[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 15 (Tuesday, January 23, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1752-1753]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-902]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


DOE Response to Recommendation 95-2 of the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board Regarding Safety Management

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: Section 315 (b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
42 U.S.C. 2286d(b) requires the Department of Energy to publish its 
response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recommendations for 
notice and public comment. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 
published Recommendation 95-2 concerning Safety Management in the 
Federal Register on October 19, 1995 (60 FR 54065). The Department of 
Energy published notice of a request for an additional 45 days to 
respond to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 95-2 
concerning Safety Management in the Federal Register on December 11, 
1995 (60 FR 63514). The Department of Energy (DOE) hereby publishes its 
response to Recommendation 95-2 as allowed by the statute cited above.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the Secretary's 
request are due on or before February 22, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the 
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 
Indiana Avenue NW., Suite 700. Washington, D.C. 20004.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Peter N. Brush, Principal Deputy, 
Assistant Secretary for Environmental, Safety and Health, Department of 
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC. 20585.

    Issued in Washington, D.C., on January 18, 1996.
Mark B. Whitaker,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 
Board.

The Secretary of Energy

Washington, DC 20585

January 17, 1996
The Honorable John T. Conway,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20004

    Dear Mr. Chairman: On October 11, 1995, the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board issued Recommendation 95-2, Safety 
Management, to the Department of Energy. The Department shares the 
concerns that prompted the Board to formulate its recommendation. 
Like you, we are committed to conducting our work efficiently and in 
a manner that ensures protection of workers, the public and the 
environment. Over the past three years, we have developed and 
implemented a number of systems that are designed to achieve an 
acceptable level of safety throughout Departmental operations. These 
systems are designed to achieve the following objectives:

--enhance our ability to plan and execute work, identify the hazards 
associated with specific operations and activities, and control or 
eliminate such hazards in an appropriate and cost-effective manner;
--clarify our expectations for the work to be accomplished and the 
level of environment, safety and health protection to be established 
and to do so in a manner that is not overly prescriptive but allows 
contractors to exercise the best means of meeting these 
expectations;
--establish clear roles and responsibilities for protection of 
environment, safety and health throughout the Department and our 
contractor corps;
--shift the focus of attention from ``paper requirements'' and 
documentation to a disciplined, analytical and collaborative focus 
on work planning, hazards analysis and hazards control; and
--establish analytical bases for setting risk-based management and 
project priorities.

    Key among these policy initiatives and programs are directives 
reform, the Necessary and Sufficient Closure Process, including the 
companion process relating to Standards/Requirements Identification 
Documents, and contract reform, including performance-based 
contracting.
    In developing and implementing these safety systems, we have 
recognized that the size and diversity of the Department's 
organization and operations do not permit a ``one-size-fits-all'' 
approach to management. Further, the need for the Department's 
Headquarters program managers to be responsible and accountable for 
establishing environment, safety and health policies and management 
systems must be balanced against the practical imperative to provide 
field operations and contractors sufficient flexibility to 
accomplish their missions effectively. Finally, in this period of 
severely constrained resources, it is critical that management 
systems ensure that we are attending to our most significant risks 
to environment, safety and health, that resources dedicated to 
environment, safety and health are both adequate and appropriate to 
the attendant level of risk throughout the complex, and that hazard 
control be achieved in a cost-effective manner.
    The Department accepts Recommendation 95-2 as follows:
    1. The first subpart of Recommendation 95-2 calls for the 
Department to institutionalize the process of incorporating into the 
planning and execution of every major defense nuclear activity 
involving hazardous materials those controls necessary to ensure 
that environment, safety and health objectives are achieved. We 
accept this Recommendation. While we believe that we have 
accomplished a great deal in this regard, we are committed to 
further improvements as evidenced by our ongoing safety management 
initiatives and recognize the need to further institutionalize the 
process of incorporating environment, safety and health 
considerations into the planning and execution of all activities at 
our facilities.
    The task of institutionalizing the process includes 
incorporation in work planning of the ``Necessary and Sufficient 
Closure Process,'' along with other relevant processes, such as the 
process for Standards/Requirements Identification Documents.
    2. Subpart 2 calls for the conduct of all operations and 
activities within the defense nuclear complex or the former defense 
nuclear complex that involve radioactive and other substantially 
hazardous materials to be subject to management plans that are 
graded according to the risk associated with the activity. We accept 
this portion of the Recommendation.
    We cannot accept the portion of subpart 2 which calls for 
``Safety Management Plans'' to be ``structured on the lines'' of 
certain Board Technical Documents. As stated above, we are committed 
to the development of effective safety plans which reflect the 
diversity of the Department's operations and the need for a flexible 
approach to these activities. We stand ready to work closely with 
the Board as we refine our approach to subpart 2, but the Department 
is not able to accept this part in all of its detail.
    3. Subpart 3 calls for the Department to prioritize its 
facilities and activities according to their hazard and their 
importance to defense and cleanup programs. We accept this portion 
of the Recommendation because for both safety and budget formulation 
reasons, the Department always will need an effective understanding 
of its priorities.
    The Department cannot accept the portion of subpart 3 that calls 
for the development of priorities ``following the process of Section 
I of DNFSB/TECH-6,'' relating to the revised Standards/Requirements 
Identification Document process, and Safety Management Plans. To be 
useful, any such new list of prioritized facilities and activities 
must reflect other current initiatives underway in the Department 
and should not be carried out exclusively for the purpose of 
focusing the transition from implementation programs related to 
Board Recommendations 90-2 and 92-5. Again, the Department stands 
ready to 

[[Page 1753]]
work with the Board to seek a common understanding of an acceptable 
approach to this subpart.
    4. Subpart 4 calls for the Department to promulgate requirements 
and associated instructions (Orders/Standards) which provide 
direction and guidance for the process defined in subpart 1, 
including responsibility for carrying it out. It also recommends 
that these requirements and associated instructions be made a 
contract term. We accept these portions of the Recommendation.
    The Department cannot accept that portion of subpart 4 that 
would impose as a ``model'' for this process a specific Departmental 
Order relating to Operational Readiness Reviews. This ``model,'' 
which has proven quite effective for start-up and re-start of high 
hazard nuclear facilities, may simply prove to be inappropriate for 
all activities covered by this subpart.
    5. The Department accepts subpart 5 of Recommendation 95-2 and 
will continue to take measures to ensure that we have or will 
acquire the technical expertise to implement effectively our 
integrated safety management process.
    The Department's initiatives and programs to improve safety 
management are at various stages of maturation, implementation and 
institutionalization. We are mindful of our responsibility to keep 
the Board apprised of the direction and progress of these 
undertakings and are appreciative of the time and attention that 
Board Members and staff already have devoted to reviewing and 
consulting with Departmental management and staff on several of the 
initiatives and programs.
    It is our intent to work closely with the Board and any 
individuals identified by the Board as the Department prepares its 
plan to develop this integrated safety management process. We also 
look forward to further discussions with the Board to determine how 
we may best accomplish our mutual objectives and responsibilities in 
these matters.

      Sincerely,
Hazel R. O'Leary
[FR Doc. 96-902 Filed 1-18-96; 4:01 pm]
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