[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 232 (Monday, December 4, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62111-62114]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-29422]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-245]


Northeast Nuclear Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of 
Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a 
Hearing

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is 
considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. 
DPR-21 issued to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) for operation 
of the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, located in Waterford, 
Connecticut.
    The proposed amendment would remove the Limiting Condition for 
Operation (LCO) and Surveillance Requirements for the loss-of-normal 
power (LNP) trip function from Tables 3.2.2 and 4.2.1 and insert new 
LCO 3.2.F and Surveillance Requirement 4.2.F. In addition, the proposed 
amendment will add a new table to specify the required LNP 
instrumentation for each bus, will update the Table of Contents, will 
make some editorial changes, and will revise the associated Bases 
section.
    Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission 
will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.
    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment 
request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of 
the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As 
required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of 
the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented 
below:

    NNECO has reviewed the proposed change against the criteria set 
forth in 10 CFR 50.92 and has concluded that the change does not 
involve a Significant Hazards Consideration (SHC). The bases for 
this conclusion are that the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c), 
discussed separately below, are not compromised. The proposed change 
does not involve an SHC because the change would not:
    1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously analyzed:
    These changes do not increase the probability of a loss of 
offsite power event or the occurrence of any accidents which assume 
loss of offsite power. This is ensured by the LNP instrumentation 
system design which uses multiple sensing relays and qualified Class 
1E components, as well as conservative operability and surveillance 
requirements.
    The LNP instrumentation for a safety division consists of 
discrete voltage sensing, time delay, initiation, and auxiliary 
logic relaying. The LNP instrumentation for a safety division is a 
single trip system (initiation channel) controlled by two instrument 
channels. Each instrument channel consists of a loss of voltage trip 
function and a degraded voltage trip function. The two instrument 
channels each provide a trip signal. The LNP trip signal is 
comprised of two instrument channels made up of a loss of voltage 
relay and its timer, and a degraded voltage relay and its timer. The 
signals from the two instrument channels feed into a delay timer, 
producing the LNP initiation system for the safety division. The S1 
LNP instrumentation is powered from the 

[[Page 62112]]
S1 125V dc bus, and the S2 LNP instrumentation is powered from the S2 
125V dc bus. The loss of voltage, and degraded voltage, sensing 
relays can be placed in the tripped condition by removing the relay 
from the case. To minimize the likelihood of an inadvertent safety 
division initiation, the loss of voltage trip requires 3/3 relays 
and the degraded voltage trip requires 2/3 relays.
    If the LNP instrumentation senses that the preferred offsite 
power source has been lost for that safety division, the safety 
related buses for that safety division are disconnected from the 
offsite source and connected to their emergency power source. If the 
LNP instrumentation determines that the preferred offsite power 
source is in a degraded condition for that safety division, and that 
an ECCS [emergency core cooling system] signal is present, then the 
safety related buses for that safety division are disconnected from 
the offsite source and connected to their emergency power source. 
For a degraded voltage condition on either safety division, without 
ECCS actuation, the operators are alerted to this condition by an 
annunciator and will initiate the appropriate corrective actions. 
This design fulfills the safety functions assumed in the accident 
analyses relating to loss of normal power/loss of offsite power.
    If one instrument channel for a safety division were to fail in 
the non-conservative state, the safety division's other instrument 
channel would provide the loss of voltage trip and the degraded 
voltage trip for that safety division. The ability of the safety 
division to detect an undervoltage condition and respond is 
maintained. Each instrument channel has a separate feed, from 
separate breakers, from the 125 V dc power supply associated with 
that safety division. The seven day LCO of section 3.2.F.2 is 
justified based on continued operability of the safety division's 
redundant trip channel. Seven days allows reasonable time to perform 
repairs.
    The time delays and voltage setpoints specified in Table 3.2.4 
ensure that the emergency power source starting and loading times 
continue to meet the current technical specification requirements. 
Also, these time delays are long enough to precluded false trips due 
to voltage transients (e.g., during motor starts). The relay 
calibration surveillance procedure will establish acceptance 
criteria for each relay to ensure that the total times specified in 
Table 3.2.4 are not exceeded. The proposed surveillance testing and 
calibration frequency of every refueling outage is consistent with 
the requirements in the current technical specification.
    Some of the redundancy in the existing LNP logic will be lost as 
a result of separating the two divisions of LNP logic, yielding a 
small increase in the probability of failure of certain portions of 
LNP logic. However, this impact is not significant, and is 
outweighed by the beneficial automatic repowering of a deenergized 
division following an LNP.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously analyzed.
    2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously evaluated:
    Following the proposed changes, plant response to an LNP on one 
division would be improved, since a deenergized division would be 
automatically repowered by its emergency power source while the 
other division remains aligned to offsite power. There are no 
malfunctions which would adversely impact both safety divisions 
while in this alignment.
    There are no new failure modes associated with these changes 
which will prevent the LNP instrumentation from performing its 
intended safety function. Each individual voltage sensing relay, 
when removed from its case, provides the tripped contact 
configuration. The proposed technical specifications would allow 
relays to be placed in the tripped condition as long as this would 
not inhibit the LNP function or cause an inadvertent initiation. 
Additionally, since the design function to ensure that adequate 
power is available to operate the emergency safeguards equipment has 
not changed, no new accident or accident of a different kind is 
created.
    The test switches provided for load shed logic testing are 
similar to the existing test switches on the secondary side of the 
Potential Transformers. Moreover, they require preplanned removal of 
a switch box cover, and require the switch to be in its original 
position before the switch box cover can be replaced. These switches 
help to avoid operator error in the present practice of sleeving 
contacts, installing jumpers, and pulling fuses. Administrative 
controls and personnel training ensure that there are no new failure 
modes or new or different accident scenarios than those previously 
evaluated.
    A keylock bypass switch when placed in the ``Bypass'' position 
will block LNP actuation, thus, preventing the starting and loading 
of the emergency generator for the associated division, if an LNP 
were to occur. This is not a new failure mode since similar blocking 
mechanisms currently exist for each of the emergency generators. 
Currently, the EDG [emergency diesel generator] and GTG [gas turbine 
generator] can be prevented from starting on an ECCS signal by 
placement of an existing keylock switch in the ``Off-Normal'' 
position. To minimize the impact of inadvertent use of the bypass 
switch, an annunciation is provided. Also, these switches would be 
strictly administratively controlled to prevent their use during 
power operation. This restriction on the use of the keylock bypass 
switches during non-power operation is discussed in the Bases 
section of these proposed technical specifications. Operation of a 
keylock switch will result in the emergency power source being 
declared inoperable per proposed Technical Specification 3.2.F.3. 
The current logic will not actuate the LNP logic if power is removed 
from bus 14E or bus 14F individually. These switches will help avoid 
inadvertent actuation of equipment during surveillance testing by 
eliminating the need for sleeving of relay contacts, installing 
jumpers and pulling fuses to perform testing. Administrative 
controls and personnel training ensure that there are no new failure 
modes. Careful isolation of a bus for preplanned maintenance is part 
of the existing maintenance and surveillance activities, and the 
provision of the keylock switches does not change the infrequent 
need for these activities. Administrative controls and personnel 
training ensure that there are no new failure modes or new or 
different accident scenarios than those previously evaluated.
    Although the proposed design does not provide an LNP signal if 
the 14C/E tie breaker is inadvertently opened, the loss of voltage 
on bus 14E (which would result from the failure or the inadvertent 
opening of the tie breaker) is enveloped by the single failure of 
one safety division. This would be mitigated by the redundant safety 
division. For a division S1 loss of normal power, plus LOCA [loss of 
coolant accident], the S2 division is available to power the A and C 
LPCI [low pressure coolant injection] trains and the A train of core 
spray. This scenario is no different than the existing design.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously analyzed.
    3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
    The protective boundaries (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant 
system, containment building) are not affected because the 
consequences of a design basis accident are not changed. Since the 
protective boundaries are not affected, any margin of safety is also 
unaffected. The proposed changes ensure that adequate electrical 
power is available to operate the emergency safeguards equipment. By 
maximizing the operability of the LNP Instrumentation without 
requiring high risk testing, the proposed changes will improve the 
margin of safety as related to availability of electric power to 
safety related loads.
    Based on the above, the proposed changes do not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed NNECO's analysis and, based on this 
review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances 
change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely 
way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, 
the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of 
the 

[[Page 62113]]
30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the 
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final 
determination will consider all public and State comments received. 
Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal 
Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing 
after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this 
action will occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and 
Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications 
Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page 
number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be 
delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.
    The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to 
intervene is discussed below.
    By January 03, 1996, the licensee may file a request for a hearing 
with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility 
operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this 
proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding 
must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to 
intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene 
shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice 
for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested 
persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is 
available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman 
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public 
document room located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers 
Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 
06360. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is 
filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the 
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/
or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and 
Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the 
Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of 
the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the 
proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be 
entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition 
should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of 
the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person 
who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been 
admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of 
the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy 
the specificity requirements described above.
    Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference 
scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to 
the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions 
which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must 
consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be 
raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a 
brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise 
statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the 
contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the 
contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those 
facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information 
to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material 
issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within 
the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be 
one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A 
petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these 
requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be 
permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-
examine witnesses.
    If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The 
final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves 
no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the 
amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the 
request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance 
of the amendment.
    If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a 
significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place 
before the issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services 
Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, 
the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above 
date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the notice 
period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the 
Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 
248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator 
should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the following 
message addressed to Phillip F. McKee: petitioner's name and telephone 
number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition 
should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to Lillian M. Cuoco, 
Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. 
Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270, attorney for the licensee.
    Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended 
petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not 
be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the 
petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the 
factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment dated October 3, 1995, 

[[Page 62114]]
which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public 
Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, 
and at the local public document room located at the Learning Resources 
Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London 
Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of November 1995.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James W. Andersen,
Project Manager, Project Directorate I-3, Division of Reactor 
Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-29422 Filed 12-1-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P