[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 6 (Tuesday, January 9, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 671-672]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-286]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245]


Northeast Utilities--Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; 
Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

    In notice document 95-31255 beginning on page 66807, in the issue 
of Tuesday, December 26, 1995, the complete text of the ``Director's 
Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-95-23) was not included. The 
complete text follows this correction notice.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of January 1996.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James W. Andersen,
Project Manager, Project Directorate I-3, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

I. Introduction

    On January 8, 1995, Mr. Anthony J. Ross (Petitioner) filed a 
Petition with the Executive Director for Operations of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. In the Petition, 
the Petitioner raised concerns regarding the site paging and site siren 
evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 
maintenance shop.
    The Petitioner alleged that on numerous occasions since January 
1994, his department manager had instructed the Petitioner's coworkers 
to shut off or turn down the volume on the site paging and site siren 
evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop, and 
the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and coworker had complied with 
this request in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 and 
NUREG-0654. The Petitioner requested that the NRC impose at least three 
sanctions against his department manager, and impose sanctions against 
the Petitioner's coworker and maintenance first-line supervisor for 
engaging in deliberate misconduct in violation of 10 CFR 50.5.
    On February 23, 1995, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition 
had been referred to me pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 of the Commission's 
regulations. I also informed the Petitioner that the NRC would take 
appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific 
concerns raised in the Petition. On the basis of a review of the issues 
raised by the Petitioner as discussed below, I have concluded that no 
substantial health and safety issues have been raised that would 
warrant the action requested by the Petitioner.

II. Discussion

    In the Petition, the Petitioner raised a concern that on numerous 
occasions since January 1994, his department manager had instructed the 
Petitioner's coworkers to shut off or turn down the volume on the site 
paging and site siren evacuation alarm system in the Millstone Unit 1 
maintenance shop, and the Petitioner's first-line supervisor and 
coworker had complied with this request in violation of TS 6.8.1 and 
NUREG-0654.
    Licensees for nuclear power plants are required to have emergency 
plans that meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements 
of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Under 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), adequate 
emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response 
must be provided and maintained. Appendix E of Part 50 establishes 
minimum requirements for emergency plans for use in attaining an 
acceptable state of emergency preparedness. Section IV.E.9, in part, 
requires at least one onsite communications system.
    NUREG-0654, ``Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of 
Nuclear Power Plants,'' provides guidance for developing radiological 
emergency plans and improving emergency preparedness. Section II.F.1.e 
states that each emergency plan shall include provisions for alerting 
or activating emergency personnel in each response organization. 
Section II.J.1 states that each licensee shall establish the means and 
time required to warn or advise onsite individuals and individuals who 
may be in areas controlled by the licensee. Technical Specification 
6.8.1, in part, requires that procedures be established, implemented, 
and maintained covering emergency plan implementation.
    The topic of this Petition was one of the maintenance-related 
issues the NRC staff raised to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 
(NNECO), licensee for Millstone Unit 1, in letters dated December 5 and 
28, 1994. In those letters, the NRC staff requested NNECO to review the 
issues and submit a written response. Specifically, the NRC requested 
NNECO to review the following: (1) That NNECO management had shut off 
the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system or directed 
workers to shut off the system in the Unit 1 maintenance shop during 
morning meetings, (2) that on several occasions the system was not 
turned back on for hours, and (3) that the on/off switches for the 
speakers in question had been installed without a work order.
    The licensee's investigation into this matter, which was described 
in its January 26, 1995, response to the NRC request, confirmed that 
the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system had been 
routinely turned off at one of the two speakers located in the 
Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop area during meetings, and that this 
practice was not consistent with Emergency Preparedness Department 
guidance and NUREG-0654.1 However, NNECO management stated that it 
was confident that personnel could still hear the other speaker. This 
configuration was also tested during a special test conducted by NNECO. 
The results of the test verified that one of the two speakers had 
sufficient capacity to support event notification in the maintenance 
shop area. Since the single speaker could be heard, personnel in the 
maintenance area would be alerted if an emergency existed. NNECO's 
investigation also concluded that the on/off switches were installed 
without a work order in 1973 consistent with work performance processes 
at that time.

    \1\ NUREG-0654, paragraph J.1, states that each licensee shall 
establish the means and time required to warn or advise onsite 
individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the 
licensee. Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (Emergency Plan 
Administrative Procedure [EPAP] 1.15), at the time, required that 
the unit services director monitor and maintain emergency 
preparedness facilities and equipment. In Attachment 2 of EPAP 1.15, 
the Unit 1 public announcement speakers and evacuation alarm were 
included as emergency preparedness equipment.
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    NNECO's corrective actions to address this concern included 
prohibiting the use of any switch that disables any feature of the site 
paging and site siren evacuation alarm system, removing the two speaker 
switches, and performing a walkdown of all other system speakers to 
verify that no other similar switches existed in the system.
    The NRC conducted a special safety inspection from May 15 through 
June 23, 1995, at the Millstone station. During this inspection, the 
staff reviewed a number of the concerns, the topic of this Petition 
being one of them, and issued the findings in Inspection Report (IR) 
50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-

[[Page 672]]
22, 50-423/95-22 (95-22), dated July 21, 1995.
    The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the monthly page and 
siren tests, which were done in accordance with Procedure C-OP-605, and 
the separate test conducted in the Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop 
area. The review of the last two monthly tests showed that the site 
alarm was audible over ambient noise in all the tested areas. The 
review of the separate Millstone Unit 1 maintenance shop test showed 
that either switch, when in the off position, would not disable the 
system and that with one of the speakers turned off, the other speaker 
had sufficient capacity to support event notification.
    Emergency Preparedness Department guidance (EPAP 1.15) required 
that emergency preparedness equipment be maintained. The purpose of the 
guidance, as it related to the speakers, was to warn or advise onsite 
individuals. Since the single speaker could still be heard, the 
Petitioner's department manager stated in a meeting with the NRC 
inspectors that he believed the Emergency Preparedness Department 
guidance was still being met. Therefore, the Petitioner has not 
supported his assertion that the department manager and, indirectly, 
his first-line supervisor and coworker, deliberately violated Millstone 
procedures or technical specifications, 10 CFR 50.47(b), or 10 CFR Part 
50, Appendix E, or failed to meet the guidance in NUREG-0654.
    The inspector reviewed NNECO's corrective actions and confirmed 
that a work order had been processed to disconnect and remove the 
cutoff switches and that this work was completed. The inspector 
reviewed several Millstone site daily news articles (``To the Point'') 
that reinforced the message of not adjusting speaker volume. The 
articles clearly stated that management expectations and emergency 
preparedness guidance were that personnel were not to tamper with 
emergency preparedness equipment. The inspector also discussed the 
results of a walkdown of the entire system with a licensee 
representative. The representative stated that one additional speaker 
on/off switch had been found in the Unit 3 instrumentation and controls 
area. This speaker's on/off switch was subsequently removed.
    NNECO's investigation had also concluded that the switches were 
installed in 1973 without the use of a work order. The work control 
process has been enhanced significantly at Millstone Unit 1 since 1973. 
Performing modifications to equipment important to safety, such as the 
site paging and site alarm siren evacuation system, would now require 
engineering and operations department review. It would also require 
consideration of relevant regulatory requirements. During these reviews 
it would be expected that modifications of this type (i.e., done 
without such a work order) would be rejected and not implemented. The 
NRC inspector concluded that NNECO's current work control practices 
would require an automated work order for this type of modification and 
that these switches could not have been installed without such a work 
order under the current work control procedures. Therefore, since a 
work order for this modification was not required in 1973, no 
enforcement action is warranted.
    The NRC inspector concluded in the Inspection Report that turning 
off the site paging and site siren evacuation alarm system speaker was 
in violation of the licensee's emergency preparedness plan (and thus a 
violation of TS 6.8.1) and not in conformance with the guidance in 
NUREG-0654. Therefore, this issue, and three others were collectively 
cited as a Severity Level IV violation.2 However, the Inspection 
Report stated that since the operators in the maintenance shop were 
still able to hear information provided by the other speaker in the 
maintenance area, this event was of low safety significance and that it 
appeared NNECO had taken effective corrective action to correct the 
problem.

    \2\  The three other issues involved violations of Millstone 
Procedure ACP-QA-4.02B, ``Receipt, Control and Identification of QA 
Material,'' ACP-QA-4.01A, ``System and Component Housekeeping,'' and 
DC-1, ``Administration of Millstone Procedures and Forms.'' (NRC 
Inspection Report 50-245/95-22, 50-336/95-22, 50-423/95-22, dated 
July 21, 1995)
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    The NRC staff has concluded that the enforcement action already 
taken is sufficient in this case and, therefore, no additional 
enforcement action is warranted. The NRC staff has also concluded that 
although the Petitioner's department manager turned off or had the 
Petitioner's coworkers turn off one of the speakers, the Petitioner has 
not supported his assertion that his department manager and coworkers 
deliberately violated NRC regulations or the Millstone Unit 1 operating 
license and, thereby, violated the provisions of 10 CFR 50.5.

III. Conclusion

    The institution of proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 is 
appropriate only if substantial health and safety issues have been 
raised. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Units 1, 
2, and 3) CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 175 (1975) and Washington Public Power 
Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), DD-84-7 19 NRC 899, 924 
(1984). This is the standard that has been applied to the concerns 
raised by the Petitioner to determine whether the action requested by 
the Petitioner, or other enforcement action, is warranted.
    On the basis of the above assessment, I have concluded that no 
substantial health and safety issues have been raised regarding 
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, that would require initiation 
of additional enforcement action as requested by the Petitioner.
    The NRC has taken appropriate enforcement action for the events 
referenced in the Petition. The Petitioner's request for additional 
action is denied. As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this 
Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the 
Commission's review. This Decision will constitute the final action of 
the Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own 
motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
William T. Russell,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 96-286 Filed 1-8-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P