[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 231 (Friday, December 1, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61687-61692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-29313]



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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY


Record of Decision; Safe Interim Storage of Hanford Tank Wastes, 
Hanford Site, Richland, WA

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Notice of record of decision (ROD).

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SUMMARY: DOE and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) 
have jointly prepared the Safe Interim Storage of Hanford Tank Wastes 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (SIS EIS) (DOE/EIS-0212) to assess 
the environmental and human health impacts associated with the 
construction and operation of facilities and systems to continue the 
safe management of high-level, mixed radioactive wastes stored in tanks 
at the Hanford Site. After careful consideration of environmental 
impacts, lifecycle costs, public, agency, and tribal comments, and 
engineering evaluations, DOE has decided to implement most of the 
actions of the preferred alternative evaluated in the Final SIS EIS and 
are documenting this determination in this 

[[Page 61688]]
ROD. The actions will involve the continued operation of the existing 
cross-site transfer system (ECSTS) until replaced by the construction 
and operation of a new replacement cross-site transfer system (RCSTS) 
consisting of buried, double-wall, insulated pipes, and continued 
operation of the mixer pump installed in Tank 101-SY to mitigate the 
unacceptable accumulation of hydrogen and other flammable gases.
    Pending resolution of a recently identified safety issue, DOE is 
deferring a decision on the retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY, and 
limiting the transfer of wastes through Tank 102-SY to non-complexed 
wastes. Evaluation of this issue will be addressed under DOE's NEPA 
procedures as necessary. DOE and Ecology have determined that new 
storage tanks will not be necessary at the present time to mitigate the 
flammable gas safety issue, based on the demonstrated success of the 
mixer pump.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on DOE and 
Ecology activities related to this project or copies of the Final SIS 
EIS, please contact:

Carolyn Haass, U.S. Department of Energy, PO Box 550, MSIN S7-51, 
Richland, WA 99352, (509) 372-2731
Geoff Tallent, Washington Department of Ecology, PO Box 47600, Olympia, 
WA 98504-7600, (360) 407-7112

    For further information on DOE's National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) process, please contact: Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of 
NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585-0002, (202) 586-4600 or 
(800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: DOE has prepared this ROD pursuant to the 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for implementing the 
provisions of NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA 
regulations (10 CFR part 1021). The ROD is based on the analyses of 
environmental impacts identified in the Final SIS EIS (DOE/EIS-0212); 
consideration of project costs; compliance requirements for systems 
involved in the handling, transport, and storage of high-level mixed 
radioactive waste, and public, agency, and tribal comments.
    Because NEPA and SEPA are very comparable in their purpose, intent, 
and procedures, Ecology and DOE decided to prepare one EIS addressing 
the requirements of both SEPA and NEPA. In February 1994, a memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) was signed between the DOE, Richland Operations 
Office and Ecology. The MOU called for the joint preparation of the SIS 
EIS, the contents of which have been determined to satisfy both SEPA 
and NEPA requirements.

Purpose and Need

    DOE and Ecology identified the need to continue to provide safe 
storage of high-level radioactive tank wastes while supporting tank 
farm management and operations prior to implementing decisions made in 
the ROD for the Tank Waste Remedial System (TWRS) EIS. The TWRS EIS is 
evaluating the alternatives for permanent disposal of wastes currently 
stored in tanks at the Hanford Site. To minimize the risk of managing 
tank wastes prior to the TWRS ROD, a modern, safe, reliable, and 
compliant replacement cross-site transfer capability is needed to move 
wastes between the 200 West and 200 East Area tank farms. This transfer 
capability is required because the 200 West Area has far less useable 
double shell tank (DST) capacity than there is waste in single shell 
tanks (SSTs).
    The replacement waste transfer capability would provide the means 
to move waste from the 200 West Area to the available DST capacity 
located in the 200 East Area.
    The ECSTS has been used to transfer wastes from the 200 West Area 
to the 200 East Area for the past 40 years. This underground pipeline 
system is at the end of its original design life. Currently, four of 
six lines are out of service and unavailable to perform transfers due 
to plugging. The two useable lines do not meet current engineering 
standards such as, double containment and leak detection, required for 
waste management facilities.
    Based on current tank waste management and operation activities, 
the SIS EIS addressed the need to do the following:
     Remove Salt Well Liquids (SWLs) from older SSTs to reduce 
the likelihood of liquid waste escaping from the corroded tanks into 
the environment. Many of these tanks have leaked and new leaks are 
developing in these tanks at a rate of more than one per year.
     Provide ability to transfer the tank wastes via a 
compliant system to mitigate any future safety concerns and use current 
or future tank space allocations.
     Provide adequate tank waste storage capacity for future 
waste volumes associated with tank farm operations and other Hanford 
facility operations.
     Mitigate the flammable gas safety issue in Tank 101-SY.

Summary of Alternatives and Impacts

    DOE and Ecology have identified four action alternatives in 
addition to the no action alternative to satisfy the need to continue 
to provide safe storage of high-level waste until decisions are made 
based on the TWRS EIS. The alternatives consist of the preferred 
alternative, truck transfer alternative, rail transfer alternative, and 
new storage alternative. DOE evaluated the construction and operation 
phases of each alternative to assess potential impacts to the following 
environmental categories:
     Geology, Seismology, Soils.
     Population and Socioeconomics.
     Water Resources and Hydrology.
     Transportation.
     Air Quality.
     Land Use.
     Radiation.
     Cultural Resources.
     Noise.
     Health Effects.
     Biological Resources.
    The impact analysis showed that there would be no impacts related 
to geology, seismology, water resources and hydrology, radiation, 
noise, population and socioeconomics, or cultural resources for any of 
the alternatives. Environmental categories where potential impacts were 
identified are discussed under each alternative as applicable.

Preferred Alternative

    The preferred alternative consists of the following components:
     Construction and operation of the RCSTS for cross-site 
transfer of SWLs, and 200 West Area Facility wastes from Tank 102-SY to 
DSTs in the 200 East Area;
     Construction of a waste retrieval system in Tank 102-SY to 
retrieve solids;
     Continued operation of a mixer pump in Tank 101-SY;
     Transfer of liquid wastes through the ECSTS until the 
proposed RCSTS becomes operational in 1998.
    Transuranic solids from Tank 102-SY would be retrieved, transferred 
via the RCSTS and consolidated in 200 East Area DSTs to provide space 
for transfer of complexed SWLs. The consolidation of tank waste is an 
ongoing tank farm management action evaluated under prior environmental 
impact statements and a supplement (ERDA 1538, DOE/EIS-0063, DOE/EIS-
0113). Although such retrieval is addressed in the decisions resulting 
from these NEPA documents, the retrieval of Tank 102-SY sludge was 
discussed in the SIS EIS for a comprehensive consideration of impacts. 

[[Page 61689]]

    Impacts. Environmental effects identified under the preferred 
alternative are primarily related to construction activities and 
include impacts to soils, land use, and biological resources. 
Construction of the RCSTS and associated facilities would disturb 
approximately 30 hectares (74 acres) of land, none of which are 
considered to be prime or unique farmland. Fugitive dust emissions are 
anticipated during earth moving activities, but would be mitigated by 
dust suppression measures.
    Of the 30 hectares (74 acres) of land that would be disturbed while 
constructing the RCSTS, approximately 9 hectares (23 acres) would be 
mature sagebrush/cheatgrass habitat, a State designated Priority 
Habitat and important habitat for the loggerhead shrike, a Federal and 
State candidate species; the sagebrush lizard, a Federal candidate 
species; and the sage sparrow, a State candidate species. The 9 
hectares (23 acres) represents 0.01 percent of the total sagebrush 
habitat at Hanford. The preferred alternative would include 
establishing habitat restoration sites to mitigate the disturbance of 
native soil and removal of vegetation in the construction area.

Truck Transfer Alternative

    This alternative includes truck transfer of all wastes listed under 
the preferred alternative, with the exception of solids from Tank 102-
SY which would not be retrieved under this alternative. Mitigation of 
the Tank 101-SY safety issue by continued operation of the mixer pump 
would also occur under the truck transfer alternative. The alternative 
would transfer SWL from interim stabilization of 200 West Area SSTs and 
200 West Area facility wastes to DSTs in the 200 East Area by truck, 
without using Tank 102-SY as a staging tank for complexed wastes. The 
SIS EIS evaluated the 3,800 liters (1,000 gallons) LR-56(H) truck and a 
hypothetical 19,000 liter (5,000 gallon) tanker truck. The alternative 
would utilize existing roadways and include construction and operation 
of a new load facility in 200 West Area and an unload facility in 200 
East Area, including underground transfer piping to and from the 
facilities, and some additional roadway segments.
    Impacts. Environmental effects from implementing the truck transfer 
alternative include impacts to soils, transportation, and worker 
health, due to the construction of load and unload facilities and 
roadway segments, and operation of the truck transfer system.
    Construction of the load and unload facilities and roadways would 
disturb approximately 2 hectares (5 acres) of land, none of which is 
considered to be prime or unique farmland, or mature sagebrush habitat. 
During construction activities, dust suppression measures would be 
implemented to reduce fugitive dust emissions.
    The truck transfer alternative would use existing Hanford Site 
roadways and new onsite road extensions to transport approximately 1.9 
million liters (5 million gallons) of radioactive waste. Using the LR-
56 truck (3,800 liters (1,000 gallons) capacity), approximately 4,691 
truck trips would be required over 1,564 working days assuming three 
trips per day. If the 19,000 liters (5,000 gallons) capacity truck is 
used, approximately 938 truck trips over 313 working days would be 
required, assuming three trips per day. Potential traffic circulation 
impacts could occur from barricaded roads, speed limitations, escorts, 
and other administrative controls. However, based on a frequency of 
three truck trips per day, shipping during off-peak hours, and 
providing advanced notice of truck shipments, no significant adverse 
traffic circulation impacts are anticipated.
    Operators and health physics technicians would be exposed to 
radiation within acceptable limits during operation of the load and 
unload facilities. However, estimates for radiation dose to the truck 
driver yielded an unacceptably high dose. Additional shielding analysis 
or restrictions on the quantities of radioactive materials would be 
necessary to ensure that radiation exposures would be as low as 
reasonably achievable for the drivers.

Rail Transfer Alternative

    This alternative includes rail transfer of all wastes listed under 
the preferred alternative, with the exception of solids from Tank 102-
SY which would not be retrieved under this alternative. Mitigation of 
the Tank 101-SY safety issue by continued operation of the mixer pump 
would also occur under the rail transfer alternative. The alternative 
would transfer salt well liquids from interim stabilization of SSTs, 
and 200 West Area facility wastes by a hypothetical 38,000 liter 
(10,000 gallon) rail car. The alternative includes use of existing 
Hanford Site rail lines, construction and operation of some additional 
onsite rail line segments, as well as construction and operation of a 
new load facility in 200 West Area and a new unload facility in 200 
East Area.
    Impacts. Environmental effects associated with the rail transfer 
alternative include impacts to soils and transportation. Construction 
of the load and unload facilities and rail spurs would disturb 
approximately 2 hectares (5 acres) of land, none of which is considered 
to be prime or unique farmland, or mature sagebrush habitat. During 
construction activities, dust suppression measures would be implemented 
to reduce fugitive dust emissions.
    Approximately 470 train trips, assuming one tank car per trip, 
would be required to transfer the subject waste. Assuming 2 train trips 
per day, 235 days would be required to transfer the wastes. The two 
additional daily trips would not impact existing rail operations. 
Significant impacts to road traffic from road closures during rail 
transport are not expected because of advance notice of shipments, 
restricting shipments to off-peak hours, and the short duration of road 
closures.

New Storage Alternative

    This alternative includes mitigation of the Tank 101-SY flammable 
gas safety issue by dilution and retrieval of the waste. Facilities 
constructed and operated to accomplish this action would include a new 
tank facility (NTF), including two new DSTs and associated facilities, 
a waste retrieval system in Tank 101-SY, a waste retrieval system in 
Tank 102-SY, and the RCSTS. This alternative also includes transfer of 
waste from Tank 102-SY, SWL from interim stabilization of SSTs in the 
200 West Area, and transfer of 200 West Area facility wastes as 
described for the preferred alternative. This alternative would provide 
additional storage capacity that could be used for other future waste 
management needs.
    Impacts. Environmental effects identified under the new storage 
alternative are primarily related to construction activities and 
include impacts to soils, land use, biological resources, and worker 
exposure. Construction of the RCSTS and NTF would disturb approximately 
30 hectares (74 acres) and 20 hectares (50 acres) of land, 
respectively, none of which are considered to be prime or unique 
farmland. Fugitive dust emissions are anticipated during earth moving 
activities, but would be mitigated by dust suppression measures. The 50 
hectares (124 acres) of land would be a small incremental addition of 
land committed to waste management at Hanford.
    Approximately 30 hectares (74 acres) of mature sagebrush/cheatgrass 
habitat would be disturbed from constructing the RCSTS and NTF. The new 
storage alternative would include establishing habitat restoration 
sites to mitigate the disturbance of native soil and removal of 
vegetation in the construction area. 

[[Page 61690]]

    No health effects are anticipated for routine operation of any 
facilities under the new storage alternative.

No Action Alternative

    This alternative would not construct any new tanks, tank retrieval 
systems, or cross-site transfer systems. The flammable gas safety issue 
in Tank 101-SY would be managed through continued operation of the 
existing mixer pump. The remaining supernatant in Tank 102-SY, SWLs 
from interim stabilization of SSTs, and liquid waste from 200 West Area 
facilities would be transported from the 200 West Area to the 200 East 
Area via the ECSTS.
    Impacts. There are no environmental impacts associated with normal 
operations of the no action alternative. However, due to lack of 
secondary containment and poor leak detection capabilities of the aging 
ECSTS, leaks to the environment are considered more likely than under 
the other alternatives evaluated in the SIS EIS. To avoid environmental 
impacts from a failure of the ECSTS during waste transfer, operational 
controls prior to waste transfers such as, pressure testing at levels 
in excess of operational pressures, would be used to confirm the 
integrity of the ECSTS before waste is introduced into the system.

Environmentally Preferred Alternative

    Normal operations under the no action alternative would not result 
in the loss of State-designated Priority Habitat, would not result in 
the generation of additional contaminated materials requiring 
decommissioning and disposal, and would not cause additional worker 
exposures over existing levels, as would occur under the preferred, 
truck transfer, rail transfer, and new storage alternatives. Therefore, 
the no action alternative is considered the environmentally preferred 
alternative under normal operating conditions.
    However, because the existing cross-site transfer system is over 40 
years old, there is a higher probability of system failure or an 
accident than under the other transfer alternatives evaluated in the 
Final SIS EIS. Additionally, because the existing transfer system is 
not compliant with current engineering standards requiring double 
containment and leak detection systems, there is a higher likelihood of 
a release to the environment under accident conditions than would be 
anticipated under the other transfer alternatives.

Other Considerations

    In addition to the assessment of environmental impacts provided by 
the SIS EIS, DOE and Ecology considered costs, comments on the Final 
SIS EIS, and nuclear criticality safety in determining a course of 
action to meet the need for interim management of Hanford tank wastes.

Costs

    Comparative analysis of construction, operation, and 
decommissioning costs among the alternatives was generated for an 
interim period of five years and lifecycle operations till 2028. The 
analysis was based on a comparable set of baseline assumptions 
regarding waste volumes and transfer schedules, and accurately reflects 
relative costs among alternatives. However, the estimates may not 
accurately represent the true cost of implementing a specific 
alternative once final decisions are reached on waste transfers. Based 
on the unresolved criticality safety issues described below, retrieval 
costs for solids removal from Tank 102-SY have been excluded from the 
preferred and new storage alternatives. The results of the analysis are 
as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Interim    Lifecycle 
                                                    costs      costs b  
                  Alternative                       (1995       (1995   
                                                 dollars in   dollars in
                                                  millions)   millions) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preferred......................................    a $105.2       $243  
Truck transfer.................................       125.9        632.8
Rail transfer..................................       113.7        491.8
New storage....................................     a 328.1        589.6
No action......................................        48.9         NA  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
a Excludes costs for retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY as proposed in
  the SIS EIS.                                                          
b Includes costs for retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY under all     
  alternatives.                                                         

    The lifecycle costs for the no action alternative were not 
estimated because the ECSTS could not meet waste transfer requirements 
beyond the interim time period. All alternatives include a $36 million 
decontamination and decommissioning cost for the ECSTS.

Comments Received

    DOE and Ecology received comments from two individuals on the Final 
SIS EIS.
    Comment. One individual agreed with continued operation of the 
mixer pump in Tank 101-SY to mitigate flammable gas accumulation.
    Response. DOE will continue the operation of the mixer pump in Tank 
101-SY.
    Comment. ``The fundamental assumption is that the best way to 
maintain Safe storage is to suck liquid waste out of single shell tanks 
and then move it to a safer double shell tank. Why is that safer? A lot 
of things can go wrong when you pressurize the waste and move it that 
can't happen if you leave it in the single shell tanks. Look at the 
spray leaks from your ITRS and PPSS that can kill hundreds of people. 
Compare that to the lack of impacts to people if you leave the waste in 
the single shell tanks as laid out in the Hanford EIS that produced the 
empty grout vaults and the unbuilt vitrification plant. [Assumed DOE/
EIS-0113] Those facilities weren't needed either and the Department 
rushed to the wrong decision spending millions of dollars 
unnecessarily.''
    Response. In the Record of Decision based on the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of Hanford Defense 
High-Level, Transuranic, and Tank Wastes (HDW-EIS) (53 FR 12449), and 
again in the Finding of No Significant Impact for an environmental 
assessment for the Waste Tank Safety Program (DOE/EA-0915), DOE decided 
to continue to safely store the SST waste prior to making a decision on 
the disposal of this waste. The decision on the final disposition of 
the SST waste will be made by the Department in the TWRS EIS. The SST 
interim stabilization program is an ongoing program initiated in late 
1970s to reduce the potential for release of high-level wastes into the 
environment and allow continued safe storage of the high-level sludge, 
salt cake, and non-pumpable liquid waste. Although no adverse 
radiological impacts were postulated by the HDW-EIS for leaking SSTs, 
including the ultraconservative 40,000 m\3\ (10.5 million gallons) 
release scenario evaluated, DOE policy is to reduce the potential for 
any liquid release whenever practicable [DOE/EIS-0113]. Further, all 
retrievals and waste transfers will occur at subcritical levels in 
accordance with existing procedures. There are currently 67 SSTs which 
have been declared confirmed or assumed leakers. These SSTs have 
released 2.3 to 3.4 million liters (600,000 to 900,000 gallons) of 
waste to the environment. Therefore, it is DOE's policy that the 
continued safe storage of the SST waste pending a final disposal 
decision requires the continuation of the SST interim stabilization 
program, which is scheduled to be completed by the year 2000.
    The postulated spray releases from Initial Tank Retrieval System 
(ITRS) and Past Practice Sluicing System (PPSS) evaluated in the Final 
SIS EIS have a probability of extremely unlikely to incredible or 10-5 
to 10-7 per year. When compared to the almost certain release to the 
environment if liquid wastes are left in SSTs, DOE has determined that 
the risks of transfer are 

[[Page 61691]]
acceptable and that the risks to the environment from suspension of the 
interim stabilization program are unacceptable.
    Comment. ``What are the true impacts of leaving the waste in the 
single shell tanks? Are they any greater now than they were in the old 
EIS?''
    Response. The SIS EIS is an interim action EIS which considers only 
near term actions required to safely manage tank wastes until disposal 
decisions are made through the TWRS ROD. Leaving waste in the SSTs is 
beyond the scope of the SIS EIS. The TWRS EIS is currently re-
evaluating the consequences which would result from leaving wastes in 
single shell tanks.
    Comment. ``How much money will you waste this time on an action 
that isn't needed?''
    Response. The costs of the alternative actions are specified above. 
DOE believes that the action is needed and the costs are justified.
    Comment. ``Your purpose and need statement basically says you need 
it because the State told you to do it in the TPA. So you already made 
the decision in a fundamentally flawed way without regard to NEPA. Once 
again the NEPA process at DOE is a sham . . . The bottom line is that 
the DOE NEPA process is a sham, and now the State is a part of it. You 
make decisions and then try to justify them with EISs.''
    Response. This EIS was prepared to comply with the requirements of 
NEPA. An EIS document identifies and evaluates the environmental 
impacts of the proposed action and reasonable alternatives. The Tri 
Party Agreement defines the schedules and milestones for taking certain 
cleanup actions at the Hanford Site. The Tri Party Agreement is 
annually revisited and can be changed if new information arises or 
situations change. For example, the Tri Party Agreement had milestones 
for the six new double shell tanks which were identified in Draft SIS 
EIS. Public comments received on the Draft SIS EIS as part of the NEPA 
process and new studies indicated that six new double shell tanks were 
not needed. As a result, an adjustment to DOE's preferred alternative 
was made in the Final SIS EIS and the Tri Party Agreement was modified 
to delete the milestones for construction of new double shell tanks.
    Comment. ``Even if you absolutely had to move some waste you 
already have an existing pipeline system that can move liquids. This 
year you moved over 400,000 gallons of waste through it. Why can't you 
use it for more transfers? In fact your EIS says you plan to do just 
that. For this EIS most of the waste is planned to go through the 
existing pipelines. Why can't you send a few more transfers through the 
existing lines? This would undoubtedly be cheaper and less damaging to 
the environment. Before the last transfer the line was pressured tested 
to make sure it would be safe. Why not just do that every time? You 
could take very little risk by doing this and you'd save the people of 
this country tens of millions of dollars.''
    Response. The existing lines are planned to be used for liquid 
waste transfers as indicated in the comment. However, due to the age of 
the lines and likelihood of failure of these lines, DOE believes it is 
prudent to replace these lines with a modern, safe, reliable and 
compliant waste transfer system. This will provide DOE with a more 
certain ability to meet its need for cross-site waste transfers.
    Comment. ``A new line isn't needed just to move the amount of 
liquid waste specified in this EIS. The State is making DOE build this 
line to service the TWRS planned mission of vitrifying all the waste in 
the tanks. If that's the true need, then this action needs to be 
covered in the TWRS EIS where there might be a real need. Building it 
for this trumped up need will prejudice the TWRS decision (which 
already seems to have been made.)''
    Response. DOE has a need to move waste cross-site prior to 
implementing decisions based on the TWRS EIS. This need exists 
independent of the decisions that may be reached based on the TWRS EIS. 
The replacement cross site transfer system could become a component of 
the TWRS, but DOE does not believe that its existence would be 
prejudicial to any of the alternatives being considered within the TWRS 
EIS.
    Comment. ``How in the world can you be privatizing TWRS if you 
haven't already made the decision?''
    Response. Privatization of TWRS is not an action that was 
considered in this EIS.

Tank Farm Criticality Control

    Through an ongoing safety evaluation process, DOE recently 
revisited its operational assumptions regarding the potential for the 
occurrence of a nuclear criticality event during waste storage and 
transfers. Changes to the Tank Farm Authorization Basis for Criticality 
that were approved in September 1995, were rescinded by DOE in October 
1995, pending the outcome of a criticality safety evaluation process 
outlined for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) on 
November 8, 1995. Until these criticality safety evaluations are 
completed, Hanford will operate under the historic limits which 
maintain reasonable assurance of subcritical conditions during tank 
farm storage and transfer operations. Of the actions evaluated in the 
Final SIS EIS, only the retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY is 
affected by the technical uncertainties regarding criticality. Based on 
the quantities of plutonium in Tank 102-SY sludge, retrieval of the 
solids falls within the scope of the criticality safety issues which 
will be evaluated over the next few months. As a result, a decision on 
retrieval of solids from Tank 102-SY is being deferred in this ROD. 
Tank 101-SY mixer pump operations, interim operation of the ECSTS, 
operation of the RCSTS, SWL retrievals, and 200 West Area Facility 
waste generation, would all occur within the applicable criticality 
limits and would be subcritical.

Decision

    Based on the consideration of environmental impacts, cost, 
engineering standards, criticality safety, and comments received on the 
Final SIS EIS, DOE will construct and operate the RCSTS on the proposed 
route identified in the Final SIS EIS, continue operating the mixer 
pump in Tank 101-SY, and transfer waste from the interim stabilization 
program and other facility waste in the 200 West Area. During 
construction of the RCSTS, SWLs and 200 West Area facility wastes will 
be transferred through the ECSTS to DST storage in the 200 East Area. 
These actions will provide safe, compliant, and reliable high-level 
waste transfer capabilities and will operate with wastes at subcritical 
levels under the existing Hanford Tank Farm Interim Safety Basis, until 
final disposal decisions are made under the TWRS EIS.
    The RCSTS will provide Hanford with a waste transfer capability 
that meets current engineering standards for double containment and 
leak detection. As compared to other transfer alternatives, the RCSTS 
will:
     More effectively minimize worker exposures and meet ALARA 
requirements through remote operations and underground transfers;
     Cost less during both the interim time period and less 
over a lifecycle operation than the other action alternatives;
     Provide greater operational flexibility by conducting 
transfers that are independent of weather or site traffic;
     More efficiently manage the transfer of millions of 
gallons of wastes required in the near term and potentially required in 
the future. 

[[Page 61692]]

    The RCSTS will be built on the proposed route identified in the 
Final SIS EIS. Alternative routes evaluated in the EIS would have 
environmental impacts identical to the proposed route except with 
respect to impacts on Priority Habitat. The western segment optional 
route would reduce habitat impacts by only 0.6 hectares (1.6 acres) but 
at a significant cost increase. The eastern option would result in an 
increase in habitat loss by 2.1 hectares (5.3 acres) over the proposed 
route. Because habitat impacts will be mitigated, engineering siting 
criteria are more favorable, and construction costs would be less, the 
proposed RCSTS route is selected.
    The continued operation of a mixer pump in Tank 101-SY is selected 
to mitigate the flammable gas safety issue in that tank. The mixer pump 
has been proven to be effective mitigation during more than one year of 
operations. A replacement pump is available and will be maintained as a 
contingency should the existing pump fail. Dilution as a mitigation was 
not selected due to the success of the mixer pump, and because it would 
increase waste volumes requiring new tanks for storage and generate 
more waste for future disposal.
    DOE will continue to use the ECSTS until the RCSTS is operational 
to provide access to 200 East Area DSTs for storage of 200 West Area 
facility wastes and retrieved SWLs. SWL retrievals will continue to 
reduce the risk to the environment from leaking SSTs. Operational 
procedures will assure the integrity of the ECSTS prior to any waste 
transfers. The current planning base estimates that the ECSTS will 
operate for approximately 625 hours during five transfers before the 
RCSTS is operational.
    Based on the new information available to DOE, since the issuance 
of the Final SIS EIS, regarding nuclear criticality safety concerns 
during retrieval, transfer, and storage actions, DOE has decided to 
defer a decision on the construction and operation of a retrieval 
system in Tank 102-SY. Pending the outcome of the technical initiative 
to resolve the tank waste criticality safety issue, transfers of wastes 
through Tank 102-SY will be limited to non-complexed wastes.

Mitigation

    All practical means to avoid or mitigate environmental impacts from 
the actions to be implemented by this ROD have been adopted by DOE. 
With the exception of habitat losses and dust generation from 
construction activities, and the potential to encounter cultural 
resources during subsurface disturbance, all potentially significant 
impacts have been avoided.
    Construction of the RCSTS will result in impacts that can be either 
avoided or minimized through the implementation of mitigation measures. 
The surface and subsurface disturbance required for the installation of 
the RCSTS, a 10 kilometer (6.2 mile) double-wall pipeline, has the 
potential to affect biota, dust emissions, and cultural resources. 
Biota will be displaced due to the loss of habitat. Particulate 
emissions in the form of dust releases from exposed soils will occur if 
not mitigated. Cultural resources may be encountered during subsurface 
excavations necessitating mitigation actions.
    Impacts to biota resulting from the loss of habitat will be 
mitigated through a program of transplantation of mature sagebrush from 
the RCSTS construction corridor to a mitigation site located in close 
proximity to the impacted area. In addition, tublings will be 
cultivated and transferred to the mitigation site. For the 9 hectares 
(23 acres) of mature sagebrush lost to the RCSTS construction, 27 
hectares (69 acres) of sagebrush habitat will be planted.
    Dust emissions will be mitigated by a combination of watering and 
reseeding of disturbed areas. In areas of active construction, water 
will be applied at frequencies sufficient to prevent unacceptable 
releases of dust. After RCSTS construction is completed, those areas 
not required for routine access or maintenance will be reseeded with 
native grass species.
    No archaeological or historical sites were identified in the 
corridor to be disturbed by RCSTS construction. However, one potential 
archaeological site was identified within the compensation area to be 
utilized for habitat mitigation. Impacts to this site will be mitigated 
through avoidance. All ground-disturbing actions that occur during 
RCSTS construction or habitat mitigation activities will be monitored. 
A qualified archaeologist identified by DOE will assess the 
significance of any resources uncovered. The archaeologist will 
coordinate with DOE to initiate consultation with the State Historic 
Preservation Officer (SHPO) and the appropriate tribal representatives, 
including members of the Wanapum People, Yakama Indian Nation, 
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, and Nez Perce 
Tribe. To the extent possible, all materials determined significant 
will be avoided during subsequent activities and will be left in place. 
If this is not possible, removal will be conducted in consultation with 
DOE, the SHPO, and appropriate tribal representatives.
    In accordance with Sec. 1021.331(a) of the DOE regulations 
implementing NEPA (10 CFR part 1021), a Mitigation Action Plan (MAP) 
will be prepared that addresses mitigation actions associated with the 
course of action directed by this ROD.

Issued

    The State of Washington concurred on this Record of Decision via 
letter to the Department of Energy on November 21, 1995. This Record of 
Decision for the Safe Interim Storage of Hanford Tank Wastes is issued 
by the Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, 
Washington on November 21, 1995.
John D. Wagoner,
Manager, DOE Richland Operations Office.
[FR Doc. 95-29313 Filed 11-30-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P