

Safety Light Corporation; Bloomsburg, PA
Schott Glass Technologies; Duryea, PA
Sequoyah Fuels Corporation; Gore, OK
Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation;
Cambridge, OH
Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation;
Newfield, NJ
Texas Instruments, Inc.; Attleboro, MA
Watertown Arsenal/Mall; Watertown, MA
Watertown GSA; Watertown, MA
Westinghouse Electric Corporation; Waltz
Mill, PA
Whittaker Corporation; Greenville, PA
Wyman-Gordon Company; North Grafton,
MA

[FR Doc. 95-31298 Filed 12-26-95; 8:45 am]

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[Docket No. 50-412]

**Duquesne Light Co., Ohio Edison Co.,
The Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co., The Toledo Edison Co., Beaver
Valley Power Station, Unit 2; Notice of
Withdrawal of Application for
Amendment to Facility Operating
License**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has granted the request by Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) to withdraw its April 14, 1993, application for a proposed amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-73 for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 (BVPS-2), located in Beaver County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment involved revision of Table Notation (10) of Table 4.3-1 of Technical Specification 4.3.1.1.1. The proposed revision would have added a footnote to Table Notation (10) that would have stated: "Complete verification of OPERABILITY of the manual reactor trip switch circuitry shall be performed prior to startup from the first shutdown to Mode 3 occurring after April 6, 1993."

The Commission has previously issued a Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment in the Federal Register on April 27, 1993 (58 FR 25676). However, on December 23, 1993, the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC requesting withdrawal of the proposed change because the change was no longer required. BVPS-2 had entered Mode 3 on September 18, 1993, in preparation for its fourth refueling outage and had performed the required surveillance test on November 18, 1993.

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated April 14, 1993, and the licensee's letter of December 23, 1993, which withdrew the application for license amendment. The above documents are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public

Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 20555 and at the B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 19th day of December 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Donald S. Brinkman,
Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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[Docket Nos. 50-277 AND 50-278]

**Peco Energy Company, Public Service
Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva
Power and Light Company, Atlantic
City Electric Company, Peach Bottom
Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3;
Notice of Consideration of Issuance of
Amendment to Facility Operating
License, Proposed No Significant
Hazards Consideration Determination,
and Opportunity for a Hearing**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56, issued to the PECO Energy Company (PECO, the licensee), for operation of the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Peach Bottom, PBAPS), located in York County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment would revise the ventilation filter test program (VFTP) bypass and penetration leakage test acceptance criteria from less than 0.05 percent to less than 1.0 percent. The change corrects an administrative error that occurred during the development of the Peach Bottom Improved Technical Specifications which were issued as Amendments 210 and 214 to the Peach Bottom licenses on August 30, 1995.

The amendment is being proposed on an exigent basis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6). On December 11, 1995, the licensee determined that a change to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Improved Technical Specifications, issued by Amendments 210 and 214 to the Unit 2 and Unit 3 licenses, respectively, was required. An administrative error contained in the Improved Technical Specification VFTP would result in the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) filter ventilation systems being declared inoperable upon implementation of Improved Technical Specifications. Implementation of the Improved Technical Specifications is scheduled for January 11, 1996. Because

these ESF filter ventilation systems are common to both Units and because the ESF filter ventilation systems cannot be maintained operable in accordance with the administrative error in the VFTP, a shutdown of both Units would be required. Therefore, the licensee has requested approval of the proposed amendment in advance of the implementation of the Improved Technical Specifications in order to eliminate the unnecessary hardship associated with shutting down both units.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91(a)(6) for amendments to be granted under exigent circumstances, the NRC staff must determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

(1) The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the changes are purely administrative and do not involve any physical changes to plant SSC [systems, structures and components]. These proposed changes do not impact initiators of analyzed events, and will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident previously evaluated. These proposed changes do not impact the assumed mitigation of accidents or transient events. Therefore, these changes will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the changes will not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in methods governing normal plant operation. The changes do not allow plant operation in any mode that is not already evaluated in the safety analysis. Therefore, these changes will not create the