[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 14 (Monday, January 22, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 1649-1650]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-700]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. STN 50-454 and STN 50-455]


Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2); 
Exemption

I

    Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) is the holder of 
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66, which authorize 
operation of Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 (the facilities). The 
licenses provide, among other things, that the facilities are subject 
to all the rules, regulations, and Orders of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facilities are pressurized water reactors located at the 
licensee's site in Ogle County, Illinois.

II

    In 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage,'' 
paragraph (a), in part, states that ``the licensee shall establish and 
maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization 
which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that 
activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the 
common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk 
to the public health and safety.''
    In 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), it 
specifies that ``the licensee shall control all points of personnel and 
vehicle access into a protected area.'' Also, 10 

[[Page 1650]]
CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A numbered picture badge identification 
system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to 
protected areas without escort.'' It further states that individuals 
not employed by the licensee (e.g., contractors) may be authorized 
access to protected areas without escort provided that the individual, 
``receives a picture badge upon entrance into a protected area which 
must be returned upon exit from the protected area. * * *''
    The licensee proposes to implement an alternative unescorted access 
system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve picture 
badges at the entrance/exit location to the protected area and would 
allow all individuals, including contractors, to keep their picture 
badges in their possession when departing the Byron site.

III

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission 
may, upon application of interested person or upon its own initiative, 
grant such exemptions from the requirements of the regulations in this 
part as it determines are authorized by law and will not endanger life 
or property or the common defense and security, and are otherwise in 
the public interest. According to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may 
authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures for protection 
against radiological sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that 
the alternative measures have the same ``high assurance'' objective, 
that the proposed measures meet the general performance requirements of 
the regulation, and that the overall level of system performance 
provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to that 
which would be provided by the regulation.
    Currently, unescorted access into the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, 
is controlled through the use of picture badges. Positive 
identification of personnel who are authorized and request access into 
the protected area is established by security personnel making a visual 
comparison of the individual requesting access and that individual's 
picture badge. In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), contractor 
personnel are not allowed to take their picture badges off site. In 
addition, in accordance with the plant's physical security plan, the 
licensee's employees are also not allowed to take their picture badges 
off site.
    The proposed system will require that all individuals with 
authorized unescorted access have the physical characteristics of their 
hand (hand geometry) registered with their picture badge number in a 
computerized access control system. Therefore, all authorized 
individuals must not only have their picture badge to gain access to 
the protected area, but must also have their hand geometry confirmed. 
All individuals, including contractors, who have authorized unescorted 
access into the protected area will be allowed to keep their picture 
badges in their possession when departing the Byron site.
    All other access processes, including search function capability 
and access revocation, will remain the same. A security officer 
responsible for access control will continue to be positioned within a 
bullet-resistant structure. It should also be noted that the proposed 
system is only for individuals with authorized unescorted access and 
will not be used for those individuals requiring escorts.
    Sandia National Laboratories conducted testing which demonstrated 
that the hand geometry equipment possesses strong performance 
characteristics. Details of the testing performed are in the Sandia 
report, ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification 
Devices,'' SAND91--0276 UC--906 Unlimited Release, June 1991. Based on 
the Sandia report and the licensee's experience using the current photo 
picture identification system, the false acceptance rate for the 
proposed hand geometry system would be at least equivalent to that of 
the current system. To assure that the proposed system will continue to 
meet the general performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), the 
licensee will implement a process for testing the system. The site 
security plans will also be revised to allow implementation of the hand 
geometry system and to allow employees and contractors with unescorted 
access to keep their picture badges in their possession when leaving 
the Byron site.

IV

    For the foregoing reasons, the NRC staff has determined that the 
proposed alternative measures for protection against radiological 
sabotage meet the same high assurance objective and the general 
performance requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. In addition, the staff has 
determined that the overall level of the proposed system's performance 
will provide protection against radiological sabotage equivalent to 
that which is provided by the current system in accordance with 10 CFR 
73.55.
    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or 
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public 
interest.
    Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the following exemption:

    The requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) that individuals who have 
been granted unescorted access and are not employed by the licensee 
are to return their picture badges upon exit from the protected area 
is no longer necessary. Thus, these individuals may keep their 
picture badges in their possession upon leaving the Byron site.

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse 
environmental impact (60 FR 67369).

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 5th day of January 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Elinor G. Adensam,
Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects--III/IV, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-700 Filed 1-19-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P