 
whether to use bill and keep or some alternative option with respect to 
compensation for intrastate traffic during peak periods. The possible 
benefit of this approach is that it would provide some greater national 
uniformity, while still preserving the state commissions' flexibility 
to develop specific arrangements that meet their needs. We seek comment 
on this option and on whether it would most effectively achieve our 
goals. If parties do support the use of mandatory federal policy 
parameters, we ask that they comment on what level of detail we should 
adopt in such parameters--that is, whether we should adopt broad, 
general parameters on what the appropriate interconnection rates should 
be or whether we should adopt a more detailed set of parameters.
    66. As a third alternative, we seek comment on our promulgating 
specific federal requirements for interstate and intrastate LEC-CMRS 
interconnection arrangements. This approach would place more specific 
parameters on state action regarding interconnection rates. For 
example, if we were to affirm our tentative conclusions discussed above 
regarding bill and keep compensation, we could require LECs and CMRS 
providers to adopt such an approach with respect to all traffic.
    67. We tentatively conclude that the Commission has sufficient 
authority to implement these options, including our proposal that 
interconnection compensation on a bill and keep basis be adopted on an 
interim basis. As a preliminary matter, 47 U.S.C. 332 explicitly 
preempts state regulation in this area to the extent that such 
regulation precludes (or effectively precludes) entry of CMRS 
providers. In addition, to the extent state regulation in this area 
precludes reasonable interconnection, it would be inconsistent with the 
federal right to interconnection established by Section 332 and our 
prior decision to preempt state regulation that prevents the physical 
interconnection of LEC and CMRS networks. We also believe, contrary to 
our conclusion in earlier orders, that preemption under Louisiana 
Public Service Commission v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), may well be 
warranted here on the basis of inseverability, particularly in light of 
the strong federal policy underlying Section 332 favoring a nationwide 
wireless network. Indeed, in this regard, we note that several entities 
have argued that section 332 itself gives the Commission exclusive 
jurisdiction in this area.
    68. We seek comment on this analysis and also ask parties to submit 
relevant factual information on this issue. We seek comment, first, on 
the inseverability of interconnection rate regulation. We note that 
much of the LEC-CMRS traffic that may appear to be intrastate may 
actually be interstate, because CMRS service areas often cross state 
lines, and CMRS customers are mobile. For example, if a cellular 
customer from Richmond travels to Baltimore and then places a call to 
Alexandria, the call might appear to be an intrastate call, placed from 
a Virginia telephone number to another Virginia number, but would in 
fact be interstate because the call originates in Maryland and 
terminates in Virginia. Service areas defined as ``local'' in wireless 
providers' rate structure do not coincide with LEC ``exchanges'' 
defined by section 221(b) as subject to state authority, and often 
cross state lines. This is true of many existing cellular providers, 
and is even more likely to be true with respect to PCS licensees in 
major trading areas (MTAs). We request that commenting parties submit 
empirical data and analysis on the extent to which existing LEC-CMRS 
interconnection arrangements involve both interstate and intrastate 
traffic, the extent to which significant levels of interstate wireless 
traffic are being carried under such arrangements, and, most 
importantly, the extent to which interstate and intrastate traffic can 
be severed for regulatory pricing purposes. We seek comment on whether 
either the CMRS or the LEC networks have the technical capability to 
distinguish whether a wireless call interconnecting with its network is 
an interstate or intrastate call. We also seek comment on whether we 
should reconsider our 

[[Page 3655]]
recent conclusion, cited by BellSouth, that section 332 does not 
circumscribe state regulation of the interconnection rates that LECs 
charge CMRS providers.
    69. We also ask parties to identify what types of state rate 
regulation, if any, preclude (or effectively preclude) entry of CMRS 
providers. We seek specific information on the types of regulations 
that are either in effect or have been proposed by state regulators in 
the area of LEC-CMRS interconnection, and seek comment on what impact 
such state action has had on interconnection arrangements and on the 
ability of CMRS providers to compete in the market. We also request 
comment on the meaning and relevance of section 332(c)(1)(B) to our 
jurisdictional analysis.
    70. In determining what the Commission's role should be with 
respect to implementation of LEC-CMRS interconnection policies, we 
again emphasize our recognition of the states' legitimate interest in 
interconnection issues and our intention to work in coordination with 
state regulators in this regard. In addition, although we have 
identified three possible options to implement our interconnection 
compensation proposals, and we seek comment on these options, we also 
encourage parties to suggest other options, or variations of our 
options, regarding implementation. Our goal is to achieve 
implementation of our interconnection proposals in the most efficient 
and effective manner to the collective benefit of all the parties 
involved.

III. Interconnection for the Origination and Termination of Interstate 
Interexchange Traffic

    71. We held in 1984 that radio common carriers and cellular 
carriers are not IXCs and therefore are not required to pay LECs 
interstate access charges. We have never addressed, however, whether 
LECs or IXCs should remit any interstate access charges to CMRS 
providers when the LEC and the CMRS provider jointly provide access 
service. For example, when a cellular customer places a long-distance 
call, the cellular carrier typically transmits the call to the LEC, 
which connects the call to the IXC. Similarly, when long-distance calls 
are placed to cellular customers, the IXC handling the call typically 
transmits the call to a LEC, which, in turn, hands it to the cellular 
carrier for termination to the called party. We have not previously 
established specific rules or guidelines applicable to the joint 
provision of interstate access service by a LEC and a CMRS provider. 
Until CMRS providers generate sufficient traffic to warrant direct 
connections to IXC points of presence, we believe that most CMRS 
providers are likely to depend on LECs for interconnection of 
interexchange traffic to IXCs. Thus, we tentatively conclude that it 
will be necessary to apply certain protections to such interconnection 
arrangements, at least in the foreseeable future. We seek comment on 
this analysis and on our tentative conclusion. We also invite CMRS 
providers and LECs to describe existing arrangements under which CMRS 
providers are compensated for originating and terminating interstate 
interexchange traffic that transits a LEC's network.
    72. In the context of the existing access charge regime, we 
tentatively conclude that CMRS providers should be entitled to recover 
access charges from IXCs, as the LECs do when interstate interexchange 
traffic passes from CMRS customers to IXCs (or vice versa) via LEC 
networks. We propose to require that CMRS providers be treated no less 
favorably than neighboring LECs or CAPs with respect to recovery of 
access charges from IXCs and LECs for interstate interexchange traffic. 
We tentatively conclude that any less favorable treatment of CMRS 
providers would be unreasonably discriminatory, and would interfere 
with our statutory objective and ongoing commitment to foster the 
development of new wireless services such as CMRS. We seek comment on 
how to implement this non-discrimination requirement. For example, 
should we require that contracts between neighboring LECs establishing 
joint arrangements for providing interstate access, as well as 
comparable contracts between LECs and CMRS providers, be publicly filed 
pursuant to section 211 of the Act in order to protect against such 
discrimination? Should such arrangements be included in LEC interstate 
access tariffs?
    73. We also seek comment on the basis for CMRS providers' access 
charges, which under our proposal would be collected directly or 
indirectly from IXCs. Should CMRS providers impose interstate access 
charges that mirror those of the LECs with which they connect? Or 
should they impose their own access charges, as do many independent 
LECs? If the latter, should we retain our existing policy of forbearing 
from regulating CMRS providers' interstate access charges? In the 
alternative, should we find that, even though CMRS providers may lack 
market power with respect to end users, they may have some market power 
over IXCs that need to terminate calls to a particular CMRS provider's 
customer, or to originate calls (in an equal access context) from such 
a customer? If we were to adopt such a conclusion, should we adopt 
guidelines or some other form of pricing regulation to govern CMRS 
providers' interstate access charges? Should we address the billing 
arrangements that would apply in this context? Parties are invited to 
comment on the issues and proposals discussed herein, and to address 
the costs and benefits of these and possible alternative approaches.

IV. Application of These Proposals

    74. We invite comment on whether the proposals and options 
considered in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking should apply to 
interconnection arrangements between LECs and: (1) Broadband PCS 
providers only; (2) broadband PCS, cellular telephone, SMR, satellite 
telephony, and other CMRS providers that offer two-way, point-to-point 
voice communications, which could compete with LEC landline 
telecommunications services; or (3) all CMRS providers. We solicit 
comments and analysis on the relative costs and benefits of broader and 
narrower approaches, and on any technical or economic similarities or 
differences among CMRS services that would warrant similar or different 
treatment. (We note that, as a matter of convenience, we refer 
elsewhere in this notice generically to ``CMRS providers;'' this usage 
is not intended to exclude the possibility of applying our policies 
more narrowly.)
    75. There may be benefits to focusing primarily on broadband PCS or 
some other limited group of CMRS services. First, it might be desirable 
to limit our focus to broadband PCS because it is a new service. We 
have assigned the initial broadband PCS licenses relatively recently 
and will soon assign more. Fewer issues arise in applying policy 
changes to a new service, such as broadband PCS, than to existing 
services: For example, it is less likely that we would need to consider 
problems of displacement, interference with existing contracts, or 
transitions from existing interconnection arrangements to new 
arrangements.
    76. Second, we could consider addressing interconnection between 
LECs and all types of commercial mobile radio services that support 
voice telecommunications and could compete with the local telephone 
services provided by the LECs. The interconnection arrangements between 
this group of CMRS providers and LECs could have a critical effect on 
whether these carriers can develop into effective 

[[Page 3656]]
competitors for providing the local links required for interstate 
communications. Focusing narrowly either on broadband PCS alone or on 
this subset of CMRS would allow us to tailor our policies more 
carefully to the particular subset of carriers or services involved.
    77. Third, there are arguments for applying our proposals more 
broadly to interconnection between LECs and all CMRS providers because 
this would enable us to make improvements in as large a part of the 
local telephone and CMRS markets as possible. Moreover, pursuant to 
Congressional intent, we have taken a number of actions to apply 
similar regulatory treatment to different types of CMRS providers. 
Differential treatment among CMRS providers in the critical area of 
interconnection could be interpreted as inconsistent with our overall 
policies with respect to CMRS. On the other hand, some of the proposals 
in this Notice might not be in the public interest if applied to CMRS 
providers that do not compete with LEC services.

V. Procedural Issues

A. Ex Parte Presentations
    78. This is a non-restricted notice-and-comment rulemaking 
proceeding. Ex parte presentations are permitted, except during the 
Sunshine Agenda period, provided that they are disclosed as provided in 
the Commission's rules. See generally 47 CFR 1.1202, 1.1203, 1.1206.
B. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    79. Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 
601-612, the Commission's Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis with 
respect to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is as follows:
    80. Reason for Action: The Commission is issuing this Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment on possible changes in the 
regulatory treatment of interconnection compensation arrangements 
between LECs and CMRS providers and related issues.
    81. Objectives: The objective of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
is to provide an opportunity for public comment and to provide a record 
for a Commission decision on the issues stated above.
    82. Legal basis: The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is adopted 
pursuant to sections 1, 2, 4, 201-205, 215, 218, 220, 303(r) and 332 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 152, 154, 
201-205, 215, 218, 220, 303(r) and 332;
    83. Description, potential impact, and number of small entities 
affected: Any rule changes that might occur as a result of this 
proceeding could impact entities which are small business entities, as 
defined in section 601(3) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. After 
evaluating the comments in this proceeding, the Commission will further 
examine the impact of any rule changes on small entities and set forth 
findings in the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. The Secretary 
shall send a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration in accordance 
with section 603(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-
354, 94 Stat. 1164, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq. (1981).
    84. Reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirement: 
None.
    85. Federal rules which overlap, duplicate or conflict with the 
Commission's proposal: None.
    86. Any significant alternatives minimizing impact on small 
entities and consistent with stated objectives: The Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking solicits comments on a variety of alternatives.
    87. Comments are solicited: Written comments are requested on this 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. These comments must be filed 
in accordance with the same filing deadlines set for comments on the 
other issues in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking but they must have a 
separate and distinct heading designating them as responses to the 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. The Secretary shall send a copy of the 
Notice to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration in accordance with section 603(a) of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601, et seq.
C. Comment Filing Procedures
    88. Comments and reply comments should be captioned in CC Docket 
No. 95-185 only. Pursuant to applicable procedures set forth in 
Secs. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, 
interested parties may file comments on or before February 26, 1996, 
and reply comments on or before March 12, 1996. To file formally in 
this proceeding, you must file an original and four copies of all 
comments, reply comments, and supporting comments. If you want each 
Commissioner to receive a personal copy of your comments, you must file 
an original and nine copies. Comments and reply comments should be sent 
to Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M 
Street, NW., Room 222, Washington, DC 20554, with a copy to Janice 
Myles of the Common Carrier Bureau, 1919 M Street, NW., Room 544, 
Washington, DC 20554. Parties should also file one copy of any 
documents filed in this docket with the Commission's copy contractor, 
International Transcription Services, Inc., 2100 M Street, NW., Suite 
140, Washington, DC 20037. Comments and reply comments will be 
available for public inspection during regular business hours in the 
FCC Reference Center, 1919 M Street, NW., Room 239, Washington, DC 
20554.
    89. In order to facilitate review of comments and reply comments, 
both by parties and by Commission staff, we request that such comments 
be organized in a uniform format. Specifically, we ask the parties to 
organize their comments and reply comments according to the following 
outline:

I. General Comments
II. Compensation for Interconnected Traffic between LECs and CMRS 
Providers' Networks
    A. Compensation Arrangements
    1. Existing Compensation Arrangements
    2. General Pricing Principles
    3. Pricing Proposals (Interim, Long Term, Symmetrical)
    B. Implementation of Compensation Arrangements
    1. Negotiations and Tariffing
    2. Jurisdictional Issues
III. Interconnection for the Origination and Termination of 
Interstate Interexchange Traffic
IV. Application of These Proposals
V. Responses to Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
VI. Other

Each new section should begin on a new page, and should be labeled with 
the name of the filing party, identification of whether the document is 
an initial comment or a reply comment, the docket number, filing date, 
and number and name of the outline section addressed (although formal 
legal headers are unnecessary for section headings). No pages need be 
submitted for issues that a party chooses not to address. Arguments 
that conceptualize issues in a manner that does not fit into the 
segments listed above may be included in the ``Other'' section.
D. Ordering Clauses
    90. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to sections 1, 4, 
201-205, 215, 218, 220, 303(r) and 332 of the Communications Act of 
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 201-205, 215, 218, 220, 303(r) 
and 332, a notice of proposed rulemaking is hereby adopted.
    91. It is further ordered that, the Secretary shall send a copy of 
this 

[[Page 3657]]

notice of proposed rulemaking, including the regulatory flexibility 
certification, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business 
Administration, in accordance with paragraph 603(a) of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (1981).

List of Subjects

47 CFR Part 20

    Radio.

47 CFR Part 61

    Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Telephone.

47 CFR Part 69

    Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Telephone.

Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 96-1974 Filed 1-31-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-U